Blame America

It sounds like something out of a South Park movie, but the U.K. Independent says the United States is somehow to blame for the current hostage standoff between Britain and Iran. According to the Independent's Patrick Cockburn, Tehran's plans to seize western hostages was set in motion almost three months ago, after U.S. forces tried to nab a pair of senior Iranian officials visiting Iraqi Kurdistan. Cockburn claims that we failed to tell the Brits about the "real" motive behind the "botched" raid, setting the stage for the abduction of British sailors and Royal Marines along the Shatt al-Arab Waterway in southern Iraq.

There are a number of problems with Mr. Cockburn's version of events. First, as various analysts have observed, Iran has a long history of hostage taking, dating back to the seizure of our embassy in 1979. However, Cockburn ignores that fact, implying that this is a new tactic for the Iran, put in motion by our attempt to nab those senior officials. Five Iranian operatives were arrested in mid-January, after a raid on a so-called "diplomatic facility" in Irbil. According to the U.S. military, all of the officials arrested in Kurdistan had ties to Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps Qods Force, the military organization that provides direct support to terrorists in Iraq. But readers won't find any of those allegations in Cockburn's report; without question, he accepts Tehran's explanation that IRGC operatives were really just consular officials, helping arrange tourist visas for Kurds who wanted to visit Iran. Never mind that documents found in the facility provided direct links between the Qods force and recent arms transfers to Iraqi terrorists.

Additionally, Cockburn fails to report that Iran has apparently tried to abduct allied military personnel in the past. A recent report in Time detailed a firefight along the Iran-Iraq border last September, an episode that had all the makings of a kidnapping operation. Confronting Iranian soldiers retreating from Iraqi territory, U.S. troops were told not to leave the area by an Iranian officer. Sensing an abduction was in the offing, the Americans pulled back, and the Iranians opened fire. American troops shot back--reportedly killing an Iranian soldier--and escaped. That episode likely reminded Tehran that American forces in Iraq operate under different rules of engagement (ROE), and sent the Iranians in search of easier targets.

Cockburn's account also ignores another important fact. If the U.S. really wanted the Iranian generals who visited Irbil in January, I doubt that a raid would have been necessary. Given our close ties with Kurdish leaders and their security forces, detention of the Iranians could have been arranged with a few phone calls to the "right" people. While some Kurdish leaders talk about the need for good relations with Tehran, they are keenly aware that Iran has brutally oppressed its own ethnic Kurds, and would never support an independent Kurdistan in Iraq--or anywhere else, for that matter. Faced with the choice of antagonizing the U.S. or upsetting Iran, Kurdish authorities in Iraq would gladly choose the latter, and allowed the Americans to arrest those Iranian generals.

But, there is no indication that the U.S. ever made such a request, likely because it would have created an international incident. Catching those senior officers at the unaccredited "diplomatic" compound would have been a nice bonus, but it was not imperative to the success or failure of the raid. And, contrary to Cockburn's assertion, the operation was far from a failure. The referenced "raid" was aimed at operational-level Iranian agents, providing direct support to terrorists in Iraq.

In fact, given the facility's ties to the IRGC and insurgents, it would have been surprising to find the two generals at that location. Mr. Cockburn claims that the lack of insurgents at the compound weakens U.S. claims that it was used to support terrorists. But that argument is equally specious; over the past four years, coalition forces in Iraq have discovered numeous weapons caches and safe houses that were clearly used by insurgents, despite the fact that
"no one was home" when the raids were executed. While Kurdish security may have limited Iranian activities in Irbil, the use of diplomatic cover and the lack of a U.S. military presence (we have less than 100 troops in all of Kurdistan) made the city an excellent venue for funneling support to terrorists elsewhere in Iraq.

Moreover, the Independent's assertion that Britain was somehow "in the dark" about the raid is something of a red herring to boot. The arrest of those "junior" Iranian officials at the Irbil facility was extensively reported in the press. And, even if we were targeting bigger fish, the Brits certainly understood that the detention of Iranian agents could prompt a counter-move by Tehran. And, given the "gap" between the Irbil raid and events along the Shatt al-Arab, the Brits had plenty of time to adjust their rules of engagement, and reassess the risks for vulnerable personnel.

Instead, U.K. boarding teams along the Shatt al-Arab continued to operate with limited air support and restrictive ROE, making them prime targets for an Iranian kidnapping operation. Describing the abduction of those sailors and Royal Marines as a product of the Irbil raid is simply irresponsible, and smacks of a feeble ploy by the Blair government (and MoD elements) to shift the blame on someone else.

"Informed" Analysis

Reading some of the offerings at Slate, Harper's, the Atlantic Monthly, or other MSM outlets, I'm always wondering: how do you get a gig writing about defense issues at one of those publications? Apparently, coherence and logic are not part of the job description, because some of their recent articles on the Air Force's recapitalization efforts--namely, the F-22 and F-25 programs--are ill-informed (at best), and in many cases, just downright dumb.

Consider Ken Silverstein's recent "debunking" of conservative, think tank analysis of China's F-10 fighter program, which provided a convenient forum for attacking the F-22 Raptor. Mr. Silverstein believes the Raptor is a Cold War relic, a program largely sustained on over-inflated estimates of the Chinese threat, including the F-10. As we pointed out in our own analysis, the F-10 (though hardly a world-beater), is the best fighter the PRC has ever produced, with performance and weaponry equal to late model F-16s and similar European fighters.

Moreover, we also noted that Mr. Silverstein conveniently omits important considerations from his analysis. The F-10 isn't the only new fighter in the PRC arsenal; Beijing is also buying at least 200 Russian-made SU-27/30 Flankers, which are more than a match for our own, fourth-generation jets. Coupling these Chinese aircraft with improvements air tactics, battle management, force projection and information warfare, you'll see that a China-Taiwan scenario does, indeed, make the case for the F-22. As we see it, the bottom line is rather simple: do you want a fighter that can completely dominate the skies, or do you prefer to slug it out in a battle of attrition against a foe with aircraft--and weapons--of similar quality? With U.S. strategy predicated on control of the skies, the answer should be obvious.

The operative word here is "should," because the same type of specious reasoning is evident in Gregg Easterbrook's new "analysis" on our bomber fleet. "B-52 Where Are You" is posted at Slate, and according to Mr. Easterbrook, the Pentagon is hiding a dirty little secret from Congress and you, the taxpayers: it's long-range bombers finally work, but the brass still want to spend $322 billion on advanced fighters like the F-22 and F-35.

At the Weekly Reader level of military analysis, Easterbrook seems to have an argument. Why invest all that money in fifth-generation fighters, when platforms like the B-1 and B-52 can dump far more bombs on a target, with the same degree of precision accuracy. With weaponry like JDAM, heavy bombers can finally deliver the promise of Douhet, Billy Mitchell and other airpower theorists, who predicted about fleets of long-range bombers that could devastate enemy centers of gravity, at great range and with relatively little collateral damage.

But you'll also find a few false assumptions in Easterbrook's analysis, including his contention that the Air Force basically "gave up" on the idea of using bombers in a conventional role:

"One reason is that the emergence of the accurate bomber just wasn't in anyone's playbook. From Air Force pioneer Billy Mitchell on, air-power advocates kept promising high-altitude bombing would win wars, allow "surgical strikes," and so on. When this hadn't happened by the 1990s, the Air Force seemed to admit defeat and gave up on bombers for conventional war. Suddenly, precision bombing works, but the message has yet to sink in."

Huh? After reading that statement, I had to scratch my head, unsure if Easterbrook was actually referring to the U.S. Air Force. With the end of the Cold War, the service spent billions reconfiguring its remaining B-52s and B-1s for conventional attack, including JDAM employment. One reason that the venerable "Buff" was used so successfully in the first Gulf War (and Kosovo) is that far-sighted Air Force leaders understood that the B-52 could still play a vital role in conventional and unconventional wars. The same holds true for the B-1, although its adaptation for conventional conflicts was delayed by problems with its ECM system and other issues. By comparison, the newer B-2 was easily adapted for non-nuclear conflicts; it was simply a matter of flight testing the aircraft with new munitions, and the rest, as they say, is history.

Easterbrook also manages to understate the difficulty of designing--and flying--bomber aircraft:

"Piloting modern bombers is not meaningfully different from flying Boeing 737s for Southwest Airlines—there's no nailed-to-your-seat maneuvering, no sense of rocketing through the sky. Air Force leaders know that a new bomber designed for satellite-guided weapons would likely be a vanilla aircraft—a modified Boeing airliner could fill the role. In Afghanistan and the second Iraq campaign, bombers have mainly "orbited," or turned lazy circles, until the time came to release self-guided munitions."

That description works as long as you're flying a bomber in a totally permissive air defensenvironmentnt, like Iraq and Afghanistan. Put the aircraft in moderately-defended airspace (say, Syria or Iran), or heavily-defended skies (think Russia or China), and it becomes a totally different proposition. Against legitimate air defense threats, you need either a stealthy platform (for penetration missions), or a platform capable of standing off and delivering weaponry, even against long-range systems like the Russian-made SA-20 SAM (already in service in Russia and China). In that sort of environment, a "generic" bomber (with a huge radar cross-section) is hardly sufficient, and you'll need more than a disinterested "airline" crew to put iron on target.

Additionally, the "cost" of fielding a new manned bomber is not something that can be accomplished on the cheap. The B-2 costs more than $1 billion a copy--in part, because past administrations stopped production after on 21 were produced. Even with a larger "buy," the next generation bomber will be equally expensive, and we'll wind up with far fewer aircraft than we'll get for the $322 billion fighter program.

