When the first round of the NCAA Men's Basketball Tournament begins on Thursday, the Air Force Academy Falcons won't be there. Despite a 23-8 record and "quality" wins over Stanford, Texas Tech and Long Beach State, the Falcons didn't make the field for March madness, and will (instead) host a first-round NIT game Wednesday night against Austin Peay.
In fairness, the Falcons didn't exactly endear themselves to the selection committee. After a 17-1 start, they lost seven of their final 13 games and made an early exit from last week's Mountain West Conference Tournament. During that stretch, the Falcons lost to such non-powers as Utah and Texas Christian, effectively ending hopes for an NCAA bid, and sealing their exile to the NIT.
Still, there's much to be said for a service academy that has enjoyed remarkable success in Division I basketball over the past 5 or 6 years, despite serious recruiting disadvantages and a series of coaching changes. It's almost a given that talented basketball players with a 1200 SAT score tend to gravitate toward Duke or North Carolina, not the Air Force Academy. Then, there's the little matter of being a college athlete in a demanding academic and military environment, where players are expected to meet the same rigorous standards as other students. And after graduation, any dreams of a pro career must be deferred at least five years, while the player fulfills his military service commitment.
Needless to say, the Academy hasn't exactly been a Mecca for great basketball players and teams. While the program's founder (legendary coach Bob Spear) managed two NCAA appearances in the early 1960s, it would be another 40 years before the Falcons returned to the Big Dance, under Princeton alum Joe Scott. His 2003-04 team won an at-large beth, after finishing with a record of 22-7, the first winning record in 26 years. Unfortunately for the Falcons, Scott followed the same path of other successful coaches in difficult recruiting situations, bolting for his alma matter after the '04 season. Scott's successor, Chris Mooney, did the same thing, departing for the head coaching job at Richmond after a single season.
Since 2005, Jeff Bzdelik has served as the Falcons' head coach, leading them back to the tournament a year ago. Bzdelik, who looks far younger than his 53 years, has more than a decade of NBA experience, including a stint as coach of the Denver Nuggets. When he inherited the Falcons, Bzdelik had the good sense to retain the "Princeton" offense of his predecessors, which emphasizes passing, precise cuts to the basket and high-percentage shots--the perfect style for a team often described as "too small" and "too slow" for a Division I program. But Bzkelik compensates for his team's (supposed) lack of athleticism by emphasizing hustle, defense and complete game preparation--almost to the point of paranoia.
Graduating four senior starters off this year's team, Bzdelik will have his work cut out for him next year. Until then, the Falcons have enough talent to make a deep run into the NIT. True, it's not the same thing as the Big Dance, but in an era when most college basketball players excell at only one thing, it's refreshing to see a team of true student-athletes extend their season by at least one more game. With a little luck--and a better performance than they exhibited in the Mountain West tournament--the Falcons might wind up in Madison Square Garden on 29 March, for the finals of the NIT.
Finally, the standard disclaimer: I am not a graduate of the Air Force Academy, having earned my commission the old-fashioned way, through 13 weeks at OTS.
***
ADDENDUM: I am not a bracket-ologist, and this will likely be my only post on the college basketball tournaments. But, like other casual fans, I am constantly mystified by the selection process, and some of the (apparent) politics that influence the process. For example, how can you justify Kentucky's selection for the tournament, other than (a) they go every year, and (b) wherever they travel, 40,000 members of the Wildcat Nation are sure to follow, clogging hotels and restaurants, and spending lots of cash. For the record, this year's UK squad had a solid RPI (#13 nationally, according to one service), but finished only 1-6 against Top 25 teams, had a 9-7 record in conference play, and lost in the second round of the SEC tournament to a Mississippi State team that's headed for the NIT. Without their "tradition" and name-recognition, the Cats might also be looking at an NIT bracket.
Monday, March 12, 2007
Al-Sadr's Best Hope?
A hat tip to Paul Mirengoff at Powerline, for spotting this Robert Kagan column in yesterday's Washington Post. Mr. Kagan, a conservative scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, notes the current dichotomy in U.S. policy toward Iraq. As Congressional Democrats try to legislate a withdrawal of American forces by next year, there are growing signs that the troops surge--you remember, the strategy that was so roundly criticized just a a few months ago--is working.
Mr. Kagan writes from Brussels (where is wife is the current American Ambassador to NATO), so he relies on others for evidence that the surge is working. And his choices could hardly be described as fellow neo-cons; from Iraq the Model, Kagan cites observations from Baghdad-based bloggers Omar and Mohammed Fadhil, who reported that the surge has "changed the dynamic." Before the troop increase, the Fadhil brothers note, there was an assumption (among friends and foes alike) that the U.S. was preparing to withdrawal. Now, with the U.S. and Iraqi governments devoting required resources to the security situation, those assumptions have changed, and many insurgents have left the city.
