Today's Reading Assignment

The Wall Street Journal highlights an issue we covered a couple of weeks ago--the alarming deterioration of our nuclear arsenal. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has described the situation as "bleak" and is urging the immediate modernization of our nuclear weapons. The Journal succinctly describes the situation:

Every U.S. warhead is more than 20 years old, with some dating to the 1960s. The last test was 1992, when the U.S. adopted a unilateral test moratorium and since relied on computer modeling. Meanwhile, engineers and scientists with experience designing and building nuclear weapons are retiring or dying, and young Ph.D.s have little incentive to enter a field where innovation is taboo. The U.S. has zero production capability, beyond a few weapons in a lab.

[snip]

In a speech this fall, Mr. Gates said "there is no way we can maintain a credible deterrent" without "resorting to testing" or "pursuing a modernization program." General Kevin Chilton, the four-star in charge of U.S. strategic forces, has also spent the past year making the case for modernization. "The time to act is now," he told a Washington audience this month.

Unfortunately, Secretary Gates and General Chilton face an uphill battle in modernizing our nuclear forces. On the campaign trail, President-elect Barack Obama said he is seeking a "world without nuclear weapons," and Democrats in Congress have stymied efforts to build new warheads.

Meanwhile, Washington is awaiting a report from a Congressionally-mandated commission, which reviews the role of nuclear weapons and our overall strategic posture. Sources indicate that the commission will echo Dr. Gates' concerns, stating that the U.S. will need a nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future. According to the WSJ, the report also notes that a deterrent is credible only if it works. That means modernization.

We'll see if Mr. Obama--and his allies in Congress--are actually paying attention.

Another Failed Inspection?

The Danger Room is reporting that another Air Force unit has apparently flunked its nuclear surety inspection (NSI). Sources tell the blog's editor, Noah Shachtman, that the 90th Missile Wing at F.E. Warren AFB, Wyoming will receive a failing grade on the evaluation, which is still in progress. Insiders report that problem's with the wing's Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) prompted the failing grade.

A press release posted on the installation's official web site reports that the inspection will run through Wednesday. The two-week evaluation (which began) on 2 December, evaluates unit capabilities in 12 areas related to nuclear weapons handling, operations and security. But, given the gravity of the nuclear mission, an unsatisfactory grade in any area results in a failure for the entire inspection. Deficient areas are then reevaluated, typically two months after the original inspection.

The personnel reliability program represents a key element of any NSI, ensuring that individuals meet physical, psychological, medical and financial criteria for working with nuclear weapons. While PRP is "owned" by unit commanders, it is based on inputs from a variety of base agencies, ranging from the medical group to security forces.

PRP issues were also a key factor in a recent, failing grade for the 341st Missile Wing at Malmstrom AFB, Montana. Air Force Times reported last month that the missile unit flunked two of the twelve inspection areas during its NSI, resulting in an unsatisfactory rating for the evaluation as a whole.

Despite the failing score, the Air Force did not make any leadership changes at Malmstrom. The 341st's parent organization, Air Force Space Command, announced that the wing commander, Colonel Michael Fortney, would retain his job, as would his group commanders. According to a media release, Space Command decided the "right leadership team" was in place to make required changes at the Montana base.

A similar event occurred at Minot's 5th Bomb Wing, which flunked its NSI in May. That event came only five months after the unit failed its preliminary nuclear inspection, and less than a year after the now-infamous "weapons transfer," which prompted a wholesale review (and revision) of USAF nuclear policies.

During the transfer incident, Minot crews mistakenly shipped nuclear-tipped cruise missiles on a B-52 bound for Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. The 5th Wing eventually regained its nuclear mission certification, although four senior officers--including the unit commander--were fired after the original mishap.

But the "new" Wing Commander, Colonel Joel Westa, was not relieved after the failed NSI in May. The unit subsequently passed its make-up evaluation, and has regained its nuclear mission certification. The decision to retain Colonel Westa and his counterpart at Malmstrom suggests that some wing commanders will be allowed to keep their jobs after a failed NSI, provided the deficiencies don't indicate reveal deficiencies among key leaders.

The number of Air Force units that have failed NSIs this year remains unknown, and (in some cases) it depends on how "failure" is defined. In January, Minot's "other" nuclear-capble unit, the 91st Missile Wing, received unsatisfactory marks from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, which participates in joint nuclear inspections. But, because the Space Command Inspector General team disagreed with the finding, the missile unit did not technically "fail" the evaluation.

It is also unclear if the 2nd Bomb Wing passed its nuclear surety inspection. In mid-November, the Barksdale-based unit was the first subjected to a no-notice evaluation, standard policy under the Air Force's new inspection system, but the results have never been released. While there's no requirement for the service to reveal the results, various units have publicized their NSI performances in the past.

And, in light of the recent mishaps at Minot and Hill AFB, Utah (where ICBM components were mistakenly shipped to Taiwan), critics have urged more transparency in nuclear operations and evaluations. So far, that request has been largely ignored by the service.

With at least four failed NSIs so far this year, the USAF's struggling nuclear enterprise doesn't exactly inspire confidence. All the more reason for increased disclosure of inspection results, so the public (and Congress) have some idea of how the Air Force reform program is progressing. The current policy of "selective release" is anything but helpful, since it's often used to highlight successful inspections, while hiding failures.

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ADDENDUM: Recent evaluation results seem to support something we've advocated for a long time--a complete review (and overhaul) of the Personnel Reliability Program. With commanders making the ultimate decision of who's cleared for PRP--and who isn't--mistakes inevitably occur. One legendary Chief Master Sergeant--a man with years of PRP experience--estimated that 25-30% of the people in the program have no business with PRP certification. We can only wonder if those types of problems caused the PRP failures at Malmstrom and F.E. Warren. In any event, PRP is overdue for a long, hard scrub.

Rent-a-Tanker

After almost a decade of failed and delayed efforts to find a new air refueling platform, the USAF is exploring the "rent-a-tanker" concept.

According to Air Force Times, the service will sit down with contractors this week, to discuss the possibility of hiring private firms to provide aerial tanking. Details of the proposal have yet to be developed, but officials told the paper that a request for bids could be issued as early as next year. The contract refueling program is expected to last a minimum of five years, until the new KC-X tankers begin arriving in sufficient numbers and begin replacing Eisenhower-era KC-135s.

While "out-sourced" air refueling would represent a new approach for the Air Force, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps have used contract tankers since 2001, in support of training missions both at home and abroad. The same firm--Virginia-based Omega Air Refueling Services--has handled the Navy contract for the past seven years. Several foreign countries, including Britain and Australia, have also used the company's services.

Omega currently operates three private tankers, two Boeing 707s and one DC-10, all converted commercial aircraft. The refueling jets are crewed by former military pilots and flight engineers, with at least 3,000 hours in tanker aircraft.

Still, the proposed Air Force refueling deal is facing a couple of major hurdles. First, there's the issue of cost. Omega currently charges the Navy $7,500 an hour for the 707 tankers, and $12,500 an hour for the converted DC-10. That's slightly cheaper than what the USAF pays to operate its own tankers; figures from Air Mobility Command pegs the cost at $9,750 per flying hour for a KC-135, and $13,910 for a KC-10, the military version of the DC-10.

But, as anyone with experience in military contracts will testify, those savings are often illusory. After all. contractors have been known to "low ball" bids, then go back to the government for more money. In other cases, the military becomes its own worst enemy, inserting requirements that inflate final costs, and either eliminate (or greatly reduce) potential savings.

Then, there's the matter of the refueling system used on Omega tankers. The company's current clients use probe-and-drogue refueling, so you can guess how the contractor's existing tankers are configured. However, USAF aircraft utilize boom refueling, meaning that Omega would have to install that system--on other aircraft--to handle the proposed contract.

That represents a sizable investment; a company spokesman says if Omega receives an Air Force contract, it would convert two DC-10s to support the deal. A service official estimates that there could be a requirement for a squadron of private tankers (8-12 aircraft), if the USAF will commit to a long-term deal.