But couldn't a smaller number of advanced bombers deliver more precision munitions than those fighters? The real answer is "no," for a variety of reasons. First, there's the issue of persistence. The success of an air campaign hinges on our ability to apply--and sustain---pressure on an enemy at all levels of conflict, simultaneously. You can meet that requirement more easily with a mix of fighter and bomber aircraft, all capable of evading enemy air defenses and delivering precision munitions.

Then, there's the basing issue. For various geopolitical reasons, a lot of U.S. allies aren't keen on the prospect of hosting our bombers, particularly if those aircraft are also capable of carrying nuclear weapons. In fact, you can almost count the number of "overseas" bomber bases on on hand: Fairford in the U.K; Moron, Spain, Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, and Andersen AFB, Guam. Those "options" mean that a B-1, B-52 or B-2 is at least four hours away from its nearest target, bringing us back to the operational requirements of timeliness and persistence that usually favor fighters, stationed closer to the battlefield. Admittedly, a bomber's loiter time can partially offset the basing/distance issues, but only if the threat environment is permissive. In that regard, Iraq and Afghanistan may be the exception, not the rule.

And finally, we still have a need for aircraft that can take on--and defeat--enemy aircraft in air combat, a mission for which bombers are ill-suited. With China amassing more than 300 fourth-generation fighters along the Taiwan Strait, our bomber crews certainly appreciate the need for fighters that can neutralize that threat, and minimize the risk to their aircraft.

The concept of a "cheap" bomber, dropping tons of precision weapons with impunity, is hardly new. Back in the 1970s, the Air Force considered a modified Boeing 747, which fire dozens of cruise missiles from launchers in its cargo bay. Support for that proposal faded with the realization that the former Soviet Union wouldn't allow that huge aircraft to simply fly toward its border and shoot scores of cruise missiles into its airspace. Development of the SU-27, the MiG-31 Foxhound and long-range SAMs eventually nixed the 747 in favor of something more advanced--and survivable--like the B-1 and B-2.

Similar considerations will influence the decision this time around. To meet a variety of future threats, we need a mix of fighter and bomber aircraft, capable of performing in low, medium and high-threat scenarios. "Doing it all" (or doing most of it) with bombers is still something of an airpower myth, just as it was when Douhet wrote "Command of the Air." and the Air Corps Tactical School was hammering out the doctrine for daylight precision bombing--without fighter escort.

As for the editors at Harper's, Slate and the Atlantic--who same folks who keep serving this stuff as "informed" analysis, here's a suggestion. Consider hiring someone who can give your readers a little bit more than half-baked ideas and recycled concepts. If you're interested, I'm available, but I don't work cheap.

Today's Reading Assignment

Ralph Reiland, writing in today's Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, on the "cocky and dumb" products that are emerging from your government schools. Mr. Reiland, an economics professor at Robert Morris University, notes results from a recent survey of U.S. and South Korean students, conducted by the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C.

According to the study, only six percent of the South Korean eighth graders expressed confidence in their math skills, compared with 39% of their American counterparts. The problem? South Korean eighth graders score far better on standardized math tests than U.S. students. "Cocky and dumb," says Professor Reiland, is hardly a formula for U.S. success in an increasingly competitive global economy.

But hey, at least our kids feel good about themselves, right? Reiland notes the steady erosion of competition and other "bad influences" that (in the past) provided harsh, but necessary feedback on student performance. In an era of "no score" ballgames, and efforts to ban booing at student sporting events, it's no wonder than Little Johnny is a dumb as a stump, but he still likes himself.

Alas, I personally attest to the veracity of Mr. Reiland's observations. After retiring from the military, I worked for a while as a middle school teacher in the south. Both districts where I worked were underfunded, and many of my students came from poor families. Preparing my students for state achievement tests, I was appalled at their basic skills, or more correctly, the lack thereof. In one school system, the majority of my seventh graders couldn't handle three-place addition or multiplication; division was an alien concept, and pre-algebra concepts proved simpy beyond their grasp. Yet, few had self-esteem problems regarding their school work; more than a few expressed shock and dismay when I handed back a practice test bleeding red ink, with a score in the single digits.

But in hindsight, perhaps I should have expect those excessive levels of self-confidence. The school had its own self-esteem curriculum, complete with an after-school program run by a former special forces NCO. While the program had its merits, it also had an obvious drawback, namely a lack of emphasis on the consequences of long-term actions. Simply stated, our students felt good playing basketball with their buddies in the gym, but no one bothered to explain the "life" consequences of missing that jump shot, versus being unable to keep track of a checkbook, or fill out a job application. For the record, I was one of the few faculty members who didn't participate in the afterschool sessions; most of my colleagues did it for the supplemental pay. When asked about the "value" of the program and the false confidence it instilled, they simply shrugged.

Sadly, I know exactly where Mr. Reiland is coming from. More distressingly, there's no sign that the education establishment is prepared to abandon such efforts in favor of tried-and-true competition based models that stress actual learning and academic achievement. If ignorance is bliss, there are lots of happy school kids across America, and what's more, they feel really good about it.

The Price of Appeasement

Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf apparently isn't a student of history. Before embarking on his disastrous policy of appeasement with Al Qaida and the Taliban in the western tribal lands, one would have hoped that Mr. Musharaaf would have reviewed European history from the past century, for past examples of trying to appease fanatics, and how those acts ultimately led to a greater conflagration.

We know what happened when the British and the French tried to placate Hitler in the 1930s. When his nascent German Army rolled into the Rhineland in 1936, the British and French ignored an opportunity to crush Hitler's legions, and registered only mild diplomatic protests. When the German dictator demanded Czechoslovakia a few years later, London and Paris willingly gave away a democratic state, all in hopes of appeasing a growing menace. By the time Hitler's panzers rolled into Poland in 1939, it was too late. Over the next six years, millions died and vast stretches of Europe, Africa and Asia were laid to waste, largely because European politicians of the 1930s believed they could negotiate with a madman.

There are obvious--and eerie--parallels between the situation in Europe 70 years ago, and events that are now transpiring in Pakistan. Bill Roggio, who has covered the consequences of Musharraf's appeasement policies better than anyone, is now reporting that the situation along Pakistan's western border is growing steadily worse, despite a series of "agreements" between the Islamabad government, and tribal factions that are loyal or (or controlled) by the Taliban and Al Qaida.

And, predictably, the terrorists aren't satisfied with merely dominating the vast, rugged lands along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. The influence of Al Qaida and Taliban elements is now spreading to some of Pakistan's urban centers, posing an even greater security challenge to the Musharraf. In his latest post, Bill notes that the terrorists are openly challenging the rule of law in Islamabad, the Pakistani capital. A pro-Taliban militia is running a Saudi-style fundamentalist madrassa in the heart of Islamabad, with a reputed enrollment of more than 7,000 students. Members of the group engage in "moral policing" around the city, threatening shop owners who sell DVDs, CDs, or other western offerings. Reaction from the government has been muted, at best.

Mr. Roggio describes this as a "civil war at the peripheries," or (at the very least), the wholesale surrender of territory by the Musharraf government. In either case, the terrorists have been emboldened by the recent Waziristan accords, which they view as a sign of weakness. Their successful efforts at influencing events in Islamabad will likely accelerate this trend. As Roggio notes, the Islamists are operating without fear or impunity. The location of the Islamabad madrassa--between the Prime Minister's office and the headquarters of Pakistan's intelligence service (the ISI)--would have been almost unthinkable a few years ago.

Which brings us back to President Musharaaf, and his "plans" for dealing with this threat. The "X" factor is this equation isn't the Pakistani public--or even the United States--but rather, the senior officer corps of the nation's military. Musharaaf is, of course, a former general, the fourth who has served as the nation's leader during Pakistan's turbulent history. Mr. Musharaaf meets with the military's senior leaders, or more specifically, the Army's ranking officers, on a regular basis. Bottom line: how much longer will the military allow the unrest to continue before a corps or field army commander decides that enough is enough, and it's time for a change.

Under normal circumstances, the tipping point for President Musharaaf might already be at hand. But Taliban penetration of the ISI makes it more difficult to marshal supporters for a potential coup; clearly terrorist sympathizers within the intelligence directorate prefer the status quo, and the continuing slide toward chaos, followed by a transition to fundamentalist rule. On the other hand, other elements of the armed services (with a more western orientation) are clearly concerned about the growing influence of the terrorists, but--so far--seem unable or unwilling to do anything about it.

Clearly, any comparision between the Pakistan of today and Britain and France of the 1930s is inexact, at best. The threat posed by a resugent Germany was an external one; the dangers presented by the Taliban and Al Qaida are internal to Pakistan. Yet, in many respects, the analogy remains valid. Like Neville Chamberlain, Mr. Musharraf seems to believe that he can negotiate his way to security, despite the savage and completely disreputable nature of his foes. And, the lethargy of Pakistan's military seems oddly reminiscent of the French Army of the the pre-war era; institutions that appear impressive on paper (and in parades), but in reality, are little more than paper tigers, unable to meet emerging threats.

From the U.S. perspective, the deteriorating situation in Pakistan should be viewed with great alarm. The Bush Administration still viewed Musharaaf as an "important" ally in the War on Terror, even as his government brokered deals with terrorists in the tribal lands. Never mind that those agreements created new safe havens for the Taliban and Al Qaida to launch attacks into Afghanistan; Musharaaf got the benefit of the doubt, largely because of his past stand against the terrorists.