Similar comments were made by NBC News anchor Brian Williams, who just returned from a week in Iraq. During his stay, Mr. Williams visited the Iraqi cities of Ramidi and Hit, where the security situation was precarious just a few months ago. Now, according to the NBC anchor, The new American strategy of "getting out, decentralizing, going into the neighborhoods, grabbing a toehold, telling the enemy we're here, start talking to the locals -- that is having an obvious and palpable effect." The result, according to Williams, is "that the war has changed."
Readers will note that neither Brian Williams nor the Fadhil brothers are predicting quick victory. But, as Kagan reminds us, there has been a near-dearth of stories about the surge's early success in recent weeks. Meanwhile, Democratic efforts to force a troop withdrawal by 2008 were big news last week, and similar efforts in the future will continue to grab the headlines.
This leads Mr. Kagan to conclude that the Democrats (and their friends in the media) may yet represent the best hope for insurgents. By imposing some sort of artificial deadline, and continuing to emphasize the negative in Iraq, critics of the war--both in the government and the press--can encourage the terrorists to hang on for another year or so, then achieve the victory they have sought for so long.
Kagan concludes by noting that our final success in Iraq is far from assured; the violence continues (albeit at reduced levels), and the insurgents who have fled may return, and cause more problems down the road. And, he says, no one is asking journalists to report only good news from Iraq. But, it would be nice to see a little balance, highlighting the positive effects of the surge (so far), along with the daily diet of car bombings and suicide attacks. Is that likely to happen? I think most of us know the answer to that one.
Mr. Kagan writes from Brussels (where is wife is the current American Ambassador to NATO), so he relies on others for evidence that the surge is working. And his choices could hardly be described as fellow neo-cons; from Iraq the Model, Kagan cites observations from Baghdad-based bloggers Omar and Mohammed Fadhil, who reported that the surge has "changed the dynamic." Before the troop increase, the Fadhil brothers note, there was an assumption (among friends and foes alike) that the U.S. was preparing to withdrawal. Now, with the U.S. and Iraqi governments devoting required resources to the security situation, those assumptions have changed, and many insurgents have left the city.
Similar comments were made by NBC News anchor Brian Williams, who just returned from a week in Iraq. During his stay, Mr. Williams visited the Iraqi cities of Ramidi and Hit, where the security situation was precarious just a few months ago. Now, according to the NBC anchor, The new American strategy of "getting out, decentralizing, going into the neighborhoods, grabbing a toehold, telling the enemy we're here, start talking to the locals -- that is having an obvious and palpable effect." The result, according to Williams, is "that the war has changed."
Readers will note that neither Brian Williams nor the Fadhil brothers are predicting quick victory. But, as Kagan reminds us, there has been a near-dearth of stories about the surge's early success in recent weeks. Meanwhile, Democratic efforts to force a troop withdrawal by 2008 were big news last week, and similar efforts in the future will continue to grab the headlines.
This leads Mr. Kagan to conclude that the Democrats (and their friends in the media) may yet represent the best hope for insurgents. By imposing some sort of artificial deadline, and continuing to emphasize the negative in Iraq, critics of the war--both in the government and the press--can encourage the terrorists to hang on for another year or so, then achieve the victory they have sought for so long.
Kagan concludes by noting that our final success in Iraq is far from assured; the violence continues (albeit at reduced levels), and the insurgents who have fled may return, and cause more problems down the road. And, he says, no one is asking journalists to report only good news from Iraq. But, it would be nice to see a little balance, highlighting the positive effects of the surge (so far), along with the daily diet of car bombings and suicide attacks. Is that likely to happen? I think most of us know the answer to that one.
Friday, March 09, 2007
Meet Your New Boss
Network anchors get a little testy when someone describes them as "news readers," or "presenters," to use the British term. "We're journalists," they insist; a few even claim the title of "managing editor," suggesting someone who is actively involved in the editorial process, and helps shape the broadcast's content and scope.
Take Katie Couric, for example. Not only is she the anchor of the CBS Evening News, she also holds the mantle of managing editor, following in the footsteps of her predecessors, Dan Rather and Walter Cronkite. Given her annual salary ($15 million), Ms. Couric is certainly earns enough to perform two or three jobs at the network's struggling news division.
But we digress. Actually, you've got to wonder how much influence Ms. Couric actually has at the Evening News, in the wake of today's story in the NYT. According to the Times, CBS executives didn't tell Ms. Couric that Rick Kaplan would be her new executive producer until after he accepted the job. So much for being in the loop.
