The Tinderbox

UPDATE//1000 EST, 20 Dec// South Korea's planned live-fire drill went off today without a hitch--and without interference from North Korea. The semi-official Yonhap news agency reports that ROK artillery units fired more than 1,500 shells into the Yellow Sea near Yeonpyeong Island, which was shelled by North Korean forces after a similar drill last month. Pyongyang later released a statement saying it did not feel the need to "retaliate against every despicable military provocation."

Translation: With two South Korean destroyers in the area, and scores of ROKAF F-16s circling overhead, the North Koreans decided not to press their luck.

Unfortunately, this period of confrontation and clashes on the Korean Peninsula is far from over. With the DPRK government in a period of transition, there is every reason to believe that North Korea will strike again, trying to burnish the credentials of Kim Jong un, the dictator-in-waiting. And, with Pyongyang's armed forces in the middle of its annual Winter Training Cycle (WTC), there are more options for military show-downs with the South (and U.S. forces in the region).

Still, South Korea handled today's live-fire drill quite well. Seoul refused to cave to squishy diplomatic demands, and they backed up their exercise with the requisite force to deter North Korean adventurism. Not a bad template for going forward.

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The U.N. Security Council held an emergency session today to discuss escalating tensions on the Korean peninsula. And, as you might expect, the event was more show than substance.

Russia called for the meeting, asking for the UNSC to adopt a statement calling on North and South Korea to "exercise maximum restraint." According to the Associated Press, the Russian draft also calls for efforts "to ensure a de-escalation of tensions between the two countries" and a "resumption of dialogue and resolution of all problems dividing them exclusively through peaceful, diplomatic means."

There was a certain irony in that proposal. For much of the past week, Russian diplomats at the UN have been leaning on South Korea, with nary a word about their one-time client state in Pyongyang. Not that Russia's proposal--or any UN statement--will do any good. Toothless security council resolutions aren't worth the paper they're printed on, particularly when it comes to North Korea.

Meanwhile, the situation on the peninsula remains dire. South Korea plans to hold an artillery live-fire drill on Yeonpyeong Island, near the North Korean coast. The DPRK shelled that island last month, after a similar drill by ROK forces, who were firing into the open ocean. Pyongyang has threatened to strike even harder, if South Korea goes through with the exercise. And for good measure, Pyongyang has reportedly raised alert levels for artillery batteries along its west coast--the same units that fired on Yeonpyeong last month.

At this point, Seoul shows no signs of cancelling (or further delaying) the planned live-fire exercise. More importantly, there's no reason South Korea shouldn't proceed with the drill. Such exercises have been conducted in that area for years, and they pose no threat to North Korea. In fact, the DPRK routinely stages its own drills in the same area, firing artillery and anti-ship missiles into the Yellow Sea.

If North Korea again shells Yeonpyeong (in response to the ROK exercise), the Seoul government has vowed to up the ante, and attack targets along the DPRK coast. In fact, we're guessing that Tuesday's artillery drill will bear some resemblance to our response to the infamous "tree-cutting" incident of the 1970s, when North Korean soldiers attacked (and murdered) two American Army officers, supervising a tree-clearing operation in the Demilitarized Zone.

To remove the tree once and for all, the USFK put together a tremendous show-of-force operation. The engineer team assigned to clear the tree was backed by almost 800 other troops, plus air and artillery units. North Korean forces could see at least seven Cobra gunships circling near the DMZ, ready to provide support if necessary. On their radar screens, DPRK operators could see dozens of U.S. F-4s and B-52s (along with ROKAF F-5s) orbiting parallel to the DMZ, also ready to spring into action. Faced with allied resolve--and firepower--the North Koreans backed down. The second clearing operation was unopposed.

So, do be surprised if the South Korean artillery drill is accompanied by a large display of tactical airpower, with U.S. and ROKAF F-16s on orbit over the Yellow Sea. And, if the Obama Administration really wanted to send a signal, they could dispatch bombers from our Guam-based tasked force, and arrange for those aircraft to appear near the DMZ during the live-fire exercise. At that point, Pyongyang will have the option of renewing the conflict (and suffering significant losses), or holding fire and suffering a psychological defeat.

That's not to say that North Korea won't take the bait. Given the DPRK's current economic woes (and leadership transition), there is always the possibility that Pyongyang will bet its survival on a roll of the geopolitical dice, believing that Washington and Seoul really don't have the stomach for a second Korean War. It's a strategy that's worked so far, with both the U.S. and South Korea constantly caving to DPRK demands.

But this time may be different. The recent shelling of Yeonpyeong struck a raw nerve among the Korean public, and they are demanding action if their nation's territory is struck again. Additionally, South Korean leadership seems to be at the end of their rope in response to Kim Jong-il's antics. This time, promises of a response seem both genuine and serious.

That means the tinderbox called the Korean Peninsula is dangerously close to a wider war. Still, South Korea should stick with its plans for Tuesday's artillery drill and threats of follow-on strikes--if North Korea attacks again. This strategy carries clear risks, but so does the established practice of acceding to Pyongyang's demands. Seoul's refusal to back down might bring the region closer to war--but it might also be the first step in breaking the current cycle of letting the DPRK get what it wants through blackmail, intimidation and bluster.

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ADDENDUM: South Korea's Chosun Ilbo newspaper reported Sunday evening (U.S. time) that North Korea has also deployed multiple rocket launchers along its west coast, and put elements of its air force on stand-by. As some of my fighter jock friends would say, thanks for providing such a target rich environment. A rocket launcher in the field is a great target for a Viper dropping JDAM, or other precision weapons.

Echoes of Fairchild, Redux

When the Air Force recently released portions of its report on last summer's crash of a C-17 transport in Alaska, we noted the similarities between that fatal accident and the 1994 loss of a B-52 at Fairchild AFB, Alaska. In both cases, crews were rehearsing for air shows when the mishaps occurred and investigators discovered that pilot over-confidence and aggressive maneuvering caused the crashes, which killed a total of eight airmen.

While some cautioned against drawing parallels between the Fairchild and Alaska disasters, those comparisons have been confirmed by the Air Force accident report. Bruce Rolfsen of Air Force Times has dug deeper into the service's inquiry into crash. He discovered the USAF is pinning the blame almost entirely on Major Michael Freyholtz, the C-17 demonstration pilot who was flying the airlifter at the time it went down near Elmendorf AFB:

Maj. Michael Freyholtz flew C-17 Globemasters beyond their limits to entertain crowds, routinely ignoring cockpit stall warnings as he maneuvered the aircraft in and out of danger.

The 34-year-old demonstration pilot was teaching others to do the same July 28 when the C-17 he was flying crashed at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, an investigation concluded. The crash killed all four on board and happened just two days before the Arctic Thunder air show was to begin at the base.

The report blamed Freyholtz for the crash because he failed to fly the C-17 within flight manual guidance for the plane.

“His aggressive flying placed the aircraft outside the viable flight parameters ... where recovery was not possible,” wrote Brig. Gen. Carlton Everhart, president of the accident investigation board.

But oddly enough, the same report largely absolves Freyholtz's superiors of any responsibility for the crash. Investigators learned that Major Freyholtz, as an experienced demonstration pilot, was given wide latitude in developing air show profiles for the C-17. At the time of his death, Freyholtz was one of the most experienced C-17 pilots at Elmendorf, with more than 3,000 hours in the cockpit of the Globemaster III. He had been a demonstration pilot for two years, flying the aircraft at air shows and similar events around the world.

According to the board, senior officers at Elmendorf "simply weren't aware" of what he was up to."

