Blowing Away the Threat

A vehicle-mounted Cyclone blower, used to expose trash and other debris that hide IEDs in Iraq; more than 100 are currently in service with U.S. forces in Iraq (Buffalo Turbine photo via the Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel).

In the long struggle against IEDs in Iraq, it has often been said that there won't be a single, "magic bullet" solution that solves the problem, once and for all.

Instead, dealing with that threat has required a variety of tactics and technologies, incorporating everything from dismounted troops, to super-sized debris sweepers.

That's right, debris sweepers. The same devices used to blow away trash at football stadiums, race tracks, public parks and on city streets is now being employed to expose roadside bombs in Iraq, with considerable success.

A recent article in the Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel details the effort. A couple of years ago, with IED attacks on the rise, former soldiers working for an equipment manufacturer wondered why a modified blower couldn't be used to expose IEDs, which are often concealed beneath piles of trash and other debris.

Buffalo Turbine, a Springville, New York firm, stepped up to the challenge, producing a vehicle-mounted blower (aptly named the Cyclone) that could direct a powerful blast of air at roadside trash piles and other suspicious debris. Powered by Kohler engines (built in Wisconsin), the Cyclone can generate a hurricane-force torrent of air, reaching speeds of 180 mph. That force is more than sufficient to blow away trash or debris hiding IEDs, and sometimes, actually detonate the device.

According to the manufacturer, the Cyclone has uncovered "dozens" of IEDs in Iraq. The military has over 100 of the blowers in service and more are on the way. Countless lives have been saved by the Cyclone, and no soldiers have been injured while using the device. In fact, the vehicle-mounted blower has been so effective that Cyclones now lead many convoys in Iraq.

Development and deployment of the blower system reminds us that some of the best military innovations come from outside the R&D community. For a fraction of the billions spent (so far) on IED jammers and robots, the Cyclone has proven to be a highly effective counter-measure, using the same technology found in leaf blowers found at your hardware store.

The Cyclone story reminds us of another "low-tech" solution to a vexing military problem during World War II. As Allied forces advanced slowly through Normandy, armored units suffered horrendous losses from the thick "hedgerows" that bordered the region's many fields. Most of the hedgerows were too dense to simply punch through and rolling over the top exposed the tank's thin "belly" armor to enemy anti-tank fire.

The losses continued until a maintenance NCO developed a simple "hedge chopper" fashioned from scrap metal. Mounted on the front of a Sherman tank, the chopper allowed tank crews to slice through a hedgerow quickly, often surprising German defenders on the other side. Development of the chopper took a few hours, some scrap steel, a welding torch, and some old-fashioned American ingenuity. For his efforts, the Sergeant received the Distinguished Service Cross--and the gratitude of Sherman crews that no longer had to "climb over" hedgerows.

Power Up

UPI reports that electrical production and distribution in Iraq has reached a post-war high:

Nationwide, average electricity not provided by private generators was 107,581 megawatt hours from September through November, according to the U.S. Defense Department's "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq" report released Tuesday.

That's a 14 percent increase over the same time frame last year and included an all-time, post-2003 high of 125,000 megawatt hours on Oct. 12, 2007.

But this has only translated into an average of 15.1 hours of electricity per day across the country, with many provinces, including Baghdad, receiving less. Salah al-Din province, north of Baghdad, received the most average electricity with about 19.1 hours per day in November, according to the Pentagon report.

The use of private generators for a home or block is still prevalent, adding to the run on fuels that are in high demand but low supply in Iraq, a result of slow development of both the electricity and oil sectors.

While those numbers are certainly encouraging, there's an important element missing from this --and all other stories on efforts to rebuild the Iraqi power grid. There's a major reason that many areas of Iraq experience daily blackouts, and it's not the result of limited generating capacity, insurgent attacks, or an aging transmission network. Rather, it's the result of an important change in electrical distribution, instituted by U.S. and Iraqi authorities after the country was liberated.

