Monday, September 24, 2012

Today's Reading Assignment


A Navy P-8 Poseidon in flight.  Program delays and the threat of sequestration could create more difficulties for the new ASW aircraft, leaving the Navy with inadequate airborne resources for detecting, tracking and attacking enemy subs (Wikipedia photo).    

An excellent post at The NavLog, on the Navy's troubled P-8 ASW aircraft.  The service is moving forward with long-standing plans to replace what's left of its P-3 Orion fleet with the next-generation ASW airframe, based on the Boeing 737-800.  But, as the author observes, successful implementation of the P-8 depends on technology that is inmature (at best), and on a planned aircraft "buy" that is inadequate for the mission:

We recently attended a briefing on the Navy’s new P-8 Poseidon aircraft, the replacement for the P-3C Orion. The short version is that it is not working out as hoped and that US Navy airborne anti-submarine warfare (ASW) is in jeopardy.

[snip]

{the} Boeing P-8 was conceived as a 156-airframe replacement for the already dwindling number of P-3s, a number of P-8s then reduced to 108 aircraft, to be augmented by dedicated UAVs and UCAVs for persistent surveillance over-ocean missions. The P-3’s 330 knot enroute speed would be substantially increased to over 500 knots with the P-8, meaning a faster arrival on station. Since a jet burns far more fuel per mile than a turboprop, the P-3’s low-level endurance was to be sacrificed by a never before tried high-altitude precision ASW at or above 20,000 feet, meaning abandonment of what had been traditional low-level tracking of and attack upon a submarine. Torpedoes dropped from 200-500 feet will now become glide-bombs: torpedoes with wings dropped from 20,000 feet to somehow reach a fleeing submarine before it's long gone. The P-8s MAD boom was summarily dispatched. To those of us with real world ASW experience, the picture was questionable and depended upon no yet developed new ASW techniques and technology.

At the recent brief we were instructed about new, smaller, light-weight sonobouys equipped with GPS that will be launched from rotary launchers aboard the P-8. This is aimed at plot stabilization, or plotstab, a critical element in ASW. A submarine or surface contact is positioned with respect to the sono pattern dropped. Unless you know where your bouys are, you can’t know where your target is. The GPS-broadcasting bouys are meant to align target location with the real world. This will be especially tough because the P-8 is meant to stay above 20,000 feet. This altitude restriction is imposed for several reasons, but we were informed it is primarily because the P-8s planned onsta performance is not even close to what the Boeing and Navy engineers estimated, and is, in fact perhaps four hours, or about half that of the P-3 or even the P-2

And unfortunately, the problems don't end there.  While the Navy plans to field 12 P-8 squadrons, each unit will have only six assigned aircraft.  Do the math, and you'll discover that our "new" ASW fleet will consist of only 72 aircraft, along with a smaller number of P-3s that will be re-winged to extend their service life.  Once upon a time, the Navy had more than 400 Orions, with most devoted to the ASW mission.  True, those numbers existed during the heyday of the Soviet Navy, but it's worth noting that many countries are now building or purchasing quiet diesel submarines, so the threat is steadily increasing.  And, when you consider the P-8 won't the endurance of its predecessors, it's clear the Navy won't have enough of the new ASW jets for the mission.

As we've noted in the past, the ASW mission was largely ignored after the collapse of the former Soviet Union.  Making matters worse, the Navy wasted years of development time (and millions of dollars) on the "first" Orion replacement, the Lockheed P-7, which was scrapped in the 1980s.  Meanwhile, the service was flying the wings off its remaining P-3s (quite literally) by reassigning the aircraft for overland missions in places like Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan.

One more thing: as The NavLog observes, lead-in training for a new P-8 crew member will be an "astounding" 15 months, so the Navy will be hard-pressed to meet its goal of geting the first squadron operational in 2013.  And no one wants to predict the potential impact of sequestration on the Poseidon.  If the P-8 doesn't survive under sequestration, then we'll be left with a dwindling number of deteriorating P-3s, and no replacement in sight--truly, the worst case scenario.

But that's just the tip of the fiscal iceberg.  Multiply this sort of program cancellation across the services, and you'll have a good idea of what our military may look like in the years to come.      

Saturday, September 22, 2012

Who Knew, Redux

It doesn't take a foreign policy wonk to understand why the Obama Administration is so desperate to "spin" its version of how Islamic terrorists attacked the U.S. Consulate (and diplomatic safe house) in Benghazi, Libya almost two weeks ago, resulting in the murder of Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other Americans.  As the true details of that incident begin to emerge, one thing is clear: this is a security, intelligence and leadership debacle of the first magnitude.

Mr. Stevens and his colleagues didn't have to have to die--it's that simple.  There were warnings of a possible attack up to three days prior, from Libyan officials and Egyptian intelligence.  There are also indications that the Brits knew something was up and shared that information with us, but to no avail.  Ambassador Stevens, who reportedly told co-workers he "had a price on his head," elected to travel to the unsecure Benghazi facility, with no dedicated security detail.  However, it is unclear if Stevens received the latest threat information before setting out for the consulate.

And, it now evident that senior U.S. officials knew the Benghazi compound was under attack as it unfolded (emphasis ours).  According to media reports, President Obama was told of the assault between 90 minutes and three hours into the incident.  He later went to bed, before the fate of Ambassador Stevens and his colleagues was determined.

But that timeline is predictably fuzzy.  Earlier this week, Libyan officials claimed that U.S. officials intercepted communications between Al Qaida's Libyan affiliate and members of the Islamist Ansar al-Sharia brigade discussing the planned attack.  So far, it has not been disclosed if those conversations came before, during or after the attacks on the consulate and the safe house, which unfolded over several hours.

In any event, there is reason to believe that Mr. Obama may have learned of events in Libya long before the three-hour mark, and here's why: reports of escalating threats to U.S. interests in the Middle East should have put the National Security Agency (and its global intercept capabilities) on heightened alert.

It's also worth noting that the U.S. (read: NSA) monitored several phone conversations between Al Qaida operatives and representatives of the Ansar al Sharia group.  During the calls, they discussed the attack on the American consulate in Benghazi.  So far, U.S. officials have not revealed if the chatter was related to planning the assault, or if it occurred while the attack was in progress.

But let's assume that the conversations occurred just prior to the attack and while it unfolded.  We make this assumption (hoping) that if NSA had advance notice that our consulate was being targeted, protective measures would be implemented to safeguard our personnel.  Obviously, we cannot make this assumption with complete certainty; after all, the agency collects millions of bits of information on a daily basis.  There are delays in translation, and even with sophisticated data-mining and keyword search techniques, analysts don't always receive information required to provide timely warning.

Still, if we're reading the tea leaves correctly, it appears that NSA was monitoring terrorist communications for a period that included the actual attack on the consulate and the murder of Ambassador Stevens.  If that's the case, then the agency most likely issued its highest priority message traffic (known in the trade as FLASH/CRITICs).

These alerts, reserved for the most important global events, are supposed to be in the hands of the President--and other senior officials--within 10 minutes of receipt.  There are established guidelines for events considered worthy of a CRITIC, and NSA has sometimes rejected submissions from lower levels in the signals intelligence (SIGINT) community.  For example, when U.S. listening posts in Japan detected the shoot down of Korean Airlines Flight 007 in 1983, initial CRITICS sent to NSA were rejected, on the grounds of insufficient information.  However, as the situation became more clear, FLASH/CRITIC traffic was quickly forwarded to President Reagan and key members of his national security team.

Based on what we're hearing, it seems likely that President Obama was in receipt of similar messages on the night our consulate was breached and Ambassador Stevens was murdered, along with three other Americans.  And, if NSA was monitoring terrorist phone calls in the run-up to the attack, there is a very real possibility that the commander-in-chief knew what was going on well before the "three hour" mark.  That possibility raises very real questions about what Mr. Obama knew, when he knew it, and his initial response to the crisis.