In reality, the title of "managing editor" at a TV newscast is little more than window dressing. Anchors are certainly aware of the stories that will be covered; most report from the field from time-to-time, and some make contributions to their scripts (which are written by other staffers). But others are decidedly hands-off. Early viewers of satellite TV could watch the late Max Robinson of ABC talking on the phone about his art collection during pre-broadcast technical rehearsals from his Chicago studio. And, one of the Windy City's true news legends, the late Floyd Kalber of NBC (and later, WLS-TV) reportedly arrived for work only one hour before his 6 p.m. newscast, and departed shortly after it ended. However, I'm note sure if either Robinson or Kalber claimed the exalted title of "managing editor." For the record, some other notables in the history of broadcast news (including Chet Huntley, David Brinkley and Peter Jennings) also managed to get by without that mantle.
Which brings us back to Ms. Couric at CBS. As someone who once worked in the salt mines of broadcasting, I don't begrudge her position, or her paycheck. Anchoring a newscast is definitely an acquired skill, and Couric earned her spurs in the morning news wars. But describing her--or any other anchor--as hands-on, take charge managing editors is a bit silly. Their job, in a nutshell, is to read the news and look attractive. That may be one of the reasons that Katie Couric was among the last to know that she had a new executive producer.
Take Katie Couric, for example. Not only is she the anchor of the CBS Evening News, she also holds the mantle of managing editor, following in the footsteps of her predecessors, Dan Rather and Walter Cronkite. Given her annual salary ($15 million), Ms. Couric is certainly earns enough to perform two or three jobs at the network's struggling news division.
But we digress. Actually, you've got to wonder how much influence Ms. Couric actually has at the Evening News, in the wake of today's story in the NYT. According to the Times, CBS executives didn't tell Ms. Couric that Rick Kaplan would be her new executive producer until after he accepted the job. So much for being in the loop.
In reality, the title of "managing editor" at a TV newscast is little more than window dressing. Anchors are certainly aware of the stories that will be covered; most report from the field from time-to-time, and some make contributions to their scripts (which are written by other staffers). But others are decidedly hands-off. Early viewers of satellite TV could watch the late Max Robinson of ABC talking on the phone about his art collection during pre-broadcast technical rehearsals from his Chicago studio. And, one of the Windy City's true news legends, the late Floyd Kalber of NBC (and later, WLS-TV) reportedly arrived for work only one hour before his 6 p.m. newscast, and departed shortly after it ended. However, I'm note sure if either Robinson or Kalber claimed the exalted title of "managing editor." For the record, some other notables in the history of broadcast news (including Chet Huntley, David Brinkley and Peter Jennings) also managed to get by without that mantle.
Which brings us back to Ms. Couric at CBS. As someone who once worked in the salt mines of broadcasting, I don't begrudge her position, or her paycheck. Anchoring a newscast is definitely an acquired skill, and Couric earned her spurs in the morning news wars. But describing her--or any other anchor--as hands-on, take charge managing editors is a bit silly. Their job, in a nutshell, is to read the news and look attractive. That may be one of the reasons that Katie Couric was among the last to know that she had a new executive producer.
Truth in Advertising
A few months ago, the state of Michigan was running a radio ad blitz, inviting companies to move there. The ads were voiced by actor Jeff Daniels, a Michigan native who still runs a small, not-for-profit theater in his home state. Firms that moved to Michigan, Mr. Daniels informed us, could take advantage of billions of dollars in state assistance and spport. Other ads in the series highlighted some of the companies that had taken the plunge, making the Wolverine State sound like an absolute business nirvana.
But today's Opinion Journal tells the other side of the story. Apparently, one reason the state wants more companies to relocate there is so it can tax the hell out of them. Michigan's Democratic Governor, Jennifer Granholm, has proposed a new corporate income tax, a two percent excise tax on 100 business services, and five percent death tax on estates over $ 2 million--measures almost guaranteed to drive more businesses out of the state. As the Journal notes, Michigan has lost more than 360,000 jobs since 2000; the state is saddled with an $860 million budget deficit, and per capita income is at its lowest in 75 years, relative to the national average. And the solution to those problems? Why raise taxes, of course!
In fairness, much of Michigan's economic woes can be traced to the steady decline of the nation's automobile industry, which is continuing its migration to more business-friendly, right-to-work states in the south. But Granholm's proposed increases in taxes and fees will actually increase the burden on businesses she's trying to bring to the state. In reality, Governor Granholm's proposal is nothing more than a standard, Democratic bait-and-switch. She eliminated the state's anti-growth single business tax, but (apparently) can't resist the temptation to other hike fees and levies that businesses must pay. Judging from the Journal article, it doesn't sound like companies are exactly rushing to Michigan, and the few that actually made the move may question their decision. Just this week, one of the state's oldest and largest bank holding companies, Comercia, announed that it will transfer its corporate headquarters from Detroit to Dallas, citing "better growth opportunites" in the Lone Star Stte.
