Philip Giraldi in the American Conservative, on the damning allegations of virtually unknown FBI whistleblower, Sibel Edmonds. A former contract translator at the agency, Ms. Edmonds has leveled charges that are jaw-dropping, and (if confirmed) could shakes the highest reaches of our diplomatic and security establishments. As Giraldi writes...
[She] tells a chilling story of corruption at Washington’s highest levels—sale of nuclear secrets, shielding of terrorist suspects, illegal arms transfers, narcotics trafficking, money laundering, espionage. She may be a first-rate fabulist, but Edmonds’s account is full of dates, places, and names. And if she is to be believed, a treasonous plot to embed moles in American military and nuclear installations and pass sensitive intelligence to Israeli, Pakistani, and Turkish sources was facilitated by figures in the upper echelons of the State and Defense Departments.
Mr. Giraldi notes that Edmonds' claims have attracted little interest in Congress, and the Justice Department has shrouded its inquiry in secrecy. Yet, the charges could be easily affirmed (or refuted) by simply releasing available files on the case--something else the government appears hesitant to do.
H/T: The Belmont Club
***
Ms. Edmonds' accusations sound intriguing, to say the least. Still, you've got to wonder how a single contract translator could uncover so much incriminating information, during a limited tenure with the FBI.
Showing posts with label FBI. Show all posts
Showing posts with label FBI. Show all posts
Wednesday, January 23, 2008
Thursday, January 10, 2008
Unpaid Bills
Remember the initial furor over the government's warrantless surveillance program? Or, subsequent uproar about the nation's phone companies sharing calling records with law enforcement and intelligence agencies? It was an unprecedented invasion of privacy, civil libertarians warned. Just another sign that the Bush Administration was undermining our constitutional rights.
Turns out that suspected terrorists, the ACLU and other concerned parties may have less reason to worry. A Justice Department Inspector General audit reveals that the big telecom firms routinely cut off covert surveillance lines established by the FBI, because the bureau's field offices failed to pay their phone bills (emphasis mine).
Details of the audit can be found in the Thursday edition of USA Today. Some of the report's findings are absolutely mind-boggling. A few extracts from the summary:
As part of our audit, we analyzed 990 telecommunication surveillance payments made by 5 field divisions and found that over half of these payments were not made on time. We also found that late payments have resulted in telecommunications carriers actually disconnecting phone lines established to deliver surveillance results to the FBI, resulting in lost evidence including an instance where delivery of intercept information required by a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) order was halted due to untimely payment.
According to FBI field division officials, the various types of telecommunication charges, coupled with the number of invoices resulting from each surveillance order, make it difficult to identify and track incoming surveillance bills. The FBI also lacks proper guidance and consistent procedures necessary to track telecommunication surveillance bills accurately. Lacking such headquarters-issued procedures, FBI field divisions have instituted separate, ad hoc tracking mechanisms, which had mixed results in paying bills on time. For example, a primary carrier sent a list to one of the field divisions we tested detailing $66,000 in unpaid telecommunication costs resulting from surveillance activity.
[snip]
According to the OIG investigators who conducted the criminal investigation described at the beginning of this summary report, the lack of formal procedures used by field divisions to handle telecommunication refunds provided opportunities for the FBI employee to steal refunded money. Moreover, our audit found that many FBI employees did not know how to handle refunds of confidential case fund money. One technical agent told us that he sends refunds back to the carrier attached to other telecommunication surveillance bills and requests that they be applied to the remitted bill. Another official told us that he does not know why he receives refunds and has a difficult time matching them to the proper case. In some cases, special agents told us they returned refund checks to the third party draft office simply because they did not know what else to do. Our report recommends that the FBI ensure that employees understand how to properly process refunds of confidential case payments.
The problem apparently stems (in part) from an antiquated financial management system, in use for more than 20 years. Reading the IG summary, it sounds like the FBI software is light-years behind QuickBooks, and other commercial programs. Auditors found that the current system does not allow users to enter details for confidential case payments, including vendor names and invoice numbers. As a result, it's often difficult to determine what phone bills have been paid, and where refunds should be applied.
