The Politics of Intelligence

With more details emerging on the recently-declassified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran's nuclear program, it seems clear that the assessment--like so many aspects of the intel community--has been affected by partisan politics and individual bias.

To be fair, we should note that the nation's intel apparatus (like any government bureaucracy) is subject to political influence. And the work of intelligence analysts will always be affected by their personal views and biases. However, in something as important as an NIE, every effort should be made to minimize those influences. Sadly, that wasn't the case with the Iran estimate.

In our initial post on the NIE, we noted a New York Sun editorial which (rightfully) challenged the objectivity of Vann Van Diepen, one of the principal analysts who authored the assessment. A CIA employee, Mr. Van Diepen has, according to the Sun, "spent the last five years trying to get America to accept Iran's right to enrich uranium." You don't need a Top Secret security clearance to understand that Van Diepen's position represents a minority view in most intelligence circles. So, why was he assigned to the NIE team?

A similar question might be asked about other intel officials who played key roles in producing the assessment. The Iranian document, (indeed, all NIEs) are produced under the auspices of the National Intelligence Council (NIC), which leads community efforts in that area. The current chairman of the NIC is none other than Tom Fingar.

Does that name ring a bell? It should. As Ken Timmerman at Newsmax reminds us:

Fingar was a key partner of Senate Democrats in their successful effort to derail the confirmation of John Bolton in the spring of 2005 to become the U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations.

As the head of the NIC, Fingar has gone out of his way to fire analysts “who asked the wrong questions,” and who challenged the politically-correct views held by Fingar and his former State Department colleagues, as revealed in "Shadow Warriors."

In March 2007, Fingar fired his top Cuba and Venezuela analyst, Norman Bailey, after he warned of the growing alliance between Castro and Chavez.

Mr. Timmerman describes Fingar as part of a "coterie of State Department officials brought over to ODNI by the first director, career State Department official John Negroponte." Another member of that group was Kenneth Brill, another key contributor to the Iranian estimate.

At one time in his foreign service career, Mr. Brill served as U.S. Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It appears that Brill was a good match for the organization, which has never been particularly aggressive--or successful--in discovering nuclear programs among rogue states. As today's Wall Street Journal notes, Brill's performance in Vienna was unimpressive, at best:

For a flavor of their political outlook, former Bush Administration antiproliferation official John Bolton recalls in his recent memoir that then-Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage "described Brill's efforts in Vienna, or lack thereof, as 'bull--.'" Mr. Brill was "retired" from the State Department by Colin Powell before being rehired, over considerable internal and public protest, as head of the National Counter-Proliferation Center by then-National Intelligence Director John Negroponte.

In his book "Shadow Warriors," Ken Timmerman describes Brill as a man who steadfastly refused to address the issue of Iran's nuclear program, despite evidence to the contrary:

“While in Vienna, Brill consistently failed to confront Iran once its clandestine nuclear weapons program was exposed in February 2003, and had to be woken up with the bureaucratic equivalent of a cattle prod to deliver a single speech condemning Iran’s eighteen year history of nuclear cheating.”

Negroponte rehabilitated Brill and brought the man who single-handedly failed to object to Iran’s nuclear weapons program and put him in charge of counter-proliferation efforts for the entire intelligence community.

The collective contributions of Messrs. Van Diepen, Fingar and Brill may explain the NIE's "diplo-centric" perspective and its optimistic outlook on Iran's nuclear program. And that brings us to another point. Media coverage of any NIE invariably highlights the assessment as the "consensus" of the nation's 16 intelligence agencies.

Well, almost. One of the dirty little secrets of the NIE process is that some organizations have a greater say (and influence) than others. For example, while representatives of the Coast Guard intelligence and the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MICA) may have been invited to the initial meeting on the Iran report, it is virtually certain that no "coasties" or Marines were involved in the final preparation. Iran's national nuclear program is beyond the purview of many intelligence organizations, so they have no input in the final report.

So, who was actually responsible for the NIE? Well, obviously the NIC (which controlled development of the assessment), along with the CIA, NSA, DIA, NGA, State Department and the Department of Energy. The bulk of the information--and analytical expertise--came from only six of the sixteen intelligence agencies.