As for Mr. Daniels, he professes to "love" Michigan in one of the ads, and it doesn't look like his Purple Rose Theater (located in Chelsea) will move anytime soon. But you've got to wonder if the actor realizes Governor Granholm's economic policies have made him the pitchman for something of a scam. Michigan (and its economic development fund, which hired Mr. Daniels) are eager to bring companies to the state, and even offers some generous incentives. But, once there, the Granholm plan would reduce potential advantages in the marketplace, thanks to the built-in costs of higher taxes and fees that Michigan firms would add to their products and services.
If Granholm's tax proposals are approved by the state legislature, business owners would have to be suckers to move their firms to Michigan. And even Harry Dunne--the dim-witted character that Mr. Daniels played in Dumb and Dumber--would understand that.
But today's Opinion Journal tells the other side of the story. Apparently, one reason the state wants more companies to relocate there is so it can tax the hell out of them. Michigan's Democratic Governor, Jennifer Granholm, has proposed a new corporate income tax, a two percent excise tax on 100 business services, and five percent death tax on estates over $ 2 million--measures almost guaranteed to drive more businesses out of the state. As the Journal notes, Michigan has lost more than 360,000 jobs since 2000; the state is saddled with an $860 million budget deficit, and per capita income is at its lowest in 75 years, relative to the national average. And the solution to those problems? Why raise taxes, of course!
In fairness, much of Michigan's economic woes can be traced to the steady decline of the nation's automobile industry, which is continuing its migration to more business-friendly, right-to-work states in the south. But Granholm's proposed increases in taxes and fees will actually increase the burden on businesses she's trying to bring to the state. In reality, Governor Granholm's proposal is nothing more than a standard, Democratic bait-and-switch. She eliminated the state's anti-growth single business tax, but (apparently) can't resist the temptation to other hike fees and levies that businesses must pay. Judging from the Journal article, it doesn't sound like companies are exactly rushing to Michigan, and the few that actually made the move may question their decision. Just this week, one of the state's oldest and largest bank holding companies, Comercia, announed that it will transfer its corporate headquarters from Detroit to Dallas, citing "better growth opportunites" in the Lone Star Stte.
As for Mr. Daniels, he professes to "love" Michigan in one of the ads, and it doesn't look like his Purple Rose Theater (located in Chelsea) will move anytime soon. But you've got to wonder if the actor realizes Governor Granholm's economic policies have made him the pitchman for something of a scam. Michigan (and its economic development fund, which hired Mr. Daniels) are eager to bring companies to the state, and even offers some generous incentives. But, once there, the Granholm plan would reduce potential advantages in the marketplace, thanks to the built-in costs of higher taxes and fees that Michigan firms would add to their products and services.
If Granholm's tax proposals are approved by the state legislature, business owners would have to be suckers to move their firms to Michigan. And even Harry Dunne--the dim-witted character that Mr. Daniels played in Dumb and Dumber--would understand that.
If Musharraf Won't Do the Job
...Then send in Task Force 145. As Bill Roggio reported yesterday, the joint special operations unit staged a raid into Pakistan's tribal lands earlier this week and captured a big fish, identified as Mullah Hakimallah Mansub, the Taliban's deputy commander in Waziristan. His capture came less than two weeks after Pakistani forces nabbed the former Taliban defense minister, Mullah Obaidullah Akhund. However, that news was tempered by a subsequent announcement that Islamabad would continue the "peace process" in the tribal lands, indicating that there are limits on how Pakistan will pursue terrorists within its borders.
The common thread in both of these operations is better intelligence. We don't send a gaggle of special forces operators into Pak territory, supported by Air Force Pave Low helicopters, AC-130 gunships, Apache attack choppers and other elements, unless there's a high probability of success, and acceptable risks for the strike force. The capture of several high-ranking Taliban officials (in a relatively short period) indicates that we're getting better information on the whereabouts of key terrorist leaders, allowing Task Force 145 (and other SOF units) to mount effective operations.
While taking nothing away from the accomplishments of our SOF operators, our recent success in Waziristan may also reflect a degree of complacency on the part of Al Qaida and its Taliban allies. With the signing of the initial Waziristan accords last fall, the terrorists believed they had attained a degree of safety and sanctuary that had been lacking since the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Recent U.S. intelligence estimates--and credible media reports--suggested that the terrorists had rebuilt their support infrastructure in the tribal lands, and that senior Al Qaida leaders (including Osama bin Laden) were again taking an active role in the network's operations. Those steps would not occur unless the terrorists believed they could operate with relative impunity in Waziristan.