Inspectors also discovered that the system is ripe for fraud:
As part of our review of the FBI’s oversight of confidential case funds, we also examined the personnel and security files of 35 field division employees who had daily access to confidential case funds. This examination revealed that nearly half of the sampled employees had indications of personal financial problems, such as late loan payments and bankruptcies. As demonstrated by our review of FBI files, the 5-year background investigation program may be helpful in identifying employees who have financial hardships or concerns. Beyond identification, however, the FBI has not developed or implemented procedures that ensure employees with financial concerns are not placed in situations where they are responsible for approving and handling confidential case funds without enhanced supervision. We believe that the FBI needs to develop and implement procedures that ensure employees with serious financial concerns do not regularly handle confidential case funds without additional oversight or safeguards.
In one case, an agent stole thousands of dollars that was supposed to pay for wiretap-related phone bills.
The FBI's latest mess would be comical if the consequences weren't so serious. Since the Justice Department audit only covered a portion of the FBI's telecom payments, we can only wonder how many other wiretap lines--including those authorized by the FISA court--were cut off, simply because the bureau couldn't pay its phone bills on time.
Somewhere, Osama and his minions are smiling.
Turns out that suspected terrorists, the ACLU and other concerned parties may have less reason to worry. A Justice Department Inspector General audit reveals that the big telecom firms routinely cut off covert surveillance lines established by the FBI, because the bureau's field offices failed to pay their phone bills (emphasis mine).
Details of the audit can be found in the Thursday edition of USA Today. Some of the report's findings are absolutely mind-boggling. A few extracts from the summary:
As part of our audit, we analyzed 990 telecommunication surveillance payments made by 5 field divisions and found that over half of these payments were not made on time. We also found that late payments have resulted in telecommunications carriers actually disconnecting phone lines established to deliver surveillance results to the FBI, resulting in lost evidence including an instance where delivery of intercept information required by a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) order was halted due to untimely payment.
According to FBI field division officials, the various types of telecommunication charges, coupled with the number of invoices resulting from each surveillance order, make it difficult to identify and track incoming surveillance bills. The FBI also lacks proper guidance and consistent procedures necessary to track telecommunication surveillance bills accurately. Lacking such headquarters-issued procedures, FBI field divisions have instituted separate, ad hoc tracking mechanisms, which had mixed results in paying bills on time. For example, a primary carrier sent a list to one of the field divisions we tested detailing $66,000 in unpaid telecommunication costs resulting from surveillance activity.
[snip]
According to the OIG investigators who conducted the criminal investigation described at the beginning of this summary report, the lack of formal procedures used by field divisions to handle telecommunication refunds provided opportunities for the FBI employee to steal refunded money. Moreover, our audit found that many FBI employees did not know how to handle refunds of confidential case fund money. One technical agent told us that he sends refunds back to the carrier attached to other telecommunication surveillance bills and requests that they be applied to the remitted bill. Another official told us that he does not know why he receives refunds and has a difficult time matching them to the proper case. In some cases, special agents told us they returned refund checks to the third party draft office simply because they did not know what else to do. Our report recommends that the FBI ensure that employees understand how to properly process refunds of confidential case payments.
The problem apparently stems (in part) from an antiquated financial management system, in use for more than 20 years. Reading the IG summary, it sounds like the FBI software is light-years behind QuickBooks, and other commercial programs. Auditors found that the current system does not allow users to enter details for confidential case payments, including vendor names and invoice numbers. As a result, it's often difficult to determine what phone bills have been paid, and where refunds should be applied.
Inspectors also discovered that the system is ripe for fraud:
As part of our review of the FBI’s oversight of confidential case funds, we also examined the personnel and security files of 35 field division employees who had daily access to confidential case funds. This examination revealed that nearly half of the sampled employees had indications of personal financial problems, such as late loan payments and bankruptcies. As demonstrated by our review of FBI files, the 5-year background investigation program may be helpful in identifying employees who have financial hardships or concerns. Beyond identification, however, the FBI has not developed or implemented procedures that ensure employees with financial concerns are not placed in situations where they are responsible for approving and handling confidential case funds without enhanced supervision. We believe that the FBI needs to develop and implement procedures that ensure employees with serious financial concerns do not regularly handle confidential case funds without additional oversight or safeguards.