As Congress digs deeper into the incident, they should ask the NSA Director (General Keith Alexander) about CRITIC reporting from Libya on the night in question.  The amount of CRITIC reporting by NSA is very small--usually no more than a handful of messages a year.  It won't be very hard to determine if any FLASH/CRITIC messages were sent to the White House that night; when the President received them, and exactly what he knew before his "command decision" to go back to bed.      



  .                  

Thursday, September 20, 2012

The Right Call

Senate Republicans are being called "cruel," "heartless" (and worse) after rejecting a $1 billion veterans jobs bill.  More from The Hill:

Senate Republicans stopped the veterans jobs bill Wednesday by forcing a budget point of order vote.
Senate Majority Whip Dick Durbin (R-Ill.) requested a motion to waive the budget point of order, which was raised by Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.). Democrats needed 60 votes, but got only 58.
“This violates the Budget Control Act, there is no dispute about it,” Sessions said in a floor speech Wednesday. “The bill will not even go through the House and it violates the Constitution because it says revenue bills must be started in the House ... [and] this is a revenue bill.”
The Veterans Jobs Corp Act would have created new job-training programs to help veterans find work in targeted fields such as national park conservation, historic preservation projects, police work and firefighting, among others.
Only five GOP senators voted in favor of the waiver; two of them (Scott Brown of Massachusetts and Dean Heller of Nevada) are in tough re-election fights, so perhaps we'll give them a pass. 
Meanwhile, the Republicans who voted against the bill deserve praise, for several reasons.  First, the Senate bill was nothing more than a political stunt, aimed at painting the GOP as "anti-veteran."  Democrats who backed the legislation knew it was doomed for defeat on procedural grounds alone, but offered it anyway.  Call it an exercise in cynicism.  
Secondly, as Oklahoma Senator Tom Coburn explained, the veterans job bill is a prime example of wasteful spending that will only add to the national debt.  Once created, programs like the veterans job act tend to grow like weeds, consuming far more tax dollars than anyone originally envisioned, and providing few positive results.  
Case-in-point?  The new Post 9-11 GI Bill, which was passed and signed into law with much fanfare a few years back.  Senator Jim Webb of Virginia, the primary author of the legislation, claimed the new GI Bill would finally provide the same level of support given to veterans who went back to school after World War II.  
Obviously, no one would reject education benefits for veterans.  But there's a dirty, dark secret about the latest version of the GI Bill: it has become a fiscal black hole that is producing almost no graduates.  
Last fall, an official with the Labor Department told a military education group in Colorado that 88% of veterans who become full-time students on the Post 9-11 GI Bill leave school after only one year.  Financial aid officials at various colleges and universities report that some recipients are in school only for the housing stipend, allowing them to survive in a tough economy.  And the total cost of the latest GI Bill is already at $15 billion a year, almost double the original projection.  
Despite the best intentions, the new GI Bill is clearly off the fiscal rails and will continue to waste tax dollars without serious reform.  And there's no reason to believe the veterans job bill would have fared any better.  Some of the "conservation" positions were little more than make-work jobs, totally dependent on more federal funding to keep vets employed.  
Additionally, there are plenty of training programs for veterans who want to work as police officers or fire fighters; in fact, many ex-service members are trained as MPs or military firemen while in uniform, so it shouldn't take a billion-dollar program to prepare vets for those jobs.  Indeed, one could argue that the money would be better spent on finding vets already qualified for such positions.  But that would block the opportunity to create another, massive government bureaucracy, the unstated goal of most new programs.  
Throughout the current recession, unemployment rates for veterans have remained well above the national average, and various federal programs and initiatives have done little to help the situation.  Of course, the best solution is the most obvious: avoid the massive defense cuts that are forcing thousands out of the military and crippling our defense industrial base.  If the Senate is truly serious about unemployment among veterans, they might consider a defense "surge," providing more money for critical military programs that would create thousands of good-paying American jobs. 
Instead, Senate Democrats are playing procedural games while sequestration looms on the horizon.  That would mean an additional $50 billion a year in defense cuts, bringing the annual reduction to $100 billion over 10 years.  If you think a lot of vets are out of work now, just wait until sequestration takes hold. 

Monday, September 17, 2012

Crossing the Red Line?

Last month, President Obama warned Syria that "signs" of use or movement of its chemical weapons arsenal would constitute a "red line" that could trigger an American military response.

Now we've learned that if Damascus hasn't crossed that line, it's on the verge of doing so. From Der Spiegel, via the Jerusalem Post:

Syria tested firing systems for poison gas shells at the country's largest chemical weapons research center at Safira, east of Aleppo, last month, German weekly Der Spiegel reported on Monday, citing statements from various witnesses.

According to the report, Iranian Revolutionary Guard officers were flown in by helicopter to witness the testing.

Several empty shells, designed to carry chemical weapons, were fired by tanks and helicopters in a desert location near the research center, Der Spiegel quoted the witnesses as saying.

The timing and location of the test was hardly coincidental. The Safira complex is located near Aleppo, Syria's largest city, and a center of the anti-government violence that has flared for more than a year, threatening the regime of dictator Bashir al-Assad.

By conducting the test, Damascus was sending a message not only to the rebels, but to the Israelis and the U.S. as well. Facing regime survival, Assad is clearly prepared to use weapons of mass destruction against his enemies, foreign and domestic.

Indeed, this is not the first time that Syria has been detected conducting chemical weapons testing and related activities. On several occasions over the past two decades, western intelligence has picked up indications of live chemical weapons testing at various ranges in Syria. On some occasions, the weapons have been dropped by fighter jets, such as the MiG-23 Flogger. Damascus has a large inventory of potential delivery systems for its chemical arsenal, including artillery, attacks helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft and ballistic missiles.

It's also a well-known fact that Iran has been an active participant in Syria's WMD activities. In July 2007 "dozens" of Iranian engineers were killed (along with 15 Syrian military personnel) in an explosion at a research complex in the Aleppo region. According to Jane's Defence Weekly, the incident occurred when rocket fuel caught fire and Iranian and Syrian technicians attempted to load mustard gas onto a SCUD C missile. The blast also released a cloud of mustard, Sarin and VX nerve gas across the compound.

The 2007 disaster was detected--and analyzed--by western intelligence, as were previous tests involving chemical weapons. Syria has a sophisticated denial-and-deception (D&D) program, but there have been only modest efforts to conceal this activity. Indeed, one could make the case that Mr. Assad wants to remind Israel (and other adversaries) that his regime has a large inventory of chemical weapons and is quite prepared to use them.

It is worth noting that yesterday's test did not involve live chemical agents. That may have been a calculated move to avoid so-called "red lines" that would invite outside military intervention.

Another possibility is that the Syrians were testing some type of new binary shell design, perhaps of Iranian origin. Before filling shells with live agent, it's necessary to make sure they function as designed. If the tests were successful, series production of the "new" rounds could begin in as little as a few weeks.

Tehran has long used Syria as a proxy for the development and testing of chemical weapons, largely avoiding the risk (and international condemnation) that comes with conducting such activity on your own soil. Beefing up the Syrian arsenal also provides another benefit for Iran, forcing Israel to contend with a growing WMD threat, literally on its doorstep.

However, the systems tested at Safira are also useful for domestic applications, such as suppressing rebel forces. That's why the recent drill should be viewed as something of a dry run, both literally and figuratively. As the Assad regime continues to crumble, it is facing the choice of using WMD to retain power. And that decision may come sooner rather than later, based on the timing of the recent test.

