In a Jam

Over at Aviation Week's defense blog, Graham Warwick highlights yet another headache for the Air Force--the service's inability to develop a viable electronic attack strategy, or platforms to carry out that mission.

As Mr. Warwick reminds us, the USAF has been relying on Navy and Marine Corps EA-6B Prowlers to provide tactical jamming support for its strike aircraft. But the support agreement between the two services is set to expire in 2012 and as of this writing, the Air Force has nothing in the works to provide electronic jamming for non-stealth aircraft.

And, making matters worse, the Navy is only buying 85 of its new EA-18G Growler--enough to cover fleet operations, but not enough to support carrier squadrons and Air Force strike packages.

You may recall that the USAF once had a superb escort jammer--the EF-111 "Raven." Based on the venerable F-111 design, the Raven was more than fast enough to follow strike packages into the target area, establish its "Taco" jamming orbit and suppress enemy radars, then cover the egress of attack aircraft.

But, in the post-Cold War military, it became apparent that DoD couldn't afford the Raven and the EA-6B. So, some bright folks in the Pentagon hit on the idea of retiring the EF-111 and utilizing the more-numerous Prowler squadrons to cover Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force strike operations.

To some degree, the idea made sense. Not only was the EA-6B inventory greater than the number of EF-111s, the Navy and Marine Corps jammer offered greater coverage of threat radars and it was capable of firing anti-radiation missiles. But there were some trade offs. The Prowler was slower than the Raven.

Participating in more than a few Red Flags and Green Flags, I listened to strike crews complain that the Prowlers "couldn't keep up." A standard tactic on the Nellis range was to "push" the EA-6Bs ahead of the bombers, particularly if you had aircraft like the F-111 or F-15E in the formation. Sending the Prowlers in advance allowed them to target air defenses more effectively, and it also kept them from falling behind.

Unfortunately, that tactic made them an easy target for "red air," which was quite adept at stripping the jammers from the strike package. If the Prowlers survived, their HARM capability was a welcome addition for EC (electronic combat) package commanders. But, if I recall correctly, the addition of HARMs limited their jammer load.

Whatever their liabilities, the Prowler community did a fine job supporting Air Force strike operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and over Iraq. In the interim, the USAF was supposed to develop its own plan for jamming support, developing new systems that were supposed to be ready by 2012.

Even if you're not a career electronic warfare officer (EWO), you can probably guess what happened. Two of the Air Force's "favored" solutions for electronic attack, the EB-52 (a Buff configured for stand-off jamming) and the Joint Unmanned Combat Air System (J-UCAS) were cancelled. A third system projected for the USAF EC quiver, the miniature air-launched decoy, has been delayed until 2011, at the earliest.

That is not to say the USAF is completely without options. With its purchase of the F-22 (and the F-35 in the works), a significant number of Air Force strike platforms will be low-observable and, presumably, require less jamming support than older aircraft. The AESA radars of the Raptor and the Lightning II also have inherent jamming capabilities.

But those arguments only go so far. F-22 production will likely be capped in the low 200s, and those platforms will be used for a variety of missions. Given those realities, the F-22's most likely EC mission will be self-defense (or screening other Raptors), rather than protecting non-stealth aircraft. The same holds true for the F-35.

And, until the F-35 begins replacing the F-16 in large numbers--at the end of the next decade--most of the Air Force strike inventory will consist of aircraft that are not low observable. That means a continuing requirement for stand-off and close-in jamming support, against an air defense arrays that grow increasingly robust.

At this point, there are no easy solutions for the Air Force's electronic attack woes. The clock is ticking on that support agreement and buying Growlers for the USAF simply isn't an option. Our guess is that the USAF will attempt to muddle through, relying on stealth to decrease the need for jamming and hoping that its non-stealthy attack jets don't have to face an advanced air defense network (read: double-digit SAMs) before retirement.

As Mr. Warwick writes, someone needs to ask the Air Force why it has bungled the electronic attack mission so badly. True, the service had to be dragged into the EA-6B agreement, and many EWOs warned of its long-term consequences. But the USAF ultimately signed on the bottom line, with a promise to develop long-term solutions for tactical jamming.

More than a decade later, those "solutions" are as elusive as ever. As for the EWOs who tried to warn Air Force about the perils of the Prowler deal and the long-term development strategy? They're either flying a desk, or enjoying a happy retirement.

***
ADDENDUM: We should also note that stealth does not completely eliminate the need for jamming support. EA-6Bs were included on more than a few missions flow by the F-117, for obvious reasons. As a rule, older radars are more effective against LO platforms that newer radars that operate at higher frequencies. Adding an EA-6B to the mission reduces that threat, because the jammer is highly effective against older acquisition radars, among other threats.

A Brother for the Defense

There's an interesting letter to the editor in this week's edition of Air Force Times. It was written by Brigadier General David Goldfein, who currently serves as Deputy Director of Programs in the Plans Directorate at Air Force Headquarters in Washington.

As you might have guessed, Dave Goldfein is the younger brother of Major General Stephen Goldfein, who was implicated in the "Thunder Vision" contracting scandal. Major General Goldfein received administrative punishment after DoD investigators determined that he helped steer a $50-million audio-visual contract to a firm that included his former boss, General Hal Hornburg, among its partners.

It's comes as no surprise that Brigadier General Goldfein's letter provides a spirited defense of his brother. A few excerpts:

When newspapers across the country grabbed the story and posted Maj. Gen. Stephen Goldfein’s picture all over the news [“Major general disciplined,” April 28], I, along with everyone who has ever served with this officer, was outraged. You see, not only is Maj. Gen. Goldfein the finest officer I have ever known, he is my brother.

[snip]

While readers will think this is just a brother standing up for his sibling, it is really an attempt to allow you to get to know my brother like I do, and perhaps question whether the price he has paid, both personally and professionally, is appropriate given the alleged offense.

First, my brother Steve is a true patriot who embodies the core values of our Air Force: integrity first, service before self, excellence in all we do. From his days as a wing commander at the Air Force Academy to his days commanding at squadron, group and wing levels, he has become well known for his quiet and steady demeanor. He is one of those guys you want to be near when things go south. I have never known him to lose his cool — with maybe one exception, on the golf course ... but it really was a bad shot.

