Remember the kerfuffle over John McCain being born in the Panama Canal Zone? Never mind that McCain’s parents were native-born Americans. Or, that he entered this world in an American military hospital in the Canal Zone, which was U.S. territory at the time. According to a few legal experts (dutifully interviewed by the MSM), McCain’s overseas birth raised questions about his ability to meet constitutional requirements for the presidency, which limits eligibility to “natural-born” Americans.
The “controversy” struck us as an exercise in legal silliness, but the U.S. Senate actually passed a non-binding resolution in April, declaring that Mr. McCain qualifies as a “natural born citizen." Before that, the issue had been fodder for the blogosphere and pundits for almost two months, after The New York Times broached the subject in a February article.
Not surprisingly, the Times and other MSM outlets have been noticeably absent in questioning Barack Obama’s “birth” qualifications for the White House. As Jim Geraghty of NRO reminds us, there’s been a persistent internet buzz about Mr. Obama’s birth certificate, which has never been released by his campaign. Reporters have asked for it (and been denied); the state of Hawaii, where Obama was born, does make those records public:
Mr. Geraghty notes there are several (unlikely) rumors about the birth certificate, and why it’s never been released. Obviously, the Obama campaign could clear those up rather quickly, by simply releasing the document and redacting any information that could be targeted by identity thieves.
But Senator Obama and his advisers show no inclination to release the birth document, and there’s been virtually no pressure from the MSM. Of course, this is the same press corps that has speculated (at length) about John McCain’s ability to handle the presidency, based on his age and past health problems. That prompted the Senator and his doctors to release more than 1,000 pages of medical records, affirming that Mr. McCain is in good health, despite the injuries he suffered as a POW in North Vietnam, and past bouts with skin cancer.
When it came to Obama, his doctor issued a one page letter, testifying that the Senator is medically fit. There was no demand for more information, or stories highlighting the difference between McCain’s voluminous disclosure, and Obama's one-page health statement. Little wonder the mainstream press has no interest in what might be found in the senator’s birth certificate.
Tuesday, June 10, 2008
Monday, June 09, 2008
Happy Birthday, Mr. Allingham
At age 112, Henry Allingham is not only the oldest man in Europe, he's also the last survivor of the Battle of Jutland, and the last living member of the RAF's initial cadre (BBC photo)
In recent posts, we've celebrated the life of Frank Buckles, the last surviving U.S. veteran of World War I. Mr. Buckles was only 17 when he joined the Army, then headed to France as part of the American Expeditionary Force. Though he never saw combat, Mr. Buckles endured another kind of hell 25 years later, when (as a civilian steamship executive), he was captured and held as a POW by the Japanese. Buckles spent more than three years in Japanese prison camps before being liberated.
Today, Mr. Buckles has become something of a celebrity--and deservedly so. He's the last, living American link to a generation that stemmed the German tide during World War I, and returned home to an indifferent public. There were a few victory parades, but none of the benefits that greeted veterans of the Second World War. It's more than ironic that Mr. Buckles' service to his country was finally recognized when he became our only living veteran of the Great War.
Still, at age 108, Frank Buckles is a broth of a boy compared to Henry Allingham, who turned 112 this week. Not only is Mr. Allingham the oldest man in Europe (and one of the 20 oldest people in the world), he also has an impressive military resume.
Allingham joined the Royal Naval Air Service during World War I, but only after he mother died--she was against his plans to enlist. As a crew member on a flimsy seaplane, he witnessed the Battle of Jutland in 1916. Mr. Allingham is the last survivor of that epic sea engagement; even today, he remembers watching large shells from the opposing battle lines "skip across the water."
Rated as a rigger and mechanic, Allingham later retrived downed aircraft on the battlefields of France, where he was bombed and shelled. When the Navy's Flying Service and the Army's aerial arm merged in 1918, Mr. Allingham became a founding member of the Royal Air Force. As you might have guessed, Allingham is last surviving member of the RAF's inital cadre.
After the war, Mr. Allingham took a job at Ford, staying there until retirement. During World War II, he worled on several defense projects, including counter-measuers for German magnetic mines. Allingham outlived his wife (who died in 1970), and his two daughters, who lived into their 80s. Today, most of his family lives in the United States, but they still return to Britain every June for his birthday.
Both the U.K. Telegraph and the BBC have video of this remarkable man. Mr. Allingham's mental faculties remain extraordinarily sharp, despite his advanced age.
More importantly, Britain's First World War Veteran's Association has taken the necessary steps to preserve Allingham's recollections for future generations--something that has been done (belatedly) with Frank Buckles and the last American survivors of World War I.
Happy Birthday, Mr. Allingham. And many more.
Forget the Interview Tour
Defense Secretary Robert Gates--and President Bush--have found their nominee for Air Force Chief of Staff. General Norton Schwartz, the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Transportation Command, was nominated for the chief of staff post this morning, replacing General T. Michael Moseley. Along with Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne, General Moseley was forced to resign last week, amid continuing problems with nuclear accountability.
If confirmed by the Senate, General Schwartz will be the first non-fighter pilot to lead the Air Force since 1982. Schwartz spent his career flying transport and special operations aircraft. He served as Commander of the USAF's 16th Special Operations Wing at Hurlburt Field, Florida in 1995, and became Vice-Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command just five years later.
More on General Schwartz's career from Air Force Times.
Before today's announcement, it was widely assumed that Mr. Gates would use a planned tour of Air Force commands to interview potential candidates to replace General Moseley. The Secretary of Defense is scheduled to visit Air Combat Command (headquartered at Langley AFB, Virginia) this week, along with U.S. Space Command (Peterson AFB, Colorado) and Air Mobility Command, at Scott AFB, Illinois. The four-star generals in charge of those commands had been mentioned as possible contenders for Chief of Staff.
Along with the Schwartz nomination, Mr. Gates has also selected a new Vice Chief of Staff. Lieutenant General William Fraser III, who current serves as Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has been nominated for his fourth star and the vice chief position. General Fraser is a career bomber pilot who has participated in diplomatic missions to the Middle East, aimed at brokering a peace deal between the Israeli and Palestinians. Before entering his current post, General Fraser served as Vice Commander of ACC.
Fraser will replace General Duncan McNabb, who has been nominated to replace General Schwartz at Transcom. Like Schwartz, General McNabb has broad experience in transport aircraft and operations.
Today's announcements represent a blow to the so-called "fighter mafia" that has dominated the senior Air Force ranks for more than two decades. The last Chief of Staff without a background in fighter aircraft was General Lew Allen, Jr., who retired in 1982.
If confirmed by the Senate, General Schwartz will be the first non-fighter pilot to lead the Air Force since 1982. Schwartz spent his career flying transport and special operations aircraft. He served as Commander of the USAF's 16th Special Operations Wing at Hurlburt Field, Florida in 1995, and became Vice-Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command just five years later.
More on General Schwartz's career from Air Force Times.
Before today's announcement, it was widely assumed that Mr. Gates would use a planned tour of Air Force commands to interview potential candidates to replace General Moseley. The Secretary of Defense is scheduled to visit Air Combat Command (headquartered at Langley AFB, Virginia) this week, along with U.S. Space Command (Peterson AFB, Colorado) and Air Mobility Command, at Scott AFB, Illinois. The four-star generals in charge of those commands had been mentioned as possible contenders for Chief of Staff.
Along with the Schwartz nomination, Mr. Gates has also selected a new Vice Chief of Staff. Lieutenant General William Fraser III, who current serves as Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has been nominated for his fourth star and the vice chief position. General Fraser is a career bomber pilot who has participated in diplomatic missions to the Middle East, aimed at brokering a peace deal between the Israeli and Palestinians. Before entering his current post, General Fraser served as Vice Commander of ACC.
Fraser will replace General Duncan McNabb, who has been nominated to replace General Schwartz at Transcom. Like Schwartz, General McNabb has broad experience in transport aircraft and operations.
Today's announcements represent a blow to the so-called "fighter mafia" that has dominated the senior Air Force ranks for more than two decades. The last Chief of Staff without a background in fighter aircraft was General Lew Allen, Jr., who retired in 1982.
How the Air Force Lost its Way
A lack of accountability over decades past led to current problems.
by Nate Hale
Integrity First
Service Before Self
Excellence in All We Do
Those simple statements form the Core Values of the United States Air Force, principles designed to set the ethical foundation for every airman and the service’s civilian employees.
Unfortunately, those standards have sometimes been ignored over the past two decades—and by the very individuals charged with setting the example: the USAF’s highest-ranking officers and civilian officials. Since the early 1990s, the Air Force has suffered through a series of scandals involving senior personnel, creating an ethical cloud that lingers to this day. Some of these incidents were highly-publicized; others remain virtually unknown outside the service.
But all share something in common; not only did these scandals involve high-ranking officers and civilians; they (typically) resulted in minor punishment for the offending parties. Only one of the senior Air Force officials (a civilian) went to jail for their wrong-doing—and she emerged from prison with pension benefits intact. The rest escaped with lesser sentences, ranging from administrative punishment to reduction in rank.
“Different spanks for different ranks” is a military maxim that probably dates back to the Crusades. But in today’s Air Force, the notion of lesser punishment—or a lack of accountability -- for senior personnel has been carried to an illogical extreme, creating an atmosphere where misconduct is seemingly tolerated and sanctioned only as a last resort.
Consider the case of one USAF general, now retired. As the leader of a training command in the early 1990s, this officer became angry when a female subordinate, who happened to be an African-American, failed to arrive on time for a meeting. “Where is that g—d---ned black b---h?” he thundered to his staff.
When she learned of his racist rant, the black officer filed a complaint with the command’s inspector general. However, any hopes of a serious inquiry were quickly dashed when a Colonel was appointed to “investigate” the three-star.
In his subsequent report, the colonel concluded that the black officer was not the victim of racist or vile behavior, because the general in question “treated everyone like that.” Incidentally, the lieutenant general in question went on to earn his fourth star and led both an allied and joint command before retirement. He is but one of several flag officers who evaded serious punishment for misdeeds in recent past.
Sadly, that case represents only the tip of the ethical iceberg. On April 14, 1994, two USAF F-15s mistakenly shot down two Army Black Hawk helicopters over northern Iraq, killing 24 Allied personnel. Over the year that followed, the incident was exhaustively investigated by the Air Force, other government agencies and the U.S. Congress. But only one Air Force member, Captain Jim Wang, faced a court-martial for his role in the incident.
Wang, who was later acquitted, had served as a crew member on the AWACS radar plane that was controlling the F-15s. Members of the military jury apparently believed that Wang was made a scapegoat—and their concerns are not unfounded. The pilots who fired the fatal shots received only non-judicial punishment, as did senior officers in charge of the operation.
Indeed, it’s worth remembering that some Air Force officials appeared reluctant to file criminal charges, despite command and operational failures that led to an appalling loss of life. The pilots’ wing commander described their errors in the shoot down as “reasonable” and one of his superiors concurred; in late 1994, the three-star general with court-martial authority over the pilots and on-scene commanders declined to pursue criminal disciplinary action against them.
The gross lack of accountability stunned the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Ronald Fogleman, who discovered that many of the officers involved in the incident received glowing performance reports, and recommendations for more important assignments. That prompted Fogleman to take the rare step of placing letters of evaluation in the personnel files of seven officers, noting their “failure” to meet Air Force standards.
While General Fogleman’s actions were widely praised, a subsequent controversy suggested his own inconsistencies in the area of accountability. In 1997, Fogleman requested early retirement, protesting the results of a DoD investigation into the terrorist bombing at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, which occurred a year earlier. General Fogleman believed the probe unfairly criticized the senior Air Force commander at Dhahran, who was completing his year-long tour at the time of the attack.
The preliminary DoD inquiry, led by retired led by retired Army General Wayne Downing, offered a blunt assessment of Brigadier General Terry Schwailer, the wing commander in charge of the Khobar complex. Downing’s panel determined that General Schwailer should have taken additional measures to protect against a possible truck bombing at the Khobar facility—the same type of attack that killed 19 of his airmen in the June, 1996 attack.
Critics of the Downing Report claim that his inquiry was unduly influenced by political pressures, and there is some evidence to support those allegations. But those charges ignore another salient point, namely that Pentagon officials found serious fault with USAF investigations into the attack, which determined that no personnel should be sanctioned.
Announcing his verdict on the incident, Defense Secretary William Cohen wrote that the Air Force reports did “not reflect a thorough, critical analysis of all of the facts and issues,” and arrived at conclusions not fully supported by the facts. Determining that Schwalier bore some measure of blame, Cohen removed Schwailer’s name from the promotion list for Major General, a decision that infuriated Fogleman and influenced his retirement decision.
But debates over the various Khobar reports—and their findings—obscure another issue: the same Chief of Staff who demanded accountability in the Black Hawk incident was much more sympathetic to a fellow general, implicated in a tragedy of similar magnitude.
As Air Force standards of accountability grew more fuzzy, it was inevitable that ethical lapses would occur more frequently. And, as the service moved into a new century, they happened with alarming regularity. In 2004, the USAF’s former top procurement official, Darlene Druyun, pleaded guilty to corruption charges in connection with a plan to lease tanker aircraft from Boeing. Druyun was accused of inflating the contract price to favor Boeing (which promised her a job upon retirement) and leaking information on a bid from a rival firm, EADS. She served a nine-month prison term, but still receives her federal retirement benefits.
The same year, the Air Force’s senior legal officer, Major General Thomas Fiscus, was punished for a string of “inappropriate relationships” with female subordinates. While Fiscus was demoted two grades (to Colonel), he collects an annual pension of $85,000. The former head of the service’s Senior Leader Management Office, Brigadier General Richard Hassan, suffered a similar fate, after he harassed female personnel in his organization, and engaged in inappropriate relationships with other women. Hassan retired from the Air Force as a Colonel in 2006.
Another scandal involving a senior officer has yet to be resolved. Colonel Michael Murphy was removed as Commander of the Air Force Legal Operations Agency in 2006, after investigators learned that he had been disbarred as a civilian attorney in the early 1980s. Murphy served his entire career as a judge advocate general without a valid law license—an essential requirement for any military attorney. He faces court-martial next month, on a variety of charges, including dereliction of duty and making false official statements.
Also in the offing is the latest investigation into “Thunder Vision,” a $50-million support contract that was steered by senior officers to a firm with close ties to USAF leadership. At least five officers have been disciplined in the matter (so far), and the current probe is focusing on the conduct of senior leaders, including the outgoing Chief of Staff, General Michael Moseley. A preliminary inquiry revealed that Moseley maintained personal ties with executives from the company that won the contract, while it was up for bids. General Moseley has denied any wrong-doing.
In fairness, the number of misconduct cases involving senior officers and civilian officials remains small. And, their prosecution suggests that the system still works, to some degree. But sadly, these incidents also suggest a larger problem, rooted in the ethical climate that permeates today’s Air Force. Having observed scandals in years past, some leaders apparently believed they could get by with unethical conduct, illegal behavior, and deadly mistakes—or face only minor sanctions if they “got caught.”
None of this was lost on Defense Secretary Robert Gates. Since assuming his post, Dr. Gates has been waging an intense battle with the Air Force, over issues ranging from UAV support for the War on Terror, to the number of F-22s needed to assure air supremacy. In his dealings with Air Force leadership, Gates found a service that was both arrogant and implacable, resting on past laurels instead of focusing on contemporary issues.
And, the SecDef apparently viewed the Air Force as incapable of policing itself. After recent nuclear incidents at Minot AFB, North Dakota and Hill AFB, Utah, Mr. Gates gave the service an opportunity to fix its problems. But when an independent report showed continuing problems in nuclear operations--including a lack of accountability--the secretary moved quickly, forcing the resignation of the Secretary of the Air Force and the service's Chief of Staff. The problems at Hill and Minot simply gave Mr. Gates the ammunition he needed, imposing a measure of high-level accountability that the service couldn't muster on its own.
The USAF proudly boasts that it has never court-martialed a general officer in its 60-year history, suggesting a leadership corps with bedrock integrity. But the recent scandals that have rocked the service speak otherwise, tarring the reputation of thousands of airmen, officers and civilian who serve with pride and honor. Those men and women—not to mention the U.S. taxpayer—deserve better.
