Back in the DPRK

There was a fascinating article this week in Donga Ilbo, one of South Korea's leading daily newspapers. Many of us learned of it through the efforts of "Tiger Likes Rooster," an American living in Asia who translates local media reports into English, and posts them at FreeRepublic.com.

According to the paper, North Korea's military is running out of food.

N. Korea's recent shortage of food is reaching close to the level during the famine in 90's, aka 'March of Suffering.' In particular, discontinued food aid from international community is reportedly hurting soldiers most.

Sources say that food situation in N. Korean military have rapidly deteriorated since the second half of last year. Civilians learned to survive without government ration, but soldiers cannot survive unless the state provide them with food. Stopped food aid from international community dealt a serious blow to them.

According to one of the sources, since the latter part of last year, many units can only provide a few dozen corn kernels or a couple of potatos (per meal) and they have only enough for two meals (a day.) Order came down to make soldiers sleep in the afternoon and not put them into training or work as much as possible.

Another source said, "Malnutrition among soldiers are increasing fast, and I have even seen a case of an unmarried company commissar who went home, stayed for a month, 'replenish himself with calories', before returning (back to his unit.)"

Donga Ilbo never identifies the "sources" for its report, but they are almost certainly members of the ROK intelligence community. Obviously, South Korea's spooks spent most of their time watching the DPRK, but there are significant "gaps" in their reporting. Like the U.S., Seoul relies heavily on technical collection (particularly SIGINT and imagery) to keep tabs on what's happening in North Korea. While those disciplines are useful in tracking military activity, they are less reliable in gauging the impact of famines, and other catastrophes caused by Pyongyang's communist government.

For that, you need accurate human intelligence (HUMINT) reporting. Unfortunately, HUMINT information from inside North Korea remains weak. A former intel collection manager for U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK) told us that South Korea has "never" had a successful agent operation inside the DPRK, despite years of efforts and millions of dollars in funding. Because of that failure, both Washington and Seoul utilize "second-hand" reporting from such disparate surces as foreign diplomats; Japanese businessmen who travel to Pyongyang; the few defectors who escape from Kim Jong-il's regime, and groups who assist North Koreans attempting to flee their own country.

While these individuals--and organizations--can provide valuable insights, there are limits on their reporting. For example, diplomats and foreign business representatives are usually restricted to the North Korean capital, the area least affected by famine. Pyongyang has always been a "showplace" for the government (outsiders need special approval to move there), and civilians in the city usually have priority for food over those living in the countryside. While more than a million peasants starved during the mid-1990s, residents of Pyongyang subsided on meager rations, allowing the regime to keep up appearances.

And, with the discontinuation of food aid from the international community, intelligence agencies have lost another valuable source. In the past, North Korea allowed aid groups and medical teams into the countryside; their reporting provided some of the most detailed (and graphic) information on the mass starvation that afflicted the peasant class in years past.

On the other hand, the exodus of literally thousands of Koreans fleeing the "worker's paradise" for an uncertain fate in China speaks volumes about conditions inside the DPRK. The refugees' accounts are routinely collected by assistance groups operating in China, who pass them on to representatives of the South Korean and U.S. governments. Venturing a guess, we'd say that refugee reporting was the foundation of the "leak" provided to the South Korean newspaper.

So, that media account cannot be totally dismissed, despite our limited reporting on conditions in North Korea. And, if the newspaper article is even partly right, it is something of a bombshell. The military is the most powerful institution in the DPRK; it is the guarantor of the Kim dynasty and the communist state. If the North Korean military is going hungry, it could certainly affect loyalty toward the regime, and Kim Jong-il's ability to retain power.

Still, a word of caution is in order. Excerpts from the Donga Ilbo article offer no indication on the extent of the North Korean military's food shortage. While the armed forces of the DPRK always get first first crack at limited foodstuffs (along with the ruling elites), there is a pecking order within the military. Elite units and those with important military assignments would have priority for food over those performing less-critical missions. Are the food shortages in the DPRK military wide-spread, or limited to secondary units? Based on the press report, we simply can't say.

At least two other elements of the article are also a bit suspect. In one paragraph, we're told that a company-level political officer went home for a month to "replenish himself with calories" before returning to his unit. Unless the officer's family is politically-connected, that scenario is highly unlikely. In North Korea's food distribution hierarchy, "ordinary" civilians come in dead last; in most cases, the family would have less to eat than their son, so it's hard to imagine the officer being able to "fatten himself up" during a visit home. On the other hand, if the political officer's relatives enjoy full access to food, you'd think they'd have enough pull to get him assigned to a unit in Pyongyang, where soldiers are (normally) better fed.

Reports of dwindling food supplies in military units is also surprising for another reason. As we've noted in previous posts, virtually all activity in the DPRK armed forces stops during the spring and summer months, so the troops can tend to fields and plots reserved for their units. This communal effort is supposed to provide a minimum food supply for military organizations, supplemented by rations from other sources. If conditions are as bad as the article indicates, it affirms that collectivized agriculture is also a bust in the DPRK military, despite the incentive for soldiers to grow food for themselves.

But it would be a mistake to discount Pyongyang's ability to muddle through the reported food crisis. The regime retained its grip on power in the mid-1990s, while millions of peasants starved to death in the countryside. North Korea has a long history of doing whatever it takes to survive, although wide-spread hunger in the military could pose a long-term threat to government stability.

While it's tempting to predict the demise of a brutal regime, it would also be premature to consign the DPRK to the dustbin of history. During a tour of duty in Korea almost 20 years ago, we reviewed a ROK Ministry of Defense White Paper on future threats to South Korea. In 2010, the authors predicted, Japan and China would represent emerging threats to the ROK, because North Korea would be gone by that time. Two decades later, we see how that prediction panned out.

Put another way: the reported famine in the DPRK will have to get a lot worse to trigger regime change. And Kim Jong-il will do what's necessary to feed his most important military formations, even if other units see their rations cut. And finally, if the food situation is this bad in Pyongyang's military, you can only shudder when contemplating the diet of a North Korea peasant.

Death Watch

For those who toil in the mainstream media, these are times that try men's (and women's) souls.

Saying the dinosaur media is in trouble is the equivalent of saying the Titanic had a bit of a problem with an ice berg. Across the media landscape, "traditional" outlets are in trouble, bleeding red ink and shedding employees in a desperate effort to help the bottom line.

If you need more evidence, look no further than ABC News. Quite frankly, a lot of media companies would gladly trade places with ABC, which has a wealthy corporate parent (Disney) and programs (World News; Good Morning America) which finish second in their time slots and generate modest profits.

But that isn't good enough. Last week, ABC News President David Westin announced that his division was cutting 20% of its workforce, in an effort to save money and improve profitability. Additionally, ABC will shutter its various news bureaus around the country (except for Washington, D.C.) and slash the number of journalists covering flyover country. The Los Angeles bureau, now home to six correspondents, will soon have only two, with a corresponding decrease in producers and technicians as well.

And for those that remain in the down-sized bureaus, their accomodations will change as well. ABC's regional newsrooms will now share space with their local stations. That means the network's Chicago bureau will be housed at WLS-TV, while the Los Angeles staff moves into the complex owned by the local affiliate, KABC-TV.

As you've probably heard, the network types typically look down their noses at the "locals," who are viewed more as entertainers or "personalities," rather than serious journalists. So, the local ABC news departments won't exactly greet their network breathern with open arms. If you're part of a domestic ABC bureau outside D.C. (and you still have a job), congratulations: we hope you enjoy your new digs in the broom closet or the basement. Local anchors, producers and news executives who've been turned down for network jobs--or snubbed by ABC News "royalty"--have been waiting for this opportunity for years.

But the folks at ABC aren't the only ones experiencing hard times. In February, CNN just suffered its lowest audience ratings in four years, and its smallest viewership in the 25-54 demographic in almost a decade. To be fair, those numbers were registered against the Winter Olypmics opening ceremony on NBC and its affiliated cable networks. But CNN's decline began well before MSNBC got its recent Olympics "bounce."

And the trend for March doesn't look much better. HotAirPundit has the cable news numbers for last night (originally posted at TVNewser), and they are stunning to say the least. At 8 pm, The O'Reilly Factor pulled in roughly 10 times the audience of Campbell Brown on CNN. And, if that isn't embarassing enough, Ms. Brown's program usually runs dead last in the time slot, ranking behind the noxious Keith Olbermann on MSNBC and Nancy Grace's nightly crimefest on HLN.

Still, the folks at NBC should resist the temptation to break out the champagne. Despite tons of favorable publicity (and countless cross-network marketing efforts) Olbermann has only one-quarter of O'Reilly's total audience, and Bill kills him in the demo as well. In fact, Olberman is also getting clobbered by Nancy Grace, who beats him in viewers between the ages of 25 and 54. While Olbermann still beats HLN and CNN in total viewers, recent reports suggest his act is wearing thin at MSNBC and the network's new owners (Comcast) may be planning to dump their "star" host.

Traditional media types are quick to blame the internet and the economy for their problems, and there's an element of truth in that. But it's also true that some media outlets are dong quite well in the on-line age and still attract a significant audience. You don't need to be a TV executive to understand that FNC is crushing the competition in cable news, and generating a tidy profit, to boot.

