Don't Trust--and Verify

A day after supposedly agreeing to give up its nuclear weapons program, North Korea has thrown a monkey wrench into the process, demanding that the U.S. give Pyongyang a light-water nuclear reactor before it begins disposing of its nukes.

That's a major shift from the agreement that North Korean diplomats signed in Beijing on Monday. Under the terms of that deal, North Korea said it would give up its nuclear arsenal, while agreeing to discuss the reactor issue "at an appropriate time." Barely 24 hours later, Pyongyang said delivery of the reactors was a prerequisite for North Korea to dismantle its nukes.

Does this surprise anyone? I'm not on the staff at Foggy Bottom, but I can't recall a single international agreement that North Korea has actually kept. Lies, subterfuge and double-dealing are standard items in Pyongyang's diplomatic tookbox, and their sudden "addition" to Monday's agreement is hardly a shock. Having extracted a promise for light-water reactors, Pyongyang will now compel the U.S. to make good on that offer, threatening to abandon the non-proliferation agreement if a delivery date isn't established.

The U.S. and Japan will hem and haw, but I'm guessing that we'll ultimately capitulate to North Korea's demands. No one wants a war with North Korea and, from the State Department perspective, even a flawed agreement is better that no agreement.

As an old Korea-hand, I'm a little disturbed that the U.S. is heading down this road again. We made similar promises in the Jimmy Carter-brokered Agreed To Framework of 1994, promising oil deliveries and reactors in exchange for a suspension of North Korea's nuclear efforts. Of course, Pyongyang quickly broke the agreement, continuing to develop nuclear weapons covertly. The North Koreans admitted their deceit in 2002, spurring the current round of six-nation talks aimed at reigning in Pyongyang's nuclear program.

Getting other parties invovled was the right idea, but offering North Korea the same type of carrot--and no stick--is simply bad policy. North Korea perceives (correctly) that it has the U.S. and its partners over a barrel, so it can reluctantly agree to get rid of its nukes, then demand last-minute changes in the agreement, figuring that Washington, Seoul, Tokyo, and even Beijing will eventually come around.

Is there another option? I'd suggest a nuclear laydown on the DPRK, but I don't think the White House will buy off on that idea. Instead, how about making reactor deliver contigent upon full cooperation from North Korea--as verified by the IAEA and inspectors from the five nations that met with Pyongyang in China. Failure to comply will result in immediate referral to the UN Security Council, with the recommendations for economic sanctions and a military quarrantine of North Korea.

Naturally, the Russians and the Chinese wouldn't buy off on that idea, and that kind of talk makes the Japanese and South Koreans nervous. So, we'll keep muddling along the diplomatic track, making more agreements that Pyongyang can violate at its leisure. Based on their track record, North Korea simply cannot be trusted. If we insist on pursuing the diplomatic option--and apparently, it's the only game in town--we need a much tougher verification process that encourages compliance, and not more cheating.