Restoring accountability throughout the ranks should be the #1 priority for General Norton Schwartz, nominated today to be the next Air Force Chief of Staff. Without it, the service’s vaunted core values will be nothing more than empty buzz-words.
by Nate Hale
Integrity First
Service Before Self
Excellence in All We Do
Those simple statements form the Core Values of the United States Air Force, principles designed to set the ethical foundation for every airman and the service’s civilian employees.
Unfortunately, those standards have sometimes been ignored over the past two decades—and by the very individuals charged with setting the example: the USAF’s highest-ranking officers and civilian officials. Since the early 1990s, the Air Force has suffered through a series of scandals involving senior personnel, creating an ethical cloud that lingers to this day. Some of these incidents were highly-publicized; others remain virtually unknown outside the service.
But all share something in common; not only did these scandals involve high-ranking officers and civilians; they (typically) resulted in minor punishment for the offending parties. Only one of the senior Air Force officials (a civilian) went to jail for their wrong-doing—and she emerged from prison with pension benefits intact. The rest escaped with lesser sentences, ranging from administrative punishment to reduction in rank.
“Different spanks for different ranks” is a military maxim that probably dates back to the Crusades. But in today’s Air Force, the notion of lesser punishment—or a lack of accountability -- for senior personnel has been carried to an illogical extreme, creating an atmosphere where misconduct is seemingly tolerated and sanctioned only as a last resort.
Consider the case of one USAF general, now retired. As the leader of a training command in the early 1990s, this officer became angry when a female subordinate, who happened to be an African-American, failed to arrive on time for a meeting. “Where is that g—d---ned black b---h?” he thundered to his staff.
When she learned of his racist rant, the black officer filed a complaint with the command’s inspector general. However, any hopes of a serious inquiry were quickly dashed when a Colonel was appointed to “investigate” the three-star.
In his subsequent report, the colonel concluded that the black officer was not the victim of racist or vile behavior, because the general in question “treated everyone like that.” Incidentally, the lieutenant general in question went on to earn his fourth star and led both an allied and joint command before retirement. He is but one of several flag officers who evaded serious punishment for misdeeds in recent past.
Sadly, that case represents only the tip of the ethical iceberg. On April 14, 1994, two USAF F-15s mistakenly shot down two Army Black Hawk helicopters over northern Iraq, killing 24 Allied personnel. Over the year that followed, the incident was exhaustively investigated by the Air Force, other government agencies and the U.S. Congress. But only one Air Force member, Captain Jim Wang, faced a court-martial for his role in the incident.
Wang, who was later acquitted, had served as a crew member on the AWACS radar plane that was controlling the F-15s. Members of the military jury apparently believed that Wang was made a scapegoat—and their concerns are not unfounded. The pilots who fired the fatal shots received only non-judicial punishment, as did senior officers in charge of the operation.
Indeed, it’s worth remembering that some Air Force officials appeared reluctant to file criminal charges, despite command and operational failures that led to an appalling loss of life. The pilots’ wing commander described their errors in the shoot down as “reasonable” and one of his superiors concurred; in late 1994, the three-star general with court-martial authority over the pilots and on-scene commanders declined to pursue criminal disciplinary action against them.
The gross lack of accountability stunned the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Ronald Fogleman, who discovered that many of the officers involved in the incident received glowing performance reports, and recommendations for more important assignments. That prompted Fogleman to take the rare step of placing letters of evaluation in the personnel files of seven officers, noting their “failure” to meet Air Force standards.
While General Fogleman’s actions were widely praised, a subsequent controversy suggested his own inconsistencies in the area of accountability. In 1997, Fogleman requested early retirement, protesting the results of a DoD investigation into the terrorist bombing at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, which occurred a year earlier. General Fogleman believed the probe unfairly criticized the senior Air Force commander at Dhahran, who was completing his year-long tour at the time of the attack.
The preliminary DoD inquiry, led by retired led by retired Army General Wayne Downing, offered a blunt assessment of Brigadier General Terry Schwailer, the wing commander in charge of the Khobar complex. Downing’s panel determined that General Schwailer should have taken additional measures to protect against a possible truck bombing at the Khobar facility—the same type of attack that killed 19 of his airmen in the June, 1996 attack.
Critics of the Downing Report claim that his inquiry was unduly influenced by political pressures, and there is some evidence to support those allegations. But those charges ignore another salient point, namely that Pentagon officials found serious fault with USAF investigations into the attack, which determined that no personnel should be sanctioned.
Announcing his verdict on the incident, Defense Secretary William Cohen wrote that the Air Force reports did “not reflect a thorough, critical analysis of all of the facts and issues,” and arrived at conclusions not fully supported by the facts. Determining that Schwalier bore some measure of blame, Cohen removed Schwailer’s name from the promotion list for Major General, a decision that infuriated Fogleman and influenced his retirement decision.
But debates over the various Khobar reports—and their findings—obscure another issue: the same Chief of Staff who demanded accountability in the Black Hawk incident was much more sympathetic to a fellow general, implicated in a tragedy of similar magnitude.
As Air Force standards of accountability grew more fuzzy, it was inevitable that ethical lapses would occur more frequently. And, as the service moved into a new century, they happened with alarming regularity. In 2004, the USAF’s former top procurement official, Darlene Druyun, pleaded guilty to corruption charges in connection with a plan to lease tanker aircraft from Boeing. Druyun was accused of inflating the contract price to favor Boeing (which promised her a job upon retirement) and leaking information on a bid from a rival firm, EADS. She served a nine-month prison term, but still receives her federal retirement benefits.
The same year, the Air Force’s senior legal officer, Major General Thomas Fiscus, was punished for a string of “inappropriate relationships” with female subordinates. While Fiscus was demoted two grades (to Colonel), he collects an annual pension of $85,000. The former head of the service’s Senior Leader Management Office, Brigadier General Richard Hassan, suffered a similar fate, after he harassed female personnel in his organization, and engaged in inappropriate relationships with other women. Hassan retired from the Air Force as a Colonel in 2006.
Another scandal involving a senior officer has yet to be resolved. Colonel Michael Murphy was removed as Commander of the Air Force Legal Operations Agency in 2006, after investigators learned that he had been disbarred as a civilian attorney in the early 1980s. Murphy served his entire career as a judge advocate general without a valid law license—an essential requirement for any military attorney. He faces court-martial next month, on a variety of charges, including dereliction of duty and making false official statements.
Also in the offing is the latest investigation into “Thunder Vision,” a $50-million support contract that was steered by senior officers to a firm with close ties to USAF leadership. At least five officers have been disciplined in the matter (so far), and the current probe is focusing on the conduct of senior leaders, including the outgoing Chief of Staff, General Michael Moseley. A preliminary inquiry revealed that Moseley maintained personal ties with executives from the company that won the contract, while it was up for bids. General Moseley has denied any wrong-doing.
In fairness, the number of misconduct cases involving senior officers and civilian officials remains small. And, their prosecution suggests that the system still works, to some degree. But sadly, these incidents also suggest a larger problem, rooted in the ethical climate that permeates today’s Air Force. Having observed scandals in years past, some leaders apparently believed they could get by with unethical conduct, illegal behavior, and deadly mistakes—or face only minor sanctions if they “got caught.”
None of this was lost on Defense Secretary Robert Gates. Since assuming his post, Dr. Gates has been waging an intense battle with the Air Force, over issues ranging from UAV support for the War on Terror, to the number of F-22s needed to assure air supremacy. In his dealings with Air Force leadership, Gates found a service that was both arrogant and implacable, resting on past laurels instead of focusing on contemporary issues.
And, the SecDef apparently viewed the Air Force as incapable of policing itself. After recent nuclear incidents at Minot AFB, North Dakota and Hill AFB, Utah, Mr. Gates gave the service an opportunity to fix its problems. But when an independent report showed continuing problems in nuclear operations--including a lack of accountability--the secretary moved quickly, forcing the resignation of the Secretary of the Air Force and the service's Chief of Staff. The problems at Hill and Minot simply gave Mr. Gates the ammunition he needed, imposing a measure of high-level accountability that the service couldn't muster on its own.
The USAF proudly boasts that it has never court-martialed a general officer in its 60-year history, suggesting a leadership corps with bedrock integrity. But the recent scandals that have rocked the service speak otherwise, tarring the reputation of thousands of airmen, officers and civilian who serve with pride and honor. Those men and women—not to mention the U.S. taxpayer—deserve better.
Restoring accountability throughout the ranks should be the #1 priority for General Norton Schwartz, nominated today to be the next Air Force Chief of Staff. Without it, the service’s vaunted core values will be nothing more than empty buzz-words.
Sunday, June 08, 2008
The Few and the Proud
In a recent post, we noted the hardships endured by ROTC cadets at Ivy League schools. With their institutions refusing to host ROTC detachments, cadets at schools like Yale, Columbia and Harvard must commute across town for their military training.
For some students, the trip is relatively short. Cadets at Harvard make a two-mile trip to the MIT campus, although that trek is never fun in Boston traffic. Still, their commute is brief compared to the handful of ROTC students at Yale. For them, completing military studies requirements means a drive to the University of Connecticut, more than an hour each way.
Despite those obstacles--and palpable on-campus hostility--a few Ivy Leaguers still participate in ROTC and earn their commissions as military officer. Dean Barnett of the Weekly Standard attended Harvard's latest commissioning ceremony last week, which produced five new officers for the U.S. military. The university president attended the event, but still managed to get in a dig at the Pentagon's "anti-gay" policy. Is anyone surprised?
Still, there is some cause for optimism. ROTC still has an on-campus presence at two Ivy League institutions, Princeton and Cornell. And, with public trust in the military ranking well above that of other public institutions, who knows? In a few years, Harvard might be commissioning eight or ten new officers a year.
We can always hope.
For some students, the trip is relatively short. Cadets at Harvard make a two-mile trip to the MIT campus, although that trek is never fun in Boston traffic. Still, their commute is brief compared to the handful of ROTC students at Yale. For them, completing military studies requirements means a drive to the University of Connecticut, more than an hour each way.
Despite those obstacles--and palpable on-campus hostility--a few Ivy Leaguers still participate in ROTC and earn their commissions as military officer. Dean Barnett of the Weekly Standard attended Harvard's latest commissioning ceremony last week, which produced five new officers for the U.S. military. The university president attended the event, but still managed to get in a dig at the Pentagon's "anti-gay" policy. Is anyone surprised?
Still, there is some cause for optimism. ROTC still has an on-campus presence at two Ivy League institutions, Princeton and Cornell. And, with public trust in the military ranking well above that of other public institutions, who knows? In a few years, Harvard might be commissioning eight or ten new officers a year.
We can always hope.
Friday, June 06, 2008
The Replacement Game
Following yesterday's sudden resignation of the Air Force Secretary and the service's Chief of Staff, Defense Secretary Robert Gates appears to be moving quickly to fill both posts.
Sources tell the AP that a former acting Secretary of the Air Force, Michael Donley, would be nominated to replaced Michael Wynne as the USAF's top civilian. Donley, who currently serves as the Pentagon's Director of Administration, held the post of acting secretary for seven months in 1993, prior to the confirmation of Sheila Widnall. Before that, Donley was the Air Force's top finance official, beginning in 1989.
Donley has held a number of high-level government posts during his career, including a stint on the National Security Council during the Reagan Administration, and a staff position on the Senate Armed Services Committee.
Before assuming the secretary's job, Donley must be confirmed by the Senate. There was no word on when the nomination would be submitted, or when confirmation hearings might be held. However, one Capitol Hill source speculated that Donley would be easily confirmed, given his service under Democratic and Republican administrations, and his past experience as an Air Force leader.
Mr. Wynne and the Air Force's senior uniformed officer, General Michael Moseley, were forced to resign after recent reports showed a long decline in USAF nuclear standards. Those problems became public over the last year, after a B-52 mistakenly carried six nuclear-tipped cruise missiles between bases in North Dakota and Louisiana, and an Air Force depot accidentally shipped nuclear fuses to Taiwan.
Gates said an internal investigation led by Adm. Kirkland Donald found a common theme in the B-52 and Taiwan incidents: "a decline in the Air Force's nuclear mission focus and performance" and a failure by Air Force leaders to respond effectively.
To underscore his demand for greater accountability, the Defense Secretary plans to visit three Air Force bases next week: Langley AFB, Virginia; Peterson AFB, Colorado and Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.
Langley is home to Air Combat Command Headquarters, which controls the nation's nuclear bombers. Air Force Space Command, based at Peterson, is responsible for the nation's intercontinental ballistic missiles, while Air Mobility Command, headquartered at Scott, provides aerial tankers that refuel the nation's strategic bombers and nuclear-capable fighters.
While Mr. Gates is expected to deliver a strong accountability message at all three installations, the trip also gives him an opportunity to talk with potential replacements for General Moseley. Many Air Force insiders believe that General John D. W. Corley, the Commander of Air Combat Command, is the leading candidate for the Chief of Staff job.
Before his arrival at ACC last fall, General Corley served as the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff. A career fighter pilot, General Corley has not been tainted by the various scandals that have ensnared other Air Force leaders.
General Robert Kehler, the leader of Air Force Space Command at Peterson, has spent his entire career in missile and space units. If selected, he would be the first non-pilot to fill the Chief of Staff position. While General Kehler is highly regarded in defense circles and Gates could use his nomination to send a powerful message to the "fighter pilot mafia" that has dominated the Air Force's upper ranks for more than 20 years.
However, some analysts believe that Kehler's lack of flying experience would be a liability in a service that still revolves around manned (and unmanned) aircraft. At this point, Kehler seems to be a dark horse candidate for the Chief of Staff position.
The Commander of Air Mobility Command, General Arthur J. Lichte, is viewed as another non-traditional candidate. While Lichte is a command pilot with over 4,000 flying hours, all of his experience is in tanker and transport aircraft--not bombers or fighters.
But Lichte's command has played a critical role in delivering troops and supplies to the battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan, and provided refueling support to aircraft that attack terrorist targets. Given Mr. Gates' belief that current conflicts are a template for future operations, he may believe that General Lichte has the right background to lead the Air Force.
Other potential candidates for the Chief of Staff job are General Kevin Chilton, the former astronaut who now leads U.S. Strategic Command, and General Duncan McNabb, the former AMC commander who is now the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff.
Sources tell the AP that a former acting Secretary of the Air Force, Michael Donley, would be nominated to replaced Michael Wynne as the USAF's top civilian. Donley, who currently serves as the Pentagon's Director of Administration, held the post of acting secretary for seven months in 1993, prior to the confirmation of Sheila Widnall. Before that, Donley was the Air Force's top finance official, beginning in 1989.
Donley has held a number of high-level government posts during his career, including a stint on the National Security Council during the Reagan Administration, and a staff position on the Senate Armed Services Committee.
Before assuming the secretary's job, Donley must be confirmed by the Senate. There was no word on when the nomination would be submitted, or when confirmation hearings might be held. However, one Capitol Hill source speculated that Donley would be easily confirmed, given his service under Democratic and Republican administrations, and his past experience as an Air Force leader.
Mr. Wynne and the Air Force's senior uniformed officer, General Michael Moseley, were forced to resign after recent reports showed a long decline in USAF nuclear standards. Those problems became public over the last year, after a B-52 mistakenly carried six nuclear-tipped cruise missiles between bases in North Dakota and Louisiana, and an Air Force depot accidentally shipped nuclear fuses to Taiwan.
Gates said an internal investigation led by Adm. Kirkland Donald found a common theme in the B-52 and Taiwan incidents: "a decline in the Air Force's nuclear mission focus and performance" and a failure by Air Force leaders to respond effectively.
To underscore his demand for greater accountability, the Defense Secretary plans to visit three Air Force bases next week: Langley AFB, Virginia; Peterson AFB, Colorado and Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.
Langley is home to Air Combat Command Headquarters, which controls the nation's nuclear bombers. Air Force Space Command, based at Peterson, is responsible for the nation's intercontinental ballistic missiles, while Air Mobility Command, headquartered at Scott, provides aerial tankers that refuel the nation's strategic bombers and nuclear-capable fighters.
While Mr. Gates is expected to deliver a strong accountability message at all three installations, the trip also gives him an opportunity to talk with potential replacements for General Moseley. Many Air Force insiders believe that General John D. W. Corley, the Commander of Air Combat Command, is the leading candidate for the Chief of Staff job.
Before his arrival at ACC last fall, General Corley served as the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff. A career fighter pilot, General Corley has not been tainted by the various scandals that have ensnared other Air Force leaders.
