The Wall Street Journal does an excellent job contrasting our successful shoot-down of that dead spy satellite, and last year’s Chinese ASAT test. By any standard, our public announcements on the planned intercept--and concurrent diplomatic efforts aimed at reassuring the world community--were models of disclosure and openness.
Quite a contrast to Beijing's anti-satellite test of January 2007, which was conducted in secrecy, with little regard for the political or military consequences. As the Journal observes, there is some reason to believe that senior Chinese leaders were unaware of their nation's test until it was actually conducted. By comparison, our decision to intercept the defunct spy satellite was made by civilian leaders, at the highest levels of our government.
Thursday, February 21, 2008
Wednesday, February 20, 2008
It's a Hit
AP military correspondent Robert Burns reports that an SM-3 missile from a U.S. navy vessel successfully struck a defunct spy satellite over the Pacific tonight. The intercept was aimed at destroying the satellite before it reenters the earth's atmosphere, lessening the danger from falling debris that survives reentry, including the platform's large propellant tank, filled with toxic hydrazine.
The missile was launched around 10:30 p.m. EST this evening, and struck the satellite shortly after. Defense Secretary Robert Gates made the final decision to conduct the intercept.
Earlier in the day, it appeared that heavy seas around Hawaii would delay the intercept attempt. But the weather improved in the later afternoon, allowing the launch to proceed.
Pentagon officials say it may be a couple of days before the status of the fuel tank and its cargo are known. However, early reports suggested that the tank was destroyed by the missile impact.
It was, by any measure, an impressive test. Plans for the shootdown moved from the drawing board to execution in barely three months, after it became apparent that the dead spy satellite would soon reenter the earth's atmosphere.
The intercept was conducted by three U.S. Navy vessels, the cruiser Lake Erie and the destroyers Russell and Decatur. It is believed that the SM-3 that engaged the satellite came from the Lake Erie. All three ships had been modified for the shootdown mission.
The missile was launched around 10:30 p.m. EST this evening, and struck the satellite shortly after. Defense Secretary Robert Gates made the final decision to conduct the intercept.
Earlier in the day, it appeared that heavy seas around Hawaii would delay the intercept attempt. But the weather improved in the later afternoon, allowing the launch to proceed.
Pentagon officials say it may be a couple of days before the status of the fuel tank and its cargo are known. However, early reports suggested that the tank was destroyed by the missile impact.
It was, by any measure, an impressive test. Plans for the shootdown moved from the drawing board to execution in barely three months, after it became apparent that the dead spy satellite would soon reenter the earth's atmosphere.
The intercept was conducted by three U.S. Navy vessels, the cruiser Lake Erie and the destroyers Russell and Decatur. It is believed that the SM-3 that engaged the satellite came from the Lake Erie. All three ships had been modified for the shootdown mission.
The Next Step
As we’ve often observed, developing a nuclear weapons capability is actually a multi-step process. Beyond the construction of an actual device, aspiring nuclear powers must also develop delivery platforms, create the necessary databases of intelligence and targeting information, and make the weapon small enough to fit atop a missile, or beneath a combat aircraft.
Without the B-29 Superfortress--and men like the late Paul Tibbets-- the out-sized nuclear weapons of 1945 would have been virtually useless; it took long-range bombers and highly trained crews to realize the awful strike (and deterrent) power of the atomic age.
Against that backdrop, it should come as no surprise that Iran is hard at work on nuclear warhead technology. The Iranian opposition group that first revealed Tehran’s nuclear- fuel program has given information on a reported warhead facility to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the U.N.’s nuclear watchdog group.
Information on the warhead facility, compiled by the exiled National Council of Resistance of Iran, first appeared in today’s edition of The Wall Street Journal. The AP and Japan’s Kyodo news agency offered a summary of the Journal's report:
The facility at Khojir, a defense-ministry missile-research site on the southeast edge of Tehran, is developing a nuclear warhead for use on Iranian medium-range missiles, Mohammad Mohaddessin, foreign-affairs chief for the exiled National Council of Resistance of Iran, reportedly said.
He also said the NCRI has identified a guest house on a military compound near Khojir that the group says houses North Korean specialists working at the warhead facility, the report said.
[snip]
Mohaddessin reportedly said, however, the NCRI information was finalized in recent weeks and is current.
It was not possible to verify any of the NCRI's claims independently. On Tuesday, Mohaddessin passed the information, which includes satellite images, to the International Atomic Energy Agency and asked the agency to investigate.
An IAEA representative said the organization would check the NCRI's claim against the agency's own data and pursue it "if appropriate."
The NCRI is the Paris-based political wing of the Mujahedin e-Khalq, an exiled military group that has been seeking to overthrow the current Iranian regime since the mid-1980s. The United States and the European Union list the group as a terrorist organization.
While the NCRI (and its parent organization) may not be on the guest list for the next State Department soiree, the group does have a solid reputation in tracking Iran’s nuclear program. Running well ahead of most western intelligence organizations, the group’s claims about Iran’s efforts to produce nuclear fuel were later verified by the IAEA and other agencies.
Obviously, Iranian opposition groups have an interest in depicting Tehran’s nuclear threat in the gravest terms. But, let’s say for a moment that this report proves accurate, as did their information on the nuclear fuel program. What does that tell us about Iran’s overall nuclear effort?
Well, for starters, it’s another nail in the coffin of last year’s NIE, which judged, “with high confidence,” that Iran suspended its weapons development program in 2003. It makes little sense to pursue warheads for a weapons program that has (supposedly) been suspended. Readers will recall that senior U.S. intelligence officials have been back-pedaling from that assessment in recent weeks, admitting that Iran may have continued covert efforts while the “official” program was on hold.
Secondly, Tehran’s reported rush to build warheads reflects a nation that is anxious to flex its nuclear muscle. Making a nuke that’s small enough to fit on a medium or inter-mediate range missile is a time-consuming process. There is still some debate as to whether North Korea—which has had a crude weapons capability for years—can actually mount a nuke on one of its missiles. Iran clearly wants a missile-based nuclear delivery capability at the earliest possible date, to reach distant targets in Israel, the Middle East and even Europe.
Finally—and perhaps most disturbingly—Tehran’s interest in nuclear warhead production suggests a weapons program that is relatively advanced. Developing a viable warhead requires a design and technology baseline, i.e., the dimensions of a first-generation weapon, giving engineers some idea of what must be done to get the device on its intended delivery platform. If Iran is actively pursuing warhead design, it’s a safe bet that the country’s first nuclear warhead will appear well before the middle of the next decade—a timeline offered in a recent U.S. intelligence assessment.
In fairness, we should note that warhead research is adaptable for other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological agents. But most intel analysts assume that Tehran and its partners (North Korea and Syria) have long since mastered that technology. That means the facility near Khojir may be what the MEK says it is—a research and production facility for nuclear warheads. And that would indicate that the threat from a nuclear-capable Iran is much closer that previously thought.
Hat tip: Powerline.
Without the B-29 Superfortress--and men like the late Paul Tibbets-- the out-sized nuclear weapons of 1945 would have been virtually useless; it took long-range bombers and highly trained crews to realize the awful strike (and deterrent) power of the atomic age.
Against that backdrop, it should come as no surprise that Iran is hard at work on nuclear warhead technology. The Iranian opposition group that first revealed Tehran’s nuclear- fuel program has given information on a reported warhead facility to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the U.N.’s nuclear watchdog group.
Information on the warhead facility, compiled by the exiled National Council of Resistance of Iran, first appeared in today’s edition of The Wall Street Journal. The AP and Japan’s Kyodo news agency offered a summary of the Journal's report:
The facility at Khojir, a defense-ministry missile-research site on the southeast edge of Tehran, is developing a nuclear warhead for use on Iranian medium-range missiles, Mohammad Mohaddessin, foreign-affairs chief for the exiled National Council of Resistance of Iran, reportedly said.
He also said the NCRI has identified a guest house on a military compound near Khojir that the group says houses North Korean specialists working at the warhead facility, the report said.
[snip]
Mohaddessin reportedly said, however, the NCRI information was finalized in recent weeks and is current.
It was not possible to verify any of the NCRI's claims independently. On Tuesday, Mohaddessin passed the information, which includes satellite images, to the International Atomic Energy Agency and asked the agency to investigate.
An IAEA representative said the organization would check the NCRI's claim against the agency's own data and pursue it "if appropriate."
The NCRI is the Paris-based political wing of the Mujahedin e-Khalq, an exiled military group that has been seeking to overthrow the current Iranian regime since the mid-1980s. The United States and the European Union list the group as a terrorist organization.
While the NCRI (and its parent organization) may not be on the guest list for the next State Department soiree, the group does have a solid reputation in tracking Iran’s nuclear program. Running well ahead of most western intelligence organizations, the group’s claims about Iran’s efforts to produce nuclear fuel were later verified by the IAEA and other agencies.
Obviously, Iranian opposition groups have an interest in depicting Tehran’s nuclear threat in the gravest terms. But, let’s say for a moment that this report proves accurate, as did their information on the nuclear fuel program. What does that tell us about Iran’s overall nuclear effort?
Well, for starters, it’s another nail in the coffin of last year’s NIE, which judged, “with high confidence,” that Iran suspended its weapons development program in 2003. It makes little sense to pursue warheads for a weapons program that has (supposedly) been suspended. Readers will recall that senior U.S. intelligence officials have been back-pedaling from that assessment in recent weeks, admitting that Iran may have continued covert efforts while the “official” program was on hold.
Secondly, Tehran’s reported rush to build warheads reflects a nation that is anxious to flex its nuclear muscle. Making a nuke that’s small enough to fit on a medium or inter-mediate range missile is a time-consuming process. There is still some debate as to whether North Korea—which has had a crude weapons capability for years—can actually mount a nuke on one of its missiles. Iran clearly wants a missile-based nuclear delivery capability at the earliest possible date, to reach distant targets in Israel, the Middle East and even Europe.
Finally—and perhaps most disturbingly—Tehran’s interest in nuclear warhead production suggests a weapons program that is relatively advanced. Developing a viable warhead requires a design and technology baseline, i.e., the dimensions of a first-generation weapon, giving engineers some idea of what must be done to get the device on its intended delivery platform. If Iran is actively pursuing warhead design, it’s a safe bet that the country’s first nuclear warhead will appear well before the middle of the next decade—a timeline offered in a recent U.S. intelligence assessment.
In fairness, we should note that warhead research is adaptable for other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological agents. But most intel analysts assume that Tehran and its partners (North Korea and Syria) have long since mastered that technology. That means the facility near Khojir may be what the MEK says it is—a research and production facility for nuclear warheads. And that would indicate that the threat from a nuclear-capable Iran is much closer that previously thought.
Hat tip: Powerline.
Heading to Court
The bizarre case of two Army officers who tried to alter a paternity test to avoid paying child support is expected to be settled in a Pennsylvania court room, possibly as early as next month.
Cumberland County Assistant District Attorney Derek Clepper tells In From the Cold that Army Colonel Scott Carlson and Lt Col Bruce Adkins could face trial in late March, on felony and misdemeanor charges relating to the phony paternity test.
Clepper says he does not believe the case against Carlson and Adkins will be settled through a plea bargain, due to the number of charges filed against the two officers, and the severity of the alleged crimes. Mr. Clepper says that Adkins’ attorney inquired about a possible plea deal for his client in December, shortly after the Lt Col was arraigned on eight different charges in the case.
However, discussions about a potential deal broke off after prosecutors insisted that Adkins plead guilty to felony, rather than misdemeanor charges. Lieutenant Colonel Adkins is accused of obstruction of justice, conspiracy to tamper with evidence, conspiracy theft by deception, forgery, solicitation of forgery, and three other charges for his role in the alleged scheme. Adkins entered a not guilty plea to all charges at his arraignment in December.
Carlson, the alleged mastermind of the scheme, is facing ten different felony and misdemeanor charges, ranging from criminal solicitation to tamper with public records and solicitation to fabricate evidence, to obstruction of justice, forgery and theft by deception. If convicted on all counts, both Carlson and Adkins could be sentenced to more that 50 years in prison.
According to the Cumberland County District Attorney’s Office, Colonel Carlson is currently completing a “mail-in” arraignment through his local attorney. Prosecutors also expect Carlson to enter a not guilty plea, setting the stage for his court date later this spring. If the mail-in arraignment is concluded in the next 2-3 weeks (as expected), Mr. Clepper believes the case against the two officers could go to trial at the end of March.
Carlson and Adkins were classmates at the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks in Cumberland County (near Harrisburg), when the plot unfolded last spring. The mother of Carlson’s nine-year-old daughter requested an increase in child support, from $400-$600 a month. Due to Carlson’s assignment at the war college, the case wound up in the Pennsylvania court.
While Colonel Carlson had paid support in the past, he claimed that the child was not his, and asked for genetic testing to prove paternity. However, when Adkins showed up to provide a DNA sample, court personnel determined that he was not the same man who requested the paternity test. Fingerprints and other military records confirmed the attempted deception.
By the time investigators concluded their probe, both officers had completed the prestigious war college and moved on to other assignments, Adkins at Ft McPherson, Georgia, and Carlson in Egypt. While Mr. Clepper reports that Pennsylvania authorities had “initial difficulty” in getting Colonel Carlson back to the states for arraignment, he apparently returned from Egypt in early November. Carlson’s current assignment is also at Ft McPherson.
Despite his “not guilty” plea, Adkins has provided a statement to prosecutors, and Clepper said it is possible that the Lt Col may be called to testify against Carlson. Mr. Clepper indicated that Adkins’ information provided a better “timeline” of events associated with the case.
By comparison, Colonel Carlson has not offered information to Pennsylvania officials, and Clepper doesn’t expect him to. “That’s his right,” the prosecutor observed.
The assistant district attorney claims that the state will present compelling evidence when the case goes to trial. “I believe I can prove every element of these crimes, “ Clepper said in an interview, “if the defendants testify, or even if they don’t.”