But Al Qaida's efforts to regroup also present a (slightly) easier target set for our SOF teams and the spooks that support them. Assembling--and training--more fighters requires larger, more formal facilities, along the lines of Danda Saidgai, the major Al Qaida and Taliban camp in North Waziristan, struck by Task Force 145 last March. The raid reportedly inflicted numerous casualties among members of bin Laden's personal protection detail (the "Black Guards"), and SOF operators also killed the camp commander, a senior Chechen Al Qaida leader. The Danda Saidgai camp was described as a "sprawling" complex, with eight large barracks for housing terrorist fighters and recruits. It's still unclear if this week's raid targeted a similar-sized complex, but whenever the terrorists mass in Waziristan, the job of identifying and targeting them grows less complex.
What happens in the coming weeks will give us some idea of Al Qaida's relative "comfort level" in Waziristan. If the terrorists are truly concerned with the threat posed by TF 145 (and they should be), Al Qaida's leaders could choose to again disperse their operations, utilizing smaller training camps and support facilities. Decentralized operations would be more difficult to detect, but it would also slow terrorist efforts to train more fighters for upcoming operations--and respond to increased NATO pressure in southern Afghanistan. On the other hand, if the terrorists view these cross-border raids as only an occasional nuisance, they may continue to mass, and sustain a more overt infrastructure.
Regardless of the path chosen by Al Qaida (and the Taliban), the continued flow of timely, actionable intelligence will be essential for keeping pressure on the terrorists, and impeding their ability to operate.
The common thread in both of these operations is better intelligence. We don't send a gaggle of special forces operators into Pak territory, supported by Air Force Pave Low helicopters, AC-130 gunships, Apache attack choppers and other elements, unless there's a high probability of success, and acceptable risks for the strike force. The capture of several high-ranking Taliban officials (in a relatively short period) indicates that we're getting better information on the whereabouts of key terrorist leaders, allowing Task Force 145 (and other SOF units) to mount effective operations.
While taking nothing away from the accomplishments of our SOF operators, our recent success in Waziristan may also reflect a degree of complacency on the part of Al Qaida and its Taliban allies. With the signing of the initial Waziristan accords last fall, the terrorists believed they had attained a degree of safety and sanctuary that had been lacking since the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Recent U.S. intelligence estimates--and credible media reports--suggested that the terrorists had rebuilt their support infrastructure in the tribal lands, and that senior Al Qaida leaders (including Osama bin Laden) were again taking an active role in the network's operations. Those steps would not occur unless the terrorists believed they could operate with relative impunity in Waziristan.
But Al Qaida's efforts to regroup also present a (slightly) easier target set for our SOF teams and the spooks that support them. Assembling--and training--more fighters requires larger, more formal facilities, along the lines of Danda Saidgai, the major Al Qaida and Taliban camp in North Waziristan, struck by Task Force 145 last March. The raid reportedly inflicted numerous casualties among members of bin Laden's personal protection detail (the "Black Guards"), and SOF operators also killed the camp commander, a senior Chechen Al Qaida leader. The Danda Saidgai camp was described as a "sprawling" complex, with eight large barracks for housing terrorist fighters and recruits. It's still unclear if this week's raid targeted a similar-sized complex, but whenever the terrorists mass in Waziristan, the job of identifying and targeting them grows less complex.
What happens in the coming weeks will give us some idea of Al Qaida's relative "comfort level" in Waziristan. If the terrorists are truly concerned with the threat posed by TF 145 (and they should be), Al Qaida's leaders could choose to again disperse their operations, utilizing smaller training camps and support facilities. Decentralized operations would be more difficult to detect, but it would also slow terrorist efforts to train more fighters for upcoming operations--and respond to increased NATO pressure in southern Afghanistan. On the other hand, if the terrorists view these cross-border raids as only an occasional nuisance, they may continue to mass, and sustain a more overt infrastructure.
Regardless of the path chosen by Al Qaida (and the Taliban), the continued flow of timely, actionable intelligence will be essential for keeping pressure on the terrorists, and impeding their ability to operate.
Thursday, March 08, 2007
Debunking the Debunker
Over at Harper's, I found this piece by Ken Silverstein, which claims to blow holes in a recent International Herald-Tribune article on China's new fighter, the F-10. The IHT piece, which ran last month, described the F-10 as a "super fighter," the first PRC fighter with capabilities similar to fourth-generation western aircraft, including the U.S. F-16, the French Rafale, and the Eurofighter Typhoon.
Not true, says Mr. Silverstein. He claims that the F-10 (China uses the J-10 designation) has serious defects:
"...the plane is reported to have serious problems with its engine and other major systems; finally, the electronics systems on the J-10 are downright primitive compared to those of American warplanes."