The delineation of labor goes something like this: CIA leads community efforts in WMD and counter-proliferation, and they controlled the defector reporting which (reportedly) prompted the revised assessment. NSA provided SIGINT information used in formulating the NIE; DIA analysts offered expertise on links between Iran's nuclear program and its military, and NGA's imagery products were used in tracking changes at facilities associated with Iran's nuclear program. Among the other key players, the State Department furnished analysis on the diplomatic aspects of Tehran's nuclear effort, while the Energy Department provided critical assessments on Iranian nuclear research, technology and related matters.

While most (if not all) intel agencies were given an opportunity to review--and critique--draft versions of the NIE, most of the actual work on the assessment was done by the "Big 4" intel agencies (CIA, NSA, DIA and NGA), with key assistance from NGA, the State Department and DOE. That isn't surprising; collectively, the three organizations control much of the nation's intel analysis, and a good chunk of our collection capabilities.

What's more surprising is that the document's preparation was largely entrusted to three individuals who have, to varying degrees, opposed existing U.S. policies in the Middle East and prevailing perspectives within the intelligence community. While honest dissent among intel analysts is welcome--even necessary--we can only wonder if the Iran NIE was influenced more by new information, or by the prevailing biases and political agendas that affect portions of our intelligence community.

Tug of War, Part II

Seventeen months ago, we noted an emerging battle between the Air Force and the Defense Intelligence Agency in the realm of missile analysis. For years, the Air Force's National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), located at Wright-Patterson AFB in Ohio, led the analysis of medium and long-range ballistic missiles, defined as those with a range of 1,000 kilometers or more. Short-range missiles remained the province of the DIA's Missile and Space Intelligence Center (located in Huntsville, Alabama).

As we observed back in October 2005, DIA had proposed a realignment of responsibilities in certain areas--including ballistic missiles--under its Defense Intelligence Analysis Program (DIAP). Under that proposal, MSIC would assume greater responsibilities in analyzing medium and long-range missiles, at the expense of the Air Force--and NASIC.

Understandably, the Air Force didn't like that idea. Not only had NASIC become the recognized leader in the analysis of longer-ranged missiles, there was also the perception that DIA had a "dog in the fight." With MSIC a part of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Air Force was concerned that any realignment would favor the agency--and its own missile intelligence center.

Sure enough, DIA apparently circulated a classified memorandum last year that blurred analytical responsibilities, giving MSIC an opportunity to assume a great role in long-range missile work. Ohio Senator Mike DeWine, who served on the Senate Intelligence Committee, successfully fought to delay implementation of that memo.

But, last November, Senator DeWine was defeated in his bid for a third term by Democratic Congressman Sherrod Brown. Now, there's a belief by Ohio lawmakers that DIA--and their friends in the Alabama congressional delegation--are pressing ahead on the realignment issue. DIA (and MSIC) have a powerful ally in Alabama Senator Richard C. Shelby, who (not surprisingly) is a long-time advocate of the Huntsville organization, which features a center named for--you guessed it--Senator Shelby.

Members of the Ohio delegation--including Senator Brown--have sent a letter to the DIA Director, Lt Gen Michael Maples, expressing concern about MSIC's growing role in missile analysis. Senator Brown signed the letter, but he has little prior experience in defense or intelligence matters. And on this issue, Brown has not demonstrated the leadership or understanding of Mike DeWine.

Why does this matter? As Ohio Congressman Dave Hobson told the Dayton Daily News, the kind of capability that exists at NASIC can't be replicated overnight, and many of that organization's missile analysts would prefer to do that job in Ohio. More importantly, the existing "division of labor" in missile analysis worked quite well, as demonstrated during North Korea's Tapeodong 2 test launch. NASIC analysts led the community in predicting (and analyzing) the event, winning plaudits for their work.

MSIC's expansion into long-range missile analysis is little more than a power grab, the kind of turf battle that's grown increasingly common in the BRAC era. With money (and hundreds of jobs) at stake, intelligence organizations are trying to position themselves for the long haul and keep their focus relevant, even if it means poaching on someone else's territory. Unfortunately, such moves also detract from the analytical mission, forcing the same organizations to justify their expertise--or defend their expansion--when they ought to be focusing on their real mission, analyzing the threat posed by enemy missile systems.

From what we can gather, this battle is far from over. And, with the prospect of hundreds of jobs--and millions in tax revenue--potentially leaving Ohio, some voters in the Buckeye State may wish they had re-elected Mike DeWine last November.