However, even the contract tankers won't be available right away. Omega says it would take two years to convert and re certify the DC-10s for the Air Force mission. Refurbishing more aircraft for the tanker mission would take even longer. The timeline becomes an issue when you consider that the first KC-X refuelers should be available between 2013 and 2015. If that schedule proves realistic, does it make sense to spend millions of additional dollars on contract tankers during the same period?

Sadly, the answer appears to be yes. Congressional wrangling and contract problems have created delays in the KC-X program, and forecast deliveries for 2013 are optimistic, at best. Additionally, the demands on our tanker fleet are expected to remain constant in the years to come, with on-going operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, more KC-135s are reaching the end of their service lives, so the number of available refuelers will decline, even with contractor support.

The potential deal is just one more reminder of how the Air Force has bungled its tanker competition. Almost a decade into the process, the service has yet to select a new refueling platform. The USAF isn't entirely at fault, but it deserves most of the blame. If the Air Force hadn't embarked on its corrupt "tanker lease" effort a few years ago, the service might be taking deliveries of new airframes right now. Instead, there's a scramble on to fill the gap, with solutions that are less-than-optimum.

***
It's also worth noting that the Air Force's tanker woes had an indirect influence on the Navy's initial decision to seek contract refueling services. During recent conflicts, thirty percent of all KC-135 sorties have been flown in support of Navy aircraft. With more KC-135s heading toward the bone yard--and the retirement of the USN's KA-6 and KA-3 tankers--the Navy had little choice but to seek a creative solution to its tanker requirements. While contract refuelers don't fly in combat, they "free up" military assets to support those operations.

Remembering Lieutenant Maryk

Actor Van Johnson died today at the age of 92. A product of the Hollywood studio system of the 1940s and 50s, Mr. Johnson was often cast as the "All-American, boy-next-door type" in comedies, musicals and dramas during two decades as a contract player at MGM.

With his athletic build and freckled good looks, Johnson was a heart-throb with bobbysoxers--he was called the "non-singing Sinatra" after achieving screen stardom in the mid-1940s. While some critics dismissed him as an actor of limited depth, his career included everything from Broadway musicals (he began as an understudy to Gene Kelley) to a Woody Allen film. He was touring in La Cage aux Folles" during the 1980s, and made his last screen appearance in 1992, decades after most of his contemporaries had retired--or died.

But for many movie-goers, Johnson's signature performances came in two of the better films about World War II, Thirty Seconds Over Tokyo and The Caine Mutiny. The former film, which appeared in 1944, was the factual account of the famous Doolittle Raid on the Japanese capital in April, 1942. Johnson played Army Air Corps Captain Ted Lawson, the pilot of one of the B-25s who launched from the carrier Hornet and carried out the surprise attack on Tokyo.

More than 60 years after its premiere, Thirty Seconds Over Tokyo is regarded as one of the finest World War II films, hailed for its historical accuracy and fine potrayals by Johnson, Robert Walker, Robert Mitchum and Don DeFore (who played other pilots in the squadron), and the incomparable Spencer Tracy as the raid leader, Lt Col Jimmy Doolittle. Produced with the full cooperation of the War Department, some of the film's sequences were recorded at Eglin Field, Florida, where the real raiders trained.

A decade later, Johnson delivered perhaps in best performance in as Lieutenant Steve Maryk in the screen adaptation of The Caine Mutiny. Based on Herman Wouk's Pulitzer Prize-winning novel, the film details events surrounding a fictional mutiny on a U.S. Navy destroyer during the Second World War.

While the central plot focuses on the mutiny (and the events that precipitated it), the Caine Mutiny also does a nice job in capturing the "culture clash" that occurred in Navy wardrooms during the war. An officer corps traditionally populated by Annapolis graduates was suddenly filled with thousands of "thirteen week wonders," newly-commissioned ensigns who sometimes chafed at the dull, repetitive nature of their duties aboard ship.

Two of those officers are among the crew of the Caine; Ensign Willie Keith (played by Robert Francis), the wealthy Princeton grad whose world-view has been entire shaped by his college days and a more recent romance with a nightclub singer, May Wynn. Willie Keith's disdain for the Navy is shared by the ship's communications officer, Lieutenant Tom Keefer (Fred MacMurray), a former magazine writer who is working on an epic novel about the Pacific War.

Van Johnson's Maryk represents another faction in the wardroom, the less-educated officers who earned their commissions on merit, rather than their academic credentials. Maryk is a former commercial fisherman (and expert ship-handler) who sees opportunities in the post-war, regular Navy. Lieutenant Maryk also demonstrates loyalty to his commanders, qualities noticeably absent in Keefer, Keith and other junior officers on the Caine.

But, with Keefer's prodding, Maryk begins to question the actions of the new skipper, Lieutenant Commander Philip Queeg. The communications officer encourages the exec to keep a log on Queeg's erratic behavior, suggesting that their commander is a paranoid.

Despite his initial reservations, Lieutenant Maryk is eventually convinced that Captain Queeg is mentally ill, and relieves him of command at the height of a deadly typhoon. Keith, as Officer of the Deck, supports Maryk, resulting in mutiny charges against the two officers.

At court-martial, Maryk and Keith are saved from prison by their skillful defense counsel, Lt Barney Greenwald (Jose Ferrer). Greenwald's aggressive questioning of Queeg shifts the focus to the Caine's skipper, leading a display of the same, bizzare behavior that characterized his command.

The acquittal sets the stage for the film's climax, a showdown between Greenwald and the "real author of the Caine mutiny," Lieutenant Keefer. Greenwald expresses shame over torpedoing Queeg on the stand, since the officer was in the service and defending the nation long before the war began--a task that Keefer and Keith viewed as beneath them. It's a message that still resonates in the era of an all-volunteer military, when many Americans view the duty in the armed services as "someone else's work."

Fifty-four years after its release, The Caine Mutiny has lost none of its power. The film remains a fascinating study of leadership, loyalty and responsibility in combat, thanks largely to its source material, and the performances of its cast. Humphrey Bogart (a Navy veteran of World War I) won an Academy Award nomination for his performance as Queeg, as did character actor Tom Tully, who played the Caine's original skipper. Fred MacMurray--playing brilliantly against his "good guy" image--deserved one for the duplicitous Keefer.

But it is Johnson's Stephen Mayrk that embodies the film's central conflict. Torn between supporting his commander or the accusations of his fellow officers, Mayrk chose the latter. While the decision saved in the typhoon, it (ultimately) cost him any chance at a naval career. In Van Johnson's capable hands, the decency and leadership skills of Lieutenant Mayrk are apparent, but so is his susceptibility to the suggestions and manipulations of others. It's a remarkable performance from an actor that never quite got his critical due.

R.I.P. Mr. Johnson.

Rush to Judgment

Our thoughts on attempts to "convict" those former Blackwater contractors, in the courts of public opinion and the press. Just a couple of years ago, a similar verdict was rendered on the Haditha Marines, but (ultimately) the military justice system delivered a much different decision.

Could the same thing happen again? We won't know until the former security guards have their day in court and until then, they're entitled to the presumption of innocence.

Posted at Pajamas Media.

Iran Closes the Deal for the SA-20

After years of rumors and false reports, it appears that Iran will soon receive the SA-20 air defense system.

A senior U.S. defense official tells David Fulghum of Aviation Week that Tehran is "on contract" to obtain the advanced surface-to-air missile system in the coming months. And when it achieves operational status in Iran, the SA-20 will present serious challenges for U.S. and Israeli planners.

We’ve been lulled into a false sense of security because our operations over the last 20 years involved complete air dominance and we’ve been free to operate in all domains,” he adds.

Other Pentagon officials have also confirmed the deal, despite Kremlin claims to the contrary. One official suggested that Moscow might use Byelorussia as a trans-shipment point, allowing the Russians to deny any direct involvement. Analysts believe it could take the Iranians up to 22 months to become proficient on the system.

But, as we've noted in past posts, any SA-20 contract between Moscow and Tehran will include training support, including the option of using Russian contractors to operate the system while Iranian crews undergo training. That could give Iran an initial capability with the system, well before the projected operational date. At that point, both the U.S. and Israel will have to re-visit potential air campaign plans for hitting Iranian targets. As Mr. Fulghum describes the problem:

The SA-20, and even more so the SA-21 Growler (S-400) which is now entering service, pose an increasing problem for mission planners using conventional strike aircraft. While low observable aircraft offer greater latitude for operations, they are not totally immune to air defenses.

