Among its other problems, the U.S. Air Force is facing a crisis in electronic combat (EC).
At issue is what type(s) of jammers will be available to support USAF, joint-service and allied strike packages in the decades to come. As you’ll recall, the Air Force retired its EF-111 Ravens in the late 1990s, opting to rely on Navy and Marine Corps EA-6Bs for jamming support until new platforms became available after 2012.
Trouble is, most of those new systems—including UAV-based jammer and a previously-proposed B-52 electronic combat variant—have been cancelled, victims of budget issues and technical problems. Making matters worse, the Air Force agreement with the Navy, which covered EA-6B support, is set to expire in four years.
As we noted in a recent post, prospects for extending the agreement are virtually nil. While the Navy is buying 86 of the new EF-18 “Growlers,” those numbers are only sufficient to support USN operations and training. The same holds true for the EA-6Bs that will remain in the Marine Corps inventory.
That’s not to say the Air Force is without electronic combat options. Advanced Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars on the F-22 and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter can be used in a jamming role. Those aircraft also present a more difficult target for enemy radars, thanks to their stealth design.
But, with large numbers of non-stealthy strike aircraft projected to remain in the inventory through 2020, the Air Force still needs dedicated, stand-off jammers to reduce their vulnerability from ground-based air defenses. That’s one reason that the B-52 EC option isn’t quite dead—at least not yet.
According to Graham Warwick of Aviation Week, Boeing and several system suppliers have received contracts to “mature technology” for an Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) pod that could be flight-tested on a B-52 by 2012. If successful, the pod could lead to a more extensive jamming system, give the venerable bomber another shot as a stand-off EC platform, suppressing enemy radars for other strike aircraft.
The initial effort outlined in Aviation Week article is fairly modest—at least in terms of dollars. The three-year contracts given to Boeing and its partners total only $15 million—less than one percent of the funding allocated to the B-52 Stand-Off Jammer System (SOJS). More than $7 billion was spent on that project before it was cancelled in 2006, due to cost overruns.
If all goes well, the second phase of the AEA pod program would spend up to $350 million on two prototype pods, with flight testing in four years. As a Boeing official explained, the pod will use jammers already found on (or planned for) the EF-18, and the system will fit easily on the B-52:
To reduce costs, the pods are planned to have the same size, weight and center of gravity as underwing fuel tanks carried by the earlier B-52D. The pods would house high-power phased arrays providing jamming in two low bands and one mid band, principally to counter early-warning radars.
To power the pods, Boeing plans to add generators to the B-52, which presently has them on only four of its eight engines. There would be an electronic-attack processor and a dedicated display at the existing electronic-warfare officer’s station.
Boeing is teamed with Northrop Grumman, its partner on the U.S. Navy’s electronic-attack EA-18G Growler. “We will leverage off the EA-18’s controls and displays and Northrop Grumman’s electronic attack expertise to keep it affordable,” said Jeff Weis, the Boeing program manager.
The AEA development effort is actually a prelude to planned Core Component Jammer (CCJ), envisioned as a cost-efficient alternative to the cancelled B-52 SOJS. While all Buffs were scheduled for the SOJS upgrade, only a limited number will carry the CCJ—another tip toward saving money.
Boeing executives (and the Air Force) believe that the core jammer system could enter operational service in ten years. That would be welcome news but it also raises the question of what happens during that six-year stretch between 2012 and 2018, the period between the end of the Navy support agreement, and arrival of the first operational CCJ pods.
It’s just one more quandary awaiting the next Air Force Chief of Staff, General Norton Schwartz. Looking at the long list of critical issues facing the USAF, a senior Congressional aide said last month that the service needs a “miracle worker” as CofS.
We can’t disagree; while the EC issue is vitally important, in today’s Air Force, it wouldn't make the “Top 10” list of problems now facing the service. In a nutshell, General Schwartz is inheriting a mess. He’ll need all of his miracle-working skills (and then some) to resolve the jammer problem—and more pressing matters—that now confront the Air Force.
Showing posts with label USAF. Show all posts
Showing posts with label USAF. Show all posts
Tuesday, July 01, 2008
Tuesday, April 22, 2008
How the SecDef Got It Wrong
Military circles are still abuzz over yesterday's speech by Defense Secretary Robert Gates at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Speaking to students at the Air War College, Mr. Gates criticized the Air Force for "not doing enough" in Iraq and Afghanistan. He also observed that trying to get the service to send more UAVs to the war zone was "like pulling teeth."