When Syria recently confirmed its WMD weaponry (perhaps the worst-kept secret in the Middle East), the Assad government vowed they would only be used against "outside" forces. But that's a hollow vow. Collectively, Bashir Assad and his late father slaughtered tens of thousands of Syrians to maintain their hold on power. The younger Assad has no qualms about using chemical weapons against the rebels in Aleppo or other locations.

The recent test was also aimed at gauging outside reaction, particularly from Israel and the United States. Judging from Israeli media coverage, it's clear that Prime Minister Netanyahu and his advisers are paying very close attention. As for the U.S., it's difficult to say. so far, there's been no public reaction from the White House or the Pentagon, and with President Obama MIA from recent intelligence briefings, there are concerns about how much attention the activity is receiving at the highest levels of our government.

One thing is certain: Mr. Assad is tip-toeing along the edge of Mr. Obama's WMD red line, and appears poised to cross it in the near future. At that point, we'll learn if the red line is real, or just imaginary.

Friday, September 14, 2012

Who Knew?

What a bitter--and ironic--twist. During the same week that The New York Times lambasted former President George W. Bush for "ignoring" the intelligence warning signs of 9-11, we learned that the current administration missed their cues, too.

Or put another way, now we know why the White House (and the State Department) were so anxious to blame escalating violence in the Middle East on that internet "film" that is offensive to Muslims.

Turns out the Obama team missed (or ignored) intelligence indicators of pending attacks across the Middle East:

Not surprisingly, it was a British newspaper, The Independent, which broke the story.

According to senior diplomatic sources, the US State Department had credible information 48 hours before mobs charged the consulate in Benghazi, and the embassy in Cairo, that American missions may be targeted, but no warnings were given for diplomats to go on high alert and "lockdown", under which movement is severely restricted.

[snip]

Eight Americans, some from the military, were wounded in the attack which claimed the lives of [Ambassador Chris] Stevens, Sean Smith, an information officer, and two US Marines. All staff from Benghazi have now been moved to the capital, Tripoli, and those whose work is deemed to be non-essential may be flown out of Libya.

Since the account first appeared on The Independent's website last night, there has been a fair amount of speculation about its sourcing. Some have suggested that the information was leaked by members of the U.S. diplomatic corps, upset that senior officials ignored warnings that might have saved the lives of their colleagues. The American diplomats took the information to the British press, knowing U.S. reporters would never print (or broadcast) anything that would reflect badly on the Obama Administration.

But we'll take a different tack. The article wasn't datelined Washington, suggesting it was prepared by the Independent's domestic staff. And, we're guessing their sources were in the British diplomatic community, rather than the U.S. foreign service. If that supposition is accurate, it's even more damning for President Obama and Hillary Clinton, suggesting that warnings of possible attacks were known by several foreign intelligence services, which probably shared their information with the U.S.--and it was apparently ignored.

To be fair, no one knows what was in those reports, beyond vague warnings of a possible attack. But the Brits have long had better HUMINT in the Middle East, given their colonial and military history. And there's something else that tells us London was not only a source for U.K. press account, it was likely a source of the original intelligence.

Consider this: with the exception of Friday's attack against its embassy in Sudan, Britain has been largely immune from the current wave of anti-U.S. and anti-western violence. Do the Islamists simply like the Brits better than Americans? Hardly. Within hours the the Khartoum incident, Taliban fighters attacked a base in Afghanistan where Prince Harry is serving alongside U.S. Marines. Maybe the British have simply done a better job of reading the intel tea leaves and improving security at their diplomatic compoumds.

There's also the matter of exactly how the warnings were shared. The U.S. and Great Britain exchange plenty of raw intelligence data, but the report seems to suggest that attack predictions circulating before the Libyan massacre were in the form of finished intelligence. That raises other questions regarding the classification of the information, which government officials had access to it, when it was received, and why it was--or wasn't conveyed--to our staff in Benghazi.
In the wake of this week's tragedy, there have been bi-partisan calls for a Congressional investigation into what we knew before Ambassador Stevens and his colleagues were slaughtered in Benghazi. The American people have a right to know why Mr. Stevens and his associates were left so vulnerable when there were warnings of potential danger. We may learn the same thing we discovered about the intelligence before 9-11: it was so vague, there was little that could be done.

But Congress--and the public--have a right to make that judgment for themselves. So far, the State Department has refused to brief the House Intelligence Committee on what "it knew" before the slaughter at the U.S. consulate in Libya. Rather than getting at the truth, it looks like some in the administration would prefer to stonewall, for reasons that could be politically devastating.

Thursday, September 13, 2012

The "Logistics" of Intelligence

***UPDATE/17 Sep 2012***

Mitt Romney finally received his first national intelligence briefing on Monday. A campaign spokesman said the GOP presidential nominee met with "members of the intelligence community" at a federal building in the Los Angeles area. The briefing lasted for more than two hours (emphasis ours). Romney's update came more than three weeks after the Republican convention in Tampa, raising questions about the apparent delay. During recent campaigns, presidential challengers have typically received their first intel briefings within days of the nominating convention.

While initial intel updates for presidential candidates are often long, the Los Angeles meeting suggests that Mr. Romney had lots of questions for his briefers. That's reassuring, when you consider the current commander-in-chief has skipped more than half of his intel updates, and didn't receive a single intelligence briefing in the week leading up to the current unrest in the Middle East. A (potential) President who is actually attends his intel briefs? That would be a refreshing change.

*****
Gee, I never knew the "logistics" of intelligence briefings were so difficult.

Amid the kerfuffle over Mitt Romney's comments about anti-American violence in the Middle East (and the murder of our ambassador to Libya), we also learned this rather interesting fact:

Almost three weeks after accepting his party's nomination for President, Mr. Romney was yet to receive an intelligence briefing.

Given the gravity of issues facing a prospective commander-in-chief, it has become customary for each party's nominee to receive regular intelligence updates during the run-up to the fall election. In 2008, then-Senator Barack Obama received his first briefing just five days after accepting the Democratic nomination.

So why hasn't Mitt Romney received the same courtesy? According to a spokesman for the Director of National Intelligence, it's a matter of "logistics."

As the nominee, Romney should receive classified briefings on U.S. intelligence, but administration officials said that hasn't been arranged yet.

"The intelligence community is working closely with the Romney campaign to finalize the logistics for the candidate briefings," said Shawn Turner, spokesman for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Incidentally, that information was buried deep in an Associated Press article that followed the media "theme of the day," suggesting that Mr. Romney somehow misspoke on the Middle East, spoke too soon, or violated the old dictum that "politics ends at the water's edge."

I'll leave that debate to others, but it is rather curious that John Kerry repeatedly criticized George W. Bush's handling of the Iraq War during the 2004 campaign, and even Barack Obama used the deaths of nine American soldiers to criticize President Bush and the 2008 GOP nominee, John McCain.

Equally curious is the "logistics" argument that has supposedly prevented Mr. Romney from receiving intelligence updates. While details of these briefings have not been disclosed, they are believed similar to the Presidential Daily Brief (PDB), which is provided to the commander-in-chief.

As a former command intelligence briefer, I'm wondering why it has become so difficult to get information to Mr. Obama's Republican rival. In reality, the "logistics," cited by Turner are rather simple. As noted in previous posts, the intelligence community has invested heavily in secure communications networks for the dissemination of Secret and Top Secret information. Data classified up to the Secret level can be posed on SIPRNET (Secret Internet Protocol Router Network), while TS/SCI material is hosted on the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS).

Terminals for the JWICS (read: desktop or laptop PCs with the right comm connections and security systems) are located at all intelligence nodes and most military installations. Regardless of where Mr. Romney is campaigning, he's never more than a couple of hours from a sensitive compartmentalized intelligence facility (SCIF), where intelligence briefers can access the latest information and provide it to the Republican candidate.