The Lockheed Martin F-22 with its all-aspect, -40 dBsm radar cross-section signature can operate within the engagement envelope of the SA-20 and SA-21. But the Lockheed Martin F-35 with its -30 dBsm signature, which is not all-aspect stealth, is at greater risk. The rear quadrant of the F-35, particularly around the tailpipe area, is not as stealthy as the F-22.

The Northrop Grumman B-2, because of its aging stealth design, also has limitations in the amount of time it can spend within the range of double-digit systems since small signature clues can become cumulative and offer a firing solution. The U.S.’s next-generation bomber program is aimed at developing a low-observable platform capable of operating irrespective of the threat from systems of the SA-21 class.

Unfortunately, the next USAF bomber won't enter service for another decade--if it's actually built. Until then, American planners will have to make do with the B-2. F-22, F-35, and scores of legacy aircraft. And, since older fighters like the F-16 and F-15E are extremely vulnerable to double-digit SAMs, any air campaign against Iran will require lots of additional cruise missiles, anti-radiation missiles, and much better intelligence The SA-20 is a mobile system and those suppression weapons need accurate intel to neutralize advanced SAMs, ahead of manned aircraft.

The air defense environment in Iran is about to change--forever. Put another way: confirmation of the SA-20 deal puts Israel that much closer to a strike against Tehran's nuclear facilities.

Under the Umbrella

Haaretz reports that President-elect Barack Obama will offer Israel additional protection against an Iranian nuclear attack, A source close to the incoming administration says Mr. Obama will propose placing Israel under our nuclear umbrella, meaning that any Iranian nuclear strike would bring a "devastating response" from the United States.

The Obama team is not the first to suggest such a policy. Earlier this year, columnist Charles Krauthammer urged the Bush Administration to issue a "Holocaust Declaration," fashioned after President Kennedy's famous words during the Cuban Missile Crisis:

"It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear attack upon Israel by Iran, or originating in Iran, as an attack by Iran on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon Iran."

The statement, he continued, should be accompanied by a simple explanation:

"As a beacon of tolerance and as a leader of the free world, the United States will not permit a second Holocaust to be perpetuated upon the Jewish people."

Former Democratic Presidential candidate (and Secretary of State designee) Hillary Clinton offered a similar proposal during this year's campaign. During a debate with Mr. Obama in April, Mrs. Clinton suggested that the American nuclear umbrella be extended to Israel and friendly Arab states in the Middle East, as a hedge against Iran.

Dr. Krauthammer, Senator Clinton and Mr. Obama's national security advisers believe that such a declaration offers the best hope for deterring Iran. And, at first blush, it's hard to disagree. Negotiations efforts aimed at curtailing Tehran's nuclear ambitions have been a dismal failure. The same holds true for economic and political sanctions.

In terms of U.S. military options, those were essentially derailed by last year's National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) which declared that Iran suspended its nuclear weaponization program, while accelerating other efforts that will eventually lead to a bomb. It was an amazing bit of analytical gymnastics that proved--once again--that key elements of our intelligence community view the current administration as more of a threat than Tehran.

But would such a guarantee actually deter Iran? Scott Johnson at Powerline reminds us of a particularly astute observation by Middle East scholar Bernard Lewis, who observed:

"Iran's leadership comprises a group of extreme fanatical Muslims who believe that their messianic times have arrived." {For the Iranian regime] "mutually assured destruction is not a deterrent factor, but rather an inducement" because the regime's authorities believes it "can hasten the final messianic process. This is an extremely dangerous situation of which it is important to be aware."

It's also worth noting that placing Israel under our nuclear umbrella carries other risks, as we outlined in this April post. For starters, it could limit Israel's ability to defend itself. With the largest nuclear arsenal in the Middle East--and multiple delivery platforms--the Jewish State is more than capable of meeting the Iranian threat:

For argument's sake, let's say an Iranian attack achieves operational surprise, and the initial strike eliminates one-third of Israel's nuclear arsenal (highly unlikely). That still leaves Tel Aviv with almost 150 warheads for a retaliatory attack. We should also note that Israeli weapons are much more powerful than those initially available to Iran. In other words, Israel's nukes carry a far bigger punch and they would inflict far more damage and casualties--against more targets--than Iran's first strike.

Additionally, Tehran faces the daunting challenge of pinpointing and accurately hitting Israel's nuclear arsenal. True, Iranian intelligence knows the location of Israeli fighter bases and its primary missile installation, but their ability to track dispersed aircraft and missiles is severely limited. That task is further complicated by the IDF's extraordinary skills at military denial and deception. Virtually every successful campaign waged by Israeli forces has been accompanied by a detailed deception campaign, giving the IDF strategic or tactical surprise. Given that history, it's quite possible that Israel would beat Iran to the punch (with its own preemptive strike) or inflict a devastating counter-strike, utilizing aircraft and missiles that survived Tehran's initial onslaught.

So far, Israeli officials haven't exactly embraced the Obama proposal, for obvious reasons. Not only could it limit Israel's strike options, the security pledge also suggests that the U.S. is willing to come to terms with a nuclear-armed Iran. From the Israeli perspective, security guarantees against an Iranian regime with nuclear weapons are simply unacceptable:

"What is the significance of such guarantee when it comes from those who hesitated to deal with a non-nuclear Iran?" asked a senior Israeli security source. "What kind of credibility would this [guarantee have] when Iran is nuclear-capable?"

The same source noted that the fact that there is talk about the possibility of a nuclear Iran undermines efforts to prevent Tehran from acquiring such arms.

Earlier this week, Mr. Obama said he would offer Iran economic incentives for abandoning its nuclear program. If that fails, he promised to intensify sanctions against the Islamic Republic.

Readers will note that the president-elect and his advisers still haven't said what will happen when Tehran rejects those incentives and the sanctions don't work. Or (alternatively), they take a page from the North Korean playbook and accept the economic carrots, while taking their nuclear program underground. What happens then?

It's quite a jump from failed sanctions to a U.S. nuclear counter-strike. Caution--and common sense--dictate that Washington have some sort of intermediate steps, or at least allow Israel to defend itself. In its current form, the Obama's proposed policy for dealing with Iran--and ensuring Israel's security--has some rather gaping holes. No wonder Tel Aviv reacted with such skepticism.

Doing the Right Thing

Like thousands of other young Americans, Joseph Weston joined the military in search of a brighter future. Tired of his part-time position at a restaurant--and few other jobs available in his hometown of Cadillac, Michigan--Weston enlisted in the Air Force, with plans to become a jet engine mechanic.

But Weston never made it to tech school. In fact, he never completed basic training. Less than two weeks after he arrived for basic training at Lackland AFB, Texas, Weston received a stunning diagnosis from Air Force doctors. He was suffering from acute lymphoblastic leukemia, a form of blood cancer that is extremely rare--and often deadly--in adult patients.

Basic training and technical school were put on hold, as Weston began a battle to save his life. He underwent months of grueling chemotherapy that put the disease in check, but left his body weakened. Then, the USAF bureaucracy delivered a second, devastating verdict. A personnel evaluation board (PEB) determined that Weston is unfit for service, because of his leukemia.

While that was hardly surprising, the second part of the board's ruling came as a shock. The panel determined that Weston's illness was a pre-existing condition, meaning that he would be discharged without a pension or medical benefits.

But Weston's doctor disagrees with the board's decision, as Erik Holmes of Air Force Times reports:

“In my opinion, there wasn’t a way to prove that [the cancer] was there two weeks beforehand” when he started basic training, said Maj. (Dr.) Della Howell, a pediatric hematologist and oncologist at Lackland’s Wilford Hall Medical Center. “These types of leukemias ... are acute in nature so they do occur fairly rapidly. ... I didn’t think they could prove [whether] it’s pre-existing or not.”

Weston is appealing the physical evaluation board’s Oct. 29 ruling. The secretary of the Air Force Personnel Council will rule on the appeal, though there is no word when that decision will be rendered.

A spokesman for the PEB declined to comment on the case.