While the SecDef's harsh critique is grabbing headlines, few people pay attention to the other side of the UAV argument. As we noted yesterday, the recent surge in drone operations in the Middle East comes at a price. Pilots of unmanned aerial vehicles--pulled from the cockpits of manned aircraft--are serving longer tours, limiting their prospects for advancement and promotion. Efforts to train new UAV crews have been hampered as well, since most pilots and sensor operators are busy flying combat missions.
There's also the lingering question of how effective the drones really are. Before he retired last year, General Ron Keys, commander of the Air Force's Air Combat Command (which "owns" most of the military's UAVs and crews), declared that the unmanned aircraft are largely useless for some missions in the war zone, including the search for IEDs.
But, such protests have fallen on deaf ears. With ground commanders clamoring for more UAV support, the number of drone orbits has doubled over the past year and Mr. Gates is pushing for a further increase, even if it means pulling a few more Air Force molars.
In his Aviation Week blog, veteran defense writer Bill Sweetman doesn't say that the SecDef has no clothes, but suggests that his UAV argument is shabbily dressed, at best. The problem, he reports, isn't a lack of pilots (or Air Force disinterest in the drone mission), but rather, the extensive training requirements associated with UAVs:
If you've ever spent five minutes talking to GA-ASI president Tom Cassidy, you know that the Predator has to be flown by a pilot. The ground control system (GCS) is cockpit-like, with stick and rudder pedals - this is not a mouse-commanded automaton. The backseater needs skills, too, because the Predator is designed to direct lethal force even when it is not using its own weapons; and despite the seeming "war by video game" simplicity of the system, retaining situational awareness despite the soda-straw view through the turreted sensors is not easy.
Moreover, everyone knows that a midair or a blue-on-blue involving a UAV will set back the entire project by years. That this has not happened is a testament to rigorous training and disciplined operations.
Of course commanders never have enough overhead full-motion video (FMV); they'd like it all the time. But people have realized something else about 24-hour, FMVUAVs: they are voracious consumers of pilot hours. Consider this: one Predator orbit requires at least six combat-trained aircrew flying three shifts. If they are going to have any time at all for recurrent training, make that eight or ten crew. And if the operation is to be sustained, add four or five people in replacement training.
The Predator operation is expanding, too, which means that there are three training streams: proficiency, replacement and expansion. All of those require hardware, instructors and maintenance support. At the same time, the USAF has introduced the bigger Reaper, imposing a new training burden.
While the SecDef's harsh critique is grabbing headlines, few people pay attention to the other side of the UAV argument. As we noted yesterday, the recent surge in drone operations in the Middle East comes at a price. Pilots of unmanned aerial vehicles--pulled from the cockpits of manned aircraft--are serving longer tours, limiting their prospects for advancement and promotion. Efforts to train new UAV crews have been hampered as well, since most pilots and sensor operators are busy flying combat missions.
There's also the lingering question of how effective the drones really are. Before he retired last year, General Ron Keys, commander of the Air Force's Air Combat Command (which "owns" most of the military's UAVs and crews), declared that the unmanned aircraft are largely useless for some missions in the war zone, including the search for IEDs.
But, such protests have fallen on deaf ears. With ground commanders clamoring for more UAV support, the number of drone orbits has doubled over the past year and Mr. Gates is pushing for a further increase, even if it means pulling a few more Air Force molars.
In his Aviation Week blog, veteran defense writer Bill Sweetman doesn't say that the SecDef has no clothes, but suggests that his UAV argument is shabbily dressed, at best. The problem, he reports, isn't a lack of pilots (or Air Force disinterest in the drone mission), but rather, the extensive training requirements associated with UAVs:
If you've ever spent five minutes talking to GA-ASI president Tom Cassidy, you know that the Predator has to be flown by a pilot. The ground control system (GCS) is cockpit-like, with stick and rudder pedals - this is not a mouse-commanded automaton. The backseater needs skills, too, because the Predator is designed to direct lethal force even when it is not using its own weapons; and despite the seeming "war by video game" simplicity of the system, retaining situational awareness despite the soda-straw view through the turreted sensors is not easy.