In a recent profile, Fox News Chairman Roger Ailes affirmed that his channel is on track to deliver $700 million in profits to the News Corporation bottom line this year, and he sees $1 billion in annual profits in the near future. Not bad for a new outlet that was given virtually no chance for success when it launched 14 years ago. As a comparison, FNC's profits are greater than those of CNN, MSNBC and the three network evening newscasts combined.

My, my how times have changed. I'll bet a lot of "professional" journalists who once sneered at Fox are now calling their friends at the news channel, and asking them to put in a good word. As the MSM dinosaurs die a slow, agonizing death, Fox is (if you'll pardon our analogy) looking like an alligator: tough, dominant and built to last.

Putting an Entitlement on Hold

Ask anyone who's been a company, squadron or battalion commander, and they will tell you. One of the quickest ways to gauge a unit's morale is to spend a little time with military spouses. Husbands and wives of soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines are rarely shy about offering their opinions, and besides, if there's a problem with the unit (or base support services), it inevitably impacts the troops and their job performance.

Currently, a lot of unit commanders--and their superiors--are getting an earful about something called MyCAA accounts. The abbreviation stands for "My Career Advancement Account;" it's a relatively new DoD program that provides education funds for military spouses.

Launched last year, MyCAA was an outgrowth of a Labor Department effort to help the husbands and wives of military personnel develop "portable" career skills that can be easily transferred from one location to another. The program provides up to $6,000 that spouses can use for a wide range of educational programs, ranging from college and vocational courses, to specialized certification classes leading to a teacher's or real estate license.

But two weeks ago, the Pentagon suddenly put the program on hold, pending an administrative review. That left thousands of MyCAA participants in the lurch; students who had signed up for classes--but were still awaiting funding through the program--suddenly found themselves looking for other forms of financial aid, or paying the bills themselves.

As you might expect, the temporary suspension of MyCAA touched off a furor among military spouses. One group of angry participants met with Virginia Congressman Glenn Nye, whose district includes the sprawling Norfolk Naval Station. After the meeting, Mr. Nye sent a letter to defense secretary Robert Gates, asking for more information on the program's suspension-- and its future.

When MyCAA was placed on hold, the Pentagon didn't offer an immediate explanation for its actions, touching off speculation about how the money was being spent (or wasted). But it turns out the program was a victim of its own success; Military Times reports that MyCAA received more than 95,000 applications in the first six weeks on 2010, swamping the system and threatening to drain its budget.

DoD hopes to resume MyCAA at some point in the future, although it's unclear how much money the program will receive, and the number of military spouses that will be eligible for financial assistance. At projected levels (150,000 participants @ $6K per person), MyCAA is a $900 million program. Even in an era of $600 billion defense budgets, $900 million is hardly chump change.

In fact, the spouse program could prove to be more expensive (over the near-term) than tuition assistance for active duty military members; the Air Force, for example, will spend about $200 million on TA for its personnel this year, roughly one-quarter the cost of MyCAA for the first 150,000 participants.

And, in fairness, costs for MyCAA can be more easily controlled than those for the T/A program. While spouses are limited to $6,000, active duty personnel receive $4,500 in tuition assistance funds a year, and many use the benefit for an extended period. In today's military, it's not unusual to find retiring officers and senior NCOs who earned multiple degrees on active duty, using their T/A benefits.

However, the current problems surrounding MyCAA obscures a larger issue, namely, should the Pentagon provide education benefits for the spouses of armed forces personnel? While it's clearly a quality-of-life issue for military families, you can argue that education for dependent husbands and wives doesn't have the same impact as off-duty education for members of the armed forces. It may give the family a bigger income or a larger house, but the gains don't directly enhance our military capabilities.

Besides, military dependents aren't lacking for educational benefits. In addition to student loans and Pell Grants, there are literally hundreds of scholarships available for military spouses and their children. When the MyCAA program was suspended, an Army base in Virginia put together a list of available scholarships and programs for military spouses and other dependents; the list is three pages long, single-spaced, in eight-point type.

But participants in the MyCAA program don't want a scholarship roster; they want funding restored for their program. That's consistent with today's entitlement culture which is also evident in the U.S. military. When tuition assistance rates were raised from 75% to 100%, the Pentagon anticipated a 25% increase in program participation. Our good friend Chief Buddy tried to warn Air Force leaders that demand for TA would explode, with the military paying all tuition costs.

The Chief was right. In only seven years, the Air Force TA budget grew almost three-fold, from $66 to $190 million. Similar increases have been noted by the other services--and that was before MyCAA arrived on the scene. Clearly, there are limits on how much DoD can spend on educational benefits, and the rapid growth of MyCAA was more than even the Pentagon could afford.

Still, it seems doubtful that the MyCAA program will be eliminated. Once in place, entitlement programs are almost impossible to kill and this one has already developed a powerful constituency of military families, members of Congress and universities which serve the armed forces market. Look for an expanded version of MyCAA to emerge in a few months, with more money and staff to accommodate the increased demand. Questions regarding the efficacy of spousal education programs will be swept aside, and the budget will continue to grow.

To be sure, military spouse education is a far more worthy endeavor than many of the projects funded under President Obama's stimulus program. But if we're ever going to get a hold on government spending, Congress must mandate tough choices for all agencies and cabinet departments, including DoD. Perhaps the MyCAA program can be a starting point for DoD, along with all of that money wasted on VIP airlift for members of Congress. The savings may seem small, but if you apply the same cost/benefit analysis to enough programs, you can begin to eliminate waste and generate substantial savings.

All that's required are senior military officials--and members of Congress--who are willing to make the tough choices and stick by them. And that may be the biggest obstacle of all.

***

ADDENDUM: Did we mention that service members with the Post 9-11 G.I. Bill can assign unused portions of their education benefits to spouses or dependent children. One more option for financing their education--without the added expense of my CAA.

The Usual Suspects

When a senior Hamas official was assassinated in Dubai a few weeks ago, Israel was immediately blamed for the hit.

Indeed, the killing of Mahmoud al-Mabhouh seemed to have all the trappings of a Mossad operation. Al-Mabhouh was drugged, then suffocated by assassins in his hotel room. And the hit team, traveling on stolen passports, made a clean get-away. By some estimates, more than 20 agents were involved in the operation, one of many high-profile assassinations (allegedly) carried out by the Israeli intelligence over the last four decades.

But was the Mossad really behind the killing of the terrorist leader? While the western media (and so-called "experts) have been blaming Israeli agents, Hamas is offering a different explanation. Mahmoud Nasser, a member of the group's political bureau, believes that his colleague was targeted by an Arab government, probably Egypt or Jordan. As Reuters reports:

Nasser told the Al Quds-Al Araby newspaper that al-Mabhouh was likely being tracked by agents from Jordan and Egypt prior to the January 19 killing. Nasser said he had been given information regarding such efforts to kill Mabhouh, adding that the evidence indicated that the assassination was carried out earlier than the alleged agents had planned. According to Nasser, Mabhouh was in possession of "dangerous" information seen as dangerous to particular Arab elements seeking to topple Islamist resistance.

Nasser oversees Hamas' ties with Iran and worked closely with Mabhouh, sometimes referred to as his deputy. Hamas raised these accusations after a prelimary investigation immediately following the murder, and match early suspicions raised by Dubai as well.

It's rather interesting that Nasser continues to blame Egypt and Jordan, while Dubai authorities are still pursuing the Israeli angle. According to the same Reuters dispatch, authorities in the UAE have asked the FBI to look into claims that the hit team used pre-paid Visa cards, issued by MetaBank, a regional U.S. financial institution. The cards were reportedly used to pay for hotel rooms and airline tickets used by the assassination squad.

While the Israelis can't be ruled out as suspects, the Egypt/Jordanian connection bears scrutiny as well. Despite their official "support" for the Palestinian cause, Hamas is viewed as a threat by leaders in Cairo and Amman. Given the opportunity to take out a senior terrorist leader, both the Egyptian and Jordanian intelligence services would be more than willing to expend the necessary resources.

Besides, claims of Israeli involvement provide the perfect cover for such an operation. While Dubai authorities disclose more details about the "Israeli" hit team, Egyptian and/or Jordanian operatives can cover their tracks, making it more difficult to follow any trail that leads back to Cairo or Amman. Blaming Israel also allows Dubai to avoid the political and diplomatic headaches that come with pinning the assassination on a friendly Arab government.

At this point, no one is really sure who killed Mahmoud al-Mabhouh. But the Egypt-Jordan "theory" makes sense, for at least two reasons. First, if the assassination was a Mossad operation, it was a rather bloated and messy affair. By Israeli standards, the hit team was huge (at least 27 members), with all sorts of loose ends that could help identify the operatives.

For example, there is an extensive closed circuit television system in the hotel where the hit was carried out. Members of the team were photographed both before and after they donned disguises, making it easier to identify individuals involved in the operation. It's hard to believe that the Mossad would fail to detect--or compensate for--CCTV surveillance in the hotel. Not exactly the level of professionalism observed in past Mossad "jobs."