For now, Weston is on base at quarters provided by Fisher House, the private-public venture that offers housing and services to sick and injured military members and their families. He is undergoing a chemotherapy regimen of intravenous injections, pills, muscle injections and painful spinal taps. His treatment is scheduled to last 2½ to three years and will cost hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Without a temporary disability retirement, Weston will return to Michigan without medical benefits --and facing a likely gap in his treatment. While he would qualify for coverage through Medicaid, the Social Security disability program and the Michigan Department of Veteran's Affairs, establishing those benefits would take time, delay treatment and increase chances for a relapse.

We understand that the military isn't a social welfare agency and there are established rules for who does--and doesn't--receive benefits. But there is no indication that Weston was suffering symptoms of the disease before he reported to basic training, and Dr. Howell says it's impossible to know if the leukemia was a pre-existing condition.

That should be good enough for the Air Force, but then again, personnel boards aren't always know for rational decisions. Consider the case of Major Jill Metzger, the personnel officer who disappeared during her deployment to Kyrgyzstan a couple of years ago. Metzger claimed that she was abducted, but there is considerable evidence that she faked her disappearance. She later claimed to be suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, and was received a temporary disability retirement--the same type of discharge being sought by Joseph Weston.

Clearly, the ruling in one case should not affect a decision in another. But the Metzger case is an absolute travesty, a case that has stirred enormous discontent within the ranks. And for good reason. Metzger got her retirement (and pension) in near-record time, while scores of combat-wounded warriors from Iraq and Afghanistan are still trying to work their way through the system.

If Jill Metzger deserves benefits for her "injuries" (and we use that term loosely), how can the Air Force deny someone who is genuinely deserving, like Joseph Weston?

The Man Who (Almost) Discovered Elvis

Fred Cook died last week at the age of 83. The name may not ring a bell unless you grew up in the Mid-South, where Mr. Cook was a popular radio and TV personality for more than 50 years.

With his partner John Powell, Cook co-hosted "The Zero Hour" on WREC-AM for more than a decade during the 1960s and 70s. Even today, it's hard to describe what made the program--and the duo--so special. In some respects, it was the radio equivalent of "Seinfeld." They talked about everything (and nothing), but did it with a whimsical style that was legendary.

Long-time WREC announcer Allan Tynes reminisced about the show (and its hosts) in a 2007 post on a radio message board. He remembers that "The Zero Hour" began, quite literally, by accident:

WREC-AM was located in the basement of the Peabody Hotel in 1964. A fire started one day and most of the power was lost for several hours. I believe John was on the air at the time doing his regular midday show. The power loss did not cause WREC to go off the air. Fred came into the control room and the two of them sat in the dark and talked on the air while firemen came and went around them searching for the fire and putting it out. The entertaining conversation they held under those circumstances must have been amazing. Listeners enjoyed it immensely for the two had caught lightning in a bottle while talking over the little bright wire there in the dark basement of the Peabody.

In the weeks that followed, Fred and John discussed the event often and gradually the idea for a program evolved. I believe the first broadcast date for "The Zero Hour" was September 1, 1964. (At least that's the date of their 3rd Anniversary Show three years later.) The format was simply the two of them talking for an hour about anything that came into their heads. The commercials were live and unrehearsed. Almost the only thing pre-produced was the theme music. The show opened with a Gong sound effect followed by a song titled, "Clinkerated Chimes" from the "Musically Mad" album by Bernie Green and the Stereo Mad-Men (RCA/1958). Yes, it had a picture of Alfred E. Newman on the cover. There were other musical themes for the various bits they did, but no structured music or produced commercials like you would hear the other 23 hours of the day on WREC.

"The Zero Hour" became a popular addition to the WREC lineup and they did the show until about 1975 or 1976, I think. Ownership of WREC changed and Fred was fired and John went with WREC(G)-TV full time. Don't ask!

[snip]

Fred and John's bits included "Fremont Filligree the Poet and Ziggy, the Organ Player", "Gunfolks", a fabulous rendition of "The 12 Days of Christmas", "Frantic Fred, the Rock DJ" and many more. John wrote the material and usually played the straight man and they were hilarious. They had guests occasionally, but most of the time it was just the two of them. If you ever heard them, there's no need for any analysis. If not, well, I'm sorry for you. They were much better than Godfrey, in my book, better than anybody else I ever heard on the air with the possible exception of Bob and Ray.

Save a few tapes in boxes or snippets loaded onto computer hard drives, there are few surviving examples of "The Zero Hour." Powell and Cook reunited (briefly) in the early 1980s, but it wasn't the same. Today, they'd have a syndication deal and hefty bank accounts, but sadly, the hosts--and their program--were decades ahead of their time.

These days, John Powell is semi-retired and living in Arkansas, though he still does some work for a small radio station in Hardy. Fred Cook remained active as a Memphis broadcaster until the end of his life, lending his booming voice to countless radio commercials. He also served as the public address announcer for University of Memphis basketball games for two decades, beginning in the early 1970s.

Mr. Cook had one other claim to fame that (might) have put his career on a very different path. In 1954, someone from Sun Records brought Cook a release from a new singer named Elvis Presley. Cook played the record for about a minute, then pulled it off the air. "That's the worst s--t I've ever heard," he exclaimed, predicting that the artist had "no future."

Sometimes, even the greats get it wrong. And for a generation of Mid-South radio listeners, there was no doubting the talent--or genius--of Fred Cook, despite his disdain for rock and roll.

R.I.P.

Expanding the Arsenal?

Israel's Channel 10 reports that Iran has tripled the number of medium-range missiles in its arsenal.

According to the report, Iran possessed 30 Shahab-3 missiles at the beginning of 2008. Currently, the country claims to have over 100 over long-range missiles capable of hitting Israel.

While the ability of the Islamic Republic to strike any point in Israel has long been known, this latest build-up potentially points to an Iranian intent to launch a protracted counter-strike against those who seek to destroy its nuclear program.

The claim was reprinted by the Jerusalem Post, which has been unable to confirm the report.

While Iran has been working feverishly to expand its missile inventory, it would be helpful to know the types of missiles included in the count. The "Shahab" designator is used for a family of missiles and space launch vehicles, with a maximum range of 1300-1600 km, depending on the variant.

Based on the North Korean "No Dong" design, most Shahab models are powered by liquid-fueled engines, although Iran has reportedly test both a solid-fuel version and even a hybrid variant, using both liquid and solid fuel technology. Intelligence analysts believe that most of Iran's medium-range missiles are still liquid fueled, giving them a longer reaction time that solid-fueled systems, and making them more vulnerable to accidents.

Indeed, Tehran's missile program has been beset by failures--airframes that explode in flight, or don't achieve their advertised range. Additionally, there have been reported problems with missile launchers. Some accounts suggest that most of Iran's Shahab launchers cannot raise a fully-fueled missile to launch position. That means a longer preparation time--and a greater chance of being detected.

The launcher issue is an important consideration for any mobile missile force. Normally, there are three to four times the number of missile airframes, in comparison to the launcher inventory. Sustaining a missile offensive hinges, to a large degree, on maintaining a viable launcher force, with a rapid reload capability--and the tactics to prevent detection of missiles in the field.

Tracking down mobile missiles remains a challenge, despite improvements in technology. A few years back, the Israelis reported great difficulty in locating missile TELs (transporter-erector-launchers) within their borders--an area that's only a fraction the size of Iran. Compounding the the problem? The IAF's limited ability to sustain an air campaign, against targets more than 1,000 miles away.

At this point, Tehran still lacks the ability to mount a continuous missile and rocket barrage against Israel, as Hizballah did in the summer of 2006. But that's not necessarily a requirement for Iran. With a chemical or nuclear warhead, Tehran needs to put only one missile on target. But that reality is tempered by another fact; Israel still retains its own, massive counter-strike capability, with an arsenal that includes an estimated 200 nuclear warheads.

Shinseki's Other Legacy

Despite a military career spanned 40 years, General Eric Shinseki will be remembered for two things: his decision as Army Chief of Staff to award black berets to all soldiers--a uniform item previously reserved for Rangers--and most famously, his 2003 observation that the occupation of Iraq would require a force of "several hundred thousand" men.