Given the current situation in Pakistan, Washington would be well-advised to keep its options open. Musharraf's survival is hardly assured, and I'm hoping that the folks at DIA, CIA and the National Security Council have been keeping track of potential successors. Obviously, we'd prefer someone from the "western" wing of the military, capable of restoring security in Islamabad and other key cities, then (eventually) resuming the fight against terrorists in the tribal lands. The question, of course, is whether Pakistan's general staff can find someone willing to take on this menace, or if Musharraf's appeasement policies have left the military divided and distracted.

For the sake of Pakistan's future--and stability on the Asian subcontinent, we'd better hope that the answer to that question lies in the former option, and not the latter. The real prize for control of the country lies in the heavily-guarded caves and bunkers of the Pakistani mountains, where the nation's nuclear weapons are stored. Imagine an Al Qaida/Taliban regime with nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, and you've got some idea of the nightmare that could emerge in Pakistan.

Journalistic Malpractice at the Chicago Trib

In today's edition of "The Swamp," the blog of the Chicago Tribune's Washington Bureau, reporter Frank James engages in a little bit of journalistic malpractice that, unfortunately, has become SOP for the mainstream press.

"Generals to Bush: Soldiers Not Props," is the title of his piece. It's based on a conference call with three retired Army Generals, held just before President Bush's afternoon visit to Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington. Reading the headline--and the comments that followed--readers would believe that these retired officers didn't want the visit to become a political forum, giving the Commander-in-Chief a backdrop to score points against Democratic war opponents.

But who were those generals? The Tribune identified them, respectively, as retired Major General Paul Eaton, former Lieutenant General Robert Garde and retired National Guard Major General Mel Montano. All insisted that the President should focus on the problems at Walter Reed--and not politics--during his visit. Here's a sample quote from General Eaton:

"Gen. Garde is on target, that the president is going to visit our wounded soldiers. I'm convinced that he would honor them more if he would refrain from using soldiers as props in political theater.

We have a commander-in-chief who does very well when he is unscripted, unrehearsed and engaging with soldiers. But too often those who handle his performances try to turn the American fighting man and woman into a political prop for the scenery."

If the names of those retired general officers should familiar, they should. All are prominent critics of the Bush Administration's management of the military, and its policies in Iraq. Just over a year ago, Major General Eaton penned an op-ed for The New York Times, demanding the resgination of former defense secretary Don Rumsfeld. Mr. James identifies Eaton as "the father of the Iraqi Army," but that's largely inaccurate. As we noted last April, Eaton's tenure as head of the U.S. training mission in Iraq was largely a failure, characterized by Iraqi units that sometimes broke and ran under fire. General Eaton was eventually replaced by Lieutenant General David Petraeus, who turned the program around and trained more than 80 Iraqi battalions in a little over a year. Petraeus recently returned to Iraq as the commander of U.S. forces in that country, while Eaton never earned his third star. Could it be possible that he has a little grudge against the Bush Administration and the guy who used to run the Pentagon?

As for Generals Garde and Montano, they are affiliated with a group called Americans Against Escalation in Iraq, which (in turn) has ties to a number of liberal organizations such as MoveOn.org. As the Raleigh News & Observer reported on 21 March, Garde and Montano were part of a seven-state "barnstorming tour," urging Congress to draft legislation that would remove American troops from Iraq. During remarks at the Raleigh-Durham Airport, General Garde compared Iraq to Vietnam, and advocated a "political solution" to the war:

"Will the Congress have the political courage," Gard said. "Or will we look back five years from now after this surge with many more U.S. combat casualties and wonder why we did not take action to achieve a political solution?"

And who was standing next to Garde when he made those comments? None other than retired Major General Montano, former Commander of the New Mexico Army National Guard.

Make no mistake: Generals Eaton, Garde, and Montano are entitled to their opinions--and they are free to speak out against the war. But, by failing to identify them as past critics of the Bush Administration and the War in Iraq, Mr. James is guilty of professional malpractice, perhaps borderline fraud. Interestingly, Jay Price, the News & Observer reporter who covered the North Carolina event, managed to identify Garde and Montano's affiliation with liberal groups and their anti-war positions. But somehow, Mr. James of the Tribune conveniently ignored those ties. We're also never told who arranged the conference call. Did the Trib simply contact the generals out of the blue, or was the session arranged by the anti-escalation group? Readers certainly have a right to know.

But Mr. James doesn't provide that information, which would certainly cast the generals' comments in a different light. Instaed, he depicts the trio as concerned, retired military officers--which may be an apt description. However, they are also on the record as outspoken administration critics, facts that never made it into "The Swamp," but (clearly) should have been part of the story.

You can contact the Trib's public editor at (312) 222-3348, or PublicEditor@tribune.com.

Make your voices heard.

Pervert Alert

During my lunch hour, I made a stop at the base personnel office, to pick up a new retiree identification card. Waiting my turn in the customer service section, I watched a story on Fox News that was absolutely horrifying, if you have children.

Or grandchildren.

Or, you're part of that overwhelming majority that believes perverts, molesters and pedophiles should be kept away from our kids, and preferably locked up.

Meet Jack McClellan. He's a 45-year-old, self-confessed peophile, who (amazingly) has never convicted of a sex crime. McClellan lives at home (in the Seattle area) with his parents--next to a school bus stop. A few years ago, he created a website that offers advice on the best place to see little girls, and avoid getting caught by the police. McClellan says he's most attracted to girls between the ages of 3 and 11.

The report on the pervert and his website have several sick, twisted comments from McClellan that don't deserve to be reprinted here. Bottom line: this pervert wants to "bring peophiles out of the closet" and give them a way to be around little girls.

And, under Washington state laws, there's apparently nothing the authorities can do--or so they claim. "As disturbing and offensive as we find this, there's no evidence of a crime, or even suspicion of illegal activity," said Rebecca Hover of the Snohomish County Sheriff's Department. Authorities say they've known about the site for several years, but can't shut it down because it's "legal."

Give me a break. The odds that McClellan has never acted on his impulses are exactly zero. You'd think that his comments would be enough to warrant an investigation, and perhaps secure a judge's permission to seize his computer. But, then again, this is tolerant, politically-correct Washington state, which (until recently) was still struggling to prevent teachers convicted of sex offenses from moving to another district and continuing their behavior.

The Numbers Game

From the DEW Line, an insightful (and incisive) blog devoted to the global defense industry, here some numbers for the multi-national F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program:

5-16-47
2-12-16

The first figures represent the original production forecast for the JSF. Plans called for building 5 this year, 16 next year, and 47 in 2009.

But, as DEW crew points out, the military is now looking at substantially lower production rates, evidenced by the second set of numbers. Under that plan, we'll build two JSFs in 2007, 12 in 2008, and only 16 in 2009.

Why is that important? Smaller production totals equals higher unit costs. That reality has been evident in the F-22 Raptor program, where scaled-back "buys" have driven up the cost for individual aircraft. Originally pegged at $60-80 million a copy, the price for each F-22 is now well over $100 million an aircraft, and will rise even higher, if the production run drops below the 179 aircraft currently projected.

For a program predicated on "affordability" (like JSF) production decreases and delays will translate to higher costs, and the possibility that some foreign buyers might elect to cancel their planned purchases. And that will drive costs for the F-35 even higher.

***

On a related note, the Weekly Standard has links to some cool video of the JSF's first maneuvering flight tests. "It worked exceedingly well," the test pilot reported. Or, as they say in the flight test business these days, "It flew just like the sim."

Ya Think?

From today's U.K. Times: "How Britons were conned by Iranian gunboat trick."

Speed and cunning shown by the Revolutionary Guards suggests that their action was premeditated.

And it only took a week for the Times to figure that out. Still, the paper is light-years ahead of the ultra-liberal Guardian. In an op-ed column that ran yesterday, Guardian columnist Ronan Bennett says that Iran's treatment of Seaman Faye Tunney is "wrong," but "not in the same league as U.S. and British abuses."

Wow. That's quite a feat of gymnastical logic. Comparing the detention (and interrogation) of suspected terrorists, legally captured on the battlefield by uniformed combatants, to the plight of British marines and sailors, taken illegally in international waters--while conducting a U.N.-sanctioned mission. Only a unber-leftist could come up with that sort of analogy. The New York Times must be jealous. Paging Bill Keller. I think we've found your next op-ed columnist.

"Full Protection" Against Iran

The head of Israel's missile defense program says that recent modifications to the Arrow II system will allow it to successfully intercept and destroy any ballistic missile in the Middle East, including nuclear-capable missiles under development by Iran. Arieh Herzog, head of the Defense Ministry's Homa Missile Defense Agency, made the comments in an interview with the Jerusalem Post, which will run in Monday's edition of the paper. A preview of the interview was published in today's Post.

Herzog's comments are certainly welcome news for a nation facing an ever-expanding ballistic missile threat. Mr. Herzog notes that both Iran and Syrian have essentially abandoned efforts at building modern air forces, and are devoting "unprecedented" amounts of money to their ballistic missile programs. In the case of Iran, the missile defense director noted that the Tehran government is buying "entire missile systems" from North Korea, an apparent reference to the intermediate-range BM-25, acquired last year. He also identified Pyongyang as the primary supplier of ballistic missile technology to Syria, although Damascus's best missile system (the SS-21) was provided by Russia.