Moreover, everyone knows that a midair or a blue-on-blue involving a UAV will set back the entire project by years. That this has not happened is a testament to rigorous training and disciplined operations.
Of course commanders never have enough overhead full-motion video (FMV); they'd like it all the time. But people have realized something else about 24-hour, FMVUAVs: they are voracious consumers of pilot hours. Consider this: one Predator orbit requires at least six combat-trained aircrew flying three shifts. If they are going to have any time at all for recurrent training, make that eight or ten crew. And if the operation is to be sustained, add four or five people in replacement training.
The Predator operation is expanding, too, which means that there are three training streams: proficiency, replacement and expansion. All of those require hardware, instructors and maintenance support. At the same time, the USAF has introduced the bigger Reaper, imposing a new training burden.
But the training issues aren't limited to the UAV crews. Information collected by the drones must be exploited and processed, a task typically performed by intelligence specialists at one of the Air Force's Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) facilities. Every operational UAV mission requires the support of dozens of intelligence specialists. As you might have guessed, there are only a handful of DCGS sites, with personnel that must be trained for the mission. The limited number of DCGS facilities (and their in-house training requirements) places another limit on the number of UAV missions that can be flown.
Obviously, getting more UAVs into the fight entails more than shipping additional Predators or Reapers to Balad and putting them on the flying schedule. Increasing the number of orbits and sorties will require trade-offs. More operational missions will mean cuts in crew training and longer tours for pilots and sensor operators already trained in the system. If training levels dip too low, the Air Force will find it even more difficult to field enough UAV crews.
Some of the proposed work-arounds are problematic, too. As Mr. Sweetman notes, Army proposals to use non-rated pilots for its Warrior UAVs will increase chances for a midair collision or a fratricide incident, something the Air Force has worked hard to avoid. The "Big Sky, Little Airplane" theory only goes so far.
Of course, that doesn't mean that enlisted aviators or limited-duty pilots can't handle drones. But operating them in a safe and effective manner will require an extensive training program, akin to the current Air Force effort. Facing that reality, it's quite possible that Army and Marine Corps UAV units will face the same training issues at some point down the road. When that happens, will Mr. Gates' successor press for an even greater number of orbits, or realize there are limits on what unmanned aircraft can do.
As for the current SecDef, he plans to continue the push to get more UAVs to Iraq and Afghanistan, convinced that the Air Force just isn't trying hard enough. Mr. Gates recently-created UAV task force will be very busy in the coming months, trying to make his vision a reality. But the cost of attaining that goal--in crew training, aircraft maintenance, intelligence support and flight safety--has yet to be measured.
***
ADDENDUM: In response to the Maxwell speech, the Air Force offered its own volley, detailing recent efforts to increase UAV support. Back to you, Mr. Secretary.
Thursday, March 13, 2008
Saddam's Last Laugh (Or, How to Control the World With PlayStation 3s)
Around Christmas 2000, some U.S. military and intelligence officials were referring to Saddam Hussein as a Grinch.
It wasn't because of Iraqi dictator's human rights record, his continued defiance in the face of U.N. sanctions, or attacks against allied aircraft in the no-fly zones. Instead, American concerns during that holiday season were focused on, oddly enough, Sony PlayStations.
U.S. intel reporting suggested that Saddam had acquired a large number of the game consoles. But the Iraqi leader didn't plan to pass out the systems as a favor to his allies, or their children. American analysts believed that Saddam's intentions were much more sinister. As World Net Daily reported at the time:
Two government agencies are investigating the purchases because the PlayStations can be bundled together into a sort of crude super-computer and used for a variety of military applications, say intelligence sources.
"Most Americans don't realize that each PlayStation unit contains a CPU -- every bit as powerful as the processor found in most desktop and laptop computers," said one military intelligence officer who declined to be identified. "Beyond that, the graphics capabilities of a PlayStation are staggering -- five times more powerful than that of a typical graphics workstation, and roughly 15 times more powerful than the graphics cards found in most PCs."
A single PlayStation can generate up to 75 million polygons per second. Polygons, as noted in the DIA report, are the basic units used to generate the surface of 3-D models -- extremely useful in military design and modeling applications.