Second, my brother is an honest man. In his 30-year career, I have never known him to do anything other than the right thing. While the recent press has certainly tarnished his reputation, those who know Maj. Gen. Steve Goldfein and have worked with him remain absolutely convinced that in the case of the Nellis contracting issue, he was doing what he has always done: the right thing in his heart for the Air Force and nation. There was no personal gain. There was no agenda. I seriously question whether there was any true influencing (as have others who were there in the room). Why? Because it would be completely out of sync with how he has handled himself and treated his subordinates over the past 30 years.

Dave Goldfein's willingness to stand up for his brother is commendable. Faced with family scandal, I've known other siblings (military and civilian) who made a mad dash for the tall grass. And, Brigadier General Goldfein's letter won't exactly endear him to senior Air Force leaders, suggesting that his brother has paid too high a price for the alleged offense.

For the record, I never served under either of the Goldfein brothers. Friends and former colleagues who have generally give them high marks; I've heard similar stories about Major General Goldfein's reputation for coolness in tough situations. There is little doubt that both are able officers who have served this country well over the past 30 years.

But Dave Goldfein's laudatory description of his brother must be squared against DoD IG's findings on Thunder Vision. Based on months of investigation--and interviews with scores of witnesses--the IG paints a different picture of Major General Goldfein: an officer who leaned hard on the contract selection team and steered the deal toward a firm with close Air Force ties.

From the report, we know that Major General Goldfein tried to assume a greater role in the contracting process, by joining the selection panel. Rebuffed in that attempt, he became an adviser to the team and lobbied tirelessly for the company that eventually won the contract, Strategic Message Services (SMS). The deal--which would provide enhanced audio-visual support for the USAF Thunderbirds--was later cancelled, after rival firms filed a protest.

As an active participant in the contracting process, Major General Goldfein knew that SMS's bid was far higher than those submitted by other firms. He was also aware that the Air Force had the capability to provide the required support "in house," through a training squadron at Hill AFB, Utah. But he kept pushing SMS until the selection team chief finally relented. "Sorry guys, I caved" the officer told his colleagues, after a final meeting with Goldfein. Another participant said the experience left him feeling "dirty."

How was that in the best interest of the Air Force and the nation? Short answer--it wasn't. True, there was no immediate personal gain for General Goldfein, but he was aware that the Thunder Vision plan had strong support from the USAF Chief of Staff, General Michael Moseley. With the chief's personal interest in the project, there was a long-term incentive for Goldfein to steer the project in a direction that Moseley would support.

To be fair, Major General Goldfein strongly disagrees with the report and its findings, disputing some of the comments and actions attributed to him. But his claims go against the testimony of other participants, and the conclusions of the IG.

As for the price he paid, there are many in the Air Force who would say that Steve Goldfein got off easy. He may never see his third star, but he'll still retire with a comfortable pension, and the opportunity for even bigger bucks as a consultant or defense contractor.

Compare that to the Technical Sergeant who was court-martialed for adding $75 to his claim for a Do-It-Yourself (DITY) move. That man lost his career for less than one percent of the Thunder Vision contract.

Like that E-6, Major General Goldfein made a mistake--and was held accountable. There's nothing inappropriate about that. If anything, Goldfein should be thankful that he faced "justice" as a two-star general, and not a Tech Sergeant.

More Bad News

***UPDATE/1742 EDT***

DoD officials now say that the "manufacturing irregularities" at the Boeing plant were acts of vandalism. A reward has been offered for information in the case. Portions of the Chinook production line remain idled.

***

Boeing’s chances for winning the Air Force’s next generation combat search-and-rescue (CSAR-X) helicopter contract took an unexpected hit this week, when the company was forced to temporarily shut down the Pennsylvania assembly line that would build the new rescue choppers.

As Aviation Week reports, Boeing halted production after discovering manufacturing irregularities in two Chinook helicopters being built at its Ridley Township, Pennsylvania facility. The shutdown affects CH-47 production at the plant—the same one that would build CSAR helicopters, if Boeing wins the Air Force contract.

The production pause is standard procedure in such incidents:

According to Boeing, the company notified its security organization and the site’s resident Defense Contract Management Agency representatives who oversee all U.S. government contracts at the facility. Boeing’s standard operating procedures require a thorough investigation of the incident to determine the extent of the irregularities, according to a company statement.

Subsequent reports indicate the “irregularities” consisted of severed wires on one Chinook, and a suspicious washer in the subsystem of another aircraft. The problems were discovered by Boeing employees, who conducted inspections of four other CH-47s on the assembly line. No irregularities were found in the other helicopters. Work on the helicopters was set to resume today.

Pennsylvania Congressman Joe Sestak, whose district includes the Boeing plant, said there was a “very low probability” that the damage was deliberate. “But it’s not out of the question that it’s the result of an accident,” he told Aerospace Daily. Sestak also emphasized that “the system worked” in discovering the irregularities and reporting them to the proper authorities.

But the problems at Ridley Township won’t be lost on Boeing critics—or Air Force officials still mulling the CSAR-X contract. While the brief production halt at the helicopter plant won’t scuttle Boeing’s chances of winning the Air Force contract, it will raise new questions about the company and its entry in the competition, the HH-47.

Based on the Chinook variant currently in service with U.S. special forces, the HH-47 was a relatively late addition to the initial CSAR-X competition. When Boeing won the contract in late 2006, the losing bidders (Sikorsky and Lockheed-Martin) filed a protest with the Government Accountability Office (GAO). In a rare move, the GAO upheld the protest, prompting the Air Force to re-open the competition.

A final decision on the CSAR-X contract is expected later this year. At one point, the Air Force hoped to announce the winner in early 2008, but that decision was pushed back until late summer. The delay will give the USAF more time to evaluate operating and maintenance costs for the new helicopters—sticking points in the earlier CSAR-X competition.