In terms of future threats, Herzog hedged a bit, telling the Post that "there might be missile systems in Iranian hands that the Arrow could not intercept." Is that another reference to the BM-25, or a nod toward Iranian systems that are still in development? As we've observed in the past, Tehran's scientists and engineers have experienced significant difficulties in extending the reach of their Shahab-3 medium-range missiles (maximum range: 900 miles), and developing intermediate-range systems. Those difficulties were likely a deciding factor in the decision to buy the BM-25, which gives Iran a ready-made capability to strike targets as far away as southern Europe.

Mr. Herzog's comments also beg another question: is he admitting that the latest variant of Arrow II has significant limitations, or (perhaps) providing a bit of disinformation through the pages of the Post? Obviously, no missile defense system is completely fool-proof; to some degree, all are vulnerable to countermeasures (typically dispensed during reentry, along with the warhead), saturation, and simple physics. Clearly, hitting a missile with another missile is a difficult proposition, but as range and velocities increase, the complexity of that task grows almost geometrically. That's why existing defense systems are capable against short or medium-range systems, but have little or no capability against ICBMs.

If I had to guess, I'd say Herzog's observations are more disinformation than an admission of weakness. The Arrow II system and its components have sufficient room for "growth," incorporating improvements in radar, computer and missile technology. Last Monday's test launch is an example of how the system has matured since its introduction in the mid-1990s. The most recent test was used to evaluate the latest variant of the Arrow II's interceptor missiles, which have undergone a number of modifications over the years. Israeli officials described Monday's test as a "complete success."

Moreover, since the Arrow program is a cooperative venture with the United States, Israel will continue to benefit from our own missile defense efforts (and vice-versa). As existing systems (eventually) reach their engineering limits, Israel will access technologies that would further expand their defensive shield, such as THAAD. The Israelis might also renew calls for a mutual defense pact with the U.S., which could lead to full integration of current and projected systems into plans for defending the Jewish State.

But even without a bilateral defense pact, Israel's missile defenses are adequate for meeting the Iranian and Syrian threats, at least for the near term. Saturation will remain the Israeli's greatest concern; there are only so many rounds for the Arrow II and Patriot batteries, to deal with ever-expanding missile arsenals in both Syria and Iran. As we've seen in simulations of a Taiwan-China conflict, extended barrages of ballistic missiles can eventually overwhelm ground- based defenses. That's one reason the PRC has massed over 700 short and medium-range missiles opposite Taiwan, creating an offensive threat that will saturate the island's few Patriot batteries.

However the Taiwan example can't be fully applied to Israel, which has trump cards the Taiwanese clearly lack. The Israeli Air Force (with precision munitions and its ISR system) will make it difficult for the Syrians to sustain a missile barrage. More importantly, the Israelis can "up the ante" using the threat of nuclear strikes (using Jericho II MRBMs, cruise missiles, or aircraft-delivered weapons) to keep their enemies in check. And, neither Damascus nor Tehran has any defensive capabilities against an Israeli missile strike.

A New Strategy for Counterintelligence?

It hasn't received a lot of attention (at least, not yet), but President Bush has approved a new counter-intelligence (CI) strategy for the United States. The Director of National Intelligence public affairs office issued a press release on Tuesday that outlined the new strategy, and its key objectives. They include:

• Secure the Nation Against Foreign Espionage and Electronic Penetration
• Protect the Integrity of the US Intelligence System
• Support National Policy and Decisions
• Protect US Economic Advantage, Trade Secrets and Know How
• Support US Armed Forces
• Manage the Counterintelligence Community to Achieve Efficient Coordination
• Improve Training and Education of the Counterintelligence Community
• Expand National Awareness of Counterintelligence Risk in the Private as well as Public Sector

Some of the stated goals are hardly surprising; securing the nation against foreign espionage, protecting the integrity of our intelligence system, supporting the armed forces, and improving counter-intelligence coordination are standard functions--tasks that CI organizations have always performed.

What is interesting about the new strategy--or at least, the bare details made public so far--is the apparent emphasis on economic counter-intelligence, and increased cooperation with the private sector. And, that shouldn't come as a real surprise, since economic and technical espionage represents one of the greatest security challenges facing this nation. Former FBI Director Louis Freeh once described economic espionage as "the greatest threat to national security" since the Cold War. According to one estimate, the theft or unauthorized transfer of trade secrets and proprietary data costs U.S. businesses about $250 billion a year, or roughly half the total cost of the Iraq War to date.

The economic intelligence crisis has been well-documented in Steven Fink's Sticky Fingers, which details the problem in corporate America. But obviously, the problem extends well-beyond the pilfering of trade secrets by a business competitor, or a employee who tries to peddle his company's most sensitive information for profit. Increasingly, the theft of such data is part of a state-directed effort that targets critical technologies, or entire business sectors. The People Republic of China has been conducting such operations on a massive scale for years. And, as Washington Times reporter Bill Gertz notes in his book Enemies: How America's Foes Steal Our Vital Secrets--and How We Let It Happen," Beijing has been quite successful in those efforts, allowing it to save billions of dollars--and years of research time--by simply acquiring (and copying) advanced U.S. technology.

But the Gertz book is also an exploration of critical counter-intelligence failures that allowed our enemies to steal key secrets. He recounts the career of Ana Montes, the Cuban "mole" who worked as a senior intelligence analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency for two decades. Not only did Ms. Montes pass extremely sensitive information to her bosses in Havana, she also influenced U.S. government policies affecting Castro's government. When a DIA counter-intelligence official became suspicious of her activities, he was initially ridiculed by his superiors and the FBI.

The bureau--which runs domestic counter-intelligence efforts--receives special scrutiny from Gertz, and decidedly so. Over the last decade, the agency has been embarrassed by a number of bungles and blunders, including one case where a Chinese operative seduced two FBI agents, and persuaded both to pass sensitive information. In another example, the bureau spent years harassing a CIA operative, convinced that he was a Russian spy because he lived near a particular park. When the mole was finally caught, it turned out to be FBI agent Robert Hanssen, who passed sensitive counter-intelligence information to Moscow for years. Hanssen also lived near the park, but escaped detection for years.

Which brings us back to the nation's "new" counter-intelligence strategy. Is it viable? My first reaction is that the emphasis on economic intelligence is long overdue. Our adversaries have been stealing us blind--literally--for years, and the new strategy represents a needed effort to combat that threat. I'm also encouraged by its outreach to the private sector. For obvious reasons, many espionage rings target commercial firms, particularly in the high-tech and information sectors. To protect vital secrets, private firms need to be more aware of this threat, and provide information on suspected penetration attempts to the counter-intelligence community. That will provide a bigger picture that may identify spy rings earlier, and prevent the compromise of critical information. In that regard, the new strategy is a step in the right direction.

But the plan has some serious problems. For starters, we're still stuck with a counter-intelligence system that divides responsibilities between the CIA (for overseas operations) and the FBI, which handles the domestic end. Historically, this "partnership" has never worked very well, one reason that the strategy document calls for improved coordination, training and education. But that raises another question: do we have the luxury of time (and resources) to fix this broken system, or would we be better off in creating a new agency, combining resources from both the CIA and FBI (more on that in a moment). Failing to address this fundamental, organizational issue is the major flaw of the new strategy.

Additionally, I'd like to know more about how the CI plan will deal with terrorist-related spy efforts. As Mr. Gertz reported in his book, the U.S. has been targeted by at least 35 terrorist organizations through espionage, and some of those groups have proven adept at penetrating supposedly "secure" organizations to gain information, or carry out attacks. Clearly, it's difficult to assess a strategy on the basis of a one-page press release, but it would be interesting to know how the plan assesses that threat, and how it addresses it.

Supporters of the new strategy might argue that The National Counterterrorism Center (launched in 2003) represents the right approach, bringing together personnel from intelligence and law enforcement agencies to share information and develop terrorism analysis. Unfortunately, the center remains hampered by competing lines of control; look at its organizational lines, and you'll see that the NCTC works for both the DNI and the FBI director. That reality provides a compelling case for creation of a single, domestic intelligence agency, combining collection, analytical and counter-intelligence functions. Sadly, that option seems unlikely, since it would mean diminished roles (and resources) for both the CIA and the bureau.

Finally, as with any "national strategy," the devil is always in the details. Getting the various players to cooperate and share vital information remains a Herculean task. The prescribed training program will be another massive undertaking, and building those ties to the private sector will take time, too. All represent important steps in the counter-intelligence struggle, but the strategy document seems to ignore the essential question: can this plan actually work, given the organizational flaws that exist in our current system? The Bush Administration clearly believes it can, but some of us remain unconvinced. Fixing counter-intelligence requires revolutionary, rather than evolutionary, thinking.

***

I may be reading between the lines, but the new CI strategy outline doesn't say much about the "other" players in counter-intelligence--the armed services. While the Army, Navy and Air Force have long maintained CI elements, their role has (traditionally) focused on investigating espionage cases involving military personnel, or "external" spy operations aimed at military targets. If I'm reading the outline correctly, it looks like the "new" strategy envisions a similar role for military CI elements--and that might be a mistake. Military counter-intelligence units have gained valuable experience against insurgent groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that expertise could be useful in tracking terrorist espionage threats closer to home--assuming that legal requirements could be satisfied.

A Fitting Tribute

Even casual students of World War II are familiar with the Tuskegee Airmen, the lengendary group of African-American fighter pilots and ground crews who battled racism (and the enemy) in compiling an exemplary combat record in the skies over Europe. Under the leadership of Colonel (later General) Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., the Airmen, flying their familiar, red-tail P-51s, proved that black Americans had the mettle to take on the Luftwaffe--and deliver a decisive defeat.