Likewise, the use of poorly-forged European passports is also evidence of sloppy tradecraft. Making matters worse, many of the assassins traveled under the names of recent emigres to Israel, putting those individuals in potential danger. Why didn't the Mossad--with its ample resources and vast experience--simply create false identities for its team, with high-quality travel documents and credit cards that would be more difficult to trace?

We find it rather telling that Hamas is still blaming Egypt and Jordan, despite all those revelations about the Israeli hit squad. The terror group clearly knows its enemies, and has no reason to "protect" Israel. Moreover, Hamas also knows how the political game is played in the Middle East and the willingness of Arab governments to use Israel as a convenient bogeyman in virtually any circumstance.

That's why Dubai's fixation on the Israelis is vaguely reminiscent of the film Casablanca, and Captain Renault's famous order to "round up the usual suspects." Obviously, the authorities in Dubai haven't arrested anyone for the assassination of Mahmoud al-Mabhouh. But the Mossad does provide a rather convenient scapegoat, allowing Dubai to ignore other regimes who had their own reasons for killing the Hamas leader.

The Coming Breach

When the Obama Administration announced plans to cap F-22 production last year, they suggested that a smaller Raptor fleet would mean more money for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the stealthy, multi-role aircraft that will replace thousands of older jets in the U.S. inventory, and those of various allied nations.

With the JSF program moving from the development phase to early series production, the move made fiscal sense, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates. He described the F-22 as something of a Cold War relic, a technical marvel designed to counter threats that never materialized. On the other hand, Gates argued, there was a pressing need to replace aging F-16s, A-10s, F/A-18s (and other aircraft) with the more capable JSF.

But critics noted that Dr. Gates' actions on the F-35 didn't exactly match his rhetoric. In an interview for our Examiner.com column last spring, airpower analyst Rebecca Grant observed that Gates did not accelerate the pace of the JSF program (despite its stated importance), and left open the possibility of cuts under the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

Since then, the Joint Strike Fighter has taken more lumps, raising more questions about its delivery timetable, and the number that will actually be produced. Costs for late-stage development and production have soared, prompting Dr. Gates to fire the DoD program manager (a Marine Corps Major General) earlier this year.

And earlier today, Air Force Secretary Michael Donley confirmed that the F-35 program will be delayed by at least two years and "significantly over cost." Mr. Donley didn't put a dollar figure on the overruns, but said "it is probable there will be a Nunn-McGurdy breach."

Named for its Congressional sponsors, the Nunn-McGurdy act mandates an extensive review of the program, the reasons behind the overruns and potential alternatives to the weapons system. In conversations with Aviation Week (and other news outlets), Donley and other senior DoD officials have emphasized that there is "no alternative" to the JSF, which combines speed and stealth in a multiple versions that will be used by the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Navy, the Marine Corps, along with the air and naval forces of nine allied nations.

Donley also reports that steps are being taken to "shore up" the program, in anticipation of the fiscal breach. But the F-35's problems mean that development of the aircraft will be extended, pushing back delivery dates for the first operational models.

Donley attributes much of the delay to airframe availability, which is under the purview of Lockheed Martin. The Air Force last week announced a slip of initial operational capability (IOC) for its conventional-takeoff-and-landing F-35 from 2013 to late calendar year 2015, and Navy officials are assessing the impact to their planned IOC in 2014.

The Pentagon is in the midst of negotiating LRIP (Low Rate Initial Production) Lot 4 with Lockheed Martin, and Donley appears hopeful that the contractor can produce the aircraft below prices cited by independent estimates. This could allow the Defense Dept. to buy more aircraft per year than planned; the Fiscal 2011 spending plan sliced 122 aircraft from the next five years to allow for $2.8 billion be added into the development program. Donley declined to say how many aircraft could be bought above the planned numbers using this “buy-to-budget” strategy.

While JSF will assuredly survive its current problems, the Pentagon hasn't determine the final size of the aircraft "buy." Last year, Dr. Gates indicated that the U.S. would purchase 2,443 F-35s, equipping Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps squadrons for the next 30 years. But cost overruns (and other problems) may reduce that total. There is also the possibility that some of the foreign partners might back out of the program, further decreasing the number of F-35s, and driving up production costs.

How important is the price factor? Consider this: originally, the JSF was supposed to be four times more effective than fourth-generation fighters (F-15, F-16, Typhoon, SU-27/35 Flanker) in air-to-air combat, and eight times better in air-to-ground roles, at 75% of the price of an F-22 ($80 million versus $120 million). But now there are growing concerns about the ability of Lockheed Martin and its sub-contractors to meet that goal. In fact, some export versions may break the $100 million/unit barrier, one reason that some U.S. allies (notably Australia) have asked about buying Raptors instead of the F-35, which has been nicknamed the Lightning II.

As for alternatives, we highlighted this possibility almost a year ago. Facing a massive federal budget deficit (and a troubled F-35 program), the Obama Administration could adopt an "alternate" procurement strategy developed by the Congressional Budget Office. That plan calls for cutting the Air Force's JSF buy in half, and limiting the Marine Corps purchases to the number of aircraft required to replace the AV-8B Harriers still in service.

During a visit to the F-35 production facility in Fort Worth last fall, Robert Gates described the aircraft as "the heart of future tactical combat aviation." But with the program behind schedule and way over budget, the "heart" may be much smaller than originally envisioned.

Making matters worse, the F-35 is also expected to fill the gap created by capping F-22 production at less than 200 aircraft. The magnitude of that blunder will be even more evident in the years to come. The JSF is a marvelous piece of technology, but it is no substitute for the Raptor, no matter how Robert Gates tries to spin it. And, if the military, contractors and Congress can't get a handle on the program's problems, there may be even fewer F-35s to fill that gap.

An Eye for an Eye

It's no secret that our blog has been highly critical of President Obama and his security policies. Barely one year into his term, Mr. Obama and his team have committed a number of critical blunders, including cancellation of missile defense deployments in eastern Europe; delayed approval for the surge in Afghanistan, and giving Iran a year to "come around" on giving up its nuclear program. Repercussions from those decisions alone will haunt the U.S. for years to come.

But if President Obama has made his share of mistakes, he also deserves credit for getting a few things right. At the top of that list is the "drone campaign" against Taliban and Al Qaida leaders in Afghanistan, Yemen and the tribal lands of western Pakistan. By one tally, drone strikes have eliminated 14 of Al Qaida's Top 20 leaders over the last year.

Indeed, the emergence of UAV technology, backed by all-source intelligence, has become our most effective tool for targeting terrorist leaders. Carrying sensor packages and Hellfire missiles, Predator and Reaper drones can orbit over terrorist havens for hours, transmitting real-time video to intelligence cells. Analysts can "fuse" the imagery with information from other sources and if they confirm the presence of a wanted terrorist, the drone's mission changes from "hunter" to "killer" with the push of a button.

Still, not everyone is a fan of the drone campaign. Writing in Thursday's edition of The New York Times, columnist Roger Cohen decries the lack of "accountability" in UAV strikes. He argues that the U.S. government has never disclosed key details of the program, ranging from the number of terror leaders eliminated by drone attacks, to the rules of engagement used in deciding where (and when) such strikes will occur.

Cohen also describes the drone campaigns as unjustified "revenge killings:"

Revenge killings don’t pass the test for me. They’re unacceptable under international law. I want to know that any target is selected because there is verifiable intelligence that he’s actively planning a terrorist attack on the United States or its allies; that the danger is pressing; that arrest is impossible; and that civilian lives are not wantonly risked.

The bar of pre-emptive self-defense is then passed. A pinpoint strike is better than the Afghan or Iraqi scenarios. But that bar must be high. America departs at its peril from its principles.

I know, terrorists have no rule book, no borders and no compunction. The global war on terror (GWOT) is untidy. Still, the current accountability void for U.S. targeted killing is unacceptable.

The rest of Mr. Cohen's column is a (predictable) attack on Israeli drone strikes and the recent assassination of a Hamas operative in Dubai, presumably by a Mossad hit team. He believes that following the Israeli example diminishes our standing in the global community. Cohen also states that "fear" of potential terror attacks cannot become a global license for the U.S. to kill.

But such arguments miss essential points. First, our drone attacks in the Middle East have been carried out (largely) with the tacit support of local regimes. To be fair, officials in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Yemen have complained about the collateral damage that is sometimes a product of these strikes. But the same leaders also realize that the UAV strikes are eliminating potential threats to their own government.

Without the drone campaign, the U.S. would be leaning heavily on local security forces to go after terrorists inside their countries. In some instances (Yemen and Afghanistan) the national Army and paramilitary forces are ineffective, or incapable of carrying out complex counter-insurgency operations targeting key terrorist leaders. That means greater U.S. participation (and all the risks entailed), and more claims that we are extending "our war" into countries like Yemen and Pakistan, causing unnecessary headaches for those regimes.

In the case of Pakistan, one can argue that the Islamabad government should be doing more to eliminate the terrorist threat. After all, Pakistan's intelligence service had a role in creating the Taliban, and the regime's reluctance to go after insurgents in the tribal areas helped spark a terrorist resurgence over the past couple of years.