Lawyers representing Carlson and Adkins did not immediately respond to e-mail requests for comment. However, Colonel Carlson and his attorney outlined a possible defense in December, at a court hearing on the child support issue.
During that proceeding, Carlson produced a letter that requested cancellation of last April’s DNA test. Mr. Clepper and court officials said it was the “first time” they had seen the letter. The Colonel did not explain why Adkins still appeared on the referenced date—posing as Carlson--and provided the DNA sample.
Adkins’ motivation for taking part in the scheme remains murky. In his statement to authorities, Lt Col Adkins said that he agreed to participate “to help [Colonel] Carlson save his marriage.” Prosecutor Clepper says he is unsure if Adkins had “other reasons” for assisting Carlson.
The two Army officers could go on trial as early as March 24th, based on the current court calendar—and the expected completion of Carlson’s mail-in arraignment. If that process is delayed, Clepper says the trial would begin on April 17th or May 19th.
Beyond their Pennsylvania court date, Carlson and Adkins could also face criminal prosecution from the Army. A decision on military charges is expected after completion of civilian proceedings against the two men.
Clepper describes the case as “one of the strangest” he's handled during his years as a prosecutor. The assistant district attorney says he can’t remember the last time an Army War College student faced felony charges in Cumberland County.
The program is considered the “capstone” of an officer’s military education. Selection for the course is highly competitive, and typically reserved for best and brightest officers in the armed forces. Many war college graduates go on to reach flag rank in their respective services.
But, a preliminary hearing in the Carlson-Adkins case raised questions about the officers' past conduct, and why they were selected for the course. A Cumberland County Domestic Relations Officer testified that the mother of Carlson's daughter--who filed the request for increased child support--was a soldier in the Colonel's battalion when their affair began.
Improper relationships between superiors and subordinates are prohibited under Army regulations, and may result in punishment under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Testimony at the January hearing also revealed that another soldier once accused Adkins of assault--a claim that was reflected in the Lieutenant Colonel's military records. The board that selected Adkins for the war college was almost certainly aware of the purported assault; it's unclear if Carlson's superiors were aware of his past affair with a subordinate.
Adkins and Carlson are not the first defendants accused of faking a paternity test in Cumberland County. In an earlier case, a man was charged with providing DNA to help his brother "beat" a paternity suit. Their plan eventually unraveled, and both men wound up in prison, after being convicted on lesser charges than those facing the Army officers.
Cumberland County Assistant District Attorney Derek Clepper tells In From the Cold that Army Colonel Scott Carlson and Lt Col Bruce Adkins could face trial in late March, on felony and misdemeanor charges relating to the phony paternity test.
Clepper says he does not believe the case against Carlson and Adkins will be settled through a plea bargain, due to the number of charges filed against the two officers, and the severity of the alleged crimes. Mr. Clepper says that Adkins’ attorney inquired about a possible plea deal for his client in December, shortly after the Lt Col was arraigned on eight different charges in the case.
However, discussions about a potential deal broke off after prosecutors insisted that Adkins plead guilty to felony, rather than misdemeanor charges. Lieutenant Colonel Adkins is accused of obstruction of justice, conspiracy to tamper with evidence, conspiracy theft by deception, forgery, solicitation of forgery, and three other charges for his role in the alleged scheme. Adkins entered a not guilty plea to all charges at his arraignment in December.
Carlson, the alleged mastermind of the scheme, is facing ten different felony and misdemeanor charges, ranging from criminal solicitation to tamper with public records and solicitation to fabricate evidence, to obstruction of justice, forgery and theft by deception. If convicted on all counts, both Carlson and Adkins could be sentenced to more that 50 years in prison.
According to the Cumberland County District Attorney’s Office, Colonel Carlson is currently completing a “mail-in” arraignment through his local attorney. Prosecutors also expect Carlson to enter a not guilty plea, setting the stage for his court date later this spring. If the mail-in arraignment is concluded in the next 2-3 weeks (as expected), Mr. Clepper believes the case against the two officers could go to trial at the end of March.
Carlson and Adkins were classmates at the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks in Cumberland County (near Harrisburg), when the plot unfolded last spring. The mother of Carlson’s nine-year-old daughter requested an increase in child support, from $400-$600 a month. Due to Carlson’s assignment at the war college, the case wound up in the Pennsylvania court.
While Colonel Carlson had paid support in the past, he claimed that the child was not his, and asked for genetic testing to prove paternity. However, when Adkins showed up to provide a DNA sample, court personnel determined that he was not the same man who requested the paternity test. Fingerprints and other military records confirmed the attempted deception.
By the time investigators concluded their probe, both officers had completed the prestigious war college and moved on to other assignments, Adkins at Ft McPherson, Georgia, and Carlson in Egypt. While Mr. Clepper reports that Pennsylvania authorities had “initial difficulty” in getting Colonel Carlson back to the states for arraignment, he apparently returned from Egypt in early November. Carlson’s current assignment is also at Ft McPherson.
Despite his “not guilty” plea, Adkins has provided a statement to prosecutors, and Clepper said it is possible that the Lt Col may be called to testify against Carlson. Mr. Clepper indicated that Adkins’ information provided a better “timeline” of events associated with the case.
By comparison, Colonel Carlson has not offered information to Pennsylvania officials, and Clepper doesn’t expect him to. “That’s his right,” the prosecutor observed.
The assistant district attorney claims that the state will present compelling evidence when the case goes to trial. “I believe I can prove every element of these crimes, “ Clepper said in an interview, “if the defendants testify, or even if they don’t.”
Lawyers representing Carlson and Adkins did not immediately respond to e-mail requests for comment. However, Colonel Carlson and his attorney outlined a possible defense in December, at a court hearing on the child support issue.
During that proceeding, Carlson produced a letter that requested cancellation of last April’s DNA test. Mr. Clepper and court officials said it was the “first time” they had seen the letter. The Colonel did not explain why Adkins still appeared on the referenced date—posing as Carlson--and provided the DNA sample.
Adkins’ motivation for taking part in the scheme remains murky. In his statement to authorities, Lt Col Adkins said that he agreed to participate “to help [Colonel] Carlson save his marriage.” Prosecutor Clepper says he is unsure if Adkins had “other reasons” for assisting Carlson.
The two Army officers could go on trial as early as March 24th, based on the current court calendar—and the expected completion of Carlson’s mail-in arraignment. If that process is delayed, Clepper says the trial would begin on April 17th or May 19th.
Beyond their Pennsylvania court date, Carlson and Adkins could also face criminal prosecution from the Army. A decision on military charges is expected after completion of civilian proceedings against the two men.
Clepper describes the case as “one of the strangest” he's handled during his years as a prosecutor. The assistant district attorney says he can’t remember the last time an Army War College student faced felony charges in Cumberland County.
The program is considered the “capstone” of an officer’s military education. Selection for the course is highly competitive, and typically reserved for best and brightest officers in the armed forces. Many war college graduates go on to reach flag rank in their respective services.
But, a preliminary hearing in the Carlson-Adkins case raised questions about the officers' past conduct, and why they were selected for the course. A Cumberland County Domestic Relations Officer testified that the mother of Carlson's daughter--who filed the request for increased child support--was a soldier in the Colonel's battalion when their affair began.
Improper relationships between superiors and subordinates are prohibited under Army regulations, and may result in punishment under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Testimony at the January hearing also revealed that another soldier once accused Adkins of assault--a claim that was reflected in the Lieutenant Colonel's military records. The board that selected Adkins for the war college was almost certainly aware of the purported assault; it's unclear if Carlson's superiors were aware of his past affair with a subordinate.
Adkins and Carlson are not the first defendants accused of faking a paternity test in Cumberland County. In an earlier case, a man was charged with providing DNA to help his brother "beat" a paternity suit. Their plan eventually unraveled, and both men wound up in prison, after being convicted on lesser charges than those facing the Army officers.
Shoot to Kill
The USS Lake Erie (CG-70), which will attempt to shoot-down a defunct spy satellite with a specially-modified SM-3, surface-to-air missile (U.S. Navy photo via Wikipedia)
***
UPDATE//AP is now reporting that the shootdown may be delayed 24 hours, due to high seas in the area where the Lake Erie and its sister ships are positioned. The intercept will be attempted tonight only if weather conditions improve. A final decision on today's intercept attempt will be made late this afternoon, by Defense Secretary Robert Gates.
***
The Navy’s first attempt to shoot down a defunct spy satellite may occur as early as this afternoon, in the skies above the central Pacific.As the U.K. Register reports, the U.S. military has imposed a large exclusion zone near the Hawaiian Islands. The airspace directive, outlined in a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) issued on Sunday, bars flights over a 1400 x 700 square mile stretch of ocean, located southwest of Hawaii. According to the NOTAM, the restricted zone covers all airspace in the area, stretching from the ocean’s surface into space. Air traffic will not be allowed to enter the exclusion zone while it remains in effect.
The airspace restriction will be in effect between 0230 and 0500 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) on 21 February, or 4:30-7:00 p.m. today, Hawaii time. Amatuer satellite trackers calculate that the dead satellite will approach the exclusion zone about an hour after airspace restrictions go into effect. That means the most likely time for the first intercept attempt will be around 5:30 p.m. in Hawaii.
Three U.S. Navy vessels assigned to the shoot-down mission—the cruiser Lake Erie, and the destroyers Russell and Decatur—are already on station, southwest of Maui. Each ship contains at least one specially-modified SM-3 missile, designed to impact the dead spy satellite. The missiles were divided among the three ships to give the Pentagon more “options” for the intercept, in the event of guidance or interceptor problems on one of the vessels.
By slamming an SM-3 into the satellite, the military hopes to limit the amount of debris that survive re-entry, lessening the danger for people on the ground. Officials have expressed particular concern about the vehicle’s large propellant tank, filled with the toxic chemical hydrazine, which used in the satellite’s thrusters. If the tank falls to the earth intact, it could create a dangerous cloud of gas the size of two football fields.
But some analysts believe the hydrazine threat—and the SM-3’s ability to rupture the propellant tank—are overstated. When U.S. officials first announced that the satellite was returning to earth, the Commander of U.S. Northern Commander, General Gene Renuart, downplayed the risk posed by hydrazine. As the NORTHCOM CINC, General Renuart would lead the lead the initial military response to satellite wreckage (and chemicals) that land inside the CONUS.
However, other senior officers have emphasized the hydrazine threat as an impetus for the shootdown attempt. Still, at least one expert believes the chances that toxic propellant will land in a populated area—defined as more than one person per quarter hectacre--are no more than one-half of one percent. The same analyst, geographer Tim Gulden, pegs the chances of debris injuring someone on the ground at no more than “two in one thousand.”
Another researcher, MIT’s Geoffrey Forden, believes there’s about a “three percent” chance that the satellite’s hydrazine fuel will kill or injure someone on the ground (H/T Jeffrey Lewis at the Danger Room). But Forden's calculations consider every place on earth as a potential impact point, despite the fact that the risk, in some locations, is virtually nil.
By any standard, those are very slim odds, indeed. So, why spend $60 million for an attempted intercept that (might) prevent an extremely low-probability event? The real answer may lie in the platform’s sensors and other on-board technology. At the time of its launch in December 2006, U.S. 193 (the designation for the dead satellite) was considered state-of-the-art. It was developed under the ill-fated Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) program, an effort to build smaller and lighter satellites that were less vulnerable to enemy attack.
Due to excessive delays and cost overruns, FIA was cancelled in September 2005 by then-Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte. When U.S. 193 was launched 15 months later, the satellite contract had been returned to Lockheed-Martin, which built previous generations of U.S. overhead platforms. But U.S. 193 is believed to hold advanced technology associated with FIA, providing a potential windfall if sensitive components fall into the wrong hands.
On its present orbital path, the dead satellite makes several passes a day across China and Russia. Beijing is keenly interested in bettering its own spy satellites, and technology from U.S. 193 could help the Chinese improve their overhead sensors. Both Moscow and Beijing would also like to know the capabilities of our advanced imagery satellites--something they might be able to discern by recovering the "right" wreckage.
Intercepting the satellite with an SM-3 missile, the Pentagon hopes to shatter the platform’s sensitive components and puncture its hydrazine tank, reducing the threat of system compromise or toxic exposure on the ground. If the initial shoot-down effort fails--or weather conditions force a delay--the Navy will have a second window of opportunity about 13 hours later, beginning at 5:30 a.m., Thursday, Hawaii Time.
Tuesday, February 19, 2008
Casualties of War
The D-Day Memorial in Bedford, Virginia (PBS photo)
In their never-ending hunt for bad news in the War on Terror, MSM outlets have left no stone unturned—or story angle unexplored. Not long ago, The New York Times determined that combat duty had turned scores of veterans into deranged killers, based on its “analysis” of police and court records nationwide.
That sounded rather chilling until bloggers pointed out a little problem with the NYT narrative. In their rush to uncover killings and other acts of violence by combat vets, the paper (conveniently) forgot to compare those numbers to the general population. When that contrast is made, the story changes dramatically. Turns out that military vets are less likely to commit murders and other violent crimes than their civilian peers.
Now, USA Today is taking a different tack on the “toll of war” theme. Based on their review of Pentagon casualty lists, the paper concludes that some three dozen American cities, all with populations of more than 100,000, have not lost a service member in Iraq or Afghanistan.
According to the paper, that statistic proves “how sporadically the war has affected much of the American home front.” Various “experts” quoted by reporters Rick Hampson and Paul Overburg suggest that casualty patterns are a reflection of “where the military does its recruiting,” i.e., in small towns and rural areas. By comparison, they believe that some urban areas have suffered fewer casualties because “cities tend to have more viable economies than those [rural] places."
In other words, recruits from the sticks enlist in the armed forces because they no other options. Paging John Kerry.
And, if you take that analysis to its “logical” conclusion, one might conclude that the hinterlands are bearing an undue burden in the War on Terror. That would seem to be the case, particularly when larger cities like Oakland, California and Fort Lauderdale, Florida haven’t lost a single military member in combat since 2001.