As a demonstration pilot, Freyholtz developed his own air show routine that violated safety standards, the report said. The 3rd Wing’s operations group officers responsible for Elmendorf’s demonstration team weren’t aware of what Freyholtz was doing.

“Because [Freyholtz] was an accomplished aviator, leadership allowed him to operate independently with little or no oversight,” the report said. “As a result, checks and balances within the program were insufficient.”

To be blunt, that explanation is simply incredible. Air show routines are briefed up the chain of command before any pilot takes to the skies. Air Force officials probing the 1994 B-52 crash at Fairchild discovered that the demonstration pilot, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur "Bud" Holland routinely briefed profiles that exceeded flight safety limits for the aircraft. In most cases, Holland was corrected by superiors and reminded of the parameters for the B-52, but Holland violated them anyway. Senior leadership at Fairchild made no effort to sanction the rogue pilot, or remove him from flying status.

If we're to believe the Elemendorf report, then Major Freyholtz was left up to his own devices, and commanders within the Alaska Air National Guard (his parent organization) and the 3rd Wing (which "owned the C-17) never bothered to monitor his airshow routines. Again, that account strains the limits of credulity.

Are we supposed to believe that Freyholtz's routines were never briefed to his squadron commander, the operations group commander, or the wing commander? And what about leadership at Pacific Air Forces, the MAJCOM that controls the 3rd Wing, or Headquarters Air Mobility Command, which controls all of the USAF's airlift assets? Were senior officers in charge of operations and safety equally unaware of what Freyholtz was doing?

According to the accident investigation board, Major Freyholtz routinely flew the C-17 beyond its limits. Given his status as a demonstration pilot, it's reasonable to assume that some of performances occurred at air shows, in front of huge crowds that included senior airlift officers and other Globemaster III pilots. To their trained eyes, Freyholtz's unsafe routines would have been obvious--and alarming; it's hard to believe that no one raised a red flag about his air show profiles. Conversely, if other aviators did voice concerns, why were they ignored by senior leadership?

Finally, it's also worth noting that the final, fatal flight of Freyholtz and his crew was captured on videotape, available for viewing at airforcetimes.com and other websites. Judging from the tape, it was apparently recorded from the base control tower, and it focuses specifically on the doomed C-17, so it was not a security camera, positioned to record runway activity. That means someone--Major Freyholtz, his squadron, or someone else--detailed an individual to record the air show rehearsal.

Who was the videographer--and why was he/she taping that day? Additionally, if they were dispatched specifically to record the C-17 flight, that means that tapes of Freyholtz's other, unsafe profiles must exist. Were those tapes (assuming they exist) ever reviewed by senior leadership, or were they content to let Freyholtz operate on his own.

So far, we don't know the answers to those questions. But it's worth remembering that the Fairchild accident was followed by sanctions for senior officers who failed to stop Bud Holland. So far, there haven't been similar penalties (to our knowledge) for the officers above Major Freyholtz. That raises another obvious question--why? And how have those individuals managed to hang onto their jobs, in light of the failed oversight that contributed to the crash.

Accountability Arrives in the Wild Blue

Disciplined: Former Chief of Staff General T. Michael Moseley is one of 14 Air Force generals to be disciplined over the past two years for performance or discipline issues. According to Air Force Times, Moseley received a letter of admonishment for accepting gifts from individuals bidding on USAF contracts. An Air Force Times report on the surge in general officer disciplinary action will be published on 20 December (USAF photo).

Fourteen Air Force generals have been disciplined over the past two years for poor performance or improper conduct, according to Air Force Times.

In an article slated for publication on December 20th, the Times identifies the senior officers who have received Letters of Admonishment or Letters of Reprimand since 2008, when General Norton Schwartz took over as the service's Chief of Staff and Michael Donley became the Air Force Secretary. Under their leadership, the USAF has given admonishment letters to 13 generals, ranging from four-star leaders of major commands, to one-star brigadiers serving in staff billets. During the same period, another general (a three-star) received a Letter of Reprimand, considered a slightly more serious sanction.

In From the Cold obtained an advance copy of the article from sources within the service. E-mail copies of the piece have been circulating among active-duty and retired Air Force members for several days. In recent hours, the article was even posted on a Yahoo news group site.

News of the disciplinary actions have sent shock waves through the Air Force. At least two retired generals described the actions as "extraordinary." One told the Times the Air Force is now applying a tougher standard than anyone else in the Defense Department. In the past, they observed, generals who violated Air Force regulations without criminal intent or fraud would have been told (in private) not to repeat the mistake.

The long list of admonishments and reprimands suggest the service is now holding senior leaders more accountable, a change that critics say is long overdue. In years past, they argue, USAF flag officers have gotten away with offenses ranging from inappropriate relationships, to the unauthorized use of government aircraft. The actions by Schwartz and Donley appear aimed at restoring accountability at the highest levels of military leadership within the Air Force.

Times Staff Writer Bruce Rolfsen, who prepared the article, discovered the generals received punishment for a variety of offenses, most of them performance related. For example, five generals--including two four-stars--were sanctioned for over-spending the Air Force permanent change of station budget by $87 million in 2005. That account is used to pay for the transfer of Force personnel (and their dependents) to new duty stations, both at home and abroad.

At the time of the overrun, three of the five generals held lower flag ranks, and occupied senior positions in the Air Force personnel and budget systems. Officers disciplined for the budget overrun included:

-- General Roger Brady, who left command of U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) on 13 December, ahead of his scheduled retirement on 1 February. Brady received an admonishment for his actions as the three-star deputy chief of staff for personnel when the overrun occurred.

-- General Stephen Lorenz, scheduled to retire as the leader of Air Education and Training Command (AETC) on 1 January. Five years ago, Lorenz was the service's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Budget when the PCS budget was over-spent. Lorenz, who went on terminal leave last month, also received a letter of admonishment.

Some observers found a certain irony in Lorenz leaving the service under a cloud; as a senior officer, he wrote a series of commentaries on leadership for Air and Space Power Journal, the official professional journal of the USAF. In one of those articles--which appeared about the time of the budget overrun--Lorenz counseled that leaders must "balance shortfalls," and observed that "all decisions must pass the sunshine test."

Other generals disciplined for the PCS budget problem included Lieutenant General Glenn Spears, who currently serves as Commander of 12th Air Force at Davis-Month AFB, Arizona. In 2005, Spears was a Brigadier General, assigned as Director of Personnel Policy. General Speaks also received a Letter of Admonishment, as did Major General Anthony Przybyskawski, who ran the Air Force Personnel Center five years ago, and Brigadier General Sandra Gregory, then the service's director of budget operations and personnel.

General Gregory retired from active duty more than four years ago, in November, 2006. Przybyskawski's retirement is pending, but General Spears remains in his position in Arizona. He is one of only three generals on the discipline list who have not already left the service, or announced their retirement date.

The Air Force has not revealed why its PCS budget experienced such a severe overrun in 2005, or what specific roles the generals played in that debacle. However, the planned retirements of Lorenz, Brady and Przybyskawski were put on hold while the matter was investigated.

Other generals received letters of admonishment for incidents related to the Air Force nuclear scandal of 2007-2008. The Times reports that six flag officers were sanctioned for problems tied to the loose handling and poor accountability of nuclear weapons and components.

The disciplinary list obtained by the paper also includes the former Air Force Chief of Staff, General Michael Moseley who was fired (along with the service secretary, Mike Wynne) for wide-spread problems in the service's nuclear enterprise.