Shouldn't be that difficult. Today, for example, Governor Romney is campaigning in Fairfax, Virginia, barely 16 miles from ODNI headquarters in nearby McLean. Yeah, traffic on the Beltway or I-66 can be a bear, but it wouldn't be that difficult to dispatch a briefer to Mr. Romney's hotel and allow him to review a hard-copy or computer version of the daily summary.

The same drill applies at more remote locations. On Friday, Mr. Romney will be on the road in Painesville, Ohio, near Cleveland. One of the largest intelligence organizations in the Air Force, the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), is located at Wright-Patterson AFB in Dayton, 235 miles away. A DNI briefer could easily access intel information at that node and ferry it to Mr. Romney at Painesville. Intelligence material is also available through JWICS terminals belonging to the Ohio National Guard and Air National Guard, along with federal law enforcement agencies. And thanks to the Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS), the security clearance and identity of anyone with access to classified information can be instantly verified.

But let's say the intel update contains Special Access Program/Special Access Required (SAP/SAR) material, or ODNI doesn't want to coordinate working from someone else's facility. In those situations, the ODNI briefer still has the option of preparing the briefing in McLean, and flying to Mr. Romney's destination on a government jet. It's hardly a problem for the DNI to schedule such a flight and coordinate it with the Romney campaign, so the information reaches the candidate at the scheduled time.

Truth be told, the "logistics" of getting intel information to Governor Romney are pretty simple. It's really a matter of professional courtesy, one that was readily extended to candidate Obama in 2008, but one that has been denied to Mr. Romney this time around. It's a subject you'd think the mainstream media might be interested in, but they're too busy trying to stretch the Libya e theme into multiple news cycles.


Saturday, September 08, 2012

A Nation of Flukes

...Today's reading assignment from the great Mark Steyn, writing at National Review. A couple of excerpts:

According to Georgetown Law student Sandra Fluke, invited to address the Democratic convention and the nation, America faces a start choice this November. "During this campaign, we've heard about two profoundly different futures that could await women in this country--and how one of those futures looks like an offensive, obsolete relic of our past," she cautioned. "That future could become real."

[snip]

With respect to Sandra Fluke, I think there’s a third future looming. The paperback edition of my book comes out in a week or so, and you can pretty much get the gist of it from the title: After America. For me, the likely scenario isn’t that the Republicans will be terrorizing rape victims or that the Democrats will finally pass the necessary legislation to make contraception available for the contraceptively starved millions crying out for it, but that America will be sliding off the cliff — literally, as Joe Biden would literally say. And when America slides off the cliff it lands with a much bigger thud than Greece or Iceland. I’m not certain that the Republicans will be able to prevent that happening. But I know that the Democrats can’t. America owes more money than anybody has ever owed anyone in the history of the planet. But millions of Americans don’t see it, and millions of those who do see it don’t see it as a problem.

Sandra Fluke is one of them. She completed her education a few weeks ago — at the age of 31, or Grade 25. Before going to Georgetown, she warmed up with a little light B.S. in Feminist, Gender, and Sexuality Studies from Cornell. She then studied law at one of the most prestigious institutions in the nation, where tuition costs 50 grand a year. The average starting salary for a Georgetown Law graduate is $160,000 per annum — first job, first paycheck.

If you want another analogy, Sarah Palin summed it up nicely on Fox News last night. The choice for Americans, she said, is between "freedom and free stuff." Unfortunately, at least 100 million Americans have already decided on the latter, with no regard for the fiscal consequences. Sandra Fluke, that taxpayer-financed product of Cornell and Georgetown law, figures she can ride out the storm, as long as abortion remains legal and someone else pays for her contraception.

Sadly, she is not alone in her thinking. Will Rogers once observed, famously, that America would be the first nation to drive to the poor house in a "brand new car." On our current trajectory, with Barack Obama at the wheel--and 100 million along for the ride--we're rocketing past the poor house, and over the cliff.


Wednesday, September 05, 2012

Changing of the Guard (San Antonio Edition)

Fresh from his "triumph" at Lackland AFB, Colonel Eric Axelbank is headed for bigger and better things at the Pentagon.

For just over a year, Axelbank served as Commander of Lackland's 37th Training Wing, the unit that provides basic military training to all new Air Force enlisted recruits. Axelbank's tenure coincided with the eruption of the worst sex scandal in the history of the unit, and perhaps the service as a whole. At least 17 military training instructors (MTIs) have been accused of sexual misconduct with recruits in their charge. Two have already been court-martialed and more will face justice in the coming months.

While factors that led to the scandal preceded Colonel Axelbank, he was charged with the initial response and by most indications, botched it. As the number of accused MTIs continued to grow, his response was slow. The first officer in the basic training chain-of-command wasn't relieved until this summer. Nine of the accused MTIs worked for Lt Col Michael Paquette, the former commander of the 331st Training Squadron at Lackland. Amazingly, Paquette's reassignment was described as "administrative" in nature, rather than punitive.

A few weeks later, Paquette's immediate supervisor, was relieved as Commander of the 737th Training Group, which supervised the 331st. About the same time, the Air Force announced that Axelbank would relinquish command of the 37th Wing to Colonel Mark Camerer, former head of the 436th Airlift Wing at Dover AFB, Delaware. The handover took place yesterday, in a ceremony that was (uncharacteristically) closed to the media. A spokesman for the USAF's Air Education and Training Command said he "didn't know" why the media was excluded. And presumably, he said it with a straight face.

Obviously, the command media flack knows darn well why the ceremony was off-limits to the press. They didn't want reporters button-holing Alexbank (or other senior officers) about the ever-widening sex scandal and the service's slow response. Axelbank cancelled a press interview scheduled for 15 August, after reviewing questions that reporters planned to ask.

As a reformed journalist, I can't imagine anyone submitting questions to an interview subject in advance. Maybe the media operates a little differently in San Antonio, or perhaps Colonel Axelbank backed out after a prep session with his public affairs staff, realizing that "real" reporters would ask much tougher questions. Whatever the case, it was clear the Air Force wanted Axelbank out of San Antonio without facing the media, and they apparently achieved that goal.

But perhaps the Pentagon press corps will follow up with a few basic questions: first, why was Axelbank allowed the PCS to Washington and not move to an administrative billet in San Antonio, as Paquette and Palmer did? Is Axelbank facing any disciplinary action for his failures as a commander? And just for kicks and grins, they might ask if the Colonel's former boss, Major General Leonard Patrick, was serious when he described Axelbank as a "great wingman."

They might also ask about the results of a study, conducted by a female two-star, into problems at Lackland that caused the scandal. The inquiry, led by Major General Margaret Woodward, has been completed but details have not been released. Many believe the study will highlight a long pattern of misconduct by MTIs with female airmen in basic training or technical school. A recent article by the San Antonio Express-News revealed that two dozen training instructors faced charges over the past decade for illicit conduct with trainees.

Colonel Axelbank didn't create the problems at Lackland, but his tepid response allowed the scandal to fester. And for that effort, the "great wingman" is being sent to the Pentagon? Apparently, the Air Force is trying to hide him in the bureaucracy, or he's someone's fair-haired boy, and they want him out of San Antonio before his career is completely destroyed. As we've noted in the past, the USAF has managed some rather amazing resurrections, rehabilitating officers who presided over other scandals. Given the mess at Lackland, we'd say that Axelbank's career is over, but you never know. And that's part of the larger problem that still faces the Air Force.

Monday, September 03, 2012

Feckless


An Israeli Air Force F-16I. Recent policy decisions by the Obama Administration may actually hasten, rather than deter, an Israeli strike against Iran's nuclear facilities (photo via Breitbart.com).

The Obama Administration has (reportedly) come up with a plan that will supposedly deter an Israeli strike against Iran, while at the same time, prevent Tehran from attacking U.S. interests in the region.

Someone alert the Nobel Peace Prize committee. Mr. Obama wants another one.