According to urban legend, Shinseki's remarks on Iraq earned him the lasting ire of the Bush Administration, which forced him into retirement. It was a charge repeated by John Kerry in the first presidential debate of 2004, a charge that, regrettably, went unanswered by the commander-in-chief.

Flash-forward four years and General Shinseki now Barack Obama's nominee to head the Veteran's Administration. Based on his qualifications, few would argue with that choice. Not only does Shinseki offer decades of executive experience, he also knows something about the obstacles facing wounded and disabled veterans. As a young Army officer in Vietnam, Shinseki stepped on a land mine and suffered a mangled left foot. He underwent multiple surgeries and extensive rehabilitation before returning to active duty.

As VA Administrator, General Shinseki will be preoccupied with treatment programs, facilities and trying to contain rising costs. In that capacity, he won't be called upon for advice on troop levels and force structure, matters that defined his tenure as the Army's senior uniformed officer.

And that's unfortunate, for a couple of reasons. First, if what liberals claim is true--Shinseki's appointment is vindication of his views on Iraq (and those of Congressional Democrats), then the general still owes us an explanation of how he arrived at those numbers, and how they square against the events that followed. Secondly, he should clarify what actions he took (or didn't take) to prepare the Army for the challenges of Iraq. On both counts, the reality of Shinseki's record is less impressive than the carefully-cultivated legend.

In fairness, the general's comments on required troop levels for Iraq were offered reluctantly, in response to questions by Michigan Senator Carl Levin. Never one to miss an opportunity for political theater, Mr. Levin was aware of previous disagreements between the Chief of Staff an then-Defense Secretary Don Rumsfeld.

So, when Shinseki was called before Congress in February 2003 (one month before the Iraq invasion), Levin seized the opportunity. After repeated questions from the Senator, Shinseki finally offered his assessment on the number of troops required to stabilize Iraq after the invasion. That gave Mr. Levin and other war critics the soundbite they were looking for.

But, as National Review's Mackubin Thomas Rubin observes, the general's estimate was less of an operational projections and more of a wild guess. Owens, a retired Marine officer and a professor at the Naval War College, reminds us that Shinseki's numbers were "a straight-line extrapolation from very different environments," an analysis by Army historians based on experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo. Tom Ricks of the Washington Post--hardly a fan of the Bush Administration--reported that the study was criticized as "naive" and "unrealistic," more of a "war college exercise" than serious planning.

Rubin also reminds us that Shinseki's numbers were based on flawed operational assumptions. His belief that Iraq would need more troops was rooted in a belief that humanitarian operations, rather than an insurgency, would drive force levels in post-war Iraq. Accordingly, Rubin says that Shinseki was "right for the wrong reasons."

But even if General Shinseki deserves some credit on the occupation force issue, then he also bears some responsibility for an Army that was (initially) ill-prepared for Iraqi insurgency. Rubin quotes Army Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling, who wrote a savage critique of Army leadership in the April 2007 issue of Armed Forces Journal; reading between the lines, it's apparent that Shinseki is among those targeted:

For the second time in a generation, the United States faces the prospect of defeat at the hands of an insurgency. In April 1975, the U.S. fled the Republic of Vietnam, abandoning our allies to their fate at the hands of North Vietnamese communists. In 2007, Iraq’s grave and deteriorating condition offers diminishing hope for an American victory and portends risk of an even wider and more destructive regional war.

These debacles are not attributable to individual failures, but rather to a crisis in an entire institution: America’s general officer corps. America’s generals have repeated the mistakes of Vietnam in Iraq. First, throughout the 1990s our generals failed to envision the conditions of future combat and prepare their forces accordingly. Second, America’s generals failed to estimate correctly both the means and the ways necessary to achieve the aims of policy prior to beginning the war in Iraq. Finally, America’s generals did not provide Congress and the public with an accurate assessment of the conflict in Iraq

It's also worth remebering that General Shinseki was in a position to affect the Army that went to war in the spring of 2003. While it's barely mentioned in his biography, Shinseki spent more than two years (in the late 1990s) as the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations. In that post, General Shinseki is best remembered as an advocate for programs (and training) that still reflected a Cold War mindset.

Four years later, as the service's Chief of Staff, he was still fighting the same battles. One of his first showdowns with Don Rumsfeld was over the Crusader artillery system, an out sized, costly weapons system that was envisioned for the Fulda Gap, not the mountains of Afghanistan. And, we can't find any evidence of Shinseki fighting hard against the force cutbacks that hollowed our ground forces in the 1990s.

In other words, General Shinseki bears more than a little responsibility for our early failures in Iraq. But, because his force estimates put him squarely opposite the Bush Administration, his contributions to those problems are quietly forgotten.

No wonder Barack Obama nominated him for the VA. Whatever his faults, the president-elect is savvy enough to avoid unnecessary battles; sending Shinseki back to the Pentagon would have raised embarrassing (though valid) questions about his role in preparing the Army for Afghanistan and Iraq.

Mumbai Calling

Today's Wall Street Journal has a timely editorial on one of the critical--but under-reported-- lessons from the recent terrorist attack in Mumbai. As the Journal observes, the days of carnage in India serve as a stark reminder of how easily terrorists can mount a major strike.

Preventing a similar attack in the U.S. requires more than military might; it takes extraordinary effort and coordination between federal, state and local officials. But the local end of that effort may be in jeopardy, judging from recent letters between New York Police Commissioner Ray Kelly and U.S. Attorney General Michael Mukasey. As the Journal describes it, the anti-anti terror lobby has constrained Bush Administration intelligence programs, making it "harder to intercept terrorists before they strike."

Those constraints are having a major impact at the local level, where Commissioner Kelley--and other local counter-terrorism officials--claim that current intelligence laws are limiting their ability to prevent the next Mumbai. As the WSJ explains:

The city and the Justice Department are feuding over the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA, the 1978 domestic wiretapping law that was amended this year and requires a warrant to listen in on suspected foreign terrorists. Mr. Kelly says that Justice's FISA policies are "unduly constraining" his high-priority "international terrorism investigations in the greater New York area."

Two city applications for electronic surveillance, one in June and the other in September, got quashed -- not by the FISA court, but by Justice's own legal team. As a municipal outfit, the police intelligence division cannot appeal directly to the special FISA panel of rotating judges but must instead work through DOJ. Both cases are classified.

Mr. Kelly was furious and let Mr. Mukasey know it in a searing critique. Someone leaked the October correspondence late last month, and though each party blames the other, both have since walked back from public conflict. In any event, whoever leaked made his point. Mr. Kelly's letter exposed a "lack of urgency and excessive time lags" in processing FISA applications; as well as a bureaucracy that insists on "frequently long and unjustifiable delay," even "weeks of delay." This is disturbing enough given fast-moving terror plots.

But Mr. Kelly's main criticism -- "an unnecessarily protracted, risk-averse process that is dominated by lawyers, not investigators and intelligence collectors" -- is far more troubling. He believes that Justice is applying "inappropriately high standards of probable cause" that stop "close cases," which "involve considerable uncertainty," from ever going before a FISA judge.

Kelly's critique affirms the critique of the current system. Running wiretap requests through the FISA system is slow and sometimes cumbersome. And, the standards apparently established by Justice Department lawyers mean that some surveillance requests will never be approved. We can only wonder what terrorist plots may be percolating right now, because a wiretap petition failed to meet the requirements of probable cause.

The Journal reminds us that the real problem isn't federal standards, or the impatience of the NYPD. It's FISA itself:

FISA was passed before the advent of disposable cell phones, encrypted emails and high-speed fiber optic networks. Now we live in a world where terrorist communications that originate in, say, Peshawar happen to move through U.S. switching networks. The executive branch already possesses the Constitutional authority to monitor such communications, but Democrats and the political left claimed it was "illegal" under FISA.

Then the anti-antiterror bar filed multibillion-dollar lawsuits against the telecom companies whose good-faith assistance after 9/11 made such surveillance possible. The goal was to shut down the program, and the telcos made it clear they couldn't cooperate without Congress's blessing. Forced to choose between a Democratic deal that gave the companies legal immunity or giving up a key U.S. antiterror tool, President Bush chose the former. The price -- the one Commissioner Kelly is paying -- was narrowing the government's antiterror wiretapping powers.