In the meantime, there will be whispers in the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill about the production problem in Pennsylvania, designed to raise more doubts about the HH-47. The Boeing product has its backers in Washington, but Sikorsky and Lockheed-Martin are also well-represented, and they’ll use the assembly line shut-down as one more reason to reject the HH-47.

Boeing faces the added obstacle of trying to overcome the Air Force tanker lease scandal, which sent one of its senior executives to prison, and resulted in a record, $600-million fine. While the deal was scrapped five years ago, the controversy still resonates in many political and military circles, making it more difficult for Boeing to win new, multi-billion dollar deals like CSAR-X.

At this point, the rescue helicopter competition is still a horse race. But Boeing didn’t do itself any favors, having to admit problems on its production line, in the run-up to the Air Force decision.

Iran Outflanks Israel

Today's reading assignment, from Ralph Peters in The New York Post.

As Colonel Peters observes, Hizballah, Iran and Syria are attaining their goals in Lebanon for a simple reason: no one in Israel or the west will do anything about it.

When will we face reality? Hezbollah can't be appeased. Hezbollah can't be integrated into a democratic government and domesticated. And Hezbollah, whose cadres believe that death is a promotion, can't be deterred by wagging fingers and flyovers.

Hezbollah, our mortal enemy, must be destroyed. But we - Israel, the United States, Europe - lack the will. And will is one thing Hezbollah and its backers in Iran and Syria don't lack: They'll kill anyone and destroy anything to win.
We won't. We still think we can talk our way out of a hit job. Not only are we reluctant to kill those bent on killing us - we don't even want to offend them.

Hezbollah's shocking defeat of Israel in 2006 (when will Western leaders learn that you can't measure out war in teaspoons?) highlighted the key military question of our time: How can humane, law-abiding states defeat merciless postnational organizations that obey only the "laws" of bloodthirsty gods?

The answer, as Iraq and Afghanistan should have taught us, is that you have to gut the organization and kill the hardcore cadres. (Exactly how many al Qaeda members have we converted to secular humanism?).

Entranced by the military vogue of the season, we don't even get our terminology right. Defeating Hezbollah has nothing to do with counterinsurgency warfare - the situation's gone far beyond that. We're facing a new form of "non-state state" built around a fanatical killing machine that rejects all of our constraints.

Meanwhile, Israel is preoccupied with the Olmert scandal and the situation in Gaza. As for the U.S., we're still promoting some sort of peace deal that will, ultimately, strengthen the terrorists.

We will pay a heavy price for our inattention and inactivity.

Circle the Wagons

As the Defense Department begins its latest probe into the Air Force "Thunder Vision" scandal, there are signs that the service will defend officials who may be targeted by that inquiry.

Speaking to a group of intelligence professionals, an Air Force Brigadier General said yesterday that "One of our top priorities right now is keeping General [Michael] Moseley in there, what with Thunder Vision and all." In From the Cold learned of the general's remarks from a senior Air Force civilian who was in the audience.

Moseley, who serves as the USAF Chief of Staff, was mentioned in the original DoD Inspector General (IG) report on the controversy. While General Moseley was not accused of any wrong-doing, the document detailed his personal relationship with the head of Strategic Message Services (SMS), a Pennsylvania firm that won a contract to provide audio-visual support for the USAF Thunderbirds in 2005.

The $50-million deal was cancelled in early 2006, after a rival firm filed a complaint. Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne referred the matter to the IG office. Investigators spent almost two years compiling their report, which was completed in early 2008 and released to the public last month.

According to the IG, at least five USAF officials took part in an effort to steer the contract to SMS, a firm that included a retired Air Force four-star general among its partners. The report placed much of the blame on Major General Stephen Goldfein, then-Commander of the Air Warfare Center at Nellis AFB, Nevada. In that post, Goldfein was responsible for supporting the Thunderbirds, the Air Force's renowned precision-flying team.

Defense Department investigators found that Goldfein labored tirelessly for SMS, despite the fact that the company's bid was twice that of other firms. General Goldfein and two other officers subsequently received administrative punishment from Secretary Wynne for their conduct in the investigation.

While General Moseley was not sanctioned, the report raised questions about his ties to the company during the contract process. While bids were under review in 2005, Moseley and his wife paid a "social visit" to the home of Ed Shipley, the SMS president. Mr. Shipley's partner in the venture, retired Air Force General Hal Hornburg, was also present during that visit. General Moseley told the IG that the proposed Thunderbirds contract "never came up" during his time at Shipley's home.

Other sections of the IG report detailed additional contacts between Moseley and Shipley while SMS was competing for the Thunderbirds contract. In one e-mail, General Moseley asked the SMS president to fly a friend (a retired Royal Air Force officer) in one of Shipley's vintage aircraft. Mr. Shipley owns both a P-51 Mustang and an F-86 Sabre; his aircraft have routinely participated in USAF "heritage flights," which showcase vintage warbirds and today's combat aircraft.

Results of the IG investigation prompted key members of the Senate to ask for another inquiry. In late April, Senator Carl Levin of Michigan and Arizona Senator John McCain, asked the inspector general to launch a new probe, focusing on the comments of senior Air Force officials. Earlier this week, congressional sources told In From the Cold that the new investigation was underway.

While the USAF has not responded officially to the latest Thunder Vision probe, the brigadier general's comments may offer insight into the thinking of senior officials. They suggest the service is prepared to circle the wagons around Moseley, and fight to keep him as Chief of Staff. The remarks also indicate that some senior officers view Moseley as vulnerable, and fear that the new investigation will lead to his early retirement.

General Moseley has served as the service's senior uniformed officer since September 2005; his term is scheduled to end in 2009. An early departure from the chief of staff position would be another blow for the Air Force, which has endured a series of scandals involving high-ranking officials over the past five years.

Spokesmen for the Air Force did not immediately respond to requests for comment on the matter.

The Brigadier General who suggests that keeping Moseley is a "top priority" now serves as vice commander of a major Air Force organization and is stationed outside the Washington, D.C. area. A career fighter pilot, the general has extensive operational experience and previously served as commander of wing-level units. He made the comment about General Moseley during a visit to an east-coast base.