Ironically, Moseley's admonishment was not related to the nuclear issue, but rather, his acceptance of gifts from individuals bidding for Air Force contracts. That is believed to be a referral to the so-called "Thundervision Scandal," when Moseley and his wife spent the weekend at a Pennsylvania estate owned by a TV executive, who was hoping to win a multi-million dollar contract to provide a video screen and production support for the service's precision-flying team, the USAF Thunderbirds.

While the string of disciplinary letters is viewed as a blow for accountability, the punishments imposed on the general officers were relatively minor, except for two of the cases. A letter of admonishment is considered less severe that a letter of reprimand or an Article 15, although an official admonishment is usually enough to kill the career of a general officer. In the cases of General Brady and General Lorenz, both received their fourth star before investigators began probing the PCS budget overrun.

While most of the generals received only an admonishment, two of the officers on the discipline list did receive grade reductions in conjunction with their punishment. Lieutenant General Kevin Sullivan lost a star (and retired as a major general) after receiving a letter of reprimand in connection with the nuclear scandal. He left active duty in the fall of 2008. And earlier this year, Major General Arthur Morrill III, a Vice Director of the Defense Logistics Agency, was given a letter of admonishment for dating a civilian woman while legally separated from his wife. He retired on 1 February as a Brigadier General, after being removed from his post.

It is unclear if the demotions were part of their punishment, or the officers didn't spend enough time in the higher grade to retire at that rank.

Research by Air Force Times found no record of senior officers receiving official admonishments and reprimands at this rate prior to 2008. A spokesman told the paper the USAF doesn't have a way to track letters issued prior to that time.

Despite the sudden jump in disciplinary letters for general officers, at least one Air Force legal streak remains intact. Since it became an independent service in 1947, the USAF has never court-martialed one of its generals, though several have been reduced in grade to Colonel for various infractions. In one well-publicized case, the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force, Major General Thomas Fiscus, was demoted two grades, to Colonel, after admitting to a serious of inappropriate relationships with female subordinates.

Coverage of the flag officer disciplinary actions will be the cover story for the upcoming issue of Air Force Times, appearing on newsstands next Monday.

Echoes of Fairchild?

Smoke rises from the site where an Air Force C-17 transport crashed last summer near Elmendorf AFB, Alaska. An accident investigation board has concluded that pilot error, including "over-aggressiveness" and "over confidence" led to the accident that killed four crew members (AP photo)

The Air Force has released portions of the report on last summer's crash of a C-17 transport at Elmendorf AFB, Alaska--and it's not pretty.

According to investigators, the accident was the result of pilot error, specifically "over aggressive maneuvering and over confidence." Four crew members died in the mishap, which destroyed the $184 million airlifter. From the AP report on the accident board's findings, via Air Force Times:

Besides pilot error, the crew on board was also faulted for failing to notice the dangerous situation that culminated with the plane stalling and crashing into the woods July 28 at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson.

“The mishap pilot violated regulatory provisions and multiple flight manual procedures, placing the aircraft outside established flight parameters at an attitude and altitude where recovery was not possible,” the report’s executive summary says.

[snip]

The probe “found clear and convincing evidence the cause of the mishap was pilot error,” the report says. It also found evidence that other factors including overconfidence and misplaced motivation contributed to the crash.

“Furthermore, the mishap co-pilot and mishap safety observer did not realize the developing dangerous situation and failed to make appropriate inputs.”

When the stall warning sounded, the co-pilot responded by saying “temperature, altitude lookin’ good,” according to the report.

Excerpts from the report were made public Friday afternoon by Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), headquartered at Hickam AFB, Hawaii. The C-17 and its combined active duty/National Guard flight crew were assigned to the 3rd Wing at Elmendorf, which is a part of PACAF.

Following long-standing service rules, the USAF did not release the entire report. The service refused to disclose which of the three pilots was at the controls when the C-17 went down. The Air Force identified the pilots assigned to the mission as Major Michael Freyholtz, 34, of Hines, Minnesota; Major Aaron Malone of Anchorage, Alaska and Captain Jeffrey Hill, 31, of York, Pennsylvania. The fourth crew member killed in the accident was the C-17 loadmaster, Senior Master Sergeant Thomas Cicardo, 47, of Anchorage.

The airlifter crew was rehearsing an air show performance at the time of the crash. According to the crash board (and video of the accident) the pilot made an aggressive right turn after the C-17's initial climb out and left-hand turn. The stall warning system activated as the aircraft made its final turn, but the pilot continued the maneuver. When he finally responded, the pilot employed incorrect recovery procedures and there wasn't enough time (or altitude) to regain controlled flight. The C-17 went down about a minute after takeoff, crashing in a wooded area near Elmendorf. No one on the ground was hurt.

For some Air Force members, the C-17 accident in Alaska brought back memories of another air show practice gone bad. Sixteen years ago, a B-52 crashed at Fairchild AFB, Washington, under similar circumstances. The heavy bomber went down while the crew was rehearsing an air show profile, killing four crew members. The crash board found that the pilot at the controls, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur "Bud" Holland not only exceeded safety limitations for the giant aircraft, he had a long history of unsafe flight.

Holland often bragged that his "career ambition" was to do a barrel roll in the B-52 and his antics resulted in some crew members refusing to fly with him. Amazingly, Holland was never sanctioned for safety violations and at the time of the 1994 crash, he was Chief of Standardization and Evaluation for the 92nd Bomb Wing at Fairchild. In that capacity, Holland was charged with ensuring that all B-52 crew members at the base could operate their aircraft in accordance with Air Force standards.

The safety board that investigated the Fairchild tragedy discovered that Holland had violated pitch, altitude and bank restrictions for the B-52 on at least six separate occasions before the fatal crash. Many of the incidents occurred during air shows and other public venues. More disturbingly, Holland briefed illegal flight profiles to wing leadership before those events. Senior officers corrected Lieutenant Colonel Holland during his briefings, but there is no evidence that anyone tried to discipline the rogue pilot, let alone ground him.

Sadly, one of the few officers that tried to stop Holland died in that B-52 crash. Lieutenant Colonel Mark McGeehan was the commander of the 325th Bombardment Squadron at Fairchild. After listening to complaints from other crew members, McGeehan flew with Holland and discovered he was unsafe in the air. McGeehan elevated his concerns to the operations group commander and wing commander, to no avail.

So, with Holland scheduled to pilot the B-52 for the 1994 air show--marking the end of "Buff" operations at Fairchild, McGeehan and his deputy, penciled themselves in as co-pilot and navigator for the final flight. The wing's retiring Vice-Commander, Colonel Robert Wolff, was added as a safety observer. Their aircraft, callsign Czar 52, crashed as the pilot (almost certainly Holland) tried to execute an extremely tight turn around the base control tower, at low altitude.

Over the years that followed, the Fairchild disaster became one of the most-studied accidents in the history of military aviation. Holland's recklessness in the cockpit became the stuff of legend--as did leadership's inability to stop him.

That's why the Elmendorf crash is so disconcerting. Air show routines are carefully planned and tightly scripted. Crews are hand-picked, and profiles are briefed up the chain of command well in advance. In fact, there are only a handful of "demo" pilots and crews within any command, so the men on board that C-17 were highly experienced, following a routine that had, in all likelihood, been flown on previous occasions.

So that raises some rather obvious issues: did the C-17 crew brief--and attempt to fly--a profile that was outside safety limitations for their aircraft? And, if that was the case, did anyone in the 3rd Wing, PACAF or Air Mobility Command chain attempt to correct the pilot and remind him of the parameters for the demo? Beyond that, was the crew following a profile flown by C-17 crews from other units? And, given the tragedy in Alaska, does that mean that other aviators were flying an approved "demo" that created unnecessary risks for the crews?