What Democrats have done, in essence, is to insert an unelected judiciary into the wartime chain of command. As Mr. Kelly notes, this is producing a "lack of accountability" and "the lack of transparency into the inner workings of the FISA process." If some faceless FISA judge denies a surveillance request from Mr. Kelly and New Yorkers die as a result, that judge will answer to no one. Under current FISA rules, we won't even know who that judge is. Meanwhile, the very Members of Congress who insisted on FISA's limitations will blame the executive branch that they put under the supervision of those anonymous judges.

And, the power of those judges will likely increase under an Obama Administration and a Democratic-controlled Congress. Meanwhile, the terrorists keep plotting and Kelly's comments are a stark reminder that we are not immune from future attacks--particularly if we entrust key decisions to lawyers, not security officials.

Now,, That's What We Call Border Security

As Noah Shactman at the Danger Room notes, the U.S. government has been trying (with marginal success) to implement "high-tech" surveillance systems along our southern border. Current plans call for a series of "sensor towers," which will monitor the border and feed data to monitoring stations.

However, the so-called "virtual fence" has been affected by technical problems and staggering costs. Last May, Boeing announced plans to revamp the prototype, and it's still unclear how much we'll pay for the system. By one (inflated) estimate, the fence will cost between $300 million and $1.7 billion per mile; but even at a lower price, there are legitimate questions about how much security it will provide, and the long-term expenditures required to keep the sensors --and the technicians who monitor them--on the job.

Meanwhile, the Israelis have taken the concept of high-tech border security to another level. Aviation Week's Ares defense blog reports that the IDF is now operating remote-controlled weapons stations along the "hot" border with Gaza.

Developed by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, the network consists of weapons towers, mounting a remotely-controlled 7.62 mm or 50-caliber weapon, linked to an observation station. The observation post, manned mostly by female soldiers, monitors border activity around the clock. When an attempted border penetration (or other suspicious activity) is detected, operators can direct one or more towers to engage the targets. In addition to the tower-mounted guns, observers can also employ precision-guided missiles.

Obviously, we'll never have anything like the Israeli system in our country--that is, until terrorists detonate a nuke in an American city, and the plot is traced through our porous borders. There's nothing like mass casualties and a verified threat to change your way of thinking.

N/T: The Danger Room.

Warning Signs

On the 67th anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor, The New York Times is revisiting one of the key controversies surrounding that debacle. For years, urban legends--and a few historians --have claimed that U.S. intelligence intercepted a prearranged diplomatic message, providing a final warning of the pending strike.

The so-called "winds execute" message was a coded weather report, notifying Japanese diplomats around the world of a pending conflict with the United States, Great Britain or the Soviet Union. Upon receipt of the message, Tokyo's envoys were supposed to initiate the destruction of classified material and equipment, in preparation for war.

"East wind rain" was the signal for a looming conflict with the U.S. But was the signal actually transmitted, and did it provide a significant clue for American political leaders in Washington, and military commanders around the globe? According to a newly-published work, written by historians for the National Security Agency (NSA), the answer to the transmission question is a tentative yes, but it did not provide an unambiguous attack warning, as some have insisted.

In the history, “West Wind Clear,” published by the agency’s Center for Cryptologic History, the authors, Robert J. Hanyok and the late David Mowry, attribute accounts of the message being broadcast to the flawed or fabricated memory of some witnesses, perhaps to deflect culpability from other officials for the United States’ insufficient readiness for war. A Congressional committee grappled with competing accounts of the “winds execute” message in 1946, by which time the question of whether it had been broadcast had blown into a controversy. The New York Times described it as a “bitter microcosm” of the investigation into American preparedness.

[snip]

In an interview, Mr. Hanyok said there were several lessons from the controversy that reverberate today. He said that some adherents of the theory that the message was sent and seen were motivated by an unshakable faith in the efficacy of radio intelligence, and that when a copy of the message could not be found they blamed a cover-up — a reminder that no intelligence-gathering is completely foolproof.

Washington also missed potential warning signs because intelligence resources had been diverted to the Atlantic theater, he said, and the Japanese deftly practiced deception to mislead Americans about the whereabouts of Tokyo’s naval strike force.

“The problem with the conspiracy theory,” Mr. Hanyok said, “is that it diverted attention from the real substantive problems, the major issue being the intelligence system was so bureaucratized.”

Hanyok's claims are certainly valid--but only up to a point. For starters, serious students of our intelligence puzzle at the time of Pearl Harbor have long dismissed the significance of the "winds" message. Certainly the Japanese established such a system; it was outlined in a diplomatic message transmitted on 19 November 1941. But did Tokyo insert the message into a radio newscast in the days before Pearl Harbor? Evidence suggests that the Japanese made such a broadcast, but only after the attack was concluded:

“In the end, the winds code never was the intelligence indicator or warning that it first appeared to the Americans, as well as to the British and Dutch,” they wrote. “In the political realm, it added nothing to then current view in Washington (and London) that relations with Tokyo had deteriorated to a dangerous point. From a military standpoint, the winds coded message contained no actionable intelligence either about the Japanese operations in Southeast Asia and absolutely nothing about Pearl Harbor.

“In reality,” they concluded, “the Japanese broadcast the coded phrase(s) long after hostilities began — useless, in fact, to all who might have heard it.”

But excerpts of the NSA monograph--and the Times story--ignore the larger question of what warnings were available to U.S. officials. Recent books on the subject, including Robert Stinnett's Day of Deceit (2000) and George Victor's more recent The Pearl Harbor Myth: Rethinking the Unthinkable reveal that military and civilian leaders had at least 16 warnings of the attack, ranging from vague to clear.

These included the so-called "bomb plot messages," which divided the naval anchorage into a grid, to be used in planning attack runs on Pearl Harbor; decrypted intercepts by British and Dutch intelligence, which indicated that Japanese carriers were en route to Pearl Harbor, and radio direction finding that put the enemy fleet in Hawaiian waters on the night of 6 December 1941. As Victor writes, given that the Navy's "30-year expectation" that Japan would start a war with an attack on Pearl Harbor, "even one warning, from a reliable source," should have been taken seriously.

But dissemination of available information was uneven, and it's apparent that much of it was withheld from the commanders at Pearl Harbor, Navy Admiral Husband Kimmel and Army Lieutenant General Walter Short. While a number of mid-level intelligence officers urged sharing recently-received information with the Hawaiian command, their requests were rejected by superiors.

As a result, Kimmel and Short remained in the dark, concerned more about sabotage than the threat of surprise attack. When Japanese planes arrived on the morning of 7 December, they found our aircraft parked wingtip-to-wingtip, and most of the Pacific Fleet floating peacefully at anchor. Almost 70 years later, we can only speculate how Kimmel, Short and their subordinates would have reacted to the data that was denied them--and the extent of the information conspiracy within the U.S. government.

***
ADDENDUM: As Stinnett recounts in his book, Roosevelt seemed stunned by our losses at Pearl Harbor. "They caught our ships like lame ducks," he exclaimed to his Coordinator of Information, Colonel "Wild Bill" Donovan, who went on to head the OSS during World War II. But Donovan later disclosed that Roosevelt seemed "less surprised" by the attack than others at the White House, and claimed that "warnings" had been sent to Pearl Harbor in advance. Needless to say, there is no record of any advisory from the Commander-in-Chief.

Additionally, Stinnett provides another fascinating anecdote in the hours after the attack. CBS newsman Edward R. Murrow was invited for dinner at the White House days before the debacle. After supper, Murrow and Donovan participated in a private meeting with FDR.

After his session with the President, an agitated Murrow returned to his hotel room and paced the floor, unable to sleep. "It's the biggest story of my life," he told his wife Janet, "but I don't know if it's my duty to tell it or forget it." Whatever Murrow learned in that conversation with Roosevelt has never been disclosed. He carried that secret to his grave.

Beating the Rap

While military prosecutors claim an overall conviction rate of 98%, some defendants still manage to beat air-tight cases, raising questions about favoritism and double-standards in the armed forces justice system.