Air Force members present for yesterday's event expressed some surprise at the general's remarks. While the Thunder Vision scandal has reverberated throughout the service, there have been few indications as to how senior officers view the controversy, and their reaction to the latest investigation.

Today's Reading Assignments

From OpinionJournal.com:

"The Challenge From China," by Mark Helprin, senior fellow at the Claremont Institute, and adapted from his recent speech at the Hoover Institution. A brief excerpt:

As we content ourselves with the fallacy that never again shall we have to fight large, technological opponents, China is transforming its forces into a full-spectrum military capable of major operations and remote power projection. Eventually the twain shall meet. By the same token, our sharp nuclear reductions and China's acquisitions of ballistic-missile submarines and multiple-warhead mobile missiles will eventually come level. The China that has threatened to turn Los Angeles to cinder is arguably more cavalier about nuclear weapons than are we, and may find parity a stimulus to brinkmanship. Who will blink first, a Barack Obama (who even now blinks like Betty Boop) or a Hu Jintao?

Also recommended is Bret Stephens' latest Global View column, "From Lebanon to Hezbollahstan." As he writes:

Future historians will look for the precise moment the Lebanese Republic began to transmogrify into Hezbollahstan. Was it the June 2005 murder of anti-Syrian journalist Samir Kassir – the earliest sign that Syria, whose 29-year military occupation of its neighbor had ended just two months before, intended to reinsert itself by stealth and terror (and with the connivance of Hezbollah)? Was it the role played by the Maronite Gen. Michel Aoun, a hero of the last Lebanese civil war, who returned from exile in 2005 intending to play the part of de Gaulle only to become, after striking a bargain with Hezbollah, another Pétain?

Was it the summer war of 2006, when Israel failed to destroy Hezbollah militarily and, in so failing, gave Hezbollah an aura of invincibility? Was it the unwillingness of international peacekeepers to patrol the Lebanese-Syrian border, thereby allowing Hezbollah to rearm itself after the war? Was it the absence of an effective, or even intelligible, American policy toward Lebanon, epitomized by Condoleezza Rice's decision to rehabilitate Damascus by inviting it to November's Annapolis Middle East conference?

The answer is all of the above: An accumulation of policy mistakes, political dodges and moral atrocities that have nearly killed the "new" Lebanon in its crib.

Festering problems, in opposite corners of the world, waiting for the next administration. And sadly, there are grave doubts about the ability of any of the presidential candidates to address these challenges.

Oops, They Goofed (Explaining Away the PRC ASAT Test)

China's leaders likely regret their decision to carry out an anti-satellite weapons test in 2007, according to a top U.S. expert on Beijing's space program.

Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese recently told a Congressional panel that China "miscalculated" international reaction to the test, which created a large cloud of space debris and brought near-universal condemnation. As Aviation Week reports:

"The Chinese took very careful aim and shot themselves in the foot with that test," says Joan Johnson-Freese, chairman of the National Security Decision-Making Dept. at the U.S. Naval War College. "I think they now are now recognizing that the international condemnation due them was actually moderated."

Testifying before the Senate Commerce space, aeronautics and related sciences subcommittee, Johnson-Freese said it is impossible to know exactly what motivated the test, given the layers of Chinese government secrecy. But she says an emerging consensus among China-watchers holds that it was the logical outcome of an Asat-weapon development program started in response to the U.S. program that tested an air-launched satellite interceptor against a defunct weather satellite.

Military research and development is heavily "bureaucratized" and "very stovepiped," Johnson-Freese says, emphasizing that she is speaking for herself and not her government employers. "The engineers who were in charge of that technology development program put it forward as 'it's time to test,'" she says.

Dr. Johnson-Freese emphasized that she was speaking for herself, and not her government employers. But she isn't the first analyst to suggest that last year's ASAT test was the product of bungled decisions, and not an attempt to demonstrate China's growing counter-space capabilities.

Still, her theory has several flaws. First, let's assume that Johnson-Freese is correct in assuming that Chinese President Hu Jinato personally authorized the test. Even if he didn't fully understand the event's potential ramifications, there are plenty of smart folks in the PLA and the CMC who did.

Like all leaders, Mr. Hu (presumably) sought the advice of experts and weighed possible consequences before green-lighting the test. If the PRC leader didn't seek counsel from his military and space advisers--or dismissed their concerns--well, that raises serious questions about decision-making at the highest levels of the Beijing government. But, that's a topic for another day.

We also have problems with Johnson-Freese's assertion that the Chinese test was the ultimate reaction to the U.S. ASAT program. The last American ASAT weapon, launched from an F-15 fighter, was tested in 1985 (emphasis ours), and the program was cancelled three years later. In other words, Beijing decided to launch a priority state program, with an investment of billions of dollars, in response to a U.S. ASAT effort that had been terminated in the late 1980s. With all due respect to the good professor, that sort of logic fails the Aggie test.

Readers will also note that the assessment of Dr. Johnson-Freese fails to put the Chinese ASAT test into the large context of Beijing's "Space War" strategy. As we've noted in earlier posts, the PRC is actively pursuing doctrine and capabilities aimed at crippling our overhead assets, while ensuring their own, continued access to the high frontier.

That's one reason the Chinese are pursuing guided weapons that are compatible with multiple satellite navigation systems. If they succeed in targeting our GPS constellation (with jamming or destruction), their missiles and smart bombs can still work with updates from GLONASS, the European Galileo network, or their own Beidou satellites.

Beijing has also invested heavily in ground-based anti-satellite weapons. In her Congressional testimony, Johnson-Freese failed to mention that a high-powered Chinese laser successfully tracked a U.S. spy satellite just months before the 2007 ASAT test. The same laser could be potentially used to blind our reconnaissance platforms in low earth orbit (LEO). Was the tracking event a mere coincidence, or another demonstration of China's "Space War" options.

Those rather inconvenient facts provide sufficient reason to doubt the explanation offered by Dr. Johnson-Freese. But then again, her position on China--and the "logic" behind her theory--are anything but surprising.

Before moving to her job at the naval war college, Johnson-Freese served on the faculty at the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) in Honolulu. Created by the Department of Defense in 1995, the center has long been criticized for downplaying the China threat.