General Robert Kehler, the leader of Air Force Space Command at Peterson, has spent his entire career in missile and space units. If selected, he would be the first non-pilot to fill the Chief of Staff position. While General Kehler is highly regarded in defense circles and Gates could use his nomination to send a powerful message to the "fighter pilot mafia" that has dominated the Air Force's upper ranks for more than 20 years.
However, some analysts believe that Kehler's lack of flying experience would be a liability in a service that still revolves around manned (and unmanned) aircraft. At this point, Kehler seems to be a dark horse candidate for the Chief of Staff position.
The Commander of Air Mobility Command, General Arthur J. Lichte, is viewed as another non-traditional candidate. While Lichte is a command pilot with over 4,000 flying hours, all of his experience is in tanker and transport aircraft--not bombers or fighters.
But Lichte's command has played a critical role in delivering troops and supplies to the battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan, and provided refueling support to aircraft that attack terrorist targets. Given Mr. Gates' belief that current conflicts are a template for future operations, he may believe that General Lichte has the right background to lead the Air Force.
Other potential candidates for the Chief of Staff job are General Kevin Chilton, the former astronaut who now leads U.S. Strategic Command, and General Duncan McNabb, the former AMC commander who is now the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff.
The Miracle Before the Miracle
Sixty-six years ago today, the Battle of Midway was in its final stages. But the outcome had already been secured; two days earlier, U.S. carrier aircraft sank four Japanese flattops, delivering a devastating blow to the Imperial Navy. The heart of the Japanese carrier fleet—along with its best naval aviators—were lost at Midway, a debacle from which Japan would never recover. While years of bitter fighting still remained, the tide in the Pacific had turned.
Like most epic battles, Midway is filled with subplots and twists that have occupied historians and strategists for the past half-century. What if Commander Joseph Rochefort and his cryptanalysts at Pearl Harbor hadn’t penetrated the JN-25 naval code, giving U.S. admirals keen insight into enemy intentions and force dispositions? What if the Tokyo didn't for a brilliant ruse (devised by Rochefort), prompting Japanese commanders to reveal Midway as their intended target?
And, what if the Americans had staged a coordinated attack on the morning of 4 June, rather than a piecemeal effort? Crews from Torpedo Squadron 8, flying antiquated Douglas Devastators from the USS Hornet, found the enemy first and attacked without fighter support. They were decimated by Japanese fighters and anti-aircraft fire; only one pilot, Ensign George Gay, survived.
But the legendary sacrifice of Torpedo 8 disrupted Japanese combat air patrols, clearing the way for dive bombers led by Lieutenant Commanders Wade McCluskey and Max Leslie. In five minutes, their planes reduced three Japanese carriers to burning hulks. Despite low fuel, the two squadron commanders decided to press their search for the Japanese.
Moments later, their decision paid off, with the sighting of a Japanese destroyer, the Arashi, which led them to the carriers. Seven decades later, we can only guess what might have happened if McCluskey and Leslie attacked in tandem with the torpedo planes, or never saw that Japanese tin can.
But the list of “what ifs” doesn’t end there. Why didn’t Japan bother to send another carrier—the Zuikaku—to the battle? Would a Japanese force that included five flattops (versus only three for the Americans) have produced a different outcome? What if the Japanese carrier force commander, Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo had been more aggressive in going after the American fleet on the morning of June 4th, instead of preparing for a second strike on Midway?
It was that kind of battle. Change a handful of these elements—or perhaps only one—and the results might have been very different. No wonder that historian Gordon Prange's titled his book “Miracle at Midway.
Yet, for all the fateful events that occurred during the battle, there was one other “miracle” that occurred before the opposing fleets clashed in the central Pacific. Only a month earlier, one of the American carriers, the USS Yorktown, had been damaged in the Battle of the Coral Sea. Some experts believed the ship would need months in drydock to for repairs. Others estimated that fixing the battle damage would require a minimum of two weeks.
The Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Chester Nimitz, rejected those timetables. With the Japanese heading for Midway, Nimitz needed every flattop he could muster. When the Yorktown returned to Pearl Harbor on May 27, 1942, Nimitz told repair crews they had three days to get the ship back into fighting shape. In an article posted at the AMVETS website, writer Mike McLaughlin describes what happened next:
Overnight, more than 1,400 workers swarmed aboard the stricken ship. Civilian contractors and Navy technicians dragged miles of electrical cable. Other men on scaffolds patched the hull. Carpenters shored up the decks with wooden beams or cut wooden templates of bulkheads. Steel plates were dropped over the holes in the deck and welded down. Indeed, acetylene torches burned everywhere, sending temperatures in the smoke-filled compartments soaring over 120 degrees.
[Machinist’s Mate First Class] John Miller’s machine shop made parts to fix valves, pipes and conduits. “Our crew was busy all the time,” he recalls. “I worked around the clock. They brought a cot in for me and set it in place where it wouldn’t be in the way of the machines.”
The work on the Yorktown had become one of the most intensive repair jobs the Navy had ever undertaken, rivaling its efforts to salvage the ships sunk on December 7. The requirement for electricity alone became so great that districts in Honolulu endured shortages so that the yard could get the extra power it needed. Being in the water for more than two years, the ship’s hull had to be cleaned of an impressive layer of barnacles and slime, then painted. Using only a 3-inch scraper and dangling on a window washer’s rig, Emmett McLaughlin, a signalman first class from White Plains, N.Y., wondered if the Marines hadn’t offered a better deal after all.
On May 30th, Yorktown headed out, to rendezvous with Enterprise and Hornet at Midway. The carrier would be lost during the battle that followed, but not before her planes helped send four Japanese flattops to the bottom. Yorktown’s presence at Midway was nothing short of miraculous, providing another flight deck that Nimitz and his tactical commanders so desperately needed. It was a miracle provided by men like John Miller, who served on the ship, and those resourceful technicians at Pearl Harbor.
Ironically, the loss of the Yorktown provides a final “what if” for Midway. Disabled on the afternoon of June 4th by a Japanese air attack, the carrier began to list badly, prompting her skipper, Captain Elliot Buckmaster, to order “abandon ship.”
But the ship remained afloat and a damage control party returned to the Yorktown the next day. Efforts to tow the carrier proceeded slowly, giving a Japanese submarine time to locate the carrier. Penetrating an escort screen, it fired a salvo of torpedoes that struck the Yorktown and the USS Hammann, an attending destroyer.
The Hammann went down in only four minutes, but the carrier remained defiantly afloat until the morning of June 7th, when it finally sank. While the Yorktown's crew worked valiantly to save their ship, there has been a long debate over whether the carrier could have been saved, through an expedited effort to get her out of the battle zone.
Efforts to tow the Yorktown, by a tug dispatched from Hawaii, didn’t begin until the morning of June 6th, almost two days after the carrier was damaged. An improvised tow, by one of the carrier's escorts, might have pulled her from harm's way before the submarine arrived, and sealed the Yorktown's fate.
Like most epic battles, Midway is filled with subplots and twists that have occupied historians and strategists for the past half-century. What if Commander Joseph Rochefort and his cryptanalysts at Pearl Harbor hadn’t penetrated the JN-25 naval code, giving U.S. admirals keen insight into enemy intentions and force dispositions? What if the Tokyo didn't for a brilliant ruse (devised by Rochefort), prompting Japanese commanders to reveal Midway as their intended target?
And, what if the Americans had staged a coordinated attack on the morning of 4 June, rather than a piecemeal effort? Crews from Torpedo Squadron 8, flying antiquated Douglas Devastators from the USS Hornet, found the enemy first and attacked without fighter support. They were decimated by Japanese fighters and anti-aircraft fire; only one pilot, Ensign George Gay, survived.
But the legendary sacrifice of Torpedo 8 disrupted Japanese combat air patrols, clearing the way for dive bombers led by Lieutenant Commanders Wade McCluskey and Max Leslie. In five minutes, their planes reduced three Japanese carriers to burning hulks. Despite low fuel, the two squadron commanders decided to press their search for the Japanese.
Moments later, their decision paid off, with the sighting of a Japanese destroyer, the Arashi, which led them to the carriers. Seven decades later, we can only guess what might have happened if McCluskey and Leslie attacked in tandem with the torpedo planes, or never saw that Japanese tin can.
But the list of “what ifs” doesn’t end there. Why didn’t Japan bother to send another carrier—the Zuikaku—to the battle? Would a Japanese force that included five flattops (versus only three for the Americans) have produced a different outcome? What if the Japanese carrier force commander, Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo had been more aggressive in going after the American fleet on the morning of June 4th, instead of preparing for a second strike on Midway?
It was that kind of battle. Change a handful of these elements—or perhaps only one—and the results might have been very different. No wonder that historian Gordon Prange's titled his book “Miracle at Midway.
Yet, for all the fateful events that occurred during the battle, there was one other “miracle” that occurred before the opposing fleets clashed in the central Pacific. Only a month earlier, one of the American carriers, the USS Yorktown, had been damaged in the Battle of the Coral Sea. Some experts believed the ship would need months in drydock to for repairs. Others estimated that fixing the battle damage would require a minimum of two weeks.
The Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Chester Nimitz, rejected those timetables. With the Japanese heading for Midway, Nimitz needed every flattop he could muster. When the Yorktown returned to Pearl Harbor on May 27, 1942, Nimitz told repair crews they had three days to get the ship back into fighting shape. In an article posted at the AMVETS website, writer Mike McLaughlin describes what happened next:
Overnight, more than 1,400 workers swarmed aboard the stricken ship. Civilian contractors and Navy technicians dragged miles of electrical cable. Other men on scaffolds patched the hull. Carpenters shored up the decks with wooden beams or cut wooden templates of bulkheads. Steel plates were dropped over the holes in the deck and welded down. Indeed, acetylene torches burned everywhere, sending temperatures in the smoke-filled compartments soaring over 120 degrees.
[Machinist’s Mate First Class] John Miller’s machine shop made parts to fix valves, pipes and conduits. “Our crew was busy all the time,” he recalls. “I worked around the clock. They brought a cot in for me and set it in place where it wouldn’t be in the way of the machines.”
The work on the Yorktown had become one of the most intensive repair jobs the Navy had ever undertaken, rivaling its efforts to salvage the ships sunk on December 7. The requirement for electricity alone became so great that districts in Honolulu endured shortages so that the yard could get the extra power it needed. Being in the water for more than two years, the ship’s hull had to be cleaned of an impressive layer of barnacles and slime, then painted. Using only a 3-inch scraper and dangling on a window washer’s rig, Emmett McLaughlin, a signalman first class from White Plains, N.Y., wondered if the Marines hadn’t offered a better deal after all.
On May 30th, Yorktown headed out, to rendezvous with Enterprise and Hornet at Midway. The carrier would be lost during the battle that followed, but not before her planes helped send four Japanese flattops to the bottom. Yorktown’s presence at Midway was nothing short of miraculous, providing another flight deck that Nimitz and his tactical commanders so desperately needed. It was a miracle provided by men like John Miller, who served on the ship, and those resourceful technicians at Pearl Harbor.
Ironically, the loss of the Yorktown provides a final “what if” for Midway. Disabled on the afternoon of June 4th by a Japanese air attack, the carrier began to list badly, prompting her skipper, Captain Elliot Buckmaster, to order “abandon ship.”
But the ship remained afloat and a damage control party returned to the Yorktown the next day. Efforts to tow the carrier proceeded slowly, giving a Japanese submarine time to locate the carrier. Penetrating an escort screen, it fired a salvo of torpedoes that struck the Yorktown and the USS Hammann, an attending destroyer.
The Hammann went down in only four minutes, but the carrier remained defiantly afloat until the morning of June 7th, when it finally sank. While the Yorktown's crew worked valiantly to save their ship, there has been a long debate over whether the carrier could have been saved, through an expedited effort to get her out of the battle zone.
Efforts to tow the Yorktown, by a tug dispatched from Hawaii, didn’t begin until the morning of June 6th, almost two days after the carrier was damaged. An improvised tow, by one of the carrier's escorts, might have pulled her from harm's way before the submarine arrived, and sealed the Yorktown's fate.
Thursday, June 05, 2008
Jack Lucas, RIP
The man who became the nation's youngest Medal of Honor recipient during World War II has died.
Jack Lucas passed away early this morning at a hospital in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, at the age of 80. He had been battling cancer in recent months.
During the Battle of Iwo Jima in 1945, Lucas saved the lives of two fellow Marines by throwing himself on a pair of Japanese grenades that landed in their trench. Only one of them exploded and Lucas (then only 17) miraculously survived, with over 250 pieces of shrapnel in his body. He underwent 21 surgeries in the months after the battle.
But how Jack Lucas arrived in that trench is one of the great stories of the Second World War, and emblematic of "The Greatest Generation." While Mr. Lucas's saga has been told in several books, one of the best accounts can be found in "Flags of Our Fathers," by James Bradley and Ron Powers:
But up on the front lines, American boys were avenging these losses with a fury. Some of the fiercest of these boys were just that: kids barely out of childhood. Jacklyn Lucas was an example. He'd fast-talked his way into the Marines at 14, fooling the recruiters with his muscled physique and martinet style--he'd attended a military academy before signing up. Assigned to drive a truck in Hawaii, he'd grown frustrated--he wanted to fight. He stowed away on a transport out of Honolulu, surviving on food passed along by sympathetic leathernecks on board.
He landed on D-Day without a rifle. He grabbed on lying on the beach and fought his way inland.
Now, on D+1, Jack and three comrades were crawling through a trench when eight Japanese sprang in front of them. Jack shot one in the head. Then his rifle jammed. As he struggled with it, a grenade landed at his feet. He yelled a warning to the others and rammed the grenade into the soft ash. Immediately, another rolled in. Jack Lucas, seventeen, fell on both grenades. "Luke, you're gonna die," he remembered thinking.
The force of the explosion threw Lucas into the air and on his back. After his comrades wiped out the remaining Japanese, they returned to collect his dog tags. Amazingly, they found him not only alive, but conscious. Doctors on the hospital ship that treated him were equally surprised. He became the only high school freshman to win the nation's highest award for valor.
Decades later, James Bradley asked Lucas why he jumped on those grenades. His answer was simple: "To save my buddies."
Lucas was among 27 military members who won the Medal of Honor at Iwo Jima. In a battle where, "uncommon valor was a common virtue," a 17-year-old boy was among the bravest.
RIP, Mr. Lucas.
Jack Lucas passed away early this morning at a hospital in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, at the age of 80. He had been battling cancer in recent months.
During the Battle of Iwo Jima in 1945, Lucas saved the lives of two fellow Marines by throwing himself on a pair of Japanese grenades that landed in their trench. Only one of them exploded and Lucas (then only 17) miraculously survived, with over 250 pieces of shrapnel in his body. He underwent 21 surgeries in the months after the battle.
But how Jack Lucas arrived in that trench is one of the great stories of the Second World War, and emblematic of "The Greatest Generation." While Mr. Lucas's saga has been told in several books, one of the best accounts can be found in "Flags of Our Fathers," by James Bradley and Ron Powers:
But up on the front lines, American boys were avenging these losses with a fury. Some of the fiercest of these boys were just that: kids barely out of childhood. Jacklyn Lucas was an example. He'd fast-talked his way into the Marines at 14, fooling the recruiters with his muscled physique and martinet style--he'd attended a military academy before signing up. Assigned to drive a truck in Hawaii, he'd grown frustrated--he wanted to fight. He stowed away on a transport out of Honolulu, surviving on food passed along by sympathetic leathernecks on board.
He landed on D-Day without a rifle. He grabbed on lying on the beach and fought his way inland.
Now, on D+1, Jack and three comrades were crawling through a trench when eight Japanese sprang in front of them. Jack shot one in the head. Then his rifle jammed. As he struggled with it, a grenade landed at his feet. He yelled a warning to the others and rammed the grenade into the soft ash. Immediately, another rolled in. Jack Lucas, seventeen, fell on both grenades. "Luke, you're gonna die," he remembered thinking.
The force of the explosion threw Lucas into the air and on his back. After his comrades wiped out the remaining Japanese, they returned to collect his dog tags. Amazingly, they found him not only alive, but conscious. Doctors on the hospital ship that treated him were equally surprised. He became the only high school freshman to win the nation's highest award for valor.