As for the IHT article, Silverstein says it's nothing more than a plug for the Air Force's F-22 Raptor, thanks to an over-inflated assessment of the China threat from Rick Fisher, director of the International Assessment and Strategy Center's Project on Asian Security and Democracy. Mr. Fisher is apparently suspect because (gasp) he once worked for the Heritage Foundation and is a fomer advisor to California Congressman Chris Cox, who happens to support Taiwan. Why, one of Mr. Fisher's current colleagues, Dr. Arthur Waldron, has actually advocated "regime change" in the PRC.
Mr. Silverstein has clear problems with Fisher's assertion that the F-22 is the only fighter currently in service that would clearly outmatch the F-10. Silverstein describes the Raptor as a Cold War relic, over-priced and not necessary to meet the emerging Chinese threat. It's an argument frequently used by foes of the F-22, and it's almost entirely inaccurate, as is his characterization of the Chinese fighter.
Let's begin with the F-10. It is a super fighter? Depends on how you define the term. Put another way, it's the best tactical aircraft the Chinese have ever produced, thanks largely to technology acquired lock, stock and barrel from Israel, and its cancelled Lavi fighter program. Serious problems with its engines and other systems? Please be more specific. In a twin-engine fighter (like the F-15 or the F-22), loss of a single powerplant is a manageable problem, in most circumstances. In a single-engine jet (such as the F-10 or F-16), it's a major emergency, one that requires quick acquisition of a runway.
Has the PRC had problems with F-10s that lost their engine and crashed? Yes, but by that standard, so has the United States and every other country that has operated single-engine fighters. And, based on my conversations with analysts who have followed the F-10 program for more than a decade, the number of Chinese crashes has not been excessive, and the test program advanced steadily. True, the F-10 was in development for more than a decade, but that's typical for modern fighter programs. The days when a team of engineers could retire to a room a design a new fighter in 90 days (like the famed P-51 Mustang) have long since passed.
In terms of electronics, the F-10 has a Russian-designed, multi-function Pulse-Doppler radar, the first ever in a Chinese-designed fighter. This radar, probably a derivative of the Zhuk or RP-35 models, supports the AA-12 ADDER, an active radar missile, similar in performance to the U.S. AIM-120 AMRAAM. More disturbingly, advanced models of the AA-12 (which Beijing will have access to) are expected to have a larger employment envelope that the U.S. missile, giving the Chinese a potential "first shot" advantage against other fourth-generation fighters equipped with AMRAAM.
In terms of overall performance, the F-10 is extremely competitive with the F-16 and various European fighters. And that brings us to the heart of Silverstein's argument. Is a peer competitor, as he implies, good enough to guarantee air supremacy over the Taiwan Strait. I would argue that it isn't, for a couple of reasons. First, U.S. defense plans are (typically) built on the assumption that we will control the skies. Without air supremacy, our operating bases are threatened, along with the flow of supplies and reinforcements into a region.
Secondly, control of the skies gives us the flexibility to attack enemy target sets--in depth--at the time of our choosing. The lessons of both Gulf Wars and Operation Allied Force have not been lost on Beijing, which is building an Air Force (and air defense system) capable of challenging U.S. domination of the skies. These capabilities are being supplanted by a state-of-the art denial and deception (D&D) program, aimed at denying our advantages in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR).
Finally, Silverstein conveniently ignores the other half of China's air force modernization program, embodied by the acquisition of more than 200 SU-27/30 FLANKER aircraft from Russia. A potential battle for control of the Taiwan Straits isn't simply an F-10 vs. F-22 proposition. It's a scenario pitting large numbers of F-10s and FLANKERs against Taiwanese F-16s, Indigenous Defense Fighters (IDFs), Mirage 2000-5s, and at some point, U.S. F-15s and F-22s.
Unfortunately for Taiwan's Air Force, the numbers are (increasingly) on the PRC's side, and with the F-10 and SU-27/30, Beijing has achieved technological parity in basic fighter performance. And, with the AA-11 (infrared air-to-air missile) and extended range AA-12, PRC pilots will have the advantage in both beyond-visual-range (BVR) and short-range engagements.
Against that sort of threat, you don't want equality; you want a fighter that totally eclipses the adversary's capabilities. In other words, you want the F-22, and its combination of stealth, super-cruise and advanced avionics to (a) ensure air supremacy, and (b) allow us to penetrate enemy airspace, and eliminate high-value targets.
If the Chinese threat evaporated tomorrow, I'd be the first to suggest an early termination of the F-22 program, and accelerated development of UCAV technology. But as Beijing continues its military modernization program, the F-22 remains a wise investment, not only for the defense of Taiwan, but for other regions as well. You see, there's another element missing from Mr. Silverstein's piece. China will aggressively market the F-10, just as Russia has done with the FLANKER. Advanced fighters from those countries will likely show up in Iran and Syria in the near future, providing a similar challenge to existing, fourth-generation fighters. And once again, the question becomes: do you want an absolute advantage, or just parity?