In one case, an agent stole thousands of dollars that was supposed to pay for wiretap-related phone bills.
The FBI's latest mess would be comical if the consequences weren't so serious. Since the Justice Department audit only covered a portion of the FBI's telecom payments, we can only wonder how many other wiretap lines--including those authorized by the FISA court--were cut off, simply because the bureau couldn't pay its phone bills on time.
Somewhere, Osama and his minions are smiling.
Friday, January 04, 2008
Still on the Trail
Have you seen this man? The FBI's Seattle field office is (still) looking for D.B. Cooper, the airline hijacker who vanished--and, most likely, died--36 years ago. A better question is why the FBI is still on his trail, given the bureau's more pressing duties in battling terrorism and cybercrime (FBI photo via the Danger Room).
Noah Shachtman at the Danger Room summed it up well a couple of days ago: terrorists must be rejoicing, he surmised, because the FBI is still looking for D.B. Cooper, wasting precious resources that might otherwise be used on (shall we say) more pressing threats.
Cooper, you'll recall was the hijacker who commandeered a Northwest Orient passenger jet on a flight from Portland, Oregon to Seattle on 24 November 1971. Passing a note to a stewardess, Cooper requested $200,000 in unmarked bills and four parachutes, threatening to blow up the plane (a Boeing 727) if his demands weren't met. Northwest Orient and the FBI decided to cooperate with Cooper. When the flight landed in Seattle, the money and parachutes were placed on the jet, while other passengers were allowed to exit.
Airborne once again, Cooper instructed the pilots to fly a southeasterly heading--in the direction of Reno, Nevada--at the relatively low altitude of 10,000 feet and a speed of only 170 knots. After ordering the remaining flight attendant to the cockpit, Cooper apparently strapped on two parachutes and jumped from the 727's rear stairway. A light on the airliner's instrument panel indicated that the stairway was being lowered; seconds later, a rush of air--from decompression of the rear cabin--a "bump" from Cooper jumping off the rear steps--confirmed that the hijacker had left the aircraft.
As you know, Mr. Cooper--mostly likely, a pseudonym--hasn't been seen since. Some of his ransom money--a total of $5,800--washed up along the Columbia River in 1980, and was found by an eight-year-old boy. The whereabouts of Cooper (and the rest of the cash) remain a mystery.
And, most likely, the case will remain unsolved, unless some hiker or logger stumbles across some skeletal remains in southern Washington. Cooper jumped into a heavy rain storm, wearing ordinary street clothing--including a pair of loafers--while 200 mph winds buffeted the aircraft. Not surprisingly, the FBI has (finally) rescinded its theory that the hijacker was an experienced skydiver or former paratrooper. A trained parachutist would not jump under those conditions.
It has also been revealed that Cooper--or whoever he was--took along a dummy reserve chute, leaving behind a fully-functioning model. That reinforces the theory that Cooper was a skydiving neophyte, who jumped under terrible conditions, and into remote, rugged terrain that he was woefully unprepared for. Even the FBI admits there's a strong chance that Cooper didn't survive the jump, his landing, or attempts to reach safety.
So, why the renewed interest in the Cooper case? The highly-publicized, successful hijacking has always been something of an embarrassment to the FBI, and the agency would still like to get its man, nearly 40 years after the crime. The bureau has also obtained a DNA sample from the J.C. Penny tie that Cooper was wearing, and hopes that new publicity--and that hi-tech lead--may finally sove the mystery of what happened to the hijacker. In fact, the FBI's Seattle field office is officially re-igniting the Cooper case.