"When I first saw this report, I was highly skeptical," said an intelligence source. "So, I did some checking with computer experts I know within the Department of Defense. From what they tell me, bundling these video game units is very feasible."
[snip]
"Applications for this system are potentially frightening," said an intelligence source. "One expert I spoke with estimated that an integrated bundle of 12-15 PlayStations could provide enough computer power to control an Iraqi unmanned aerial vehicle, or UAV -- a pilotless aircraft."
The assessment was met with skepticism by video gamers, other intel analysts and computer experts. And, when allied troops invaded Iraq three years later, they found no evidence of weapons systems designed or guided by "bundled" PlayStation 2s. If Saddam had acquired up to 4,000 game consoles--as the initial report suggested--those units were used for other purposes, say a gift for the children of political allies.
Eight years later, we've discovered an item that suggests there might have been something to that original report from Iraq. Last month, the Air Force announced plans to buy up to 300 PlayStation 3s, for a project at the Rome Research Lab in New York. According to the service, the game console processors will be bundled together. Their combine computing power will be used to design more advanced simulators.
While the PS 3s will carry a price tag of up to $120,000, the bundling option is said to be cheaper than "alternate" processors which could cost up to five times as much. But that seems to be something of a red herring. Spending $600,000 on other processor represents a veritable drop in the USAF's multi-billion IT budget.
We wonder if the "design" project isn't something of a ruse. The experiment's real purpose may be aimed at proving the viability of the original Iraqi "plan." With the computing power available in game consoles--and the bundling option--adversaries could develop a cheap, high-speed computer for military applications. Better yet, game systems aren't on export control lists, and they can be purchased in large quantities.
Maybe Saddam and his engineers were on the right track back in 2000. Or maybe the Iraqi dictator is getting the last laugh on us, from a very warm spot in the inferno.
It wasn't because of Iraqi dictator's human rights record, his continued defiance in the face of U.N. sanctions, or attacks against allied aircraft in the no-fly zones. Instead, American concerns during that holiday season were focused on, oddly enough, Sony PlayStations.
U.S. intel reporting suggested that Saddam had acquired a large number of the game consoles. But the Iraqi leader didn't plan to pass out the systems as a favor to his allies, or their children. American analysts believed that Saddam's intentions were much more sinister. As World Net Daily reported at the time:
Two government agencies are investigating the purchases because the PlayStations can be bundled together into a sort of crude super-computer and used for a variety of military applications, say intelligence sources.
"Most Americans don't realize that each PlayStation unit contains a CPU -- every bit as powerful as the processor found in most desktop and laptop computers," said one military intelligence officer who declined to be identified. "Beyond that, the graphics capabilities of a PlayStation are staggering -- five times more powerful than that of a typical graphics workstation, and roughly 15 times more powerful than the graphics cards found in most PCs."
A single PlayStation can generate up to 75 million polygons per second. Polygons, as noted in the DIA report, are the basic units used to generate the surface of 3-D models -- extremely useful in military design and modeling applications.
"When I first saw this report, I was highly skeptical," said an intelligence source. "So, I did some checking with computer experts I know within the Department of Defense. From what they tell me, bundling these video game units is very feasible."
[snip]
"Applications for this system are potentially frightening," said an intelligence source. "One expert I spoke with estimated that an integrated bundle of 12-15 PlayStations could provide enough computer power to control an Iraqi unmanned aerial vehicle, or UAV -- a pilotless aircraft."
The assessment was met with skepticism by video gamers, other intel analysts and computer experts. And, when allied troops invaded Iraq three years later, they found no evidence of weapons systems designed or guided by "bundled" PlayStation 2s. If Saddam had acquired up to 4,000 game consoles--as the initial report suggested--those units were used for other purposes, say a gift for the children of political allies.
Eight years later, we've discovered an item that suggests there might have been something to that original report from Iraq. Last month, the Air Force announced plans to buy up to 300 PlayStation 3s, for a project at the Rome Research Lab in New York. According to the service, the game console processors will be bundled together. Their combine computing power will be used to design more advanced simulators.
While the PS 3s will carry a price tag of up to $120,000, the bundling option is said to be cheaper than "alternate" processors which could cost up to five times as much. But that seems to be something of a red herring. Spending $600,000 on other processor represents a veritable drop in the USAF's multi-billion IT budget.