Decades later, James Bradley asked Lucas why he jumped on those grenades. His answer was simple: "To save my buddies."
Lucas was among 27 military members who won the Medal of Honor at Iwo Jima. In a battle where, "uncommon valor was a common virtue," a 17-year-old boy was among the bravest.
RIP, Mr. Lucas.
A Change at the Top
The USAF's embattled Chief of Staff, General T. Michael Moseley, and the Air Force Secretary, Michael Wynne, resigned this morning, amid the biggest leadership shake-up in the service's history.
According to Air Force Times--and other media outlets--both men were forced out after hastily arranged meetings with their Pentagon bosses:
Moseley was summoned to an early morning meeting with Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to discuss a report on the Air Force’s problems handling nuclear weapons. The report, by Navy Adm. Kirkland Donald, director of naval nuclear propulsion, convinced Defense Secretary Robert Gates that senior officials should be held accountable.
Moseley resigned in response.
Later in the morning, Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England was dispatched to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, to ask for Wynne’s resignation, sources said. Wynne resigned during the meeting.
It is not clear how quickly these changes will take effect, and other senior officers could still be relieved in the wake of the Donald report.
Sources tell AFT that the Donald report is "very damming to the Air Force." Mr. Gates commissioned the report, after nuclear weapons fuses were mistakenly shipped from an Air Force storage depot in Utah, to Taiwan in 2006.
The fuse controversy was one of several that have dogged USAF leadership in recent months. Last August, six nuclear-tipped cruise missiles were inadvertently shipped from Minot AFB, North Dakota to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. That incident, described as the nation's worst nuclear mishap in three decades, prompted three separate investigations by the Air Force and the Defense Department.
More recently, the service was criticized for its handling of a $50-million support contract for the Thunderbirds, the Air Force's precision flying team. An investigation by the Defense Department Inspector General revealed that senior officers pressured the selection team to award the contract to a firm with close ties to General Moseley.
While the contract was later overturned--and the report did not accuse Moseley of wrongdoing--a new probe in the matter has been launched, at the request of key U.S. Senators. They claimed that General Moseley and other senior officials should be held accountable in the matter.
Five lower-ranking personnel, including a two-star general, have received administrative punishment in conjunction with the matter. Other investigations have revealed similar problems with at least seven Air Force contracts, worth millions of dollars.
The service has also been faulted for its handling of recent acquisition decisions. In April, the USAF selected a French-built aircraft for its next generation tanker, igniting howls of protest from rival Boeing and members of Congress. The Government Accountability Office is currently evaluating a protest of the tanker contract, with was awarded to Northrop-Grumman and its European partner, EADS.
In 2007, the GAO overturned an Air Force plan to buy new combat search-and-rescue helicopters from Boeing. The Chicago-based defense giant was a late entrant in the competition, and other bidders claimed that the Boeing design did not meet contract specifications. A final decision on the new helicopter has been delayed until later this year.
Air Force leaders also fought a running battle with Secretary Gates over the service's contributions in the War on Terror. In a speech at Maxwell AFB earlier this year, Mr. Gates openly chided the USAF for its reluctance to supply more surveillance drones, in support of ground operations in Iraq. Air Force officials contend that more UAV missions puts a greater strain on drone units, and the intelligence organizations that support them.
Against that backdrop, Gates apparently decided it was time for a change, forcing Moseley and Wynne to step down. General Moseley had served as the Air Force's top uniformed officer since September 2005. Before that, he spent two years as the service's Vice Chief of Staff, and previously, as Commander of allied air units during the invasion of Iraq.
Mr. Wynne became Secretary of the Air Force in 2005, after a stint as Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. Before entering public service, Wynne was a senior vice president for General Dynamics, retiring from the company in 1999.
Loren Thompson, an airpower analyst at the Lexington Institute, told AFT that relations between the Air Force and DoD leadership had eroded in recent months:
“It was clear the relationship between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Air Force was deteriorating,” Thompson said. “But it wasn’t clear what that would mean for Air Force leadership. … “This [is] the final chapter in a long list of grievances between OSD and the Air Force.”
At this point, Mr. Gates and President Bush have not indicated how they will fill the leadership gap left by the resignation of Moseley and Wynne. With only seven months remaining in office, Mr. Bush could elect to leave the secretary's position vacant, and allow the current Vice Chief of Staff, General Duncan McNabb, to serve as acting Chief of Staff.
But, with the service facing critical budget battles and acquisition decisions, it seems likely that the Chief of Staff position will be filled. Air Force sources believe an early contender for that post is General John D.W. Corley, Commander of Air Combat Command (ACC) at Langley AFB, Virginia. Corley previously served as Vice Chief of Staff, but he has not been implicated in the recent controversies that rocked Air Force leadership.
***
More on the USAF's recent woes--and today's leadership change--from The Danger Room.
And, our own thoughts on the service's ethical morass, posted almost two months ago.
According to Air Force Times--and other media outlets--both men were forced out after hastily arranged meetings with their Pentagon bosses:
Moseley was summoned to an early morning meeting with Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to discuss a report on the Air Force’s problems handling nuclear weapons. The report, by Navy Adm. Kirkland Donald, director of naval nuclear propulsion, convinced Defense Secretary Robert Gates that senior officials should be held accountable.
Moseley resigned in response.
Later in the morning, Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England was dispatched to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, to ask for Wynne’s resignation, sources said. Wynne resigned during the meeting.
It is not clear how quickly these changes will take effect, and other senior officers could still be relieved in the wake of the Donald report.
Sources tell AFT that the Donald report is "very damming to the Air Force." Mr. Gates commissioned the report, after nuclear weapons fuses were mistakenly shipped from an Air Force storage depot in Utah, to Taiwan in 2006.
The fuse controversy was one of several that have dogged USAF leadership in recent months. Last August, six nuclear-tipped cruise missiles were inadvertently shipped from Minot AFB, North Dakota to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. That incident, described as the nation's worst nuclear mishap in three decades, prompted three separate investigations by the Air Force and the Defense Department.
More recently, the service was criticized for its handling of a $50-million support contract for the Thunderbirds, the Air Force's precision flying team. An investigation by the Defense Department Inspector General revealed that senior officers pressured the selection team to award the contract to a firm with close ties to General Moseley.
While the contract was later overturned--and the report did not accuse Moseley of wrongdoing--a new probe in the matter has been launched, at the request of key U.S. Senators. They claimed that General Moseley and other senior officials should be held accountable in the matter.
Five lower-ranking personnel, including a two-star general, have received administrative punishment in conjunction with the matter. Other investigations have revealed similar problems with at least seven Air Force contracts, worth millions of dollars.
The service has also been faulted for its handling of recent acquisition decisions. In April, the USAF selected a French-built aircraft for its next generation tanker, igniting howls of protest from rival Boeing and members of Congress. The Government Accountability Office is currently evaluating a protest of the tanker contract, with was awarded to Northrop-Grumman and its European partner, EADS.
In 2007, the GAO overturned an Air Force plan to buy new combat search-and-rescue helicopters from Boeing. The Chicago-based defense giant was a late entrant in the competition, and other bidders claimed that the Boeing design did not meet contract specifications. A final decision on the new helicopter has been delayed until later this year.
Air Force leaders also fought a running battle with Secretary Gates over the service's contributions in the War on Terror. In a speech at Maxwell AFB earlier this year, Mr. Gates openly chided the USAF for its reluctance to supply more surveillance drones, in support of ground operations in Iraq. Air Force officials contend that more UAV missions puts a greater strain on drone units, and the intelligence organizations that support them.
Against that backdrop, Gates apparently decided it was time for a change, forcing Moseley and Wynne to step down. General Moseley had served as the Air Force's top uniformed officer since September 2005. Before that, he spent two years as the service's Vice Chief of Staff, and previously, as Commander of allied air units during the invasion of Iraq.
Mr. Wynne became Secretary of the Air Force in 2005, after a stint as Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. Before entering public service, Wynne was a senior vice president for General Dynamics, retiring from the company in 1999.
Loren Thompson, an airpower analyst at the Lexington Institute, told AFT that relations between the Air Force and DoD leadership had eroded in recent months:
“It was clear the relationship between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Air Force was deteriorating,” Thompson said. “But it wasn’t clear what that would mean for Air Force leadership. … “This [is] the final chapter in a long list of grievances between OSD and the Air Force.”
At this point, Mr. Gates and President Bush have not indicated how they will fill the leadership gap left by the resignation of Moseley and Wynne. With only seven months remaining in office, Mr. Bush could elect to leave the secretary's position vacant, and allow the current Vice Chief of Staff, General Duncan McNabb, to serve as acting Chief of Staff.
But, with the service facing critical budget battles and acquisition decisions, it seems likely that the Chief of Staff position will be filled. Air Force sources believe an early contender for that post is General John D.W. Corley, Commander of Air Combat Command (ACC) at Langley AFB, Virginia. Corley previously served as Vice Chief of Staff, but he has not been implicated in the recent controversies that rocked Air Force leadership.
***
More on the USAF's recent woes--and today's leadership change--from The Danger Room.
And, our own thoughts on the service's ethical morass, posted almost two months ago.
Wednesday, June 04, 2008
Farewell to a Warrior
Airmen at Ramstein AB, Germany said goodbye to a legend on Wednesday.
With a farewell spray from base fire trucks and salutes from aircrews and maintenance personnel, one of the Air Force’s most revered C-130s taxied out for a final flight.
The vintage “Herk,” tail number 63-7865, is leaving active service. Wednesday marked its departure from Ramstein, as the airlifter headed for the USAF “boneyard” at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona and a well-deserved retirement.
While the C-130E logged thousands of sorties and flying hours during its long career, it is best remembered at the only Herk—and quite possibly the only military aircraft—to receive an honorary Purple Heart, for “wounds” received in Vietnam.
Reporter Scott Schonauer of Stars and Stripes explains:
A plaque on the flight deck tells the story:
On June 1, 1972, the plane took a mortar round through the No. 3 engine while parked on the tarmac at Kontum Air Base. A maintenance team changed out the engine, but the new one failed to start. Pilots had to force the plane to take off with only three engines under "heavy mortar attack," the citation reads.
The aircraft was hit with several more mortar rounds during takeoff, puncturing the wings and damaging the other engines. The plane could climb to only 1,000 feet but made an emergency landing at Plieku Air Base, where mechanics determined it needed two new wings and four new engines.
After receiving the repairs, the plane continued to serve in the Pacific region. It later arrived at Ramstein Air Base, where it became an airlift workhorse. The wing last deployed 7865 to the Persian Gulf region last year. The aircraft flew its last combat mission on Nov. 13, ferrying cargo and troops around Iraq.
Despite its advanced age, 63-7865 earned a reputation as a reliable aircraft. SSgt Ryan Shallenberger, a crew chief who has worked on the airplane, reports that it flew more hours than any of the unit’s C-130s during a recent deployment to the Persian Gulf. The aircraft flew its last combat mission last November, hauling troops and cargo in Iraq.
Before arriving at Ramstein, the C-130 was a workhorse in the Pacific for years, remaining in that theater after its service in Vietnam. The “decorated” airlifter is one of five aging C-130Es being retired from Ramstein’s 86th Airlift Wing. They will be replaced by the new “J-model” Hercules, which will arrive next spring.
As the Viet Cong discovered back in 1972, Lockheed built ‘em tough. That’s one reason that so many of us have a soft spot for the Herk. There was—and is—nothing like the rumble of those Allisons, and the knowledge that the plane will bring you home, again and again.
Equally remarkable is the amount of service rendered by these aircraft to the Air Force—and the taxpayer. During my days as a C-130 crew member, I took part in a milestone mission for another member of the fleet. On a sunny day in September 1993, we took a 62-tail number Herk over the 30,000 hour mark.
That particular aircraft—which was modified for a battle management role—remained in service for almost another decade, until its unit was inactivated.
With a farewell spray from base fire trucks and salutes from aircrews and maintenance personnel, one of the Air Force’s most revered C-130s taxied out for a final flight.
The vintage “Herk,” tail number 63-7865, is leaving active service. Wednesday marked its departure from Ramstein, as the airlifter headed for the USAF “boneyard” at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona and a well-deserved retirement.
While the C-130E logged thousands of sorties and flying hours during its long career, it is best remembered at the only Herk—and quite possibly the only military aircraft—to receive an honorary Purple Heart, for “wounds” received in Vietnam.
Reporter Scott Schonauer of Stars and Stripes explains:
A plaque on the flight deck tells the story:
On June 1, 1972, the plane took a mortar round through the No. 3 engine while parked on the tarmac at Kontum Air Base. A maintenance team changed out the engine, but the new one failed to start. Pilots had to force the plane to take off with only three engines under "heavy mortar attack," the citation reads.
The aircraft was hit with several more mortar rounds during takeoff, puncturing the wings and damaging the other engines. The plane could climb to only 1,000 feet but made an emergency landing at Plieku Air Base, where mechanics determined it needed two new wings and four new engines.
After receiving the repairs, the plane continued to serve in the Pacific region. It later arrived at Ramstein Air Base, where it became an airlift workhorse. The wing last deployed 7865 to the Persian Gulf region last year. The aircraft flew its last combat mission on Nov. 13, ferrying cargo and troops around Iraq.
Despite its advanced age, 63-7865 earned a reputation as a reliable aircraft. SSgt Ryan Shallenberger, a crew chief who has worked on the airplane, reports that it flew more hours than any of the unit’s C-130s during a recent deployment to the Persian Gulf. The aircraft flew its last combat mission last November, hauling troops and cargo in Iraq.
Before arriving at Ramstein, the C-130 was a workhorse in the Pacific for years, remaining in that theater after its service in Vietnam. The “decorated” airlifter is one of five aging C-130Es being retired from Ramstein’s 86th Airlift Wing. They will be replaced by the new “J-model” Hercules, which will arrive next spring.
As the Viet Cong discovered back in 1972, Lockheed built ‘em tough. That’s one reason that so many of us have a soft spot for the Herk. There was—and is—nothing like the rumble of those Allisons, and the knowledge that the plane will bring you home, again and again.
Equally remarkable is the amount of service rendered by these aircraft to the Air Force—and the taxpayer. During my days as a C-130 crew member, I took part in a milestone mission for another member of the fleet. On a sunny day in September 1993, we took a 62-tail number Herk over the 30,000 hour mark.
That particular aircraft—which was modified for a battle management role—remained in service for almost another decade, until its unit was inactivated.
Raptor Arrival
Holloman AFB, New Mexico became the Air Force’s latest F-22 base on Monday, with the arrival of its first Raptors.
According to a news release, more than 200 people welcomed the arrival of the fifth-generation fighters. The two aircraft were flown to Holloman by Colonel Jeff Harrigan, the 49th Fighter Wing Commander, and Lt Col Mike Hernandez, commander of the 7th Fighter Squadron.
"It's a big day. We're very proud to have the aircraft finally here," Colonel Hernandez said. "The F-22 is the finest fighter in the world. It is by far better than anything else that is out there and better than anything on anyone's drawings board. We're very lucky."
However, residents of southern New Mexico won’t see many Raptors in the skies, at least for now. While the two jets will fly on a regular basis, the wing’s initial focus, according to Lt Col Hernandez, will be on training airmen.
Holloman will receive more aircraft early next year, after the Air Force’s second F-22 wing (located at Elmendorf AFB, Alaska receives its full complement of jets.
The relatively slow pace of deliveries to Holloman reflects the complexity of the F-22, and its limited production run. The plane’s primary contractor, Lockheed-Martin, produces an average of two Raptors per month at its Marietta, Georgia assembly facility.
Current plans call for the Air Force to buy only 183 Raptors, a fraction of the original request, and barely half of what the service says it needs. A recent Senate defense bill would add more money for F-22 production, allowing the USAF to buy 20 additional aircraft.
But Pentagon officials says the Air Force doesn’t need the extra planes, and would prefer to spend the money on other projects, including the F-25 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).
The 49th Wing will eventually receive 40 F-22s, enough for two squadrons. The unit is expected to achieve operational readiness with its new aircraft by November, 2009.
According to a news release, more than 200 people welcomed the arrival of the fifth-generation fighters. The two aircraft were flown to Holloman by Colonel Jeff Harrigan, the 49th Fighter Wing Commander, and Lt Col Mike Hernandez, commander of the 7th Fighter Squadron.