Unfortunately, we may never know the answers to those questions. Portions of the accident report dealing with those matters have not been released, and will probably never be made public. We can only hope the Air Force learns from this accident and takes those lessons to heart. Similarities between the Fairchild disaster in 1994 and last summer's C-17 crash are enough to raise eyebrows and make one wonder---was this a case of tragic history repeating itself?

Crash Program

Since 9-11, various government officials have warned about the possibility of a terrorist attack using a radiological weapons (say, a "dirty bomb"), or an actual nuclear device. It remains one of the most frightening scenarios for those charged with keeping us safe.

But such warnings often carried caveats, to mitigate public fears. For example, despite Al-Qaida's demonstrated interest in nuclear and radiological weapons, we were told it would "be difficult" for terrorists to fabricate or obtain such devices, and smuggle them into America for detonation. The government has also spent freely in an effort to deter potential terrorist attacks using nuclear or radiological weapons, investing hundreds of millions of dollars into detection technology alone.

Some of that investment was on display in the Atlanta area last month, as federal, state and local agents scanned hundreds of trucks along Interstate 20, looking for radiological material. The event, which lasted for several days, was described as an "exercise." A few analysts expressed doubt about that explanation, given the scope of the drill, and the fact that continued during the Atlanta rush hour, snarling traffic for miles on either side of the checkpoints.

And federal preparations for the unthinkable aren't limited to scanners and search exercises. There's been a flurry of activity in recent months surrounding a new drug called CBLB502 and a company called Cleveland BioLabs. Less than two weeks ago, the Food and Drug Administration took the unusual step of labeling CBLB502 as an "orphan drug," reserved for medications used to treat rare diseases and conditions. The orphan drug designation came only four months after the FDA granted "fast track" status for CBLB502, accelerating its development and potential introduction.

Why those designations for Cleveland BioLab's new product? Because CBLB502 is the only drug available to reduce the risk of death due to total body irradiation. The most likely cause of that condition: a radiological or nuclear disaster.

While orphan drug status is often reserved for medications with limited market potential, Cleveland BioLabs has already found a buyer for CBLB502: the U.S. military. Back in September, the Pentagon gave the firm a $14.8 million contract for an injectable form of the drug, to protect troops during a nuclear catastrophe. That contract allowed Cleveland BioLabs to complete more tests and the application process with the FDA.

Since Congress passed the Orphan Drug Act 27 years ago, less that 250 new medications and treatments have reached the market, so that means CBLB502 is in very select company. It is the first designed to combat the effects of a massive radiation dose.

The rush to get the drug on the market raises a rather obvious question. The threat of a nuclear or radiological attack by terrorists has existed for more than a decade. If their capabilities in those areas have remained rather crude, why expedite production and introduction of CBLB502? Why not spend the money on more pressing homeland security needs?

The answer can probably be told by intelligence dispatches that haven't been featured in WikiLeaks. Based on the recent spate of CBRN exercises (and the accelerated introduction of CBLB502), it appears the feds are more concerned than ever about the possibility of a terrorist attack, using a nuclear bomb or a radiological device. And, since the drug is used for treatment after radiation exposure, the government isn't taking any chances. Doses of CBLB502 will be administered to military personnel responding to a nuclear or radiological attack, allowing them to do their job in the days following the catastrophe.

Production of the drug also affirms our worst fears about that scenario. Despite all the equipment, all the personnel and all that money, the terrorists still have a reasonable chance of success, once they get a dirty bomb (or a full-up nuke) in our territory. That's why the crash program for CBLB502 is clearly aimed at the aftermath. From the homeland security perspective, it makes sense to prepare now, for an attack that may be on the way, and could very well succeed when the elements come together.

One final note: some reports peg the government's initial order of the drug at 37,000 doses. That quantity is sufficient for military responders, but not for civilians living in the disaster zone. Without larger purchases, civilians exposed to high doses of radiation during terrorist attacks will be on their own. Welcome to government-run healthcare.

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ADDENDUM: Here's another element of this crash program that we find rather revealing. While Al-Qaida's interest in WMD has never waned, there is no evidence of a recent breakthrough in terms of their capabilities to produce such weapons. The government's rush to get CBLB502 into production suggests a growing concern over bin Laden simply purchasing the needed weaponry from Iran or friendly elements within the Pakistan military. And judging by the timeline for the anti-radiation drug program, U.S. officials see a rapidly escalating CBRN threat against the homeland over the next five years.

The Next Missile Crisis?

Almost 50 years ago, for a few fateful days in October, the world teetered on the brink of a nuclear war during the showdown now referred to as the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Almost anyone who was alive in the autumn of 1962 can tell you how it began, and how the crisis eventually ended. Cuba, acting on behalf of its Soviet patrons, agreed to the basing of Russian nuclear missiles on its soil. Their discovery prompted a standoff that lasted for a week, until Moscow finally back down and removed the weapons. Meanwhile, the U.S. began deactivating Jupiter missiles at bases in Turkey and Italy. Deployment of those missiles had inspired the Russian basing in Cuba, a move that almost triggered a nuclear holocaust.

Russia's withdrawal of those SS-4 missiles marked the end of the only nuclear crisis in the history of the Western Hemisphere. And, over the decades that followed, it was widely assumed that the Americans would never again witness such an incident. After all, the U.S. was the only superpower in the neighborhood, and our military might was enough to dissuade the region's few rogue states from pursuing nuclear weapons, and the long-range missile technology. True, a few countries like Brazil and Argentina formed alliances with Middle Eastern states with the SCUD missile system (notably Egypt), but nothing really came from those programs.

However, the notion of another nuclear crisis in he Western Hemisphere is no longer unthinkable. Late last month, the German daily Die Welt reported that Iran is planning to base short and medium-range missiles in Venezuela, as part of a development program with their ally, Hugo Chavez. Die Welt's account received virtually no media in the U.S., but it highlights a potential menace to the U.S. homeland. From a Hudson Institute blog post on the story:

At a moment when NATO members found an agreement, in the recent Lisbon summit (19-20 November 2010), to develop a Missile Defence capability to protect NATO's populations and territories in Europe against ballistic missile attacks from the East (namely, Iran), Iran's counter-move consists in establishing a strategic base in the South American continent - in the United States's soft underbelly.

According to Die Welt, Venezuela has agreed to allow Iran to establish a military base manned by Iranian missile officers, soldiers of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and Venezuelan missile officers. In addition, Iran has given permission for the missiles to be used in case of an "emergency". In return, the agreement states that Venezuela can use these facilities for "national needs" – radically increasing the threat to neighbors like Colombia. The German daily claims that according to the agreement, Iranian Shahab 3 (range 1300-1500 km), Scud-B (285-330 km) and Scud-C (300, 500 and 700 km) will be deployed in the proposed base. It says that Iran also pledged to help Venezuela in rocket technology expertise, including intensive training of officers.

So, as NATO forged a missile defense plan aimed (primarily) at Iran, the leadership in Tehran was already implementing a counter-move. At this point--assuming the deployment actually occurs--Iranian missiles in Venezuela would not pose an immediate threat to U.S. territory. Cities such as Miami, Tampa, New Orleans and Houston (along with military bases in those regions) are currently outside the threat ring of the Shahab-3, which has a maximum range of up to 1500 km. On the other hand, the missiles would pose an instant threat to key American allies in the region (i.e., Colombia) and such vital waterways as the Panama Canal.

And, over the long haul, Caracas and Tehran would expand and improve Mr. Chavez's missile arsenal, adding such systems as the BM-25 (with a range of up to 4,000 km) that are capable of striking U.S. population centers with a nuclear warhead. Iran reportedly acquired the BM-25 from North Korea back in 2006 and has been working to duplicate the technology. Obviously, Tehran would have no qualms about selling the BM-25 to Venezuela, or simply moving its own intermediate range missiles to that joint base described in the Die Welt dispatch.