But, it gets better. Here’s the take of William O’Hare, a University of New Hampshire demographer who has studied U.S. deaths in Iraq:
"There's a big random element in this…"Even in a city of 100,000, you're talking about a fairly small pool of recruit-age people."
Ya think?
Fact is, there is an awful randomness in combat deaths, and they reflect more than geography or economic opportunities. Depicted on a map, the town of Brook Park, Ohio (near Cleveland) would seem particularly hard-hit. During a five-day stretch in August 2005, 19 young men from the community died in Iraq. All were members of a Marine Reserve unit based in Brook Park. Fourteen died in one of the war’s deadliest roadside bombings, and five more perished while on sniper duty. Except for those terrible events, the war toll in Brook Park might rival that of Oakland or Fort Lauderdale.
On a personal note, we know several members of a Mississippi National Guard unit that pulled tough duty in Iraq a couple of years ago. Despite the hazards of daily patrols and frequent bomb attacks, the military police outfit completed its year-long deployment with only a few minor casualties. The Wisconsin unit that replaced wasn’t as lucky. Within a week of taking over their sector, five Wisconsin guardsmen died in combat, on the same streets that the Mississippians patrolled, largely without incident.
We are also reminded that young men (and women) join the military for a variety of reasons, including love of country and a desire to serve. Those factors also figure into the eventual casualty totals. Perhaps the desire to serve and sacrifice is stronger in small towns or rural regions than, say, Berkeley.
And maybe it’s easier to find recruits who meet military standards in those areas. Talk an armed forces recruiter, and they will tell you that cities are tough markets for more than economic reasons. Urban areas have higher crime rates, with more young people involved in drugs and criminal activities.
While much has been made of the military “lowering” recruiting standards, there is a limit to conduct that can be waivered. If fewer young people from cities are dying in Iraq and Afghanistan, it may be that fewer are eligible for military service. In fact, a 2006 Heritage Foundation study of military recruits found that poor areas—including urban neighborhoods--are proportionately underrepresented in the armed services (emphasis ours).
The same analysis also revealed that military enlistees are wealthier and better educated than their civilian peers. And, appropriately enough, Heritage researchers found that during one year of the study period (2003-2005), not a single resident of Congressman Charles Rangel’s Harlem district joined the armed forces. Congressman Rangel, you’ll recall, has long—and falsely--claimed that minorities and the poor are bearing the brunt of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan.
But such inconvenient facts are lost on the MSM, because they contradict long-established templates about “who fights” America’s wars. With that in mind, we can only imagine how USA Today would have covered the war news from Bedford, Virginia in 1944. Of the 35 soldiers from the town who took part in the Normandy invasion, 21 died on D-Day, including 19 who perished in just 15 minutes of fighting on Omaha Beach.
Bedford’s staggering casualties represented the highest per-capita loss of any American community during World War II. That doesn't mitigate the death toll from Iraq and Afghanistan, but it does provide a little perspective--something that's a bit lacking in the USA Today article.
That sounded rather chilling until bloggers pointed out a little problem with the NYT narrative. In their rush to uncover killings and other acts of violence by combat vets, the paper (conveniently) forgot to compare those numbers to the general population. When that contrast is made, the story changes dramatically. Turns out that military vets are less likely to commit murders and other violent crimes than their civilian peers.
Now, USA Today is taking a different tack on the “toll of war” theme. Based on their review of Pentagon casualty lists, the paper concludes that some three dozen American cities, all with populations of more than 100,000, have not lost a service member in Iraq or Afghanistan.
According to the paper, that statistic proves “how sporadically the war has affected much of the American home front.” Various “experts” quoted by reporters Rick Hampson and Paul Overburg suggest that casualty patterns are a reflection of “where the military does its recruiting,” i.e., in small towns and rural areas. By comparison, they believe that some urban areas have suffered fewer casualties because “cities tend to have more viable economies than those [rural] places."
In other words, recruits from the sticks enlist in the armed forces because they no other options. Paging John Kerry.
And, if you take that analysis to its “logical” conclusion, one might conclude that the hinterlands are bearing an undue burden in the War on Terror. That would seem to be the case, particularly when larger cities like Oakland, California and Fort Lauderdale, Florida haven’t lost a single military member in combat since 2001.
But, it gets better. Here’s the take of William O’Hare, a University of New Hampshire demographer who has studied U.S. deaths in Iraq:
"There's a big random element in this…"Even in a city of 100,000, you're talking about a fairly small pool of recruit-age people."
Ya think?
Fact is, there is an awful randomness in combat deaths, and they reflect more than geography or economic opportunities. Depicted on a map, the town of Brook Park, Ohio (near Cleveland) would seem particularly hard-hit. During a five-day stretch in August 2005, 19 young men from the community died in Iraq. All were members of a Marine Reserve unit based in Brook Park. Fourteen died in one of the war’s deadliest roadside bombings, and five more perished while on sniper duty. Except for those terrible events, the war toll in Brook Park might rival that of Oakland or Fort Lauderdale.
On a personal note, we know several members of a Mississippi National Guard unit that pulled tough duty in Iraq a couple of years ago. Despite the hazards of daily patrols and frequent bomb attacks, the military police outfit completed its year-long deployment with only a few minor casualties. The Wisconsin unit that replaced wasn’t as lucky. Within a week of taking over their sector, five Wisconsin guardsmen died in combat, on the same streets that the Mississippians patrolled, largely without incident.
We are also reminded that young men (and women) join the military for a variety of reasons, including love of country and a desire to serve. Those factors also figure into the eventual casualty totals. Perhaps the desire to serve and sacrifice is stronger in small towns or rural regions than, say, Berkeley.
And maybe it’s easier to find recruits who meet military standards in those areas. Talk an armed forces recruiter, and they will tell you that cities are tough markets for more than economic reasons. Urban areas have higher crime rates, with more young people involved in drugs and criminal activities.
While much has been made of the military “lowering” recruiting standards, there is a limit to conduct that can be waivered. If fewer young people from cities are dying in Iraq and Afghanistan, it may be that fewer are eligible for military service. In fact, a 2006 Heritage Foundation study of military recruits found that poor areas—including urban neighborhoods--are proportionately underrepresented in the armed services (emphasis ours).
The same analysis also revealed that military enlistees are wealthier and better educated than their civilian peers. And, appropriately enough, Heritage researchers found that during one year of the study period (2003-2005), not a single resident of Congressman Charles Rangel’s Harlem district joined the armed forces. Congressman Rangel, you’ll recall, has long—and falsely--claimed that minorities and the poor are bearing the brunt of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan.
But such inconvenient facts are lost on the MSM, because they contradict long-established templates about “who fights” America’s wars. With that in mind, we can only imagine how USA Today would have covered the war news from Bedford, Virginia in 1944. Of the 35 soldiers from the town who took part in the Normandy invasion, 21 died on D-Day, including 19 who perished in just 15 minutes of fighting on Omaha Beach.
Bedford’s staggering casualties represented the highest per-capita loss of any American community during World War II. That doesn't mitigate the death toll from Iraq and Afghanistan, but it does provide a little perspective--something that's a bit lacking in the USA Today article.
Today’s Reading Assignment
…From The Wall Street Journal editorial board, on House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s recent “offensive” against the warrantless wiretapping of suspected terrorists. By scuttling a bi-partisan compromise to extend the surveillance program, Ms. Pelosi and her allies have not only suspended reality—they’ve endangered the nation’s security as well. As the Journal observes:
For the next 9/11 Commission, we nominate the first witness: Silvestre Reyes, Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. He's the man now telling everyone to chill out, take it easy, there's nothing to worry about, after his fellow Democrats last week scuttled a bipartisan compromise on warrantless wiretapping of al Qaeda.
"It is an insult to the intelligence of the American people to say that we will be vulnerable unless we grant immunity for actions that happened years ago," Mr. Reyes wrote in a letter to President Bush. By "actions" he means the cooperation with U.S. intelligence by private telecom companies after 9/11, for which the companies now face more than 40 lawsuits.
Mr. Reyes's letter is a political keeper -- all the more so because it is so divorced from intelligence reality. Nearly every other professional says that Friday night's expiration of the wiretap law will do significant security harm.
Intelligence Chairman Jay Rockefeller, a Democrat, on the Senate floor last week: "What people have to understand around here is that the quality of the intelligence we are going to be receiving is going to be degraded. It is going to be degraded. It is already going to be degraded as telecommunications companies lose interest."
Reyes’s letter also affirms that he was a poor choice to lead the House intel committee, despite past service on the panel. In selecting Reyes, Ms. Pelosi bypassed a pair of better candidates, California Congresswoman Jane Harman, and Georgia Representative Sanford Bishop. But the speaker preferred a political ally for the intelligence post, and she found one in Mr. Reyes, who gladly affirmed Ms. Pelosi’s feckless position on the wiretapping bill.
Senator Rockefeller is understandably upset with the actions of House Democrats--and well he should be. In a shameless bit of pandering to the party’s radical left and trial lawyer constituencies, Ms. Pelosi, Mr. Reyes and their cohorts undermined a piece of carefully-crafted legislation, aimed at sustaining the flow of intelligence information on suspected terrorists.
But such concerns (apparently) mean little to Speaker Pelosi and her intel committee chair. And that raises a larger, equally disturbing question, articulated by Bill Kristol in his latest column in The New York Times: Is this generation of Democrats capable of governing? On the essential issues of intelligence and national security, the answer seems painfully obvious.
For the next 9/11 Commission, we nominate the first witness: Silvestre Reyes, Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. He's the man now telling everyone to chill out, take it easy, there's nothing to worry about, after his fellow Democrats last week scuttled a bipartisan compromise on warrantless wiretapping of al Qaeda.
"It is an insult to the intelligence of the American people to say that we will be vulnerable unless we grant immunity for actions that happened years ago," Mr. Reyes wrote in a letter to President Bush. By "actions" he means the cooperation with U.S. intelligence by private telecom companies after 9/11, for which the companies now face more than 40 lawsuits.
Mr. Reyes's letter is a political keeper -- all the more so because it is so divorced from intelligence reality. Nearly every other professional says that Friday night's expiration of the wiretap law will do significant security harm.
Intelligence Chairman Jay Rockefeller, a Democrat, on the Senate floor last week: "What people have to understand around here is that the quality of the intelligence we are going to be receiving is going to be degraded. It is going to be degraded. It is already going to be degraded as telecommunications companies lose interest."
Reyes’s letter also affirms that he was a poor choice to lead the House intel committee, despite past service on the panel. In selecting Reyes, Ms. Pelosi bypassed a pair of better candidates, California Congresswoman Jane Harman, and Georgia Representative Sanford Bishop. But the speaker preferred a political ally for the intelligence post, and she found one in Mr. Reyes, who gladly affirmed Ms. Pelosi’s feckless position on the wiretapping bill.
Senator Rockefeller is understandably upset with the actions of House Democrats--and well he should be. In a shameless bit of pandering to the party’s radical left and trial lawyer constituencies, Ms. Pelosi, Mr. Reyes and their cohorts undermined a piece of carefully-crafted legislation, aimed at sustaining the flow of intelligence information on suspected terrorists.
But such concerns (apparently) mean little to Speaker Pelosi and her intel committee chair. And that raises a larger, equally disturbing question, articulated by Bill Kristol in his latest column in The New York Times: Is this generation of Democrats capable of governing? On the essential issues of intelligence and national security, the answer seems painfully obvious.
Checking Intelligence Reform
Monday’s Washington Post htmlhad a rather interesting—and timely--column by Jack Devine, a former senior CIA official. As Mr. Devine reminds us, with the latest “reform” of the U.S. intelligence community approaching its fourth anniversary, Congress should take another look at the effort, and determine what progress (if any) has been made.
In the aftermath of 9-11, it was obvious that our intelligence apparatus was in need of serious repairs. But, as the retired CIA officer observes, the foundation for reform had its own flaws. Legislation passed by Congress—the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act in December 2004—was based on hastily-adopted recommendations from by the 9-11 Commission, eagerly embraced by politicians of both parties…
“Unfortunately, it [reform legislation] was too quickly seized upon and endorsed by presidential candidate John Kerry and seconded, apparently without serious reflection, by the Bush administration. The proposed reforms were only briefly debated in Congress and were adopted without any serious public discussion of their merits.
Professionals who had spent their careers in the trenches tackling the complexity of the intelligence business were largely sidelined from the decision process. Regrettably, the commission's report was viewed as sacrosanct, and nobody dared challenge its recommendations, despite the fact that many intelligence professionals believed creation of a director of national intelligence would only lead to additional layers of bureaucracy and lack the teeth to bring all the diverse intelligence entities into line.
Nonetheless, Congress easily passed the measure, which afforded the DNI only limited authority over the 16 agencies in the intelligence community. The legislation simply didn't give the DNI the budgetary muscle needed to lead the intelligence community, and it created a troublesome confusion here and abroad regarding precisely who is in charge.
Today, the DNI has become what intelligence professionals feared it would: an unnecessary bureaucratic contraption with an amazingly large staff. It certainly had to be taken as a lack of confidence in the DNI's viability when its first occupant, John Negroponte, stepped down to become second in command at the State Department.”
The result, as Mr. Devine observes, is a DNI who has marginal control over many of the entities that make up his sprawling community. He believes our restructured intel system has also created problems abroad, as evidenced by a recent trip to Pakistan by the Director of National Intelligence, retired Admiral Mike McConnell, and the CIA Director, General Michael Hayden. The intelligence officials were dispatched to Islamabad to press Pakistani officials for a stronger U.S. presence in Pakistan’s tribal lands, to battle Al Qaida. They left empty-handed.
Devine also believes (not surprisingly) that intelligence reform has had a negative impact on his old employer—the CIA:
The passage of time has not significantly enhanced the power of the DNI, but it has diminished the role of the CIA, our nation's preeminent human intelligence agency -- much to the detriment of our national security. Despite this situation, McConnell has, to his credit, agreed to take on the monumental task of trying to reform the intelligence process in what must by now be largely a thankless task.