"It's a big day. We're very proud to have the aircraft finally here," Colonel Hernandez said. "The F-22 is the finest fighter in the world. It is by far better than anything else that is out there and better than anything on anyone's drawings board. We're very lucky."
However, residents of southern New Mexico won’t see many Raptors in the skies, at least for now. While the two jets will fly on a regular basis, the wing’s initial focus, according to Lt Col Hernandez, will be on training airmen.
Holloman will receive more aircraft early next year, after the Air Force’s second F-22 wing (located at Elmendorf AFB, Alaska receives its full complement of jets.
The relatively slow pace of deliveries to Holloman reflects the complexity of the F-22, and its limited production run. The plane’s primary contractor, Lockheed-Martin, produces an average of two Raptors per month at its Marietta, Georgia assembly facility.
Current plans call for the Air Force to buy only 183 Raptors, a fraction of the original request, and barely half of what the service says it needs. A recent Senate defense bill would add more money for F-22 production, allowing the USAF to buy 20 additional aircraft.
But Pentagon officials says the Air Force doesn’t need the extra planes, and would prefer to spend the money on other projects, including the F-25 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).
The 49th Wing will eventually receive 40 F-22s, enough for two squadrons. The unit is expected to achieve operational readiness with its new aircraft by November, 2009.
Twists and Turns in the Electronic Attack Roadmap
Recently, we wrote of the Air Force’s pending problems in electronic attack (EA). More than a decade ago, the service retired its EF-111 Ravens, entering into a support agreement with the U.S. Navy. Under that pact, Navy and Marine Corps EA-6B Prowlers would provide jamming support for USAF strike packages, while the service worked on its next generation of electronic attack platforms.
Unfortunately, most of those options--including a jammer drone and an EA version of the B-52—were cancelled. And, with the Navy agreement set to expire in 2012, the Air Force is facing potential shortfalls in electronic attack.
As we noted in our previous post, there is a continuing need for jamming support, even in an age of stealth aircraft. For starters, most of the Air Force strike fleet will consist of unstealthy F-15Es and F-16s well into the next decade.
Beyond that, even the stealthiest of aircraft, including the F-22 Raptor, benefit from EA support, since jammers can effectively target the older, low-frequency radars that are more effective against LCS platforms. Against that backdrop, the Air Force is about to get some good news on the EA front. David Fulghum of Aviation Week reports that the Pentagon is preparing to finalize the last part of the airborne electronic attack (AEA) roadmap, with the F-35 as the threshold aircraft. As Mr. Fulghum writes:
The Defense Department-mandated electronic attack (EA) package will be integral to the F-35, and it will likely be added, as a podded system, to existing aircraft. It will complement the EA system already in the F-22, the industry officials say. The specifics of that operational interrelationship are not clear, but will likely involve the use of additional frequencies.
The system is designed to have increasing capability as spirals of development work are completed, they say. That could include an increasingly broad frequency spectrum of attack, additional power for longer-range attacks including damage to some electrical components and the capability to plant false targets at longer ranges into enemy sensors.
We’ll defer the technical analysis to our EWO colleagues, but the F-35 proposal certainly makes sense. Not only does it allow jamming through the strike fighter’s advanced AESA radar, the proposed system will eventually incorporate techniques (information operations; network attack and false information) that have been largely unavailable in previous tactical EA platforms.
And, by utilizing a pod system, virtually any F-35 can serve as a jammer. Previous EA aircraft—including the EF-111—were built around internal jammers, limiting the jet to a support role. With its external jamming pods, the F-35 can still carry a limited amount of ordnance, giving it a hard-kill capability as well.
Best of all, with the Air Force is set to acquire hundreds of F-35s, the logistics and training infrastructure will be in place to support the jammer variant. The USAF took a pass on the EF-18 (the Navy’s new tactical jamming platform) is because the acquisition would require a huge, additional investment in maintenance, crew training and logistical services, required to integrate a “new” jet into the service inventory.
According to Fulghum, USAF officials expressed “surprise” that the EF-18 wasn’t selected as the threshold EA aircraft. But the Growler is anything but an also-ran in the jammer arsenal. The Navy is pushing ahead with the acquisition of 90 aircraft—enough for 10 squadrons—and the platform will likely have “linkages” with the F-35 jammer, and possibly with the upgraded EA-6B Prowlers, scheduled to remain in service with the Marine Corps.
While the F-35 decision is welcome news for the Air Force, it is not a panacea. The Joint Strike Fighter is on the cusp of low-rate initial production; significant numbers of F-35s (with their jammer pods) won’t be available until the middle of the next decade, at the earliest. That’s roughly three years after the Navy support agreement expires. And of course, there’s no guarantee that the next administration will fund the F-35 (and ancillary programs) to the same levels proposed by the Bush Administration.
While that memorandum on Mr. Young’s desk gets the Air Force back into the tactical EA game, the service will still face a jammer shortfall after 2012. Filling the gap between the expiration of the Navy support agreement and wide availability of pod-equipped F-35s remains a serious problem. But so far, the USAF hasn’t articulated a plan to get through that period—other than hoping it won’t need extensive jamming support before the EA-35 comes on line.
Unfortunately, most of those options--including a jammer drone and an EA version of the B-52—were cancelled. And, with the Navy agreement set to expire in 2012, the Air Force is facing potential shortfalls in electronic attack.
As we noted in our previous post, there is a continuing need for jamming support, even in an age of stealth aircraft. For starters, most of the Air Force strike fleet will consist of unstealthy F-15Es and F-16s well into the next decade.
Beyond that, even the stealthiest of aircraft, including the F-22 Raptor, benefit from EA support, since jammers can effectively target the older, low-frequency radars that are more effective against LCS platforms. Against that backdrop, the Air Force is about to get some good news on the EA front. David Fulghum of Aviation Week reports that the Pentagon is preparing to finalize the last part of the airborne electronic attack (AEA) roadmap, with the F-35 as the threshold aircraft. As Mr. Fulghum writes:
The Defense Department-mandated electronic attack (EA) package will be integral to the F-35, and it will likely be added, as a podded system, to existing aircraft. It will complement the EA system already in the F-22, the industry officials say. The specifics of that operational interrelationship are not clear, but will likely involve the use of additional frequencies.
The system is designed to have increasing capability as spirals of development work are completed, they say. That could include an increasingly broad frequency spectrum of attack, additional power for longer-range attacks including damage to some electrical components and the capability to plant false targets at longer ranges into enemy sensors.
We’ll defer the technical analysis to our EWO colleagues, but the F-35 proposal certainly makes sense. Not only does it allow jamming through the strike fighter’s advanced AESA radar, the proposed system will eventually incorporate techniques (information operations; network attack and false information) that have been largely unavailable in previous tactical EA platforms.
And, by utilizing a pod system, virtually any F-35 can serve as a jammer. Previous EA aircraft—including the EF-111—were built around internal jammers, limiting the jet to a support role. With its external jamming pods, the F-35 can still carry a limited amount of ordnance, giving it a hard-kill capability as well.
Best of all, with the Air Force is set to acquire hundreds of F-35s, the logistics and training infrastructure will be in place to support the jammer variant. The USAF took a pass on the EF-18 (the Navy’s new tactical jamming platform) is because the acquisition would require a huge, additional investment in maintenance, crew training and logistical services, required to integrate a “new” jet into the service inventory.
According to Fulghum, USAF officials expressed “surprise” that the EF-18 wasn’t selected as the threshold EA aircraft. But the Growler is anything but an also-ran in the jammer arsenal. The Navy is pushing ahead with the acquisition of 90 aircraft—enough for 10 squadrons—and the platform will likely have “linkages” with the F-35 jammer, and possibly with the upgraded EA-6B Prowlers, scheduled to remain in service with the Marine Corps.
While the F-35 decision is welcome news for the Air Force, it is not a panacea. The Joint Strike Fighter is on the cusp of low-rate initial production; significant numbers of F-35s (with their jammer pods) won’t be available until the middle of the next decade, at the earliest. That’s roughly three years after the Navy support agreement expires. And of course, there’s no guarantee that the next administration will fund the F-35 (and ancillary programs) to the same levels proposed by the Bush Administration.
While that memorandum on Mr. Young’s desk gets the Air Force back into the tactical EA game, the service will still face a jammer shortfall after 2012. Filling the gap between the expiration of the Navy support agreement and wide availability of pod-equipped F-35s remains a serious problem. But so far, the USAF hasn’t articulated a plan to get through that period—other than hoping it won’t need extensive jamming support before the EA-35 comes on line.
Tuesday, June 03, 2008
The Defensive Crouch
It's rule #1 of military public relations: when faced with bad news, go into a defensive crouch, lock the gates and hope those pesky reporters will eventually go away.
That strategy appears to be in effect at Minot AFB, North Dakota, where the 5th Bomb Wing recently failed its Nuclear Surety Inspection. So far, the unit affairs shop has been tight-lipped about the evaluation.
The inspection ended on May 25th, but the wing commander, Colonel Joel Westa, and his public affairs chief, Major Elizabeth Ortiz, didn't issue a statement until almost a week later, when they spoke with the Minot Daily News. Their comments came after this blog, Air Force Times and other media outlets reported serious security discrepancies during the NSI.
But Colonel Westa and Major Ortiz offered few details. As the Daily News reported:
Col. Joel Westa, commander of the 5th Bomb Wing at Minot Air Force Base, said he can’t comment on nuclear surety inspection findings because it’s against Department of Defense policy.
Maj. Elizabeth Ortiz, chief of Public Affairs at Minot AFB, reiterated that commenting on inspection findings is against policy.
Westa said Friday that there are some areas that need work and inspectors would return in 90 days to review those areas, as was also reported in a story in The Minot Daily News earlier this week.
[snip]
Maj. Ortiz noted that the release of the report is strictly against Defense Department policy, said Friday, “Someone not authorized received the report and released it.”
“This is a serious breach of sensitive information for anyone to release this, and the matter is being investigated,” she said.
In fairness, we should observe that Major Ortiz (and Colonel Westa) are correct in their comments about discussing inspection results. DoD policy discourages it, although there are plenty of examples of units reporting favorable evaluation grades to the news media.
A quick Yahoo search produced this glowing report from Whiteman AFB, Missouri in 2006, and even more details from a Minot in 2006. But, when the results are bad, the policy gives the Air Force a pretext for being less-than-candid.
As for the report, it's listed as "Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information." Not exactly top secret. Moreover, the report was widely circulated on DoD's unclassified computer network upon its completion by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). Our contacts tell us that within hours of publication, there were plenty of copies floating around Minot; Kirtland AFB, New Mexico (where the inspection team is based), Air Combat Command Headquarters (the 5th BW's parent organization), and other installations.
On the issue of sensitivity, it's also worth noting that the failures at Minot were concentrated in the 5th Security Forces Squadron, charged with protecting the bomb wing, its assets and the surrounding base. So, we're not talking about nuclear weapons design, or highly classified technical matters.
Additionally, the problems highlighted by DTRA evaluators were nothing more than human errors on a grand scale: failing to inspect personnel and vehicles entering/leaving the weapons storage area; a faulty response to a simulated attack and ineffective security for weapons convoys. They even saw one security specialist playing games on a cell phone during a critical exercise event.
Does the public have a right to know that information? Given the gravity of the bomb wing's ultimate mission--nuclear operations--we'd answer in the affirmative. And, the unit's past problems with weapons security (evident in last year's mishap) support the argument for greater transparency.
That strategy appears to be in effect at Minot AFB, North Dakota, where the 5th Bomb Wing recently failed its Nuclear Surety Inspection. So far, the unit affairs shop has been tight-lipped about the evaluation.
The inspection ended on May 25th, but the wing commander, Colonel Joel Westa, and his public affairs chief, Major Elizabeth Ortiz, didn't issue a statement until almost a week later, when they spoke with the Minot Daily News. Their comments came after this blog, Air Force Times and other media outlets reported serious security discrepancies during the NSI.
But Colonel Westa and Major Ortiz offered few details. As the Daily News reported:
Col. Joel Westa, commander of the 5th Bomb Wing at Minot Air Force Base, said he can’t comment on nuclear surety inspection findings because it’s against Department of Defense policy.
Maj. Elizabeth Ortiz, chief of Public Affairs at Minot AFB, reiterated that commenting on inspection findings is against policy.
Westa said Friday that there are some areas that need work and inspectors would return in 90 days to review those areas, as was also reported in a story in The Minot Daily News earlier this week.
[snip]
Maj. Ortiz noted that the release of the report is strictly against Defense Department policy, said Friday, “Someone not authorized received the report and released it.”
“This is a serious breach of sensitive information for anyone to release this, and the matter is being investigated,” she said.
In fairness, we should observe that Major Ortiz (and Colonel Westa) are correct in their comments about discussing inspection results. DoD policy discourages it, although there are plenty of examples of units reporting favorable evaluation grades to the news media.
A quick Yahoo search produced this glowing report from Whiteman AFB, Missouri in 2006, and even more details from a Minot in 2006. But, when the results are bad, the policy gives the Air Force a pretext for being less-than-candid.
As for the report, it's listed as "Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information." Not exactly top secret. Moreover, the report was widely circulated on DoD's unclassified computer network upon its completion by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). Our contacts tell us that within hours of publication, there were plenty of copies floating around Minot; Kirtland AFB, New Mexico (where the inspection team is based), Air Combat Command Headquarters (the 5th BW's parent organization), and other installations.
On the issue of sensitivity, it's also worth noting that the failures at Minot were concentrated in the 5th Security Forces Squadron, charged with protecting the bomb wing, its assets and the surrounding base. So, we're not talking about nuclear weapons design, or highly classified technical matters.
Additionally, the problems highlighted by DTRA evaluators were nothing more than human errors on a grand scale: failing to inspect personnel and vehicles entering/leaving the weapons storage area; a faulty response to a simulated attack and ineffective security for weapons convoys. They even saw one security specialist playing games on a cell phone during a critical exercise event.
Does the public have a right to know that information? Given the gravity of the bomb wing's ultimate mission--nuclear operations--we'd answer in the affirmative. And, the unit's past problems with weapons security (evident in last year's mishap) support the argument for greater transparency.
But don't expect that from the folks at the 5th BW. Major Ortiz has ignored our requests for comment, and she's reportedly informed Air Force Times that base officials won't be speaking with that publication, either. However, they are still talking to the Minot Daily News, which provided a sanitized account of the inspection results, days after the DTRA team left town. What's that old adage about a blind hog and an acorn?
Obviously, the leaders of the bomb wing are under no obligation to speak to the media. Still, it's worth remembering Colin Powell's famous dictum that "bad news doesn't improve with age." If the 5th BW has suffered another black eye over the latest inspection results, then part of that blame lies with its post-evaluation strategy.
Instead of going silent, the wing should have released at statement, outlining what Colonel Westa said days later. The message would have been simple and direct:
"While we passed nine of ten inspection areas, evaluators found problems in our security procedures. Because of the demanding criteria for an NSI, this resulted in an overall failing grade. We are taking steps to correct these problems. Our strategic assets remain safe, our nuclear certification is unaffected, and inspectors will return in three months to ensure that these discrepancies have been fixed."
Not exactly the glowing press release that Minot issued in 2006, but it would have been an accurate description of what happened--and what will occur in the months ahead. More importantly, it would have put them ahead of the story--and not in a defensive crouch.
Today's Reading Assignment
…from Robert Kaplan of The Atlantic, on what it takes to win the Congressional Medal of Honor. Mr. Kaplan recounts the saga of Army Sergeant First Class Paul Ray Smith, the first MOH recipient from the Iraq War. He won the award (posthumously) for defeating an Iraqi attack at the Baghdad Airport in April, 2003.
Recognizing the valor of Sergeant Smith represented another battle. His battalion commander spent the next two years pushing the paperwork through the Army bureaucracy, proving that Smith’s actions were worthy of the Medal of Honor. Those efforts finally paid off with a White House ceremony on April 5, 2005,when President Bush presented the medal to Smith’s 11-year-old son.
Yet, as Kaplan notes, the heroism of Sergeant Smith received scant attention from the media and the public:
The Paul Ray Smith story elicited 96 media mentions for the eight week period after the medal was awarded, compared with 4,677 for the supposed abuse of the Koran at Guantánamo Bay and 5,159 for the disgraced Abu Ghraib prison guard Lynndie England, over a much longer time frame that went on for many months. In a society that obsesses over reality-TV shows, gangster and war movies, and NFL quarterbacks, an authentic hero like Sergeant Smith flickers momentarily before the public consciousness.