More than 60 years after the Tuskegee Airmen returned home--to a nation that was still segregated--surviving members of that unit (and the widows of those who have passed on) will receive the Congressional Gold Medal, the highest honor that can be awarded to civilians. President Bush is scheduled to speak at today's presentation ceremony, which will be held at 1 p.m. in the Capitol Rotunda.

While the Army Air Corps initially fought proposals to train black pilots (and send them into combat), the combat record of the Tuskegee Airmen quickly destroyed the notion that African-Americans lacked the capacity to fly high-performance aircraft and lead combat formations. For years, it was believed that the 332nd Fighter Group (the unit's combat designation) never lost a bomber they escorted to enemy fighters. While that claim is now being disputed, it seems evident that the 332nd lost far fewer bombers on escort missions than all-white fighter groups. The 332nd's reputation for getting B-17s to the target--and back again--quickly spread through the European Theater, and bomber units often requested escort by the "Red Tails," if they were available.

Today, the spirit of the Tuskegee Airmen lives on in the Air Force. The 332nd Air Expeditionary Wing at Balad AB, Iraq, bears the designation and lineage of the World War II fighter group. The motto of the latter-day unit is "The Legend Continues." It's another fitting tribute to a group of airmen who were--and are--heroes, in the truest sense of that word.

Today's Reading Assignment

Historian Arthur Herman on Britain's military impotence--and its consequences--in a timely New York Post op-ed.

Also recommended: Mr. Herman's January column in the Post, which noted how Tony Blair's planned budgetary cutbacks will decimate the Royal Navy. As he archly notes, the naval supremacy that France couldn't win at Trafalgar how now been gained at the bureaucrats' desks. Reductions in the Royal Navy will leave it smaller than the French Navy for the first time in 400 years, giving Britain a fleet that's roughly comparable (in size) to that of Belgium and Turkey.

The Right Men in the Right Place

In an earlier post, we cautioned against reading too much into current U.S. military moves in the Persian Gulf. Nothing we've seen (so far) suggests that President Bush has made a decision to attack Iran. However, the Commander-in-Chief is wisely keeping his options open, in the event that a strike becomes necessary.

The most likely impetus for that scenario remains the Iranian nuclear program, or more specifically, hard evidence that Tehran is about to acquire--or has actually acquired--atomic weapons. Readers will note that most "official" U.S. estimates put that timetable toward the end of this decade. Those assessments may be based (in part) on information provided by that recent Iranian defector, who reportedly spied for the west for more than four years.

However, there are other events that might prompt a U.S. military strike against Iran, including attacks against our naval vessels and oil tankers in the Persian Gulf, or a "mass casualty" event among American troops in Iraq that can be traced to Tehran.

While we don't see anything in the tea leaves that would suggest that military action is imminent (on either side), it is interesting to note some of the moves the Pentagon is making, just in case. In some instances, these preparations have been widely publicized, such as the decision to send more Patriot missile batteries to the Persian Gulf Region. Those weapons would be vital in defending airfields, ports, logistics centers and troop concentrations from Iranian air and missile attacks.

In other cases, moves are being made at the "micro" level, to ensure the right leaders are in place--if the balloon goes up. Consider the recent announcement that Air Force Brigadier Generals Larry Wells and Burton Field are being reassigned to head Air Expeditionary Wings in the United Arab Emirates and Iraq, respectively.

While such rotations occur on a regular basis--both positions are one-year "remote" tours, it's no accident that General Wells and General Field were selected for those assignments. Both are experienced wing commanders; Field's currently leads the 1st Fighter Wing at Langley AFB, VA, the Air Force's first F-22 unit. He also served a tour as commander of the 8th Fighter Wing (located at Kunsan AB, Korea), and has decades of experience as an F-16 pilot. Just the sort of guy you'd want as commander of the 332nd Wing at Balad, the base that serves as our primary fighter hub in Iraq--and could be a potential staging base for operations against Iran.

General Wells is also an experienced F-16 driver who most recently served as Assistant Director of Operations for the Air Force Air Combat Command (ACC). Before that, he was Commander of the 9th Reconnaissance Wing at Beale AFB, California, home of the Air Force's U-2 fleet, and key elements of the intelligence architecture that support that aircraft and our UAVs. As it happens, General Wells new assignment will put him in charge of an organization (the 380th Air Expeditionary Wing) that "owns" much of our air refueling and reconnaissance capability in the Persian Gulf. The 380th is located at Al Dhafra, AB, a facility used by U.S. forces since the first Gulf War.

Obviously, the assignment of two Air Force brigadier generals to lead these units is not a harbinger of imminent hostilities against Iran. But as our stand-off with Tehran nears a critical phase, it's clear that USAF leadership wants its most experienced commanders to lead front-line units, just in case.

This is News?

Russian intelligence sees U.S. military buildup on Iran border?

File that one under "headlines that least deserve an above-the-banner" link from Drudge.

The referenced article, from Russia's Novosti news agency, is basically a hash of long-reported events and ill-informed conjecture. Deployment of the aircraft carrier John C. Stennis to the Persian Gulf was first announced back in January; the vessel and its escorts have already arrived in the region, and are conducting maneuvers with the Eisenhower carrier battle group, which has been on station since December. Readers will note that Novosti claims that the Stennis is still enroute to the Gulf, suggesting that Russian intelligence isn't what it once was, or (more likely) the wire service reporter simply reprinted what his sources told him, no questions asked.

A Russian security sources also tell Novosti that he see preparations for an "air and ground offensive against Iran," although the timing for such an attack has not been determined. He claims that the U.S. is looking for a way to bring Iran to its knees, at minimal cost.

While the U.S. is apparently keeping its options open on Iraq, I certainly don't see any preparations for a ground attack. The five additional brigades arriving in Iraq (as part of the recent troop surge) are aimed at defeating the insurgency, not attacking Iran. And, beyond the 80 aircraft embarked onboard the Stennis, the number of U.S. aircraft in the region has remained fairly constant. Any attack against Iran would be preceded by a major build-up of U.S. airpower in the region, although current basing issues could make that problematic. According to the India News, the United Arab Emirates has said that its territories are off limits to anyone for staging military or intelligence operations against Iran. Access to airfields in the UAE has long been considered essential for any potential air campaign against Iranian targets.

At this point, I would describe U.S. military preparations in the region as prudent, but not necessarily indicative of a pending strike against Iran. However, one key indicator of how Washington views the situation will be revealed in the coming weeks. The Eisenhower is scheduled to leave the gulf in early April; an extension of its tour--or replacement by another carrier group--would indicate that the U.S. plans to sustain current force levels in the region. Additionally, the next round of the Air Force's Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) rotations to the Middle East begins in about a month. Delaying the return of currently-deployed AEF units could be used to temporarily bolster U.S. airpower in the region, providing another indicator of possible military moves.

While I don't see anything significant in the Novosti article, there are sufficient reasons to keep an eye on our forces in the Persian Gulf, particularly over the next month or so. By remaining flexible in our military deployments and force structure, we can certainly keep Tehran guessing, and that is hardly a bad thing.

Confirming the Big Fizzle

The CIA has reportedly confirmed what's been rumored for months: last year's nuclear test by North Korea was, in fact, a flop.

According to Reuters, CIA Director General Michael Hayden described Pyongyang's nuclear test as a failure and said the United States does not recognize North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. Hayden made the comments on Tuesday, during a meeting with South Korea's Defense Minister, part of a visit to U.S. allies in the region.

Before reading too much into this report, a word of caution is in order. The Reuters disptach is based on an article in a South Korean newspaper, which got its information from a ROK defense official. Officially, the South Korean MOD has refused to confirm Hayden's comments, as has our embassy in Seoul. The Korean publication that broke the story--JoongAng Ilbo--is one of the "big three" papers in South Korea, with reliable access to government officials and information. While no one seems willing to verify General Hayden's assessment, the lack of confirmation suggests two possibilities: (a) the Director's remarks weren't intended for public release (at least not yet); or (b) the story was a deliberate media plant, designed to reassure a nation that has the most to fear from North Korea's nuclear program, while granting Hayden a measure of deniabilit. My money is on Option B.

As we reported last October, Pyongyang's first nuclear test was a giant fizzle by any standard. Post-blast analysis suggested that the DPRK device had a yield equivalent to only 200-400 tons of TNT, perhaps only 5-10% of what they hoped to achieve. That made North Korea's first nuclear bomb a veritable pop-gun; by comparison, the first U.S. atomic bombs (dropped on Japan in 1945) had a yield of 10-20 kt; nuclear devices detonated by India and Pakistan in the late 1990s had yields in the range of 5-10 kt. At the other end of the scale, "modern" thermo-nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the U.S., Russia, China, France and Britain have explosive yields measured in the hundreds of kilotons, or even megatons (one megaton equals one million tons of TNT).

Technically, the reasons for North Korea's apparent failure remain unclear. However, there are a number of factors that might have prevented a successful test, as one of our readers pointed out last fall:

"An accidental 4 KT yield could come from a large mass of fuel that doesn't get held together long enough for more than a few 'links' of the chain reaction - because of weak metal alloys, or poor conventional shaped charge design or manufacture, or poor fuse design or manufacture. Or even if the bomb design & manufacture were good, the fuel could be contaminated such that neutrons are either absorbed too frequently by an impurity, or released too frequently by a fuel 'hotter' than the design. NONE of these are trivial problems to solve. And the smaller the fuel mass employed, the more sensitive the whole process becomes. Big bombs (20 KT) are hard; huge bombs (200 KT) are harder; small bombs (2 KT) are really, really hard to make."