Here's how the plan would supposedly work, according to The New York Times. The U.S. is considering new "curbs" against the Iranian regime (and its nuclear program), hoping to forestall an Israeli attack. The administration hopes the same measures will persuade to resume nuclear talks with the west that have been all-but-stalled for many months. From today's report in the Times:

Already planned are naval exercises and new antimissile systems in the Persian Gulf, and a more forceful clamping down on Iranian oil revenue. The administration is also considering new declarations byPresident Obama about what might bring about American military action, as well as covert activities that have been previously considered and rejected.

As part of a planned show of strength, the U.S. is planning a major mine sweeping exercise in the Persian Gulf later this month. Ships, aircraft and personnel from 25 nations will participate in the drill, rehearsing skills that would be used to re-open the Strait of Hormuz in the event of a conflict between Iran and its enemies. Tehran has repeatedly vowed to block the strategic waterway in the event of an Israeli strike, or in retaliation for western military action.

The Times also reports the administration is considering a public declaration of so-called red lines that would prompt a U.S. response (if Iran crosses them), and the employment of covert measures that have been previously ruled out. Collectively, the U.S. proposals are designed to buy time, illustrating that Washington is serious about dealing with Tehran and its nuclear program, and dissuading Israel from launching a near-term strike. Concurrently, the tightened sanctions are supposed to put the screws to the Iranian regime and force them back to the bargaining table.

But Israel is hardly reassured. An article posted at the Israeli site Ynetnews.com puts a completely different spin on the matter. Diplomatic sources tell Israeli journalists that the U.S. is scrambling to distance itself from the Israel and appears to be giving Iran the green light to launch a counter-strike, if Israel attacks first:

The United States has indirectly informed Iran, via two European nations, that it would not back an Israeli strike against the country's nuclear facilities, as long as Tehran refrains from attacking American interests in the Persian Gulf, Yedioth Ahronoth reported Monday.

According to the report, Washington used covert back-channels in Europe to clarify that the US does not intend to back Israel in a strike that may spark a regional conflict.

To anyone outside of Foggy Bottom, this "proposal" is the height of fecklessness--a veritable fool's errand that will almost guarantee the opposite results.

Consider the position of Israel. Based on this "offer," the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will (rightly) conclude it has been sold down the river again, leaving it with no option but striking Iran before that nation's nuclear program reaches the point of no return. The U.S. plan comes on the heels of an announced down-sizing in a planned exercise between American and Israeli forces, scheduled for early this fall. Based on these developments, Israel views itself as "alone" in facing the Iranian menace, adding more urgency to reported attack preparations.

From the Iranian perspective, the proposal is an open invitation for Tehran (and its surrogates) to hit back in retaliation for an Israeli strike, using all the resources at their disposal. In return, the U.S. only asks the Iran, Syria, Hizballah and Hamas simply refrain from hitting our interests in the region.

Yet once again, the administration is deluding itself. The Israeli Air Force will use U.S.-built aircraft and weaponry to carry out any raid against Iran's nuclear facilities. American intelligence has provided some of the data used to formulate Israeli attack options. When IAF F-15s and F-16s head east, there will be claims of U.S. complicity in the attack, even if we distance ourselves from the Israelis, as evidenced by President Obama's new policy options. Against that backdrop, it will be almost impossible for Iran to resist the temptation to strike out at us. calculating its has little to fear from an Obama Administration and a response that will likely be quite measured.

Former U.N. Ambassador John Bolton was quite right today when he described Israel as alone, with no other option than military force for dealing with Iran. From Big Peace:

There is no way at this state to prevent iran from going nuclear without the use of fore. It is very unfortunate in my opinion, but I see no possibility that Obama will use military force, and therefore it falls upon Israel. I think that even though the Administration says that containment is not its policy, it will become its policy the day after Iran possesses nuclear weapons."

Mr. Obama's latest geopolitical machinations remind us of another politician who worked to avoid conflict at all costs, yet only hastened its onset. We speak, of course, of British Prime Neville Chamberlain, architect of the infamous appeasement scheme that was supposed to contain the ambitions of Adolf Hitler. Of Chamberlain and his policies, Winston Churchill aptly observed:

"You were given the choice between war and dishonour. You chose dishonour and you will have war."

And so shall we, sooner rather than later.

Friday, August 31, 2012

Selective Prosecution?

Like many Americans, I'll be watching 60 Minutes next Sunday night. Not that I'm a regular viewer of the program; from my perspective, the MSM is like bad medicine, best taken in small doses, and only when necessary. So why is CBS appointment television on 9 September? Because the network's venerable news magazine will have the first broadcast interview with Mark Owen, the Navy SEAL who participated in the raid that killed Osama bin Laden, and has written about the mission.

While other media outlets have published Owen's real name, CBS refers to him by his pen name. And it's the right call, in my opinion. While Owen retired from the Navy after last year's raid, he remains in potential danger. Various jihadist web sites have called for his death, in retribution for the killing of bin Laden.

But Mr. Owen may have more pressing problems than Muslim fanatics. He's facing potential legal action from the U.S. government because his memoir, No Easy Day, was not approved and vetted by the Pentagon in advance. On Thursday, the Pentagon's top lawyer, Jeh Johnson, sent a letter to Mr. Owen, announcing that the former SEAL was in "material breach" of non-disclosure agreements he signed back in 2007. Owen reportedly retired from the Navy in May of this year, near the one-year anniversary of the bin Laden mission.

From a legal standpoint, it's hard to dispute Johnson's decision. The non-disclosure agreements are standard for anyone with a security clearance; in exchange for access to sensitive information, the holder agrees not to divulge that material--even after that individual leaves government service. If you want to write a book about your experiences, the prospective author obtains permission from the feds, then submits the manuscript for review before it is published.

Mr. Owen is a brave man and a patriot, but he clearly broke the rules. Several retired SEALs have written books about their careers, and to my knowledge, all followed the prescribed protocol. Had Mr. Owen followed the same procedures, there's a chance the Pentagon might have signed off on the book, after the required review and sanitization of sensitive material.

So, why didn't the SEAL-turned-author follow the protocol? First, I'm guessing he saw his chances for approval as slim-to-none, and with the first "insider" account of the bin Laden raid, he had an opportunity to set the record straight and make a pile of money in the process. And, if he didn't go through the normal review process, the government would be unable to stop the book.

Sure, he still faces legal action from the feds, but with the book expected to become an instant best-seller, he will be in a better position to battle the government and their legions of lawyers. Heck, I'm not even convinced the Pentagon can force Owen to forgo royalties from the book (as some have claimed). His publisher (Penguin) is part of a British conglomerate; if Mr. Owen and his literary agent are as sharp as I think they are, they're probably being paid through one of the corporation's non-U.S. subsidiaries, and the royalty money will sit in an overseas bank account, untouched by Uncle Sam.

But, judging from brief excerpts of the interview that have aired so far, it's clear that Mr. Owen i is seeking more than financial gain with the publication of his book. As the former SEAL told CBS anchor Scott Pelley, he wants to set the story straight, and that puts him at odds with the Pentagon and the Obama Administration.

Consider his account of how bin Laden actually died. When they entered bin Laden's home in Pakistan, Owen was #2 in the "stack," the line of SEALs charged with entering the building and finding bin Laden. So, Mr. Owen was--literally and figuratively--at the tip of the spear, with a front row view of what actually transpired. According to Owen, the SEALs took fire from the moment they left their helicopters--a far cry from initial reports which suggested virtually no resistance from inside the compound.