It may be that the public, which still can’t get enough of World War II heroics, even as it feels guilty about its treatment of Vietnam veterans, simply can’t deliver up the requisite passion for honoring heroes from unpopular wars like Korea and Iraq.
It may also be that, encouraged by the media, the public is more comfortable seeing our troops in Iraq as victims of a failed administration rather than as heroes in their own right. Such indifference to valor is another factor that separates an all-volunteer military from the public it defends. “The medal helps legitimize Iraq for them. World War II had its heroes, and now Iraq has its,” said Colonel Smith.
We all owe a debt to Sergeant First Class Paul Smith, for his uncompromising valor on that fateful day in Baghdad, and to his former commander, who refused to let such brave and selfless acts go unnoticed.
Recognizing the valor of Sergeant Smith represented another battle. His battalion commander spent the next two years pushing the paperwork through the Army bureaucracy, proving that Smith’s actions were worthy of the Medal of Honor. Those efforts finally paid off with a White House ceremony on April 5, 2005,when President Bush presented the medal to Smith’s 11-year-old son.
Yet, as Kaplan notes, the heroism of Sergeant Smith received scant attention from the media and the public:
The Paul Ray Smith story elicited 96 media mentions for the eight week period after the medal was awarded, compared with 4,677 for the supposed abuse of the Koran at Guantánamo Bay and 5,159 for the disgraced Abu Ghraib prison guard Lynndie England, over a much longer time frame that went on for many months. In a society that obsesses over reality-TV shows, gangster and war movies, and NFL quarterbacks, an authentic hero like Sergeant Smith flickers momentarily before the public consciousness.
It may be that the public, which still can’t get enough of World War II heroics, even as it feels guilty about its treatment of Vietnam veterans, simply can’t deliver up the requisite passion for honoring heroes from unpopular wars like Korea and Iraq.
It may also be that, encouraged by the media, the public is more comfortable seeing our troops in Iraq as victims of a failed administration rather than as heroes in their own right. Such indifference to valor is another factor that separates an all-volunteer military from the public it defends. “The medal helps legitimize Iraq for them. World War II had its heroes, and now Iraq has its,” said Colonel Smith.
We all owe a debt to Sergeant First Class Paul Smith, for his uncompromising valor on that fateful day in Baghdad, and to his former commander, who refused to let such brave and selfless acts go unnoticed.
An Error of Commission, Not Omission
In his latest column for The New York Times, Bill Kristol dissects Barack Obama’s recent commencement address at Wesleyan University in Connecticut. In terms of his delivery, Mr. Kristol writes, the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee hit a home run. But in terms of content, Mr. Obama’s ode to public service left something to be desired.
Obama chooses to introduce the notion of public service from an autobiographical point of view. In college, he explains, “I began to notice a world beyond myself.” So while his friends were seeking jobs on Wall Street, he applied for jobs as a grass-roots activist. And one day, a group of churches in Chicago offered him a job as a community organizer for “$12,000 a year plus $2,000 for an old, beat-up car.”
“And I said yes.”
[snip]
More striking is Obama’s sin of omission. In the rest of the speech, he goes on to detail — at some length — the “so many ways to serve” that are available “at this defining moment in our history.” There’s the Peace Corps, there’s renewable energy, there’s education, there’s poverty — there are all kinds of causes you can take up “should you take the path of service.”
But there’s one obvious path of service Obama doesn’t recommend — or even mention: military service. He does mention war twice: “At a time of war, we need you to work for peace.” And, we face “big challenges like war and recession.” But there’s nothing about serving your country in uniform.
But we would describe it as an error of commission, rather than omission. You see, Mr. Obama has made similar remarks in the past. In fact, we wrote about his description of public service a few months ago. As in the commencement speech, Senator Obama failed to mention military service as a laudable way to serve your country.
Not that we’re surprised. Obama’s experience with the U.S. military is cursory, at best. He attended two universities—Columbia and Harvard—where ROTC is not allowed on campus. Students preparing for a military career must attend ROTC classes at other schools.
In the case of Harvard, it means a two-mile drive to the MIT campus. For ROTC cadets at Columbia, it’s at least a four mile trip to Manhattan College, or other local institutions that allow the military on campus.
A two or four-mile trip may not sound like much. But making that commute in city traffic is no picnic. And, as far as we know, neither Harvard nor Columbia offers a free shuttle for its ROTC students. That’s about what you’d expect from Ivy League schools that loathe the prospect of on-campus military presence, but still gladly accept DoD research dollars.
And, it’s about what you’d expect from one of their most famous grads, who can’t equate public service with a military uniform.
Obama chooses to introduce the notion of public service from an autobiographical point of view. In college, he explains, “I began to notice a world beyond myself.” So while his friends were seeking jobs on Wall Street, he applied for jobs as a grass-roots activist. And one day, a group of churches in Chicago offered him a job as a community organizer for “$12,000 a year plus $2,000 for an old, beat-up car.”
“And I said yes.”
[snip]
More striking is Obama’s sin of omission. In the rest of the speech, he goes on to detail — at some length — the “so many ways to serve” that are available “at this defining moment in our history.” There’s the Peace Corps, there’s renewable energy, there’s education, there’s poverty — there are all kinds of causes you can take up “should you take the path of service.”
But there’s one obvious path of service Obama doesn’t recommend — or even mention: military service. He does mention war twice: “At a time of war, we need you to work for peace.” And, we face “big challenges like war and recession.” But there’s nothing about serving your country in uniform.
But we would describe it as an error of commission, rather than omission. You see, Mr. Obama has made similar remarks in the past. In fact, we wrote about his description of public service a few months ago. As in the commencement speech, Senator Obama failed to mention military service as a laudable way to serve your country.
Not that we’re surprised. Obama’s experience with the U.S. military is cursory, at best. He attended two universities—Columbia and Harvard—where ROTC is not allowed on campus. Students preparing for a military career must attend ROTC classes at other schools.
In the case of Harvard, it means a two-mile drive to the MIT campus. For ROTC cadets at Columbia, it’s at least a four mile trip to Manhattan College, or other local institutions that allow the military on campus.
A two or four-mile trip may not sound like much. But making that commute in city traffic is no picnic. And, as far as we know, neither Harvard nor Columbia offers a free shuttle for its ROTC students. That’s about what you’d expect from Ivy League schools that loathe the prospect of on-campus military presence, but still gladly accept DoD research dollars.
And, it’s about what you’d expect from one of their most famous grads, who can’t equate public service with a military uniform.
Monday, June 02, 2008
Not on Obama’s Travel Itinerary
Facing a steady stream of good news from Iraq over the past year, Democratic politicians and the MSM have often responded with warnings about Afghanistan. Attacks were on the upswing , they claimed, and insurgents were expanding their operational base. No less an expert than Barack Obama has pledged a speedy withdrawal from Iraq, so we can “finish” the job in Afghanistan. You know, the same country where, according to Mr. Obama, U.S. forces have “air-raided” villages, killing scores of civilians.
Someone might want to pass this item from the U.K. Telegraph to Mr. Obama. According to the Commander of British forces in Afghanistan, missions by special forces teams and air strikes by unmanned drones have “decapitated” the Taliban, and “brought the conflict to a tipping point.” At that assessment is correct, there may not be much of a job to finish in Afghanistan.
As the Telegraph’s Thomas Harding reports:
The new "precise, surgical" tactics have killed scores of insurgent leaders and made it extremely difficult for Pakistan-based Taliban leaders to prosecute the campaign, according to Brig Mark Carleton-Smith.
In the past two years an estimated 7,000 Taliban have been killed, the majority in southern and eastern Afghanistan. But it is the "very effective targeted decapitation operations" that have removed "several echelons of commanders".
This in turn has left the insurgents on the brink of defeat, the head of Task Force Helmand said.
"The Taliban are much weaker," he said from 16 Air Assault Brigade headquarters in Lashkar Gah.
"The tide is clearly ebbing not flowing for them. Their chain of command is disrupted and they are short of weapons and ammunition."
Brigadier Carleton-Smith is a veteran of multiple tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, so his analysis can’t be dismissed as that of a p.r. mouthpiece, or rear-echelon briefer. He believes last year’s targeting killing of Mullah Dadullah, the Taliban Chief, was a seminal moment in the campaign.
"We have seen increasing fissures of stress through the whole organisation that has led to internecine and fratricidal strife between competing groups."
Taliban fighters are apparently becoming increasingly unpopular in Helmand, where they are reliant on the local population for food and water.
Carleton-Smith also said that coalition forces have “marginalized” the ability of Al Qaida and Taliban commanders to run operations from neighboring Pakistan. He predicted that the terrorists will shift tactics from pitched battles, to roadside bombs and ambushes, similar to insurgent operations in Iraq.
The British commander told the Telegraph that the next major task is to regenerate the economy, in order to win over the population.
As readers know, the GOP has been chiding Mr. Obama for the lengthy gap since his last visit to Iraq. Perhaps we missed it, but we can’t find any record of the Senator making a similar trip to Afghanistan. And, given the continued progress in that country, don’t look for Senator Obama to make that visit anytime soon.
Someone might want to pass this item from the U.K. Telegraph to Mr. Obama. According to the Commander of British forces in Afghanistan, missions by special forces teams and air strikes by unmanned drones have “decapitated” the Taliban, and “brought the conflict to a tipping point.” At that assessment is correct, there may not be much of a job to finish in Afghanistan.
As the Telegraph’s Thomas Harding reports:
The new "precise, surgical" tactics have killed scores of insurgent leaders and made it extremely difficult for Pakistan-based Taliban leaders to prosecute the campaign, according to Brig Mark Carleton-Smith.
In the past two years an estimated 7,000 Taliban have been killed, the majority in southern and eastern Afghanistan. But it is the "very effective targeted decapitation operations" that have removed "several echelons of commanders".
This in turn has left the insurgents on the brink of defeat, the head of Task Force Helmand said.
"The Taliban are much weaker," he said from 16 Air Assault Brigade headquarters in Lashkar Gah.
"The tide is clearly ebbing not flowing for them. Their chain of command is disrupted and they are short of weapons and ammunition."
Brigadier Carleton-Smith is a veteran of multiple tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, so his analysis can’t be dismissed as that of a p.r. mouthpiece, or rear-echelon briefer. He believes last year’s targeting killing of Mullah Dadullah, the Taliban Chief, was a seminal moment in the campaign.
"We have seen increasing fissures of stress through the whole organisation that has led to internecine and fratricidal strife between competing groups."
Taliban fighters are apparently becoming increasingly unpopular in Helmand, where they are reliant on the local population for food and water.
Carleton-Smith also said that coalition forces have “marginalized” the ability of Al Qaida and Taliban commanders to run operations from neighboring Pakistan. He predicted that the terrorists will shift tactics from pitched battles, to roadside bombs and ambushes, similar to insurgent operations in Iraq.
The British commander told the Telegraph that the next major task is to regenerate the economy, in order to win over the population.
As readers know, the GOP has been chiding Mr. Obama for the lengthy gap since his last visit to Iraq. Perhaps we missed it, but we can’t find any record of the Senator making a similar trip to Afghanistan. And, given the continued progress in that country, don’t look for Senator Obama to make that visit anytime soon.
Back to You
There’s nothing like a good media scandal to send tongues wagging.
And, for the past year, the good folks of Philadelphia have been watching a real doozy.
It began last summer, when former KYW-TV anchor Alycia Lane became tabloid fodder, after exchanging e-mails (and bikini photos of herself) with Rich Eisen, the former ESPN sportscaster who now works for the NFL network. The e-mails were quickly leaked to the press, along with a tart reply from Eisen’s wife, Suzy Shuster.
Lane’s career at KYW came to an end a few months later, after she was accused of striking a police officer during a trip to New York City. However, felony charges filed against Ms. Lane were later dropped, and according to the Philadelphia Inquirer, summary charges are expected to be dropped this summer. At that point, her record will be cleared.
At last report, Ms. Lane and her attorneys were still negotiating a settlement with CBS, which owns KYW-TV. At the time of her dismissal, the anchorwoman was earning a reported $700,000 a year.
But one question in the Lane saga remained unanswered. Exactly who leaked those saucy e-mails and photos between the Philly anchor and Mr. Eisen? The smart money was on Ms. Shuster, is a former ABC sportscaster who knows her way around media circles. Shuster certainly had the motivation and the connections to humiliate Alycia Lane publicly.
On the other hand, maybe it’s time to rethink the Shuster connection. It now appears that Ms. Lane’s tormentor may have been as close as the co-anchor’s chair. As Michael Klein of the Inquirer reports:
Federal authorities have launched a criminal investigation of CBS3 anchor Larry Mendte, searched his home and confiscated his personal computer, to determine whether he illegally accessed the private e-mail of former colleague Alycia Lane, numerous sources told The Inquirer yesterday.
Mendte's lawyer, Michael A. Schwartz, confirmed tonight that FBI agents approached his client on Thursday and searched his Chestnut Hill home.
[snip]
Told of Schwartz's statement, Lane's attorney, Paul R. Rosen, said: "Alycia Lane did not make any claims involving anyone. The investigation by the FBI and the direction it took was done by the federal government and not by Alycia Lane.
"She was shocked when she learned of any invasion of her privacy," Rosen said.
The station issued a statement tonight that read: "Late this week CBS3 became aware of an investigation by the U.S. Attorney's Office regarding anchor Larry Mendte. CBS3 is cooperating fully with that office in this investigation."
Sources tell the Inquirer that the FBI is investigating whether Mendte read Lane’s personal e-mails. It is a federal crime to read someone else’s e-mails without their permission.
Before her dismissal, Lane and Mendte had been the primary anchor team at KYW for almost five years. They were widely credited for lifting the station out of last place in the local ratings, and making it a solid number two, behind perennial market leader WPVI, which is owned by ABC.
Mr. Mendte and Ms. Lane seemed to have a genuine chemistry on the air, and they easily connected with viewers. But, as anyone who’s worked in TV news can tell you, appearances are often deceiving. Unfortunately, the stereotype of anchors who smile and joke while the camera is on—then scream at each other when the red light goes off—isn’t that far from reality, at least in some newsrooms.
When sportscaster (and former big-league pitcher) Jim Bouton worked at WABC-TV in New York in the 1970s, the news team was promoted as a big, happy family. “We Really Like Each Other,” one advertisement read. In reality, Bouton recalled, members of the Eyewitness News crew couldn’t stand each other.
So far, there have been no reports of off-camera battles between the former co-anchors. But, if the federal allegations are true, Mr. Mendte (apparently) rummaged through Lane’s e-mails on multiple occasions, and he’s emerged as a primes suspect for those embarrassing media leaks. Not exactly something you’d do to a friend.
But entirely consistent with the cut-throat world of TV news.
And, for the past year, the good folks of Philadelphia have been watching a real doozy.
It began last summer, when former KYW-TV anchor Alycia Lane became tabloid fodder, after exchanging e-mails (and bikini photos of herself) with Rich Eisen, the former ESPN sportscaster who now works for the NFL network. The e-mails were quickly leaked to the press, along with a tart reply from Eisen’s wife, Suzy Shuster.
Lane’s career at KYW came to an end a few months later, after she was accused of striking a police officer during a trip to New York City. However, felony charges filed against Ms. Lane were later dropped, and according to the Philadelphia Inquirer, summary charges are expected to be dropped this summer. At that point, her record will be cleared.
At last report, Ms. Lane and her attorneys were still negotiating a settlement with CBS, which owns KYW-TV. At the time of her dismissal, the anchorwoman was earning a reported $700,000 a year.
But one question in the Lane saga remained unanswered. Exactly who leaked those saucy e-mails and photos between the Philly anchor and Mr. Eisen? The smart money was on Ms. Shuster, is a former ABC sportscaster who knows her way around media circles. Shuster certainly had the motivation and the connections to humiliate Alycia Lane publicly.
On the other hand, maybe it’s time to rethink the Shuster connection. It now appears that Ms. Lane’s tormentor may have been as close as the co-anchor’s chair. As Michael Klein of the Inquirer reports:
Federal authorities have launched a criminal investigation of CBS3 anchor Larry Mendte, searched his home and confiscated his personal computer, to determine whether he illegally accessed the private e-mail of former colleague Alycia Lane, numerous sources told The Inquirer yesterday.
