South Korea's military remained on alert for a second day, after North Korea threatened military action in response to Seoul's recent, tougher stance against its communist neighbor.
ROK forces went to a higher state of readiness on Saturday, after a DPRK spokesman described South Korean President Lee Myung-bak a "traitor," and accused him of preparing of preparing a "military provocation." For good measure, the statement was read by a military officer, not a TV news anchor.
Pyongyang said it was adopting "an all-out confrontational posture" and warned of a "strong military retaliatory step." South Korea immediately put its forces on alert.
Seoul's Yonhap news agency reported Sunday that the South has significantly beefed up forces along its heavily armed land border with the North and near their disputed western sea border. But the presidential office and the Defense Ministry denied the report.
Pyongyang is upset because Mr. Lee has ended unconditional aid to the DPRK, a hallmark of recent South Korean governments. President Lee understands that Kim Jong-il's regime has used nuclear negotiations to extract more aid from his country and the United States. While the current ROK government is open to more talks, it is demanding that North Korea comply with existing agreements.
Seoul's tougher policy stands in stark contrast to the outgoing Bush Administration, which has tolerated Pyongyang's stalling and obfuscation on the Six Party nuclear deal. The accord is currently stalled over the verification of North Korea's nuclear activities. Before that, the release of DPRK funds--frozen in a Macau bank--delayed the agreement.
The current round of saber-rattling clearly has two goals: first, Pyongyang is hoping to force the Seoul government into a more flexible position, and secondly, it wants Barack Obama's attention on Inauguration Day.
So far, the Blue House shows no sign of backing down. Defense sources in Seoul suggest that ROK forces along the DMZ have been beefed up. They also report that North Korean units have not made any "unusual moves" that might foreshadow a further escalation, or a limited attack.
The DPRK threat comes at a time of year when North Korea military readiness is nearing its peak. Pyongyang's armed forces carry out their most important drills during the annual Winter Training Cycle (WTC), which runs from early December through the end of March.
North Korea's winter training period follows a building-block approach, beginning with small-unit drills in December, and moving on to division-level exercises in January. Training at the corps level usually begins in February and the cycle concludes with nationwide exercises in March. The winter training cycle is considered the most important for North Korean Army and SOF units. Air Force drills also increase in the winter, although bad weather--and occasional accidents--reduce sortie levels. Training for the DPRK Navy is limited during the WTC, due to conditions in the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan.
How will Mr. Obama react to an obvious challenge from Pyongyang? So far, the President-elect seems wedded to the diplomatic track initiated by his predecessor. During her confirmation hearings last week, Secretary of State designate Hillary Clinton promised that the Obama team will engage friends and foes "more quickly" than the Bush Administration.
It has also been revealed that Christopher Hill, the lead U.S. negotiator with North Korea, will be staying on at State under Mrs. Clinton. Suffice it to say that the Six Party Process will continue, despite the change of administrations.
And that underscores the real trouble with American policies toward the DPRK. Not only is Pyongyang bound to test the new President (believing it has no more to fear than it did under Mr. Bush), the Obama White House is also facing a potential rift with its allies. Both Seoul and Tokyo have grown tired of North Korea's antics, and favor a tougher line toward Kim Jong-il.
As a result, our most important allies in east Asia will put immediate pressure on Mr. Obama to use more sticks than carrots in dealing with Pyongyang. If he refuses go along, the new president may find it tough going on other issues which require assistance from South Korea and Japan.
Sunday, January 18, 2009
Saturday, January 17, 2009
Mr. Obama, Please Call General Alexander on the Gray Phone
It's obvious that President-elect Barack Obama has never heard of communications security (COMSEC).
If he had any familiarity with that term--and what it entails--Mr. Obama might be a bit more flexible on his plan to retain a Blackberry. As AFP reports, Obama wants to hang on his smartphone, despite security and legal concerns:
Interviewed by CNN Friday, Obama said the Blackberry was among the tools that he would use to stay in touch with real Americans and avoid becoming trapped inside the presidential "bubble."
"I think we're going to be able to hang on to one of these. My working assumption, and this is not new, is that anything I write on an email could end up being on CNN," he said.
"So I make sure to think before I press 'send'," he said of his Blackberry, which was an ever-present fixture on his belt or in his hand on the campaign trail.
Obama did not divulge just how he will overcome legal constraints, given the requirement of the post-Watergate Presidential Records Act of 1978 to keep a record of every White House communication.
As an attorney, you'd think Mr. Obama would be wary of any device capable of voice and data communications that could be subject to subpoena or other legal action. Let's assume the next president keeps his Blackberry. When his administration hits its first scandal, Mr. Obama's communications will be the first target of political opponents, or groups like Judicial Watch. Better get those "executive privilege" arguments ready.
But, from our perspective, security concerns pose a far better reason for Barack Obama to temporarily "retire" that Blackberry. He should understand that hostile intelligence services operate "outside" the presidential bubble, and they must be salivating at the prospect of a presidential PDA. Several foreign embassies in Washington, D.C., house SIGINT operations and our major adversaries can collect cell phone traffic around the world.
We'll assume that President Obama will be utilizing a Blackberry with some sort of encryption software. But the security of that phone will only be as good as its encryption system. Virtually any cypher can be broken, given enough time and the right tools. Obviously, the world's major intelligence services have access to those tools, and it's a sure bet that "cracking" the encrypted PDA would be a high priority, to sustain collection on Obama's communications.
While no one has divulged details on the president-elect's Blackberry, the device will clearly have security features beyond those available on the standard phone. But Mr. Obama wants to "make sure that people can still reach me.
"If I'm doing something stupid, somebody in Chicago can send me an email and say, 'What are you doing?'
"I want to be able to have voices, other than the people who are immediately working for me, be able to reach out and send me a message about what's happening in America."
But there is a tradeoff between security and accessibility. Mr. Obama's desire to "reach out" to virtually anyone will place certain constraints on the security of his Blackberry. And as security decreases, the phone becomes an easier target for hostile intelligence collection.
That's one reason that presidents don't send e-mail, or carry cell phones or PDAs. The security risks have been judged as unacceptable, at least until now. True, security technology for mobile devices has improved dramatically in recent years, but no encryption system is perfect, or invulnerable to deciphering. History is filled with examples of secrets that were lost because a nation--and its leaders--believed their cyphers were impenetrable.
Upon entering the Oval Office, a president loses certainly "rights" that many of us take for granted. Among those is the ability to pick up a cell phone, or dash off an e-mail. The potential security and legal ramifications are simply too high.
But Mr. Obama believes those risks can be mitigated. Predictably, the AFP story doesn't address the obvious questions surrounding the president-elect and his Blackberry. First, has the National Security Agency (NSA) been consulted on the matter? And beyond that, did the agency director, Lieutenant General Keith Alexander, try to dissuade the president-elect from maintaining his Blackberry. We can't imagine that General Alexander is exactly thrilled with the prospect of a president "reaching out" on his cell phone.
***
ADDENDUM: Before he makes that first Blackberry call from the White House, Mr. Obama might consider the example of Bill Clinton. There are reports that his phone conversations with Monica Lewinsky were intercepted (and recorded) by Israel's intelligence service, the Mossad. That claim has never been fully verified, but in one call, Clinton told Ms. Lewinsky that he suspected a foreign embassy was tapping his phone conversations.
We also know that the Clinton team reportedly stopped the search for a high-level Israeli mole (nicknamed Mega), after the Tel Aviv government began blackmailing the president over his affair. And it all began with the Mossad's access to Monica Lewinsky's cell phone.
Then, there's a problem called "electronic spillage," the storing of classified data on laptops and other systems (including PDAs) that aren't cleared for that material. According to Bill Gertz of the Washington Times, the Navy is spending at least $5 million a year to remove classified files from unauthorized systems. There's been no estimate on how much information is being compromised by the spillage problem.
All the more reason for Mr. Obama to give General Alexander a call (on a secure phone) and reconsider the Blackberry plan.
If he had any familiarity with that term--and what it entails--Mr. Obama might be a bit more flexible on his plan to retain a Blackberry. As AFP reports, Obama wants to hang on his smartphone, despite security and legal concerns:
Interviewed by CNN Friday, Obama said the Blackberry was among the tools that he would use to stay in touch with real Americans and avoid becoming trapped inside the presidential "bubble."
"I think we're going to be able to hang on to one of these. My working assumption, and this is not new, is that anything I write on an email could end up being on CNN," he said.
"So I make sure to think before I press 'send'," he said of his Blackberry, which was an ever-present fixture on his belt or in his hand on the campaign trail.
Obama did not divulge just how he will overcome legal constraints, given the requirement of the post-Watergate Presidential Records Act of 1978 to keep a record of every White House communication.
As an attorney, you'd think Mr. Obama would be wary of any device capable of voice and data communications that could be subject to subpoena or other legal action. Let's assume the next president keeps his Blackberry. When his administration hits its first scandal, Mr. Obama's communications will be the first target of political opponents, or groups like Judicial Watch. Better get those "executive privilege" arguments ready.
But, from our perspective, security concerns pose a far better reason for Barack Obama to temporarily "retire" that Blackberry. He should understand that hostile intelligence services operate "outside" the presidential bubble, and they must be salivating at the prospect of a presidential PDA. Several foreign embassies in Washington, D.C., house SIGINT operations and our major adversaries can collect cell phone traffic around the world.
We'll assume that President Obama will be utilizing a Blackberry with some sort of encryption software. But the security of that phone will only be as good as its encryption system. Virtually any cypher can be broken, given enough time and the right tools. Obviously, the world's major intelligence services have access to those tools, and it's a sure bet that "cracking" the encrypted PDA would be a high priority, to sustain collection on Obama's communications.
While no one has divulged details on the president-elect's Blackberry, the device will clearly have security features beyond those available on the standard phone. But Mr. Obama wants to "make sure that people can still reach me.
"If I'm doing something stupid, somebody in Chicago can send me an email and say, 'What are you doing?'
"I want to be able to have voices, other than the people who are immediately working for me, be able to reach out and send me a message about what's happening in America."
But there is a tradeoff between security and accessibility. Mr. Obama's desire to "reach out" to virtually anyone will place certain constraints on the security of his Blackberry. And as security decreases, the phone becomes an easier target for hostile intelligence collection.
That's one reason that presidents don't send e-mail, or carry cell phones or PDAs. The security risks have been judged as unacceptable, at least until now. True, security technology for mobile devices has improved dramatically in recent years, but no encryption system is perfect, or invulnerable to deciphering. History is filled with examples of secrets that were lost because a nation--and its leaders--believed their cyphers were impenetrable.
Upon entering the Oval Office, a president loses certainly "rights" that many of us take for granted. Among those is the ability to pick up a cell phone, or dash off an e-mail. The potential security and legal ramifications are simply too high.
But Mr. Obama believes those risks can be mitigated. Predictably, the AFP story doesn't address the obvious questions surrounding the president-elect and his Blackberry. First, has the National Security Agency (NSA) been consulted on the matter? And beyond that, did the agency director, Lieutenant General Keith Alexander, try to dissuade the president-elect from maintaining his Blackberry. We can't imagine that General Alexander is exactly thrilled with the prospect of a president "reaching out" on his cell phone.
***
ADDENDUM: Before he makes that first Blackberry call from the White House, Mr. Obama might consider the example of Bill Clinton. There are reports that his phone conversations with Monica Lewinsky were intercepted (and recorded) by Israel's intelligence service, the Mossad. That claim has never been fully verified, but in one call, Clinton told Ms. Lewinsky that he suspected a foreign embassy was tapping his phone conversations.
We also know that the Clinton team reportedly stopped the search for a high-level Israeli mole (nicknamed Mega), after the Tel Aviv government began blackmailing the president over his affair. And it all began with the Mossad's access to Monica Lewinsky's cell phone.
Then, there's a problem called "electronic spillage," the storing of classified data on laptops and other systems (including PDAs) that aren't cleared for that material. According to Bill Gertz of the Washington Times, the Navy is spending at least $5 million a year to remove classified files from unauthorized systems. There's been no estimate on how much information is being compromised by the spillage problem.
All the more reason for Mr. Obama to give General Alexander a call (on a secure phone) and reconsider the Blackberry plan.
Friday, January 16, 2009
Let the Second-Guessing Begin
As praise pours in for the crew of U.S. Air Flight 1549, we wondered how long it would take for someone to second-guess the actions of Captain Chesley Sullenberger and his crew.
Consider the headline for this Associated Press article, posted at Breitbart.com.
"Source: Pilot rejected 2 airport landings"
That headline is grossly misleading; it suggests that Sullenberger and his co-pilot turned down the option of returning to New York's LaGuardia Airport (where the flight originated), or Teterboro Airport in northern New Jersey.
The rest of the story isn't quite as bad, but it's obvious that the AP's Michael J. Sniffen, who wrote the article, has no aviation experience. His account is based on a source who was "briefed" on the crew's communications with air traffic controllers. In other words, the individual who spoke with the AP wasn't in the ATC facility when the plane went down and probably got his (or her) information second-hand. Here's how the "source" summarized the exchange between Sullenberger and controllers, as the U.S. Air pilot weighed his options:
Air traffic controllers first gave Sullenberger directions to return to LaGuardia, but he replied, "unable." Then he saw the Teterboro airstrip in the northern New Jersey suburbs, got clearance to go there, but then again responded, "unable." He then said he was going into the river.
What the "source" (and the AP) fail to note is that "unable" doesn't mean that the Captain rejected emegency landings at LaGuardia or Teterboro. Sullenberger's terse response meant the A320 couldn't make it to either airport, based on the aircraft's altitude, loss of power, and the distances to those airfields.
Heading back to LaGuardia would have required another turn and a dangerous glide over Manhattan, most likely leading to a crash landing--short of the field--in some of the most densely-populated terrain in the world. Trying for Teterboro would have produced the same, disastrous results. In that split second, confronted with a situation few pilots encounter, Sullenberger chose his only viable option: a risky water landing in the Hudson River.
Oh, and did we mention that no one has ever ditched an airliner and everyone lived to tell about it?
Yesterday's "Miracle on the Hudson" is largely the result of an exceptionally skilled U.S. Air crew, and emergency personnel who responded so quickly. That's the real story, not some tripe about "rejected" landings at LaGuardia and Teterboro.
As for the AP, it's about what you'd expect. Stay tuned; the wire service is probably working on another "exclusive," explaining how the Bush Administration was responsible for what happened to Flight 1549.
Consider the headline for this Associated Press article, posted at Breitbart.com.
"Source: Pilot rejected 2 airport landings"
That headline is grossly misleading; it suggests that Sullenberger and his co-pilot turned down the option of returning to New York's LaGuardia Airport (where the flight originated), or Teterboro Airport in northern New Jersey.
The rest of the story isn't quite as bad, but it's obvious that the AP's Michael J. Sniffen, who wrote the article, has no aviation experience. His account is based on a source who was "briefed" on the crew's communications with air traffic controllers. In other words, the individual who spoke with the AP wasn't in the ATC facility when the plane went down and probably got his (or her) information second-hand. Here's how the "source" summarized the exchange between Sullenberger and controllers, as the U.S. Air pilot weighed his options:
Air traffic controllers first gave Sullenberger directions to return to LaGuardia, but he replied, "unable." Then he saw the Teterboro airstrip in the northern New Jersey suburbs, got clearance to go there, but then again responded, "unable." He then said he was going into the river.
What the "source" (and the AP) fail to note is that "unable" doesn't mean that the Captain rejected emegency landings at LaGuardia or Teterboro. Sullenberger's terse response meant the A320 couldn't make it to either airport, based on the aircraft's altitude, loss of power, and the distances to those airfields.
Heading back to LaGuardia would have required another turn and a dangerous glide over Manhattan, most likely leading to a crash landing--short of the field--in some of the most densely-populated terrain in the world. Trying for Teterboro would have produced the same, disastrous results. In that split second, confronted with a situation few pilots encounter, Sullenberger chose his only viable option: a risky water landing in the Hudson River.
Oh, and did we mention that no one has ever ditched an airliner and everyone lived to tell about it?
Yesterday's "Miracle on the Hudson" is largely the result of an exceptionally skilled U.S. Air crew, and emergency personnel who responded so quickly. That's the real story, not some tripe about "rejected" landings at LaGuardia and Teterboro.
As for the AP, it's about what you'd expect. Stay tuned; the wire service is probably working on another "exclusive," explaining how the Bush Administration was responsible for what happened to Flight 1549.
Thursday, January 15, 2009
Two Minutes a Year
Every now and then, someone suggests that the era of the pilot will soon be over. With improvements in aircraft, flight control and navigation systems, they claim, future airliners will be operated entirely by remote control.