However, the are limits (both politically and militarily) on what the Pakistan Army can accomplish. Past campaigns in the tribal regions were only marginally successful, but more recent efforts have been more effective, thanks (in part) to the drone campaign. With senior terrorists dead--or in hiding--after UAV attacks, Taliban and Al Qaida elements have been put on the defensive, though both groups continue to lash out with deadly bomb attacks.

A similar trend is evident in Pakistani cities, where a joint CIA-ISI campaign has rounded up a number of terror suspects over the past year. That effort also builds on the success of the drone campaign; with Predators and Reapers targeting insurgents in the tribal lands and Afghanistan, more terror leaders are migrating to Pakistan's sprawling urban areas, and onto the radar of CIA and ISI operatives. The death--or capture--of terror leaders clearly benefits both countries, eliminating both regional and global threats.

Finally, there's the matter of fleeting targets. In Waziristan or Afghanistan, the "window" for eliminating a terror suspect is often narrow; choices must be made quickly, on the best available intelligence. If the decision is delayed, the terror cell leader often gets away, to live and kill again. More often than not, there simply isn't enough time to go through the checks and balances Cohen alludes to in his column.

Similarly, the "full accounting" demanded by Cohen (and other critics) is an equally bad idea. Disclosing the mechanics of the program would give terrorists valuable insights into how the strikes are conducted, allowing them to develop effective counter-measures. Currently, the terrorists seem to have only limited awareness of the UAVs and their operational tactics. One insurgent was killed by a drone-launched missile while sunning himself on the roof of his compound, enjoying a back rub from his wife.

Such attacks send shock waves through terrorist ranks, and they're one reason that the most senior targets have gone underground, where their effectiveness as leaders is further diminished. The ability of our UAVs to range across broad areas--and locate specific figures--keeps individuals like Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar on the run.

Mr. Obama would be well-advised to continue his drone wars; they're an effective complement to other military and intelligence operations in the Middle East. And contrary to the wishes of the NYT, the administration doesn't owe us a full accounting of what the UAVs (and their support crews) are up to. As we've written before, a democracy has certain secrets that must be preserved to ensure our national security. The scope of our drone war against terrorists is one of those secrets.

A Return of the Murphy Defense?

Military law analysts will be keeping a close eye on the case of Air Force Chief Master Sergeant William Gurney. Last November, In From the Cold was one of the first media outlets to report that Gurney had been fired as Command Chief Master Sergeant for Air Force Material Command (AFMC), headquartered at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. As one of only 12 command-level chiefs in the service, Gurney became one of the most senior enlisted members to lose his job in recent years.

At the time of his dismissal, there were reports that Gurney had (allegedly) been involved in inappropriate relationships with female subordinates. Now, those allegations have become the basis for legal action. In a press release issued yesterday, the command announced that Chief Gurney is facing various charges under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, stemming from the purported relationships. Specific counts include:

- Seven specifications of violation of Article 92, Failure to Obey an Order or Regulation and Dereliction of Duty.

- Two specifications of violation of Article 93, Maltreatment.

- Two specifications of violation of Article 120, Indecent Conduct and Wrongful Sexual Contact.

- Seven specifications of violation of Article 134, Adultery and Misuse of Official Position.

According to the statement, agents from the Air Force Office of Special Investigations began a probe into Gurney's conduct last November, after a junior female airman came forward with allegations of harassment. General Donald Hoffman, the AFMC Commander, relieved Chief Gurney from his position in late November, after the investigation began.

Hoffman also asked another organization, Air Mobility Command, for the administration of military justice in the case. General Hoffman made the request because he was Gurney's immediate supervisor at AFMC.

At this point, it's impossible to accurately predict the outcome of Chief Gurney's case. In the past, senior officers and NCOs accused of sexual misconduct have been given administrative punishment and allowed to retire. But with the USAF's renewed emphasis on accountability, Chief Master Sergeant Gurney is facing the very real prospect of a court-martial, conviction, and even jail time.

But Gurney may have a legal ace up his sleeve, based another, recent Air Force case. Earlier this week, the service announced that Colonel Michael Murphy, a former senior JAG officer, will be retired on 1 April, in the grade of First Lieutenant. Murphy faced multiple charges at court-martial last year, after it was revealed that he had been disbarred as a civilian attorney and practiced military law--without a license--for more than two decades.

While Colonel Murphy was still convicted, he still escaped punishment. Before Murphy's day in court, a military judge ruled that he could not be punished (even if convicted), because the defense team could not present the "good airman defense," demonstrating the Colonel's past, honorable service. The ruling stemmed from the White House's refusal to divulge details of Murphy's classified service in the White House Military Office. Without that information, the judge ruled, Colonel Murphy could receive an adequate defense.

How does that help Chief Gurney? Before assuming his post at AFMC, Gurney spent most of his career in the intelligence career field, including stints as the Command Chief Master Sergeant for the 67th Information Warfare Wing and its successor, the 67th Network Warfare Wing. Over the past decade or so, that unit has been involved in some of the most sensitive computer warfare and information operations campaigns conducted by DoD. In his role as a senior leader, Gurney almost certainly had some knowledge of those efforts, and assisted wing commanders in managing the personnel who conducted those campaigns.

During his long tenure in the spook world, Gurney was aware of (and probably "read into") various SAR/SAP programs relating to some of our most sensitive assets and capabilities. Given that reality, it's easy to envision the Chief's legal team asking for details of those efforts, so they can be used in presenting the "good airman" defense. That would put the Air Force in a bind; releasing the information would--potentially--jeopardize key intelligence programs in the IO realm. But without the data, Gurney's defense team could make the same argument as Colonel Murphy's attorneys.

And we know how that turned out. Call it the "Murphy Defense," the disgraced JAG's most lasting contribution to military law.

One (Big) Reason Johnny Can't Read. Or Write, Or...

In the herculean effort to improve its failing schools, New York City isn't shying away from one of the most difficult tasks--getting rid of incompetent teachers.

And, the city school system is devoting significant resources to that process. Chancellor Joel Klein, with the full support of Mayor Michael Bloomberg, has assigned eight full-time attorneys to build cases against educators who can't get the job done. Known as the Teacher Performance Unit (TPU), the group also includes retired principals and administrators who assist in case preparation. The unit has an annual budget of at least $1 million.

So, two years into the assignment, how is the effort faring? According to The New York Times, the unit has only fired three teachers for incompetence, among the 55,000 with tenure in the city school system. Ten others charged with incompetence resolved their cases by resigning or retiring, and nine more took classes, paid small fines (or both) to retain their jobs. More than 50 other incompetence cases are awaiting arbitration.

Mr. Klein says the unit has been successful, but "at a far too modest level." Both the Chancellor and Mayor Bloomberg say attempts to weed out bad teachers have been hampered by a "broken system" that protects incompetent and makes it almost impossible to fire them.

Here's an example; a Times reporter was allowed to sit in on a hearing between a middle school principal and one of her math teachers, who has been judged unfit:

Inside a barren room near City Hall, the teacher, Michael Ebewo, sat at a table as the principal of the Manhattan middle school where he had taught for years, Isaac Newton Middle School for Math and Science, began to go through each of the many deficiencies she said she had found in his classroom.

There was a chart with misspellings and unclear instructions. There were students staring into space and doodling rather than completing their worksheet, which contained questions that the students, who were in special education, had difficulty understanding. Rather than pressing the students for answers, Mr. Ebewo simply answered himself, making the students only more confused.

At the time of that visit, the principal, Lisa Nelson, criticized Mr. Ebewo, who had been teaching for 15 years, for not having proper behavior incentives and consequences for the students. The next time she came to the classroom, Ms. Nelson said, he distributed candy to students early in the morning, something she said “even a layperson” would object to.

Mr. Ebewo’s lawyer interrupted with objections more than two dozen times, but the arbitrator overruled him in nearly every instance. The hearing, which covered lessons dating to 2005, lasted four hours. The principal was only the first of several witnesses the Education Department would call to try to prove that Mr. Ebewo was unfit to be in any classroom.

Mr. Ebewo, through his lawyer, declined to comment for this article. His case took years to reach a hearing because of a state law that requires the city to show evidence that it has given the teacher a chance to improve and instruction on how to do so. Any missing file could jeopardize a case, lawyers for the department say.

And the hearing will probably go on for months, because of a rule the city agreed to four years ago. In an effort to impose more order on the process, the city and the union agreed to set up a panel of arbitrators to hear such cases regularly. There are only so many arbitrators, however, and lawyers can handle only so many cases at once, so the arbitrators hear a case only five days a month.

At that pace, some of these cases will drag on indefinitely. During the hearing and arbitration process, teachers are removed from the classroom and pass their days in one of the city's "rubber rooms," with full pay and benefits. To be fair, not all of the educators in the holding centers are accused of classroom incompetence; some were placed there after run-ins with administrators, while others are facing charges of misconduct. By one estimate, New York City spends $30 million a year on salaries for teachers in the rubber rooms.

And one more thing: the number of teachers in New York facing potential removal for incompetence? Less than 2% of the system's 55,000 tenured educators. It doesn't take a statistician to understand that many of the unfit teachers will keep flying beneath the radar, and remain on the job, to the everlasting detriment of their schools and students.

Still, New York City is light-years ahead of other large systems in trying to get rid of incompetent teachers. LA Weekly recently published a lengthy article on attempts by the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) to get failing teachers out of the classroom. The piece is entitled "Dance of the Lemons," and for good reason.