We wonder if the "design" project isn't something of a ruse. The experiment's real purpose may be aimed at proving the viability of the original Iraqi "plan." With the computing power available in game consoles--and the bundling option--adversaries could develop a cheap, high-speed computer for military applications. Better yet, game systems aren't on export control lists, and they can be purchased in large quantities.
Maybe Saddam and his engineers were on the right track back in 2000. Or maybe the Iraqi dictator is getting the last laugh on us, from a very warm spot in the inferno.
No Leaks in On-Line F-22 Comments
An F-22 pilot who made numerous internet posts about his state-of-the-art aircraft did not divulge classified information, according to an Air Force operations security (OPSEC) assessment and a security review. Both were conducted prior to a recent briefing by the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), which suggested the on-line comments confirmed technical and operational details about the fifth-generation fighter.
An AFOSI spokeswoman also revealed that a widely-circulated PowerPoint presentation on the incident was intended for internal use, and not general release. Entitled “Cyber OPSEC: An F-22 Case Study,” the unclassified briefing was designed as an in-house training tool for the OSI detachment at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. But, after its initial presentation at the Arizona base, the briefing was quickly passed to scores of Air Force units and military bloggers.
“There’s been a lot of misinformation about this,” said Linda Card, a public affairs specialist at AFOSI Headquarters in Washington. She emphasized that the organization did not conduct a criminal investigation into the pilot’s on-line comments, which appeared on a popular aviation forum.
“The guy did something dumb—not illegal,” Card observed.
According to the OSI spokeswoman, the organization’s involvement in the matter was limited to a classification review of material posted by the pilot, who used the screen name “Dozer.” OSI personnel conducted the review in conjunction with SAF/AQL, the Headquarters Air Force acquisition directorate in charge of special programs.
The classification review determined that none of the pilot’s forum comments revealed sensitive information about the F-22. SAF/AQL is the service’s original classification authority for a number of systems that incorporate classified technology, including the F-22.
Card also said that an operations security (OPSEC) study, conducted by Air Combat Command (ACC), reached a similar conclusion. Headquartered at Langley AFB, Virginia, ACC has been responsible for integrating the F-22 into combat units. The Air Force’s first F-22 wing is based at Langley, and the pilot involved in the internet episode was formerly assigned there.
During his tour at the base, Dozer also served as the Air Force F-22 demonstration pilot, showcasing the jet at various airshows around the country. He has also been interviewed by a number of media outlets and appeared in TV documentaries about the stealth fighter. He is now the commander of the first F-22 squadron based outside the CONUS, at Elmendorf AFB, Alaska.
The AFOSI public affairs representative said she “did not know” if agents who assembled the PowerPoint presentation spoke with “Dozer” as part of their research. Asked if those agents were “read into” the F-22 program, Card said “not to my knowledge.
Personnel with that status—which requires additional security screening—are privy to the most sensitive information on the “Raptor’s” technology and performance.
Card confirmed that the OSI’s Davis-Monthan detachment built the briefing after receiving information on the OPSEC study from ACC, which cited it as a “good example” of on-line security hazards. First delivered at Davis-Monthan last month, the briefing was intended for unit training. But it quickly circulated to other Air Force units and military bloggers, generating a minor tempest.
The briefing’s cover slide contains a silhouette photo of an F-22 and the shields of four military and law enforcement agencies: the AFOSI, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) and the Department of Homeland Security. The appearance of those shields suggested that the presentation was a multi-agency product.
However, Card affirmed that none of those organizations assisted with the briefing, or the original OPSEC study. She said that agents who prepared the briefing decided to insert the other shields because they assist the AFOSI in the investigation of cyber-crime and security issues. They also participate (along with the OSI) in threat working groups, a target audience for the cyber OPSEC briefing.
Separately, a DHS official in Washington stated that his organization had no involvement with the OSI briefing or the earlier security assessments. Representatives from the FBI and NCIS did not respond to e-mail requests for comment.
Much of the AFOSI presentation is devoted to Dozer’s various posts on the forum, and queries from other participants. One of the briefing’s final slides, labeled “What Have We Learned About the F-22,” lists a wide range of technical and operational information, ranging from aircraft lot numbers at different bases, the function of specific flaps and doors on the jet, and “weapons systems operational details.”