Thankfully, that day is still a ways off--and the 146 passengers of U.S. Air Flight 1549 would probably agree. Thursday afternoon, in the skies over Manhattan, the skill of a cockpit crew saved them from almost certain death, after a double bird-strike crippled their Airbus A320 passenger jet.
Thankfully, that day is still a ways off--and the 146 passengers of U.S. Air Flight 1549 would probably agree. Thursday afternoon, in the skies over Manhattan, the skill of a cockpit crew saved them from almost certain death, after a double bird-strike crippled their Airbus A320 passenger jet.
Consider this scenario: moments after takeoff from LaGuardia Airport, the aircraft flies into a flock of geese. Both engines are shredded; the A320 is now without power and in desperate need of a place to land. The Captain realizes he can't make it back to LaGuardia and tells air traffic controllers he's heading for Teterboro Airport, located just across the Hudson River in New Jersey.
But it quickly becomes apparent that even Teterboro is out of reach, so Captain Chesley Sullenberger makes a fateful decision to land in the river. Clearing the George Washington Bridge by less than 1,000 feet, Sullenberger and his First Officer flawlessly ditch the A320 in the Hudson. The jet skids to a stop--fully intact--and the cabin crew begins to evacuate the passengers. Ferries serving lower Manhattan divert from their crossings and rescue passengers and crew, lined up on the airliner's wings.
Everyone walked away.
Captain Sullenberger has been rightfully called a hero. A veteran of more than 19,000 flying hours in military and civilian aircraft, Sullenberger also runs is own aviation safety consulting firm in California. He has been a U.S. Air pilot for almost 29 years. His consummate skills clearly made the difference for the passengers and crew of Flight 1549.
But the list of heroes doesn't end with with Captain Sullenberger. Flying an airliner in an emergency is a two-person job, and Sullenberger's co-pilot deserves a lot of credit for getting that Airbus onto the only available runway--the Hudson River. Ditto for the three flight attendants; evacuating 146 passengers from a plane that has just ditched is no easy feat, but they got everyone out of the cabin and onto the wing, where they were rescued by ferry crews. The passengers also deserve praise for remaining calm under extraordinarily difficult conditions.
A few years ago, I heard someone chide an airline pilot about the "ease" of his job. "You're bus drivers," he told the pilot. "The autopilot flies the plane. You just taxi out and taxi in."
The pilot didn't dispute the fact that flying is easier now than in decades past. "I get paid for about two minutes a year," he replied, referring to those moments that require a highly trained pilot to make split-second, life-and-death decisions.
Those of us in the flying public are barely aware of those moments. Ninety-nine percent of the time, professionals like Captain Sullenberger and his co-pilot make the right call, averting potential tragedy, and delivering passengers safely to their destination.
An executive salary for "two minutes" of real flying a year? Sounds like a bargain to us.
Making the Case for George W. Bush
In today's U.K. Telegraph, historian Andrew Roberts explains how the departing President got it right, particularly in the areas of homeland security and foreign policy. A few salient paragraphs:
In the avalanche of abuse and ridicule that we are witnessing in the media assessments of President Bush's legacy, there are factors that need to be borne in mind if we are to come to a judgment that is not warped by the kind of partisan hysteria that has characterised this issue on both sides of the Atlantic.
[snip]
At the time of 9/11, which will forever rightly be regarded as the defining moment of the presidency, history will look in vain for anyone predicting that the Americans murdered that day would be the very last ones to die at the hands of Islamic fundamentalist terrorists in the US from that day to this.
The decisions taken by Mr Bush in the immediate aftermath of that ghastly moment will be pored over by historians for the rest of our lifetimes. One thing they will doubtless conclude is that the measures he took to lock down America's borders, scrutinise travellers to and from the United States, eavesdrop upon terrorist suspects, work closely with international intelligence agencies and take the war to the enemy has foiled dozens, perhaps scores of would-be murderous attacks on America. There are Americans alive today who would not be if it had not been for the passing of the Patriot Act. There are 3,000 people who would have died in the August 2005 airline conspiracy if it had not been for the superb inter-agency co-operation demanded by Bush after 9/11.
The next factor that will be seen in its proper historical context in years to come will be the true reasons for invading Afghanistan in October 2001 and Iraq in April 2003. The conspiracy theories believed by many (generally, but not always) stupid people – that it was "all about oil", or the securing of contracts for the US-based Halliburton corporation, etc – will slip into the obscurity from which they should never have emerged had it not been for comedian-filmmakers such as Michael Moore.
Instead, the obvious fact that there was a good case for invading Iraq based on 14 spurned UN resolutions, massive human rights abuses and unfinished business following the interrupted invasion of 1991 will be recalled.
Read the whole thing; it's an insightful, honest examination of Mr. Bush and his decision-making. Too bad you can't find similar analysis in American media outlets. Predictably, they're capping off eight years of Bush Derangement Syndrome by declaring his presidency an abject failure.
Consider, for example, Bob Woodward's assessment in today's Washington Post. His "10 Take-Aways From the Bush Years" is nothing more than a cherry-picked collection of comments and anecdotes from Mr. Woodward's recent books, designed to cast President Bush--and his decision-making--in the worst possible light.
Clearly, President Bush made mistakes during his eight years in office. His Medicare Prescription Drug plan was an early indicator that Mr. Bush was, indeed, a Big Government Republican. He also deserves criticism for his initial handling of the Iraq War, and his failed immigration reform plan.
But, as Mr. Roberts reminds us, Bush deserves tremendous credit for keeping the American people safe in the years that followed 9-11. That is no small accomplishment, regardless of the decision-making process that led to the administration's security policies.
In the avalanche of abuse and ridicule that we are witnessing in the media assessments of President Bush's legacy, there are factors that need to be borne in mind if we are to come to a judgment that is not warped by the kind of partisan hysteria that has characterised this issue on both sides of the Atlantic.
[snip]
At the time of 9/11, which will forever rightly be regarded as the defining moment of the presidency, history will look in vain for anyone predicting that the Americans murdered that day would be the very last ones to die at the hands of Islamic fundamentalist terrorists in the US from that day to this.
The decisions taken by Mr Bush in the immediate aftermath of that ghastly moment will be pored over by historians for the rest of our lifetimes. One thing they will doubtless conclude is that the measures he took to lock down America's borders, scrutinise travellers to and from the United States, eavesdrop upon terrorist suspects, work closely with international intelligence agencies and take the war to the enemy has foiled dozens, perhaps scores of would-be murderous attacks on America. There are Americans alive today who would not be if it had not been for the passing of the Patriot Act. There are 3,000 people who would have died in the August 2005 airline conspiracy if it had not been for the superb inter-agency co-operation demanded by Bush after 9/11.
The next factor that will be seen in its proper historical context in years to come will be the true reasons for invading Afghanistan in October 2001 and Iraq in April 2003. The conspiracy theories believed by many (generally, but not always) stupid people – that it was "all about oil", or the securing of contracts for the US-based Halliburton corporation, etc – will slip into the obscurity from which they should never have emerged had it not been for comedian-filmmakers such as Michael Moore.
Instead, the obvious fact that there was a good case for invading Iraq based on 14 spurned UN resolutions, massive human rights abuses and unfinished business following the interrupted invasion of 1991 will be recalled.
Read the whole thing; it's an insightful, honest examination of Mr. Bush and his decision-making. Too bad you can't find similar analysis in American media outlets. Predictably, they're capping off eight years of Bush Derangement Syndrome by declaring his presidency an abject failure.
Consider, for example, Bob Woodward's assessment in today's Washington Post. His "10 Take-Aways From the Bush Years" is nothing more than a cherry-picked collection of comments and anecdotes from Mr. Woodward's recent books, designed to cast President Bush--and his decision-making--in the worst possible light.
Clearly, President Bush made mistakes during his eight years in office. His Medicare Prescription Drug plan was an early indicator that Mr. Bush was, indeed, a Big Government Republican. He also deserves criticism for his initial handling of the Iraq War, and his failed immigration reform plan.
But, as Mr. Roberts reminds us, Bush deserves tremendous credit for keeping the American people safe in the years that followed 9-11. That is no small accomplishment, regardless of the decision-making process that led to the administration's security policies.
Wednesday, January 14, 2009
More Reasons to Build the Fence
At last report, the border fence between the U.S. and Mexico was behind schedule and over budget. A GAO study (from August 2008) reported that the Department of Homeland Security has completed only 341 miles of the border barrier, and costs associated with the project were rising. Currently, a mile of pedestrian fence is running about $7.5 million and a similar stretch of vehicle fence costs about $2.8 million. Labor shortages and land acquisition issues are also hampering the effort.
To his credit, President-elect Barack Obama has supported the border fence, and perhaps the project will take on new urgency when he takes office. If Mr. Obama needs additional justification, he should take a look at a new report from U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), based in Norfolk, Virginia.
In its Joint Operating Environment report for 2008, the command offers a dire assessment of the situation in Mexico, lumping that category in the same category as Pakistan--vulnerable to a "rapid and sudden collapse," according to JFCOM.
This isn't the first time that U.S. intelligence analysts have voiced those concerns about Pakistan. While the JFCOM report marks one of the few times that a military or intel organization has expressed public worries about the future of Mexico, it is consistent with a recent trend.
The assessment is generating a fair amount of media attention, particularly in communities along the U.S.-Mexican border. But a couple of caveats are in order. First, the primary mission of JFCOM is the transformation of military forces, not geopolitical analysis. Secondly, the organization's intelligence directorate is small in comparison to, say, CENTCOM, and historically, JFCOM hasn't been a major player in the analytical business.
But the command's leadership clearly understand the impact of this report, and it's virtually certain that the assessment was coordinated through other intel organizations. JFCOM wouldn't issue its warning about Mexico without some degree of support. Indeed, many of the concerns outlined in the command report have been echoed in recent summaries by the Department of Homeland Security and retired Army General Barry McCaffrey.
As JFCOM sees it, the Mexican government--and its institutions--are under sustained, serious attack, putting it at risk for a potential collapse:
"The Mexican possibility may seem less likely, but the government, its politicians, police and judicial infrastructure are all under sustained assault and press by criminal gangs and drug cartels. How that internal conflict turns out over the next several years will have a major impact on the stability of the Mexican state. Any descent by Mexico into chaos would demand an American response based on the serious implications for homeland security alone."
Conditions in Mexico represent a growing challenge for the intel community, which has (historically) devoted fewer resources to Latin America. Additionally, intelligence organizations have usually viewed the "threat" in terms of Cuba and more recently, Venezuela. Transnational issues in the region receive less coverage (although reporting on guerrilla factions in Colombia is an exception), and Mexico has long been a low priority target. In fact, one "knock" against the recently-retired CIA Director of Operations was that he "cut his teeth" in the agency's Latin America division.
That is about to change--or should change--in the coming years. As for the border fence, it wouldn't stop the human tsunami that would crash against our borders after a Mexican collapse. But it would provide needed assistance in controlling the flow of refugees. Completing the fence should be a national priority--just in case JFCOM's prediction comes true.
To his credit, President-elect Barack Obama has supported the border fence, and perhaps the project will take on new urgency when he takes office. If Mr. Obama needs additional justification, he should take a look at a new report from U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), based in Norfolk, Virginia.
In its Joint Operating Environment report for 2008, the command offers a dire assessment of the situation in Mexico, lumping that category in the same category as Pakistan--vulnerable to a "rapid and sudden collapse," according to JFCOM.
This isn't the first time that U.S. intelligence analysts have voiced those concerns about Pakistan. While the JFCOM report marks one of the few times that a military or intel organization has expressed public worries about the future of Mexico, it is consistent with a recent trend.
The assessment is generating a fair amount of media attention, particularly in communities along the U.S.-Mexican border. But a couple of caveats are in order. First, the primary mission of JFCOM is the transformation of military forces, not geopolitical analysis. Secondly, the organization's intelligence directorate is small in comparison to, say, CENTCOM, and historically, JFCOM hasn't been a major player in the analytical business.
But the command's leadership clearly understand the impact of this report, and it's virtually certain that the assessment was coordinated through other intel organizations. JFCOM wouldn't issue its warning about Mexico without some degree of support. Indeed, many of the concerns outlined in the command report have been echoed in recent summaries by the Department of Homeland Security and retired Army General Barry McCaffrey.
As JFCOM sees it, the Mexican government--and its institutions--are under sustained, serious attack, putting it at risk for a potential collapse:
"The Mexican possibility may seem less likely, but the government, its politicians, police and judicial infrastructure are all under sustained assault and press by criminal gangs and drug cartels. How that internal conflict turns out over the next several years will have a major impact on the stability of the Mexican state. Any descent by Mexico into chaos would demand an American response based on the serious implications for homeland security alone."
Conditions in Mexico represent a growing challenge for the intel community, which has (historically) devoted fewer resources to Latin America. Additionally, intelligence organizations have usually viewed the "threat" in terms of Cuba and more recently, Venezuela. Transnational issues in the region receive less coverage (although reporting on guerrilla factions in Colombia is an exception), and Mexico has long been a low priority target. In fact, one "knock" against the recently-retired CIA Director of Operations was that he "cut his teeth" in the agency's Latin America division.
That is about to change--or should change--in the coming years. As for the border fence, it wouldn't stop the human tsunami that would crash against our borders after a Mexican collapse. But it would provide needed assistance in controlling the flow of refugees. Completing the fence should be a national priority--just in case JFCOM's prediction comes true.
A Passing Grade
Officially, the Air Force doesn't publicly discuss the results of Operational Readiness Inspections (ORIs) or Nuclear Surety Inspections (NSIs). The policy is based on a long-standing belief that discussing a unit's particular strengths--or weaknesses--would divulge valuable information to particular adversaries.
Of course, there are exceptions to every rule. Leaders of the 62nd Airlift Wing, stationed at McChord AFB, Washington, had no problem discussing their recently-completed NSI. As you might have guessed, the 62nd passed their evaluation with flying colors, the first Air Force unit to receive a satisfactory grade in recent months:
The 62nd Airlift Wing — the nation’s primary nuclear airlift force— passed its Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection on Jan. 7 after a weeklong review by Air Mobility Command inspectors.
It is the first successful nuclear inspection the Air Force has made public since two missile wings in Air Force Space Command failed their Nuclear Surety Inspections in November and December. The two NSI failures ended a year in which the Air Force saw at least five units fail their NSIs for only the fourth time since 1992, according to the Defense Department Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management.
Following the recent failures, 62nd Airlift Wing Commander Col. Jeffrey Stephenson said he was “elated not only for the Air Force but also my airmen” that AMC inspectors issued his wing an overall grade of “satisfactory” — the highest possible score — to the wing.
Airlift is often the "forgotten element" of nuclear operations, but it remains a vital component of the overall program. The wing's 4th Airlift Squadron is the only C-17 unit tasked to transport nuclear weapons. It's a mission with no margin for error, as affirmed by the squadron's nuclear airlift flight commander:
“It’s nice to be recognized for doing a good job,” said Maj. Jeffrey Meyers, the 4th AS PNAF flight commander. “As the PNAF unit in the Air Force, it is a responsibility the wing and the nuclear surety office take very seriously. Wing leadership has made it clear: Perfection is the standard.”
NSIs in an airlift wing aren't quite as demanding as similar evaluations in missile, bomber and tactical fighter units. Airlift units aren't tasked with the full range of nuclear activities, such as weapons maintenance. But the McChord NSI involved the entire wing, which supports the 4th Airlift Squadron through such functions as the Personnel Reliability Program, ensuring that personnel meet the requirements for working with nukes.
The 62nd has every reason to be proud of its inspection performance. But, given the USAF's inconsistency in discussing NSI results, we wonder if the wing would have been as candid in discussing unsatisfactory results. As we observed in a recent post, some Air Force units--notably the 2nd Bomb Wing at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana--have never disclosed the results of their evaluations, also conducted in recent months.
That's certainly their prerogative, but given recent troubles in the Air Force nuclear enterprise, we'd say that a little more transparency is in order. Units can report the results of their inspections without divulging details that could, potentially, jeopardize nuclear operations.
Releasing inspection grades would also provide confirmation that the service's nuclear program is on the road to recovery. At least five units failed their NSIs last year, despite a major overhaul within the enterprise. Congress--and the public--need some assurance that recent problems in nuclear operations, maintenance and security are being fixed.
***
ADDENDUM: We had a chance to work with airlift crews and mission planners in the early 1990s, during the scheduled removal of nuclear weapons from a foreign country. The operation was classified and required precise planning and execution. Weapons loading and movement were scheduled during "gaps" in enemy spy satellite coverage. The effort continued over a couple of months and was carried out flawlessly, thanks in no small measure to the C-141 crews that flew the missions, and the airlift planners that helped coordinate the operation.