After climbing to the third floor of the residence, Owen says, they saw a man stick his head out of a door that led to one of the rooms. The point man opened fire, striking bin Laden in the head. The Al Qaida leader staggered back into the room and slumped to the floor, the SEALs in pursuit. Shoving two women aside, the special forces operators stood over bin Laden; his wounds were clearly fatal, but at that moment, he was very much alive. Without hesitation, two of the SEALs finished the job, pumping several shots into bin Laden. Owen photographed the body of the dead terrorist, images that provided preliminary verification that bin Laden was indeed, dead.

Compare that to the more "antiseptic" version that made the rounds in May of 2010. According to those accounts (based largely on leaks from senior government officials), bin Laden retreated into his room before the SEALs opened fire. Inside, they confronted the terror leader and the lead operator dispatched him with a "double tap," one shot to the heart, one to the head. There was no mention of bin Laden being shot as he lay on the floor, or the fact that he was hit multiple times, with the final rounds clearly aimed at killing him.

So why the difference? Well, Owen's account doesn't exactly square with the precision strike that was widely touted in the days after the raid. And the image of "execution" shots doesn't exactly help President Obama's outreach to the Muslim world, at least from the administration's perspective. Never mind that OBL was responsible for the deaths of thousands of Americans--and his "popularity" with Muslims had sunk to historic lows by the time the SEALs caught up with him. The actual events that unfolded that night clearly didn't match the White House's desired "narrative," so they offered up an altered version.

That clearly bothered Mr. Owen, who decided to buck the Pentagon by offering his own, eyewitness version of the raid. And while the military pursues legal action against the former SEAL, we're reminded of another, on-going legal action against "leakers" in the U.S. government. We refer to the probe being conducted by two U.S. attorneys who are attempting to determine who disclosed extraordinarily sensitive information about such projects as our cyber campaign against Iran's nuclear program, and a Saudi-run double agent operation that foiled an Al Qaida plot to bomb an airliner.

Those disclosures represent a serious breach of national security, yet it took bi-partisan pressure from Capitol Hill to get Attorney General Eric Holder to launch an investigation. More than a month later, there has been no word of how the probe is going and who the leakers might be.

To be fair, investigations of this type should never be conducted in public, and we may yet see someone held accountable. But I'm not optimistic; over a 10-year span from the mid-1990s until 2005, the FBI conducted over 500 inquiries into the unauthorized disclosure of classified information. Despite all that effort, there were no indictments and no prosecutions.

And more recently, there have been only two senior government officials who have been sanctioned for disclosing or mishandling classified material. Lewis "Scooter," Libby a former aide to Vice President Dick Cheney, was convicted for lying to government investigators about his role in the Valerie Plame affair, and Sandy Berger, former national security adviser for Bill Clinton, received a slap on the wrist for illegally removing secret documents from the national archives.

Against that backdrop, it's a pretty safe bet that whoever might be implicated in the recent breaches will get off scot-free, or receive some sort of administrative punishment at best. Meanwhile, Mark Owen may face the full wrath of the federal government for his disclosures. It's the same sort of bureaucratic and political hypocrisy that official Washington does so well.

Monday, August 27, 2012

The Intel Bug-Out



Members of the 11th Intelligence Squadron depart Hurlburt Field, Florida, as part of the hurricane evacuation from that base (U.S. Air Force photo via Air Force Times).


Like the proverbial blind hog, even Air Force Times--and the rest of the MSM--stumble across a real nugget every now and then. In this case, it came in the form of an Air Force photo that currently appears on the paper's website (posted above). It's an illustration of the capabilities that must be preserved for today's modern battlefield, even when a hurricane threatens.

According the caption, the photograph shows members of the 11th Intelligence Squadron at Hurlburt Field, Florida, evacuating ahead of Tropical Storm Issac. Hurlburt, home of Air Force Special Operations Command, is located in the Florida panhandle, and is expected to feel the effects of Isaac as it churns ashore in the next 36 hours.

At this point, a lot of former blue-suiters are scratching their heads. Traditionally, most hurricane evacuations are limited to aircraft, their crews and a few maintenance personnel. Everyone else hunkers down at home station and prepares for the worst.

So why are dozens of spooks being flown out of Hurlburt before the storm? The answer lies in the mission and capabilities of the 11th IS. From another AFT article, this one published in 2008:

Since the 11th stood up in 2006, it has grown from just a few to a force of 240 airmen and contracted imagery analysts. Officials see it growing to 500 in the next couple of years, [ a former commander ]said.

Stood up primarily to analyze intelligence collected by MQ-1 Predators and MQ-9 Reapers associated with Special Forces missions, the 11th analyzes about half of all the full-motion video collected in Iraq and Afghanistan, [the official] said.

The 11th also operates a dedicated fusion cell which melds FMV with other intel information, giving commanders a more complete look at the battlefield. And with the unit responsible for much of the FMV support in the U.S. military, it can't afford to have its most valuable asset--those highly-trained analysts--sitting at a base that may be without power (or running on generator back-up) for days, or even weeks after the storm, with limited communications capabilities. And with today's "wired" intel networks, the analysts leaving Hurlburt can recreate their capabilities from locations ranging from St. Louis to Fort Bragg, preserving a vital analytic mission.

It's just one more reminder of the tremendous intel "reach-back" system that is essential for modern combat operations. Who would have ever thought that an intel unit would have the same evacuation priority as the F-22s at Tyndall, or other aircraft based along the northern Gulf? But there are very good reasons for pulling most of the 11th IS out of Hurlburt, and those reasons can be found with our combat units around the globe.

Saturday, August 25, 2012

Neil Armstrong, RIP

Neil Armstrong died today. The first man to walk on the moon was 82; he passed away at a hospital in Columbus, Ohio, after suffering complications from recent heart surgery.

For those of a certain age, Armstrong's death conjured up images of a July night in 1969, when he descended the steps of the lunar lander, set foot on the surface of the moon, and uttered the epic words:

"That's one small step for man...one giant leap for mankind."

In a sense, the accomplishments of Armstrong and his fellow astronauts (Buzz Aldrin and Michael Collins) represented the apogee of American exceptionalism. While Collins waited in the command module, Aldrin and Armstrong descended to the lunar surface, explored its dusty terrain and returned, making good on President Kennedy's promise to reach the moon--and return--within a decade.

At the time, it seemed a near-impossible task, given the initial failures of our rockets and the early lead established by the Soviets. But we quickly regained the advantage and rode that momentum all the way to the moon, culminating in the mission of Apollo 11, led by a taciturn engineer from Ohio named Neil Armstrong.

In retrospect, Armstrong's journey to the moon was almost inevitable. He earned his pilot's license at 15, and was flying light aircraft before he could drive a car. Armstrong attended Purdue on a Navy scholarship that paid for his engineering studies, with a promise of pilot training when his number came up.

Called to active duty in 1949, Armstrong qualified as a naval aviator (two weeks after his 20th birthday) and logged scores of combat missions during the Korean War, flying F9F Panther jets. One one occasion, he was forced the eject from a damaged plane after it struck a wire during a low strafing pass. Armstrong managed the fly the jet back to friendly territory before he bailed out and was picked up by a classmate from pilot training. He became a member of the "Caterpillar Club" for a second time during his NASA career, when he had to eject from an aircraft that replicated the lunar module, just before it crashed.

After leaving the Navy, Armstrong joined NASA's forerunner (the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics) and eventually became a civilian test pilot, working at Edwards AFB, California. Between 1955 and 1962, Armstrong flew chase planes on a number of test flights and flew a number of research missions himself, piloting rocket aircraft like the Bell X-1B and the North American X-15.

As recounted in James Hansen's 2006 biography, Armstrong flew the longest mission in the history of the X-15 program, completely by accident. After zooming to an altitude of 207,000 feet, Armstrong began his planned descent into Edwards.