Venezuela also provides a convenient mechanism for Iran to evade UN sanctions and various export controls on weaponry. For example, Russia has, supposedly, decided not to go through with a planned sale of the S-300 air defense system to Tehran (a transaction opposed by both the U.S. and Israel. Now, with Moscow looking for a new buyer, who do you think is at the top of the list? If you guessed Hugo Chavez, move to the head of the class. And once the S-300 arrives in Venezuela, there's nothing to prevent Chavez from transferring the advanced SAM system to his allies in Iran.

We assume the U.S. intelligence community has been monitoring the situation, looking for any tell-tale signs of an impending arms transfer. Construction activity will be an early indicator, as Venezuela builds shelters, crew quarters, assembly buildings and other support facilities needed for missile operations and training at the joint base.

As for the actual delivery of airframes, that may come suddenly, since missile components can be easily flown from Tehran on an IL-76 transport. And, if the Iranians and Venezuelans have a satellite warning program, they can schedule on-load and off-load activities during periods when our surveillance platforms aren't overhead, making detection more difficult.

In that sense, a future missile crisis in Venezuela might resemble the 1962 standoff in Cuba. We didn't detect those missiles until they arrived in that country, thanks to elaborate Soviet deception efforts and a self-imposed moratorium on reconnaissance flights over Cuba, which lasted from August until early October of 1962. Navy aircraft actually detected a shipment to Cuba, but the containers on the deck of a Russian cargo vessel were mis-identified as those containing IL-28 aircraft, not medium range ballistic missiles.

Fifty years later, our intelligence collection and analytical capabilities are much improved, but that leads to a larger question: what is Mr. Obama prepared to do if Iranian missiles (or even missile components) are detected in Venezuela? We're guessing that Caracas and Tehran already have a cover story for that contingency, claiming the missiles are part of some space research project. North Korea made similar statements before testing its TD-1 and TD-2 long-range missiles and a few western observers actually supported that position, saying that Pyongyang had a "right" to a space program. Will the president follow a similar position when Venezuela and Iran make similar claims?

With most of its territory located along and just north of the Equator, Venezuela is in an excellent location to launch geosynchronous satellites into orbit. But that would put Chavez in competition with the European Space Agency and its established complex in neighboring French Guiana. Needless to say, the Europeans aren't worried about losing launch business to the Venezuelans and their Iranian partners. But the space ruse could provide an excuse for Chavez and Tehran to send bring even larger missiles--like the North Korean TD-1 or TD-2--to South America. The presence of those long-range systems would pose an even greater threat to the United States and our interests in this hemisphere.

Bottom line: the U.S. should never tolerate ballistic missiles in the hands of Hugo Chavez and his patrons in Tehran. According to the German newspaper account, Iran has already agreed to transfer operational control of the weapons "during an emergency." We can only imagine Chavez's thresh hold for launching a strike against the U.S.--or the Iranians using his territory to do the same thing.

One cautionary note: the German media was the first to report that Iran had acquired the BM-25. However, those claims have never been fully verified. And even if the newspaper article is correct, it may take years for the Iranians and Venezuelans to achieve operational capability, giving us more time to formulate an operational strategy. But inactivity and idle threats are not viable options. Drawing imaginary lines in the sand doesn't impress the thugs in Tehran or Caracas. Perceiving Mr. Obama as a weakling, they are making (or at least contemplating) a highly provocative move--one that demands an equally forceful U.S. response.

One Night in December

The 30th Anniversary of John Lennon's death was more than a reminder of a extraordinarily gifted man whose life was cut tragically short by a crazed killer. It also reminds us of another media age, in the days before cable news, e-mail and Twitter, when everyone still relied on the mainstream media for breaking news.

Sounds almost quaint, doesn't it? But on the night John Lennon died, CNN was only six months old, and its viewership was measured in the thousands, not millions. Fox News, MSNBC, CNBC and the rest of the cable news outlets were still years in the future, and what would become the internet was essentially a DARPA project, linking a few mainframe computers a government research centers around the world. The news cycle was still largely defined by local newspapers, the network evening newscasts, and local TV news programs.

So, when Lennon was fatally shot outside the Dakota apartment building in New York City, there wasn't an instantaneous surge of media coverage. In fact, the first journalist to learn of Lennon's death made the discovery by being in the right place at the right time. Alan Weiss, a producer for WABC-TV in New York, had been injured a motorcycle accident earlier in the evening; he was in the emergency room at Roosevelt Hospital when Lennon was rushed in. Learning of Lennon's death a few minutes later, Weiss made his way to a pay phone and called the newsroom at Channel 7.

But the late edition of Eyewitness News was delayed that evening by Monday Night Football. Additionally, the local station was reluctant to interrupt the network's highly-rated football broadcast and decided the "scoop of a lifetime" should be passed to ABC News. The network's New York newsroom quickly transmitted the information to Roone Arledge, the legendary president of ABC sports, who was in the MNF production truck in Miami, for a game between the Patriots and Dolphins.

Arledge relayed the bulletin to the announcing team: Frank Gifford, Fran Tarkenton and Howard Cosell. It would be Cosell who would break the news of the "unspeakable tragedy" that had occurred a few minutes earlier. Cosell knew Lennon personally and spoke briefly, but eloquently, about the former Beatle's life and cultural impact.

But oddly enough, Howard Cosell was reluctant to report the story. ESPN recently tracked down tapes of the off-air conversations between Cosell and his broadcast partners. With the Patriots preparing for a last-second field goal to beat the Dolphins, Cosell wasn't sure if the "game situation" was appropriate for airing such tragic news. He was also worried that the report might prove to be false. It was Frank Gifford who urged Cosell to pass along the news that would "shake up the entire world."

My own memories of that night are also shaped by the media, but as a participant, rather than a spectator. In December 1980, I was assistant news director for a couple of radio stations in the Springfield, Missouri, market. It was my second radio gig out of college, and it sounds more glamorous than it was. As the assistant ND, my job was to anchor the station's afternoon newscasts, and cover spot news in the area. And, since I didn't have to get up at 4 am for the morning shift, my beat also included local city council and county commission meetings.

On the night John Lennon died, I had returned from a commission meeting not far from Springfield. I was in our tiny newsroom, trying to find something useful from interviews conducted after the meeting. Our black and white TV was turned off, I wasn't aware of the Lennon shooting until the bell began to ring on our AP wire machine. The first bulletin was cryptic, announcing the former Beatle had been shot outside his New York apartment and taken to the hospital. A few minutes later, a second AP flash reported his death.

John Lennon's passing was clearly big news, even in a Midwestern town more than 1,000 miles from the Big Apple. But like the crew at WABC, we weren't sure how to handle it. Our stations played country music, and the program director didn't tolerate any deviations from the format. But from the perspective of your humble correspondent (and our evening disc jockey), it seemed inappropriate to announce the news without playing at least one of his songs. I remembered when Elvis died three years earlier; the 4 pm newscast on CBS Radio began with the opening strains of "Love Me Tender," followed by anchor David Jackson stating that the rock legend was dead.

Our program director was also our morning jock, so he didn't appreciate being awakened at 10 pm by Doug, our evening DJ. But on hearing the news, he instantly agreed to let us follow the bulletin with one of Lennon's songs. He suggested "Imagine"--an obvious choice. But there was only one problem; our stations had been playing country music for more than a decade, so we didn't have a copy of "Imagine." Our Beatles records had been given away years earlier, after a format switch. So, even if the PD was willing to let us play a Lennon record, there wasn't a single one in the station.