Of course, there are exceptions to every rule. Leaders of the 62nd Airlift Wing, stationed at McChord AFB, Washington, had no problem discussing their recently-completed NSI. As you might have guessed, the 62nd passed their evaluation with flying colors, the first Air Force unit to receive a satisfactory grade in recent months:
The 62nd Airlift Wing — the nation’s primary nuclear airlift force— passed its Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection on Jan. 7 after a weeklong review by Air Mobility Command inspectors.
It is the first successful nuclear inspection the Air Force has made public since two missile wings in Air Force Space Command failed their Nuclear Surety Inspections in November and December. The two NSI failures ended a year in which the Air Force saw at least five units fail their NSIs for only the fourth time since 1992, according to the Defense Department Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management.
Following the recent failures, 62nd Airlift Wing Commander Col. Jeffrey Stephenson said he was “elated not only for the Air Force but also my airmen” that AMC inspectors issued his wing an overall grade of “satisfactory” — the highest possible score — to the wing.
Airlift is often the "forgotten element" of nuclear operations, but it remains a vital component of the overall program. The wing's 4th Airlift Squadron is the only C-17 unit tasked to transport nuclear weapons. It's a mission with no margin for error, as affirmed by the squadron's nuclear airlift flight commander:
“It’s nice to be recognized for doing a good job,” said Maj. Jeffrey Meyers, the 4th AS PNAF flight commander. “As the PNAF unit in the Air Force, it is a responsibility the wing and the nuclear surety office take very seriously. Wing leadership has made it clear: Perfection is the standard.”
NSIs in an airlift wing aren't quite as demanding as similar evaluations in missile, bomber and tactical fighter units. Airlift units aren't tasked with the full range of nuclear activities, such as weapons maintenance. But the McChord NSI involved the entire wing, which supports the 4th Airlift Squadron through such functions as the Personnel Reliability Program, ensuring that personnel meet the requirements for working with nukes.
The 62nd has every reason to be proud of its inspection performance. But, given the USAF's inconsistency in discussing NSI results, we wonder if the wing would have been as candid in discussing unsatisfactory results. As we observed in a recent post, some Air Force units--notably the 2nd Bomb Wing at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana--have never disclosed the results of their evaluations, also conducted in recent months.
That's certainly their prerogative, but given recent troubles in the Air Force nuclear enterprise, we'd say that a little more transparency is in order. Units can report the results of their inspections without divulging details that could, potentially, jeopardize nuclear operations.
Releasing inspection grades would also provide confirmation that the service's nuclear program is on the road to recovery. At least five units failed their NSIs last year, despite a major overhaul within the enterprise. Congress--and the public--need some assurance that recent problems in nuclear operations, maintenance and security are being fixed.
***
ADDENDUM: We had a chance to work with airlift crews and mission planners in the early 1990s, during the scheduled removal of nuclear weapons from a foreign country. The operation was classified and required precise planning and execution. Weapons loading and movement were scheduled during "gaps" in enemy spy satellite coverage. The effort continued over a couple of months and was carried out flawlessly, thanks in no small measure to the C-141 crews that flew the missions, and the airlift planners that helped coordinate the operation.
Tuesday, January 13, 2009
Make or Break Time
Describing the fighter export business as "no holds barred" is probably an understatement. With billions of dollars on the line (not to mention thousands of defense jobs and national pride), it's little wonder that competing firms--or in this age, competing teams--go all out in trying to sell their products to the world's air forces.
For the remaining consortium's that build jet fighters, the stakes have never been higher, as Bill Sweetman pointed out in his recent article for Defense Technology International. Defense firms that lose out in the next round of contracts face an uncertain future. Some will be driven out of the fighter business; others could be forced out of business altogether. A few survivors will face an uncertain and uphill road in attempting to reenter future fighter competitions, dwarfed by teams that sew up the next round of major aircraft contracts.
As Mr. Sweetman writes, there is tremendous competition in Europe, South America and East Asia, where various nations are looking for "late" fourth-generation fighters to improve their air-to-air and air-to-ground capabilities. In some cases, the potential customers are countries that can't afford (or don't qualify) for the Joint Strike Fighter program. But in other countries, the JSF is now being challenged by European competitors:
All eyes are on Norway, the Netherlands and Denmark, seeking a replacement for their F-16s. Norway needs 48 new aircraft, the Netherlands nominally 85, Denmark 24. Norway is moving toward a decision as early as this month. The Netherlands is expected to decide early in 2009, Denmark later in the year.
It’s remarkable that these nations are holding competitions at all. The F-16 program forged industrial and military bonds with the U.S. Air Force and Lockheed Martin, and all three countries were early partners in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).
JSF is driving the timing of these decisions. If this was an off-the-shelf purchase, the customers would not have to make a decision yet, since none is looking at initial operating capability (IOC) before 2016. But Lockheed Martin says it needs to ramp up production now to hit cost targets and wants to bind its partners into an early, large and contractually enforceable joint commitments to their 2012-16 buys. Before 2007, there seemed little doubt that Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands would lead the way into such a deal. Ironically, it was Eurofighter that started to change the picture in Norway, lobbying aggressively for an open competition, before pulling out of Norway and Denmark early this year.
But the Eurofighter's departure created an opening for the Saab, which is aggressively pushing its Gripen NG (Next Generation) as an alternative to the JSF. While the Gripen cannot match the JSF's stealthiness, it does offer lower operating costs and proven capabilities. Additionally, Sweden is offering attractive industrial participation (IP) for potential European customers, winning support among Norway's aviation industry.
Still, the Gripen faces an uphill battle in the three NATO countries, given the advanced technology of the JSF, and their long-standing commitment to the program. However, the Saab product can still "win by losing." Winding up in second place behind the JSF could be an effective marketing tool for the Gripen NG, making it more attractive for such customers as Brazil and Switzerland.
The emergence of the Gripen has also forced JSF into a "must win" situation. As Bill Sweetman observes, a Saab victory in Denmark, Norway or the Netherlands (or two of those countries) would create problems in other export markets--namely Australia--where various defense and industry factions favor the F-22 over the JSF. But with the USAF blocking Raptor exports, the Australians are still in line for the Joint Strike Fighter.
In other markets, Gripen is battling the Eurofighter Typhoon, the French Rafale and Boeing's F/A-18 Super Hornet for potential sales. Here's how Bill Sweetman handicaps the sweepstakes:
Among these are Switzerland and Brazil. The former has downselected to Gripen, Rafale and Typhoon; the latter to Gripen, Rafale and the F/A-18 Super Hornet. Switzerland has evaluated all three aircraft in-country and expects to make a decision in the third quarter of 2009.
Other than India, they are the only near-term contests where the European twins are engaged. Also, Brazil included the Super Hornet in its downselect, while the fighter was pulled out of Switzerland—even though it is a current Hornet operator, and Boeing’s only Super Hornet export so far was based on the ease and low cost of transition from the “classic” to the new aircraft.
After Switzerland and Brazil are decided, the Rafale is down to India. Typhoon is in play there, with longer-shot prospects in Korea and Japan. So far, however, the market seems to be taking its cues from the fighters’ sponsors in the U.K., Italy and France and their tepid support for both programs. The advantage in that respect belongs to Rafale, which has not been hampered by endless negotiations over every production batch of aircraft, and should benefit from a French government decision next year to buy 60 more aircraft and integrate active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar.
Both European twins suffer from high price tags, being more expensive than the projected price of JSF and more costly than the Super Hornet. And although fighters are Dassault’s heritage, it’s easy to forget that the company’s main business is selling corporate jets. The company has no incentive to give the Rafale away.
Boeing, as a competitor in Brazil, is working to eke out the Super Hornet line, which is supposed to close in 2014 as the Navy ends production in favor of the F-35C. But Boeing has taken advantage of a stable Navy production program to turn the Super Hornet into a model of efficient production.
Among the various competitor, Mr. Sweetman believes Saab is in the best shape, with likely deals in Switzerland, Romania and (possibly) other countries. That leaves Boeing, Dassault and Eurofighter battling over what's left. He thinks the market may be big enough for two firms, but not three. That means that one legacy company is building its last fighter.
For the remaining consortium's that build jet fighters, the stakes have never been higher, as Bill Sweetman pointed out in his recent article for Defense Technology International. Defense firms that lose out in the next round of contracts face an uncertain future. Some will be driven out of the fighter business; others could be forced out of business altogether. A few survivors will face an uncertain and uphill road in attempting to reenter future fighter competitions, dwarfed by teams that sew up the next round of major aircraft contracts.
As Mr. Sweetman writes, there is tremendous competition in Europe, South America and East Asia, where various nations are looking for "late" fourth-generation fighters to improve their air-to-air and air-to-ground capabilities. In some cases, the potential customers are countries that can't afford (or don't qualify) for the Joint Strike Fighter program. But in other countries, the JSF is now being challenged by European competitors:
All eyes are on Norway, the Netherlands and Denmark, seeking a replacement for their F-16s. Norway needs 48 new aircraft, the Netherlands nominally 85, Denmark 24. Norway is moving toward a decision as early as this month. The Netherlands is expected to decide early in 2009, Denmark later in the year.
It’s remarkable that these nations are holding competitions at all. The F-16 program forged industrial and military bonds with the U.S. Air Force and Lockheed Martin, and all three countries were early partners in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).
JSF is driving the timing of these decisions. If this was an off-the-shelf purchase, the customers would not have to make a decision yet, since none is looking at initial operating capability (IOC) before 2016. But Lockheed Martin says it needs to ramp up production now to hit cost targets and wants to bind its partners into an early, large and contractually enforceable joint commitments to their 2012-16 buys. Before 2007, there seemed little doubt that Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands would lead the way into such a deal. Ironically, it was Eurofighter that started to change the picture in Norway, lobbying aggressively for an open competition, before pulling out of Norway and Denmark early this year.
But the Eurofighter's departure created an opening for the Saab, which is aggressively pushing its Gripen NG (Next Generation) as an alternative to the JSF. While the Gripen cannot match the JSF's stealthiness, it does offer lower operating costs and proven capabilities. Additionally, Sweden is offering attractive industrial participation (IP) for potential European customers, winning support among Norway's aviation industry.
Still, the Gripen faces an uphill battle in the three NATO countries, given the advanced technology of the JSF, and their long-standing commitment to the program. However, the Saab product can still "win by losing." Winding up in second place behind the JSF could be an effective marketing tool for the Gripen NG, making it more attractive for such customers as Brazil and Switzerland.
The emergence of the Gripen has also forced JSF into a "must win" situation. As Bill Sweetman observes, a Saab victory in Denmark, Norway or the Netherlands (or two of those countries) would create problems in other export markets--namely Australia--where various defense and industry factions favor the F-22 over the JSF. But with the USAF blocking Raptor exports, the Australians are still in line for the Joint Strike Fighter.
In other markets, Gripen is battling the Eurofighter Typhoon, the French Rafale and Boeing's F/A-18 Super Hornet for potential sales. Here's how Bill Sweetman handicaps the sweepstakes:
Among these are Switzerland and Brazil. The former has downselected to Gripen, Rafale and Typhoon; the latter to Gripen, Rafale and the F/A-18 Super Hornet. Switzerland has evaluated all three aircraft in-country and expects to make a decision in the third quarter of 2009.
Other than India, they are the only near-term contests where the European twins are engaged. Also, Brazil included the Super Hornet in its downselect, while the fighter was pulled out of Switzerland—even though it is a current Hornet operator, and Boeing’s only Super Hornet export so far was based on the ease and low cost of transition from the “classic” to the new aircraft.
After Switzerland and Brazil are decided, the Rafale is down to India. Typhoon is in play there, with longer-shot prospects in Korea and Japan. So far, however, the market seems to be taking its cues from the fighters’ sponsors in the U.K., Italy and France and their tepid support for both programs. The advantage in that respect belongs to Rafale, which has not been hampered by endless negotiations over every production batch of aircraft, and should benefit from a French government decision next year to buy 60 more aircraft and integrate active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar.
Both European twins suffer from high price tags, being more expensive than the projected price of JSF and more costly than the Super Hornet. And although fighters are Dassault’s heritage, it’s easy to forget that the company’s main business is selling corporate jets. The company has no incentive to give the Rafale away.
Boeing, as a competitor in Brazil, is working to eke out the Super Hornet line, which is supposed to close in 2014 as the Navy ends production in favor of the F-35C. But Boeing has taken advantage of a stable Navy production program to turn the Super Hornet into a model of efficient production.
Among the various competitor, Mr. Sweetman believes Saab is in the best shape, with likely deals in Switzerland, Romania and (possibly) other countries. That leaves Boeing, Dassault and Eurofighter battling over what's left. He thinks the market may be big enough for two firms, but not three. That means that one legacy company is building its last fighter.
***
On a related note, the current edition of Aviation Week offers more evidence of consolidation in the fighter business. The head of the holding company that owns the Russian Sukhoi design bureau is now in charge of rival MiG. His job is to improve the financial position of MiG, as the firm is consolidated into the United Aircraft Corporation, dominated by Sukhoi. That's quite a reversal from the days when MiG dominated the Russian fighter business.
Battling for the CSAR Mission
It's no secret that the Air Force is anxiously awaiting the departure of John Young, the Pentagon acquisition chief. Over the past couple of years, Young has been fighting a protracted battle against the service and its broken acquisition process, challenging both the Air Force's procurement priorities, and how it handles the purchase of multi-billion dollar weapons systems.
Putting it bluntly, Mr. Young is not impressed by the USAF Acquisition Corps. He led efforts to strip the service of its authority to select the next generation of air refueling aircraft, after previous attempts ended in scandal and non-stop protests by contractors. Instead, the Air Force's new tanker aircraft will be selected by senior Pentagon officials, a move the service views as a public relations embarrassment and the micro-managing of its affairs.
Young is also an opponent of continued production of the F-22 Raptor, believing that money could be better spent on other programs, such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). While the Air Force remains officially committed to more F-22s, many officials privately concede that production will be capped at barely 200 aircraft, a total in line with Mr. Young's expectations.
A few months ago, the USAF hoped that Young, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, would be moving on with the change of administrations. But with Defense Secretary Robert Gates remaining on the job for President-elect Barack Obama, it appears that Mr. Young will also retain his post, at least for a while. As the Danger Room noted a few days ago, a new defense acquisition chief was not among the senior defense appointments announced by the transition team. That suggests that John Young will be on the job for a few more months, if not another year.
And Mr. Young isn't easing up on the Air Force, either. According to Michael Fabey of Aviation Week, the Pentagon acquisition chief recently challenged the service's requirement for a dedicated, Combat Search-and-Rescue (CSAR) fleet. That represents a shot across the bow for another, critical USAF program--the plan to spend $15 billion on new rescue helicopters.
More than a year ago, the USAF awarded the helicopter contract to Boeing. But that deal was scuttled after protests from rival firms, and the program is now up for rebidding. Many analysts believe the next chopper deal will also face challenges, further delaying the purchase of new rescue helicopters, which will replace the HH-60 Pave Hawks now in service.
But John Young isn't sure the Air Force needs a standing rescue fleet--a refrain recently echoed by the House Armed Services Committee (HASC). They note that the CSAR crews rarely perform their original mission, picking up aircrew members stranded behind enemy lines. Today, a Pave Hawk crew is more likely to insert or retrieve special forces personnel; perform medical evacuations under marginal flying conditions, or provide humanitarian and rescue support after a natural disaster. The traditional CSAR mission has become a small part of the repertoire.
That shift has led to complaints about mission "poaching" by Army aviation units, the Coast Guard and other DoD elements that handle those missions. If the Air Force is largely replicating those capabilities, the thinking goes, why not just get rid of their rescue fleet, and expand the rescue and SOF elements of the other services?
Fortunately, the Air Force is fighting back. A briefing prepared for the HASC reveals that USAF rescue units have saved the lives of 2,800 personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, flying missions in "high risk areas that the other services cannot support," due to availability and environment. The presentation also notes the contributions of Air Force assets in overseas rescue missions (including Tsunami relief in Indonesia), which cannot be easily supported by the Army and the Coast Guard.
While the service hasn't released the presentation, we also hope it highlights another, salient fact: CSAR is not some sort of ad hoc mission that can be performed by any medium or long-range helicopter and its crew. Retrieving military or civilian personnel under hostile fire or in difficult flying conditions requires specialized equipment and skill sets. We wonder if Mr. Young understands that it takes almost two years to train the pararescueman that fly as part of each CSAR crew, or that it takes years of practice for pilots and flight engineers to attain the required proficiency.
And, there's something to be said for a little redundancy in the SOF and rescue arena. In the aftermath of a catastrophic disaster, every chopper and crew becomes a valuable asset. Residents of New Orleans didn't particularly care who "owned" the heliopter that carried them to safety after Katrina.