Case in point: Air Force attempts to court-martial Colonel Michael Murphy, the former head of the service's Legal Operations Agency. Murphy was on the fast-track for flag rank until it was discovered that the career JAG lacked an essential requirement for any military lawyer.

He didn't have a law license.

Colonel Murphy served as an Air Force attorney for more than 20 years despite being disbarred in two states, Texas and Louisiana. Murphy was disbarred in Texas for failing to file an appeal for a client, then lied about his past problems when applying for admittance to the Louisiana bar. When Louisiana learned about Murphy's previous difficulties, he was disbarred in that state as well.

But Murphy never divulged his problems to the Air Force, either, and he advanced steadily until the deception was discovered in 2007. A subsequent investigation resulted in charges of failing to obey a general regulation, conduct unbecoming an officer and larceny. At that point, most legal experts considered Murphy's conviction an all-but-done deal.

Fast forward a couple of years, and the case against Colonel Murphy is in tatters. Last September, the trial judge ruled that Murphy couldn't be punished for his crimes, even if he is convicted. The decision was based on the Bush Administration's refusal to release details of Murphy's classified duties as a member of the White House Military Office, where he served until 2005. Without that information, the judge decided, Murphy's lawyers would be unable to prove that their client had served honorably in the past.

Air Force attorneys have appealed the decision, but analysts believe it's a long shot. In any event, the Murphy courts-martial is now on hold, and there is some speculation that the remaining charges against him may be dismissed. At that point, the Colonel would be allowed to retire, pension intact.

And sadly, Murphy may not be the only officer to dodge a major legal bullet. The folks at MilitaryCorruption.com have been following the case of Navy Lieutenant Commander Rebecca Dickinson. Readers may recall that Commander Dickinson is the former Naval Academy staff member who supplemented her income by working as a high-priced call girl.

In fact, Dickinson worked for the notorious "D.C. Madam," Deborah Jean Pelfrey. Her "girls" performed favors for hundreds of rich and powerful clients in the nation's capital, and Pelfrey's arrest and prosecution made a lot of people nervous.

But Pelfrey carried most of her secrets to the grave. She committed suicide at her mother's home in Florida, not long after her conviction.

By comparison, Commander Dickinson won't be spending any time in jail. Despite admitting that she serviced over 200 clients (at $275 a pop, pun intended), Dickinson worked a plea deal with prosecutors, and wasn't prosecuted for her crimes.

The Navy seemed equally anxious to make the matter "go away," since some of Dickinson's clients were high-ranking military officers. As punishment for her role in the world's oldest profession, Dickinson received a reduction in grade, to lieutenant. However, she'll still receive her pension (worth an estimated $2330 a month) and other retirement benefits.

Libertarians--and others--have long argued that prostitution is a "victimless crime," and offenders don't deserve harsh punishment. But we'd argue that Dickinson's case is a bit different, given her status as a naval officer with a security clearance. For her indiscretions, Dickinson deserved more than a reduction in grade.

But in the military justice system, what you know, who you know (and the favors they perform) can sometimes trump official investigations and criminal prosecutions. That certainly seems to be the case with Colonel Murphy, and that former naval officer who worked as a hooker.

Big Day for Missile Defense

You could almost hear the champagne corks popping, from Vandenburg AFB to Washington.

Barely two hours ago--around 3:30 p.m., eastern time--an interceptor missile from the California base slammed into a target missile over the eastern Pacific Ocean. The test simulated the intercept of a long-range ballistic missile, like those being developed by North Korea and Iran.

Politically, today's test came at a particularly critical moment for the missile defense program. President-elect Barack Obama has voiced opposition to "unproven" missile defense systems, suggesting he may terminate them. The successful intercept provided a major boost for one of the key components of the missile defense shield, demonstrating the ability of ground-based interceptors to engage long-range ballistic threats.

The threat-representative missile was launched at 3:04 p.m. from Kodiak, Alaska, followed 19 minutes later by the interceptor missile. Over the next six minutes, the defensive missile maneuvered into the target's predicted orbit and delivered its kill vehicle, which destroyed the target missile.

Today's test featured several new operational wrinkles, as described by the Missile Defense Agency:

This was the first time an operational crew located at the alternate fire control center at Ft. Greely, Alaska remotely launched the interceptor from Vandenberg AFB. In previous interceptor launches from Vandenberg, military crews at the fire control center at Schriever AFB, Colo. remotely launched the interceptor.

The target was successfully tracked by a transportable AN/TPY-2 radar located in Juneau, Alaska, a U.S. Navy Aegis BMD ship with SPY-1 radar, the Upgraded Early Warning Radar at Beale Air Force Base, Calif., and the Sea-Based X-band radar. Each sensor sent information to the fire control system, which integrated the data together to provide the most accurate target trajectory for the interceptor.

The interceptor’s exoatmospheric kill vehicle is the component that collides directly with a target warhead in space to perform a "hit to kill" intercept using only the force of the collision to totally destroy the target warhead.

Initial indications are that all components performed as designed. Program officials will evaluate system performance based upon telemetry and other data obtained during the test.

According to MDA, today's test was the 37th successful hit-to-kill intercept (in 47 attempts) since 2001. But even that number is a bit misleading; most of the unsuccessful tests occurred in the early years of that period. As missile defense technology evolved, so has its accuracy and reliability.

Given his campaign rhetoric, most analysts still think that Mr. Obama may cut some missile defense programs. But the string of recent successes--including a successful firing of the Airborne Laser last month and February's dramatic intercept of a failing U.S. spy satellite by naval based-missile defense systems--will make that effort more difficult.

It's worth noting that the interceptor missile used in today's test was launched from the Ronald Reagan Missile Defense Site at Vandenburg. The Gipper's Dream, once derided as little more than science fiction, is steadily advancing toward reality.

Going it Alone

The Jerusalem Post reports that Israel is "drawing up plans to attack Iran's nuclear facilities," and is prepared to strike "without U.S. backing."

Officials in the Israeli Defence Ministry told the Post that while they prefer to act in consultation with the US, they were preparing plans that would allow them to act in isolation.

"It is always better to coordinate," a senior Defence Ministry official told the newspaper. "But we are also preparing options that do not include coordination."

But the day after the Post report appeared, Israeli defense officials appeared to back away from those claims, telling the U.K. Times a unilateral strike by the IDF would "probably fail" to take out all of Iran's nuclear facilities. That would leave Israel potentially vulnerable to an Iranian counter-strike, particularly after Tehran develops nuclear weapons.

“We could not risk an operation which would only partially succeed," one defence official told The Times.

Still, that unnamed defense official and at least one member of the Parliament refused to rule out the option of a unilateral attack. "There is always the option of Israel going it alone. It just does not seem like a good option at present time,” the Knesset member told the Times.

In fact, the thrust of both the Post account and the Times article are misleading. The Israelis have always understood that the chances for a joint attack against Iran are virtually nil, for obvious political reasons. Additionally, the Israeli government realizes that last year's National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) virtually eliminated the possibility of a preemptive U.S. strike. Given those realities, a unilateral Israeli attack is probably the only short-term military option for dealing with the Iranian nuclear threat.

That's why Israeli planning is based on the "go it alone" option. When Israeli Air Force officers outlined strike options with their USAF counterparts two years ago, the plans did not call for any American involvement. The Israelis even described options for forward basing--arrangements made without U.S. consultation.

As we've noted in previous posts, Israel has more than sufficient military power to mount an air strike against Iran. Two of the three potential routes (through Turkey and around the Arabian Peninsula) would take Israeli jets outside U.S.-controlled airspace.

Obviously, the most direct routing--across Iraq--would send IAF fighters through skies patrolled by the U.S. military. But the presence of American aircraft does not preclude the Iraq route. Even without the Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) codes mentioned in the Times account, the Israelis could still send their strike package through Iraq, and face only a moderate risk.

We base that assessment on several factors. First, in the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom (and the end of Saddam's air force), we removed AWACS aircraft and Patriot batteries from the country. Radar coverage of Iraq is now based largely on ground sites and controllers, who vector our fighters toward suspicious tracks. Due to terrain and other factors, ground based radar often has coverage gaps, particularly at low altitude, that could be exploited by an in-bound strike package.