Obviously, the test failure was a major reason behind North Korea's decision to return to the Six-Party talks late last year, and its subsequent agreement to shut down its Yongbyon nuclear reactor. Obviously, a marginally-reliable nuclear weapon isn't much of a negotiating chip, so Pyongyang was suddenly willing to cut the best deal possible, getting rid of an aging nuclear facility, in exchange for desperately-needed energy assistance.

Despite the apparent problems in North Korea's nuclear program (and the recent diplomatic success in Beijing), it is far too early to write off the DPRK's nuclear ambitions. Most likely, Pyongyang still has some sort of covert development program--the same track that was used to continue weapons research after the 1994 "Agreed To" framework. Continuation of the covert program would allow North Korea to resolve technical problems evident in last year's test, while "publicly" abiding by the most recent agreement, and receiving energy aid from the west. Once the technical issues are solved, Pyongyang would start complaining about the current accord, find a pretext for abandoning it, and follow those acts with another--and possibly, much more successful--nuclear test.

Today's Reading Assignment

Jack Kelly at Real Clear Politics, on Britian's tepid response to last Friday's hostage taking along the Shatt al-Arab, and the rules of engagement that (apparently) helped facilitate the incident.

According to Mr. Kelly, U.S. vessels also patrol the waterway, but our Navy (thankfully) allows a more aggressive response to such provocations. Maybe that's why the Iranians have steered clear of our forces in the Shatt al-Arab. But if I were the U.S. Navy, I wouldn't be too complacent. If Tehran achieves its goals in this hostage drama, we can expect more incidents of this type.

A Hero Passes

A hat tip to the indefatigable Michelle Malkin, who notes the recent passing of a genuine American hero. Retired Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Chase Nielsen died last Friday in Brigham City, Utah, at the age of 90.

On April 16, 1942, Nielsen--then a lieutenant in the Army Air Corps--was a navigator on a B-25 Mitchell bomber, part of the famed "Doolittle Raiders" who delivered a devastating psychological blow against Japan during the dark days of World War II. Launched from the aircraft carrier USS Hornet, the bombers hit targets in Tokyo (and four other cities) that Japan's military government claimed were invulnerable to attack.

With the 65th anniversary of the raid now approaching, it's worth remembering what an audacious enterprise it was. Barely five months after Pearl Harbor, Allied fortunes in the Pacific were at low ebb; the British garrisons at Hong Kong and Singapore had fallen, along with U.S.-Filipino Army on Bataan. Surviving British naval units had been chased back to Ceylon, while much of our fleet remained on the bottom of Pearl Harbor. For the moment, the Japanese appeared unstoppable.

Against that backdrop, the War Department was searching for a way to strike back against Japan. A Navy submariner (Captain Francis Low) actually came up with the idea of launching Army bombers from a carrier deck, for a raid against the Japanese home islands. To lead the mission, the Army Air Corps Commander, General Hap Arnold, selected one of America's best-known aviators, Lieutenant Colonel Jimmy Doolittle. The winner of numerous international air races and competitions in the 1920s and 1930s, Doolittle also held a PhD in aeronautics from MIT. Among his many achievements, Doolittle pioneered instrument flying, and was the first pilot to successfully perform an outside loop.

Arnold allowed Doolittle to hand-pick his crews, who underwent an intensive, two-month training program, primarily at Eglin Field in Florida. Once their traning was complete, Doolittle and his crews flew cross-country to Alameda, California, where their 16 B-25s were loaded onto the deck of the Hornet. The carrier left port on April 2, 1942, joining formation with the USS Enterprise off the California coast. Both carriers--and their escorts--sailed across the Pacific under strict radio silence, to minimize chances of Japanese detection.

Original plans called for the B-25s to launch about 400 miles from the Japanese coast, giving them enough fuel to fly on to landing strips in China. But on the morning of April 18th, the U.S. task force was sighted by a Japanese picket vessel, prompting a decision to launch the B-25s early, about 625 miles from Japan, and a day ahead of schedule.

Lieutenant Nielsen was navigator of the sixth B-25 to leave the Hornet. While most of the raiders survived the raid and found safety in China, Nielsen was one of eight crew members who were captured by the Japanese. He endured torture and deprivation during three years as a POW before being liberated by American troops in 1945. Nielsen was the only member of Crew #6 to survive the war.

When he emerged from that prison camp, Chase Nielsen already knew that the raid had been a success. While the B-25 strike had inflicted little physical damage, it had delivered a severe psychological blow against Japan, while greatly boosting American morale--at very the moment we needed it most. For their efforts, Nielsen and the other POWs suffered horribly (Nielsen spent much of his captivity in solitary confinement), but they endured and kept the faith, despite the execution of three raiders by the Japanese, and the death of another from disease.

April 18th falls on a Wednesday this year. On that date, when you have a moment, pause and say a silent prayer of thanks for men like Chase Nielsen, and the nation that still produces them.

***

ADDENDUM: Many of the Dootlittle Raiders were rescued in China through the efforts of a Baptist missionary-turned-intelligence officer, John Birch. Yes, that John Birch.

Amateur Hour

Democrats sometimes wonder why Americans have little faith in their ability to handle national security issues. Maybe it's the series of irresponsible, even cockamamie defense proposals that they've offered over the years, including last week's idea of forcing a troop withdrawal from Iraq through a pork-laden spending bill. In other words, you don't get goodies for the folks back home unless you support an arbitary pull-out date from Iraq. And, of course, that measure was narrowly approved by the House, which must be awfully reassuring for California spinach farmers (who get $25 million under the plan), and Al Qaida's Iraq affiliate, which has the reassurance that the new majority party is fully committed to cut-and-run.

It's difficult to top such a feckless plan, but somehow the Democrats have managed to accomplish that feat. With the House plan facing an uphill battle in the Senate, Democrats are thrasing about for compromise legislation that stands a better chance of passage. Compromise measures are sometimes a bit odd, but the proposal put forth by Arkansas Senator Mark Pryor is, err...downright stupid. Senator Pryor proposing a "secret" withdrawal plan from Iraq, with a timetable that would be known only to the White House, the Iraqi government, the U.S. military, and of course, members of Congress.

Pryor told the Washington Post that he's confident the plan would remain secret, because Congress is entrusted with secrets "all the time." Riiighhht. Saying that Congress leaks like a seive would be an insult to seives. Hundreds of Senators and Representatives have access to classified information, along with thousands of Congressional staffers. And many have been quite willing to share that data with friendly reporters, all in an effort to score political points. Barely a year after 9-11, the White House demanded an investigation into leaks from the Hill, where unnamed personnel were passing information on "intelligence failures" to members of the media.

Last year, a Democratic staffer temporarily lost his security clearance after portions of a National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq appeared in The New York Times. After a predictable protest from Congressional Democrats, the aide's clearance was restored. By party standards, I suppose, his "sins" were relatively minor and deserving of forgiveness. Afterall, Vermont's Patrick Leahy is still serving proudly as a leading Democratic member of the Senate, almost 20 years after he was forced to resign as Vice-Chairman of that body's intelligence committee. As you may recall, Leahy was accused of leaking sensitive information to members of the press--material that compromised U.S. counter-terrorism operations and may have killed a key intelligence asset.

Readers will also note that there have been few (if any) prosecutions of Congressmen or their staffers for revealing classified information. Based on that track record, anyone from the Hill leaking Pryor's "secret" withdrawal plan would little to fear in terms of potential penalties. The same holds true for elements within the intelligence community (which would also gain access to the information). Recent press reports suggest that intel agencies have "stonewalled" Justice Department efforts to investigate the leaks, originating within the community and aimed at damaging the Bush Administration.

In fairness, the legions of potential leakers aren't limited to Capitol Hill and the intelligence community. Members of the administration and the defense establishment also leak, for motives all their own. Even if the "secret" withdrawal date was carefully guarded--say, in a special access (SAR/SAP) program, the number of personnel with access to the information would number in the hundreds, possibly the thousands. In today's "leak" culture, the possibility of preventing disclosure of that information is virtually nil. The odds of actually finding and prosecuting the leaker are even lower.

But, just for the sake of arugment, let's step inside Mr. Pryor's alternate universe for just a moment and pretend that everyone involved can actually keep a secret. That still wouldn't prevent the jihadists from divining our plans, based on the one-way flow of troops and supplies. If the amount of soliders, vehicles and equipment leaving Iraq exceeds the in-bound flow, even the dumbest terrorist can discern that the Americans are on their way out. Time to rachet up the insurgency.

You will observe that the WaPo describes Senator Pryor's proposal as "unusual." If a junior Republican had offered the same plan, the paper would have categorized it more bluntly--and correctly--as just plain dumb. Setting an arbitrary withdrawal date from Iraq is militarily incoherent, whether the timeline is public knowledge or a highly-guarded secret. But, because of his party affiliation, Mr. Pryor is allowed to peddle a brain-dead idea as a serious proposal on Iraq. In some Democratic circles, Pryor is reportedly viewed as an up-and-comer, a possible Vice-Presidential nominee in the near term, and beyond that, a potential Presidential candidate. From our perspective, Pryor's ideas about a "secret" timetable for getting out of Iraq illustrate that he's hardly ready for primetime, just a hack politician who remains unschooled and unserious in the deadly business of national security.