But an analysis of the information, conducted by In From the Cold, determined that virtually all of the data was already in the public domain. One question, about the F-22’s lack of a helmet-mounted sight, could be easily answered by on-line articles dating back to the late 1990s.
Another interrogatory, about a mock dogfight between the Raptor and the new Eurofighter ”Typhoon,” was also the subject of prior press reporting and on-line speculation. An Aviation Week article—easily accessed through internet search engines–provided details on the deployment, and hinted that the Typhoons had some success in tracking the stealthy F-22.
Answers to other questions were also readily found, through other on-line sources.
Card said it was unclear why the training brief was circulated beyond the OSI detachment at Davis-Monthan. While the 28-slide presentation is clearly marked "unclassified/open source," there are no overt indications that it was intended solely for training purposes--or that distribution was limited to the Arizona detachment.
In the wake of the F-22 controversy, Air Force members have received additional training on security hazards associated with social networking sites. That training has been provided by public affairs specialists.
While cyber-crime is a major mission for the OSI, Card noted that the organization rarely investigates OPSEC issues on blogs and message boards. "The OSI investigates criminal cases for the Air Force," she said in an e-mail. "This particular situation did not warrant a criminal investigation nor an official inquiry."
An AFOSI spokeswoman also revealed that a widely-circulated PowerPoint presentation on the incident was intended for internal use, and not general release. Entitled “Cyber OPSEC: An F-22 Case Study,” the unclassified briefing was designed as an in-house training tool for the OSI detachment at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. But, after its initial presentation at the Arizona base, the briefing was quickly passed to scores of Air Force units and military bloggers.
“There’s been a lot of misinformation about this,” said Linda Card, a public affairs specialist at AFOSI Headquarters in Washington. She emphasized that the organization did not conduct a criminal investigation into the pilot’s on-line comments, which appeared on a popular aviation forum.
“The guy did something dumb—not illegal,” Card observed.
According to the OSI spokeswoman, the organization’s involvement in the matter was limited to a classification review of material posted by the pilot, who used the screen name “Dozer.” OSI personnel conducted the review in conjunction with SAF/AQL, the Headquarters Air Force acquisition directorate in charge of special programs.
The classification review determined that none of the pilot’s forum comments revealed sensitive information about the F-22. SAF/AQL is the service’s original classification authority for a number of systems that incorporate classified technology, including the F-22.
Card also said that an operations security (OPSEC) study, conducted by Air Combat Command (ACC), reached a similar conclusion. Headquartered at Langley AFB, Virginia, ACC has been responsible for integrating the F-22 into combat units. The Air Force’s first F-22 wing is based at Langley, and the pilot involved in the internet episode was formerly assigned there.
During his tour at the base, Dozer also served as the Air Force F-22 demonstration pilot, showcasing the jet at various airshows around the country. He has also been interviewed by a number of media outlets and appeared in TV documentaries about the stealth fighter. He is now the commander of the first F-22 squadron based outside the CONUS, at Elmendorf AFB, Alaska.
The AFOSI public affairs representative said she “did not know” if agents who assembled the PowerPoint presentation spoke with “Dozer” as part of their research. Asked if those agents were “read into” the F-22 program, Card said “not to my knowledge.
Personnel with that status—which requires additional security screening—are privy to the most sensitive information on the “Raptor’s” technology and performance.
Card confirmed that the OSI’s Davis-Monthan detachment built the briefing after receiving information on the OPSEC study from ACC, which cited it as a “good example” of on-line security hazards. First delivered at Davis-Monthan last month, the briefing was intended for unit training. But it quickly circulated to other Air Force units and military bloggers, generating a minor tempest.
The briefing’s cover slide contains a silhouette photo of an F-22 and the shields of four military and law enforcement agencies: the AFOSI, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) and the Department of Homeland Security. The appearance of those shields suggested that the presentation was a multi-agency product.
However, Card affirmed that none of those organizations assisted with the briefing, or the original OPSEC study. She said that agents who prepared the briefing decided to insert the other shields because they assist the AFOSI in the investigation of cyber-crime and security issues. They also participate (along with the OSI) in threat working groups, a target audience for the cyber OPSEC briefing.