***
In fairness, both Silverstein's article--and my reply--ignore the issue of pilot training and tactical proficiency. Historically, that has been an area where the U.S. (and other western Air Forces) have held a clear advantage. But even that advantage may be eroding, as demonstrated by recent Cope India exchanges, where Indian Air Force FLANKERS, operated by tactically competent crews, surprised their USAF counterparts. There are indications that China's air tactics are also evolving, to take full advantage of the capabilities found in the F-10 and SU-27/30. Improving proficiency by PRC pilots buttress the case for the F-22.
As for that computer-code "bug" that supposedly short-circuited the recent Raptor deployment to Okinawa? It's been fixed. Using that flaw as proof that the F-22 is a "dodo," is reminiscent of early criticism of the Maverick missile. During one of its early tests, the Maverick suffered a seeker malfunction and missed the target, causing critics to howl. The Maverick has gone on to become the most successful air-launched anti-armor weapon in history, with thousands used successfully in the Gulf Wars and Kosovo. It's not a stretch to say the F-22 will be even more successful.
Finally, I do not know Mr. Fisher, nor am I affilated with his organization.
Not true, says Mr. Silverstein. He claims that the F-10 (China uses the J-10 designation) has serious defects:
"...the plane is reported to have serious problems with its engine and other major systems; finally, the electronics systems on the J-10 are downright primitive compared to those of American warplanes."
As for the IHT article, Silverstein says it's nothing more than a plug for the Air Force's F-22 Raptor, thanks to an over-inflated assessment of the China threat from Rick Fisher, director of the International Assessment and Strategy Center's Project on Asian Security and Democracy. Mr. Fisher is apparently suspect because (gasp) he once worked for the Heritage Foundation and is a fomer advisor to California Congressman Chris Cox, who happens to support Taiwan. Why, one of Mr. Fisher's current colleagues, Dr. Arthur Waldron, has actually advocated "regime change" in the PRC.
Mr. Silverstein has clear problems with Fisher's assertion that the F-22 is the only fighter currently in service that would clearly outmatch the F-10. Silverstein describes the Raptor as a Cold War relic, over-priced and not necessary to meet the emerging Chinese threat. It's an argument frequently used by foes of the F-22, and it's almost entirely inaccurate, as is his characterization of the Chinese fighter.
Let's begin with the F-10. It is a super fighter? Depends on how you define the term. Put another way, it's the best tactical aircraft the Chinese have ever produced, thanks largely to technology acquired lock, stock and barrel from Israel, and its cancelled Lavi fighter program. Serious problems with its engines and other systems? Please be more specific. In a twin-engine fighter (like the F-15 or the F-22), loss of a single powerplant is a manageable problem, in most circumstances. In a single-engine jet (such as the F-10 or F-16), it's a major emergency, one that requires quick acquisition of a runway.
Has the PRC had problems with F-10s that lost their engine and crashed? Yes, but by that standard, so has the United States and every other country that has operated single-engine fighters. And, based on my conversations with analysts who have followed the F-10 program for more than a decade, the number of Chinese crashes has not been excessive, and the test program advanced steadily. True, the F-10 was in development for more than a decade, but that's typical for modern fighter programs. The days when a team of engineers could retire to a room a design a new fighter in 90 days (like the famed P-51 Mustang) have long since passed.
In terms of electronics, the F-10 has a Russian-designed, multi-function Pulse-Doppler radar, the first ever in a Chinese-designed fighter. This radar, probably a derivative of the Zhuk or RP-35 models, supports the AA-12 ADDER, an active radar missile, similar in performance to the U.S. AIM-120 AMRAAM. More disturbingly, advanced models of the AA-12 (which Beijing will have access to) are expected to have a larger employment envelope that the U.S. missile, giving the Chinese a potential "first shot" advantage against other fourth-generation fighters equipped with AMRAAM.
In terms of overall performance, the F-10 is extremely competitive with the F-16 and various European fighters. And that brings us to the heart of Silverstein's argument. Is a peer competitor, as he implies, good enough to guarantee air supremacy over the Taiwan Strait. I would argue that it isn't, for a couple of reasons. First, U.S. defense plans are (typically) built on the assumption that we will control the skies. Without air supremacy, our operating bases are threatened, along with the flow of supplies and reinforcements into a region.
Secondly, control of the skies gives us the flexibility to attack enemy target sets--in depth--at the time of our choosing. The lessons of both Gulf Wars and Operation Allied Force have not been lost on Beijing, which is building an Air Force (and air defense system) capable of challenging U.S. domination of the skies. These capabilities are being supplanted by a state-of-the art denial and deception (D&D) program, aimed at denying our advantages in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR).