Over the past decade, LAUSD has spent $3.5 million on trying to fire just seven incompetent teachers. Only four were actually dismissed, following legal battles that lasted an average of five years and cost the district thousands of dollars in legal fees. Two others received substantial settlements in their cases and one was reinstated. The average cost per teacher: $500,000.

To make it easier to fire incompetent teachers in the future, both New York and Los Angeles are attempting to limit tenure for new educators. Under the current system, a teacher with only three years of experience can receive life-time tenure, provided they receive satisfactory evaluations. School officials are also encouraging principals to take a harder look at classroom performance, and hand out more unsatisfactory evaluations. But the number of teachers who receive failing grades is also low; in New York City and LA, less than two percent of educators have been rated as "unsatisfactory."

That may not seem rather low, and (truth be told) many teachers are doing a good job, against long odds. But the impact of those classroom "lemons" cannot be underestimated. Sources told LA Weekly writer Beth Barrett that as many as 1,000 teachers in the LAUSD could be classified as incompetent and targeted for dismissal. Collectively, those individuals are responsible for as many as 30,000 students who struggle with basic skills because their teachers aren't up to the job.

Trading Eagles for Silver Bars (The Murphy File, Retirement Edition)

A former senior Air Force legal officer will be retired in April as a First Lieutenant, an administrative review board has determined.

The Air Force announced today that Colonel Michael Murphy will enter retirement in the second-lowest officer grade, almost a year after a courts-martial board convicted him of crimes related to his service as a JAG without a law license. Murphy served as an Air Force legal officer for 23 years until it was discovered that he had been disbarred by two states, about the time he entered the JAG Corps.

Murphy, a former civilian lawyer in Texas, was disbarred by that state in 1983 for failing to file a client's appeal in a timely manner. Facing sanctions in Texas, Murphy applied for admittance to the Louisiana bar, which also disbarred him after learning of his problems in Texas. By that time, Murphy had already entered the Air Force and was serving as a member of the Judge Advocate General Corps.

For more than two decades, Murphy never told his superiors about his disbarment in Texas and Louisiana. And, oddly enough, the Air Force never found out, despite the fact that the disciplinary actions were posted in on-line databases maintained by the bar associations in both states.

A retired senior Air Force JAG, with detailed knowledge of the Murphy case, tells In From the Cold that news of the Colonel's past problems literally "came in over the transom." An unknown tipster apparently found Murphy's disbarment listing in the Texas Bar Association database, and sent a copy to the Air Force.

That revelation touched off an investigation's of the Colonel's past and ended his meteoric career. At the time the service learned of Murphy's past ethical troubles, he was Commander of the Air Force Legal Operations Agency in Washington, D.C. and (reportedly) being screen for flag rank.

Instead, Colonel Murphy was reassigned to a desk job while awaiting court-martial on multiple charges and counts that, with conviction, could have resulted in a 41-year prison sentence for the former JAG. At the time, Murphy's conviction was a foregone conclusion. Various legal analysts suggested the real issue was how much prison time the Colonel might receive.

Unfortunately for him, Murphy's scandal came on the heels of another controversy involving another senior Air Force legal officer, Major General Thomas Fiscus. General Fiscus was forced to retire in December 2007, after engaging in a number of inappropriate relationships with female subordinates. The reduction in grade cost Fiscus an estimated $900,000 in retirement pay though he still collections an annual pension of $8264 a month.

But Murphy's conviction was anything but a slam dunk. His attorneys argued they could not present the "good airman defense" because the White House (where Murphy worked as chief counsel in the Military Office from 2001-2005) would not release classified details of his service. Without those details, the lawyers said, Colonel Murphy could not receive an adequate legal defense.

And the Army trial judge assigned to hear the case, Colonel Stephen Henley agreed. Without Murphy's service record from the White House, the judge ruled, defense lawyers could not demonstrate the defendant's good conduct and performance during the sentencing phase, depriving the former JAG of a "substantial right." Henley also determined that Murphy could not be punished--even if he was found guilty at court-martial. The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals upheld Judge Henley's ruling in December 2008, four months before Murphy's case went to trial.

With Colonel Henley's decision, Murphy's subsequent conviction became almost meaningless. The former JAG walked out of the courtroom a free man, and returned to a staff job at Andrews AFB, where he was assigned after losing his command billet.

However, the Air Force wasn't quite finished with Colonel Murphy. In such cases, an administrative board must determine if the individual will be allowed to retire and at what rank. While the deliberations of administrative panels remain confidential, the service said almost nothing about the Murphy case until today's decision was announced. Media queries for an update on Murphy and the administrative process were routinely ignored, or buried in the service's public affairs bureaucracy.

The Colonel's exact whereabouts also remained a mystery, until this blog tracked him to Andrews AFB, Maryland, where he works in the A3/A5 (Operations and Plans) Directorate for the Air Force National Capital Region command. To date, Colonel Murphy has not responded to various e-mail inquiries about his activities, and other members of the directorate refer reporters to public affairs officials.

Still, Murphy's most recent assignment raise more questions about his treatment, in comparison to those of other military defendants. A billet in an A3/A5 organization typically requires a security clearance; however, as a convicted federal felon, Murphy should not be eligible for access to classified information. Not surprisingly, the USAF has been extremely tight-lipped about Colonel Murphy's job duties, and whether they involve sensitive material.

With his retirement rank, Murphy will receive an estimated monthly pension of $2730, plus medical coverage for life and other benefits, including BX and commissary privileges. That's about $5500 a month less that his retirement check as a Colonel, but it's still something of a victory for Murphy.

You see, the legal fraud managed to beat the system, both as a disbarred JAG officer and a high-profile military defendant. When he goes on the retired list, Michael Murphy will trade his Colonel's eagles for the silver bars of a First Lieutenant, but he still received far better than he deserved. Now, the taxpayers of America will be supporting this con man and felon for the rest of his life.

Air Force leaders had one final chance to give Murphy his just desserts with an administrative discharge (and no pension or benefits), but they blinked. Never mind that the former JAG served legally--and honorably--for only about 12 months of his 27-year career. Murphy was well-regarded in senior circles before his fall from grace, and still has friends in high places. Additionally, no one wanted to broach the subject of what Murphy did during his White House years, including a shadowy assignment to Baghdad during the early days of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Between his secrets and his White House connections, Michael Murphy had enough horsepower to beat the rap. And with the final disposition of his case (and career) the Air Force has suffered another needless black eye.

Keeping an Eye on Iran

Israel has raised the ante in its stand-off with Iran, unveiling a new long-range drone that can monitor Tehran's nuclear facilities, and (potentially) carry weapons that could be used against those sites.

The Heron TP--nick-named "Eitan" by the Israeli Air Force--is one of the largest UAVs in the world. The drone made its public debut on Sunday, with a press event at Tel Nof Airbase near Rehovot. The propeller-drive UAV has a wingspan almost as long as a Boeing 737 jetliner; overall, the Eitan is about three-quarters as large as the U.S. Global Hawk, which flies at much higher altitudes and can remain over a target for a much longer period.

Still, the new UAV represents a quantum leap for the IAF's already-impressive drone fleet. For the first time, Israeli intelligence analysts (and military planners) have a surveillance drone that can reach Iranian targets and remain on station for more than 12 hours. Eitan can carry a variety of sensor packages and its on-board satellite communications suite allows ground operators to instantly access what the UAV is collecting.

Introduction of the Eitan (which has already entered limited service) will give the Israelis far greater flexibility in gathering information against Iran. While Israel already has a small constellation of spy satellites, their coverage is somewhat limited, and their collection "windows" are predictable, allowing the Iranians to conceal sensitive activities when the platforms are overhead.

Israel also has access to much of the satellite imagery collected by the United States. But those assets are subject to the same limitations, and the Israelis are concerned about the future of information-sharing agreements under the Obama Administration. With the IAF standing up a squadron of Heron TPs later this year, Tel Aviv will become slightly less dependent on foreign intelligence collection in keeping tabs on Iran.

The new UAV also has the ability to respond more quickly to pop-up or ad hoc tasking. Anyone who's been in the spy business knows how difficult it is to "roll" a satellite and cover fleeting events along the edge of its track. Assuming the request is actually approved, the result (in many cases) is limited-quality imagery and the expenditure of precious fuel on the "bird," decreasing its operational career.

By comparison, it's much easier to dispatch a UAV, based on an established "collection deck," or in response to cueing from other sensors. And, while a satellite's surveillance window (against a particular target) is often measured in minutes, the drone can orbit for hours, providing an expanded view of enemy activities and making it easier to spot developing trends.

Those same features are also useful against high-value mobile targets, like Tehran's medium-range missiles, or advanced air defense systems (namely the Russian-built S-300) that is expected in Iran soon. Scanning thousands of square miles on a single missions, the on-board sensors can look or "listen" for sites than may support dispersed missile launchers, or a field-deployed S-300 battalion. Such intelligence would be vital for an IAF strike package heading for Iran.