The professor is also among those who (apparently) blame the U.S. for international problems relating to space. The Space Review described that thesis in a review of her book, Space as a Strategic Asset, which was published last year:

"The core problem with US space policy, she emphasizes, is America’s unrelenting militarization and weaponization of space. “While the rest of the world seeks to increase its ability to use space assets for information linkages required for economic growth in a globalized world, the United State sees much of the technology they are seeking as militarily sensitive and, consequently, is trying to stop its spread. That initial clash of ambitions is further exacerbated by the parallel emphasis the United States places on expanding its space superiority to space dominance.”

[snip]

She makes a compelling argument that “through clumsy rather than intentionally nefarious use of its considerable power, the U.S. is perceived as a rogue nation in its own right. Other nations regard the U.S. as skirting international law in its treatment of war prisoners, lack of support for international treaties, and proclivity toward preemption and unilateralism. In the space arena, movement toward space weapons further reinforces this perception.

And this woman chairs the "National Security Decision-Making Department" at the Naval War College.

Ray Spruance must be spinning in his grave.

Thundervision, Take Two

As expected, The Department of Defense Inspector General has reopened its investigation into the Air Force Thunder Vision contract, with emphasis on the conduct of current and former service officials.

In a letter dated May 2nd, the IG notified the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services that it had reopened its inquiry into the matter. The inspector general's actions came in response to a recent request from the chairman, Michigan Senator Carl Levin, and the panel's ranking Republican, Senator John McCain of Arizona. A copy of the IG letter announcing the new investigation was provided to In From the Cold by Congressional sources.

Levin and McCain asked for another probe of the matter last month, after reviewing the initial report from the inspector general's office. That document detailed a two-year investigation into the contract--dubbed "Thuder Vision"--which covered audio-visual support for the Thunderbirds, the Air Force's precision flying team.

The report detailed attempts by senior officials to steer the contract to a firm with close ties to the service, but it did not reach any findings or recommendations "with regard to the conduct of other, more senior current and former Air Force officials."

Representatives of the IG office refused to speculate on which officials might be the target of the latest inquiry. However, Democratic members of the Senate Armed Services Committee were critical of the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Michael Moseley, who was mentioned in the first report, but not accused on any wrong-doing. The document revealed that General Moseley visited the CEO of the firm that received the contract--just months before it was awarded.

Instead, the IG report implicated five Air Force officials, including Major General Stephen Goldfein, former commander of the Air Warfare Center at Nellis AFB, Nevada. In that post, Goldfein was responsible for both the Thunderbirds and support efforts for the team.

Investigators from the Inspector General's office determined that Goldfein actively attempted to steer the contract to the winning firm, Strategic Message Solutions. After being told that he could not be a member of the selection panel, General Goldfein assumed the role of an advisory, and lobbied heavily for SMS, a Pennsylvania company that included a retired Air Force four-star general, Hal Hornburg, among its partners.

The IG also discovered that Hornburg was present when General Moseley visited the home of Ed Shipley, the CEO of SMS. Moseley and the other participants insist that the Thunderbirds contract never came up during the get-together, which was described as a social event.

But the visit did occur during a one-year "cooling off" period following Hornburg's retirement, a time when he was not supposed to have official contact with Air Force officials. Hornburg also had military ties to Major General Goldfein before leaving active duty. As Commander of Air Combat Command, Hornburg supervised scores of subordinate units and their commanders, including Goldfein and the Air Warfare Center.

As a result of the preliminary IG investigation, Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne referred General Goldfein and two other senior officials for administrative action. Two lower-ranking individuals were referred to their chains-of-command for potential punishment.

To date, no criminal charges have been filed in connection with the contract. The U.S. Attorney's Office in Las Vegas declined to prosecute anyone involved in the matter, citing a lack of evidence. It is uncertain if federal prosecutors and the FBI will assist with the latest investigation.

No timeline has been established for completing the new probe. The letter announcing the latest investigation was signed by John Crane, the Assistant Inspector General for Communications and Legislative Liaison.

Investigators began their first look at the Thunderbirds contract in February 2006, after a referral from Mr. Wynne. The referral stemmed from a complaint by another firm that bid on the Thunderbirds project.

As the IG report subsequently revealed, the Air Force awarded the $50 million audio-visual support contract to SMS after extensive lobbying by Goldfein. The "winning" bid was more than twice that of other companies. Pentagon officials later cancelled the contract, after the inspector general's office began its investigation.

The contract called for SMS to provide upgraded video and audio support for the Thunderbirds during air show performances. As part of that plan, the company planned to utilize cameras on the unit's aircraft and on the ground, projecting those images on giant "Jumbotron" video screens. SMS also suggested synchronizing music to maneuvers by the Thunderbirds.

A second inquiry into the Thunder Vision controversy was considered all-but-inevitable, after Senators Levin and McCain submitted their request last month. Air Force magazine's website first reported the new investigation last week, based on information from Pentagon sources. The letter obtained by In From the Cold provides the first, written confirmation that a new probe has begun.

While the new investigation will focus on the conduct of senior officials, it is unclear if the inquiry will extend to related matters, such as the assignment process. This blog reported last week that Major General Goldfein was reassigned twice during the first Thunder Vision probe, moves that may have violated Air Force personnel regulations.

The service's written instruction covering assignments states that personnel are barred from reassignment while under investigation by security forces or the AFOSI. The investigation clause is widely interpreted to mean an inquiry by any investigative organization, military or civilian. Assignments for lower-ranking Air Force members are routinely delayed or cancelled due to investigations.

Great Moments in Aviation History

1903--Wright Brothers' first flight
1914--Aircraft used in combat for the first time
1927--Charles Lindberg flies solo across the Atlantic
1929--Jimmy Doolittle develops instrument flight
1941--First jet aircraft flies
1945--Enola Gay drops the atomic bomb on Hiroshima
1958--Boeing 707 is introduced
1969--Man walks on the moon
1981--First stealth fighter
1993--B-2 Stealth Bomber reaches IOC
1999--Air power proves decisive in Operation Allied Force
2008--Vermont firm introduces improved "piddle pack" for pilots

H/T: Air Force Times

Last of the Tigers

A P-40 with the "shark" nose of the Flying Tigers and the 12-point sun of the Nationalist Chinese government (Wikipedia photo).