[snip]
The good news is that since 9/11 the intelligence budget has grown significantly, to approximately $43 billion, and there has been a sizable infusion of operational and analytical positions.
But are we getting full bang for the buck? How much has it really improved our intelligence capabilities, and has it helped to overcome the information-sharing obstacles that were so frequently discussed after Sept. 11? An amount on the order of $43 billion ought to buy a great deal of intelligence firepower and operational influence.
Most important, are we anywhere near where we need to be in penetrating the terrorist organizations that threaten us, as well as the nation-states that represent serious national security challenges: Iran, North Korea, Russia, China and an increasingly unstable Pakistan? Enough time has elapsed since Congress legislated these changes in 2004 to merit an evaluation of the new bureaucracy. Has this bureaucratic superstructure enhanced our intelligence capabilities? Does it deserve a passing grade for its efforts?
Moreover, the intelligence shortcomings that surfaced in the run-up to the Iraq war, as well as the misreading of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities, also speak to the value of conducting a fresh and in-depth evaluation of precisely how well the issues of politicization, collection and analysis are being addressed by the intelligence community. This review can be expected to recommend adjustments that surely are needed -- including dismantling the DNI if necessary and reinvigorating an authentic CIA.
Admittedly, the CIA has suffered greatly in recent years primarily because of policy shortfalls and leadership issues. But no one should underestimate the quality of its staff, its foreign ties and its unique capabilities, which are the cornerstone of the intelligence community. These strengths remain the base for building a robust intelligence agency.
And there’s the rub. While the CIA still retains unique capabilities—and the services of many outstanding intelligence professionals—there is little doubt that the agency remains in crisis. Indeed, many of the problems identified by the 9-11 Commission and the Robb Commission can be traced directly to a CIA that was outmoded, inefficient and some would say, incompetent, during the run-up to the terrorist attacks of seven years ago.
Had the “pros” at Langley been doing their job, it might be argued; the nation might have been spared the horrors of 9-11, and provided better insight into such critical issues as Iraq’s WMD program, and the nuclear efforts of Iran and North Korea. More disturbingly, there is scant evidence that the CIA’s performance has improved since 2004. If anything, elements within the agency remain deeply polarized and politicized, conducting a running war with the White House, the Pentagon and rival intelligence organizations.
Writing in the current issue of the Weekly Standard, Michael Rubin explains the problem rather succinctly. Not satisfied with developing intelligence information and providing analysis—two of the CIA’s core missions—agency personnel have repeatedly tried to set U.S. policy, with little regard for the potential consequences. This trend, Rubin notes, was particularly evident in post-war Iraq:
Rather than simply present the biographies of the various Iraqi figures, the CIA sought to be a privileged policy player. Its representative announced that not only would Langley be inviting its own candidates outside the interagency consensus, but the CIA would not be sharing the names or backgrounds of its invitees. Putting aside the ridiculousness of the CIA belief that it could invite delegates anonymously to a public conference, more troubling was the principle. Far from limiting its work to intelligence, the CIA leadership was unabashedly involving itself in major policy initiatives.
[snip]
Many of the agency's senior analysts are arrogant after years behind their computers, believing they know far better what U.S. policy should be than the policymakers for whom they draft reports. The recourse of the disgruntled, bored, or politicized analyst is the leak--the bread and butter of any national security correspondent. Journalists who fulfill the leakers' objectives win ever more tantalizing scoops; those who maintain professional integrity and question the agenda behind any leak, find their access cut. The result is a situation in which journalists that might otherwise double-check sources, take a single intelligence analyst at his word, even if he is using them to fight a policy battle.
More recently, CIA efforts at setting policy were evident in the controversial National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran’s nuclear program. While “officially” a product of the 16 organizations that make up the nation’s intel community, the estimate was based heavily on analysis provided by the CIA. The report’s key judgment--that Iran had “halted” its nuclear program for more than three years, beginning in 2003—not only reversed previous not only reversed previous assessments, it also undercut the case for potential military action against Tehran.
Since then, senior intel officials have been backing away from the controversial NIE. In his testimony before Congress earlier this month, DNI McConnell acknowledged that Iran is still pursuing uranium enrichment, which he described as “the most difficult challenge in nuclear production.” He also admitted that, due to “intelligence gaps,” the U.S. could not be sure if Iran also suspended covert nuclear activities. In other words, Admiral McConnell provided a pair of stunning caveats to the supposedly-authoritative NIE.
Four years into the latest intel reform effort, the audit suggested by Mr. Devine has clear merit, and should be pursued by Congress and the next administration. But, his suggested return to the “old” intelligence system, with the CIA in the lead, is simply ridiculous. The intelligence community of the 1990s, led by the DCI, set the stage for the twin debacles of 9-11 and assessments of Iraq’s WMD program. And, with no evidence of change in the organizational “culture” at Langley, the notion of turning back the clock is hardly a plan for reform--or better intelligence. Rather, it’s a recipe for the continued politicization of intelligence, and more flawed analysis on critical national security issues.
In the aftermath of 9-11, it was obvious that our intelligence apparatus was in need of serious repairs. But, as the retired CIA officer observes, the foundation for reform had its own flaws. Legislation passed by Congress—the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act in December 2004—was based on hastily-adopted recommendations from by the 9-11 Commission, eagerly embraced by politicians of both parties…
“Unfortunately, it [reform legislation] was too quickly seized upon and endorsed by presidential candidate John Kerry and seconded, apparently without serious reflection, by the Bush administration. The proposed reforms were only briefly debated in Congress and were adopted without any serious public discussion of their merits.
Professionals who had spent their careers in the trenches tackling the complexity of the intelligence business were largely sidelined from the decision process. Regrettably, the commission's report was viewed as sacrosanct, and nobody dared challenge its recommendations, despite the fact that many intelligence professionals believed creation of a director of national intelligence would only lead to additional layers of bureaucracy and lack the teeth to bring all the diverse intelligence entities into line.
Nonetheless, Congress easily passed the measure, which afforded the DNI only limited authority over the 16 agencies in the intelligence community. The legislation simply didn't give the DNI the budgetary muscle needed to lead the intelligence community, and it created a troublesome confusion here and abroad regarding precisely who is in charge.
Today, the DNI has become what intelligence professionals feared it would: an unnecessary bureaucratic contraption with an amazingly large staff. It certainly had to be taken as a lack of confidence in the DNI's viability when its first occupant, John Negroponte, stepped down to become second in command at the State Department.”
The result, as Mr. Devine observes, is a DNI who has marginal control over many of the entities that make up his sprawling community. He believes our restructured intel system has also created problems abroad, as evidenced by a recent trip to Pakistan by the Director of National Intelligence, retired Admiral Mike McConnell, and the CIA Director, General Michael Hayden. The intelligence officials were dispatched to Islamabad to press Pakistani officials for a stronger U.S. presence in Pakistan’s tribal lands, to battle Al Qaida. They left empty-handed.
Devine also believes (not surprisingly) that intelligence reform has had a negative impact on his old employer—the CIA:
The passage of time has not significantly enhanced the power of the DNI, but it has diminished the role of the CIA, our nation's preeminent human intelligence agency -- much to the detriment of our national security. Despite this situation, McConnell has, to his credit, agreed to take on the monumental task of trying to reform the intelligence process in what must by now be largely a thankless task.
[snip]
The good news is that since 9/11 the intelligence budget has grown significantly, to approximately $43 billion, and there has been a sizable infusion of operational and analytical positions.
But are we getting full bang for the buck? How much has it really improved our intelligence capabilities, and has it helped to overcome the information-sharing obstacles that were so frequently discussed after Sept. 11? An amount on the order of $43 billion ought to buy a great deal of intelligence firepower and operational influence.
Most important, are we anywhere near where we need to be in penetrating the terrorist organizations that threaten us, as well as the nation-states that represent serious national security challenges: Iran, North Korea, Russia, China and an increasingly unstable Pakistan? Enough time has elapsed since Congress legislated these changes in 2004 to merit an evaluation of the new bureaucracy. Has this bureaucratic superstructure enhanced our intelligence capabilities? Does it deserve a passing grade for its efforts?
Moreover, the intelligence shortcomings that surfaced in the run-up to the Iraq war, as well as the misreading of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities, also speak to the value of conducting a fresh and in-depth evaluation of precisely how well the issues of politicization, collection and analysis are being addressed by the intelligence community. This review can be expected to recommend adjustments that surely are needed -- including dismantling the DNI if necessary and reinvigorating an authentic CIA.
Admittedly, the CIA has suffered greatly in recent years primarily because of policy shortfalls and leadership issues. But no one should underestimate the quality of its staff, its foreign ties and its unique capabilities, which are the cornerstone of the intelligence community. These strengths remain the base for building a robust intelligence agency.
And there’s the rub. While the CIA still retains unique capabilities—and the services of many outstanding intelligence professionals—there is little doubt that the agency remains in crisis. Indeed, many of the problems identified by the 9-11 Commission and the Robb Commission can be traced directly to a CIA that was outmoded, inefficient and some would say, incompetent, during the run-up to the terrorist attacks of seven years ago.
Had the “pros” at Langley been doing their job, it might be argued; the nation might have been spared the horrors of 9-11, and provided better insight into such critical issues as Iraq’s WMD program, and the nuclear efforts of Iran and North Korea. More disturbingly, there is scant evidence that the CIA’s performance has improved since 2004. If anything, elements within the agency remain deeply polarized and politicized, conducting a running war with the White House, the Pentagon and rival intelligence organizations.
Writing in the current issue of the Weekly Standard, Michael Rubin explains the problem rather succinctly. Not satisfied with developing intelligence information and providing analysis—two of the CIA’s core missions—agency personnel have repeatedly tried to set U.S. policy, with little regard for the potential consequences. This trend, Rubin notes, was particularly evident in post-war Iraq:
Rather than simply present the biographies of the various Iraqi figures, the CIA sought to be a privileged policy player. Its representative announced that not only would Langley be inviting its own candidates outside the interagency consensus, but the CIA would not be sharing the names or backgrounds of its invitees. Putting aside the ridiculousness of the CIA belief that it could invite delegates anonymously to a public conference, more troubling was the principle. Far from limiting its work to intelligence, the CIA leadership was unabashedly involving itself in major policy initiatives.
[snip]
Many of the agency's senior analysts are arrogant after years behind their computers, believing they know far better what U.S. policy should be than the policymakers for whom they draft reports. The recourse of the disgruntled, bored, or politicized analyst is the leak--the bread and butter of any national security correspondent. Journalists who fulfill the leakers' objectives win ever more tantalizing scoops; those who maintain professional integrity and question the agenda behind any leak, find their access cut. The result is a situation in which journalists that might otherwise double-check sources, take a single intelligence analyst at his word, even if he is using them to fight a policy battle.
More recently, CIA efforts at setting policy were evident in the controversial National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran’s nuclear program. While “officially” a product of the 16 organizations that make up the nation’s intel community, the estimate was based heavily on analysis provided by the CIA. The report’s key judgment--that Iran had “halted” its nuclear program for more than three years, beginning in 2003—not only reversed previous not only reversed previous assessments, it also undercut the case for potential military action against Tehran.
Since then, senior intel officials have been backing away from the controversial NIE. In his testimony before Congress earlier this month, DNI McConnell acknowledged that Iran is still pursuing uranium enrichment, which he described as “the most difficult challenge in nuclear production.” He also admitted that, due to “intelligence gaps,” the U.S. could not be sure if Iran also suspended covert nuclear activities. In other words, Admiral McConnell provided a pair of stunning caveats to the supposedly-authoritative NIE.
Four years into the latest intel reform effort, the audit suggested by Mr. Devine has clear merit, and should be pursued by Congress and the next administration. But, his suggested return to the “old” intelligence system, with the CIA in the lead, is simply ridiculous. The intelligence community of the 1990s, led by the DCI, set the stage for the twin debacles of 9-11 and assessments of Iraq’s WMD program. And, with no evidence of change in the organizational “culture” at Langley, the notion of turning back the clock is hardly a plan for reform--or better intelligence. Rather, it’s a recipe for the continued politicization of intelligence, and more flawed analysis on critical national security issues.
Sunday, February 17, 2008
Half-a-Loaf
The Air Force's troubled C-5 modernization program got a bit of good news the other day, with word that 47 of the newer airlifters will receive both engine and avionics upgrades.
John Young, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, signed off on the plan Thursday, according to Delware Senator Tom Carper. A press release from Carper's office announced that the service's C-5Bs, built during the 1980s, will get new engines and improved avionics under the program. More than 50 older C-5As, which date from the 1970s, will receive the avoinics upgrade.
Carper has been a strong supporter of modernizing the C-5 fleet, which includes jets based at Dover AFB in his home state.
Under the original proposal, both C-5A and B models were slated for full upgrades. But severe cost overruns put the program in jeopardy. A limited modernization for the C-5A is expected to save the Pentagon more than $10 billion. The cost estimate for the revised upgrade program is now pegged at $7.7 billion, compared to last year's $17.5 billion price tag for modernizing the entire C-5 fleet.
But the pared-down upgrade program will leave the service with large numbers of older C-5s that are anything but fuel-efficient. Engine upgrades are supposed to improve the Galaxy's fuel efficiency by at least 15%, but those savings won't be realized among the A models, operated mostly by Air Guard and Air Force Reserve units.
A partial modernization of the C-5 fleet is better than nothing. But it also leaves the Air Force in something of a quandry. With limited purchases of the new C-17, the service needs C-5s to transport out-sized cargo and heavy loads. But without new engines, the C-5As will prove increasingly expensive to operate, at a time when jet fuel prices are rising steadily. We wonder how much of the money "saved" by limiting upgrades for the C-5A will be consumed by higher operating costs over the next couple of decades.