Likewise, if you're a SOF team or downed aircrew member who needs extraction, it's reassuring to know that the Air Force has dedicated CSAR assets. In fact, the USAF has more rescue choppers than any other service, and they routinely train with other elements (A-10s, HC-130s) that form the CSAR mission package. When aviators where shot down in Vietnam, Kosovo or Iraq, it was an Air Force rescue chopper that was usually tasked to bring them home. More than a few CSAR crews died in the effort--a reminder of the dangers associated with their mission.
Mr. Young's past critiques of Air Force operations and acquisition policy have been largely accurate, but his questions on CSAR are ill-informed and off-base. The requirement for the humanitarian and SOF support missions flown by USAF rescue units will almost certainly increase in the coming years, and there's no guarantee that future conflicts won't require more aircrew extractions.
All the more reason to maintain dedicated CSAR squadrons within the USAF, and get on with the business of choosing a new rescue helicopter.
Putting it bluntly, Mr. Young is not impressed by the USAF Acquisition Corps. He led efforts to strip the service of its authority to select the next generation of air refueling aircraft, after previous attempts ended in scandal and non-stop protests by contractors. Instead, the Air Force's new tanker aircraft will be selected by senior Pentagon officials, a move the service views as a public relations embarrassment and the micro-managing of its affairs.
Young is also an opponent of continued production of the F-22 Raptor, believing that money could be better spent on other programs, such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). While the Air Force remains officially committed to more F-22s, many officials privately concede that production will be capped at barely 200 aircraft, a total in line with Mr. Young's expectations.
A few months ago, the USAF hoped that Young, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, would be moving on with the change of administrations. But with Defense Secretary Robert Gates remaining on the job for President-elect Barack Obama, it appears that Mr. Young will also retain his post, at least for a while. As the Danger Room noted a few days ago, a new defense acquisition chief was not among the senior defense appointments announced by the transition team. That suggests that John Young will be on the job for a few more months, if not another year.
And Mr. Young isn't easing up on the Air Force, either. According to Michael Fabey of Aviation Week, the Pentagon acquisition chief recently challenged the service's requirement for a dedicated, Combat Search-and-Rescue (CSAR) fleet. That represents a shot across the bow for another, critical USAF program--the plan to spend $15 billion on new rescue helicopters.
More than a year ago, the USAF awarded the helicopter contract to Boeing. But that deal was scuttled after protests from rival firms, and the program is now up for rebidding. Many analysts believe the next chopper deal will also face challenges, further delaying the purchase of new rescue helicopters, which will replace the HH-60 Pave Hawks now in service.
But John Young isn't sure the Air Force needs a standing rescue fleet--a refrain recently echoed by the House Armed Services Committee (HASC). They note that the CSAR crews rarely perform their original mission, picking up aircrew members stranded behind enemy lines. Today, a Pave Hawk crew is more likely to insert or retrieve special forces personnel; perform medical evacuations under marginal flying conditions, or provide humanitarian and rescue support after a natural disaster. The traditional CSAR mission has become a small part of the repertoire.
That shift has led to complaints about mission "poaching" by Army aviation units, the Coast Guard and other DoD elements that handle those missions. If the Air Force is largely replicating those capabilities, the thinking goes, why not just get rid of their rescue fleet, and expand the rescue and SOF elements of the other services?
Fortunately, the Air Force is fighting back. A briefing prepared for the HASC reveals that USAF rescue units have saved the lives of 2,800 personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, flying missions in "high risk areas that the other services cannot support," due to availability and environment. The presentation also notes the contributions of Air Force assets in overseas rescue missions (including Tsunami relief in Indonesia), which cannot be easily supported by the Army and the Coast Guard.
While the service hasn't released the presentation, we also hope it highlights another, salient fact: CSAR is not some sort of ad hoc mission that can be performed by any medium or long-range helicopter and its crew. Retrieving military or civilian personnel under hostile fire or in difficult flying conditions requires specialized equipment and skill sets. We wonder if Mr. Young understands that it takes almost two years to train the pararescueman that fly as part of each CSAR crew, or that it takes years of practice for pilots and flight engineers to attain the required proficiency.
And, there's something to be said for a little redundancy in the SOF and rescue arena. In the aftermath of a catastrophic disaster, every chopper and crew becomes a valuable asset. Residents of New Orleans didn't particularly care who "owned" the heliopter that carried them to safety after Katrina.
Likewise, if you're a SOF team or downed aircrew member who needs extraction, it's reassuring to know that the Air Force has dedicated CSAR assets. In fact, the USAF has more rescue choppers than any other service, and they routinely train with other elements (A-10s, HC-130s) that form the CSAR mission package. When aviators where shot down in Vietnam, Kosovo or Iraq, it was an Air Force rescue chopper that was usually tasked to bring them home. More than a few CSAR crews died in the effort--a reminder of the dangers associated with their mission.
Mr. Young's past critiques of Air Force operations and acquisition policy have been largely accurate, but his questions on CSAR are ill-informed and off-base. The requirement for the humanitarian and SOF support missions flown by USAF rescue units will almost certainly increase in the coming years, and there's no guarantee that future conflicts won't require more aircrew extractions.
All the more reason to maintain dedicated CSAR squadrons within the USAF, and get on with the business of choosing a new rescue helicopter.
Monday, January 12, 2009
About That "Air Refueling Equipment"
An Israeli Air Force KC-707 (Airliners.net)
According to The New York Times, President Bush "deflected" an Israeli request for assistance in a proposed strike on Iran's nuclear facilities. The Times' David Sanger reports the White House rejected several requests for military hardware and airspace access, aimed at facilitating a potential raid on nuclear sites in Iran.
Among the items requested by Israel: improved "bunker-buster" bombs, designed to penetrate Iranian nuclear labs and processing centers buried deep underground; additional "air refueling equipment," and the right to fly through Iraqi airspace during the long-distance mission.
While sources interviewed by the Times didn't provide a precise timeline, the Israeli request for help came in early 2008, just months after the U.S. intelligence community released its controversial estimate on Iran's nuclear intentions. The report concluded that Tehran had temporarily suspended it weapons development program, although efforts to support that effort--including uranium enrichment and missile research--were continuing.
That assessment led Tel Aviv to conclude that the United States had rejected its own military option for dealing with Iran. Not surprisingly, the Israeli government began to signal its willingness to "go it alone", while pressing Washington for technical and operational assistance.
Administration sources say they're still not sure if the Israelis were on the verge of launching an airstrike, or merely trying to goad the U.S. into action. The Times' account suggests that U.S. never went beyond "routine contingency planning" during Mr. Bush's time in office. However, he did authorize expanded covert action against the Iranian nuclear program last year, hoping to delay or derail Tehran's effort through various clandestine efforts.
From our perspective, the Times story only offers a couple of new elements. First, there's the willingness of senior administration officials to discuss our discussions with the Israelis, and the decision-making that (ultimately) led to our rejection of their requests for assistance. But, with the Bush Administration in its final days, there is an understandable urge to clarify the record and even attempt a little legacy building. Apparently, a few folks at the White House and the Pentagon want the world to know that our policy toward Iran was actually a model of restraint.
The second element is hardly new, but it's the most intriguging, at least from our perspective. Well before the NYT article was published, various media outlets in Israel were reporting on the U.S. "rejection" of an Israeli request for additional aerial tankers. A Haaretz account from August of last year summarizes the "official" line very well.
But that version is something of a red herring. Truth is, an order for new tankers would have little impact on a near-term strike against Iran. Supposing that Mr. Bush had approved the request, the first KC-767 wouldn't be delivered to the Israeli Air Force for three to four years. By that time, Iran would already have a small arsenal of nuclear weapons, and key elements of the program would be more widely dispersed, largely mitigating the effects of a potential airstrike.
And, the Israelis don't need American assistance to field more tankers. The IAF's seven, existing KC-707s are converted airliners, modified by Israeli contractors, using their own equipment and designs. They could significanty increase their air refueling capability by simply "acquiring" older 767s that are being retired by the state-owned airline, El Al, or purchasing other airframes on the global market.
Still, the conversion process would be time-consuming; a recent addition of glass cockpits to the KC-707 fleet took two years. As with new tankers from the Boeing assembly line, the "converted" tankers would arrive too late for a preemptive strike on Iran.
So, what were the Israelis really asking for? Given the short-term requirement for increased tanking capacity, the IAF was, most likely, looking for a transfer of older USAF KC-135s, or in-flight refueling by U.S. aircraft during a raid on Iran.
The transfer option has been used before, most notably during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Thirty brand-new F-4 Phantoms were stripped of their U.S. markings and flown directly to Israel, replacing IAF jets that had been shot down by Egyptian and Syrian surface-to-air missiles and AAA batteries. American C-5 and C-141 transports also flew 22,000 tons of supplies to Israel, part of Operation Nickel Grass. Their cargo included everything from M-60 tanks to Shrike anti-radiation missiles, needed to negate the threat posed by SA-6 mobile SAMs.
While the USAF still has hundreds of KC-135s in service, the most capable R and T variants are heavily engaged in support of global operations. The most likely candidates for transfer would be older "E" models, largely in service with Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units.
However, mission capability rates have been dropping among those airframes. Some remain in service at the insistence of Congress (to prevent the loss of authorized maintenance billets), but some of these tankers are no longer airworthy. Restoring them to full operational service would take time--something the Israelis can hardly afford.
We should also note that the USAF's other tanker, the KC-10 Extender, is a less likely candidate for sale or transfer. Air Force KC-10s are also heavily tasked and besides, Israel has no existing maintenance or operations base for that aircraft. Creating one would be too costly and time-consuming.
Exact phrasing of the tanker request remains classified, but there are signs that Israel asked for direct assistance--the in-flight refueling of IAF jets by U.S. tankers, over Iraq, in support of a strike against Iran. Those aircraft would (presumably) come from the 380th Air Expeditionary Wing, based in the Persian Gulf region. Both KC-135s and KC-10s are routinely assigned to the 380th, along with battle managment and reconnaissance aircraft.
The availability of American tankers would greatly increase the size of a potential Israeli strike package. Analysts believe that the IAF's existing refueling fleet could only support a strike force of 20-25 aircraft, limiting the number of facilities that could be targeted. With U.S. support, the size of the strike package could grow by a factor of three or four. Israeli F-15s and F-16s use the same "flying boom" refueling system as USAF aircraft; Additionally, by tanking with American KC-135s and KC-10s, IAF fighters would (likely) use callsigns and IFF squawks associated with our fighters, adding a deception element to their plan.
But it's a request the White House could only refuse. Allowing Israeli jets to fly through Iraqi airspace would jeopardize relations with Baghdad, and the use of tanker jets based in other Gulf States would further complicate regional diplomacy. It's a risk Mr. Bush found unacceptable, opting for covert action and a continuation of existing diplomatic efforts.
Did he make the right decision? We'll know by 2010, and possibly, much sooner. The U.S. refusal does not eliminate the possibility of an Israeli attack against Iran. Israeli leaders still have the option of sending a strike package through Turkey, using commercial call signs and resolution cell formations to mask their intent. Ultimately, the decision on striking Iran will hinge on factors more important than tanker availability.
Among the items requested by Israel: improved "bunker-buster" bombs, designed to penetrate Iranian nuclear labs and processing centers buried deep underground; additional "air refueling equipment," and the right to fly through Iraqi airspace during the long-distance mission.
While sources interviewed by the Times didn't provide a precise timeline, the Israeli request for help came in early 2008, just months after the U.S. intelligence community released its controversial estimate on Iran's nuclear intentions. The report concluded that Tehran had temporarily suspended it weapons development program, although efforts to support that effort--including uranium enrichment and missile research--were continuing.
That assessment led Tel Aviv to conclude that the United States had rejected its own military option for dealing with Iran. Not surprisingly, the Israeli government began to signal its willingness to "go it alone", while pressing Washington for technical and operational assistance.
Administration sources say they're still not sure if the Israelis were on the verge of launching an airstrike, or merely trying to goad the U.S. into action. The Times' account suggests that U.S. never went beyond "routine contingency planning" during Mr. Bush's time in office. However, he did authorize expanded covert action against the Iranian nuclear program last year, hoping to delay or derail Tehran's effort through various clandestine efforts.
From our perspective, the Times story only offers a couple of new elements. First, there's the willingness of senior administration officials to discuss our discussions with the Israelis, and the decision-making that (ultimately) led to our rejection of their requests for assistance. But, with the Bush Administration in its final days, there is an understandable urge to clarify the record and even attempt a little legacy building. Apparently, a few folks at the White House and the Pentagon want the world to know that our policy toward Iran was actually a model of restraint.
The second element is hardly new, but it's the most intriguging, at least from our perspective. Well before the NYT article was published, various media outlets in Israel were reporting on the U.S. "rejection" of an Israeli request for additional aerial tankers. A Haaretz account from August of last year summarizes the "official" line very well.
But that version is something of a red herring. Truth is, an order for new tankers would have little impact on a near-term strike against Iran. Supposing that Mr. Bush had approved the request, the first KC-767 wouldn't be delivered to the Israeli Air Force for three to four years. By that time, Iran would already have a small arsenal of nuclear weapons, and key elements of the program would be more widely dispersed, largely mitigating the effects of a potential airstrike.
And, the Israelis don't need American assistance to field more tankers. The IAF's seven, existing KC-707s are converted airliners, modified by Israeli contractors, using their own equipment and designs. They could significanty increase their air refueling capability by simply "acquiring" older 767s that are being retired by the state-owned airline, El Al, or purchasing other airframes on the global market.
Still, the conversion process would be time-consuming; a recent addition of glass cockpits to the KC-707 fleet took two years. As with new tankers from the Boeing assembly line, the "converted" tankers would arrive too late for a preemptive strike on Iran.
So, what were the Israelis really asking for? Given the short-term requirement for increased tanking capacity, the IAF was, most likely, looking for a transfer of older USAF KC-135s, or in-flight refueling by U.S. aircraft during a raid on Iran.
The transfer option has been used before, most notably during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Thirty brand-new F-4 Phantoms were stripped of their U.S. markings and flown directly to Israel, replacing IAF jets that had been shot down by Egyptian and Syrian surface-to-air missiles and AAA batteries. American C-5 and C-141 transports also flew 22,000 tons of supplies to Israel, part of Operation Nickel Grass. Their cargo included everything from M-60 tanks to Shrike anti-radiation missiles, needed to negate the threat posed by SA-6 mobile SAMs.
While the USAF still has hundreds of KC-135s in service, the most capable R and T variants are heavily engaged in support of global operations. The most likely candidates for transfer would be older "E" models, largely in service with Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units.
However, mission capability rates have been dropping among those airframes. Some remain in service at the insistence of Congress (to prevent the loss of authorized maintenance billets), but some of these tankers are no longer airworthy. Restoring them to full operational service would take time--something the Israelis can hardly afford.
We should also note that the USAF's other tanker, the KC-10 Extender, is a less likely candidate for sale or transfer. Air Force KC-10s are also heavily tasked and besides, Israel has no existing maintenance or operations base for that aircraft. Creating one would be too costly and time-consuming.
Exact phrasing of the tanker request remains classified, but there are signs that Israel asked for direct assistance--the in-flight refueling of IAF jets by U.S. tankers, over Iraq, in support of a strike against Iran. Those aircraft would (presumably) come from the 380th Air Expeditionary Wing, based in the Persian Gulf region. Both KC-135s and KC-10s are routinely assigned to the 380th, along with battle managment and reconnaissance aircraft.
The availability of American tankers would greatly increase the size of a potential Israeli strike package. Analysts believe that the IAF's existing refueling fleet could only support a strike force of 20-25 aircraft, limiting the number of facilities that could be targeted. With U.S. support, the size of the strike package could grow by a factor of three or four. Israeli F-15s and F-16s use the same "flying boom" refueling system as USAF aircraft; Additionally, by tanking with American KC-135s and KC-10s, IAF fighters would (likely) use callsigns and IFF squawks associated with our fighters, adding a deception element to their plan.
But it's a request the White House could only refuse. Allowing Israeli jets to fly through Iraqi airspace would jeopardize relations with Baghdad, and the use of tanker jets based in other Gulf States would further complicate regional diplomacy. It's a risk Mr. Bush found unacceptable, opting for covert action and a continuation of existing diplomatic efforts.
Did he make the right decision? We'll know by 2010, and possibly, much sooner. The U.S. refusal does not eliminate the possibility of an Israeli attack against Iran. Israeli leaders still have the option of sending a strike package through Turkey, using commercial call signs and resolution cell formations to mask their intent. Ultimately, the decision on striking Iran will hinge on factors more important than tanker availability.