There was a military reunion last Friday at Lackland AFB in San Antonio. But it was anything but your typical gathering of veterans and their family members. In fact, the reunion may be the last of its kind, since it brought together the last surviving members of the American Volunteer Group (AVG), the famed "Flying Tigers" who fought in China during the early days of World War II.

Only eight members of the unit made it to the San Antonio event--roughly half of the 19 Flying Tigers who still survive. Time has already claimed most of the group's most famous members, including double ace David "Tex" Hill, who passed away in 2007, and Richard "Dick" Rossi, who died last month at the age of 92. Mr. Rossi, who was credited with six aerial victories in World War II, did much to preserve the heritage of his unit, serving as President of the Flying Tigers Association for 50 years.

The seven men and one woman honored at Lackland last Friday represent more than 300 who sailed for the Far East in the fall of 1941. While war clouds gathered in the Pacific, the U.S. had not entered combat. The future Tigers went as volunteers, fighting for Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Chinese government. They were promised salaries well above those of the U.S. military and for the pilots, a bonus for each Japanese plane they shot down.

"We're the last of the Mohicans," said Chuck Baisden, who joined the group as a 21-year-old armorer. Today, 67 years later, he is the second-youngest alumnus of the Flying Tigers. "That's the way it is," he told the San Antonio Express-News. You come and you go.

Mr. Baisden's job was loading ammunition into the machine-guns of the P-40 Warhawks flown by the group's pilots. Today, only four of the men who flew those warbirds are still living, and only one of them attended last week's reunion.

But, as their numbers dwindle, the Flying Tigers' wartime record provides an enduring legacy. At a time when the Japanese seemed unstoppable, AVG pilots decimated enemy bomber and fighter formations, racking up an impressive 15-1 kill ratio. By some accounts, the Flying Tigers shot down as many as 296 Japanese aircraft, though some historians believe the total may be considerably lower.

More remarkably, the Tigers earned their reputation in an aircraft--the venerable Warhawk--that was ill-suited for dog-fighting against more maneuverable Japanese aircraft. But the group's legendary commander, Claire Chennault, understood the P-40's limitations, and adopted tactics that emphasized its advantages in speed and armament.

Like his men, Chennault was also a volunteer. He resigned from the Army Air Corps in 1937, after battling superiors on the issue of pursuit, or fighter aviation. As an instructor at the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS), Chennault was one of the few that challenged the "holy grail" of that era--an unshakable belief that bomber formations could always reach their target.

Chennault vehemently disagreed. He believed that well-coordinated air defenses, including fighter planes, could shoot down enough bombers to render their attacks ineffective, or unsustainable.

As an air adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, Chennault got a chance to prove his theory. But his initial attempts at organizing a Chinese air force met with mixed results and the withdrawal of Soviet mercenary units (in 1940) created an urgent need for skilled pilots and ground crews. Chennault returned to the United States and rounded up 300 volunteers, who formed the initial cadre of the AVG.

After a brief training period in Burma, the Flying Tigers entered combat just two weeks after Pearl Harbor, protecting the vital "Burma Road" from enemy air attack. Though badly out-numbered, Chennault's squadrons made the Japanese pay dearly for their advance into Burma and southern China, shooting down scores of enemy fighters and bombers. The volunteer unit remained in combat into the summer of 1942, when it was absorbed by the U.S. Army Air Force and designated the 23rd Fighter Group.

While many of the Tigers had previously served with the Army, Navy or Marine Corps, only five officers and 19 enlisted men elected to join the new group, disgusted by the "strong-arm" tactics of the Army general sent to recruit them. Chennault, who was promoted to Brigadier General, retained his position as commander. Tex Hill stayed on as well, serving as a squadron commander.

But most of the AVG pilots turned down a chance to join the 23rd. Some went to work as transport pilots, flying vital supplies "across The Hump" from India; others transitioned to civilian jobs back in the U.S., or rejoined the military and served with other units.

Along with its remaining aircraft and equipment, the newly-formed 23rd Fighter Group inherited something else from the Flying Tigers--the famous "shark mouth" painted on the nose of each aircraft. Today, the unit's A-10 attack jets (based at Moody AFB, Georgia), are the only Air Force aircraft authorized to carry that famous marking.

One of the 23rd's A-10s recently logged its 9,000th flying hour, becoming the most travelled fighter aircraft in Air Force history. It's part of the proud history of the group--a history that began with the AVG and the veterans recognized last Friday in San Antonio.

Will They Ever Learn?

Here's a suggestion for all those would-be and never-were Rambos out there: give it up. You may get away with your false claims of military service and/or heroism for a while, but eventually your lies will be exposed. And, thanks to the Stolen Valor Act of 2005, you could find yourself facing a federal judge.


The latest armed forces phony also hails from California (more on him in a moment). The Golden State is also home to Xavier Alvarez, the Pomona water board member who identified himself, on at least two occasions, as a retired Marine who won the Congressional Medal of Honor back in 1984.


Mr. Alvarez is currently awaiting sentencing on charges relating to the Stolen Valor Act. As we reported recently, a judge rejected Alvarez's claim that he had a "constitutional right" to lie about his military service. Mr. Alavarez never spent a day in uniform, but that didn't stop him from bragging about being a "26-year Marine," who won the MOH for his actions in a harrowing firefight. On another occasion, the Democratic politician claimed to have been a military helicopter pilot in Vietnam during the late 1960s. At the time, Alvarez was only 17 years old.


His comrade in deceit is one Michael Allan Fraser, who hails from Oroville. Last year, Mr. Fraser gave an interview to the local paper, according to the Military Times, and claimed to be a decorated combat veteran, with two Purple Hearts and two Bronze Stars from his days in Vietnam. He even took part in a veterans' trip to Vietnam, to help "bury ghosts of the past."