John Young, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, signed off on the plan Thursday, according to Delware Senator Tom Carper. A press release from Carper's office announced that the service's C-5Bs, built during the 1980s, will get new engines and improved avionics under the program. More than 50 older C-5As, which date from the 1970s, will receive the avoinics upgrade.
Carper has been a strong supporter of modernizing the C-5 fleet, which includes jets based at Dover AFB in his home state.
Under the original proposal, both C-5A and B models were slated for full upgrades. But severe cost overruns put the program in jeopardy. A limited modernization for the C-5A is expected to save the Pentagon more than $10 billion. The cost estimate for the revised upgrade program is now pegged at $7.7 billion, compared to last year's $17.5 billion price tag for modernizing the entire C-5 fleet.
But the pared-down upgrade program will leave the service with large numbers of older C-5s that are anything but fuel-efficient. Engine upgrades are supposed to improve the Galaxy's fuel efficiency by at least 15%, but those savings won't be realized among the A models, operated mostly by Air Guard and Air Force Reserve units.
A partial modernization of the C-5 fleet is better than nothing. But it also leaves the Air Force in something of a quandry. With limited purchases of the new C-17, the service needs C-5s to transport out-sized cargo and heavy loads. But without new engines, the C-5As will prove increasingly expensive to operate, at a time when jet fuel prices are rising steadily. We wonder how much of the money "saved" by limiting upgrades for the C-5A will be consumed by higher operating costs over the next couple of decades.
Disinformation
Both the Russians and Chinese have long excelled at the art of deception, and those skills are evident in rhetoric regarding U.S. plans to shoot down a defunct spy satellite.
In recent days, both Moscow and Beijing have warned that the planned intercept is little more than a thinly-veiled test of U.S. missile defenses, or anti-satellite weapons. The latest verbal blast came Saturday from the Russian Defense Ministry, which warned that the U.S. had "failed to provide enough arguments" to justify shooting down the satellite. As the AP reports:
"There is an impression that the United States is trying to use the accident with its satellite to test its national anti-missile defense system's capability to destroy other countries' satellites," the ministry said.
As with any viable deception effort, there appears to be an element of truth in claims from the Russias and Chinese. The AEGIS cruisers and SM-3 missiles (which will be used in the attempted intercept) form the sea-based leg of U.S. ballistic missile defense efforts. And the dead satellite is the type of space vehicle that would be targeted by ASAT weapons, a spy platform in low earth orbit.
Still, there are obvious differences between the planned shootdown and dedicated ASAT programs, being pursued by both Moscow and Beijing. A little over a year ago, China conducted a controversial test of a "killer" satellite, which maneuvered close to an obsolete weather bird and destroyed it, creating a large "cloud" of space debris. Not only was the killer vehicle specifically designed for that purpose, the intercept took place at a much higher altitude than the planned U.S. intercept.
By comparison, the attempted shootdown of our dead spy satellite will occur at the upper reaches of the SM-3's engagement envelope. And, both the missile and the launch vessel's AEGIS radar have been specially modified for the intercept. At the present time, there are only three Navy cruisers with this (limited) capability, and those ships have only a handful of SM-3 SAMs capable of engaging the dead satellite. Transforming the AEGIS/SM-3 combination into a dedicated ASAT platform would require extensive, additional modifications, including a larger missile that could actually reach LEO satellites.
With their "attack satellite," Beijing already has a weapon for the ASAT mission. The Chinese are also working feverishly on high-powered, ground-based lasers that could blind sensors on spy satellites operating in low orbit. Months before last year's ASAT test, U.S. imagery analysts noticed an experimental PRC laser "tracking" an American satellite as it passed overhead.
While the laser was never fired, the message sent a clear message: China is matching its military doctrine with action. Various PRC military analysts have written extensively about the need to challenge U.S. capabilities in space, and various ASAT programs pose a direct threat to our spy satellites (and other platforms) in low orbits around the earth.
As for the Russians, their opposition to American missile defense is well-known. But Moscow rarely mentions its own efforts to counter our BMD systems, most notably the hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) program. Moscow's HGV has been tested on several occasions and has received personal support from Russian President Vladimir Putin. Launched from an ICBM, the hypersonic vehicle maneuvers to its target at a relatively shallow angle (compared to a missile warhead), making it difficult to detect--and almost impossible to shootdown.
For public consumption, both Moscow and Beijing have pressed for new treaties on space weapons, casting U.S. programs as provocative and dangerous. But, the Russian and Chinese proposals make no mention of systems like Russia's HGV, or Beijing's anti-satellite lasers. In other words, negotiators from the two countries want to limit U.S. capabilities in the BMD and ASAT arenas, while severely limiting their own concessions.
The Bush Administration has (rightly) ignored Russian and Chinese claims about our missile defense programs and the pending satellite intercept. But, the position of a Hillary Clinton or Barack Obama administration is less clear. Former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, who is key member of Obama's foreign policy team, paid a visit to Syria this week--and a member of Ms. Clinton's staff was a part of that delegation.
That little trip suggests that the leading Democratic presidential candidates are willing to negotiate with just about anyone--even America's sworn enemies. With the advice of someone like Mr. Brzezinski (best remembered for Jimmy Carter's foreign policy debacles) we can only imagine how our BMD programs will fare.
As for an ASAT effort, forget it. The U.S. officially shuttered its anti-satellite program in the mid-1980s, and succesive administrations have shown little inclination to resurrect it. Unlike its counterparts in Moscow and Beijing, the United States is actually serious about preventing the militarization of space. Russian and Chinese claims are little more than self-serving rhetoric--disinformation at its best.
In recent days, both Moscow and Beijing have warned that the planned intercept is little more than a thinly-veiled test of U.S. missile defenses, or anti-satellite weapons. The latest verbal blast came Saturday from the Russian Defense Ministry, which warned that the U.S. had "failed to provide enough arguments" to justify shooting down the satellite. As the AP reports:
"There is an impression that the United States is trying to use the accident with its satellite to test its national anti-missile defense system's capability to destroy other countries' satellites," the ministry said.
As with any viable deception effort, there appears to be an element of truth in claims from the Russias and Chinese. The AEGIS cruisers and SM-3 missiles (which will be used in the attempted intercept) form the sea-based leg of U.S. ballistic missile defense efforts. And the dead satellite is the type of space vehicle that would be targeted by ASAT weapons, a spy platform in low earth orbit.
Still, there are obvious differences between the planned shootdown and dedicated ASAT programs, being pursued by both Moscow and Beijing. A little over a year ago, China conducted a controversial test of a "killer" satellite, which maneuvered close to an obsolete weather bird and destroyed it, creating a large "cloud" of space debris. Not only was the killer vehicle specifically designed for that purpose, the intercept took place at a much higher altitude than the planned U.S. intercept.
By comparison, the attempted shootdown of our dead spy satellite will occur at the upper reaches of the SM-3's engagement envelope. And, both the missile and the launch vessel's AEGIS radar have been specially modified for the intercept. At the present time, there are only three Navy cruisers with this (limited) capability, and those ships have only a handful of SM-3 SAMs capable of engaging the dead satellite. Transforming the AEGIS/SM-3 combination into a dedicated ASAT platform would require extensive, additional modifications, including a larger missile that could actually reach LEO satellites.
With their "attack satellite," Beijing already has a weapon for the ASAT mission. The Chinese are also working feverishly on high-powered, ground-based lasers that could blind sensors on spy satellites operating in low orbit. Months before last year's ASAT test, U.S. imagery analysts noticed an experimental PRC laser "tracking" an American satellite as it passed overhead.
While the laser was never fired, the message sent a clear message: China is matching its military doctrine with action. Various PRC military analysts have written extensively about the need to challenge U.S. capabilities in space, and various ASAT programs pose a direct threat to our spy satellites (and other platforms) in low orbits around the earth.
As for the Russians, their opposition to American missile defense is well-known. But Moscow rarely mentions its own efforts to counter our BMD systems, most notably the hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) program. Moscow's HGV has been tested on several occasions and has received personal support from Russian President Vladimir Putin. Launched from an ICBM, the hypersonic vehicle maneuvers to its target at a relatively shallow angle (compared to a missile warhead), making it difficult to detect--and almost impossible to shootdown.
For public consumption, both Moscow and Beijing have pressed for new treaties on space weapons, casting U.S. programs as provocative and dangerous. But, the Russian and Chinese proposals make no mention of systems like Russia's HGV, or Beijing's anti-satellite lasers. In other words, negotiators from the two countries want to limit U.S. capabilities in the BMD and ASAT arenas, while severely limiting their own concessions.
The Bush Administration has (rightly) ignored Russian and Chinese claims about our missile defense programs and the pending satellite intercept. But, the position of a Hillary Clinton or Barack Obama administration is less clear. Former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, who is key member of Obama's foreign policy team, paid a visit to Syria this week--and a member of Ms. Clinton's staff was a part of that delegation.
That little trip suggests that the leading Democratic presidential candidates are willing to negotiate with just about anyone--even America's sworn enemies. With the advice of someone like Mr. Brzezinski (best remembered for Jimmy Carter's foreign policy debacles) we can only imagine how our BMD programs will fare.
As for an ASAT effort, forget it. The U.S. officially shuttered its anti-satellite program in the mid-1980s, and succesive administrations have shown little inclination to resurrect it. Unlike its counterparts in Moscow and Beijing, the United States is actually serious about preventing the militarization of space. Russian and Chinese claims are little more than self-serving rhetoric--disinformation at its best.
Friday, February 15, 2008
Some Belated Thoughts...
..on last weekend's "buzz job," by a pair of Russian TU-95 Bear bombers, which overflew the USS Nimitz in the western Pacific.
True, this is another indication of more aggressive flights by Russia's long-range bomber force. According to Sky News, it was the first time in four years that Russian bombers have flown in close proximity to an American carrier. Last year, TU-95s flew a similar provocative profile in the region, passing within 200 miles of the U.S. bomber base on Guam. Initially, Moscow claimed that the Bears passed over the island, but that assertion was quickly refuted.
This time around, one of the Russian bombers reportedly flew within 2000 feet of the Nimitiz--close quarters by an standard (the other Bear was reportedly orbiting 50 miles away). But, as the TU-95 buzzed, the carrier, it was escorted by U.S. F/A-18s, part of the extensive air defense shield that protects the Nimitz and other carrier battle groups.
And, here's probably the most revealing nugget from the Sky report:
"When the bombers got to within 500 miles, four FA-18 fighters were scrambled."
So, in other words, the Bears' appearance was hardly a surprise. With available SIGINT cueing, the bombers were detected and tracked long before they appeared over the Pacific, allowing the Hornets to launch and intercept the approaching TU-95s. The F/A-18s probably appeared on the Bear's wing before they entered the employment zone of the anti-ship missiles that can be carried by Russian bombers.
That sent the type of message that the U.S. Navy has long registered with Moscow's bomber force. TU-95s (and other strategic bombers) may have the range to "reach" a carrier battle group, but those aircraft--and their missiles--would be shot down long before they could do any harm.
The Russians can claim a minor propaganda victory with their little fly-by, but if you're a TU-95 pilot, it's a little disconcerting to look out your window and see an F/A-18--literally loaded for "Bear"--flying off your wing. Not to mention those AEGIS cruisers and destroyers that surround the carrier, with hundreds of bomber-killing SM-2s in their vertical launch cannisters, just waiting for a target.
True, this is another indication of more aggressive flights by Russia's long-range bomber force. According to Sky News, it was the first time in four years that Russian bombers have flown in close proximity to an American carrier. Last year, TU-95s flew a similar provocative profile in the region, passing within 200 miles of the U.S. bomber base on Guam. Initially, Moscow claimed that the Bears passed over the island, but that assertion was quickly refuted.
This time around, one of the Russian bombers reportedly flew within 2000 feet of the Nimitiz--close quarters by an standard (the other Bear was reportedly orbiting 50 miles away). But, as the TU-95 buzzed, the carrier, it was escorted by U.S. F/A-18s, part of the extensive air defense shield that protects the Nimitz and other carrier battle groups.
And, here's probably the most revealing nugget from the Sky report:
"When the bombers got to within 500 miles, four FA-18 fighters were scrambled."
So, in other words, the Bears' appearance was hardly a surprise. With available SIGINT cueing, the bombers were detected and tracked long before they appeared over the Pacific, allowing the Hornets to launch and intercept the approaching TU-95s. The F/A-18s probably appeared on the Bear's wing before they entered the employment zone of the anti-ship missiles that can be carried by Russian bombers.
That sent the type of message that the U.S. Navy has long registered with Moscow's bomber force. TU-95s (and other strategic bombers) may have the range to "reach" a carrier battle group, but those aircraft--and their missiles--would be shot down long before they could do any harm.
The Russians can claim a minor propaganda victory with their little fly-by, but if you're a TU-95 pilot, it's a little disconcerting to look out your window and see an F/A-18--literally loaded for "Bear"--flying off your wing. Not to mention those AEGIS cruisers and destroyers that surround the carrier, with hundreds of bomber-killing SM-2s in their vertical launch cannisters, just waiting for a target.
Shot of the Day
A hat tip to Noah Shachtman at the Danger Room, for linking to one of the strangest North Korean photos we’ve ever seen--or, perhaps we should say purported DPRK photos (more on that in a bit). Originally posted at TheFirearmBlog, the photograph shows AK-47 assault rifles mounted on the barrels of S-60 anti-aircraft artillery guns.
Obviously, you don’t need to be an air defense analyst to understand that AKs bolted onto AAA weapons don’t have much value, at least from a tactical standpoint. And in a training role, their utility is only slightly better. The range of an assault rifle is far shorter (300 meters) than the S-60 (12,000 meters), and the ballistics of their rounds are vastly different as well.
Beyond basic proficiency skills (point, aim shoot), a AAA crew wouldn’t gain much training from firing a barrel-mounted AK, instead of the anti-aircraft gun. Besides, how would the gun crews fire the AK-47 as a training device? There’s no sign of a remote trigger device (i.e., a long string) in the photo. And a slow-moving or stationary target on the ground is no substitute for the towed aerial "sleeves" or drones that are often used to train AAA gunners. So much for the idea that the barrel-mounted AKs provide meaningful training.