That strikes us an exceptionally bad idea, no matter how the bureau tries to rationalize it. We realize that the statute of limitations never expires on certain crimes. But with the threats now posed by terrorism, espionage and cybercrime (to name a few) you'd think the FBI has more important jobs than chasing the ghost of D.B. Cooper. As Noah Shachtman observes, Mr. Cooper is now pushing 80--assuming he's alive--and not much of a threat to hijack another plane, or extract more money from an airline. Meanwhile, there have been a number of high-profile terror cases in the Pacific Northwest in recent years. Every agent looking for Cooper means there's one less for other investigations.
Dogged persistence is one of the FBI's more admirable traits, but sometimes, even the G-men need to move on. Put the Cooper file back on the shelf, until that hiker or logger finds some weathered bones, a parachute, and thousands of dollars in unspent ransom money.
Cooper, you'll recall was the hijacker who commandeered a Northwest Orient passenger jet on a flight from Portland, Oregon to Seattle on 24 November 1971. Passing a note to a stewardess, Cooper requested $200,000 in unmarked bills and four parachutes, threatening to blow up the plane (a Boeing 727) if his demands weren't met. Northwest Orient and the FBI decided to cooperate with Cooper. When the flight landed in Seattle, the money and parachutes were placed on the jet, while other passengers were allowed to exit.
Airborne once again, Cooper instructed the pilots to fly a southeasterly heading--in the direction of Reno, Nevada--at the relatively low altitude of 10,000 feet and a speed of only 170 knots. After ordering the remaining flight attendant to the cockpit, Cooper apparently strapped on two parachutes and jumped from the 727's rear stairway. A light on the airliner's instrument panel indicated that the stairway was being lowered; seconds later, a rush of air--from decompression of the rear cabin--a "bump" from Cooper jumping off the rear steps--confirmed that the hijacker had left the aircraft.
As you know, Mr. Cooper--mostly likely, a pseudonym--hasn't been seen since. Some of his ransom money--a total of $5,800--washed up along the Columbia River in 1980, and was found by an eight-year-old boy. The whereabouts of Cooper (and the rest of the cash) remain a mystery.
And, most likely, the case will remain unsolved, unless some hiker or logger stumbles across some skeletal remains in southern Washington. Cooper jumped into a heavy rain storm, wearing ordinary street clothing--including a pair of loafers--while 200 mph winds buffeted the aircraft. Not surprisingly, the FBI has (finally) rescinded its theory that the hijacker was an experienced skydiver or former paratrooper. A trained parachutist would not jump under those conditions.
It has also been revealed that Cooper--or whoever he was--took along a dummy reserve chute, leaving behind a fully-functioning model. That reinforces the theory that Cooper was a skydiving neophyte, who jumped under terrible conditions, and into remote, rugged terrain that he was woefully unprepared for. Even the FBI admits there's a strong chance that Cooper didn't survive the jump, his landing, or attempts to reach safety.
So, why the renewed interest in the Cooper case? The highly-publicized, successful hijacking has always been something of an embarrassment to the FBI, and the agency would still like to get its man, nearly 40 years after the crime. The bureau has also obtained a DNA sample from the J.C. Penny tie that Cooper was wearing, and hopes that new publicity--and that hi-tech lead--may finally sove the mystery of what happened to the hijacker. In fact, the FBI's Seattle field office is officially re-igniting the Cooper case.
That strikes us an exceptionally bad idea, no matter how the bureau tries to rationalize it. We realize that the statute of limitations never expires on certain crimes. But with the threats now posed by terrorism, espionage and cybercrime (to name a few) you'd think the FBI has more important jobs than chasing the ghost of D.B. Cooper. As Noah Shachtman observes, Mr. Cooper is now pushing 80--assuming he's alive--and not much of a threat to hijack another plane, or extract more money from an airline. Meanwhile, there have been a number of high-profile terror cases in the Pacific Northwest in recent years. Every agent looking for Cooper means there's one less for other investigations.
Dogged persistence is one of the FBI's more admirable traits, but sometimes, even the G-men need to move on. Put the Cooper file back on the shelf, until that hiker or logger finds some weathered bones, a parachute, and thousands of dollars in unspent ransom money.
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