Luckily, Doug had an idea. Frank, the all-night guy, had an extensive album collection, and he lived just a few blocks from the station. However, he wasn't exactly reliable. In fact, his "show prep" often included a stop at a local bar for a couple of rounds before arriving at the station. At that late hour, Frank was probably at the watering hole, not at home. Miraculously, Frank was still at home when we called, agreed to come in early, and bring his copy of "Imagine."

Within 10 minutes, Frank was in the studio, and the record was on the turntable, cued up and ready to go. The evening jock cued me, I read the AP bulletin and the song played. After that, we returned to the regular playlist. I pulled some audio cuts from the next couple of ABC newscasts for the morning news anchor, and put some wire copy on his desk. Most of it would be outdated by the time he arrived, but at least he had something to work with.

While my shift was over, I didn't go home right away. I went back in the studio, where

Doug had the ABC feed in the "cue" position. Normally, the network played Muzak between newscasts, but the younger broadcast engineers at ABC--stuck on the graveyard shift--usually canned the Montavani in favor of the feed from WPLJ, the network owned-and-operated FM rock station in New York. WPLJ had dumped its normal format in favor of a tribute to John Lennon. We sat there in that studio and listened, not saying much. The three of us had grown up with the Beatles and we understood that a part of our lives had vanished that evening, on a sidewalk outside an apartment building in New York.

The Curious Case of Edgar Kranz

Barack Obama's first list of presidential pardons, released last week, was deemed non-controversial. Most of those who received pardons from Mr. Obama were ordinary Americans, who committed such crimes as drug use, possession of stolen property and making false statements to the Food and Drug Administration. Many of the illegal acts occurred decades ago; one former Marine was pardoned for a 1963 felony conviction for cutting the lips off pennies so they could be used as dimes in vending machines.

While Mr. Obama doesn't have a Marc Rich in his first group of pardons, at least one individual on that list is receiving some scrutiny. We refer to one Edgar Leopold Kranz, Jr., of Minot, North Dakota. According to the White House web site, Kranz was court-martialed by the Air Force back in 1994 for the illegal use of cocaine, adultery and writing three bad checks while stationed at Hickam AFB, Hawaii.

For his crimes, Kranz was given a bad conduct discharge (which was suspended by the trial judge); sentenced to 24 months of home confinement and reduced in rank to Airman Basic (E-1). The punishment was fairly consistent with that received by other Air Force members, convicted of similar crimes.

Now, flash forward sixteen years, and the Kranz case takes a rather unusual turn--even before Mr. Obama issued his pardon. With Kranz's ties to the Air Force (and North Dakota), media outlets in Minot did a little checking and discovered that he was an airman assigned to Minot AFB. Air Force Times went a bit further and learned that Edgar L. Kranz, Jr. retired from the service in March of this year, at the rank of Master Sergeant (E-7). Local records indicate there in only one person by that name in the Minot area, so the retired Air Force NCO is (presumably) the same individual pardoned by Mr. Obama.

Why is that unusual? In almost any era, a bad conduct discharge was enough to end your military career. Yet, Kranz remained on active duty for almost 16 years after being court-martialed at Hickman for drugs, adultery and bouncing bad checks. That little detail is raising a lot of eye-brows among former commanders and first sergeants, who routinely send airmen packing for lesser offenses.

In fairness, we should note the BCD imposed on Airman Kranz was suspended, so that prevented an automatic exodus from service after his confinement ended. But for Kranz to remain in service (and eventually collect a retirement pension), he was allowed to re-enlist, not once but multiple times. While not unprecedented, that is highly unusual.

As anyone who's worn the uniform will tell you, re-enlistment is a privilege, based on meeting (and exceeding) standards of conduct and discipline. Needless to say, if you've been court-martialed for drugs and other offenses, you're not meeting the mark. That should have been reflected in the performance reports of Airman Basic Kranz back in 1994.

I can't speak for other commanders and supervisors, but as one of my airmen, Kranz would have received rock-bottom ratings on his EPR for the period(s) that covered the crimes and their adjudication. On the 1-5 rating scale used on EPRs, Kranz would be at the lowest end of that spectrum. That "referral" EPR would also mark the first step in removing him from service.

Does that sound harsh? It's standard operating procedure in the military. Don't forget: the Air Force denied re-enlistment to Alvin Greene (the recent Democratic nominee for U.S. Senate in South Carolina) solely on the basis of poor performance, as reflected in his EPRs. So, how did Kranz survive evaluations that should have put him on the fast-track for discharge, despite suspension of his BCD?

Under normal circumstances, the courts-martial conviction (and poor performance reports) would be enough to deny Kranz re-enlistement in the Air Force. Yet, by my calculations, Kranz re-upped at least three more times before his retirement earlier this year. Assuming his conduct (and performance) recovered in later years, there was sufficient reason to allow re-enlistment at those junctures. But I cannot fathom how Kranz was allowed to stay in service (and re-enlist) in the mid-1990s, just after he faced military justice.

It's also worth remembering that Kranz was court-martialed in an era of draw downs and cutbacks for the Air Force. In the mid-1990s, the service was over-manned, so officers and NCOs were being allowed to retire with only 15 years of active-duty service. The USAF also convened various "force-shaping" boards during this period, weeding junior personnel from the ranks. Many selected for "reduction in force" actions had a history of marginal job performance (or other issues), yet Kranz--despite his past problems--was allowed to remain in service and eventually retire. He even survived the elimination of 10,000 service billets to preserve the F-22 program--a move that ended the careers of many airmen with past problems.

Apparently, Sergeant Kranz was able to rehabilitate himself after that courts-martial back in 1994 and met Air Force standards for the remainder of his career. But another fact is equally apparent; despite serious offenses (and a conviction), Kranz received a second chance denied to the vast majority of NCOs and junior officers. And someone in the chain allowed him to re-enlist and rebuild his career, culminating in Kranz's retirement as a MSgt back in March.

We understand that all courts-martial cases are different, and the judges and panels that hear such cases must weigh unique circumstances in each one. But it's difficult to understand why Kranz received such favorable breaks while hundreds of other airmen were kicked to the curb--for lesser offenses. Now, with his pardon from President Obama, Kranz has received a judicial windfall, making him eligible for all veteran's benefits that would have (otherwise) been denied, based on that 1994 federal conviction.

And, I really can't fault Sergeant Kanz for pursuing his legal options. Applying for a pardon, he merely followed the path of other convicted felons and came up a winner, thanks to a favorable decision by the Commander-in-Chief. As for Mr. Obama, he has the right to pardon whomever he chooses, though I wonder how much coordination there was (if any) between the White House and the Air Force in reviewing the Kranz case. There's also the matter of why the President granted a pardon for MSgt Kranz, while denying hundreds of others. What made his petition so compelling? So far, the White House has provided any details.

On the other hand, the Kranz pardon has given the Air Force another black eye. Many of us who had the tough job of recommending punishment and/or sitting on court-martial panels can only shake our heads at this one. "Second chances" (like this one) are virtually unheard of, and that begs some rather obvious questions: why was the BCD suspended back in 1994? Who allowed him to re-enlist--despite a courts-martial conviction, and during a time when the Air Force was getting rid of "problem children" left and right?

The answers to those questions would be rather revealing. Unfortunately, the USAF has gone "comm out" on this one, so don't expect any explanations from the brass. Our guess is that Kranz had friends in high places, allowing him to survive misdeeds that would end the career of mere mortals.