If the photo is legit (and some folks have their doubts), it would raise additional questions about the training of North Korean AAA crews, and the viability of their air defense system. The radar-guided S-60 is one of the most widely deployed air defense weapons in the DPRK; it forms the background of North Korea’s AAA network. There are literally thousands of S-60s in Pyongyang’s inventory, and despite their age, North Korea remains committed to fielding and sustaining the AD system.
So, if DPRK anti-aircraft crews are using AK-47s as training devices, it could mean that Pyongyang is having difficulty in producing (and maintaining) sufficient quantities of 57 mm ammunition. If confirmed, that would be something of a revelation, since manufacturing 57 mm high explosive shells is a relatively inexpensive and low-tech process.
Put another way: if Kim Jong-il can’t produce enough 57 mm shells for realistic air defense training, things must really be bad in military units that use larger quantities of ammunition, or more expensive rounds (say, artillery and tank units).
Still, we’ll take the photo with a large grain of salt. A PhotoShop prank can’t be ruled out, and some have suggested that the photo isn’t from North Korea, citing the Chinese characters that appear in the background. But that would make the photo even more bizarre.
With China’s huge trade surplus, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is positively awash in cash, and (presumably), they can afford sufficient quantities of 57 mm AAA shells for training—not to mention the more expensive air defense systems that Beijing has acquired in recent years, including the state-of-the-art, Russian-built, SA-20 SAM system.
***
ADDENDUM: A former colleague who looked at the photo is convinced it’s from China, not North Korea. To his knowledge, the DPRK never used whitewall tires on military equipment displayed in parades. On the other hand, those 1950s-style tires are often seen on wheeled military vehicles and trailers paraded by the PLA.
Obviously, you don’t need to be an air defense analyst to understand that AKs bolted onto AAA weapons don’t have much value, at least from a tactical standpoint. And in a training role, their utility is only slightly better. The range of an assault rifle is far shorter (300 meters) than the S-60 (12,000 meters), and the ballistics of their rounds are vastly different as well.
Beyond basic proficiency skills (point, aim shoot), a AAA crew wouldn’t gain much training from firing a barrel-mounted AK, instead of the anti-aircraft gun. Besides, how would the gun crews fire the AK-47 as a training device? There’s no sign of a remote trigger device (i.e., a long string) in the photo. And a slow-moving or stationary target on the ground is no substitute for the towed aerial "sleeves" or drones that are often used to train AAA gunners. So much for the idea that the barrel-mounted AKs provide meaningful training.
If the photo is legit (and some folks have their doubts), it would raise additional questions about the training of North Korean AAA crews, and the viability of their air defense system. The radar-guided S-60 is one of the most widely deployed air defense weapons in the DPRK; it forms the background of North Korea’s AAA network. There are literally thousands of S-60s in Pyongyang’s inventory, and despite their age, North Korea remains committed to fielding and sustaining the AD system.
So, if DPRK anti-aircraft crews are using AK-47s as training devices, it could mean that Pyongyang is having difficulty in producing (and maintaining) sufficient quantities of 57 mm ammunition. If confirmed, that would be something of a revelation, since manufacturing 57 mm high explosive shells is a relatively inexpensive and low-tech process.
Put another way: if Kim Jong-il can’t produce enough 57 mm shells for realistic air defense training, things must really be bad in military units that use larger quantities of ammunition, or more expensive rounds (say, artillery and tank units).
Still, we’ll take the photo with a large grain of salt. A PhotoShop prank can’t be ruled out, and some have suggested that the photo isn’t from North Korea, citing the Chinese characters that appear in the background. But that would make the photo even more bizarre.
With China’s huge trade surplus, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is positively awash in cash, and (presumably), they can afford sufficient quantities of 57 mm AAA shells for training—not to mention the more expensive air defense systems that Beijing has acquired in recent years, including the state-of-the-art, Russian-built, SA-20 SAM system.
***
ADDENDUM: A former colleague who looked at the photo is convinced it’s from China, not North Korea. To his knowledge, the DPRK never used whitewall tires on military equipment displayed in parades. On the other hand, those 1950s-style tires are often seen on wheeled military vehicles and trailers paraded by the PLA.
Thursday, February 14, 2008
Your Government Schools at Work
We saw this survey in USA Today last week, but we're still stunned by the results.
Here's how it was conducted: researchers asked 2,000 high school students to name the "10 Most Famous Americans in History." Presidents and First Ladies could not be listed.
Using those criteria, here's what those high school juniors came up with, with the percentage who chose each of the individuals who made the list:
1. Martin Luther King Jr.: 67%
2. Rosa Parks: 60%
3. Harriet Tubman: 44%
4. Susan B. Anthony: 34%
5. Benjamin Franklin: 29%
6. Amelia Earhart: 25%
7. Oprah Winfrey: 22%
8. Marilyn Monroe: 19%
9. Thomas Edison: 18%
10. Albert Einstein: 16%
And predictably, the list is being hailed as a blow for diversity in education:
Sam Wineburg, the Stanford University education and history professor who led the study along with Chauncey Monte-Sano of the University of Maryland, says the prominence of black Americans signals "a profound change" in how we see history.
"Over the course of about 44 years, we've had a revolution in the people who we come to think about to represent the American story," Wineburg says.
"There's a kind of shift going on, from the narrative of the founders, which is the national mythic narrative, to the narrative of expanding rights," he says.
We'd say it's more proof that our schools are doing a lousy job of teaching history, and in particular, American history. While some of the individuals clearly belong on the list, including Dr. Martin Luther King and Benjamin Franklin, many of the "most famous" listed by high schoolers are nothing more than minor historical figures, at best.
Amelia Earhart? Among women in aviation, Jacqueline Cochran had a far greater impact that Ms. Earhart, but few students have ever heard of Ms. Cochran. And for that matter, whatever happened to the Wright Brothers, Charles Lindbergh, Chuck Yeager or Neil Armstrong? Apparently, it's not enough to develop powered flight, complete the first non-stop trans-Atlantic flight, break the sound barrier or be the first man to set foot on the moon. Disappearing on a round-the-world flight is a guaranteed ticket to lasting fame.
Some of the other names on the list are equally puzzling. Why did Harriet Tubman make the cut, while Frederick Douglass did not? Among the founding fathers, Benjamin Franklin is certainly worthy of mention, but so are Alexander Hamilton, John Hancock, and Tom Paine, to name a few.
There are only two scientists or inventors who made the Top 10 (Edison and Einstein); apparently, most high school students are unaware of such giants as George Washington Carver, Henry Ford, Jonas Salk, Alexander Graham Bell, and Philo Farnsworth, among others. Just for kicks, ask your high schooler to name Mr. Farnsworth's most famous invention.
And don't get me started on Oprah and Marilyn Monroe making the list.
But maybe we're being unfair to the students. Afterall, they were asked to compile a list of the "most famous" Americans. As we all know, fame doesn't necessarily translate to a life of accomplishment, or lasting contributions to our society. With the exception of those individuals at numbers one, five and nine on the survey, this is a terrible list.
We'll close with an equally chilling thought: give our public education system another 20 years, and think about the folks who will make the list in 2028.
Here's how it was conducted: researchers asked 2,000 high school students to name the "10 Most Famous Americans in History." Presidents and First Ladies could not be listed.
Using those criteria, here's what those high school juniors came up with, with the percentage who chose each of the individuals who made the list:
1. Martin Luther King Jr.: 67%
2. Rosa Parks: 60%
3. Harriet Tubman: 44%
4. Susan B. Anthony: 34%
5. Benjamin Franklin: 29%
6. Amelia Earhart: 25%
7. Oprah Winfrey: 22%
8. Marilyn Monroe: 19%
9. Thomas Edison: 18%
10. Albert Einstein: 16%
And predictably, the list is being hailed as a blow for diversity in education:
Sam Wineburg, the Stanford University education and history professor who led the study along with Chauncey Monte-Sano of the University of Maryland, says the prominence of black Americans signals "a profound change" in how we see history.
"Over the course of about 44 years, we've had a revolution in the people who we come to think about to represent the American story," Wineburg says.
"There's a kind of shift going on, from the narrative of the founders, which is the national mythic narrative, to the narrative of expanding rights," he says.
We'd say it's more proof that our schools are doing a lousy job of teaching history, and in particular, American history. While some of the individuals clearly belong on the list, including Dr. Martin Luther King and Benjamin Franklin, many of the "most famous" listed by high schoolers are nothing more than minor historical figures, at best.
Amelia Earhart? Among women in aviation, Jacqueline Cochran had a far greater impact that Ms. Earhart, but few students have ever heard of Ms. Cochran. And for that matter, whatever happened to the Wright Brothers, Charles Lindbergh, Chuck Yeager or Neil Armstrong? Apparently, it's not enough to develop powered flight, complete the first non-stop trans-Atlantic flight, break the sound barrier or be the first man to set foot on the moon. Disappearing on a round-the-world flight is a guaranteed ticket to lasting fame.
Some of the other names on the list are equally puzzling. Why did Harriet Tubman make the cut, while Frederick Douglass did not? Among the founding fathers, Benjamin Franklin is certainly worthy of mention, but so are Alexander Hamilton, John Hancock, and Tom Paine, to name a few.
There are only two scientists or inventors who made the Top 10 (Edison and Einstein); apparently, most high school students are unaware of such giants as George Washington Carver, Henry Ford, Jonas Salk, Alexander Graham Bell, and Philo Farnsworth, among others. Just for kicks, ask your high schooler to name Mr. Farnsworth's most famous invention.
And don't get me started on Oprah and Marilyn Monroe making the list.
But maybe we're being unfair to the students. Afterall, they were asked to compile a list of the "most famous" Americans. As we all know, fame doesn't necessarily translate to a life of accomplishment, or lasting contributions to our society. With the exception of those individuals at numbers one, five and nine on the survey, this is a terrible list.
We'll close with an equally chilling thought: give our public education system another 20 years, and think about the folks who will make the list in 2028.
BMD to the Rescue
The Associated Press is reporting that the Pentagon will attempt to shoot down a disabled U.S. spy satellite before it falls to earth in early March.
Speaking on the condition of anonymity, a Defense Department official said that a U.S. Navy vessel, modified for ballistic missile defense, will fire several interceptor missiles at the satellite before it re-enters the earth's atmosphere.
A date for the intercept was not revealed. Details of the plan are expected to be released later, at a Pentagon briefing. The intercept is expected to occur before the missile plunges back to earth next month.
Speaking on the condition of anonymity, a Defense Department official said that a U.S. Navy vessel, modified for ballistic missile defense, will fire several interceptor missiles at the satellite before it re-enters the earth's atmosphere.
A date for the intercept was not revealed. Details of the plan are expected to be released later, at a Pentagon briefing. The intercept is expected to occur before the missile plunges back to earth next month.
Blasting the satellite before it reenters the atmosphere will decrease the dangers from hazardous materials carried on the space vehicle, and lessen chances that sensitive technology could fall into the wrong hands.
The disabled spy platform has a large fuel tank filled with hydrazine, used to power the satellite's thrusters. Experts are concerned that the tank could survive re-entry and break apart upon reaching the earth, spreading the toxic fuel across populated areas. The satellite also has smaller quantities of hazardous materials in its sensors, which pose a lesser hazard.
The missile intercept is also aimed at destroying or damaging sensitive equipment on the satellite--technology that could help adversaires determine our surveillance capabilities, or imrove their own overhead systems.
While DoD hasn't revealed the ship that will carry out the intercept, that assignment will almost certainly fall on an AEGIS cruiser, equipped with SM-3 interceptor missiles. The SM-3 is designed specifically for ballistic missile defense, with the ability to hit targets at extremely high altitudes. U.S. alllies are also participating in the SM-3 program. The most recent (and successful) test of the missile was conducted in December, from a Japanese AEGIS destroyer.
While intercepting any high-velocity target is difficult, the returning spy satellite should be (slightly) easier to hit than a missile reentry vehicle. The satellite will present a much larger target, and the SM-3's discrimination algorithims allow it to compare objects within the target scene. Obviously, there's no guarantee of a successful intercept, but the SM-3/AEGIS combination is more than capable of identifying and engaging the satellite, creating smaller pieces of debris that pose less of a threat.
Needless to say, a successful engagement will also provide a big boost for ballistic missile defense, and (in particular) the Navy leg of that program. The mobility of sea-based BMD systems make them particularly attractive, and it's a given that the Navy will make hay of the event--assuming that the AEGIS system and SM-3 perform as advertised.
The Last Ace?
Retired Air Force Lieutenant General Charles Cleveland recently became the Air Force’s newest fighter ace. But it took a long time—55 years—and tremendous effort for Cleveland to receive credit for his fifth kill, joining the ranks of the world's greatest combat pilots.
As a young fighter pilot in Korea, Cleveland quickly proved his mettle. Flying F-85 Sabres from Kimpo Airbase near Seoul, then-Lieutenant Cleveland shot down four Russian-built MiG-15s in his first eight weeks of combat.
"Each of those dogfights is burned in my brain," he told Staff Sergeant Matthew Bates of the Air Force News Agency. "I can remember every minute of those battles like it happened yesterday."
Equally vivid is another encounter with enemy MiGs, on September 21, 1952. Cleveland and the rest of his flight found themselves in a swirling dogfight against a similar number of MiG-15s. Cleveland positioned his F-86 behind the North Korean jet and opened fire with the Sabre’s 50-caliber machineguns. Some of the rounds clearly struck the MiG-15, which began trailing smoke and descended rapidly.
Unfortunately, Cleveland couldn’t confirm the crash of the enemy fighter. To receive credit for a confirmed kill, U.S. flyers had to see “a fire that wouldn’t go out, watch the enemy plane crash, or observe the enemy pilot eject.” As the MiG-15 began its descent, Cleveland’s wingman called a break, to avoid being targeted by other enemy jets.