During Sunday's public debut of the Eitan, Israeli Air Force leaders noted that the UAV is "quiet enough" to support covert missions. It's also a safe bet that Israeli engineers (who largely pioneered modern drone technology) made it stealthy as well, through the use of composite materials, IR suppression and other techniques. That would enhance the aircraft's survival prospects during "overland" missions against Iran, flying through the heart of the regime's air defenses.

But, as we've noted in previous posts, detecting and downing a UAV is anything but easy. For almost a decade before Operation Iraqi Freedom, Saddam's fighter pilots chased U.S. Predators over Baghdad, with only marginal success. Since 2007, an American drone known as "The Beast of Kandahar" has been flying from its base in Afghanistan, reportedly against targets in Iran.

Publicly, the Iranians have never claimed to have engaged (or shot down) one of those platforms, which was recently acknowledged by the Air Force as the RQ-170 Sentinel.
Given the confusion that typically reigns in Tehran's air defense system, the lack of success is no surprise, and it's doubtful that Iranian air defense crews would do any better against the Eitan.

Finally, the new Israeli UAV may have one more capability worth mentioning. The Israelis are believed to have a capability similar to the U.S. Rover system, which allows ground units to access real-time information from an overhead drone. That would be particularly helpful for Israeli SOF teams, inserted into Iran as part of a air/land strike against that country's nuclear facilities.

While the IDF has closely guarded its plans for a potential attack on Iran, Israeli officials have sometimes hinted that SOF units would attack Iranian targets campaign; allowing them to "look over the hill" (thanks to the Eitan's sensor suite) would prove invaluable, and improve their chances for success.

It's Amazing..

..what a change at the top can do for an organization.

Consider the case of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the U.N.'s nuclear watchdog. Under the leadership of its former director, Mohammed El-Baradei, the agency was often described as a lap dog in its dealings with rogue states and their nuclear programs, particularly Iran's.

Mr. El-Baradei's willingness to "go easy" on Tehran was on display throughout his tenure at the IAEA. As Kenneth Timmerman reported in his book "Countdown to Crisis: The Coming Nuclear Showdown With Iran," El-Baradei ignored warnings (from German intelligence) that Tehran's nuclear program was surging ahead in early 2000. Then, to cover his tracks, El-Baradei told his spokesman to deny that he had received the information.

About the same time, El-Baradei held a highly-publicized meeting with then-President Mohammen Khatami, declaring that Iran's nuclear efforts were completely "peaceful," despite evidence the regime was building a large uranium conversion plant, useful in supporting a weapons program.

The RegimeChangeIran blog also reminds us that Mr. El-Baradei was a late convert to Iran's real intentions. In 2003, the IAEA belatedly released a report on Iran attempts to evade
international inspections--but only after the Iranian opposition released detailed (and dramatic) evidence of Tehran's efforts to develop a nuclear bomb. Still, El-Baradei and his agency won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2005, another example of the low standards used by the Norwegian voters who determine the annual recipient.

Now, with Mr. El-Baradei in retirement, the IAEA is (apparently) taking a harder look at Tehran's nuclear program. In first report on Iran, new IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano broke with his predecessor, suggesting Tehran may have looked into into the construction of a nuclear weapon, and that weaponization efforts may be underway.

According to the U.K. Guardian, Mr. Amano's report also confirmed that Iran has already produced small quantities of uranium enriched to 20% purity. That is a significant increase from the low-quality (2-3%) enriched uranium previous produced by the Iranians. Attaining the 20% level is considered an intermediate step in reaching the 90% purity required for a nuclear weapon. Nuclear experts say that Iran could reach the 90% threshhold in as little as six months, now that the intermediate level has been attained.

The appointment of Mr. Amano--and his clear-eyed reporting on Iran--represent a welcome change for the IAEA. If anything, those wishing to coddle or appease Tehran may have to look elsewhere for cover. The days of Mr. El-Baradei white-washing the Iran file are (thankfully) over.

But that raises another question: as the IAEA builds its "charge sheet" against Tehran, what will the International Community do about it? By some accounts, the Iranians are well along in their efforts to build a bomb, and could have one in a matter of months. But the Bush Administration invested years in failed diplomatic efforts (led by the EU-3), and the Obama Administration compounded that mistake by giving Iran another year to "come around."

At last report, the U.S. and its allies were developing "new and tougher" sanctions against Tehran. But if the new IAEA report is correct (and it mirrors recent intelligence reporting on the Iranian nuclear program), then the window for sanctions has largely closed, and it may be time to consider the unthinkable--military action against Iran.

Unfortunately, that option won't fly at the White House, or the U.N. Security Council. That's why the Iranians are laughing all the way to the nuclear finish line.

What Happened at Fort Jackson?

Did members of an Arabic translation team attempt to poison the food supply at Fort Jackson, South Carolina?

That's the allegation currently under investigation by agents from the Army's Criminal Investigation Division.

Both Fox News and CBN News report that the inquiry began two months ago, and has remained active since that time. Sources say the investigation has focused on five members of a Lima 09 translation team, which was apparently training with U.S. troops at Fort Jackson. The translators were reportedly detained in December, when the complaint first surfaced. It is unclear if the individuals are still in custody.

Lima 09 is the name for an Army program that hires native Arabic speakers (and those fluent in other Middle Eastern languages) to serve as translators for American units in the war zone. Fort Jackson provides both basic and advanced training for thousands of soldiers every year.

However, an Army spokesman at the Pentagon cautioned that "no credible information" has been found to support the allegations. Lt Col Christopher Garver told The State newspaper in South Carolina that he could not release specifics of the investigation, to protect the integrity of the on-going probe.

Meanwhile, a local law enforcement source tells the paper there was "never" any threat to troops at Fort Jackson. The official blamed the poisoning scare on a few soldiers "who shot their mouths off."

Still, it's hard to believe that the CID would spend two months looking into completely baseless allegations. On the other hand, it's hard to believe that a translation team could pull off the alleged poisoning plot, because (we assume) they had little access mess hall food supplies.

That's because the days of recruits pulling extended KP duty is long since past; when I went through Air Force basic three decades ago, each recruit spent just one day in the mess hall, usually scrubbing pots or doing other menial chores. Food preparation and serving--even in those days--was entrusted to contractors, closely supervised by food service NCOs.

If the translators did try something in the mess hall, it would have been as customers, and not as cooks or servers. And, their opportunities for contaminating the food would have been limited. Dining facilities at training bases at not places for leisurely meals; Drill Sergeants patrol the mess halls, "actively" encouraging soldiers to finish their food, in minimum time.

In time, we may learn if there's anything to the allegations at Fort Jackson. Until then, the CID is clearly taking no chances. After the recent massacre at Fort Hood, preceded by countless missed warning signs and clues, CID investigators (and the Army brass) have no margin for error.
***
ADDENDUM: An official with "intimate" knowledge of the investigation tells CBN's Erick Stakelbeck that the "Fort Jackson 5" may have been in contact with a group of five Muslims from the Washington, D.C. area who traveled to Pakistan to wage jihad against U.S. troops. Those men were arrested by Pakistani authorities in December, about the time the translators were detained at Fort Jackson.

The reported link between the two groups may be one reason the CID investigation is continuing. And, we're guessing that other agencies (like the FBI and CIA) are also involved. If the connection pans out, there will be new questions about the Lima 09 program, and its penetration by suspected terrorists.

Boy, Did I Miss the Boat

As most of you know, I am a retired, field-grade military officer. I left active duty just over seven years ago and since then, Uncle Sam has been kind enough to send a retirement check once a month.

My retired pay is a matter of public record; as a retired O-4, I receive $2900 a month, or just under $35,000 a year. Do the math, and you can see how much I'll earn over the next 30 years --assuming I live that long. By most standards, my pension plan is generous, particularly when you factor in cost-of-living increases and other benefits, including medical coverage and BX and commissary privileges. It reaffirms my belief that joining the military was the smartest thing I ever did (aside from marrying Mrs. Smiley, just in case she reads this post).

Of course, I would submit that I did earn my pension. The United States Air Force owned my a--- for more than 20 years, allowing them to deploy me as they saw fit, and restrict my individual liberties to conform with the demands of military service. I spent long stretches away from my family, and pulled a few hazardous duty tours. Still, I never faced the hardships endured by today's heroes in uniform, and I would never compare my sacrifices to theirs--or those of today's military families.

However, when it comes to retirement benefits, I apparently missed the boat. While the combined pay and benefits package of many retired service members is worth more than $1 million, it pales in comparison to those of other workers. And we're not referring to Wall Street investment bankers, or folks who get rich in the entertainment business. If you want a really great retirement package, you need to work for the state of New Jersey.

In fact, the Garden State's retiree plan is so generous, it has helped push the state to the edge of bankruptcy. Newly-elected Republican Governor Chris Christie laid out the facts in a recent speech on his state's fiscal crisis:

Let's tell our citizens the truth -- today, right now -- about what failing to do strong reforms costs them. One state retiree, 49 years old, paid, over the course of his entire career, a total of $124,000 towards his retirement pension and health benefits. What will we pay him?" and I had this yesterday "$3.3 million in pension payments over his life and nearly $500,000 for health care benefits -- a total of $3.8m on a $120,000 investment. Is that fair? A retired teacher paid $62,000 towards her pension and nothing -- yes, nothing -- for full family medical, dental and vision coverage over her entire career.