Saturday, January 10, 2009
Saturday Reading Assignments
For starters, Fred Barnes of The Weekly Standard has a list of "10 Things President Bush Got Right." For the record, we disagree with #7, the Medicare Prescription Drug benefit. True, the plan has cost less than expected, but it represents yet another triumph for big government--and a springboard for an expanded program under Barack Obama.
We also applaud the selection and confirmation of John Roberts and Sam Alito to the Supreme Court (number eight on Mr. Barnes' list). But Alito's nomination came only after the Harriet Miers debacle; we're not sure how much credit Mr. Bush deserves for "backing into" the right justice.
As for the rest of Top 10, we heartily concur with Fred Barnes. It will be interesting to see if Mr. Bush ever gets credit for those achievements, even through the prism of history.
The Saturday edition of Opinion Journal has three recommended reads:
In the Journal's weekend interview, Mississippi Governor (and former GOP RNC Chairman Haley Barbour) offers sage advice for reviving the Republican brand. He predicts--correctly--that the GOP resurgence will begin at the state level, where some of the party's brightest stars are now incumbent governors.
Mr. Barbour also emphasized the need to rebuild the GOP's state-level organizations:
Now is our chance when we're out of power to build back up from the bottom, to have a participatory, inclusive process for letting people get involved in our party. Barack Obama proved something that I've seen time and time again: if you'll give people a chance to participate in politics they'll knock your door down. And the Democrats did a whole lot better job of that than us this time."
But that raises a rather obvious question. If the GOP needs strong leadership at the state party level, why is it considering so many candidates (for RNC chairman) from states where brand is almost non-existent (Maryland); in serious decline (Ohio), or in near-collapse (Michigan). By that standard, folks like Michael Steele, Ken Blackman and Saul Anuzis shouldn't be serious contenders. But, with higher-profile pols like Mitt Romney and Fred Thompson, we'll probably wind up with Mr. Steele.
As Republican in Maryland, Michael Steele faced an uphill battle in his successful race for Lieutenant Governor. But he only lasted one term, and the Maryland GOP remains in dire straits. As a communicator, Mr. Steele is effective, but the next RNC needs some nuts-and-bolts party-building skills.
That's one reason we like the idea of a modified leadership team, with a General Chairman who can serve as the party's face, and an executive director who can spearhead the rebuilding process. Such an arrangement was tried before (with some success) in the early 1980s, under the direction of Paul Laxalt.
Opinion Journal also has a couple of items on the Barack Obama's efforts to re-shape the intelligence community. "President Gulliver's Lawyer" warns of the potential influence of Dawn Johnsen, the Indian University law professor nominated by Mr. Obama's to lead the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). Professor Johnsen has been a fierce critic of the War on Terror, and seems destined to hinder future executive efforts in that area.
Finally, novelist (and former CIA officer) Charles McCarry believes it's time to "Give the CIA its Due." We concur, but only to a point. How much more effective would the agency have been--without the political elements that have warred against the Bush Administration over the past eight years.
We also applaud the selection and confirmation of John Roberts and Sam Alito to the Supreme Court (number eight on Mr. Barnes' list). But Alito's nomination came only after the Harriet Miers debacle; we're not sure how much credit Mr. Bush deserves for "backing into" the right justice.
As for the rest of Top 10, we heartily concur with Fred Barnes. It will be interesting to see if Mr. Bush ever gets credit for those achievements, even through the prism of history.
The Saturday edition of Opinion Journal has three recommended reads:
In the Journal's weekend interview, Mississippi Governor (and former GOP RNC Chairman Haley Barbour) offers sage advice for reviving the Republican brand. He predicts--correctly--that the GOP resurgence will begin at the state level, where some of the party's brightest stars are now incumbent governors.
Mr. Barbour also emphasized the need to rebuild the GOP's state-level organizations:
Now is our chance when we're out of power to build back up from the bottom, to have a participatory, inclusive process for letting people get involved in our party. Barack Obama proved something that I've seen time and time again: if you'll give people a chance to participate in politics they'll knock your door down. And the Democrats did a whole lot better job of that than us this time."
But that raises a rather obvious question. If the GOP needs strong leadership at the state party level, why is it considering so many candidates (for RNC chairman) from states where brand is almost non-existent (Maryland); in serious decline (Ohio), or in near-collapse (Michigan). By that standard, folks like Michael Steele, Ken Blackman and Saul Anuzis shouldn't be serious contenders. But, with higher-profile pols like Mitt Romney and Fred Thompson, we'll probably wind up with Mr. Steele.
As Republican in Maryland, Michael Steele faced an uphill battle in his successful race for Lieutenant Governor. But he only lasted one term, and the Maryland GOP remains in dire straits. As a communicator, Mr. Steele is effective, but the next RNC needs some nuts-and-bolts party-building skills.
That's one reason we like the idea of a modified leadership team, with a General Chairman who can serve as the party's face, and an executive director who can spearhead the rebuilding process. Such an arrangement was tried before (with some success) in the early 1980s, under the direction of Paul Laxalt.
Opinion Journal also has a couple of items on the Barack Obama's efforts to re-shape the intelligence community. "President Gulliver's Lawyer" warns of the potential influence of Dawn Johnsen, the Indian University law professor nominated by Mr. Obama's to lead the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). Professor Johnsen has been a fierce critic of the War on Terror, and seems destined to hinder future executive efforts in that area.
Finally, novelist (and former CIA officer) Charles McCarry believes it's time to "Give the CIA its Due." We concur, but only to a point. How much more effective would the agency have been--without the political elements that have warred against the Bush Administration over the past eight years.
Friday, January 09, 2009
Last Train to Memphis
In honor of the 75th anniversary of Elvis Presley's birth, Scott Johnson at Powerline recounts the story of those early, legendary recording sessions at Sun Records in Memphis.
Those sessions yielded Elvis's first minor hit (his version of "That's All Right"), but more importantly, it captured what Mr. Johnson--and others--have rightly described as the musical mother lode: that perfect blend of blues, bluegrass, gospel and country that Elvis fused into rock and roll.
As music fans know, there was no shortage of irony in the discovery of Elvis, and his initial foray into the recording studio. Elvis first came to the attention of Marion Keisker, Sun's office manager, in 1953. For $3.95, the label's companion company, Memphis Recording Service, allowed anyone to record a couple of songs in their studio. On July 13th of that year, Elvis plunked down his money and recorded "My Happiness" and "That's When Your Heartache Begins" as a birthday gift to his mother.
Keisker was intrigued by what she heard. She also knew that her boss, Sun founder Sam Phillips, was looking for a new sound, a "white man who could sing the blues," as he suggested. Ms. Keisker urged Phillips to get Elvis back in the studio, culminating in two recording sessions, almost a year later.
As detailed in Peter Guralnick's seminal Presley biography, Last Train to Memphis, the first session was a bust, despite the presence of Phillips, bassist Bill Black and guitarist Scotty Moore. A second session also proved disappointing; Sam Phillips was on the verge of calling it quits until Elvis began "fooling around" with "That's All Right" during a break in the studio.
After recording the song and dubbing an acetate, the next step was getting it on the radio. Phillips invited local disc jockey Dewey Phillips to the studio for a listen. The host of the popular "Red, Hot and Blue" program on WHBQ, Dewey Phillips agreed to play the record on his show. It aired for the first time on July 8, 1954, just three days after the recording session at Sun.
"That's All Right" was an immediate sensation. Dewey Phillips (no relation to Sam) played the song seven times in a row, and Elvis was on his way.
But, as we noted last month, the early efforts to get a Presley record on the radio weren't limited to WHBQ. About the same time that Dewey Phillips began playing "That's All Right," someone from Sun (most likely Marion Keisker) delivered a copy to Fred Cook, the morning DJ at WREC in Memphis.
Mr. Cook, who passed away last month, was not impressed, and Elvis wouldn't appear on the WREC airwaves until years later. It represented a minor setback for Presley's career; in those days, WREC was one of the most important stations in Memphis, broadcasting from the legendary Peabody Hotel, and playing a mix of adult standards and big band music.
Dewey Phillips was probably the most popular DJ in Memphis in 1954, but Fred Cook wasn't far behind. More importantly, morning radio--then as now--attracted a large audience. Cook's program could be heard throughout the Mid-South, while Phillips's late night show could barely reached the Memphis city limits, thanks to WHBQ's directional signal and reduced night-time power.
So why didn't Sam Phillips make a greater effort to get Elvis on WREC? Format restrictions aside, there was no small amount of animosity between the Sun founder and the radio station.
As Peter Guralnick reminds us, Sam Phillips spent much of his life in radio, both as an announcer and later, a station owner. His Memphis radio career began in the 1945 at--you guessed it--WREC, where he served as an on-air personality and broadcast engineer. By the early 1950s, he was working 18-hour days at the station and at his fledgling recording company. The schedule drove him to exhaustion and two stays in the hospital, where Phillips received electroshock therapy.
Sam Phillips quit WREC in 1951, after station owner (and founder) Hoyt Wooten made a sarcastic comment about his absences. With his resignation, Phillips devoted his full energies to Sun and the companion recording service. His business cards carried the motto: "We record anything--anywhere--anytime." Consistent with Phillips's vision, Sun became one of the first "white" labels to record African-American artists.
Phillips was joined in his venture by Marion Keisker, another refugee from WREC. It was Ms. Keisker who greeted Elvis the day he walked into the Sun Studios on Union Avenue, "engineered" his first recording session, and urged her boss to take a chance on the young truck driver.
Seven decades later, we can only guess what might have happened if Sam Phillips and Marion Keisker had remained at WREC. It's hard to imagine Elvis going undiscovered, but his route to route to stardom--and the birth of rock and roll--would have been much different, save a cutting remark in a Memphis radio station.
Those sessions yielded Elvis's first minor hit (his version of "That's All Right"), but more importantly, it captured what Mr. Johnson--and others--have rightly described as the musical mother lode: that perfect blend of blues, bluegrass, gospel and country that Elvis fused into rock and roll.
As music fans know, there was no shortage of irony in the discovery of Elvis, and his initial foray into the recording studio. Elvis first came to the attention of Marion Keisker, Sun's office manager, in 1953. For $3.95, the label's companion company, Memphis Recording Service, allowed anyone to record a couple of songs in their studio. On July 13th of that year, Elvis plunked down his money and recorded "My Happiness" and "That's When Your Heartache Begins" as a birthday gift to his mother.
Keisker was intrigued by what she heard. She also knew that her boss, Sun founder Sam Phillips, was looking for a new sound, a "white man who could sing the blues," as he suggested. Ms. Keisker urged Phillips to get Elvis back in the studio, culminating in two recording sessions, almost a year later.
As detailed in Peter Guralnick's seminal Presley biography, Last Train to Memphis, the first session was a bust, despite the presence of Phillips, bassist Bill Black and guitarist Scotty Moore. A second session also proved disappointing; Sam Phillips was on the verge of calling it quits until Elvis began "fooling around" with "That's All Right" during a break in the studio.
After recording the song and dubbing an acetate, the next step was getting it on the radio. Phillips invited local disc jockey Dewey Phillips to the studio for a listen. The host of the popular "Red, Hot and Blue" program on WHBQ, Dewey Phillips agreed to play the record on his show. It aired for the first time on July 8, 1954, just three days after the recording session at Sun.
"That's All Right" was an immediate sensation. Dewey Phillips (no relation to Sam) played the song seven times in a row, and Elvis was on his way.
But, as we noted last month, the early efforts to get a Presley record on the radio weren't limited to WHBQ. About the same time that Dewey Phillips began playing "That's All Right," someone from Sun (most likely Marion Keisker) delivered a copy to Fred Cook, the morning DJ at WREC in Memphis.
Mr. Cook, who passed away last month, was not impressed, and Elvis wouldn't appear on the WREC airwaves until years later. It represented a minor setback for Presley's career; in those days, WREC was one of the most important stations in Memphis, broadcasting from the legendary Peabody Hotel, and playing a mix of adult standards and big band music.
Dewey Phillips was probably the most popular DJ in Memphis in 1954, but Fred Cook wasn't far behind. More importantly, morning radio--then as now--attracted a large audience. Cook's program could be heard throughout the Mid-South, while Phillips's late night show could barely reached the Memphis city limits, thanks to WHBQ's directional signal and reduced night-time power.
So why didn't Sam Phillips make a greater effort to get Elvis on WREC? Format restrictions aside, there was no small amount of animosity between the Sun founder and the radio station.
As Peter Guralnick reminds us, Sam Phillips spent much of his life in radio, both as an announcer and later, a station owner. His Memphis radio career began in the 1945 at--you guessed it--WREC, where he served as an on-air personality and broadcast engineer. By the early 1950s, he was working 18-hour days at the station and at his fledgling recording company. The schedule drove him to exhaustion and two stays in the hospital, where Phillips received electroshock therapy.
Sam Phillips quit WREC in 1951, after station owner (and founder) Hoyt Wooten made a sarcastic comment about his absences. With his resignation, Phillips devoted his full energies to Sun and the companion recording service. His business cards carried the motto: "We record anything--anywhere--anytime." Consistent with Phillips's vision, Sun became one of the first "white" labels to record African-American artists.
Phillips was joined in his venture by Marion Keisker, another refugee from WREC. It was Ms. Keisker who greeted Elvis the day he walked into the Sun Studios on Union Avenue, "engineered" his first recording session, and urged her boss to take a chance on the young truck driver.
Seven decades later, we can only guess what might have happened if Sam Phillips and Marion Keisker had remained at WREC. It's hard to imagine Elvis going undiscovered, but his route to route to stardom--and the birth of rock and roll--would have been much different, save a cutting remark in a Memphis radio station.
Thursday, January 08, 2009
The Luck of War
Military campaigns typically hinge on planning, coordination and training. But an occasional lucky break never hurts, particularly when that event provides insights into the enemy's force disposition and tactics.
Most Civil War buffs know the story of Robert E. Lee's battle plans at Antietam. The Confederate commander distributed the document to his staff, just before the bloody 1862 engagement in Maryland. Unfortunately, one of Lee's subordinates carelessly wrapped his copy around a pair of cigars, then lost his stogies.
You know what happened next. The plan was discovered by a Union solider, who passed it to the Commander of the Army of the Potomac, General George McClellan. "Now I have the means to whip Bobby Lee," McClellan reportedly observed. Unfortunately for the Union, McClellan's excessive caution almost snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. The Union general achieved a tactical draw with the Confederates and the ire of President Lincoln, who fired McClellan after the battle.
Almost 150 years later, the Israeli Army has gained a similar stroke of good fortune in Gaza. David Eshel of Aviation Week's defense blog details the discovery--and its results:
During their cordon and search operation in the Gaza village of al-Atatra in the northern Gaza Strip, Israeli paratroopers captured a suspected Hamas fighter, who emerged from his subterranean hideout and and ran into a para patrol coming in battle order around the corner. When searched, the troopers were surprised to find a detailed map prepared by Hamas commanders, pointing out precise locations of the IEDs, sniper positions and bunkers all over the village. Added to the plan were precise directions as to how Hamas troops should engage the enemy. The map was translated on the scene and has already assisted the troops in their complex and highly dangerous urban combat.
The map was displayed officially today by a senior IDF intelligence officer, Brig Gen Yuval Halamish, who explained to reporters that Hamas had divided the neighborhood into a number of areas distinguished by landmarks such as mosques, gas stations, and fuel depots. "You can see that the neighborhood was divided into three areas of fighting, according to color, and inside the terrorists spread out a number of posts, planted explosive devices, and posted sharpshooters," the general said.
An IDF spokeman also outlined a new tactic, part of a trap for Israeli soldiers. He showed a picture of a doll outside a Palestinian home. The spokesman said the doll was designed to lure troops into an ambush, and a planned kidnapping attempt.
Most Civil War buffs know the story of Robert E. Lee's battle plans at Antietam. The Confederate commander distributed the document to his staff, just before the bloody 1862 engagement in Maryland. Unfortunately, one of Lee's subordinates carelessly wrapped his copy around a pair of cigars, then lost his stogies.
You know what happened next. The plan was discovered by a Union solider, who passed it to the Commander of the Army of the Potomac, General George McClellan. "Now I have the means to whip Bobby Lee," McClellan reportedly observed. Unfortunately for the Union, McClellan's excessive caution almost snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. The Union general achieved a tactical draw with the Confederates and the ire of President Lincoln, who fired McClellan after the battle.
Almost 150 years later, the Israeli Army has gained a similar stroke of good fortune in Gaza. David Eshel of Aviation Week's defense blog details the discovery--and its results:
During their cordon and search operation in the Gaza village of al-Atatra in the northern Gaza Strip, Israeli paratroopers captured a suspected Hamas fighter, who emerged from his subterranean hideout and and ran into a para patrol coming in battle order around the corner. When searched, the troopers were surprised to find a detailed map prepared by Hamas commanders, pointing out precise locations of the IEDs, sniper positions and bunkers all over the village. Added to the plan were precise directions as to how Hamas troops should engage the enemy. The map was translated on the scene and has already assisted the troops in their complex and highly dangerous urban combat.