Somewhere out there, Michael Murphy must be smiling. There may be hope for the former JAG officer (who was court-martialed for practicing military law without a license for more than 20 years). Given the Krenz precedent--and the passage of a few more years--Murphy might also be able to get a pardon from Mr. Obama.

***

ADDENDUM: Discussing this case with former colleagues, one suggested that perhaps Kranz was a young airman with a flawless record who was deserving of a second chance. But the Kranz who resides in Minot is 56-years-old, meaning he was 40 at the time of his troubles in Hawaii. If that calculation is accurate, then Kranz was probably a mid-level NCO with years of Air Force experience when he was court-martialed. That makes Kranz's "second chance" even more puzzling.

Queen of the Deadbeats

During the current foreclosure crisis, there have been plenty of stories about lenders who "outsourced" much of the work to incompetent processing firms, resulting in badly botched paperwork and illegal property seizures.

Now, meet the other side of that story--deadbeat borrowers who manipulate the system to avoid making payments and foreclosure on their property. In fact, The Wall Street Journal has located a woman who might be described as poster girl for feckless homeowners. Meet Patsy Campbell:

The 71-year-old retired insurance saleswoman has been living in her house, a two-story on a half acre in a tidy middle-class neighborhood here in central Florida, since 1978. The last time she made a mortgage payment was October 1985.

And yet Ms. Campbell has been able to keep her house, protected by a 105-pound pit bull named Dodger and a locked, rusty gate advising visitors to beware of the dog.

"They're not going to take this house," says Ms. Campbell. "I intend to stay in this house and maintain it as my residence until I die."

Ms. Campbell's foreclosure case has outlasted two marriages, three recessions and four presidents. She has seen seven great-grandchildren born, plum real-estate markets come and go and the ownership of her mortgage change six times. Many Florida real-estate lawyers say it is the longest-lasting foreclosure case they have ever heard of.

The story of how Ms. Campbell has managed to avoid both paying her mortgage and losing her home, which is currently assessed at more than $203,000, is a cautionary tale for lenders that cut corners and followed sloppy practices when originating, processing and servicing mortgages. Lenders are especially vulnerable in the 23 states, including Florida, that require foreclosures to be approved by a judge.

According to the WSJ, Campbell has challenged her foreclosure on the grounds that her mortgage was improperly transferred between banks and federal agencies; that lawyers for the bank waited too long to prosecute her case, and that a state law shields her from all debts. And that's just for starters. In various legal proceedings down through the years, Campbell has offered countless other arguments as well. At various points, judges have agreed that her arguments have some merit, staving off foreclosure.

The saga actually began back in 1978, when the property was originally purchased by Paul Campbell, a pharmacist in Okeechobee, Florida. He took out a $68,000 mortgage to finance the purchase. Mr. Campbell married Patsy in 1980 and died later that year of emphysema. Five years later, Mrs. Campbell stopped making payments on the house after (she says) an illness caused her to lose income and fall behind on her bills.

Since then, the foreclosure mess has continued through Campbell's second marriage, the birth of multiple great-grandchildren, five presidential administrations and six different mortgage companies. Currently, she owes $68,801 in principal on the loan, plus $148,000 in interest. The firm that now owns her mortgage, Commercial Services of Perry, Florida, says it would be happy to settle the case--if Ms. Campbell will simply pay what she owes: $211,801.

As you might expect, Patsy Campbell has no intention of paying that note. She claims that no one owns her note, because of lender fraud and mistakes made when the mortgage was transferred on multiple occasions. Ms. Campbell plans to continue her fight; the attorney for Commercial Services says he receives a new appeals filing from the homeowner almost monthly, creating more delays, paperwork and expenses.

Thankfully, cases like Ms. Campbell's are rare. But it does provide a reminder: there are unscrupulous property owners who use system to avoid paying their mortgage, a fraud that everyone else pays for.

Today's Reading Assignment

...John C. Wholstetter, writing at NRO on-line, debunks eight major air security myths, often used to justify the TSA's current system of peek-a-boo scanners and intrusive pat-downs. In his point/counter-point column, Mr. Wholstetter finds that arguments used to support the new techniques are flimsy, and the security measures are unlikely to make us safer. A few excerpts:

The fact that there have been no attacks since 9/11 vindicates TSA.

The logical fallacy here is known as post hoc, ergo propter hoc (“after this, therefore on account of this”). There is zero reason to credit TSA’s new tactics with anything save annoying unlucky travelers. We can see this by looking at incidents in which governments actually foiled terror plots. None of them involved TSA-style measures.

Remember the 2006 ten-jetliner plot hatched at Heathrow? The 1995 “Bojinka” terror plot hatched by 1993 World Trade Center–bombing mastermind Ramzi Youssef? The 2006 plot was broken up by the Brits, and the Filipinos broke up the second. Neither used TSA’s methods. The Brits used shoe-leather investigating, phone taps, and intelligence from a Pakistani interrogation of one detainee. And in 1995, Youssef was interrogated by the Philippine government, and confessed.

No other government uses the TSA scanners. No one — including the Israelis — uses intimate patdowns.

[snip]

Each method terrorists use requires a targeted response.

Because terrorists have hidden stuff in their underwear, we must pat them down. So when terrorists use body cavities to conceal things, as surely they will, will TSA attempt to search everyone’s orifices? Not a chance: Americans will not stand for anything like this. Which is why the excuses for today’s patdown molestations are so infuriating and phony.

We need to catch people before they bring down planes. But we do not do this by making flying, already a grim business since 9/11, a humiliating ordeal. Making travelers cringe gives terrorists a victory even without bringing a plane down.

[snip]

Americans won’t tolerate profiling.

Does anyone really believe that Americans, if given a choice between intimate patdowns and Israel-style interviews, would choose being groped?

The bottom line is that Israel’s methods work. Instead of having ill-trained TSA agents search for bad things, have well-trained agents search for bad people. Profile by behavior and circumstance (cash ticket, one-way trip, etc.), and leave most of us alone. Compile accurate no-fly lists. Heed credible warnings. Ignore political correctness.

Instead, Homeland Security secretary Janet Napolitano reportedly has two more Bright Ideas: unionizing TSA employees and special reduced screening for Muslims in traditional garb. The former, rejected when the Department of Homeland Security was established, would make it harder to fire incompetent employees. The latter would have the unintended impact of so enraging most Americans that they will insist lawmakers make TSA apply uniform rules.

Wholstetter's final point is particularly telling. Amid the public furor over TSA's new security rules, Ms. Napolitano is actually considering reduced measures for individuals who are most likely to hijack or bomb aircraft (based on their religion and ethnic background). When the new techniques were unveiled a few weeks ago, some observers predicted that the government would do something that would prompt public demand for full enforcement of the screening techniques. At the time, I dismissed those claims as the rantings of conspiracy theorists. Now, I'm not so sure.

The Hunt for BM-25s

Like almost everyone else on the web, we've been following the latest WikiLeaks dump of thousands of U.S. diplomatic cables. So far, much of the media attention has been focused on Hillary Clinton allegedly ordering American diplomats in Argentina to gather information on that country's president, Christina Fernandez de Kirchner, with emphasis on how she handles stress and what medications she might be taking. So far, these revelations have been met with a collective yawn, but could you imagine the reaction if Condolezza Rice or Colin Powell made a similar request?

Clearly, Mrs. Clinton has a long history of trying to dig up dirt on potential adversaries, or those who might be blackmailed at some point in the future. But we digress; to be sure, the State Department has a hand in the spy business. Selected members of the CIA station at our overseas embassies operate under diplomatic cover, and intelligence collection is one of the major missions of defense attaches, who are also part of the embassy staff.