"What will we pay her? $1.4 million in pension benefits and another $215,000 in health care benefit premiums over her lifetime. Is it 'fair' for all of us and our children to have to pay for this excess? The total unfunded pension and medical benefit costs [in New Jersey] are $90 billion. We would have to pay..." Hello, public employee unions! The day of reckoning has arrived for you in New Jersey. This is not going to be pretty, folks. This is not going to be pretty. "We would have to pay $7 billion per year to make them current. We don't have that money -- you know it and I know it. What has been done to our citizens by offering a pension system we cannot afford and health benefits that are 41% more expensive than the average fortune 500 company's costs is the truly unfair part of this equation. ... Suburban districts will sacrifice. Urban districts will sacrifice. Rural districts will sacrifice. Some, both inside and outside this chamber, will urge you to retreat to the corner and protect your own piece of turf. Our state is in crisis. Our people are hurting.

"Now is the time when we all must resist the traditional, selfish call to protect your own turf at the cost of our state. It is time to leave the corner, join the sacrifice, come to the center of the room and be part of the solution. I urge all of us to come to the center of the room voluntarily, to stand up to the special interests, to fix our broken state -- together. ... In total, I am cutting spending in 375 different state programs, from every corner of state government. I doubt that many will be popular. I will use my executive authority to implement them now, because I must. ... I am not happy, but I am not afraid to make these decisions, either. It is what the people sent me here to do."

Rush Limbaugh has the entire transcript of Governor Christie's speech; read the whole thing, it's well worth your time.

To be sure, Mr. Christie faces an uphill battle in taking on his state's entrenched public employees union. But at least he's willing to fight. Unlike his predecessors, Governor Christie understands that New Jersey is on an unsustainable path; the state's unfunded pension and health care liabilities are now approaching $90 billion. As Christie told state legislators the other day, the state would have to spend $7 billion a year for a decade to close that gap--money the state simply doesn't have.

And New Jersey isn't the only state facing a pension crisis. Across the country, feckless politicians bought off the state employee unions by promising gold-plated retirement packages, knowing the bill would eventually come due.

Here's another example of benefits gone wild. Listening to Bob Brinker's Money Talk program a few months ago, we were stunned by a caller from Michigan, another state teetering on the edge of insolvency. The man that spoke with Mr. Brinker was a retired state worker who was enjoying a comfortable retirement, and looking for advice on passing on wealth to his heirs. But the real kicker came in an casual remark from the caller, who volunteered that Michigan allows state retirees to pass on their health benefits to one of their surviving family members, no questions asked (emphasis ours).

Sadly, that's typical of the lunacy that exists in state and municipal pension plans around the country. It's the mindset that has left California with more than $100 billion in unfunded liabilities, and no way to pay for them. According to various analysts, runaway pension costs are the biggest factor in the state's deepening fiscal crisis. And no wonder; one reform group learned that 3,000 retired teachers in California collect pensions of more than $100,000 a year.

No one is saying that educators don't deserve a decent benefits package, but when teachers collect a bigger retirement check than most cops, firefighters (or former members of the armed forces), something is definitely wrong.

Obama's First Challenger in 2012

With his presidency already in ruins (Don Imus called it "Jimmy Carter II this morning; welcome to the party, I-Man), Barack Obama won't be lacking for Republican opposition in 2012. If you believe that Sarah Palin, Mike Huckabee and Mitt Romney--and others--will sit out the next presidential election, we've got a bridge in Brooklyn you might want to purchase.

Yet, Mr. Obama could take some solace in the willingness of his party to stand behind him. Virtually all went along with his socialist schemes, despite the political risks. And when the polls went south (and Democrats began announcing their retirements from office), most bowed out gracefully, offering limited criticism of the President and his policies. Mr. Obama could also find comfort in the fact that none of the Democratic retirees posed a threat to his re-nomination in two years.

But all of that changed today, when Indiana's Evan Bayh announced he would not seek a third term in the Senate.

The news was stunning, to say the least. Among the Democratic incumbents up for re-election this fall, Mr. Bayh was considered one of the least vulnerable, though he certainly faced a bruising re-election battle.

In fact, while Republicans in other states were lining up to run against vulnerable Democratic incumbents, there was some question as to whom the GOP might pit against Bayh. Popular Republican Congressman Mike Pence took a pass on the race a couple of weeks ago. And, former Senator Dan Coats jumped into the fray only after it rumors of Bayh's retirement began to make the rounds. Readers may recall that Coats bowed out of a re-election bid in 1998, rather than face Mr. Bayh in the general election.

Interestingly, Mr. Coats isn't currently registered to vote in his home state, although that "problem" can be easily remedied. Since leaving the Senate more than a decade ago, Coats has worked as a lobbyist in Washington. He also served as the U.S. Ambassador to Germany under President George W. Bush, from 2001-2005.

As for Mr. Bayh, we agree (for once) with Charles Lane of the Washington Post, who believes that the "retiring" Senator is trying to avoid the looming Democratic train wreck, and re-position himself for 2012:

Quitting the Senate was a no-lose move for the presidentially ambitious Bayh, since he can now crawl away from the political wreckage for a couple of years, plausibly alleging that he tried to steer the party in a different direction -- and then be perfectly positioned to mount a centrist primary challenge to Obama in 2012, depending on circumstances.

There will be those Democrats who bid good riddance to Bayh and his coal-burning-state apostasy about cap and trade, etc. If so, they won’t need a very big tent to contain the celebration. On a more pragmatic view, Bayh’s dramatic vote of no-confidence in his own party’s leadership looks like another Massachusetts-sized political earthquake for the Democrats. Not only does it imperil the president’s short-term hopes of passing health care and other major legislation this year. It also makes it much more likely that the Republicans can pick up Bayh’s Senate seat in normally red Indiana and, with it, control of the Senate itself. If present trends continue, November could turn into a Republican rout.

Of course, there is one problem with this "theory." The Democratic base--including all those voters who show up for the early primaries and caucuses--has veered so far to the left, you can only wonder how much support Mr. Bayh would attract. On the other hand, if the economy remains in the tank (and the Obama Presidency remains a disaster area), then Evan Bayh could run well in states like Iowa, New Hampshire and the Super Tuesday primaries in the south. At that point, Mr. Obama would be in serious trouble, and the race could tilt in the challenger's favor.

Senator may also view 2012 as a "make or break" year for his presidential ambitions, despite long odds. If he waits for 2016, he would likely face a Republican incumbent, an improving economy, and a still-fractured Democratic base. Putting off a bid until 2020 would leave him out of the national spotlight for a decade, relegating him to "has been" status, and greatly impacting his fund-raising abilities.

Defeating an incumbent president from your own party is no easy task; Ted Kennedy couldn't prevent Jimmy Carter from winning re-nomination in 1980, and Ronald Reagan fell short trying to unseat Gerald Ford four years earlier. Evan Bayh would face similar obstacles in challenging Barack Obama in 2012.

But Mr. Bayh has rarely expressed doubts about his own abilities. The Senator has long viewed himself as presidential material, and his departure from Congress won't change that. He will also get plenty of encouragement from his fellow Democrats, anxious to find anyone who can rescue them from the S.S. Obama.

Put another way, we be greatly surprised if Evan Bayh didn't form some sort of exploratory committee and start visiting places like Iowa, New Hampshire and Florida on a recurring basis. He's still a long-shot to win in 2012 (and that's being charitable), but his decision to leave the Senate sends a clear signal to the anti-Obama elements in the Democratic Party. Anyone who doesn't want to go down with Captain Obama needs to find--and get behind--a candidate willing to take on a failing president. With today's announcement, Evan Bayh becomes the first Democrat to move in that direction.

He won't be the last.

"A Task that is Bigger Than Us"

A former Israeli Defense Forces Chief of Staff is expressing concerns about his nation's ability to conduct successful, preemptive strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities.

In an interview with Israel's Channel 2 television, retired General Dan Halutz said the Jewish State "should not take it upon itself to be the flag-bearer of the entire Western world in the face of the Iranian threat." Halutz made the comments in response to comments from Israeli political leaders, who have vowed to "take care" of the threat from Tehran.

"I'm not some passer-by ... I've filled a few positions that give me a different level of information to the average person," he said without elaborating.

General Halutz is more than familiar with difficult military missions. He was Israel's senior military officer during the 2006 war with Hizballah. Halutz was widely criticized for his "air-centric" approach to the conflict, which quickly neutralized the terror group's fixed targets, but did little to slow the hail of rockets fired into Israel from Lebanon.

He was also criticized for his inconsistent statements on the war; on at least two occasions, General Halutz indicated the Israeli was prepared to stay the military course, while in other statements, he suggested that the IDF would complete a speedy withdrawal from southern Lebanon, in accordance with international demands.

Critics also faulted Halutz (and Israeli Army officials) for their handling of the ground campaign. As IDF forces moved into Lebanon, they encountered a network of prepared Hizballah defenses, designed to slow the advance of ground troops and inflict maximum casualties. Halutz resigned from his post on 17 August 2006, after it was revealed the IDF chief had sold off most of his investment portfolio one month earlier, after Hizballah captured two Israeli soldiers, triggering the conflict that followed.