Unfortunately, he kept the jet plane's nose up too long, so when he reached 140,000 feet, Armstrong and the X-15 literally bounced" off the atmosphere, sending them back towards the edge of space and miles off course. Armstrong recovered, but by that time, he was more than 40 miles south of Edwards, and running out of altitude--and time. He managed to land the X-15 safely, just clearing the Joshua trees at the end of the runway. Test pilots like Chuck Yeager (who never went to college) said that men like Armstrong--with a strong engineering background--were more "mechanical" flyers, who sometimes lacked the intuitive skills that could get them out of trouble in cockpit.

But if Armstrong wasn't a natural "stick-and-rudder" man like Yeager, he had other skills that were useful as a test pilot, and later, an astronaut. One of his NASA colleagues said Armstrong had a mind that "soaked up information like a sponge," a high compliment indeed, since all of the astronauts were exceptionally bright men. Incidentally, Armstrong's application for the astronaut corps (as the part of the second group that would be selected) arrived past the original deadline. But one of his friends who was involved in the selection process spotted Armstrong's package and slipped it into pile.

Within four years of becoming an astronaut, Armstrong was selected as command pilot for Gemini 8. But technical problems marred the mission; when their capsule began to spin out of control, Armstrong and Scott were forced to scrub a planned spacewalk; separate from an unmanned vehicle and cut their flight short. Armstrong returned to earth depressed, but the issues that affected Gemini 8 had no impact on his career; on December 23, 1968, as Apollo 8 orbited the moon, Armstrong was offered command of Apollo 11 and with it, the opportunity to become the first man on the moon. The flight went off without a hitch, and Armstrong became a global icon.

But fame and Armstrong were never an easy fit. After announcing his retirement from space flight, Armstrong was made a deputy administrator at NASA, but resigned that post after only a few months. He spent most of the 1970s as a professor of aeronautical engineering at the University of Cincinnati, but left that position after eight years, for reasons that were never publicly disclosed.

He also declined opportunities to capitalize on his fame. He gave few speeches (and even fewer interviews) and sat on a few corporate boards, foregoing the opportunity to cash in on his status as the first man on the moon. Armstrong stopped signing autographs in the early 1990s, after learning that some were reselling his signature for up to $2500 and sued his long-time barber after learning the man had sold clippings of his hair to a collector. The suit was later settled when the barber agreed to donate the money to charity.

Neil Armstrong was, by nature, a very private man, so his decision to avoid the spotlight was understandable. It was also a reflection of his Midwest upbringing and his training as a pilot and engineer. From Neil Armstrong's perspective, he was simply doing his job, and he did it brilliantly.

R.I.P., Mr. Armstrong.
***
ADDENDUM: Similar thoughts from Arthur Herman in the New York Post.

Tuesday, August 21, 2012

Is Iran Building a Base for the S-300?



An SA-20 transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) at a Moscow military parade in 2008. Iran's announcement that it is building a new $300 surface-to-air missile base has renewed speculation that Russia may soon deliver the SA-20 to Tehran, greatly improving its air defense capabilities (Wikipedia photo).

Amid reports that Israel is finalizing plans to strike Iran, Tehran has announced plans for a massive, new surface-to-air missile base. More from the Times of Israel:


The new base, located near the city of Abadeh, in southern Iran, will cost $300 million, be home to 6,000 personnel, and host seven battalions, Iran’s Fars news agency reported Tuesday.

The Deputy Commander of the Khatam ol-Anbia Air Defense Base, Mohammad Hosseini, said the base, the largest of its kind in Iran, will also include one of the most important military training centers in the country.

Last month, a senior Iranian air defense commander asserted that all Iranian air defense units and systems are fully prepared to repel possible enemy air raids.
The key word in that account is "training." Iran already has an established support infrastructure for its older SAM systems, including the U.S. made HAWK, purchased by the Shah in the early 1970s. As the HAWK nears the end of its service life, along with older Russian and Chinese systems such as the SA-5 and CSA-1, it would make little sense to build a huge support center for those aging systems. Iran also has the newer SA-15 mobile SAM, but (as with its older counterparts), the support network is already established.

On the other hand, it would make a great deal of sense to build a training base (and centralized support facility) for a new system like the Russian S-300. Tehran has long hoped to acquire the advanced SAM system, but Russian has never fulfilled a contract that was reportedly signed years ago, bowing to pressure from the U.S. and other western nations.

But announcement of the new SAM training center near Abadeh (in southern Iran) may be the best indicator yet that the S-300 will become operational with Tehran's air defense forces. Widely regarded as one of the world's most potent SAM systems, the S-300 (NATO designator: SA-20) is highly effective against both tactical aircraft, stand-off platforms and tactical ballistic missiles. With a maximum range of 90-120 miles (depending on variant), multiple battalions of S-300 could provide overlapping coverage of nuclear facilities and other high-value installations in Iran, while greatly complicating Israeli tactical planning.

Obviously, the new support base won't be ready for at least a couple of years, but completion of the facility is not a requirement for the S-300 to enter operational service. If Moscow is proceeding with deliveries of the system, it is likely that the initial cadre of crews and maintenance personnel was trained in Russia, and can provide an operating capability as soon as equipment arrives. There are unconfirmed reports that support components for the system were shipped to Iran last year, but neither Moscow, Tehran or western intelligence agencies have acknowledged the arrival of the S-300 in Iran.

If deliveries of the S-300 are in progress or imminent, it will add new urgency to Israel's strategic calculus. Even a rudimentary deployment of the system represents a game-changer for Iran, forcing Israel to modify its tactical planning. At a minimum, the S-300 would force the Israeli Air Force to allocate more assets for the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) mission. However, for every fighter assigned that mission (or for every anti-radiation missile loaded on an aircraft pylon), Israel will diminished capabilities to put bombs on the most important targets--Iran's nuclear facilities.

Imagery analysts in the U.S., Israel and elsewhere will be watching the work at Abadeh very carefully. If the new SAM base is being built for the S-300, it will be patterned on similar facilities in Russia, China and other countries that operate the system. Intel experts will now fairly soon if the new facility will support the S-300, further influencing military decisions on what must be done about Iran and its nuclear program.
***
ADDENDUM: Both the United States and Israel have extensive intelligence on the S-300 and its various models. But neutralizing the system (or avoiding it) is a definite challenge, one made more difficult by the long distance associated with an Israeli airstrike against Iran, and the limited assets that could be employed.

Saturday, August 18, 2012

What Not to Wear



What's wrong with this picture?

It was taken at the recent change-of-command ceremony for the new Air Force Chief of Staff, General Mark Welsh III. That's General Welsh on the right; Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force James Roy is in the center (holding the service guidon), and the Air Force Secretary, Michael Donley, is on the left.

If you said, "what's up with those uniforms," give yourself a pat on the back and move to the head of the class. But don't congratulate yourself too much. It doesn't take a career airmen to see that General Welsh and Chief Roy are wearing uniforms that most us had never viewed before.

So, what's up with the uniforms?

Turns out they are special ceremonial uniforms, reserved for the Chief of Staff and Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force. So, at the change-of-command ceremony on 10 August, there were three people attired in the new threads, Welsh, Roy and General Norton Schwartz, the outgoing Chief of Staff.

To say the least, the design is rather unique. It looks like a variation of the "Billy Mitchell" and "Hap Arnold"-style uniforms the service was experimenting with a few years ago, with elements of the Air Force Band uniform thrown in for good measure.

Reaction to the ceremonial uniform has been decidedly mixed. One wag suggested that the USAF had raided "John Phillip Sousa's closet" in its search for ceremonial garb. In fairness to the late composer, we should note that he built the Marine Corps Band into a world-renowned ensemble, playing his unforgettable marches. And years later, when he returned to service as a Navy band leader during World War I, he donated his year pay (minus one dollar) to a military charity. So, there was a definite plan behind Sousa's fondness for fine uniforms.