***

On a related note, check out today's fawning NYT article on Hillary Clinton's "growing" ties with the U.S. military, and her gravitas on defense issues. One currently-serving defense official describes Ms. Clinton as "conversant" in the military, and thoughtful in her questions. That's damning her with faint praise. After more than six years on the Senate Armed Services Committee, she ought to know a little about the military; as for those questions, most are scripted by aides (as they are for all senators), so at least her staffers are thoughtful.

One final thought: the final measure of Senator Clinton's relationship with the military will not be based only on her dealings with the generals. If you want a glimpse of the "real Hillary," talk to uniformed personnel who served in the White House Communications Agency (WHCA) during the Clinton Administration. Selection for a WHCA assignment is extraordinarily demanding; their screening procedures are reportedly the toughest in DoD. Personnel who are selected for WHCA--and can maintain the agency's exacting standards--can remain there indefinitely. Yet, WHCA experienced a mass exodus during the Clinton years, and Ms. Clinton was apparently one of the reasons that many military members left the agency. More on that in the coming days.

The Swap

When the Iranians announced Friday that they had captured 15 British sailors and Royal Marines, it didn't take a military or intelligence analyst to see how this drama would play out. First, the captives--taken during an anti-smuggling enforcement mission along the Shatt al-Arab waterway--were moved to Tehran, for potential media exposure, and to reduce the chances of a lightning raid by allied SOF to free them.

Next, the Iranian government announced that the captured Britons would be tried on espionage charges, supposedly highlight the "gravity" of the incident. And, almost as quickly, Tehran claimed that it had obtained "confessions" from some of the captives, providing more evidence for a "show trial," should that need arise. Obviously, any confession procured at this point in captivity was likely the result of duress; press reporting from both the U.K. and the Middle East indicates that the British personnel are now in the hands of the Iranian intelligence service, which has few qualms about using sensory deprivation--and more extreme forms of "persuasion"--to obtain desired information.

At first, there was some speculation about Tehran's motives behind the hostage-taking. Was it aimed at influencing the U.N. Security Council's vote on tougher nuclear sanctions? Or, merely a reminder to London (and Washington) that Iran can easily influence events in the gulf region, and make it more difficult for our British partners to maintain a limited military presence in Iraq.

Britain's Sunday Mirror offers another--and more plausible--rationale for the event, claiming that Tehran will demand the release of up to 50 Iranian spies (previously captured by the British in southern Iraq), in exchange for the return of the sailors and marines. The paper says that the Iranian agents have been captured in recent years, by British forces operating in the Basra region.

I'll take that analysis a step further and predict that Tehran will also demand the return of some of the high-ranking IRGC and Qods force personnel recently arrested by U.S. forces. At least one of those detainees is reported to be a general officer, and a senior Iranian diplomat is also among those captives. Iran is clearly concerned that those officials could reveal vital information about Tehran's terrorist support network in Iraq and would like to get them back, to minimize further damage.

Talks between Britain and Iran over the matter and continuing, but the crisis shows no indication of being quickly resolved. Indeed, the Blair government would be well advised to prepare for the long haul. Tehran clearly wants some of its captured spies back, and it's clearly willing to detain the British personnel to exert more pressure on the British--and on us. Officially, the matter of those captured diplomats and IRGC personnel hasn't surfaced (yet), but it almost certainly will in the coming days. The Iranians understand that demanding the return of the Brits (in exchange for operatives held by the U.S.) could create a divide between London and Washington, something that Tehran would clearly welcome.

At this point, no one is predicting an extended captivity for the British prisoners (along the lines of what our embassy personnel endured in 1979-80), but--given the present circumstances--the odds of a quick, negotiated settlement seem almost nil. Both the U.K. and the U.S. will have to resist the temptation to give in to some--or all--of Iran's demands, despite some of the televised "confessions" and humanitarian pleas that will likely follow. We should all keep those brave sailors and Marines in our prayers, with the realization that this was a carefully planned and orchestrated kidnapping, aimed at achieving critical political goals. And, from the Iranian perspective, the incident was necessary because our policies against Tehran are working. All the more reason to sustain the pressure against Iran, and make it clear that the country's rulers are directly responsible for the captives' safety and well-being.

Losing the Information War

We've often taken the military to task for its handling of information operations in the GWOT. On many occasions, it seems that the terrorists are far more nimble and adept at getting information into the MSM or online, while the Pentagon moves at a glacial pace, relying on press briefings and releases that are often ignored.

Happily, that trend is beginning to turn. Over at the Danger Room, Noah Shachtman notes that some elements within the public affairs corps are taking a more proactive--and cutting edge--approach in highlighting the military's side of the story. U.S. Central Command seems to be taking the lead in this effort, providing regular updates and material for interested bloggers. And, just this week, I learned that U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) will mount a similar effort in the near future. Some of the military's professional schools (such as the USAF's Air Command and Staff College) are now offering classes and seminars about the blogosphere as an information tool, in an effort to educate future commanders.

While those developments are certainly encouraging, not everyone in the military is enamored with bloggers. Case in point? U.S. Army Major General Vincent Brooks, best remembered as CENTCOM's "official" spokesman during the invasion of Iraq four years ago. General Brooks is now back in Baghdad, this time as deputy commander of the coalition's Multi-National Division. For whatever reason, Brooks seem to have it in for Michael Yon, and is apparently trying to run him out of the country.

Given Yon's superb reporting from Iraq and Afghanistan--and the huge audience it attracts--General Brooks' effort is puzzling to say the least. Brooks is a sharp guy who should no better. Before returning to the Middle East, he served as the Army's chief public affairs officer, and was referred to as the "face" of that service. It is worth noting that CENTCOM's blog outreach effort began after General Brooks left that command and became the Army's Chief PAO. For that, I suppose, the blogosphere should be thankful, although it will be interesting to see how Brooks' efforts play out. The CENTCOM outreach effort clearly has the blessing of senior comanders. At some point (hopefully), wiser heads will tell General Brooks to shut up and color. If his approach carries the day, then his former command and the multi-national division will be taking a giant step back in getting their story to the American people.

Credit Where Credit's Due

The WaPo gets it right on the House's vote to get the troops out of Iraq through pork-barrel politics. If the Democrats are serious about a withdrawal, let that proposal stand on its own merits; don't wrap it in a Christmas-in-March giveaway package that promises something for everyone, as long as you also support the cut-and-run provision.

Hat tip: Powerline.

The Edwards Announcement

Democratic Presidential hopeful John Edwards and his wife Elizabeth held a press conference today, announcing that his campaign will continue, despite a return of her breast cancer.

Watching their announcement (televised live by all the cable news outlets) I kept wondering why the event was necessary. Perhaps I'm a bit old-fashioned and unschooled in the rules of the new media age, but there was something about the announcement that was a bit disconcerting.

First, let me say that I have nothing against the former Senator and his wife. My only disagreement with them is over their stand on the issues. On a personal issue, I have only the deepest sympathy for Mrs. Edwards and what she faces. Breast cancer is a horrible disease; more than 30 years ago, it claimed the life of my mother. She endured a double mastectomy and radiation, but to little avail. She lived barely a year after her initial diagnosis. I grieve for her to this day.

Obviously, Elizabeth Edwards has better treatment options than those available in the 1970s, but she still faces an uphill fight. According to Mr. Edwards, a recent biopsy of his wife's rib showed the cancer had returned. According to this AP story, once breast cancer spreads to the bone it is not considered curable, although women with that diagnosis can survive for years with treatment. Whatever your political position, Mrs. Edwards--and any other woman facing this disease--should be in your prayers.

As for the decision to continue the campaign, that is certainly their perogative, as is their choice to announce such grim news in a media venue. If I were a candidate, I might have reached a different decision, announcing my choice--and the medical diagnosis--in a different manner, say a press release. But then again, my sensibilites are from a different era.

Some of my fellow conservatives are already going rabid over this, claiming that Mr. Edwards is trying to elicit the "sympathy vote" by highlighting his wife's medical condition. I don't think that is the case. Rather, I'd say the former Senator is one of those post-modern politicos (Democrats and Republicans alike) who feel a little too comfortable in front of the cameras, sometimes at the expense of his own privacy--and that of their families.

It's All in the Timing, Redux

A couple of days ago, we noted a recent AFP dispatch from Baghdad, depicting U.S. soldiers who are apparently fed up with the war and want us to get out, now. We pointed out a couple of problems with that report--first of all, it doesn't jibe with other quotes from American military personnel; Secondly, reporter Bryan Pearson seemed to base most of his story on the comments of a single, unnamed (and apparently, low-ranking) soldier.

Terri at A Soldier's Mind took the inquiry a step further, sending a copy of the article to one of the officers quoted in Pearson's story. Here's a portion of his e-mail reply to her:

Thanks to you and all those who truly support us here and what we do. This was an example of a journalist with a hidden agenda. I took him out with me before I let him get in a vehicle with my soldiers. He never asked me any leading or difficult questions, but waited till he had access to a young soldier and asked him questions like what would the US Army do if Iraq were to implode; totally out of a soldiers purvue. He also embellished and exaggerated statements to add flavor to his point of view.

My intention is to alert others to his deceptive practices so that this doesn’t happen to another unit or their soldiers. The tone of the article is not what my soldiers are feeling and they were very upset that they were portrayed this way. Each is very proud of what they do here…… If any of your readers read this and think that soldiers here are in such disparaging conditions please caveat with the disclaimer that these soldiers were deceived, grossly misqouted, and had fabricated quotes.