While General Halutz clearly has an axe to grind with certain Israeli politicians--the same ones who left him "twisting in the wind" during the stock scandal and the Lebanon War post-mortem--his knowledge of air tactics and planning is beyond question. He clearly recognizes the enormous obstacles that would accompany any Israeli Air Force strike against Iran. We've outlined these difficulties in previous posts, including this one from February 2006: As we noted at the time:

"...the distance of Iran's nuclear facilities from Israel--almost 1,000 miles--creates unique challenges for the IAF. While the IAF's primary strike aircraft (the F-15I) could make the trip with external fuel tanks, other fighters (other F-15s, F-16s) would need air-to-air refueling. That's why the most important asset in any virtually any long-range strike scenario is the IAF's small fleet of KC-707 tankers.

Estimates vary on the exact numbers of tankers in the IAF inventory, but most analysts believe there are only 5-7 KC-707s. These aircraft would be an integral part of any long-range mission to Iran, providing aerial refueling and (possibly) command-and-control functions, such as radio relay. Israeli aircraft use the same "boom" refueling system as the USAF; fighters maneuver behind the tanker as the "boom operator" extends the refueling probe into the refueling receptacle of the receiving aircraft. Once contact is established, the tanker begins pumping fuel to the receiver, at a rate of several hundred pounds per minute.

The number of tankers available, coupled with their potential offload, will limit the size of any Israeli strike package. Again, estimates on the size of the formation vary (depending on the number of targets to be struck, fighter payload, target distance and airspeed), but many analysts believe the Israelis would launch 4-5 tankers, supporting no more than 30 strike aircraft, divided roughly between F-15Is and F-16Is (which would attack the nuclear facilities) and other F-15s and F-16s, flying air defense suppression and air superiority missions. Divide the number of "bombers" (say 15) by the number of nuclear complexes (four), and you'll see that the IAF has virtually no margin for error.

Four years later, the geography and support requirements for an Iran strike still haven't changed. The IAF still faces the enormous challenge of getting its strike aircraft into Iranian airspace undetected, after flying across more than 1,000 miles of hostile or neutral airspace. Forward basing in a third country--say Turkey, or the Kurdish region of Iraq--would mitigate these concerns slightly, but the Israelis remain limited in the number of aircraft they can marshal for such a mission, and the number of nuclear targets that could be attacked.

Some military analysts have also suggested that Israel might insert special forces personnel into Iran and deploy cruise missile-equipped submarines to the Persian Gulf. That would give IDF planners more assets to work with, but those options create another set of logistical and operational headaches. That's why many observers believe that any Israeli strike against Tehran's nuclear facilities would be an "air only" campaign, an option that would maximize chances for achieving tactical surprise, while minimizing operational risks.

These types of challenges clearly influenced General Halutz's comments--and it's not the first time we've heard a current or former Israeli official voice those concerns. But such observations are based (in part) on a faulty assumption; namely, that other western nations have the resolve to take on the Iranian threat.

Reviewing past "attempts" to stop the Iranian nuclear program, it's clear that the west--led by the United States--has little stomach for the military option. The Bush Administration spent roughly three years supporting talks between Tehran and the EU-3 (Great Britain, France and Germany), talks that achieved nothing.

More recently, the Obama White House is promising tougher sanctions against Iran, after giving the mullahs a year to give up their nuclear ambitions. Tehran responded with accelerated work on uranium enrichment and other elements of its weapons program; just last week, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that Iran is now a "nuclear state."

Israel may not want to be the "flag-bearer" for military action against Iran's nuclear effort but (at this point) they may be our only option.

***

ADDENDUM: And the window for miltary action by the Israelis may be closing for good. According to an AFP dispatch from Moscow, the Russians plan to honor a long-standing contract to deliver the advanced S-3o0 air defense system to Iran. A deputy secretary of the Russian Security Council said there is "no reason" not to send the S-300 to Tehran. The presence of that system in Iran would greatly complicate Israeli planning. Defeating to S-300 requires extensive suppression efforts and stealth aircraft, elements that the IAF would find difficult to muster across long distances.

A Meaningless Milestone?

The Boeing YAL-1 in flight; the airborne laser has destroyed two missile targets during flight tests conducted this month. While the ABL platform shows enormous promise, it faces an uncertain future (USAF photo via Wikipedia).

A team representing Boeing, Northrop-Grumman, Lockheed Martin and the U.S. Air Force turned science fiction into fact last night. At 8:44 p.m. Pacific Time, years of effort (and billions of tax dollars) finally paid off, as the Air Force's Airborne Laser, built by the three defense firms, successfully shot down a target missile over California's Point Magu Naval Weapons Sea Range.

It marked the first time that a directed energy weapon, fired from an airborne platform, has been used to destroy a missile in flight.

Mounted on a Boeing 747-400 airframe, the ABL launched from Edwards AFB, California late Thursday afternoon and flew to the Point Magu range, located off the coast of Ventura County. The profile was similar to a test last August when the ABL used its on-board sensors to locate (and track) a target missile launched from San Nicolas Island, California.

But this time, the aircraft and its crew not only located the liquid-fueled missile, they destroyed it, using the megawatt-class, chemical oxygen iodine laser (COIL). As described in this Wikipedia article, the detection-to-intercept sequence is both automated and brief:

The ABL system uses infrared sensors for initial missile detection. After initial detection, three low power tracking lasers calculate missile course, speed, aimpoint, and air turbulence. Air turbulence deflects and distorts the laser beam. The ABL adaptive optics use the turbulence measurement to compensate for atmospheric errors. The main laser, located in a turret on the aircraft nose, is fired for 3 to 5 seconds, causing the missile to break up in flight near the launch area. The ABL is not designed to intercept TBMs in the terminal, or descending, flight phase. Thus, the ABL must be within a few hundred kilometers of the missile launch point. All of this occurs in approximately 8 to 12 seconds.

However, the test didn't end there. The initial Reuters report failed to mention that the aircraft engaged a second, solid-fuel missile about an hour later. The liquid-fueled rocket (designed to simulate older, SCUD-type missiles) was launched from a sea-based platform; the second missile was fired from a launch site on San Nicolas Island.

According to the Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency, which is overseeing ABL development, the system met all test criteria during the second engagement, and switched off the laser before the missile was destroyed. That suggests the shut down was deliberate, probably aimed at preserving the target missile, conserving the laser's fuel supply, or both. In its operational configuration, the ABL will carry enough fuel for only 20-40 laser "shots," each lasting just 3-5 seconds.

It should be noted that last night wasn't the first time the ABL intercepted a solid-fuel missile. The MDA reports the platform destroyed a similar target on 3 February. By our count, that makes the platform three-for-three in aerial, operational testing, confirming ABL's enormous potential to intercept missiles in their boost phase, when they are the most vulnerable.

But getting the aircraft into position may be easier said than done. While the ABL is (reportedly) capable of engaging liquid-fueled targets up to 600 km away (and solid-fueled missiles at a range of 300 km), reaching that engagement point will require aerial escort by friendly fighters, electronic warfare support, dedicated tanker orbits and--in some scenarios--flights over hostile territory.

Even a countries with modest air defense capabilities (like Iran) would make a concerted effort to deny orbit areas to the ABL. And at some point, the presence of enemy fighters (or advanced SAMs like the Russian-made SA-20) become too dense for the ABL. Countries like China or Russia could simply conduct missile launches from deep inside their territory, behind layers of air defenses that couldn't be penetrated by the ABL and its support package.

But of course, ABL was never designed to be the limit of our missile defenses. Using the aircraft to knock down TBMs in the boost phase enhances the effectiveness of our overall plan, leaving fewer targets for sea and land-based interceptors to deal with. Fewer targets means a lower probability that "leakers" will penetrate the various layers of our defensive shield, and strike key military targets or civilian population centers.

That's why the multi-layered approach makes so much sense. But President Obama and Defense Secretary Robert Gates have been whittling away at missile defense, cancelling the scheduled deployed of a land-based radar and interceptor missiles in eastern Europe. They've also scaled back plans to add more ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California, opting (instead) for defenses built around the Aegis/SM-3 system, mounted on U.S. naval vessels and those of key allied nations.

While the SM-3 is very capable, the Obama plan has raised concerns about its impact on naval operations and fleet readiness. The Navy is well below the required number of ballistic missile defense ships, and there are questions about the service's ability to reach mandated levels--even if all Arleigh Burke class destroyers are upgraded to the SM-3 standard. Naval leaders are also worried about that the focus on BMD will limit the vessel's employment for other, equally-critical maritime missions.

That's one reason that a fully-funded ABL program would be a useful adjunct, particularly in regional missile defense missions. But it appears that ABL will never be fully funded or operationally deployed. Last year, the Obama Administration re-designated the program as a research project, scrapping plans to eventually build six more ABLs and employ them operationally.

As a result, those recent, successful intercepts lose some of their luster. As far as Mr. Obama and Mr. Gates are concerned, ABL is little more than an expensive science project. The aerial intercept (and destruction) of a ballistic missile--by an aircraft-mounted, high-power laser--is an astounding technological feat. But unless we're willing to translate that R&D achievement into an operational capability, last night's milestone may prove meaningless.