Separately, a DHS official in Washington stated that his organization had no involvement with the OSI briefing or the earlier security assessments. Representatives from the FBI and NCIS did not respond to e-mail requests for comment.
Much of the AFOSI presentation is devoted to Dozer’s various posts on the forum, and queries from other participants. One of the briefing’s final slides, labeled “What Have We Learned About the F-22,” lists a wide range of technical and operational information, ranging from aircraft lot numbers at different bases, the function of specific flaps and doors on the jet, and “weapons systems operational details.”
But an analysis of the information, conducted by In From the Cold, determined that virtually all of the data was already in the public domain. One question, about the F-22’s lack of a helmet-mounted sight, could be easily answered by on-line articles dating back to the late 1990s.
Another interrogatory, about a mock dogfight between the Raptor and the new Eurofighter ”Typhoon,” was also the subject of prior press reporting and on-line speculation. An Aviation Week article—easily accessed through internet search engines–provided details on the deployment, and hinted that the Typhoons had some success in tracking the stealthy F-22.
Answers to other questions were also readily found, through other on-line sources.
Card said it was unclear why the training brief was circulated beyond the OSI detachment at Davis-Monthan. While the 28-slide presentation is clearly marked "unclassified/open source," there are no overt indications that it was intended solely for training purposes--or that distribution was limited to the Arizona detachment.
In the wake of the F-22 controversy, Air Force members have received additional training on security hazards associated with social networking sites. That training has been provided by public affairs specialists.
While cyber-crime is a major mission for the OSI, Card noted that the organization rarely investigates OPSEC issues on blogs and message boards. "The OSI investigates criminal cases for the Air Force," she said in an e-mail. "This particular situation did not warrant a criminal investigation nor an official inquiry."
Sunday, February 17, 2008
Half-a-Loaf
The Air Force's troubled C-5 modernization program got a bit of good news the other day, with word that 47 of the newer airlifters will receive both engine and avionics upgrades.
John Young, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, signed off on the plan Thursday, according to Delware Senator Tom Carper. A press release from Carper's office announced that the service's C-5Bs, built during the 1980s, will get new engines and improved avionics under the program. More than 50 older C-5As, which date from the 1970s, will receive the avoinics upgrade.
Carper has been a strong supporter of modernizing the C-5 fleet, which includes jets based at Dover AFB in his home state.
Under the original proposal, both C-5A and B models were slated for full upgrades. But severe cost overruns put the program in jeopardy. A limited modernization for the C-5A is expected to save the Pentagon more than $10 billion. The cost estimate for the revised upgrade program is now pegged at $7.7 billion, compared to last year's $17.5 billion price tag for modernizing the entire C-5 fleet.
But the pared-down upgrade program will leave the service with large numbers of older C-5s that are anything but fuel-efficient. Engine upgrades are supposed to improve the Galaxy's fuel efficiency by at least 15%, but those savings won't be realized among the A models, operated mostly by Air Guard and Air Force Reserve units.
A partial modernization of the C-5 fleet is better than nothing. But it also leaves the Air Force in something of a quandry. With limited purchases of the new C-17, the service needs C-5s to transport out-sized cargo and heavy loads. But without new engines, the C-5As will prove increasingly expensive to operate, at a time when jet fuel prices are rising steadily. We wonder how much of the money "saved" by limiting upgrades for the C-5A will be consumed by higher operating costs over the next couple of decades.
John Young, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, signed off on the plan Thursday, according to Delware Senator Tom Carper. A press release from Carper's office announced that the service's C-5Bs, built during the 1980s, will get new engines and improved avionics under the program. More than 50 older C-5As, which date from the 1970s, will receive the avoinics upgrade.
Carper has been a strong supporter of modernizing the C-5 fleet, which includes jets based at Dover AFB in his home state.
Under the original proposal, both C-5A and B models were slated for full upgrades. But severe cost overruns put the program in jeopardy. A limited modernization for the C-5A is expected to save the Pentagon more than $10 billion. The cost estimate for the revised upgrade program is now pegged at $7.7 billion, compared to last year's $17.5 billion price tag for modernizing the entire C-5 fleet.
But the pared-down upgrade program will leave the service with large numbers of older C-5s that are anything but fuel-efficient. Engine upgrades are supposed to improve the Galaxy's fuel efficiency by at least 15%, but those savings won't be realized among the A models, operated mostly by Air Guard and Air Force Reserve units.