Under that approach, electricity is distributed much more equitably across the country. During Saddam's reign, Baghdad and its environs received most of the nation's electrical supply, allowing the lights to stay on around the clock. Meanwhile, outlying areas received little power, sometimes only a couple of hours a day. With the new distribution scheme providing more electricity to those regions, Iraqis in urban areas have experienced more blackouts--something that was fairly rare when Saddam Hussein was in power.

Clearly, Iraq still has a way to go in modernizing its power grid and providing continuous electrical service to all areas. But describing the frequent blackouts as a result of the war or the U.S. occupation isn't fair, or accurate. In reality, those outages (partly) reflect a concerted effort to provide more electricity across Iraq. Now, it's a matter of building enough plants and transmission lines to provide round-the-clock service, and sustaining a security environment to protect the power grid.

Move Over Saddam..

..and tell Zarqawi to slide down to the next spit. Need to make room for his "successor" at the eternal celestial BBQ, if reporting out of Baghdad is correct.

But then again, previous reports on the "death" of Al Qaida in Iraq leader Abu Ayyub al-Masri have proven false. U.S. officials are still awaiting for confirmation that al-Masri was, in fact, killed.

In the interim, Bill Roggio has an excellent summary on the shifting alliances and loyalties that might have contributed to al-Masri's demise.

The death of al-Marsi won't end Al Qaida attacks in Iraq, but it would represent a significant blow to the terror organization. Making matters worse for the bad guys, the U.S. disclosed last week that we recently captured bin Laden's "personal observer" for Iraq operations--before he could return to that country. That would compound potential leadership problems for Al Qaida's Iraqi affiliate, assuming that al-Masri is actually dead.

The Rest of the Story

Today's article in the Washington Post certainly fits the "surge isn't working" template:

"April Toll Is Highest Of '07 for U.S. Troops"

Consider the opening paragraphs from WaPo writers Sudarsan Raghavan and Karin Brulliard in Baghdad; it's enough to convince the casual reader that the war is lost, and the Democrats "Cut and Run" plan may be the right strategy, after all:

The deaths of more than 100 American troops in April made it the deadliest month so far this year for U.S. forces in Iraq, underscoring the growing exposure of Americans as thousands of reinforcements arrive for an 11-week-old offensive to tame sectarian violence.

More than 60 Iraqis also were killed or found dead across Iraq on Monday. Casualties among Iraqi civilians and security forces have outstripped those of Americans throughout the war. In March, a total of 2,762 Iraqi civilians and policemen were killed, down 4 percent from the previous month, when 2,864 were killed. Iraq's government has yet to release any monthly totals for April.

Attacks killed a total of nine U.S. troops over the weekend, including five whose deaths were announced Monday. The weekend's fatalities brought the toll for the month to 104 Americans killed, in the sixth most-lethal month for American forces since the U.S.-led invasion four years ago.

Under the new counterinsurgency plan, many U.S. forces have left large, more secure bases to live in small combat outposts and to patrol hostile neighborhoods where the risk of insurgents targeting them has multiplied.

Highlighting the vulnerability of American forces, a series of explosions Monday night rocked Baghdad's Green Zone, the most heavily secured enclave in the capital and home to thousands of U.S. troops, Western diplomats and Iraqi government officials.

Pretty hard to find a silver lining in that grim report. But to reinforce the notion that the security situation is growing worse, the Post paid a visit to a base near Baghdad International Airport, for a little Q&A with the troops. Not surprisingly, their mood was pessimistic:

On Monday, U.S. troops at Camp Victory, a sprawling base near Baghdad International Airport, reflected on April's deadly toll on their comrades.

Sitting at a picnic table outside a recreation center, four soldiers smoked Marlboros under a starry sky. Part of the Headquarters Headquarters Support Company for the 3rd Infantry Division out of Fort Stewart, Ga., they had arrived last month. They were on the base, just "sweeping parking lots and waiting for a sandstorm," as Pfc. Richard Gonzalez, 22, put it.