Mendte's lawyer, Michael A. Schwartz, confirmed tonight that FBI agents approached his client on Thursday and searched his Chestnut Hill home.
[snip]
Told of Schwartz's statement, Lane's attorney, Paul R. Rosen, said: "Alycia Lane did not make any claims involving anyone. The investigation by the FBI and the direction it took was done by the federal government and not by Alycia Lane.
"She was shocked when she learned of any invasion of her privacy," Rosen said.
The station issued a statement tonight that read: "Late this week CBS3 became aware of an investigation by the U.S. Attorney's Office regarding anchor Larry Mendte. CBS3 is cooperating fully with that office in this investigation."
Sources tell the Inquirer that the FBI is investigating whether Mendte read Lane’s personal e-mails. It is a federal crime to read someone else’s e-mails without their permission.
Before her dismissal, Lane and Mendte had been the primary anchor team at KYW for almost five years. They were widely credited for lifting the station out of last place in the local ratings, and making it a solid number two, behind perennial market leader WPVI, which is owned by ABC.
Mr. Mendte and Ms. Lane seemed to have a genuine chemistry on the air, and they easily connected with viewers. But, as anyone who’s worked in TV news can tell you, appearances are often deceiving. Unfortunately, the stereotype of anchors who smile and joke while the camera is on—then scream at each other when the red light goes off—isn’t that far from reality, at least in some newsrooms.
When sportscaster (and former big-league pitcher) Jim Bouton worked at WABC-TV in New York in the 1970s, the news team was promoted as a big, happy family. “We Really Like Each Other,” one advertisement read. In reality, Bouton recalled, members of the Eyewitness News crew couldn’t stand each other.
So far, there have been no reports of off-camera battles between the former co-anchors. But, if the federal allegations are true, Mr. Mendte (apparently) rummaged through Lane’s e-mails on multiple occasions, and he’s emerged as a primes suspect for those embarrassing media leaks. Not exactly something you’d do to a friend.
But entirely consistent with the cut-throat world of TV news.
Sunday, June 01, 2008
Searching for that Proverbial Dark Lining
The steady stream of good news from Iraq is certainly posing a challenge for the MSM. Just two months ago, various outlets were comparing the Basra upriging to the Tet Offensive, with dire warnings of a deteriorating security environment in Iraq. Since then, the level of violence has continued to drop, reaching a four-year low in the month of May. U.S. combat deaths have also declined; only 17 Americans died in battle this month, the lowest total since Saddam was toppled from power five years ago.
Iraq's improving security situation is more evidence that Al Qaida is on the ropes, at least on the Arabian Peninsula. Last week, CIA Director Michael Hayden reported that the terrorist group has suffered "near strategic defeats" in both Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and endured "significant setbacks" in other locations. That's one reason that recent propaganda tapes from Osama bin Laden have been devoted to the Palestinian issue, and harangues against moderate Arab leaders.
Against that backdrop, what's a MSM reporter to do? Well, Karen DeYoung of the Washington Post managed to find a dark lining in the silver cloud, with a little help from her friends in the intelligence community. In the Sunday edition of the Post, Ms. DeYoung lays out a gloomy scenario for the rest of the Bush presidency, claiming that the administration will make "little progress on top national security policies," including the Israeli-Palestinian issue; Iran's effort to obtain nuclear weapons, and political reconciliation inside Iraq.
The source for the paper's assessment was a recent speech by Donald M. Kerr, the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. According to the paper, Mr. Kerr's analysis was posited as the intel briefing he might deliver to the next president on January 21, 2009. Kerr is one of two officials, along with the Director of National Intelligence, Mike McConnell, who provide the president's daily intelligence update.
Ms. DeYoung carefully notes the contrast between Kerr's assessment and the more upbeat analysis recently offered by General Hayden. But both the DDNI--and the Post--ignore the obvious disconnect between the accounts of Mr. Kerr and the CIA Director. It's an apples-and-oranges comparison at best, totally disingenuous, at worst.
For starters, all incoming administrations inherit national security headaches from their predecessors. Islamofacism was a growing threat in 2000, but we don't recall any Post articles on the inability of Bill Clinton to deal with that issue. Had he been more attentive to that single issue, the security environment faced by George Bush--and Mr. Bush's successor--would be much different.
Additionally, both Mr. Kerr and the Post are predictably selective in assembling their list of "problems." An Israel-Palestinian peace accord? The U.S. has been trying to advance that process, in fits and starts, for more than 30 years. Given that record, it would be fool hardly to expect a "final" breakthrough in the next six months, and the administration has said as much in recent months.
We've discussed Mr. Bush's policies toward Iran at some length, and they have been ineffective, on the balance. But the failure to halt Tehran's nuclear efforts has been a true, multi-national effort. Years of pointless negotiations by the European Union (with U.S. support), and a series of ineffective U.N. sanctions served to only embolden the Iranians.
The final blow, of course, was last year's National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which claimed that Iran had abandoned its weaponization program, while admitting that critical efforts in uranium enrichment and missile development--essential for weapons development--continued. With publication of the NIE (which bore the handiwork of administration opponents in the intelligence community), the Bush Administration had little choice but to remain on the diplomatic track. Mr. Bush's policies toward Iran have been anything but effective, but he's had plenty of help in crafting the current strategy.
Then, there's that little matter of political reconciliation in Iraq. Never mind that the goal is somewhat nebulous--exactly when will the Iraqis achieve the required degree of reconciliation? Never mind that Iraqi leaders have made progress in this area--over the past year, the Parliament has passed a series of bills that address issues critical to the reconciliation (including oil revenue sharing). And never mind that the improved security environment is the first step toward reconciliation.
But those rather inconvenient facts don't exactly square with the preferred narrative of the Washington Post, or one of the nation's senior intelligence officers. By focusing on perpetual security problems, they offer a distorted view of what will face the next administration. While the new president will face challenges--some of them daunting--he (or she) will also reap the benefits of recent gains in Iraq, and the larger war on terror.
You'd expect that kind of reporting from the Post. But Mr. Kerr's comments raise legitimate questions about the advice our next commander-in-chief will receive from the intelligence community.
Iraq's improving security situation is more evidence that Al Qaida is on the ropes, at least on the Arabian Peninsula. Last week, CIA Director Michael Hayden reported that the terrorist group has suffered "near strategic defeats" in both Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and endured "significant setbacks" in other locations. That's one reason that recent propaganda tapes from Osama bin Laden have been devoted to the Palestinian issue, and harangues against moderate Arab leaders.
Against that backdrop, what's a MSM reporter to do? Well, Karen DeYoung of the Washington Post managed to find a dark lining in the silver cloud, with a little help from her friends in the intelligence community. In the Sunday edition of the Post, Ms. DeYoung lays out a gloomy scenario for the rest of the Bush presidency, claiming that the administration will make "little progress on top national security policies," including the Israeli-Palestinian issue; Iran's effort to obtain nuclear weapons, and political reconciliation inside Iraq.
The source for the paper's assessment was a recent speech by Donald M. Kerr, the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. According to the paper, Mr. Kerr's analysis was posited as the intel briefing he might deliver to the next president on January 21, 2009. Kerr is one of two officials, along with the Director of National Intelligence, Mike McConnell, who provide the president's daily intelligence update.
Ms. DeYoung carefully notes the contrast between Kerr's assessment and the more upbeat analysis recently offered by General Hayden. But both the DDNI--and the Post--ignore the obvious disconnect between the accounts of Mr. Kerr and the CIA Director. It's an apples-and-oranges comparison at best, totally disingenuous, at worst.
For starters, all incoming administrations inherit national security headaches from their predecessors. Islamofacism was a growing threat in 2000, but we don't recall any Post articles on the inability of Bill Clinton to deal with that issue. Had he been more attentive to that single issue, the security environment faced by George Bush--and Mr. Bush's successor--would be much different.
Additionally, both Mr. Kerr and the Post are predictably selective in assembling their list of "problems." An Israel-Palestinian peace accord? The U.S. has been trying to advance that process, in fits and starts, for more than 30 years. Given that record, it would be fool hardly to expect a "final" breakthrough in the next six months, and the administration has said as much in recent months.
We've discussed Mr. Bush's policies toward Iran at some length, and they have been ineffective, on the balance. But the failure to halt Tehran's nuclear efforts has been a true, multi-national effort. Years of pointless negotiations by the European Union (with U.S. support), and a series of ineffective U.N. sanctions served to only embolden the Iranians.
The final blow, of course, was last year's National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which claimed that Iran had abandoned its weaponization program, while admitting that critical efforts in uranium enrichment and missile development--essential for weapons development--continued. With publication of the NIE (which bore the handiwork of administration opponents in the intelligence community), the Bush Administration had little choice but to remain on the diplomatic track. Mr. Bush's policies toward Iran have been anything but effective, but he's had plenty of help in crafting the current strategy.
Then, there's that little matter of political reconciliation in Iraq. Never mind that the goal is somewhat nebulous--exactly when will the Iraqis achieve the required degree of reconciliation? Never mind that Iraqi leaders have made progress in this area--over the past year, the Parliament has passed a series of bills that address issues critical to the reconciliation (including oil revenue sharing). And never mind that the improved security environment is the first step toward reconciliation.
But those rather inconvenient facts don't exactly square with the preferred narrative of the Washington Post, or one of the nation's senior intelligence officers. By focusing on perpetual security problems, they offer a distorted view of what will face the next administration. While the new president will face challenges--some of them daunting--he (or she) will also reap the benefits of recent gains in Iraq, and the larger war on terror.
You'd expect that kind of reporting from the Post. But Mr. Kerr's comments raise legitimate questions about the advice our next commander-in-chief will receive from the intelligence community.
Friday, May 30, 2008
Security Experts Condemn Minot Failures
by Nate Hale
Air Force security experts are expressing surprise and frustration over recently-identified nuclear security failures at Minot AFB, North Dakota.
Those deviations, highlighted in a recent nuclear surety inspection (NSI) by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) resulted in an overall failing grade for Minot’s B-52 unit, the 5th Bomb Wing.
Agency inspectors discovered five major and eleven minor nuclear security failures during their evaluation, which ended on May 25th. The DTRA team also uncovered eleven less-serious security problems during the nine-day inspection. While the 5th BW earned passing grades in nine of ten evaluation categories, the high number of security violations gave the unit a composite rating of “Unsatisfactory.”
Results of the Minot inspection sent shock waves through the tight-knit Air Force security forces (SF) community. Current and former security forces officers and NCOs contacted by In From the Cold offered blunt criticism of Minot’s 5th Security Forces Squadron, which is charged with protecting the base, its B-52 bombers and Minot’s nuclear weapons storage area (WSA).
“I think the DTRA team was being nice in such areas as emergency entry and exclusion area entry,” said a former security forces senior NCO, who now works for a defense contractor.
“Personally, I would have hit them harder. Access is a critical failure in anyone’s book. You cannot pass the ‘Pearly Gates’ [of a WSA] if you don’t have the right to be there." The retired NCO—and the other experts—spoke on the condition of anonymity.
“They did not train, practice, or were even aware of what they were doing,” he continued. “A CBS [Close Boundary Sentry] on post with a cell phone? Who in the hell allowed that crap to happen? Not on my watch."
The former security forces superintendent was referring to an incident highlighted in the DTRA report, when evaluators watched a security specialist play games on a cell phone during a critical exercise event.
Another senior NCO, who currently serves as a superintendent of a security forces unit, was even tougher in his assessment. “I wouldn’t trust those cops with guarding the bicycle rack in front of the base pool, let alone the nation’s alert resources,” he said.
“The leadership [of Minot’s security forces squadron] should have been fired and departed the base with the inspection team," he continued. "This is obviously a systemic problem, starting at the top.”
The retired security forces superintendent concurred. “Leadership was AWOL. Not involved, no one gave a s—t about the troops. The folks who allowed this to happen were the mid-level NCOs, the senior NCOs and the officers who did not craft any strategy.”
A senior Air Force civilian, with decades of security experience, described seeing similar problems through the years. “When you don’t have adequate supervision at all levels (mid-level NCOs on up), then you have no concern about the mission."
"Why did this happen? It’s a common theme played out in the SF business,” he said. “The officers are beating the crap out of the enlisted because they are 'stupid,' and the enlisted screw the ‘O’s by not performing."
At least two of the experts interviewed by this blog recommended a radical step for fixing security problems at Minot—a 90-day lockdown. Under that approach, the inspection team remain at the base until all problems had been fixed and the unit is deemed capable of independent operations.
Lockdowns were a common technique during the heyday of Strategic Air Command, which controlled the Air Force’s strategic nuclear forces until the early 1990s. But in recent decades, the service has moved away from that approach, due in part to the high cost of sending personnel to supervise a failing unit for extended periods.
Air Force nuclear experts say that one of the last lock-downs occurred at Aviano AB, Italy in the early 1980s, after that installation failed an NSI. There was reportedly a near-lockdown at a U.S. base in Greece a few years later, when another failure appeared in the offing. Plans for the lock-down were cancelled when that unit scraped by with a minimum passing grade.
In light of the NSI findings, the bomb wing's security forces unit is facing possible leadership changes and other personnel actions. A spokesman for the Air Combat Command (ACC), the wing's parent organization, said Thursday that ACC is "working with Minot leadership to provide specific expertise and manning to assist the wing with working identified areas of improvement."
During a separate interview with Air Force Times, the same spokesman said there are "no plans to fire any 'key personnel' now. However, he did not rule out possible punitive action against other airmen. Current and former security forces personnel interviewed by this blog said that leadership changes in the 5th SFS are "inevitable," given the number of failures identified by inspectors.
The security violations not only prompted a failing grade for the bomb wing, they also overshadowed the accomplishments of other personnel. The unit earned passing grades in nine of ten inspection categories, and received "Excellent" marks in five areas.
In his first public statement on the inspection, Colonel Joel Westa, Commander of the 5th BW said “Overall their assessment painted a picture of some things we need to work on in the areas of training and discipline.”
Despite the security problems, the B-52 unit will retain its certification for nuclear operations. The ACC Commander, General John Corley, reinstated the wing's nuclear certification in early April, after it passed an Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection (INSI). Because failures in the recent NSI were largely concentrated in a single area, Corley determined that the 5th BW will remain certified for nuclear operations.
In the interim, members of the bomb wing will continue to practice for a nuclear surety inspection. An evaluation team from ACC will revisit the base in August, to determine if problems have been corrected. A repeat NSI will be held sometime after the ACC inspection.
Members of the ACC Inspector General (IG) team conducted their own evaluation of the 5th BW during the same period as the DTRA evaluation. Results of the ACC inspection have not been disclosed. An ACC spokesman said that the evaluation also revealed "areas of strength" in the B-52 unit, noting high ratings in several inspection categories.
The recent series of evaluations at Minot were prompted by a nuclear mishap in August of last year. During that incident, 5th BW personnel mistakenly loaded six nuclear-tipped cruise missiles onto a B-52 that flew to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. While the nuclear warheads remained under Air Force control, they were considered "unaccounted for" during a 30-hour period that ended with their discovery at Barksdale.
Four senior officers were fired as a result of that accident, considered the nation's worst nuclear mishap in almost thirty years. Scores of other personnel received other forms of punishment, or lost their certification to work with nuclear weapons.
Air Force security experts are expressing surprise and frustration over recently-identified nuclear security failures at Minot AFB, North Dakota.
Those deviations, highlighted in a recent nuclear surety inspection (NSI) by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) resulted in an overall failing grade for Minot’s B-52 unit, the 5th Bomb Wing.
Agency inspectors discovered five major and eleven minor nuclear security failures during their evaluation, which ended on May 25th. The DTRA team also uncovered eleven less-serious security problems during the nine-day inspection. While the 5th BW earned passing grades in nine of ten evaluation categories, the high number of security violations gave the unit a composite rating of “Unsatisfactory.”
Results of the Minot inspection sent shock waves through the tight-knit Air Force security forces (SF) community. Current and former security forces officers and NCOs contacted by In From the Cold offered blunt criticism of Minot’s 5th Security Forces Squadron, which is charged with protecting the base, its B-52 bombers and Minot’s nuclear weapons storage area (WSA).