Secondly, assuming that the Israeli formation is detected, it wouldn't be difficult to discern their intentions, based on its likely heading and composition. At that point, American commanders would face an immediate--and crucial decision--do they send our fighters against the IAF, or simply watch them go by? There's ample reason to believe that we would let the Israelis pass, knowing their destination.

Besides, the U.S. will be accused of complicity in the attack, regardless of our actual reaction. Just one more reason to let the Israelis pass, and make our protests later, through diplomatic channels.

However, with a new administration taking office, Israel may be less inclined to jeopardize its relationship with Washington. That's one reason that a flight path across southern Turkey may be Israel's most viable option. Taking advantage of rugged terrain and various deception options, IAF jets could fly through Turkish airspace with even lower odds of detection. In fact, many U.S. assessments of Israeli strike profiles are based on routing through Turkey, rather than Iraq.

This much we know: with Iran's nuclear program continuing apace, Israel's moment of decision is rapidly approaching. The Israeli government has long been prepared to "go it alone." The real question is when the "execute" order might be issued.

***

More on the Israeli decision-making process (and possible strike scenarios) from Rick Moran at RightWing Nuthouse.

Shadow War

The world's military powers are spending billions on information warfare (IW), but--for obvious reasons--they don't publicize their capabilities. As a result, we only get occasional glimpses of the growing battle in cyberspace, as illustrated by Russian attacks against Estonian computer networks in 2007, and more recently, against Georgian systems during the run-up to this summer's war with the Tbilisi government.

American capabilities in IW remain equally guarded, but there are occasional displays that make their way into the public arena. Earlier this year, at least three of Al Qaida's most important propaganda websites were shut down for over a month, after a series of cyber-attacks. While the culprits were never officially identified, western intelligence agencies were at the top of the list. The U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) has been following terrorist communications for years and has robust--though little-publicized--capabilities in cyber-attack.

Israel has also been busy in recent months, as detailed in a couple of items posted at Strategy Page. First, Israeli spooks hacked into the Syrian phone network and sent thousands of voice and text messages, offering a $10 million reward for information on missing Israeli soldiers. Syrian intelligence viewed the intrusion differently, speculating that the Israelis were actually trying to recruit spies.

The Israelis have also been active in Lebanon, inserting messages into Hizballah radio and TV broadcasts for the past two years. The Israeli messages point out errors in terrorist claims, or simply ridicule the organization. Israeli intelligence has also mounted a spam campaign against the insurgent's cell phone network, disseminating anti-Hizballah messages via voice and text.

These campaigns have an obvious propaganda value, but they also send a clear message to Israel's foes. The same tools used to "hack" terrorist communications networks can also be used to take them down. And so far, the insurgents seem (almost) powerless to stop it.

Information operations will be an essential part of all future conflicts, including those in the Middle East. Based on what little we've seen, the Israelis seem well-prepared to exploit the cyber realm in future campaigns against their foes.

Lest we forget, Syria's air defense network (reportedly) went dark before last year's IAF attack on that nuclear facility. As a result, Israeli jets flew unscathed across hundreds of miles of hostile territory, and returned without a scratch. That suggests a highly successful, targeted network attack that paralyzed Syrian air defenses and their supporting C2 network. It's the same technique that could be applied to Iran, as part of a strike against their nuclear facilities.

***
ADDENDUM: Speaking of Iran, it seems that the Israelis are already at work on that IW target. The Tehran government has admitted that a recently-executed spy allowed Israeli technicians to install monitoring devices on computer equipment bought by Iran. Apparently, some of the IT gear was delivered to facilites supporting Tehran's weapons program. More than likely, that intelligence coup provided valuable insights into Iran's nuclear development effort--and, quite possibly, the ability to "crash" those computer networks at a later date.

Bracing for that 3 A.M. Call

Before too long, British bookies will be taking bets on which early-morning crisis call Barack Obama will take first. Experts are now warning that the president-elect is facing a veritable "hornet's nest" in the Middle East, led by the prospect that Iran will have a nuclear bomb within a year.

Interestingly, predictions of impending crises from the West Bank to the Persian Gulf came from the Council on Foreign Relations and the Brookings Institution--organizations that are anything but unfriendly to the next commander-in-chief. The think tanks outlined their concerns in a joint report entitled Restoring the Balance, which offered a blue print for U.S. policy in the Middle East.

Gary Samore, one of the authors, said that the level of alarm over the “hornet’s nest” facing the President-elect in the Middle East, and the need for the swift adoption of previously untested approach, had inspired the decision to write policy for him. “New administrations can choose new policies but they can’t choose next contexts,” Mr Samore said.

The report paints a grim picture of the problems in the region but asserts that Mr Obama is still in a strong position. For the first time since the Iranian revolution the leadership in Tehran has endorsed the idea of talking directly with Washington, as Mr Obama has suggested. Falling oil prices also provide an opportunity, restricting Iran’s means to sponsor terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah that act as its proxy in the region.

As you might expect, the smart folks at Brookings and the CFR like the idea of a new diplomatic offensive. They believe the time is right to engage Iran, Syria and other adversaries in the region, an idea that Mr. Obama has also endorsed.

Unfortunately, the report (or at least the U.K. Telegraph's article on it) ignores a rather important question: What exactly, does the U.S. hope to gain from new talks with Tehran and Damascus? Readers will recall that Washington fully endorsed years of negotiations between the so-called "EU-3" (Britain, France and Germany) and Iran.

To date, those conversations have produced no concessions from Tehran on its nuclear program. Indeed, Iran's efforts to acquire nukes have actually accelerated during that period, leading to the dire prediction in the think tank report.

Having cast its lot with Tehran, Syria also would seem to be a poor candidate for negotiations. Readers will recall that Damascus has also spurred various overtures in recent years, and even launched a covert nuclear program during that time. Like its Iranian allies, the Syrians also see their power on the ascendancy. At this juncture, they have little incentive for serious negotiations, with Iran about to achieve an over-arching goal--the development of nuclear weapons--and Damascus will reap the benefits of that acquisition.

The policy wonks at Brookings and CFR would counter that Tehran is now in a weakened position, thanks to the recent, dramatic drop in oil prices. And, since Damascus depends on Iran for political, economic and military support, the Syrians would have little choice but follow Tehran's lead.

There's an element of truth in that assessment, but it also ignores the game-changing impact of the Iranian nuclear program. So close to achieving its goal, Tehran has no incentive to abandon its weapons development efforts. Why give up a program that will forever alter the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East and make Iran's position that much stronger?

That's the harsh reality facing the next administration. Diplomacy is fine, but so far, no one wants to talk about what happens when the talks fail. One of Mr. Obama's first early-morning calls may deliver the somber news that Iran has produced its first nuke, and is thumbing its nose at the global community. At that point, the time for negotiations is probably over. What comes next?

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And, if that's not enough, a separate report warns that the U.S. should expect a nuclear or biological terrorist attack by 2013. The assessment, which will be published tomorrow, claims that the margin of safety in America is "shrinking, not growing," despite billions of dollars in new spending on homeland security. Produced by the bi-partisan Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, the report says that insurgents' deficiencies in those areas could be easily overcome, if they find scientists willing to share their expertise.

The document also describes Pakistan as the "intersection" of weapons of mass destruction, and terrorist efforts to gain those capabilities.

How Ookie Went Broke in the Big House

Sports Illustrated's Rick Reilly has the details, from bankruptcy papers filed by the former NFL star.

Some of the expenditures are rather revealing. Along with the "usual expenses" (high-powered lawyers like Billy Martin don't work cheap), Vick also spent thousands of dollars on everything from his family, to a stable of race horses he once owned. Incidentally, Vick told the court that "he doesn't know the name" of the man who cares for his horses.

But our favorite item was a $65,000 expenditure, used to purchase a 2007 Infiniti for his fiancee. She keeps the car parked near the Leavenworth, Kansas prison where Vick is housed, so she'll have something to drive during her visits.

Cost of a cab ride from the Kansas City airport to Leavenworth: $60.

The next NFL star to join Vick on the "prison-and-bankruptcy" roster? Plaxico Burress of the New York Giants, who seems determined to throw away his pro football career, and that recently-signed, $35 million contract.