Still, they said, frequent news of troop deaths made even their mission more frightening.

"It makes me feel depressed to be in Iraq right now," said Gonzalez, who is on his second deployment. "It's a whole lot different than last time."

..."There's a whole lot more activity," said Spec. Krystal Fowler, 21, of Hampton, Va. She said it "kind of bothers" her to know other troops are taking hits in the field and she can't help.

...Gonzalez said the deaths made him realize that "there's a war going on out there."

...Fowler sighed. It's a war between Iraqis, she said.

"We are just interfering, and letting our soldiers die."

So, is there any good news from Iraq? Well, Martin Seiff of UPI examined April's casualty totals and discovered an encouraging trend--something you won't find in converage from the Washington Post.

Benchmarks: U.S. Iraq Death Rate Falls.

As Mr. Seiff reports:

U.S. fatality rates in Iraq have fallen during the past two weeks despite insurgent attempts to target American soldiers deployed as part of the "surge" strategy.

As of Monday, 3,342 U.S. troops had been killed in Iraq since the start of military operations to topple Saddam Hussein on March 19, 2003. Of these, 2,723 were killed in action, according to official figures issued by the U.S. Department of Defense.

In all, 33 U.S. soldiers were killed in the 12-day period from April 19 through Monday at an average rate of 2.75 per day. This marked a significant improvement on the previous 28-day period from March 22 to April 18 when 87 U.S. soldiers were killed at an average rate of just over 3.1 per day. It was also considerably better than the previous 22 day period from Feb. 28 to March 21, when 67 U.S. soldiers were killed at an average rate of just over three per day.

Obviously, even a single military casualty in Iraq or Afghanistan is one too many, and we mourn for all the heroes who have been killed or wounded in the line of duty. But Mr. Seiff's analysis provides more anecdotal evidence that the surge may be achieving desired results. The decline in combat deaths occurred as more troops moved into hostile areas and established a permanent presence. Military officials had warned that this phase of the plan would expose more troops to hostile fire, and produce a potential spike in casualties.

According to Mr. Seiff, the drop in combat deaths over the last 12 days of April suggests that Iraqi militants and Al Qaida terrorists are largely avoiding direct confrontations with American troops, concentrating instead on inflicting mass casualties among Shiite civilians in the Baghdad area. I would suggest that the decline also reflects other factors, including an improving security situation in Al Anbar Province (where a number of local tribes have taken up arms against Al Qaida), and successful efforts to close defensive "gaps" that facilitated a series of high-profile attacks in mid-April.

Make no mistake; the battle for Baghdad is far from won. But the situation is not as grim as the MSM would have you believe.

Reforming the General Officer Corps

There were two media performances of note in recent days, illustrating (once again), that new media dictum that he who laughs last has the latest publishing date, the best book deal, or the biggest publicity campaign. Most of the attention has been paid to former CIA Director George Tenet's appearance on 60 Minutes last night, but there was another event that caused a media splash on Friday, and is worthy of its own critique.

So, we'll begin with a gentleman who doesn't have a book contract or TV appearance (at least not yet), but I'm sure the media types will be in touch. Army Lt Col Paul Yingling's op-ed in the most recent edition Armed Forces Journal generated a significant amount of attention in the MSM, largely because it dovetails with various templates on our "failed" effort in Iraq.

Lt Col Yingling, who currently serves as Deputy Commander of the 3rd Armored Calvary Regiment (ACR), believes that the U.S. is on the verge of losing in Iraq, and places the blame squarely at the feet of the general officer corps. According to Lt Col Yingling, our most senior officers have sown the seeds for defeat by (a) concentrating on conventional warfare and high-tech weaponry; (b) failing to train and equip our forces for the challenge of counter-insurgency operations, and (c) refusing to adjust tactics to meet changing conditions in Iraq. Lt Col Yingling likens the performance of current and recent flag officers to those who served in the Vietnam era, when the generals and admirals not only failed to produce a strategy for victory, they also remained silent while civilian leaders developed--and implemented--a strategy that ensured defeat.