The map was displayed officially today by a senior IDF intelligence officer, Brig Gen Yuval Halamish, who explained to reporters that Hamas had divided the neighborhood into a number of areas distinguished by landmarks such as mosques, gas stations, and fuel depots. "You can see that the neighborhood was divided into three areas of fighting, according to color, and inside the terrorists spread out a number of posts, planted explosive devices, and posted sharpshooters," the general said.
An IDF spokeman also outlined a new tactic, part of a trap for Israeli soldiers. He showed a picture of a doll outside a Palestinian home. The spokesman said the doll was designed to lure troops into an ambush, and a planned kidnapping attempt.
Words of Warning
Former Defense Secretary William Perry is warning that the U.S. will soon face a nuclear crisis with Iran:
Iran is "moving inexorably toward becoming a nuclear power," with ominous implications for the Middle East, Perry said.
"It seems clear that Israel will not sit by idle while Iran takes the final steps toward becoming a nuclear power," Perry told a conference on foreign policy challenges facing the incoming Obama administration. The former Clinton administration defense secretary held out hope that more vigorous U.S. and international diplomacy could reverse North Korea's nuclear weapons program. But he was less confident about stopping Iran's ambitions.
"President Obama will almost certainly face a serious crisis with Iran," Perry said. "Indeed, I believe the crisis point will be reached in his first year in office. So on the nuclear front, President Obama will face a daunting set of problems, none of which can be solved unilaterally."
Perry told the AP that if North Korea and Iran cannot be contained, the world faces a "cascade of proliferation" of nuclear-armed states. The former defense chief believes the global community has reached a "tipping point" on the proliferation issue, adding, "if the world does tip, it will be irreversible and dangerous beyond the imagination of most people."
Readers may recall that Dr. Perry was running the Pentagon when the U.S. initiated the "Agreed To" framework with North Korea, aimed at ending Pyongyang's nuclear program. While former Clinton Administration officials (and arms control wonks) have hailed the "success" of that agreement, it was little more than a sham. While the DPRK was supposed to stop its nuclear work--in exchange for fuel deliveries and additional nuclear reactors--the North Koreans simply took their program underground.
Over the next seven years, Pyongyang achieved the technical breakthroughs that allowed them to develop nuclear weapons, culminating in the 2006 test of a nuclear device. Since then, the Bush Administration has worked out a new diplomatic agreement with the DPRK, with assistance from other nations in the region. But ensuring North Korean compliance remains difficult, if not impossible. The Syrian nuclear complex destroyed by Israeli jets in 2007 was a copy of the DPRK facility at Yongbyon.
While Mr. Perry's ominous prediction will likely come true, he doesn't say what the U.S. should do if diplomacy fails, particularly in the case of Iran. Years of talks between Tehran and the EU have achieved nothing; meanwhile, the Iranian nuclear program has advanced steadily, and will likely yield a nuclear weapon in the very near future.
For the record, President-elect Obama favors "tough and direct diplomacy" with Iran, aimed at achieving a comprehensive settlement on the nuclear issue. Someone ought to ask the president-elect what he--and our allies--are prepared to do, when the diplomatic option fails, and Tehran achieves its nuclear ambitions.
Or, better yet, how will the U.S. react when the IAF heads east, and carries out that all-but-inevitable strike on Iran's nuclear facilities.
Iran is "moving inexorably toward becoming a nuclear power," with ominous implications for the Middle East, Perry said.
"It seems clear that Israel will not sit by idle while Iran takes the final steps toward becoming a nuclear power," Perry told a conference on foreign policy challenges facing the incoming Obama administration. The former Clinton administration defense secretary held out hope that more vigorous U.S. and international diplomacy could reverse North Korea's nuclear weapons program. But he was less confident about stopping Iran's ambitions.
"President Obama will almost certainly face a serious crisis with Iran," Perry said. "Indeed, I believe the crisis point will be reached in his first year in office. So on the nuclear front, President Obama will face a daunting set of problems, none of which can be solved unilaterally."
Perry told the AP that if North Korea and Iran cannot be contained, the world faces a "cascade of proliferation" of nuclear-armed states. The former defense chief believes the global community has reached a "tipping point" on the proliferation issue, adding, "if the world does tip, it will be irreversible and dangerous beyond the imagination of most people."
Readers may recall that Dr. Perry was running the Pentagon when the U.S. initiated the "Agreed To" framework with North Korea, aimed at ending Pyongyang's nuclear program. While former Clinton Administration officials (and arms control wonks) have hailed the "success" of that agreement, it was little more than a sham. While the DPRK was supposed to stop its nuclear work--in exchange for fuel deliveries and additional nuclear reactors--the North Koreans simply took their program underground.
Over the next seven years, Pyongyang achieved the technical breakthroughs that allowed them to develop nuclear weapons, culminating in the 2006 test of a nuclear device. Since then, the Bush Administration has worked out a new diplomatic agreement with the DPRK, with assistance from other nations in the region. But ensuring North Korean compliance remains difficult, if not impossible. The Syrian nuclear complex destroyed by Israeli jets in 2007 was a copy of the DPRK facility at Yongbyon.
While Mr. Perry's ominous prediction will likely come true, he doesn't say what the U.S. should do if diplomacy fails, particularly in the case of Iran. Years of talks between Tehran and the EU have achieved nothing; meanwhile, the Iranian nuclear program has advanced steadily, and will likely yield a nuclear weapon in the very near future.
For the record, President-elect Obama favors "tough and direct diplomacy" with Iran, aimed at achieving a comprehensive settlement on the nuclear issue. Someone ought to ask the president-elect what he--and our allies--are prepared to do, when the diplomatic option fails, and Tehran achieves its nuclear ambitions.
Or, better yet, how will the U.S. react when the IAF heads east, and carries out that all-but-inevitable strike on Iran's nuclear facilities.
Still Broken
The Defense Science Board (DSB) has confirmed what many already knew: the Air Force nuclear inspection program remains broken, despite extensive reviews and recent reforms.
As Michael Hoffman of Air Force Times reports:
The board — organized under the Office of the Secretary of Defense — picked apart the Air Force’s nuclear inspection architecture, faulting it for not alerting leaders to the service’s nuclear erosion and recommended the Defense Threat Reduction Agency be empowered to revitalize the Air Force’s nuclear inspection process.
Meanwhile, DSB members, who have extensive nuclear backgrounds in the Air Force and Navy, found few faults with the Navy’s nuclear inspection process.
Board members questioned the credibility of Air Force nuclear inspections after service inspectors passed five nuclear units in 2007 and 2008 even after inspections done by the DTRA, who inspected those same units at the same time, had failed them.
The numbers tell the story. Over a 19-month period (September 2007-April 2008), USAF inspectors passed 20 of 21 units undergoing a nuclear surety inspection (NSI) Limited NSIs or Defense NSIs. But only 16 of of the units received passing grades from the DTRA.
Case in point? The 91st Missile Wing, located at Minot AFB, North Dakota. The unit was in danger of failing its NSI in early 2007, after DTRA inspectors found security problems within the unit. But Air Force evaluators disagreed with the finding, and gave the wing a passing score. DSB members were puzzled over the high "pass" rate from Air Force inspectors, in a period that followed the service's worst nuclear mishap in more than 20 years.
During that now-famous incident, six nuclear-tipped cruise missiles were mistakenly flown from Minot to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana on a B-52 bomber. The mistake was not discovered until hours after the aircraft landed at the Louisiana base.
To fix the inspection process, the DSB has recommended that DTRA be given oversight over USAF inspectors, and shorten the time between evaluations from the agency. Currently, agency personnel visit units with Air Force inspectors every five years. While DTRA inspectors conduct their own evaluation--and issue a separate report--the final pass/fail determination rests with the Air Force.
As Mr. Hoffman writes, the DSB wants the agency to focus on the USAF's inspectors, and shorten the interval between DTRA visits:
The DSB is recommending DTRA inspectors have the authority to instead inspect the Air Force inspectors rather than the units and issue a report to the Air Force inspection team’s command, the Air Force service chief, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs.
A recommendation was also made to cut in half the time between Nuclear Operational Readiness Inspections in Air Combat Command and Operational Readiness Inspections in Air Force Space Command from every 36 months to every 18 months.
Since NSIs are also held every 18 months, the DSB also recommended the NORIs/ORIs be held at the same time, according to the report.
As Michael Hoffman of Air Force Times reports:
The board — organized under the Office of the Secretary of Defense — picked apart the Air Force’s nuclear inspection architecture, faulting it for not alerting leaders to the service’s nuclear erosion and recommended the Defense Threat Reduction Agency be empowered to revitalize the Air Force’s nuclear inspection process.
Meanwhile, DSB members, who have extensive nuclear backgrounds in the Air Force and Navy, found few faults with the Navy’s nuclear inspection process.
Board members questioned the credibility of Air Force nuclear inspections after service inspectors passed five nuclear units in 2007 and 2008 even after inspections done by the DTRA, who inspected those same units at the same time, had failed them.
The numbers tell the story. Over a 19-month period (September 2007-April 2008), USAF inspectors passed 20 of 21 units undergoing a nuclear surety inspection (NSI) Limited NSIs or Defense NSIs. But only 16 of of the units received passing grades from the DTRA.
Case in point? The 91st Missile Wing, located at Minot AFB, North Dakota. The unit was in danger of failing its NSI in early 2007, after DTRA inspectors found security problems within the unit. But Air Force evaluators disagreed with the finding, and gave the wing a passing score. DSB members were puzzled over the high "pass" rate from Air Force inspectors, in a period that followed the service's worst nuclear mishap in more than 20 years.
During that now-famous incident, six nuclear-tipped cruise missiles were mistakenly flown from Minot to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana on a B-52 bomber. The mistake was not discovered until hours after the aircraft landed at the Louisiana base.
To fix the inspection process, the DSB has recommended that DTRA be given oversight over USAF inspectors, and shorten the time between evaluations from the agency. Currently, agency personnel visit units with Air Force inspectors every five years. While DTRA inspectors conduct their own evaluation--and issue a separate report--the final pass/fail determination rests with the Air Force.
As Mr. Hoffman writes, the DSB wants the agency to focus on the USAF's inspectors, and shorten the interval between DTRA visits:
The DSB is recommending DTRA inspectors have the authority to instead inspect the Air Force inspectors rather than the units and issue a report to the Air Force inspection team’s command, the Air Force service chief, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs.
A recommendation was also made to cut in half the time between Nuclear Operational Readiness Inspections in Air Combat Command and Operational Readiness Inspections in Air Force Space Command from every 36 months to every 18 months.
Since NSIs are also held every 18 months, the DSB also recommended the NORIs/ORIs be held at the same time, according to the report.
Reports from the DSB carry a great deal of weight in the Pentagon, so it seems likely that their recommendations will be integrated into the USAF's revised inspection system. But the report is also a reminder that the service's nuclear inspection process remains broken--and fixing it will take more time and oversight from outside agencies.
In the interim, the Air Force might consider some sort of exchange program with the Navy. As the DSB observed, the Navy has an inspection process that's virtually error-free. Obviously, there are some differences between the two services (in terms of nuclear operations), but there is a a good deal of commonality as well. Borrowing from the Navy would be another way to get the Air Force inspection program back on track.
Tuesday, January 06, 2009
Today's Reading Assignment
Why "Gaza Is Not Lebanon," by Thomas Donnelly and Danielle Pletka of The Weekly Standard.
Both Mr. Donnelly and Ms. Pletka are resident scholars at the American Enterprise Institute, with years of experience in analyzing defense and national security issues. As a result, they don't fall for the easy traps that snare the mainstream media.
Compare their assessment with those reporters who predicted the Israelis would suffer the same problems that brought defeat in Lebanon. Donnelly and Pletka understand that Gaza is a vastly different battlefield than south Lebanon, and Hamas is not in the same league as Hizballah. Consequently, the IDF campaign in Gaza stands a good chance of succeeding, while the Lebanon War was seemingly doomed from the start. As they write:
To begin with, the physical and geographical differences between southern Lebanon and the Gaza strip could hardly be greater. And while Hassan Nasrallah and the Hezbollah leadership were under air attack in the outskirts of Beirut in 2006, the Hamas leadership has far fewer places to hide in Gaza city and elsewhere in Gaza. The initial successes of the Israeli airstrikes were not just a product of much better intelligence about Hamas (though it's probable that Israeli intelligence had done a superior job of exploiting differences amongst Hamas and West Bank leaders to improve its targeting), but also reflect simple facts of proximity and smaller scale. The terrain makes perhaps an even greater difference in ground warfare. The hills of southern Lebanon are not only naturally defensible terrain--each village providing an excellent fortified fighting position--but helped to channel Israeli armored columns. A good percentage of Israeli combat deaths came from a handful of successful ambushes.
[snip]
Hamas and Hezbollah are also profoundly different beasts. While neither is really the "non-state actor" as popularly understood, Hezbollah is a much more robust and state-like organization, while Hamas is only a notch above its roots as a terrorist group, and has failed to capitalize on its control of quasi-independent Gaza to organize or modernize. And further, while both are Iranian proxies, the duration, depth and strength of Tehran's investments in Hezbollah far exceeds its investments in Hamas. (It's also worth noting that Hamas is a Sunni group, and though sectarianism is an imperfect guide to alliances in the Middle East--as our experience in Iraq should make clear--it does contribute to the fact that Iranian ties with Hezbollah are more organic than with Hamas.) In addition, the Lebanese state's weaknesses make it a free zone in which the Iranian Quds Force has been able to conduct rigorous paramilitary training and rearm its proxies freely. Hamas has operated under a much more watchful Israeli eye. Iranian military assistance and training to Hamas has been effective only in limited areas, and has itself lacked the scope of effort Hezbollah has enjoyed; whereas Hezbollah armed and trained and (with North Korean aid) built infrastructure for many years to fight as it did in 2006.
Read the whole thing; it's far more cogent than similar "analysis" from the AP, AFP, or the Washington Post.
Both Mr. Donnelly and Ms. Pletka are resident scholars at the American Enterprise Institute, with years of experience in analyzing defense and national security issues. As a result, they don't fall for the easy traps that snare the mainstream media.
Compare their assessment with those reporters who predicted the Israelis would suffer the same problems that brought defeat in Lebanon. Donnelly and Pletka understand that Gaza is a vastly different battlefield than south Lebanon, and Hamas is not in the same league as Hizballah. Consequently, the IDF campaign in Gaza stands a good chance of succeeding, while the Lebanon War was seemingly doomed from the start. As they write:
To begin with, the physical and geographical differences between southern Lebanon and the Gaza strip could hardly be greater. And while Hassan Nasrallah and the Hezbollah leadership were under air attack in the outskirts of Beirut in 2006, the Hamas leadership has far fewer places to hide in Gaza city and elsewhere in Gaza. The initial successes of the Israeli airstrikes were not just a product of much better intelligence about Hamas (though it's probable that Israeli intelligence had done a superior job of exploiting differences amongst Hamas and West Bank leaders to improve its targeting), but also reflect simple facts of proximity and smaller scale. The terrain makes perhaps an even greater difference in ground warfare. The hills of southern Lebanon are not only naturally defensible terrain--each village providing an excellent fortified fighting position--but helped to channel Israeli armored columns. A good percentage of Israeli combat deaths came from a handful of successful ambushes.
[snip]
Hamas and Hezbollah are also profoundly different beasts. While neither is really the "non-state actor" as popularly understood, Hezbollah is a much more robust and state-like organization, while Hamas is only a notch above its roots as a terrorist group, and has failed to capitalize on its control of quasi-independent Gaza to organize or modernize. And further, while both are Iranian proxies, the duration, depth and strength of Tehran's investments in Hezbollah far exceeds its investments in Hamas. (It's also worth noting that Hamas is a Sunni group, and though sectarianism is an imperfect guide to alliances in the Middle East--as our experience in Iraq should make clear--it does contribute to the fact that Iranian ties with Hezbollah are more organic than with Hamas.) In addition, the Lebanese state's weaknesses make it a free zone in which the Iranian Quds Force has been able to conduct rigorous paramilitary training and rearm its proxies freely. Hamas has operated under a much more watchful Israeli eye. Iranian military assistance and training to Hamas has been effective only in limited areas, and has itself lacked the scope of effort Hezbollah has enjoyed; whereas Hezbollah armed and trained and (with North Korean aid) built infrastructure for many years to fight as it did in 2006.