But dispatching career diplomats to gather dirt is jaw-droppingly stupid. Not only are they untrained for the task, such assignments also jeopardize their diplomatic cover and endanger other State Department personnel with no connection to our intelligence efforts.

On the other hand, there is much more serious stuff in the leaked cables, namely the claim that North Korea has supplied intermediate-range missiles to Iran. That's hardly news to readers of this blog. We first reported the transfer almost five years ago, after German intelligence officials leaked the story to the newspaper Bild. The delivery was later confirmed by Israeli intelligence sources.

Now, some U.S. experts are questioning the missile report. Sources tell the Washington Post there is no hard evidence the transfer actually occurred, noting that BM-25s have never been sighted in in Iran, and no flight-testing has occurred. They also cite another leaked cable, describing a 2009 meeting between U.S. and Russian officials where the Iranian missile transfer was discussed. According to the cable, the Russians expressed doubt about the report, referring to the BM-25 as the "mystery missile." American participants admitted there was no hard evidence that Iran had received the weapons system.

True, we haven't seen an Iranian BM-25--at least not yet. But the Post is also guilty of selective reporting in its account. While arguing that the BM-25s may not be in Iran, the paper's account includes paragraphs where government officials and outside experts agree that North Korea almost certainly shipped BM-25 kits to Iran. So, everyone accepts the fact that components for the missiles were received by Tehran. And in the arms trade, "kits" means everything you need to assemble a complete weapon. By that standard, the Iranians have all the bolts, nozzles, engines and other items needed to built a BM-25. Technically, that means the BM-25 is in Iran--they just haven't been assembled yet.

There are a variety of explanations as to why Tehran hasn't completed the assembly process. Openly displaying (and testing) the missile might accelerate Israeli attack plans, since the BM-25 was originally designed to carry a nuclear warhead, dating to its previous version as a Russian SLBM. As Iran scrambles to build nuclear weapons, it is trying to avoid additional provocations that might upset the proverbial apple cart. So, that's one reason to keep the BM-25s under cover.

A more likely explanation is the tried-and-true process of reverse engineering. Instead of remaining dependent on North Korea for advanced missile technology, Iran would prefer to build intermediate and long-range missiles on its own. It takes a while to analyze the various components that make up an IRBM, then develop the skill, expertise and machinery to duplicate those elements. Since Iran already has missiles capable of reaching its primary adversaries (Israel and U.S. troops in the Gulf Region), the BM-25 may be a lower priority--until Tehran has a nuke that can be mounted on that missile.

It's also worth remembering that Russia has plenty of reasons to downplay the missile story, casting some doubt on their accounts. The U.S. was very upset when Moscow sold the BM-25 (previously known as the SS-N-6) to Pyongyang. And, few in Washington bought the Russian story that the missile design was "de-nuclearized" prior to the sale--particularly when engineers from the design bureau that built the SS-N-6 assisted North Korea in building their first BM-25s.

Bottom line: intermediate range missile technology is almost certainly in Iran, and with outside assistance, the BM-25 could become operational in a matter of months. In terms of security policy, it's always preferable to prepare for the worst case scenario, instead of hoping that German, Israeli and U.S. intelligence agencies were wrong, and the missiles don't exist. Wishful thinking is never an effective substitute for clear-eyed, realistic threat assessments.

***
ADDENDUM: There's another disturbing confirmation in the WikiLeaks disclosures. At least one diplomatic cable reports that China failed to intercept North Korean arms shipments that transited through Beijing's airspace and sometimes landed at Chinese airfields. We reported months ago that western officials were aware of a "China" connection on some arms flights between Iran and North Korea. Those flights are continuing on a near-weekly basis, and so far, Beijing has made no effort to stop them. What a surprise.

The Latest Military Phony (National Guard E-9 Edition)

Former Command Sergeant Major John Letuli of the North Carolina National Guard has been demoted to Master Sergeant (E-8) after it was discovered that he was wearing decorations, devices and tabs he never earned. Still unanswered: why his Guard superiors tolerated the obvious fraud for so long (Military.com photo).

By the time a man reaches the rank of Command Sergeant Major, he ought to know better: wearing unauthorized decorations and devices on your uniform is a serious offense, punishable under the UCMJ.

Apparently CSM John Letuli never learned that lesson. He's currently in the process of retiring from the North Carolina National Guard at the rank of Master Sergeant (E-8) after losing a stripe for falsely claiming that he had earned such devices and decorations including HALO wings, the Purple Heart, and the special forces tab. In reality, Letuli was not authorized to wear any of those devices or medals.

More from Military.com:

Officials would not offer details on the actions of former Command Sgt. Maj. John Letuli, but a retired Green Beret who had been pressuring for the investigation since September 2009 said he is outraged that the Guard and the Army appear to be letting Letuli retire with just "a slap on the wrist."

Retired Master Sgt. Jeffrey "JD" Hinton said he has written Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., the top Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, hoping for a congressional inquiry into how the Army and North Carolina Guard handled their investigation of Letuli, including why he is not being more seriously disciplined.

The investigation was launched after Hinton published photos of Letuli on his website, Professsionalsoldiers.com. In one photo, Letuli is wearing a Special Forces patch and tab on his BDUs; in another, he is in Class As, wearing the Purple Heart and Soldier's Medal ribbons, and a Military Freefall Badge, or "HALO wings" -- none of which he earned.

[snip]

Hinton said he's angry that Letuli appears to be retiring with full benefits, with only the loss of one stripe as punishment. "He needs to be court-martialed and thrown out," Hinton said. "How does an E-8 or E-9 get away with this, with only a slap on the wrist? I don't get it."

Quite frankly, we don't get it either. But sadly, we've chronicled quite a few examples of senior personnel (both officer and enlisted) getting by with misconduct that would end the career of a mere mortal. We're also reminded that the national guard (in some states) tends to be clubby, run by the good-old-boys (and girls) network. In other words, Letuli had sponsors and patrons who helped him reach the rank of CSM--the same people who ignored those unauthorized badges, medals and tabs that appeared on his BDUs and service dress uniforms. And true to form, those same folks are now trying to ease Letuli out the door and avoid jeopardizing their own careers.

We spend a little time in the Tarheel State each month. Sadly, North Carolina has not been a model of good government in recent years. Former Democratic Governor Mike Easley recently pleaded guilty to felony charges for accepting gifts and other benefits from political allies. Through a plea deal, he won't spend any time in jail, but he has the dubious distinction of being a convicted felon--and an embarrassment to his state. Ethics questions are still swirling around his successor, fellow Democrat Beverly Perdue.

Obviously, it's a long jump from the governor's mansion to a national guard regiment. But the scandals involving Easley and Letuli are endemic of a wider problem in North Carolina. If you're willing to tolerate a governor who breaks the law, it's no surprise the state guard is populated with senior officers and NCOs who look the other way when one of their own commits his own little fraud. And when his misdeeds are exposed, the same individuals circle the wagons send Letuli out the gate with just a slap on the wrist.

In a just world, both Mike Easley and John Letuli would be cell mates at Leavenworth, or some other federal pen. Instead, they're slouching off into the sunset, reputations destroyed, but pensions and benefits intact.

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ADDENDUM: In view of recent court decisions, we wonder if Letuli will try to have his rank restored. Over the past six months, federal judges in Colorado and California have ruled that individuals have the right to lie about their military service. Does that same right extend to members of the military? In light of those rulings, you could make the case that regulations limiting the wearing of medals, decorations and devices by military personnel are a violation of free speech. So what if I never earned the Air Force Cross...I always wanted one, and according to the federal bench, I have the right to make that claim. By that standard, Letuli wasn't committing fraud, he was simply exercising his right to free speech.