It's a damning indictment, and Yingling believes the underlying cause is the system that develops and promotes general officers. Instead of fostering innovation and moral courage, he believes that today's system stifles reasoned dissent and creativity. As he notes, our civilian leaders tend to prefer senior officers who are "team players" and don't rock the boat, traits that are only reinforced by today's military culture.

"Officers rise to flag rank by following remarkably similar career patterns. Senior generals, both active and retired, are the most important figures in determining an officer's potential for flag rank. The views of subordinates and peers play no role in an officer's advancement; to move up he must only please his superiors. In a system in which senior officers select for promotion those like themselves, there are powerful incentives for conformity. It is unreasonable to expect that an officer who spends 25 years conforming to institutional expectations will emerge as an innovator in his late forties."

There's certainly an element of truth in Yingling's arguments, but his critique merits some cautionary notes as well. First, the "problem" he describes--careerism--has been the bane of our military for more than three decades. In 1970, then-Army Chief of Staff General William Westmoreland commissioned a study on professionalism in the service that revealed many of the same problems cited by Lt Col Yingling 37 years later (emphasis mine). And, the subject has hardly been ignored; over the past four decades, there have been plenty of articles in military journals and discussions at the War Colleges on those very subjects. While the system which rewards conformity and silence remains unchanged, Yingling seems to view the general officer corps as the disease, and not the symptom of a larger military culture that needs reforms in selected areas. Without corresponding changes in recruitment, training and military education, Yingling's reform plan is tantamount to treating cancer in its terminal stages.

Likewise, Lt Col Yingling's prescribed "cures" also leave much to be desired. He advocates a greater role for Congress in the selection of general officers, increased oversight by the House and Senate in military matters, and finally, holding retired generals accountable by retiring them at a lower rank, if they fail to perform adequately. At first blush, those recommendations seem quite sensible, but (as always) the devil's in the details.

Consider the prospect of increased Congressional participation in the selection of our military leaders and greater oversight authority. Such a system would quickly illustrate why the founding fathers insisted that there be only one commander-in-chief, instead of legions of would-be emperors in the halls of Congress. Fact is, Congress has (traditionally) viewed military matters through the twin prisms of politics and pork, and there's no reason to believe those practices would change under the system advocated by Lt Col Yingling.

Indeed, while our current military personnel model has produced its share of "yes men" (and women) at the flag ranks, it has one saving grace: by restricting Congress to a confirmation role, it has largely avoided the politicization of the process. Getting Congress "more involved" in the selection of flag officers is a recipie for disaster, with key members of the House and Senate touting their "favorite" candidates, and prospective flag officers actively courting our elected leaders, or even using their political connections to improve performance reports or assignments. Our previous experience with "political generals" (during the Civil War era) was an utter failure, and contributed to a number of battlefield defeats. In a global war on terror--and a looming threat from China--we simply can't afford to make the same mistake again.

Likewise, Yingling should be more skeptical about Congress' record in the oversight role. While there are a few members of the House and Senate who are experts in defense matters, the majority in both houses are politicians in search of a "hot" issue or sound bite that can enhance their stature, and denigrate the opposition. Just last week, a House committee held hearings into the alleged "cover-ups" associated with the friendly fire death of Army Ranger (and former NFL star) Pat Tillman, and the manufactured heroics of PFC Jessica Lynch. After the attention-grabbing hearings (and subsequent headlines), the House panel has already moved on, with no regard for "fixing" the process that led to the cover-ups. In today's political environment, can anyone really expect Congress to be more judicious in its oversight of larger military issues, and abandon the parochial interests that often dominate that oversight process?

Despite that reality, Lt Col Yingling also wants elected officials to "create" a promotion system that rewards intellectual achievement and adaptation by implementing a 360-degree evaluation system, and making professional writings and academic achievements a benchmark for potential flag officers. The proposed evaluation model would allow inputs from the officer's peers and subordinates, but Yingling doesn't address the pratical aspects of that approach. For example, the brigade and battalion commanders who might assist in the "evaluation" of a division commander still need the general's input and endorsement for their own efficiency reports. How many of those Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels would be willing to risk their own careers by criticizing the commander's performance, even under a system that allowed some degree of anonymity?