Cleveland lost sight of the damaged MiG and claimed a “probable kill” during his debrief. He finished his Korea tour with four confirmed kills, two probables and four damaged—“a record any pilot would be proud of,” the general observed.
The subject of the “missing MiG” surfaced again years later, when General Cleveland attended a gathering of the American Fighter Aces Association. At the meeting, he ran into a fellow West Point graduate, Dolph Overton, who also served as an F-86 pilot during the Korean War. Overton owns the distinction of becoming an ace in near-record time, shooting down five North Korean aircraft in only four days—during his second combat tour of the war.
After hearing Cleveland’s story about the unconfirmed kill, Overton took it upon himself to verify the claim. The Air Force Board for Military Corrections initially rejected Overton’s appeal, claiming that personal accounts from General Cleveland, his wingman and the unit’s operations officer (legendary fighter ace Major General Frederick “Boots” Blesse) were not sufficient to change existing records.
Then, Overton made a crucial discovery. While it was no secret that many North Korean MiGs were flown by Russian pilots, records of their missions were unavailable for many years. But in 2003, Overton learned that thousands of pages of Russian flight records from the war had been released, and copies were available in the National Archives. Researching the new information, Overton found an account of a downed MiG that seemed to match that of General Cleveland.
With the new information, Overton, General Blesse and General Cleveland appeared again before the corrections board last year. In January, Cleveland received a call at his home in Montgomery, Alabama, informing him that the board had changed its mind. Almost 56 years after that dogfight over Korea, Charles Cleveland finally got his fifth kill, and officially became an ace.
And, there’s an outside chance that General Cleveland will enter the history books as our last fighter ace. The days of titanic dogfights are largely past; the Vietnam War produced only five aces (three Air Force, two Navy). In recent years, only a handful of pilots have earned multiple kills, with most adversaries electing not to challenge our control of the skies. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Cesar Rodriguez, an F-15 pilot, shot down two Iraqi jets during Operation Desert Storm, and Serbian MiG during the allied air campaign against Serbia in 1999.
An F-16 pilot, Captain Robert Wright matched Rodriguez’s total in a single day (28 February 1994), shooting down three Serb attack jets as they bombed a Muslim facility in Bosnia. There’s some belief that Wright might have downed all six aircraft in the Serb flight, had AWACS been quicker in authorizing him to fire, and if the F-16 pilot had not been required to read a warning to the enemy pilots before launching his missiles.
As air combat victories become increasingly rare—and pilots from World War II and Korea pass on—the number of living aces continues to decline. With confirmation of his fifth kill, General Cleveland becomes a belated member of a very elite--but dwindling--fraternity.
As a young fighter pilot in Korea, Cleveland quickly proved his mettle. Flying F-85 Sabres from Kimpo Airbase near Seoul, then-Lieutenant Cleveland shot down four Russian-built MiG-15s in his first eight weeks of combat.
"Each of those dogfights is burned in my brain," he told Staff Sergeant Matthew Bates of the Air Force News Agency. "I can remember every minute of those battles like it happened yesterday."
Equally vivid is another encounter with enemy MiGs, on September 21, 1952. Cleveland and the rest of his flight found themselves in a swirling dogfight against a similar number of MiG-15s. Cleveland positioned his F-86 behind the North Korean jet and opened fire with the Sabre’s 50-caliber machineguns. Some of the rounds clearly struck the MiG-15, which began trailing smoke and descended rapidly.
Unfortunately, Cleveland couldn’t confirm the crash of the enemy fighter. To receive credit for a confirmed kill, U.S. flyers had to see “a fire that wouldn’t go out, watch the enemy plane crash, or observe the enemy pilot eject.” As the MiG-15 began its descent, Cleveland’s wingman called a break, to avoid being targeted by other enemy jets.
Cleveland lost sight of the damaged MiG and claimed a “probable kill” during his debrief. He finished his Korea tour with four confirmed kills, two probables and four damaged—“a record any pilot would be proud of,” the general observed.
The subject of the “missing MiG” surfaced again years later, when General Cleveland attended a gathering of the American Fighter Aces Association. At the meeting, he ran into a fellow West Point graduate, Dolph Overton, who also served as an F-86 pilot during the Korean War. Overton owns the distinction of becoming an ace in near-record time, shooting down five North Korean aircraft in only four days—during his second combat tour of the war.
After hearing Cleveland’s story about the unconfirmed kill, Overton took it upon himself to verify the claim. The Air Force Board for Military Corrections initially rejected Overton’s appeal, claiming that personal accounts from General Cleveland, his wingman and the unit’s operations officer (legendary fighter ace Major General Frederick “Boots” Blesse) were not sufficient to change existing records.
Then, Overton made a crucial discovery. While it was no secret that many North Korean MiGs were flown by Russian pilots, records of their missions were unavailable for many years. But in 2003, Overton learned that thousands of pages of Russian flight records from the war had been released, and copies were available in the National Archives. Researching the new information, Overton found an account of a downed MiG that seemed to match that of General Cleveland.
With the new information, Overton, General Blesse and General Cleveland appeared again before the corrections board last year. In January, Cleveland received a call at his home in Montgomery, Alabama, informing him that the board had changed its mind. Almost 56 years after that dogfight over Korea, Charles Cleveland finally got his fifth kill, and officially became an ace.
And, there’s an outside chance that General Cleveland will enter the history books as our last fighter ace. The days of titanic dogfights are largely past; the Vietnam War produced only five aces (three Air Force, two Navy). In recent years, only a handful of pilots have earned multiple kills, with most adversaries electing not to challenge our control of the skies. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Cesar Rodriguez, an F-15 pilot, shot down two Iraqi jets during Operation Desert Storm, and Serbian MiG during the allied air campaign against Serbia in 1999.
An F-16 pilot, Captain Robert Wright matched Rodriguez’s total in a single day (28 February 1994), shooting down three Serb attack jets as they bombed a Muslim facility in Bosnia. There’s some belief that Wright might have downed all six aircraft in the Serb flight, had AWACS been quicker in authorizing him to fire, and if the F-16 pilot had not been required to read a warning to the enemy pilots before launching his missiles.
As air combat victories become increasingly rare—and pilots from World War II and Korea pass on—the number of living aces continues to decline. With confirmation of his fifth kill, General Cleveland becomes a belated member of a very elite--but dwindling--fraternity.
Wednesday, February 13, 2008
Justice Served
William Gladstone was wrong: justice delayed isn’t always justice denied, though victims of terror (and their familes) might argue otherwise.
Consider the case of Imad Mughniyeh. Over a “career” that lasted more than 25 years, Mughniyeh, a shadowy, but important Hizballah commander, was responsible for a series of high profile attacks that killed scores of Americans and other westerners. Yet, he somehow escaped retribution.
Remember the blasts that shattered our embassy in Beirut in 1983 and 1984? The bombing of compounds housing U.S. Marines and French troops near the Beirut airport in October 1983? The murder of a Navy diver during the hijacking of TWA flight 847 in 1985? Or attacks against Jewish targets in Argentina in 1992 and 1994? All were the handiwork of Imad Mughniyeh.
Before 9-11, he had (arguably) killed more Americans than any other terrorist, and he made the FBI’s first list of “most wanted” terror leaders. But Mughniyeh proved elusive; various reports put him in his native village in southern Lebanon, or in Iran, which reportedly granted a diplomatic passport. Efforts to find Mughniyeh and bring him to justice proved unsuccessful.
Until yesterday, that is. Hizballah has confirmed that Mughniyeh died Tuesday in a car bombing in Damascus. The blast has hallmarks of a Mossad operation, but the Israeli government has refused comment on the matter.
Mughniyeh’s death represents a major blow for Hizballah. Along with his skills in organizing terrorist operations, Mughniyeh was credited with organizing the group’s defenses during the 2006 war with Israel. He also served as a primary liaison between the group and its patrons in Iran. In fact, Mughniyeh also held a position in the Iranian Quods Force, which provides extensive training and support for Hizballah.
Tuesday’s car bombing is also an embarrassment for Damascus, at least officially. A number of terror groups maintain offices in the Syrian capital, and operate there with relative impunity. As the Washington Post observed, the successful effort to eliminate Mughniyeh represents a “major breach” in Syria’s police-state security apparatus.
Still, that doesn’t answer the question of who dispatched Imad Mughniyeh. Israeli operatives are the most logical suspects; as Bill Roggio notes, Mughniyeh’s assassination bears an uncanny resemblance to a 2004 Mossad operation against a top Hamas operative in Damascus. In both cases, the terrorists were killed by a well-placed car bombs that devastated the driver’s compartment, but did little damage to the rest of the vehicle, and surrounding buildings.
But car-bombing is also a favored assassination technique of Syrian security organizations, employed on numerous occasions against Lebanese politicians. Had Mughniyeh run afoul of his Syrian hosts, or were Bashir Assad’s security forces simply asleep at the switch?
Mughniyeh died in a Damascus neighborhood that’s home to an Iranian school and the headquarters of the Syrian intelligence service; in that location, as Meir Javedanfar writes at PJM, you’d think that security would be tighter. Mr. Javedanfar believes that the successful “hit” against Mughniyeh indicates that western intelligence has penetrated Iran’s security services, allowing them to successfully track--and target—a Hizballah official who was known for his attention to personal security.
Israel maintains that it played no role in the assassination of Mughniyeh, and (officially) we may never know who was responsible for the operation. But, thanks to that well-executed bombing in Damascus, justice has finally been served on Imad Muchniyeh, and a man who murdered hundreds of Americans has met the fate he deserved.
Consider the case of Imad Mughniyeh. Over a “career” that lasted more than 25 years, Mughniyeh, a shadowy, but important Hizballah commander, was responsible for a series of high profile attacks that killed scores of Americans and other westerners. Yet, he somehow escaped retribution.
Remember the blasts that shattered our embassy in Beirut in 1983 and 1984? The bombing of compounds housing U.S. Marines and French troops near the Beirut airport in October 1983? The murder of a Navy diver during the hijacking of TWA flight 847 in 1985? Or attacks against Jewish targets in Argentina in 1992 and 1994? All were the handiwork of Imad Mughniyeh.
Before 9-11, he had (arguably) killed more Americans than any other terrorist, and he made the FBI’s first list of “most wanted” terror leaders. But Mughniyeh proved elusive; various reports put him in his native village in southern Lebanon, or in Iran, which reportedly granted a diplomatic passport. Efforts to find Mughniyeh and bring him to justice proved unsuccessful.
Until yesterday, that is. Hizballah has confirmed that Mughniyeh died Tuesday in a car bombing in Damascus. The blast has hallmarks of a Mossad operation, but the Israeli government has refused comment on the matter.
Mughniyeh’s death represents a major blow for Hizballah. Along with his skills in organizing terrorist operations, Mughniyeh was credited with organizing the group’s defenses during the 2006 war with Israel. He also served as a primary liaison between the group and its patrons in Iran. In fact, Mughniyeh also held a position in the Iranian Quods Force, which provides extensive training and support for Hizballah.
Tuesday’s car bombing is also an embarrassment for Damascus, at least officially. A number of terror groups maintain offices in the Syrian capital, and operate there with relative impunity. As the Washington Post observed, the successful effort to eliminate Mughniyeh represents a “major breach” in Syria’s police-state security apparatus.
Still, that doesn’t answer the question of who dispatched Imad Mughniyeh. Israeli operatives are the most logical suspects; as Bill Roggio notes, Mughniyeh’s assassination bears an uncanny resemblance to a 2004 Mossad operation against a top Hamas operative in Damascus. In both cases, the terrorists were killed by a well-placed car bombs that devastated the driver’s compartment, but did little damage to the rest of the vehicle, and surrounding buildings.
But car-bombing is also a favored assassination technique of Syrian security organizations, employed on numerous occasions against Lebanese politicians. Had Mughniyeh run afoul of his Syrian hosts, or were Bashir Assad’s security forces simply asleep at the switch?
Mughniyeh died in a Damascus neighborhood that’s home to an Iranian school and the headquarters of the Syrian intelligence service; in that location, as Meir Javedanfar writes at PJM, you’d think that security would be tighter. Mr. Javedanfar believes that the successful “hit” against Mughniyeh indicates that western intelligence has penetrated Iran’s security services, allowing them to successfully track--and target—a Hizballah official who was known for his attention to personal security.
Israel maintains that it played no role in the assassination of Mughniyeh, and (officially) we may never know who was responsible for the operation. But, thanks to that well-executed bombing in Damascus, justice has finally been served on Imad Muchniyeh, and a man who murdered hundreds of Americans has met the fate he deserved.
Military Voters March With McCain
As in the recent Florida and South Carolina primaries, yesterday's vote in Virginia revealed strong support for John McCain among military personnel and veterans.
Voting patterns in Virginia's 95 counties and 39 indepedent cities reveal that the Arizona Senator achieved some of his largest victory margins in the state's 2nd Congressional District, which is home to a host of Navy facilities, including the Norfolk Navy Base; the Naval Air Station at Oceana, and the Little Creek Amphibious Base in Virginia Beach.
McCain racked up similar totals in the adjacent 1st Congressional District, which contains the giant Northrup-Grumman shipyard in Newport News; Langley AFB in neighboring Hampton; a pair of Army installations (Ft Eustis and Ft Monroe), and the Yorktown Naval Weapons Station.
While the 2nd District has been a marginally Republican area in recent elections (Republican Congresswoman Velma Drake was reelected in a tight race two years ago), the area's electorate has the second-highest concentration of military and veterans in the nation. The 1st District has been solidly Republican for more than a decade, thanks--in part--to large blocs of military voters in areas like York County, Gloucester County and Poquoson.
On Tuesday, both areas went for McCain by large margins. In the Second District, the Senator won easily over Mike Huckabee in the military communities of Portsmouth (49-43%); Norfolk (53-37%) and Virginia Beach (53-38%). McCain's totals in those communities helped offset Huckabee's advantage in the rural counties of western and southern Virginia.