A partial modernization of the C-5 fleet is better than nothing. But it also leaves the Air Force in something of a quandry. With limited purchases of the new C-17, the service needs C-5s to transport out-sized cargo and heavy loads. But without new engines, the C-5As will prove increasingly expensive to operate, at a time when jet fuel prices are rising steadily. We wonder how much of the money "saved" by limiting upgrades for the C-5A will be consumed by higher operating costs over the next couple of decades.
Wednesday, May 02, 2007
The Next Bomber?
The Air Force has offered up a few more clues about its next bomber, set to join the service in 2018.
At a presentation in Washington yesterday, a senior Air Force official said that extensive analysis indicates that a "manned, subsonic bomber aircraft" is the best option to pursue for the service's long-range strike requirement.
"Our analysis shows that the best value and the one that meets the requirements in the mid-term, the 2018 time frame, would, in fact, be for a new concept bomber," Maj. Gen. Mark Matthews, director of plans and programs for Air Combat Command (ACC).
Matthews said the ACC-led study determined that the platform should be manned and subsonic. It is also envisioned to possess advanced stealth characteristics to penetrate hostile airspace, operate in that environment for extended periods and survive in the face of sophisticated air defenses, he said.
"It has to have the ability, in denied airspace against very capable air defense systems, to survive and persist on that battlefield," he said of the new bomber. "We are talking about the embedded capability to survive."
The service's preference for a manned aircraft is hardly surprising. As a service run by pilots, the Air Force has long espoused a need for men (and women) in the cockpit, despite the steady evolution of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and associated technology. The new aircraft will most likely have a two-person crew, similar to the B-2.
According to Defense Daily (subscription required), the service plans to spend $333 million on developing the new bomber through Fiscal Year 2013. However, in an era of tightening defense budgets, there are no guarantees that the new bomber will move steadily toward development and operational deployment. The Air Force has identified the bomber as its fifth most-important acquisition program, ranking behind such platforms as the F-22, the Joint Strike Fighter, and the CSAR-X helicopter. And, with the Army and Marine Corps demanding more funds to buy new hardware, expand their ranks and repair damaged equipment, it's easy to envision some lean funding years for the new bomber, and possible delays in its introduction.
However, there is little doubt about the need for some sort of new, long-range strike platform. While the venerable B-52 is expected to soldier on until 2040, but other bomber platforms--notably the B-1B Lancer--may face retirement sooner, mandating the need for a replacement.
But the development clock is ticking. At this point, the service--and prospective contractors--have roughly a decade to develop and test the new bomber, which is still years away from the first full-scale mock-up, let alone a flying prototype. The revolutions in computer-aided design, precision manufacturing and simulator testing will accelerate the development process, but the designated time line suggests a bomber that will be evolutionary in its design and capabilities, rather than evolutionary. Requirements dictate that the aircraft "would have the capacity to carry in the range of 14,000 pounds to 28,000 pounds of ordnance and would have to have a range in excess of 2,000 miles unrefueled," according to General Matthews. The new bomber is also expected to incorporate low-observable technology for improved survivability and advanced sensors/munitions to increase its lethality.
In terms of performance, the bomber must be able to "hold at risk any potential adversary--regardless of where they area" Matthews said. That includes the ability to locate and attack deeply-buried facilities and fleeting targets, like those associated with enemy WMD programs, air defense networks, or even terrorist organizations. But the real bottom line for the new bomber is going to be its price tag. The last Air Force bomber (the B-2) costs almost $1 billion a copy, a major reason the service bought only 21 of them. To purchase more copies of the new bomber, it's got to be affordable, particularly in the early years of the program when the Air Force will be in the middle of its JSF acquisition.
Recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have again demonstrated the value of bomber platforms. With the recent JDAM upgrade, bombers can now match fighter fighters in terms of precision, while greatly surpassing their capabilities in range, endurance and persistence. Still, I'm not completely convinced that a new manned bomber is the definitive answer for the next long-range strike platform. As the next bomber enters full-scale development (and becomes more expensive), the Air Force may be forced to consider other, potentially more affordable options, including UAVs.
Northrop-Grumman concept illustration of the Air Force's next long-range strike aircraft
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)