Additionally, there's the very real possibility that "peers" could use the process to undercut potential competitors, even if they're assigned to a different unit. Evaluating fellow officers or NCOs is a dicey process, one reason that cohort reviews are used sparingly (and informally) in training environments like ROTC, or professional military education schools. They're called "peer smears" for good reason, and it's not surprising the armed services have elected to exclude them from the formal evaluation process.

Intellectual and educational achievements represent an equally thorny issue. It's worth noting that many of America's greatest military leaders--Washington, Lee, Grant, Pershing, Eisenhower, Bradley, and Patton--made do without a graduate degree. Fact is, graduate degrees have become a check-list item for today's officers corps, securing the "tie breaker" that is sometimes used by promotion boards in determining who is selected for advancement. Lt Col Yingling is correct in his observation that the military could use more officers who can speak a foreign language, and have an advanced education in the social sciences. But, he offers no design for determining who actually needs those skills--and preventing the mass "rush" for part-time graduate schools that have produced a generation of officers with "square-filler" master's degrees, and few opportunities to apply that knowledge.

Yingling is also (slightly) off the mark when he suggests that many general officers lack the requisite knowledge or skill for fighting a war like Iraq. The recently-retired CENTCOM commander, General John Abizaid, is a West Point grad who earned a master's degree in Middle Eastern studies at Harvard, he speaks fluent Arabic, and spent years as a special forces operator, with extensive training in counter-insurgency operations. The new commander of coalition forces in Iraq, General David Petraeus, was the Army's most successful division commander in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the author of the service's new counter-insurgency manual. General Petraeus holds a Ph.D in international relations from the Wilson School at Princeton. General Peter Schoomaker, who served as Army Chief of Staff until last month, spent virtually his entire career in special operations, and was another of the service's counter-insurgency experts. Schoomaker's replacement, General George Casey, is a graduate of the foreign service program at Georgetown University.

Whatever their faults in prosecuting the Iraq War, these generals were (as a group) well-educated and trained for their mission. And ironically, the same evaluation and promotion system that Lt Col Yingling faults put these officers in line to be confirmed by the Senate, and lead our ground campaign. No system is perfect, but in the case of Abizaid, Schoomaker and Petraeus, it found officers with seemingly the right mix of education, skills and experience to carry out the Iraq mission. It's difficult to see how a model with "greater" Congressional participation and oversight would find more qualified officers.

In fact, Yingling's call for wider participation by Congress is the most alarming part of his commentary. By making that suggestion, Lt Col Yingling seems to imply that the Army in particular (and the military as a whole) are incapable of reforming themselves. History suggests otherwise. After Pearl Harbor, George Marshall cleaned house, orchestrating the rapid advancement of men like Dwight Eisenhower, Omar Bradley and George Patton, creating the team that was instrumental in winning World War II. In the late 1970s, men like Don Starry, Colin Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf transformed the post-Vietnam Army into the world's most lethal ground force. Today, the same spirit of innovation, courage and determination can be found among the Captains, Majors and Lieutenant Colonels who are leading soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. Not all of those officers will reach the flag level; some will see their careers ended by an evaluation and promotion system that has its flaws. But I still believe that the best of that group will reach the top, providing the leadership and vision required to win the long war. Reform within the military is the key to that process; increased "oversight" and meddling by Congress is not.

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Addendum: After reading Lt Col Yingling's critique, I thought about filing a grievance with my last Air Force promotion board. I've got a master's degree in one of the social sciences (poly sci), I've got all my PME squares filled, and with a little refresher training, I can get by in French. But obviously, it takes more than that to make a great general officer; that's why the Air Force made the correct decision when it put me out to pasture as a field-grader.