Read the whole thing; it's far more cogent than similar "analysis" from the AP, AFP, or the Washington Post.
The Air Force Does a "180" (Well, Maybe a 90)
The Air Force has discovered social media.
A number of blogs, including Global Nerdy and WebInkNow have lavished praise on the USAF for its commitment to the blogosphere and such cutting-edge venues as YouTube, Twitter, and Face Book, among others.
David Scott at WebInk believes the Air Force is well ahead of most large organizations in its embrace of social media:
In an environment where many corporations are scared witless about social media, here a huge global organization firmly committed to social media communications to spread messages, stories, knowledge and ideals. Capt. [David] Faggard [Chief of the Emerging Technology Branch for Air Force Public Affairs] says that the focus is on: "Direct Action within Social Media (blogging, counter-blogging, posting products to YouTube, etc.); Monitoring and Analysis of the Social Media landscape (relating to Air Force and Airmen); and policy and education (educating all Public Affairs practitioners and the bigger Air Force on Social Media)."
While I was amazed that the Air Force is doing so much while many in the private sector are still doing so little, I asked about the unique challenges faced by the US armed forces when it comes to social media. In particular, I was intrigued by the term "counter-blogging" which Capt. Faggard says is when "Airmen counter the people out there in the blogosphere who have negative opinions about the US government and the air force."
Faggard tells Mr. Scott that the service employs 330,000 "communicators," which (coincidentally) equals the number of active duty, guard and reserve personnel currently assigned to the USAF. Under the Air Force's new social media strategy, every single airman is a potential on-line communicator.
Well, almost. While the service's move into social media is commendable, the USAF remains somewhat ambivalent towards the blogosphere, and participation by its personnel. Less than a year ago, the Air Force blocked access to virtually any independent site with "blog" in its web address. That means that USAF members can't access most military or defense blogs--including this one--from their computers at work.
Accoring to the Air Force, the ban isn't aimed at specific blogs. When the service switched to BlueCoat web filtering in early 2008, the new software blocked almost anything that contained blog as part of its URL. The system is flexible, allowing network monitors to override restrictions imposed by the software. But, at last report, the USAF's general restrictions on workplace blog access remained in place.
While airmen are free to visit blogs and social network sites on their personal computers, the service cautions against posting information that might be classified or violate operational security (OPSEC). The USAF also warns that a service member's blog can be used as evidence against them if they write about illegal acts, or acts under investigation.
Those restrictions are consistent across DoD, but the Air Force policy falls well short of the Navy, which "recognizes the value of this communication channel," and "encourages the use of blogs," as long as personnel adhere to limits on content.
Additionally, the USAF hasn't produced its equivalent of Lieutenant General William Caldwell, the Commander of the Army's Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, and a veteran of two combat tours in Iraq. In a now-famous post, General Caldwell observed that, in struggles where perception is often as important as bombs and bullets, "soldiers ought to be encouraged and equipped to wage that information war on their own."
We should note that Caldwell's position is somewhat contrary to official Army policy, including a 2007 mandate that required blog posts be approved by the soldier's commander and OPSEC officer before publication. After a firestorm of protests, the service offered a clarification on its policy, saying that troops should received "guidance and awareness training" before launching a blog.
Not surprisingly, Captain Faggard says there has been "some resistance" to the Air Force web initiative. But USAF leadership is behind the effort, and his staff will grow from three persons to 16 in the coming months. As Faggard told WebInk, "We are on the verge of a revolution and it is an information revolution. The Air Force is doing new things and we're on the forefront. We'll make mistakes, but it is kind of cool to see what we can do."
Equally amazing is the service's (apparent) change-of-heart on the blogosphere and social media. Less than two years ago, we had a conversation with a senior Air Force public affairs representative. At the time, that civilian official told us that the USAF had "no plans" to engage bloggers, because studies showed that "most people don't get their news and information from blogs."
Clearly, Air Force leaders--and their public affairs apparatus--have adopted a different view of the blogosphere. Among his other duties, Captain Faggard now runs the service's official blog, and spearheads the USAF presence on YouTube, Facebook, MySpace and other web outlets. And, if that's not enough, you can even get your own, Air Force news widget.
While these ventures are a step in the right direction, it's too early to declare them a total success. The Air Force blog offers the same material as the service's official website. Recent posts include a promo for a new HBO film that includes USAF personnel; a sortie surge at Charleston AFB, South Carolina and the annual holiday message from the president.
In other words, if you're looking for controversial or delicate subjects, you probably won't find them on the official blog. That's to be expected, but it may also represent a fundamental flaw. The dynamic, fast-flowing blogosphere allows organizations to get ahead of the information curve, even if the topic is less-than-flattering.
We wonder how the Air Force blog would handle something like the Minot nuclear incident, when the public affairs system went NORDO, and official information was sometimes hard to come by. It will be interesting to see if the USAF's blogging and social media sites tackle more controversial issues, even if they're only reacting to news coverage or posts at other web sites. That may represent the ultimate test for Captain Faggard and his team.
***
ADDENDUM: The USAF has developed a process for responding to blog posts, outlined in this flow chart. Among the options listed are monitoring the site, responding in the blog's comments section, or "restoration," defined as resplying and acting on a reasonable solution.
A number of blogs, including Global Nerdy and WebInkNow have lavished praise on the USAF for its commitment to the blogosphere and such cutting-edge venues as YouTube, Twitter, and Face Book, among others.
David Scott at WebInk believes the Air Force is well ahead of most large organizations in its embrace of social media:
In an environment where many corporations are scared witless about social media, here a huge global organization firmly committed to social media communications to spread messages, stories, knowledge and ideals. Capt. [David] Faggard [Chief of the Emerging Technology Branch for Air Force Public Affairs] says that the focus is on: "Direct Action within Social Media (blogging, counter-blogging, posting products to YouTube, etc.); Monitoring and Analysis of the Social Media landscape (relating to Air Force and Airmen); and policy and education (educating all Public Affairs practitioners and the bigger Air Force on Social Media)."
While I was amazed that the Air Force is doing so much while many in the private sector are still doing so little, I asked about the unique challenges faced by the US armed forces when it comes to social media. In particular, I was intrigued by the term "counter-blogging" which Capt. Faggard says is when "Airmen counter the people out there in the blogosphere who have negative opinions about the US government and the air force."
Faggard tells Mr. Scott that the service employs 330,000 "communicators," which (coincidentally) equals the number of active duty, guard and reserve personnel currently assigned to the USAF. Under the Air Force's new social media strategy, every single airman is a potential on-line communicator.
Well, almost. While the service's move into social media is commendable, the USAF remains somewhat ambivalent towards the blogosphere, and participation by its personnel. Less than a year ago, the Air Force blocked access to virtually any independent site with "blog" in its web address. That means that USAF members can't access most military or defense blogs--including this one--from their computers at work.
Accoring to the Air Force, the ban isn't aimed at specific blogs. When the service switched to BlueCoat web filtering in early 2008, the new software blocked almost anything that contained blog as part of its URL. The system is flexible, allowing network monitors to override restrictions imposed by the software. But, at last report, the USAF's general restrictions on workplace blog access remained in place.
While airmen are free to visit blogs and social network sites on their personal computers, the service cautions against posting information that might be classified or violate operational security (OPSEC). The USAF also warns that a service member's blog can be used as evidence against them if they write about illegal acts, or acts under investigation.
Those restrictions are consistent across DoD, but the Air Force policy falls well short of the Navy, which "recognizes the value of this communication channel," and "encourages the use of blogs," as long as personnel adhere to limits on content.
Additionally, the USAF hasn't produced its equivalent of Lieutenant General William Caldwell, the Commander of the Army's Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, and a veteran of two combat tours in Iraq. In a now-famous post, General Caldwell observed that, in struggles where perception is often as important as bombs and bullets, "soldiers ought to be encouraged and equipped to wage that information war on their own."
We should note that Caldwell's position is somewhat contrary to official Army policy, including a 2007 mandate that required blog posts be approved by the soldier's commander and OPSEC officer before publication. After a firestorm of protests, the service offered a clarification on its policy, saying that troops should received "guidance and awareness training" before launching a blog.
Not surprisingly, Captain Faggard says there has been "some resistance" to the Air Force web initiative. But USAF leadership is behind the effort, and his staff will grow from three persons to 16 in the coming months. As Faggard told WebInk, "We are on the verge of a revolution and it is an information revolution. The Air Force is doing new things and we're on the forefront. We'll make mistakes, but it is kind of cool to see what we can do."
Equally amazing is the service's (apparent) change-of-heart on the blogosphere and social media. Less than two years ago, we had a conversation with a senior Air Force public affairs representative. At the time, that civilian official told us that the USAF had "no plans" to engage bloggers, because studies showed that "most people don't get their news and information from blogs."
Clearly, Air Force leaders--and their public affairs apparatus--have adopted a different view of the blogosphere. Among his other duties, Captain Faggard now runs the service's official blog, and spearheads the USAF presence on YouTube, Facebook, MySpace and other web outlets. And, if that's not enough, you can even get your own, Air Force news widget.
While these ventures are a step in the right direction, it's too early to declare them a total success. The Air Force blog offers the same material as the service's official website. Recent posts include a promo for a new HBO film that includes USAF personnel; a sortie surge at Charleston AFB, South Carolina and the annual holiday message from the president.
In other words, if you're looking for controversial or delicate subjects, you probably won't find them on the official blog. That's to be expected, but it may also represent a fundamental flaw. The dynamic, fast-flowing blogosphere allows organizations to get ahead of the information curve, even if the topic is less-than-flattering.
We wonder how the Air Force blog would handle something like the Minot nuclear incident, when the public affairs system went NORDO, and official information was sometimes hard to come by. It will be interesting to see if the USAF's blogging and social media sites tackle more controversial issues, even if they're only reacting to news coverage or posts at other web sites. That may represent the ultimate test for Captain Faggard and his team.
***
ADDENDUM: The USAF has developed a process for responding to blog posts, outlined in this flow chart. Among the options listed are monitoring the site, responding in the blog's comments section, or "restoration," defined as resplying and acting on a reasonable solution.
Monday, January 05, 2009
The Wrong Choice
More than a few spooks, current and former, are shaking their heads over the appointment of Leon Panetta as the next CIA Director.
Mr. Panetta is the consummate Washington insider who is best know as Bill Clinton's Chief of Staff during the Monica Lewinsky episode. Before that, he was Clinton's first Director of the Office of Management and Budget and a Democratic Congressman from California for 16 years, serving primarily on the Budget and Agriculture Committees.
In the early days of his political life, Panetta was actually a Republican, working as an aide to California Senator Thomas Kuchel before joining the Nixon Administration. During his first stint in Washington, Panetta served as assistant to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and later ran the Office for Civil Rights. He left the administration--and the GOP--in 1971, accusing the White House of being "soft" on enforcement of the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts.
Readers will note a common theme in Panetta's professional life: the wholesale lack of intelligence experience. While Mr. Panetta is certainly acquainted with the intel community and his capabilities, he has never served (let alone, led) an intelligence organization, or served on a Congressional panel charged with its oversight.
To be fair, many CIA Directors have come from outside the intelligence community. And, some of them, such as John McCone, who served during the Kennedy Administration, have performed admirably. At the other extreme, some of the career intelligence officers (or those with prior intel experience) have been miserable failures. So, Panetta's limited exposure to the intelligence community doesn't disqualify him for the CIA post, or predict failure during his tenure.
But these are critical days for our intelligence apparatus, including the agency that Mr. Panetta will lead. When the Bush Administration entered office eight years ago, it inherited a CIA that was dysfunctional, highly politicized and woefully inept at its critical missions of intelligence collection and analysis.
Since then, three different men--George Tenet, Porter Goss and Michael Hayden--have tried to reform the agency, with varying degrees of success. During their respective tenures, the CIA has added thousands of new operatives and analysts, and there is some evidence that the new hires (and their more experienced colleagues) are making a difference. After all, there hasn't been a terrorist attack on American soil since 9-11, and the CIA deserves some credit for that remarkable record.
Still, the agency is far from healthy. Elements within the CIA have pursued a strident, anti-administration agenda, under-cutting President Bush's policies on Iran's nuclear program and other issues. Case in point: the intelligence community's infamous 2007 assessment of Tehran's nuclear ambitions--largely based on CIA analysts--which effectively ended any chances for U.S. military action against Iran. The long-term consequences of that analytical power play have yet to be determined.
To advance the reform agenda at Langley, the CIA clearly needs an experienced hand. But there are more compelling reasons to put a career intelligence officer in charge of the agency. The threat facing our nation remains very real; a recent study suggests that terrorists will stage a chemical or biological attack inside the United States during the next five years. Meeting that challenge requires a leader who doesn't need on the job training, and will hold his organization to the highest standards of tradecraft and professional conduct.
Mr. Panetta is a capable administrator and experienced political operative, but he's the wrong man to lead the CIA at this critical juncture. His nomination also reflects badly on President-elect Barack Obama and his transition team. Most of his national security team was announced last month. Delaying the CIA announcement until the New Year suggests that the appointment was something of an afterthought, or that the job was rejected by more qualified candidates.
Obviously, the job of CIA Director doesn't carry the power it once did. The agency chief now works for the Director of National Intelligence, who oversees the functions of 16 organizations that form our intel system. But in a community of "equals" some agencies are more important than others, and the Central Intelligence Agency clearly falls in that former category.
The next CIA chief faces three herculean challenges: keeping the agency fully engaged in the war on terror; reigning in political elements that want to dictate U.S. policy, and avoiding another intelligence debacle like the one that preceded the 9-11 attacks. It's a tall order for any director, but those tasks are made more difficult by today's economic uncertainly, which may result in budget cutbacks for the intelligence community.
As a former OMB Director, Mr. Panetta is a veteran of federal budget wars. But even if he preserves the CIA's share of the intel pie, there is no evidence that he has the background or expertise to employ those assets in the most effective manner. Just one more reason that the Panetta nomination is so disappointing--and potentially dangerous.
***
ADDENDUM: Mr. Obama is entitled to the CIA Director of his choice. But the selection of Leon Panetta is a reflection of the next commander-in-chief and his own, limited intelligence experience. A few weeks ago, the president-elect named retired Navy Admiral Dennis Blair as the new Director of National Intelligence. Like Mr. Panetta, Admiral Blair has a long resume as a leader and administrator. But in terms of intel, his only experience is as a consumer.
The big-picture view is even more disturbing. President-elect Obama, a man who is decidedly short on national security experience, has appointed a pair of neophytes to fill our most important intelligence positions. Those men, in turn, are supposed to advise him on the most critical (and sensitive) intel and national security issues. That planned "arrangement" doesn't exactly inspire confidence.
And, for what it's worth, California Senator Diane Feinstein, Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, isn't exactly pleased with the Panetta nomination.
Others have suggested that Panetta may be a sop to liberal bloggers and activists who torpedoed John Brennan, the CIA veteran said to be Mr. Obama's first choice to run the agency. Brennan was unacceptable to those elements of the Obama coalition because of his support for the "forceful" interrogation of suspected terrorists.
If Panetta is a peace offering to the moon-bat brigade, it's all the more reason to oppose his confirmation as CIA Director.
Mr. Panetta is the consummate Washington insider who is best know as Bill Clinton's Chief of Staff during the Monica Lewinsky episode. Before that, he was Clinton's first Director of the Office of Management and Budget and a Democratic Congressman from California for 16 years, serving primarily on the Budget and Agriculture Committees.
In the early days of his political life, Panetta was actually a Republican, working as an aide to California Senator Thomas Kuchel before joining the Nixon Administration. During his first stint in Washington, Panetta served as assistant to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and later ran the Office for Civil Rights. He left the administration--and the GOP--in 1971, accusing the White House of being "soft" on enforcement of the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts.
Readers will note a common theme in Panetta's professional life: the wholesale lack of intelligence experience. While Mr. Panetta is certainly acquainted with the intel community and his capabilities, he has never served (let alone, led) an intelligence organization, or served on a Congressional panel charged with its oversight.
To be fair, many CIA Directors have come from outside the intelligence community. And, some of them, such as John McCone, who served during the Kennedy Administration, have performed admirably. At the other extreme, some of the career intelligence officers (or those with prior intel experience) have been miserable failures. So, Panetta's limited exposure to the intelligence community doesn't disqualify him for the CIA post, or predict failure during his tenure.
But these are critical days for our intelligence apparatus, including the agency that Mr. Panetta will lead. When the Bush Administration entered office eight years ago, it inherited a CIA that was dysfunctional, highly politicized and woefully inept at its critical missions of intelligence collection and analysis.