McCain carried the First District by similar margins. While he beat Huckabee in Hampton (home of Langley AFB) by only three points, 47-44%, McCain rolled up larger margins in the cities of Newport News (49-43%); Poquoson (51-39%); York County (49-42%) and Gloucester County (48-43%).
The Arizona Senator also scored well among military voters in Virginia's Eighth Congressional District, home to active duty personnel, retirees and veterans who work in Washington, or its southern suburbs. In Fairfax County, McCain more than doubled Huckabee's vote total (64-24%) and ran strongly in nearby Loudon County (which he carried by 57-32% margin).
If there's a dark lining in McCain's Virginia win, it could be seen in some of the Republican precincts of the Tidewater Peninsula. At mid-day Tuesday, turnout in the town of Poquoson was running below projections, according to one official. Poquoson, which lies adjacent to Langley AFB, is perhaps the "reddest" community in a region where Republicans outnumber Democrats.
A friend of ours who votes at a school in York County school (less than 10 miles away) reported similar numbers. He arrived at the polling place just after lunch and described it as a "ghost town," with more election officials outnumbering voters. Statewide, Republican voting totals ran well behind those of Democrats.
That's not completely unexpected, but a low turnout in places like Poquoson and York County suggests that many GOP voters stayed home--another indication of the fence-mending that McCain must do, if he hopes to carry Virginia in November.
Voting patterns in Virginia's 95 counties and 39 indepedent cities reveal that the Arizona Senator achieved some of his largest victory margins in the state's 2nd Congressional District, which is home to a host of Navy facilities, including the Norfolk Navy Base; the Naval Air Station at Oceana, and the Little Creek Amphibious Base in Virginia Beach.
McCain racked up similar totals in the adjacent 1st Congressional District, which contains the giant Northrup-Grumman shipyard in Newport News; Langley AFB in neighboring Hampton; a pair of Army installations (Ft Eustis and Ft Monroe), and the Yorktown Naval Weapons Station.
While the 2nd District has been a marginally Republican area in recent elections (Republican Congresswoman Velma Drake was reelected in a tight race two years ago), the area's electorate has the second-highest concentration of military and veterans in the nation. The 1st District has been solidly Republican for more than a decade, thanks--in part--to large blocs of military voters in areas like York County, Gloucester County and Poquoson.
On Tuesday, both areas went for McCain by large margins. In the Second District, the Senator won easily over Mike Huckabee in the military communities of Portsmouth (49-43%); Norfolk (53-37%) and Virginia Beach (53-38%). McCain's totals in those communities helped offset Huckabee's advantage in the rural counties of western and southern Virginia.
McCain carried the First District by similar margins. While he beat Huckabee in Hampton (home of Langley AFB) by only three points, 47-44%, McCain rolled up larger margins in the cities of Newport News (49-43%); Poquoson (51-39%); York County (49-42%) and Gloucester County (48-43%).
The Arizona Senator also scored well among military voters in Virginia's Eighth Congressional District, home to active duty personnel, retirees and veterans who work in Washington, or its southern suburbs. In Fairfax County, McCain more than doubled Huckabee's vote total (64-24%) and ran strongly in nearby Loudon County (which he carried by 57-32% margin).
If there's a dark lining in McCain's Virginia win, it could be seen in some of the Republican precincts of the Tidewater Peninsula. At mid-day Tuesday, turnout in the town of Poquoson was running below projections, according to one official. Poquoson, which lies adjacent to Langley AFB, is perhaps the "reddest" community in a region where Republicans outnumber Democrats.
A friend of ours who votes at a school in York County school (less than 10 miles away) reported similar numbers. He arrived at the polling place just after lunch and described it as a "ghost town," with more election officials outnumbering voters. Statewide, Republican voting totals ran well behind those of Democrats.
That's not completely unexpected, but a low turnout in places like Poquoson and York County suggests that many GOP voters stayed home--another indication of the fence-mending that McCain must do, if he hopes to carry Virginia in November.
Strapping It On
Strategy Page is reporting that Iran has improved the accuracy of its Zelzal 2 rockets, and it is providing the same capability to Syria.
The Zelzal 2 is an Iranian copy of the old Russian FROG-7 battlefield rocket. FROG is actually an acronym (Free Rocket Over Ground), which tells you something about its accuracy. Properly stabilized, the FROG can land within 800 meters of its target, making it useful against large facilities like ports, airfields, or massed troop concentrations.
Now, Iran is offering a strap-on guidance kit for the Zelzal 2, improving the rocket’s accuracy from 2400 feet, to just 300 feet. The Zelzal still isn’t a precision weapon, but a CEP (circular error of probability) of 100 feet represents a quantum leap in the system’s accuracy, particularly when you consider that the rocket can carry chemical or biological weapons.
Details on the new guidance system are still sketchy. The strap-on kit may contain a small inertial navigation unit, or it may utilize data from U.S. GPS satellites, Russia’s GLONASS system, or the European Galileo constellation, which is still under construction. There is also the outside chance that the strap-on guidance system may accept data from all three systems, improving performance in a jamming environment.
Strap-on guidance technology is hardly new—it’s the basic difference between a “dumb” bomb and smart weapons like JDAM. But the new kit represents a major advance for Iran, which has hundreds of older SCUD missiles and battlefield rockets that could be outfitted with the system.
Where did the technology come from? It’s only a theory, but we’d guess China. While Iran could develop a guidance kit on its own, Beijing has shown tremendous interest in strap-on guidance systems in recent years. Some reports suggest that scores of older (and somewhat inaccurate) missiles have been outfitted with the new guidance systems, greatly improving their accuracy. Most of the Chinese missiles are within range of Taiwan, and they are nuclear-capable. The sudden acquisition—and export—of a strap-on guidance system for the Zelzal suggests that Tehran had outside assistance with the project.
Potentially, there’s a large market for an “after-market” guidance kit for various ballistic missiles and battlefield rockets. Scores of countries around the world operate older SCUD and FROG-7 variants. Compared to the cost of newer (and more accurate) systems like the Russian SS-21, it’s far easier—and cheaper—to upgrade FROG or Zelzal airframes with a strap-on guidance kit.
Syria already has a limited number of SS-21s in its inventory, but the Iranian deal allows Damascus to upgrade its older rockets, giving them a CEP similar to that of the newer missile. That, in turn, would allow Syrian to target Israel with a more accurate rocket and missile barrage, using chemical and biological warheads.
The Zelzal 2 is an Iranian copy of the old Russian FROG-7 battlefield rocket. FROG is actually an acronym (Free Rocket Over Ground), which tells you something about its accuracy. Properly stabilized, the FROG can land within 800 meters of its target, making it useful against large facilities like ports, airfields, or massed troop concentrations.
Now, Iran is offering a strap-on guidance kit for the Zelzal 2, improving the rocket’s accuracy from 2400 feet, to just 300 feet. The Zelzal still isn’t a precision weapon, but a CEP (circular error of probability) of 100 feet represents a quantum leap in the system’s accuracy, particularly when you consider that the rocket can carry chemical or biological weapons.
Details on the new guidance system are still sketchy. The strap-on kit may contain a small inertial navigation unit, or it may utilize data from U.S. GPS satellites, Russia’s GLONASS system, or the European Galileo constellation, which is still under construction. There is also the outside chance that the strap-on guidance system may accept data from all three systems, improving performance in a jamming environment.
Strap-on guidance technology is hardly new—it’s the basic difference between a “dumb” bomb and smart weapons like JDAM. But the new kit represents a major advance for Iran, which has hundreds of older SCUD missiles and battlefield rockets that could be outfitted with the system.
Where did the technology come from? It’s only a theory, but we’d guess China. While Iran could develop a guidance kit on its own, Beijing has shown tremendous interest in strap-on guidance systems in recent years. Some reports suggest that scores of older (and somewhat inaccurate) missiles have been outfitted with the new guidance systems, greatly improving their accuracy. Most of the Chinese missiles are within range of Taiwan, and they are nuclear-capable. The sudden acquisition—and export—of a strap-on guidance system for the Zelzal suggests that Tehran had outside assistance with the project.
Potentially, there’s a large market for an “after-market” guidance kit for various ballistic missiles and battlefield rockets. Scores of countries around the world operate older SCUD and FROG-7 variants. Compared to the cost of newer (and more accurate) systems like the Russian SS-21, it’s far easier—and cheaper—to upgrade FROG or Zelzal airframes with a strap-on guidance kit.
Syria already has a limited number of SS-21s in its inventory, but the Iranian deal allows Damascus to upgrade its older rockets, giving them a CEP similar to that of the newer missile. That, in turn, would allow Syrian to target Israel with a more accurate rocket and missile barrage, using chemical and biological warheads.
Tuesday, February 12, 2008
Those Who Can't, Teach...
Retired Teacher Reveals He Was Illiterate Until Age 48.
But, John Corcoran still insists that he was an effective educator:
For 17 years Corcoran taught high school for the Oceanside School District. Relying on teacher's assistants for help and oral lesson plans, he said he did a great job at teaching his students.
"What I did was I created an oral and visual environment. There wasn't the written word in there. I always had two or three teacher's assistants in each class to do board work or read the bulletin," said Corcoran.
Wonder how Corcoran's former pupils feel about that "oral and visual" environment that he created. Wonder how many of them wound up in remedial education programs, because their teacher couldn't read.
Still, as a former teacher, there's something fishy about this story. Two or three teacher's assistants in each class? Oceanside must have been one wealthy school systemin Corcoran's day. And what about his annual evaluations? Didn't the principal or the observer notice something funny about Corcoran's lesson plans--or the fact that he never wrote anything on the board?
Then, there's the matter of the work assigned to his many assistants. Over the course of 17 years, you'd think that one or two would complain about having to do the teacher's job--on an aide's salary.
Sadly, Corcoran's tale may sound implausible, but it's hardly impossible. Public education in America has been in serious trouble for a long, long time, and we can only wonder how many other John Corcorans are still lurking in our classrooms.
In case you're wondering, the National Education Association remains adamantly opposed to teacher testing.
But, John Corcoran still insists that he was an effective educator:
For 17 years Corcoran taught high school for the Oceanside School District. Relying on teacher's assistants for help and oral lesson plans, he said he did a great job at teaching his students.
"What I did was I created an oral and visual environment. There wasn't the written word in there. I always had two or three teacher's assistants in each class to do board work or read the bulletin," said Corcoran.
Wonder how Corcoran's former pupils feel about that "oral and visual" environment that he created. Wonder how many of them wound up in remedial education programs, because their teacher couldn't read.
Still, as a former teacher, there's something fishy about this story. Two or three teacher's assistants in each class? Oceanside must have been one wealthy school systemin Corcoran's day. And what about his annual evaluations? Didn't the principal or the observer notice something funny about Corcoran's lesson plans--or the fact that he never wrote anything on the board?
Then, there's the matter of the work assigned to his many assistants. Over the course of 17 years, you'd think that one or two would complain about having to do the teacher's job--on an aide's salary.
Sadly, Corcoran's tale may sound implausible, but it's hardly impossible. Public education in America has been in serious trouble for a long, long time, and we can only wonder how many other John Corcorans are still lurking in our classrooms.
In case you're wondering, the National Education Association remains adamantly opposed to teacher testing.
Meanwhile, Back at Minot...
Belated congratulations to members of the 91st Space Wing at Minot AFB, North Dakota, who successfully completed their Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI) last week. In a brief interview with the Associated Press, Colonel Marty Whelan, the 91st Wing Commander, said he was "pleased" with the inspection's results, which showed the unit is ready to carry out its nuclear mission.
The 91st Space Wing is in charge of 150 Minutemen III ICBMs, based in remote silos across northwest and north-central North Dakota.
Originally, the space wing and Minot's 5th Bomb Wing were supposed to receive their NSIs at the same time. However, the bomber unit's evaluation was pushed back, after a preliminary evaluation discovered lingering problems in personnel training and certification.
The 5th BW lost its nuclear certification last fall, after a B-52 mistakenly carried six nuclear-tipped cruise missiles from Minot to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. Weapons involved in that incident were loaded by crews from the 5th Bomb Wing. The resulting nuclear mishap was described as the worst in more than 20 years, and has prompted three seperate Air Force investigations.
A spokesman for the 5th BW recently indicated that the unit's NSI will now be held "later this spring," giving the unit more time to prepare.
On a related note, results of last fall's nuclear surety inspection at Barksdale AFB remain unclear. The evaluation was held in September, not long after the unauthorized transfer between Minot and the Louisiana base. In From the Cold filed a Freedom of Information (FOIA) request for the inspection results more than four months ago; while the request has been approved, the response--at last report--was still being prepared by the Air Staff.
Official Air Force policy discourages the release of specific inspection scores or ratings. But such information has been provided through past FOIA requests, and occasional media leaks.
The 91st Space Wing is in charge of 150 Minutemen III ICBMs, based in remote silos across northwest and north-central North Dakota.
Originally, the space wing and Minot's 5th Bomb Wing were supposed to receive their NSIs at the same time. However, the bomber unit's evaluation was pushed back, after a preliminary evaluation discovered lingering problems in personnel training and certification.
The 5th BW lost its nuclear certification last fall, after a B-52 mistakenly carried six nuclear-tipped cruise missiles from Minot to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. Weapons involved in that incident were loaded by crews from the 5th Bomb Wing. The resulting nuclear mishap was described as the worst in more than 20 years, and has prompted three seperate Air Force investigations.
A spokesman for the 5th BW recently indicated that the unit's NSI will now be held "later this spring," giving the unit more time to prepare.
On a related note, results of last fall's nuclear surety inspection at Barksdale AFB remain unclear. The evaluation was held in September, not long after the unauthorized transfer between Minot and the Louisiana base. In From the Cold filed a Freedom of Information (FOIA) request for the inspection results more than four months ago; while the request has been approved, the response--at last report--was still being prepared by the Air Staff.
Official Air Force policy discourages the release of specific inspection scores or ratings. But such information has been provided through past FOIA requests, and occasional media leaks.
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