But Fraser's account seemed a little fishy to a Colorado man, who helped write the Stolen Valor legislation. With a little digging, he discovered the truth. While Fraser is a Vietnam-era veteran, he never served in the war zone. Instead, he spent his Army hitch in the Philippines, working as a veterinarian's assistant.


Earlier this week, Fraser pleaded guilty to charges relating to his bogus claims. A federal magistrate ordered him to pay a $500 fine and perform 100 hours of community service, helping veterans.


We'd say Mr. Fraser got off easy. Many of the men who earned the Bronze Star and Purple Heart in Vietnam received those awards posthumously. False assertions by phonies like Fraser degrade the accomplishments of real military heroes. They certainly deserve better.


Federal judges and magistrates could take a step toward curbing the flood of military fakes, and send them to jail. The prospect of a few months behind bars would deter many of the charlatans and reduce the number of Stolen Valor cases.


Unfortunately, violating the 2005 law is only a misdemeanor, and prosecutors and judges lean toward lenient sentences for offenders, many with no prior criminal record. The U.S. attorney who prosecuted Xavier Alvarez has recommended probation and a fine for the water board member.


We hope the judge in the Alvarez case will impose a tougher sentence, and send a message to the legions of military phonies who are still out there, regaling family, friends and the media with tales of valor that never occurred. It's worth remembering that Mr. Alvarez, who took a pass on military service, claimed an honor that has been won by less than 4,000 Americans. With his lies, Alvarez put himself in the same company with such men as Dan Daly, Audie Murphy, Jimmy Doolittle and Bud Day. That alone should qualify Alvarez for jail time, in our opinion.


As for the phony heroes still out there, no one can say they haven't been warned. In the internet age, it has never been easier to check military records, or research claims of valor. The recent flood of "Stolen Valor" prosecutions underscores public awareness of the issue (most cases begin with a tip from the public) and the government's willingness to prosecute. As the tips keep coming--the FBI has an agent who now works the issue full time--more and more of the military frauds will get the punishment they deserve.

On the Move

Major General Stephen Goldfein (DoD Photo)

USAF regulations bar permanent-change-of-station moves for personnel under investigation. So, why did a Major General, implicated in the "Thunder Vision" scandal, receive two new assignments while the matter was being probed?

by Nate Hale

Did the Air Force violate its own personnel rules, by sending a two-star general to new assignments while the Defense Department was investigating his role in a controversial contract for the USAF Thunderbirds?

The answer to that question apparently lies in how the service's regulations on assignments and investigations are interpreted.

Air Force officials insist that no rules were broken when Major General Stephen Goldfein moved from Nellis AFB, Nevada to Langley AFB, Virginia in November of 2006, and on to the Pentagon just three months later.

But other Air Force officers and senior non-commissioned officers, serving on active duty and retired, disagree with that assertion. They claim the Goldfein transfers are simply more evidence of a double-standard that exists for flag officers.

General Goldfein's permanent-change-of-station (PCS) moves occurred as DoD investigators and the FBI probed the Thunderbirds contract, including allegations that Goldfein attempted to steer it to Strategic Message Solutions (SMS), a company that included a retired Air Force four-star general, Hal M. Hornburg, among its partners. Goldfein worked briefly for Hornburg at one point in his military career.

A report released last month by the Defense Department Inspector General implicated five Air Force members, including Major General Goldfein, for directing the contract to SMS. At a cost of nearly $50 million, the firm was supposed to upgrade audiovisual support for the Thunderbirds, the Air Force's precision flying team.

At Goldfein's urging, a USAF contracting panel initially accepted the SMS proposal, despite the fact that the company existed largely on paper, and its bid was twice as high as those offered by competitors. The contract was cancelled in early 2006, after a rival firm lodged a formal protest and Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne referred the matter to the DoD IG for investigation. The inquiry began in February barely three months after SMS received the contract.

Twenty-three months after the inquiry began, the IG delivered a 250-page report that offered a scathing indictment of the contracting process and the actions of General Goldfein. DoD investigators found "the award [to Strategic Message Solutions] was tainted with improper influence, irregular procurement practices and preferential treatment."

They also determined the general's activities "represented a pattern of behavior that gave an advantage to SMS..and so constituted preferential treatment...In short, we believe the source selection process may not have selected SMS absent his influence.

In an interview with investigators, General Goldfein strongly denied that charge, asserting that he did not steer the deal to SMS. At the time the contract was up for bids, Goldfein was Commander of the Air Warfare Center at Nellis AFB, an organization responsible for both the Thunderbirds and the team's support efforts.

Responding to the IG report, which was made public last month, Secretary Wynne took administrative action against Major General Goldfein and two other individuals involved in the contract. He referred to lower-ranking individuals to their chains-of-command for possible action.

The penalty imposed on Goldfein is believed to be a Letter of Reprimand, which the military describes as non-judicial punishment. General Goldfein has not responded to media requests for comment on the matter. He currently serves as Vice Director of the Pentagon's Joint Staff, a position he has held since February 2007.

But the IG probe did not address the issue of Goldfein's continued advancement during the lengthy investigation. As the inquiry continued, the general was rewarded with two high-profile jobs that took him to a command headquarters and on to the Pentagon.

In November 2006, less than a year after the probe began, General Goldfein, a career fighter pilot, moved to the Vice Commander position at Air Combat Command headquarters, located at Langley AFB, Virginia. Three months later, in February of 2007, he was transferred to his current post on the Joint Staff.

General Goldfein's multiple moves during the Thunder Vision investigation are seemingly at odds with service personnel regulations, which prohibit PCS moves by individuals under investigation by "security forces or the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI)." USAF Instruction 36-2110, which details the service's assignment policies, lists several categories of personnel who are in-eligible for reassignment. Section 2.40.3.6 AAC 17 in the regulation describes the ban on PCS moves by those under investigation. The prohibition does not extend to "normal" security clearance investigations.

Goldfein's repeated reassignment during the probe has touched off a minor tempest in the Air Force. Current and former unit commanders, senior enlisted advisers and first sergeants contacted by In From the Cold were uniformly critical of decisions to let the general move to new jobs. All of those who offered opinions on the matter have extensive personnel experience; they believe the Goldfein example is a clear violation of assignment rules, creating a "double standard" for senior officers.