As for those dandies at the change-of-command ceremony, we find it rather odd that two four star generals (and the CMSAF) couldn't figure out the "optics" of their appearance. Lest we forget, the Air Force--along with the rest of DoD--is facing significant cutbacks in funding and personnel. Beyond that, there's a growing sex scandal at Lackland involving more than a dozen basic training instructors that threatens to tar the service. And did we mention that the USAF has other concerns, such as fixing the F-22, and getting the F-35 and the new tanker into operational service?

So, with all those issues on the table, why did the Air Force find it appropriate to outfit the current and outgoing Chiefs of Staff (along with the service's senior enlisted leader) in uniforms that were custom-made and can only be worn for a handful of events? So far, the USAF hasn't said how much was spent on the ceremonial uniforms, but we're guessing they didn't come cheap.

As for a rationale, the Air Force says the leaders of the other services have their own, special ceremonial uniforms, so apparently the boys and girls in blue need them as well, even if they're worn by only a tiny fraction of the force (0.00000607 percent, to be exact, or two out of 329,000 airmen). With that kind of thinking, the USAF might as well put in an order for an aircraft carrier, a tank and light armored vehicle. The other services have those items in their inventories, and we wouldn't want the Air Force to feel left out.

The new ceremonial garb is the latest in a long series of uniform disasters for the USAF. Many of us who served in the 1990s can remember some of the other sartorial mistakes, including the infamous "airline" uniform, which combined the "style" of U.S. Air with Navy-style rank on the sleeves. Legend has it that support for that uniform began to wane when a senior general was asked if he was piloting the 5 o'clock flight to Cleveland. It was the same era when the service also experimented with a white ceremonial uniform, complete with white shoes. As we recall, the entire rig cost more than $500, and there were cheers when it was phased out before most of us had to buy one.

More recently, the Air Force produced another clunker with its "airman combat uniform" or ACU. Most airmen hated the thing; the material felt like canvas against their skin and tended to rip in the crotch. Earlier this summer, the service unveiled a modified version of the ACU, made from material similar to that used in the Army's MultiCam uniform, which was previously issued to airmen stationed in Afghanistan. The USAF has also struggled to field the "right" boot for its ACU; a green suede model (which stained easily) has been replaced by a green leather boot (yes, we said green leather).

Airmen in combat zones deserve the best-quality gear, so it's appropriate that service devotes resources to fixing the ACU and fielding better footwear. But spending money on a ceremonial uniform for two members of the USAF is patently ridiculous, and it sends the wrong signal at the wrong time. Previous Chiefs of Staff and Chief Master Sergeants of the Air Force have made do with the standard service dress uniform--the same one worn by all airmen. That "fashion statement" is much closer to the message of General Welsh's inaugural speech as CSAF, when he stressed the "well being" of the force, and the need for innovative thinking to solve problems faced by the service.

Unfortunately, Welsh's remarks were all-but-drowned-out by those "new uniforms." And nothing smacks of elitism, a military caste system, or misplaced priorities like silly-looking ceremonial garb reserved for a select few.

Mark Welsh is a good man, and the right choice to lead the Air Force at this critical juncture. But he got off on the wrong foot with his Sousa-style uniform and the image it conveyed. General Welsh should consider a NOTAM to the force, announcing that the ceremonial uniform is being shelved, once and for all, and follow it up with a public burning of the duds. At this point, as airmen shake their heads and wonder if the USAF can ever get its uniforms (or priorities) "right," a little disposal ceremony couldn't hurt.

Monday, August 13, 2012

Movin' Down the Dial?

Talk radio in New York City is apparently heading for a major shake-up.

It was announced Monday morning that Clear Channel Communications, which owns more than 800 radio stations around the world--including some of the highest-rated news/talk stations in the U.S.--is buying WOR-AM in New York from Buckley Broadcasting. Terms of the deal were not disclosed.

Clear Channel is no stranger to the New York City. It owns five FM stations, including soft-rock WLTW, which has been the most listened to station in the market for several years. Clear Channel's contemporary hits outlet WHTZ (Z-100) is #2 in the ratings, while its other FM stations also rank in the top 10, in terms of average ratings and cumulative audience. It's a very profitable cluster for the company, although Clear Channel reported a $300 million operating loss in 2011.

So, with five profitable FM stations in NYC, why would Clear Channel invest in a "heritage" AM station that barely ranks among the top 20 stations in the city? True, WOR once ruled the roost in the Big Apple, but that was decades ago, and there's no sign the station is about to return to its former glory days. In terms of listenership, WOR has roughly half the audience of WABC-AM, home to such hosts as Rush Limbaugh, Sean Hannity and Mark Levin.

But all of that may be about to change. With today's sale, there is plenty of speculation that Rush, Hannity, Glenn Beck (and others) may soon move to WOR. It's a change that Clear Channel has engineered before, and it speaks volumes about the economics of the radio business in 2012.

Let's start with WABC. The talk outlet is now owned by Cumulus Media, which purchased it from Citadel, which snapped it up when ABC got out of the radio business in 2006. Both Citadel and Cumulus incurred serious debut with their purchases, but Cumulus managed to acquire its rival last year (just after emerging from bankruptcy), a deal that cost the Atlanta-based media company $2.5 billion.

With tons of debt on the books, a portfolio of depreciated station assets and an advertising market that is still soft, Cumulus has been slashing costs, including some of its best-known personalities. Mark Davis, mid-morning host for WBAP in Dallas (and a frequent substitute for Rush) was let go earlier this summer to save money. In San Francisco, former powerhouse talker KGO made a similar move in jettisoning radio veteran Gil Gross. Elsewhere, dozens of Cumulus employees in smaller markets were also shown the door, in an effort to cut costs.

In New York, WABC remains the city's #1 talk station, but it has historically under-performed, in terms of revenue. According to one industry publication, WABC billed about $21 million last year, not bad, but there's clear room for improvement when you consider that Clear Channel's KFI in Los Angeles billed almost three times as much. Additionally, WABC's revenue potential is limited by its programming deals with Premier Radio Networks, which syndicates Rush and Sean Hannity. Not only does WABC pay hefty programming fees for carrying those programs, they must also split advertising revenue with Premier and their hosts. That doesn't do much for the Cumulus bottom line in the nation's biggest radio market.

So, Cumulus is developing its own programming, most notably a talk show featuring former Arkansas Governor (and presidential candidate) Mike Huckabee. The program debuted earlier this year, and was widely billed as an "alternative" to Rush, since it airs in the same 12 noon - 3 pm eastern time slot. There was even speculation that Cumulus talkers like WABC, WMAL (Washington), WLS in Chicago and WJR in Detroit would drop Rush for the Huckabee show, but so far, that hasn't happened.

But Clear Channel has been known to pull Rush from a long-time affiliate when one of their own stations in the market switches to talk. That happened in Pittsburgh (where Clear Channel's WPGB-FM has become a serious challenger to KDKA); Raleigh-Durham (WRDU-FM saw its ratings soar when it became a talk station and Rush moved over from WPTF-AM) and New Orleans, where Rush pulled audience away from market icon WWL when he switched to Clear Channel's WRNO.

Now, the same thing may happen in New York with the radio giant taking control of WOR. With Limbaugh, Hannity, Beck and other shows in the station's line-up, many believe that WOR would quickly surge past WABC and become the top conservative talk outlet in the nation's biggest media market. And to make the deal even sweeter, Clear Channel (and its hosts) can keep all of the advertising revenue for themselves.

In fact, some industry insiders are now predicting the demise of WABC. Jim Farley, program director of Washington's top-rated WTOP, tells media blogger Dave Hughes that WOR will "destroy" WABC, by taking away Rush and Hannity. And while Cumulus has insisted it has no plans to get rid of Rush (or any other Premier personalities), the host "migration" could begin in a matter of weeks.