Since then, three different men--George Tenet, Porter Goss and Michael Hayden--have tried to reform the agency, with varying degrees of success. During their respective tenures, the CIA has added thousands of new operatives and analysts, and there is some evidence that the new hires (and their more experienced colleagues) are making a difference. After all, there hasn't been a terrorist attack on American soil since 9-11, and the CIA deserves some credit for that remarkable record.
Still, the agency is far from healthy. Elements within the CIA have pursued a strident, anti-administration agenda, under-cutting President Bush's policies on Iran's nuclear program and other issues. Case in point: the intelligence community's infamous 2007 assessment of Tehran's nuclear ambitions--largely based on CIA analysts--which effectively ended any chances for U.S. military action against Iran. The long-term consequences of that analytical power play have yet to be determined.
To advance the reform agenda at Langley, the CIA clearly needs an experienced hand. But there are more compelling reasons to put a career intelligence officer in charge of the agency. The threat facing our nation remains very real; a recent study suggests that terrorists will stage a chemical or biological attack inside the United States during the next five years. Meeting that challenge requires a leader who doesn't need on the job training, and will hold his organization to the highest standards of tradecraft and professional conduct.
Mr. Panetta is a capable administrator and experienced political operative, but he's the wrong man to lead the CIA at this critical juncture. His nomination also reflects badly on President-elect Barack Obama and his transition team. Most of his national security team was announced last month. Delaying the CIA announcement until the New Year suggests that the appointment was something of an afterthought, or that the job was rejected by more qualified candidates.
Obviously, the job of CIA Director doesn't carry the power it once did. The agency chief now works for the Director of National Intelligence, who oversees the functions of 16 organizations that form our intel system. But in a community of "equals" some agencies are more important than others, and the Central Intelligence Agency clearly falls in that former category.
The next CIA chief faces three herculean challenges: keeping the agency fully engaged in the war on terror; reigning in political elements that want to dictate U.S. policy, and avoiding another intelligence debacle like the one that preceded the 9-11 attacks. It's a tall order for any director, but those tasks are made more difficult by today's economic uncertainly, which may result in budget cutbacks for the intelligence community.
As a former OMB Director, Mr. Panetta is a veteran of federal budget wars. But even if he preserves the CIA's share of the intel pie, there is no evidence that he has the background or expertise to employ those assets in the most effective manner. Just one more reason that the Panetta nomination is so disappointing--and potentially dangerous.
***
ADDENDUM: Mr. Obama is entitled to the CIA Director of his choice. But the selection of Leon Panetta is a reflection of the next commander-in-chief and his own, limited intelligence experience. A few weeks ago, the president-elect named retired Navy Admiral Dennis Blair as the new Director of National Intelligence. Like Mr. Panetta, Admiral Blair has a long resume as a leader and administrator. But in terms of intel, his only experience is as a consumer.
The big-picture view is even more disturbing. President-elect Obama, a man who is decidedly short on national security experience, has appointed a pair of neophytes to fill our most important intelligence positions. Those men, in turn, are supposed to advise him on the most critical (and sensitive) intel and national security issues. That planned "arrangement" doesn't exactly inspire confidence.
And, for what it's worth, California Senator Diane Feinstein, Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, isn't exactly pleased with the Panetta nomination.
Others have suggested that Panetta may be a sop to liberal bloggers and activists who torpedoed John Brennan, the CIA veteran said to be Mr. Obama's first choice to run the agency. Brennan was unacceptable to those elements of the Obama coalition because of his support for the "forceful" interrogation of suspected terrorists.
If Panetta is a peace offering to the moon-bat brigade, it's all the more reason to oppose his confirmation as CIA Director.
Sunday, January 04, 2009
Getting Ready for the Urban Battle
Twenty-four hours into the ground campaign, Israeli forces have split the Gaza Strip in half, surrounding its largest city, and setting the stage for definitive battles that will follow.
As the AP describes it:
On Sunday, Israeli soldiers fought primarily in open areas in the launching zones used by Gaza's militants to send rockets raining down on Israeli cities. As the troops in three brigade-size formations moved in, residents of those Israeli cities began cautiously emerging from bomb shelters in hopes that the rocket fire would taper off.
Backing up the troops, mobile artillery units fired shells that exploded in veils of white smoke over Gaza's urban skyline. Tanks pushed south of Gaza City as deep as the abandoned settlement of Netzarim, which Israel left along with other communities when it pulled out of Gaza in 2005.
That effectively cut off Gaza City, the territory's largest population center with some 400,000 residents, from the rest of Gaza to the south.
Senior Israeli military officials said Hamas fighters were attempting to draw IDF soldiers deeper into Gaza's urban neighborhoods. One terrorist spokesman claimed that Gaza would be "the graveyard" of the Israeli Army.
That's nothing more than propaganda--and even Hamas understands that. The Israeli operation that is now unfolding was planned with extraordinary care, minimizing casualties among military personnel and civilians.
If you want a template, consider our own, successful "clearing" of Fallujah in 2004. U.S. Marines, supported by Army elements, took the city in only six days, killing more than 1,000 terrorists and capturing 1,100 more. American casualties were surprisingly light for an urban battle; 51 killed and 425 wounded, in an attacking force of more than 15,000.
In a post-mortem for the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Jack Kelly explained why the Iraq operation wasn't a repeat of Grozny, the infamous 1994 battle where Chechen rebels wiped out a Russian brigade that rushed into the city, unprepared for an urban engagement:
Military analysts say the Americans in Fallujah avoided the fate of the Russians in Grozny by carefully gathering intelligence over the two months preceding the attack; by innovative use of new technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicles; by being able to drop bombs and shoot artillery and even mortar shells with precision, and because of the superior training of American soldiers and Marines.
As Mr. Kelly notes, the Marine Corps began training for urban combat in the 1980s, and the Army followed suit in the decade that followed. The forces assigned to clear Fallujah were exceptionally well-prepared for the task, resulting in lower casualties for the assault force.
U.S. troops also foiled potential ambushes and traps by clearing routes through the urban terrain, using tanks and bulldozers. Instead of sending troops and armored vehicles through funnel and choke points, American forces demolished buildings and quickly cleared the rubble, creating their own routes.
And where did our forces learn that trick? From the Israelis, the same Army that is now setting the stage for the Gaza battle.
As the AP describes it:
On Sunday, Israeli soldiers fought primarily in open areas in the launching zones used by Gaza's militants to send rockets raining down on Israeli cities. As the troops in three brigade-size formations moved in, residents of those Israeli cities began cautiously emerging from bomb shelters in hopes that the rocket fire would taper off.
Backing up the troops, mobile artillery units fired shells that exploded in veils of white smoke over Gaza's urban skyline. Tanks pushed south of Gaza City as deep as the abandoned settlement of Netzarim, which Israel left along with other communities when it pulled out of Gaza in 2005.
That effectively cut off Gaza City, the territory's largest population center with some 400,000 residents, from the rest of Gaza to the south.
Senior Israeli military officials said Hamas fighters were attempting to draw IDF soldiers deeper into Gaza's urban neighborhoods. One terrorist spokesman claimed that Gaza would be "the graveyard" of the Israeli Army.
That's nothing more than propaganda--and even Hamas understands that. The Israeli operation that is now unfolding was planned with extraordinary care, minimizing casualties among military personnel and civilians.
If you want a template, consider our own, successful "clearing" of Fallujah in 2004. U.S. Marines, supported by Army elements, took the city in only six days, killing more than 1,000 terrorists and capturing 1,100 more. American casualties were surprisingly light for an urban battle; 51 killed and 425 wounded, in an attacking force of more than 15,000.
In a post-mortem for the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Jack Kelly explained why the Iraq operation wasn't a repeat of Grozny, the infamous 1994 battle where Chechen rebels wiped out a Russian brigade that rushed into the city, unprepared for an urban engagement:
Military analysts say the Americans in Fallujah avoided the fate of the Russians in Grozny by carefully gathering intelligence over the two months preceding the attack; by innovative use of new technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicles; by being able to drop bombs and shoot artillery and even mortar shells with precision, and because of the superior training of American soldiers and Marines.
As Mr. Kelly notes, the Marine Corps began training for urban combat in the 1980s, and the Army followed suit in the decade that followed. The forces assigned to clear Fallujah were exceptionally well-prepared for the task, resulting in lower casualties for the assault force.
U.S. troops also foiled potential ambushes and traps by clearing routes through the urban terrain, using tanks and bulldozers. Instead of sending troops and armored vehicles through funnel and choke points, American forces demolished buildings and quickly cleared the rubble, creating their own routes.
And where did our forces learn that trick? From the Israelis, the same Army that is now setting the stage for the Gaza battle.
Closing the Speicher Case?
Navy F/A-18 pilot Scott Speicher. He disappeared after his jet was shot down over Iraq in January 1991, but his fate has never been determine (DoD photo via Wikipedia).
The Navy will hold a hearing Monday on the status of Captain Scott Speicher, the F/A-18 pilot who disappeared on the opening night of Operation Desert Storm almost 18 years ago.
Members of the Speicher family believe that Navy Secretary Donald Winter is moving toward changing the aviator's status from missing/captured to killed. Speicher was initially listed as killed in the hours after his jet went down over Iraq in January 1991. However, his status was changed to "missing in action," based on an absence of evidence that he died.
A decade later, in October 2002, the service revised Speicher's status again, listing him as "missing/captured," although the Navy never explained the reason for the change. The revision came just months before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.
The fall of Baghdad in April 2003 brought what many believed was a new, tantalizing clue. Inside a prison in the Iraqi capital, investigators found the initials "M.S.S" carved into the wall of a cell. Some believed that the letters stood for "Michael Scott Speicher," the pilot's full name.
However, other officials discounted that possibility, noting that the initials "M.J.N." were found directly above M.S.S. The second set of initials do not correspond to any western POW known to be held by the former Iraqi regime. Speicher's name appeared on a list of prisoners held by Saddam's government, dated January 2003, but the document did not detail his location, or whether he was still alive.
This much we know: in the early hours of Desert Storm, then-Lieutenant Commander Speicher was part of an F/A-18 formation that launched from the carrier USS Saratoga. His Hornet went down in a fireball west of Baghdad. Originally, intel analysts believed that a surface-to-air missile was responsible for the shoot down, but later assessments attribute the kill to an Iraqi Air Force MiG-25. It was the only American loss on the first night of the air war.
But there is strong evidence that Speicher survived the engagement. The wreckage of his F/A-18 was found in the Iraqi desert, and examined by U.S. experts. No human remains were found at the site, and it appears that Speicher ejected from his aircraft. Additionally, the pilot's escape and evasion "letter" was found carved into the desert near the crash site. The sign is unique to each pilot or aircrew member and is used to signal that the missing airman survived the shootdown, and is attempting to evade the enemy.
At that point, the trail grows cold, except for those clues recovered in Baghdad five years ago, and occasional human intelligence reports that claimed Speicher was alive, and being held by Saddam. In other words, enough evidence to suggest that the Navy pilot might be alive, but not enough to prove it conclusively.
Officially, the Navy hasn't said if it plans to change Speicher's status. The Defense Intelligence Agency, which is responsible for tracking (and investigating) POW-MIA cases, completed its last report on the matter six months ago. But the agency hasn't said if it has new, conclusive evidence on what happened to Speicher, who has been promoted to the rank of Captain in his absence.
For years, the Speicher family has been pressing the Pentagon for a more complete accounting of his fate. And, they certainly have a point, because serious errors were made in the early stages of Captain Speicher's disappearance. For example, no rescue team was ever dispatched after his F/A-18 went down, despite robust capabilities that existed in theater. American investigators didn't actually visit the crash site until years later, raising the possibility that critical evidence disappeared, or was possibly removed from that location.
Barring the recent discovery of definitive evidence, we can't understand why the Navy might be pushing to close the Speicher case. In fact, the most obvious rationale is also the most odious: by declaring Captain Speicher dead, the service can officially "wrap up" the matter, and eliminate some aggravating details.
That means no more intelligence collection or analysis related to his disappearance, and the end of monthly pay and allowances for Speicher's family, which totals more than $116,000 a year. Put another way, the military could save a fair amount of money by declaring the Captain dead and the matter resolved. Changing his status could also improve relations with Baghdad, getting them off the hook for solving an issue that began with the previous regime.
Closing the case would also end something of a public relations headache for the Pentagon. Currently, Captain Speicher is the only American service member--from any war--who is still listed as being held by the enemy. It's an issue that always surfaces at Congressional hearings on POW-MIA affairs, and sometimes generates embarrassing questions. Listing Speicher as "dead" would resolve that issue, too.
Sadly, not all MIA cases can be resolved, even in an age of DNA testing and satellite imagery. We may never know what happened to Scott Speicher on that January night in 1991, but the Navy has not presented a definitive case for declaring him dead. As the family's attorney has noted, the Speicher example will set a precedent for future MIA cases, and there's a need for further investigation before considering a status change.
We owe that much to Scott Speicher.
Members of the Speicher family believe that Navy Secretary Donald Winter is moving toward changing the aviator's status from missing/captured to killed. Speicher was initially listed as killed in the hours after his jet went down over Iraq in January 1991. However, his status was changed to "missing in action," based on an absence of evidence that he died.
A decade later, in October 2002, the service revised Speicher's status again, listing him as "missing/captured," although the Navy never explained the reason for the change. The revision came just months before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.
The fall of Baghdad in April 2003 brought what many believed was a new, tantalizing clue. Inside a prison in the Iraqi capital, investigators found the initials "M.S.S" carved into the wall of a cell. Some believed that the letters stood for "Michael Scott Speicher," the pilot's full name.
However, other officials discounted that possibility, noting that the initials "M.J.N." were found directly above M.S.S. The second set of initials do not correspond to any western POW known to be held by the former Iraqi regime. Speicher's name appeared on a list of prisoners held by Saddam's government, dated January 2003, but the document did not detail his location, or whether he was still alive.
This much we know: in the early hours of Desert Storm, then-Lieutenant Commander Speicher was part of an F/A-18 formation that launched from the carrier USS Saratoga. His Hornet went down in a fireball west of Baghdad. Originally, intel analysts believed that a surface-to-air missile was responsible for the shoot down, but later assessments attribute the kill to an Iraqi Air Force MiG-25. It was the only American loss on the first night of the air war.
But there is strong evidence that Speicher survived the engagement. The wreckage of his F/A-18 was found in the Iraqi desert, and examined by U.S. experts. No human remains were found at the site, and it appears that Speicher ejected from his aircraft. Additionally, the pilot's escape and evasion "letter" was found carved into the desert near the crash site. The sign is unique to each pilot or aircrew member and is used to signal that the missing airman survived the shootdown, and is attempting to evade the enemy.
At that point, the trail grows cold, except for those clues recovered in Baghdad five years ago, and occasional human intelligence reports that claimed Speicher was alive, and being held by Saddam. In other words, enough evidence to suggest that the Navy pilot might be alive, but not enough to prove it conclusively.
Officially, the Navy hasn't said if it plans to change Speicher's status. The Defense Intelligence Agency, which is responsible for tracking (and investigating) POW-MIA cases, completed its last report on the matter six months ago. But the agency hasn't said if it has new, conclusive evidence on what happened to Speicher, who has been promoted to the rank of Captain in his absence.
For years, the Speicher family has been pressing the Pentagon for a more complete accounting of his fate. And, they certainly have a point, because serious errors were made in the early stages of Captain Speicher's disappearance. For example, no rescue team was ever dispatched after his F/A-18 went down, despite robust capabilities that existed in theater. American investigators didn't actually visit the crash site until years later, raising the possibility that critical evidence disappeared, or was possibly removed from that location.
Barring the recent discovery of definitive evidence, we can't understand why the Navy might be pushing to close the Speicher case. In fact, the most obvious rationale is also the most odious: by declaring Captain Speicher dead, the service can officially "wrap up" the matter, and eliminate some aggravating details.
That means no more intelligence collection or analysis related to his disappearance, and the end of monthly pay and allowances for Speicher's family, which totals more than $116,000 a year. Put another way, the military could save a fair amount of money by declaring the Captain dead and the matter resolved. Changing his status could also improve relations with Baghdad, getting them off the hook for solving an issue that began with the previous regime.
Closing the case would also end something of a public relations headache for the Pentagon. Currently, Captain Speicher is the only American service member--from any war--who is still listed as being held by the enemy. It's an issue that always surfaces at Congressional hearings on POW-MIA affairs, and sometimes generates embarrassing questions. Listing Speicher as "dead" would resolve that issue, too.
Sadly, not all MIA cases can be resolved, even in an age of DNA testing and satellite imagery. We may never know what happened to Scott Speicher on that January night in 1991, but the Navy has not presented a definitive case for declaring him dead. As the family's attorney has noted, the Speicher example will set a precedent for future MIA cases, and there's a need for further investigation before considering a status change.
We owe that much to Scott Speicher.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)