Out of all the embedded reporters we have had up to this date, Bryan Pearson is the first negative experience we have had

Terri doesn't specify which officer responded to her e-mail, but I'm guessing it was Capt Chris Dawson, the platoon commander identified in the original story. Dawson was the only soldier in the story who stated that our military effort is making a difference. Not surprisingly, Pearson buried those remarks near the bottom of his report.

Kudos to Terri for digging deeper on this one, and to that 9th Cav officer (Capt Dawson?) for setting the record straight. As for Mr. Pearson, we'll read his future dispatches with even more skepticism. And, we've got a question for the public affairs officers running the embed program in Iraq (I've been told the 82nd Airborne PAO shop is currently in charge). Why was an agenda-driven reporter like Pearson given an embed slot instead of a reputable milblogger like Mike Fumento? An explanation is certainly in order.

Today's Reading Assignment

From National Review: Steven F. Hayward, on the inconvenient truth about Al Gore and his global-warming alarmism.

Captain Nowak's New Job

When NASA fired disgraced astronaut Lisa Nowak earlier this month, we predicted that the Navy Captain would be assigned to some low-visibility post at one of the service's training bases in Texas, probably Corpus Christi or Kingsville. The posting would give the Navy two things: (1) A place to "park" Captain Nowak while the civilian justice system runs its course, and (2) Give the service time to decide what punishment--if any--might be imposed on the former astronaut. Currently, Nowak is facing charges of kidnapping and assault and battery in connection with last month's run-in with a romantic rival in Florida.

We certainly don't claim prophet status at In From the Cold, but our prediction about Nowak's next assignment came true yesterday. The Navy released a statement announcing that Captain Nowak will begin a new job next month, as part of the staff of the Naval Air Training Command in Corpus Christi. According to a Navy spokeman, Nowak will work on developing curriculum and training programs when she begins her new duties next month.

In our relentless pursuit of accuracy, we should point out that we envisioned Captain Nowak moving into some sort of "special assistant" job, often given to officers who are waiting for a key billet to open up, or (in this case) to someone with legal troubles awaiting adjudication. But a large headquarters staff is another, convenient assignment for someone in Nowak's predicament. For a training command, curriculum and training programs are critical mission functions, occupying the efforts of dozens of staff officers and NCOs.

As a Captain (O-6), Nowak would normally run a division within one of the command's various directorates. In Air Force terms (my field of reference), she would run a three-letter office within a two-letter directorate, say the Chief of Training (A3T), within the Operations (A3) directorate. Obviously, the Navy uses a different designation system, and I'll leave it up to readers who wore "the wings of gold" to provide clarification in that area.

But the key word here is "normally." With Captain Nowak facing criminal charges in Florida (and potential UCMJ action after that), there's no way the Navy will put her in charge of large staff division. More than likely, she will become the special assistant to another O-6, handling limited duties within that organization. I don't expect the Navy will release Nowak's exact job title or duty location, to give her some semblance of privacy, and make it more difficult for the press to harass her. Nowak's "new" office still has a mission to perform, and frequent phone calls from the media (and cranks in the general population) would only impede that process.

Still unanswered is how NASA--and the Navy--plan to deal with Nowak's former lover, Commander William Oefelein. While Commander Oefelein is single, he had a long affair with a married superior, Captain Nowak. That leaves him open to charges of adultery and fraternization under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), should the Navy decide to pursue the matter. But NASA shows no indication that it plans to remove Oefelein from the astronaut corps, and there's no sign the service will sanction him for his conduct.

As of this writing, Captain Nowak is apparently on leave, and won't start her new job until early April. Her trial in Florida could get underway as early as July. The woman Nowak is accused of attacking, Air Force Captain Colleen Shipman, is expected to testify during those proceedings. It's likely that Captain Nowak will apply for retirement before then (if she hasn't already), but I doubt the Navy brass will approve that request, given the case's high visibility, and the option of military punishment after that the is concluded.

Opportunity Lost

As columnist Robert Novak points out, House Republicans missed a real opportunity by not going after former CIA "operative" Valerie Plame during her Congressional testimony last week.

Mr. Novak notes that there are still critical--and unanswered--questions about the matter, despite a lengthy special prosecutor investigation. That probe was followed, of course, by the indictment (and conviction) of vice-presidential aide Scooter Libby on charges unrelated to the original claim--that White House officials had deliberately leaked the identity of a covert CIA officer (Ms. Plame), in an effort to discredit her husband, administration critic (and former Ambassador) Joe Wilson.

As special prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald quickly discovered, Ms. Plame's "status" with the agency did not meet the requirements for a covert operative, outlined in the 1982 Intelligence Identities Protection Act. Moreover, there is ample evidence that Ms. Plame was assigned to a desk job at Langley when she recommended her husband for that infamous trip to Niger. In fact, her career as a covert operative for the agency was long since over; as we noted last week, Bill Gertz of the Washington Times reported that Plame's affiliation with the CIA had been leaked to Moscow in 1995 (by a Russian agent), and Cuban intelligence agents learned the same thing from classified documents they obtained a few years later. Other sources suggest that her non-official cover (NOC) had not been updated in years, despite the fact that the Boston-based energy "company" (listed on her old business cards) had been exposed years before as a CIA front.

Additionally, there are indications that Wilson helped "out" his wife, providing information to left-wing journalist David Corn, for a Nation article that appeared shortly after Novak's original column. Corn's piece contained far more information on Plame's employment history and status that Novak had reported; Wilson is quoted extensively in the Nation article, and Mr. Corn has never denied that the former ambassador provided information on his wife's intelligence career. And, long before the controversy began, the couple approved a Who's Who entry that listed Ms. Plame's employer as the CIA.

Yet, when Committee Chairman Henry Waxman of California opened the hearing last week, he began with a statement asserting that Plame was a covert operative when her identity was revealed-- a statement that (according Waxman) had been approved by the CIA Director, General Michael Hayden.

Novak writes that several Republicans were stunned by that comment. Representative Peter Hoekstra of Michigan--former Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee--has long pressed the agency on Plame's status at the time of the disclosure, without success. As recently as this week, Hoekstra claims, General Hayden refused to say whether Plame was covert, under the guidelines of the 1982 law. Republicans claim that Hayden's stance on the matter is "proof" that he is too close to Congressional Democrats.

I would suggest a slightly different explanation, although it doesn't exactly cover the CIA--or its new director--in glory. When he moved to Langley, General Hayden inherited an agency in need of serious reform and with elements in open rebellion against the administration and even the intelligence establishment. The Plame controversy was merely one more headache for the CIA Director, and one that he hoped to get rid of, with the end of Fitzgerald's probe, Libby's conviction, and Plame's retirement. Understanding that Democrats now control intelligence oversight--and his budget--Hayden was perhaps willing to let Waxman make his statement, in an effort to make the whole mess go away for good.

As a former intelligence officer, I understand (and support) General Hayden's ultimate goal--a healthy, productive CIA--but in this case, I'm not sure the means justify the end. If Waxman was incorrect, his assertion needs to be clarified. If Plame was, indeed a covert operative (and that remains highly doubtful), that record should also be corrected. Without some sort of official confirmation or denial, the agency remains mired in the mud of partisan politics, reducing its ability to provide critical, unbiased information to our elected leaders. For the sake of the agency--and his own reputation--General Hayden owes everyone clear explanation of Plame's status at the time of Joe Wilson's expedition to Niger.

Likewise, Congressional Republicans should explain their tepid response to Ms. Plame's Congressional appearance last week. As Mr. Novak reports, only two Republicans showed up for her testimony, and their cross-examination of Ms. Plame was weak, to say the least. Essential questions regarding Plame's status went unanswered, and unless the Democrats bring her back for an encore performance, the GOP will never get another public forum to expose the lies and distortions of Mrs. Wilson and her husband.

Chalk it up as another opportunity lost for the Republican minority in Congress, which is (increasingly) adopting the "duck and cover" technique of taking on its foes. Plame's "story" has more holes than a proverbial block of Swiss; even with limited cross-examination time, it would have be relatively easy to poke holes in her account. But most of the committee's GOP members were too busy hiding in the tall grass to take a stand. And they expect us to return them to the majority?

Your Tax Dollars at Work

Study Details Catastrophic Impact Of Nuclear Attack On US Cities

Wonder how much we paid for this "science of the obvious" effort?

Make no mistake; the nuclear threat to our cities--particularly from terrorists--is very real. But I would think that 60+ years of nuclear experience would give us sufficient data to analyze the problem--and its effects on our medical system--without commissioning a new (and likely, expensive) study from the University of Georgia.

Heck, some of the simulation technology described in the news release is hardly new. I once participated in a war game with representatives from a number of government agencies, including the Department of Energy. One of the DOE guys had a laptop with a really neat program (at least, by late 1990s standards). If you wanted to calculate the effects of a nuclear blast, just pick your detonation point, altitude (air or ground burst) and yield; the computer would do the rest, showing areas that would be completely flattened by the explosion, and those that would suffer lesser damage, along with fallout patterns.

The findings of the Georgia study are sobering, but hardly surprising. A nuclear blast in a major metropolitan area would produce horrific casualties, and overwhelm our medical facilities. I'm not convinced we needed a new study to tell us that.

Hat tip: Seneca the Younger at YARGB. Also, one of Seneca's readers suggests buying (or downloading) a copy of the government's guide for surviving a nuclear war. I heartily concur; it's the definitive reference on the subject. Unfortunately, most Americans have never heard of it, and our government--never shy about working towards contradictory goals--has never encouraged personal preparation, despite the years of effort and research that Cresson Kearny devoted to the survival guide.