"I've never seen anyone allowed to PCS while under investigation," said a base personnel chief. "This sounds wrong and it should be investigated." The personnel officer (and other experts) interviewed for this article spoke on the condition of anonymity.

A senior non-commissioned officer, who serves as the superintendent of a large support squadron, was equally blunt: "If I had an airman who was under some type of investigation, they would be placed on administrative hold. An 'airman' is an 'airman' whether they're an E-1 [the lowest enlisted rank] or an E-10 [General of the Air Force]."

"This is definitely a double standard," said a civilian Air Force official. "One for the 'Good Ole Boys and Girls' and one for the rest of us."

A retired Chief Master Sergeant, who served as both a first sergeant and senior enlisted adviser during a 25-year Air Force career, voiced similar thoughts. In his experience, individuals "under any type of investigation were not allowed to PCS until the matter was completely resolved." He said the regulation was widely interpreted to include inquiries by non-Air Force agencies, such as the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, the investigative arm of the DoD IG. DCIS agents handled much of the Thunder Vision probe.

While acknowledging that personnel of all ranks are subject to the assignment regulation--and its stated limits on PCS moves--Air Force media representatives painted a different picture of the Goldfein controversy, suggesting the reassignment matter was more nuanced than it might appear.

Major David Small, a spokesman for the Secretary of the Air Force Office of Public Affairs, affirmed that the inquiry was on-going at the time of General Goldfein's reassignments. But in each case, he observed, "There was simply an on-going investigation and nothing had been substantiated."

Another Air Staff public affairs officer, Captain Michael Andrews, stated that the Thunder Vision investigation "was not initiated with Goldfein as its subject," claiming that "the general was not interviewed until early 2008," shortly before Mr. Wynne received the IG's final report. Interview dates for Major General Goldfein are listed in the document, but Andrews did not offer an explanation for his comments about who was (or wasn't) targeted by the IG probe.

Andrews also suggested that lower-ranking personnel, facing circumstances similar to that of General Goldfein, would also be allowed to move to new assignments.

Gary Comerford, A spokesman for the DoD Inspector General, refused to identify specific targets of the investigation. He referred reporters to redacted versions of the IG report, which have been posted on-line.

However, critics refute the Pentagon's claims. They note that senior officers in all services operate under a personnel system that is separate from those serving enlisted personnel and officers below flag rank. The result, they say, is a system that is more accommodating for senior personnel, and willing to overlook issues that might derail assignments for lower-ranking personnel.

As examples of how the network operates, critics note the long advancement of former Major General Thomas Fiscus and Brigadier General Richard Hassan. Fiscus, the service's former Judge Advocate General, had a long history of inappropriate relationships with female subordinates, while Hassan (who ran general officer management office) was accused of sexual harassment toward women in his command. Both men were eventually punished and forced to retire as Colonels, after their activities were exposed.

In the Air Force, assignments for general officers and civilian equivalents are handled by the Senior Leader Management Office (SLMO), located in Crystal City, Virginia. Flag-level commanders also play an important role in determining where general officers and senior civilians will be assigned.

According to Captain Andrews, officials at the SLMO are "unaware of any case in which an general officer was denied a PCS move due to an on-going investigation." Andrews could not provide statistics on the number general officer moves that occurred while the individual was under investigation, but those cases appear to be rare. A spokesman at Air Combat Command, where Goldfein served as Vice-Commander, said he "could not recall another example of a general being assigned to the ACC staff while under investigation."

By comparison, commanders and first sergeants who spoke with In From the Cold could not remember a single instance when junior personnel moved to a new assignment while being investigated. On the other hand, most could recall examples of junior personnel--particularly enlisted members--who had PCS moves delayed or cancelled, due to an investigation. They view the SLMO statement--and Goldfein's reassignment in 2006 and 2007 --as more proof of a double-standard.

Other Air Force members challenged the service's timeline of events, which was offered to explain General Goldfein's PCS moves. A senior USAF law enforcement official noted that Goldfein was actually questioned on two occasions by the DCIS, as outlined in the IG report. While the last interview took place in January of this year, DCIS investigators also spoke at length with General Goldfein on 14 September 2007, well before the probe ended.

Another Air Force law enforcement source questioned claims that the general was not a target of the inquiry. Noting that General Goldfein was advised of his rights before the September interview, the source said that action constitutes "a reasonable belief that [the subject] may have committed an offense or crime." The law enforcement official also observed that "witnesses can quickly become subjects in an investigation," depending on what is revealed.

Additionally, the IG report lists 10 different violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) that "may apply" to the Thunder Vision inquiry. To date, no one--including Major General Goldfein--has been charged with a UCMJ offense that would require an Article 32 hearing (similar to a civilian grand jury), or a courts-martial. The sanction imposed on Goldfein was characterized as an "administrative action." The U.S. Attorney's Office in Las Vegas, which also looked into the matter, also declined to press criminal charges.

While some Air Force members will complain that the general received only a "slap on the wrist," the penalty will likely derail his career. One Air Force civilian, who has followed Goldfein's climb through the ranks, described him as a "fair-haired boy"--until the scandal broke.

In the wake of the Thunder Vision report, Mr. Wynne and the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Michael Moseley, issued a letter on "Senior Leader Responsibilities in Ethics." In their memorandum, dated 26 March, Wynne and Moseley reminded USAF senior officials that "we collectively set the Air Force's ethical tone and serve as the example for all Air Force members and employees."

Cynics found a hint of irony in the letter signed by Moseley. The Chief of Staff was among those scrutinized in the Thunder Vision probe. Investigators found that General Moseley had a personal relationship with Ed Shipley, the president of SMS, and even spent the night at Shipley's home--while the firm was bidding for the Thunderbirds audiovisual contract.

Moseley told the DCIS that the contract did not come up during his stay at Shipley's Pennsylvania residence. Shipley's partner, General Hornburg, was also present for the visit, which occurred in July 2005, when the retired general was supposedly in a "cool down" period that prevented official contacts with the Air Force.