“I think the DTRA team was being nice in such areas as emergency entry and exclusion area entry,” said a former security forces senior NCO, who now works for a defense contractor.
“Personally, I would have hit them harder. Access is a critical failure in anyone’s book. You cannot pass the ‘Pearly Gates’ [of a WSA] if you don’t have the right to be there." The retired NCO—and the other experts—spoke on the condition of anonymity.
“They did not train, practice, or were even aware of what they were doing,” he continued. “A CBS [Close Boundary Sentry] on post with a cell phone? Who in the hell allowed that crap to happen? Not on my watch."
The former security forces superintendent was referring to an incident highlighted in the DTRA report, when evaluators watched a security specialist play games on a cell phone during a critical exercise event.
Another senior NCO, who currently serves as a superintendent of a security forces unit, was even tougher in his assessment. “I wouldn’t trust those cops with guarding the bicycle rack in front of the base pool, let alone the nation’s alert resources,” he said.
“The leadership [of Minot’s security forces squadron] should have been fired and departed the base with the inspection team," he continued. "This is obviously a systemic problem, starting at the top.”
The retired security forces superintendent concurred. “Leadership was AWOL. Not involved, no one gave a s—t about the troops. The folks who allowed this to happen were the mid-level NCOs, the senior NCOs and the officers who did not craft any strategy.”
A senior Air Force civilian, with decades of security experience, described seeing similar problems through the years. “When you don’t have adequate supervision at all levels (mid-level NCOs on up), then you have no concern about the mission."
"Why did this happen? It’s a common theme played out in the SF business,” he said. “The officers are beating the crap out of the enlisted because they are 'stupid,' and the enlisted screw the ‘O’s by not performing."
At least two of the experts interviewed by this blog recommended a radical step for fixing security problems at Minot—a 90-day lockdown. Under that approach, the inspection team remain at the base until all problems had been fixed and the unit is deemed capable of independent operations.
Lockdowns were a common technique during the heyday of Strategic Air Command, which controlled the Air Force’s strategic nuclear forces until the early 1990s. But in recent decades, the service has moved away from that approach, due in part to the high cost of sending personnel to supervise a failing unit for extended periods.
Air Force nuclear experts say that one of the last lock-downs occurred at Aviano AB, Italy in the early 1980s, after that installation failed an NSI. There was reportedly a near-lockdown at a U.S. base in Greece a few years later, when another failure appeared in the offing. Plans for the lock-down were cancelled when that unit scraped by with a minimum passing grade.
In light of the NSI findings, the bomb wing's security forces unit is facing possible leadership changes and other personnel actions. A spokesman for the Air Combat Command (ACC), the wing's parent organization, said Thursday that ACC is "working with Minot leadership to provide specific expertise and manning to assist the wing with working identified areas of improvement."
During a separate interview with Air Force Times, the same spokesman said there are "no plans to fire any 'key personnel' now. However, he did not rule out possible punitive action against other airmen. Current and former security forces personnel interviewed by this blog said that leadership changes in the 5th SFS are "inevitable," given the number of failures identified by inspectors.
The security violations not only prompted a failing grade for the bomb wing, they also overshadowed the accomplishments of other personnel. The unit earned passing grades in nine of ten inspection categories, and received "Excellent" marks in five areas.
In his first public statement on the inspection, Colonel Joel Westa, Commander of the 5th BW said “Overall their assessment painted a picture of some things we need to work on in the areas of training and discipline.”
Despite the security problems, the B-52 unit will retain its certification for nuclear operations. The ACC Commander, General John Corley, reinstated the wing's nuclear certification in early April, after it passed an Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection (INSI). Because failures in the recent NSI were largely concentrated in a single area, Corley determined that the 5th BW will remain certified for nuclear operations.
In the interim, members of the bomb wing will continue to practice for a nuclear surety inspection. An evaluation team from ACC will revisit the base in August, to determine if problems have been corrected. A repeat NSI will be held sometime after the ACC inspection.
Members of the ACC Inspector General (IG) team conducted their own evaluation of the 5th BW during the same period as the DTRA evaluation. Results of the ACC inspection have not been disclosed. An ACC spokesman said that the evaluation also revealed "areas of strength" in the B-52 unit, noting high ratings in several inspection categories.
The recent series of evaluations at Minot were prompted by a nuclear mishap in August of last year. During that incident, 5th BW personnel mistakenly loaded six nuclear-tipped cruise missiles onto a B-52 that flew to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. While the nuclear warheads remained under Air Force control, they were considered "unaccounted for" during a 30-hour period that ended with their discovery at Barksdale.
Four senior officers were fired as a result of that accident, considered the nation's worst nuclear mishap in almost thirty years. Scores of other personnel received other forms of punishment, or lost their certification to work with nuclear weapons.
Thursday, May 29, 2008
More Nuclear Woes at Minot
5th Bomb Wing Earns Failing Grade, Will Retain Mission Certification
by Nate Hale
For the second time in six months, the Air Force's troubled B-52 wing at Minot AFB, North Dakota has earned low scores on a nuclear surety inspection (NSI), raising new concerns about the unit's ability to perform its ultimate mission.
Minot's 5th Bomb Wing (BW) received an "Unsatisfactory" rating on a nuclear surety inspection from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), conducted between 17-25 May. In From the Cold obtained a copy of the inspection report from military sources, who requested anonymity.
A DTRA team evaluated the wing in 10 areas relating to its nuclear mission, including management and administration; technical operations, storage and maintenance facilities, security and supply support. While the 5th BW met inspection criteria in nine of the ten categories, it still received an overall failing grade, due to extensive discrepancies in nuclear security.
Inspection regulations dictate that units will receive a composite rating of unsatisfactory if they fail any of the inspection areas. The 5th BW received an "unacceptable" rating for its security efforts during the evaluation.
The failing grade from DTRA will not affect the bomb wing's recently-regained certification for nuclear operations. The wing's parent organization, Air Combat Command, restored the unit's authority to handle and maintain nuclear weapons in April, after it passed an Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection (INSI). Thursday afternoon, a spokesman said the ACC Commander, General John Corley, had been briefed on the results and the wing would "retain certification for its strategic mission."
The 5th BW was stripped of its nuclear certification last September, after maintenance personnel mistakenly loaded six nuclear-tipped cruise missiles on a B-52 bound for Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. Authorities classified the incident as the nation's worst nuclear mishap in 30 years, an event that prompted the notification of President Bush and Defense Secretary Robert Gates.
In the wake of that accident, the Air Force fired three senior officers at Minot and one at Barksdale. Lower-ranking personnel received various forms of non-judicial punishment, and more than 60 individuals lost their certification to work with nuclear weapons.
The incident also prompted three Air Force and Defense Department investigations, which led to more stringent procedures for handling, storing and protecting nuclear weapons. At the same time, the Minot wing began a concentrated effort to regain its certification, by passing the INSI and the subsequent NSI.
But the wing's road to re-certification has been bumpy. As this blog reported five months ago, the 5th BW's first INSI--conducted in December 2007--resulted in a grade of "Not Ready." While Air Force officials emphasized that it was not a failing grade, the score is the lowest possible for an initial nuclear surety inspection. As a result, the unit received more time to prepare for its preliminary evaluation, which was held in late March.
Given the gravity of nuclear operations, surety inspections are conducted by teams from the DTRA and the unit's major command, which (typically) issue separate reports. It is unclear if inspectors from Air Combat Command concurred with the DTRA findings, or what ratings they issued in various evaluation categories.
While the DTRA report carries significant weight in the military's nuclear community, the evaluation of a wing's parent or major command (MAJCOM) is considered the ultimate report card. And, on occasion, DTRA and MAJCOM inspectors disagree, as evidenced by a recent evaluation of Minot's other nuclear-capable unit, the 91st Space Wing.
Pentagon sources tell In From the Cold that the space unit received a "Not Ready" rating from DTRA, during in INSI administered in January. Agency inspectors based that grade on security deviations. However, members of the MAJCOM evaluation team (from Air Force Space Command) disagreed with that assessment, and gave the 91st passing grades in all areas.
The 5th Wing's recent NSI revealed a host of security problems. Inspectors from DTRA found five major deficiencies in unit security operations and 11 minor deviations. A description of those problems represents almost a third of the 14-page document.
According to DTRA evaluators, there were "numerous examples of escorted entry procedures into an exclusion area that were not followed during the inspection." Specific violations included a lack of metal detector screening for escorted personnel; a failure to search hand-carried items and inadequate logging procedures for individuals entering the exclusion zone.
Inspectors also observed serious deficiencies during a denial and recapture exercise. As outlined in the report, the wing's security forces control center did not immediately up-channel a Covered Wagon report, signifying a potentially serious (though simulated) nuclear incident.
Additionally, a security forces team also did not respond to their pre-designated fighting positions during a mock attack on the weapons storage, leaving part of the complex without fire support. The problems were compounded by a flight chief's inability to assume control of the situation and the failure to use authentication procedures during a duress incident.
Evaluators also found a number of discrepancies during an emergency entry exercise, including "a failure to use positive measures to preclude an adversary from entering the WSA, using emergency procedures to circumvent security." Minot personnel also forgot to search a departing vehicle that entered the weapons storage area during a simulated emergency, then neglected to follow the vehicle and search it after reached its destination.
by Nate Hale
For the second time in six months, the Air Force's troubled B-52 wing at Minot AFB, North Dakota has earned low scores on a nuclear surety inspection (NSI), raising new concerns about the unit's ability to perform its ultimate mission.
Minot's 5th Bomb Wing (BW) received an "Unsatisfactory" rating on a nuclear surety inspection from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), conducted between 17-25 May. In From the Cold obtained a copy of the inspection report from military sources, who requested anonymity.
A DTRA team evaluated the wing in 10 areas relating to its nuclear mission, including management and administration; technical operations, storage and maintenance facilities, security and supply support. While the 5th BW met inspection criteria in nine of the ten categories, it still received an overall failing grade, due to extensive discrepancies in nuclear security.
Inspection regulations dictate that units will receive a composite rating of unsatisfactory if they fail any of the inspection areas. The 5th BW received an "unacceptable" rating for its security efforts during the evaluation.
The failing grade from DTRA will not affect the bomb wing's recently-regained certification for nuclear operations. The wing's parent organization, Air Combat Command, restored the unit's authority to handle and maintain nuclear weapons in April, after it passed an Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection (INSI). Thursday afternoon, a spokesman said the ACC Commander, General John Corley, had been briefed on the results and the wing would "retain certification for its strategic mission."
The 5th BW was stripped of its nuclear certification last September, after maintenance personnel mistakenly loaded six nuclear-tipped cruise missiles on a B-52 bound for Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. Authorities classified the incident as the nation's worst nuclear mishap in 30 years, an event that prompted the notification of President Bush and Defense Secretary Robert Gates.
In the wake of that accident, the Air Force fired three senior officers at Minot and one at Barksdale. Lower-ranking personnel received various forms of non-judicial punishment, and more than 60 individuals lost their certification to work with nuclear weapons.
The incident also prompted three Air Force and Defense Department investigations, which led to more stringent procedures for handling, storing and protecting nuclear weapons. At the same time, the Minot wing began a concentrated effort to regain its certification, by passing the INSI and the subsequent NSI.
But the wing's road to re-certification has been bumpy. As this blog reported five months ago, the 5th BW's first INSI--conducted in December 2007--resulted in a grade of "Not Ready." While Air Force officials emphasized that it was not a failing grade, the score is the lowest possible for an initial nuclear surety inspection. As a result, the unit received more time to prepare for its preliminary evaluation, which was held in late March.
Given the gravity of nuclear operations, surety inspections are conducted by teams from the DTRA and the unit's major command, which (typically) issue separate reports. It is unclear if inspectors from Air Combat Command concurred with the DTRA findings, or what ratings they issued in various evaluation categories.
While the DTRA report carries significant weight in the military's nuclear community, the evaluation of a wing's parent or major command (MAJCOM) is considered the ultimate report card. And, on occasion, DTRA and MAJCOM inspectors disagree, as evidenced by a recent evaluation of Minot's other nuclear-capable unit, the 91st Space Wing.
Pentagon sources tell In From the Cold that the space unit received a "Not Ready" rating from DTRA, during in INSI administered in January. Agency inspectors based that grade on security deviations. However, members of the MAJCOM evaluation team (from Air Force Space Command) disagreed with that assessment, and gave the 91st passing grades in all areas.
The 5th Wing's recent NSI revealed a host of security problems. Inspectors from DTRA found five major deficiencies in unit security operations and 11 minor deviations. A description of those problems represents almost a third of the 14-page document.
According to DTRA evaluators, there were "numerous examples of escorted entry procedures into an exclusion area that were not followed during the inspection." Specific violations included a lack of metal detector screening for escorted personnel; a failure to search hand-carried items and inadequate logging procedures for individuals entering the exclusion zone.
Inspectors also observed serious deficiencies during a denial and recapture exercise. As outlined in the report, the wing's security forces control center did not immediately up-channel a Covered Wagon report, signifying a potentially serious (though simulated) nuclear incident.
Additionally, a security forces team also did not respond to their pre-designated fighting positions during a mock attack on the weapons storage, leaving part of the complex without fire support. The problems were compounded by a flight chief's inability to assume control of the situation and the failure to use authentication procedures during a duress incident.
Evaluators also found a number of discrepancies during an emergency entry exercise, including "a failure to use positive measures to preclude an adversary from entering the WSA, using emergency procedures to circumvent security." Minot personnel also forgot to search a departing vehicle that entered the weapons storage area during a simulated emergency, then neglected to follow the vehicle and search it after reached its destination.
Along with those write-ups, the DTRA report lists multiple problems during the inspection's aircraft regeneration phase. Inspectors noted that security forces personnel failed to search the undercarriages of seven aircraft during a purge of the parking area. They also found that security personnel neglected to investigate route vulnerabilities for a planned weapons movement.
In other cases, the performances of individual airmen were found lacking. One security specialist, posted as a Close Boundary Sentry (CBS) was playing video games on a cell phone during an exercise. Evaluators also discovered that an adjacent sentry was unaware of her duties and responsibilities.
Among the minor security discrepancies, inspectors found sentries in the weapons storage area who were unaware of security reporting and alert procedures. Security personnel in another flight were not familiar with nuclear surety terminology, including such basic concepts as the exclusion area and the two-person concept.
The extensive security problems prompted comments from the DTRA team chief, Navy Captain A.J. Camp, Jr. In Tab C of the report, Captain Camp wrote that "security forces' level of knowledge, understanding of assigned duties and response to unusual situations reflect a lack of adequate supervision."
"A review of [security forces] blotters of the past 90 days confirmed that leaders were unengaged with the proper supervision of airmen," he continued. Camp noted that the "average post visit" for senior leadership (above the flight level) was 90 minutes or less per visit, and only "15% of shifts in the weapons storage area" were visited in the last 90 days."
In response to the DTRA report, the 5th BW commander, Colonel Joel Westa, will submit a memorandum to the agency, certifying "measures initiated to preclude recurrence of the significant deficiencies." The DTRA assessment did not list a timeline for the unit's response.
A spokeswoman for the 5th BW, Major Elizabeth Ortiz, did not respond to an e-mail request for comment.
It is unclear if problems identified by DTRA inspectors would prompt leadership changes in the 5th Security Forces Squadron (SFS), charged with protecting the bomb wing and Minot AFB. The North Dakota installation actually has two security forces organizations, the 5th SFS and the 91st Security Forces Group (SFG), which is part of the space wing.
While the group is defends the space wing's Minuteman III ICBMS and launch control facilities--scattered 8,500 square miles of western North Dakota--the 5th SFS is responsible for security inside the base perimeter.
Experts contacted by this blog believe that some members of the security squadron will lose their certification to work around nuclear weapons under the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP). Depending on the number of security specialists who might be de-certified, the 5th BW might be forced to seek manning assistance from other units.
Colonel Westa, the bomb wing commander, has not spoken publicly about the NSI results. In a recent commentary, posted on the unit's official website, he praised wing organizations that have "turned it around" in recent inspections. The security forces squadron was not among those singled out for commendation.
Without the security deviations, the 5th BW would have likely earned a much higher grade from the DTRA. The wing received "Excellent" ratings in five of the inspected areas, and "Acceptable" scores in three others. Regulations require a MAJCOM evaluation of nuclear capable units every 18 months, and a DTRA inspection every five years.
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