Finally, Silverstein conveniently ignores the other half of China's air force modernization program, embodied by the acquisition of more than 200 SU-27/30 FLANKER aircraft from Russia. A potential battle for control of the Taiwan Straits isn't simply an F-10 vs. F-22 proposition. It's a scenario pitting large numbers of F-10s and FLANKERs against Taiwanese F-16s, Indigenous Defense Fighters (IDFs), Mirage 2000-5s, and at some point, U.S. F-15s and F-22s.
Unfortunately for Taiwan's Air Force, the numbers are (increasingly) on the PRC's side, and with the F-10 and SU-27/30, Beijing has achieved technological parity in basic fighter performance. And, with the AA-11 (infrared air-to-air missile) and extended range AA-12, PRC pilots will have the advantage in both beyond-visual-range (BVR) and short-range engagements.
Against that sort of threat, you don't want equality; you want a fighter that totally eclipses the adversary's capabilities. In other words, you want the F-22, and its combination of stealth, super-cruise and advanced avionics to (a) ensure air supremacy, and (b) allow us to penetrate enemy airspace, and eliminate high-value targets.
If the Chinese threat evaporated tomorrow, I'd be the first to suggest an early termination of the F-22 program, and accelerated development of UCAV technology. But as Beijing continues its military modernization program, the F-22 remains a wise investment, not only for the defense of Taiwan, but for other regions as well. You see, there's another element missing from Mr. Silverstein's piece. China will aggressively market the F-10, just as Russia has done with the FLANKER. Advanced fighters from those countries will likely show up in Iran and Syria in the near future, providing a similar challenge to existing, fourth-generation fighters. And once again, the question becomes: do you want an absolute advantage, or just parity?
***
In fairness, both Silverstein's article--and my reply--ignore the issue of pilot training and tactical proficiency. Historically, that has been an area where the U.S. (and other western Air Forces) have held a clear advantage. But even that advantage may be eroding, as demonstrated by recent Cope India exchanges, where Indian Air Force FLANKERS, operated by tactically competent crews, surprised their USAF counterparts. There are indications that China's air tactics are also evolving, to take full advantage of the capabilities found in the F-10 and SU-27/30. Improving proficiency by PRC pilots buttress the case for the F-22.
As for that computer-code "bug" that supposedly short-circuited the recent Raptor deployment to Okinawa? It's been fixed. Using that flaw as proof that the F-22 is a "dodo," is reminiscent of early criticism of the Maverick missile. During one of its early tests, the Maverick suffered a seeker malfunction and missed the target, causing critics to howl. The Maverick has gone on to become the most successful air-launched anti-armor weapon in history, with thousands used successfully in the Gulf Wars and Kosovo. It's not a stretch to say the F-22 will be even more successful.
Finally, I do not know Mr. Fisher, nor am I affilated with his organization.
An Issue Awaits in South Carolina
So far, much of the preparation for next year's Democratic primary in South Carolina has focused on signing up prominent African-American politicians, in hopes that they can deliver that segment of the vote (Hellooo, Senator Clinton).
But when the campaigning gets serious in the Palmetto State, Ms. Clinton, "Barry" Obama (as he was known at Harvard), and the Breck Girl may find themselves confronting an issue they hadn't planned on.
It's called school choice. As Brendan Minitier recently noted at OpinionJournal.com, the issue is gaining traction in South Carolina, and not just among Republicans. State school superintendent Jim Rex--the only Democrat to win state-wide election last fall--has endorsed school choice (but only within the public school system). Meanwhile, the Republican-controlled legislature is considering a bill that would provide tuition tax credits for middle-class parents, and a $4500 scholarship that poor kids could use at any school, public or private. And, a recent school choice rally in Columbia attracted several thousand supporters. One of the legislators who organized buses for rally participants was Democratic State Representative Curtis Brantley, an African-
American from Jasper County who (coincidentally) is a former educator.
School choice isn't law (yet) in South Carolina, but as Mr. Miniter observes, there is a clear groundswell in that direction. And that means the standard Democratic song-and-dance about preserving our government, err public schools, may not resonate as it once did. Admittedly, the issue probably won't determine the winner of next year's primary, but it will be useful in getting the Democratic candidates on record, and causing them to squirm, if only a bit.
***
Addendum: It would be nice if someone from the press asked Ms. Clinton, Mr. Obama and Mr. Edwards about the story of Rontrell Matthews--the African-American teenager profiled in Minitier's column. The question is simple: what would you do to improve education for young men like Rontrell--other than propping up failing public schools. As you'll discover in Miniter's account, Rontrell realized his old school was substandard, and took a job at a sandwich shop to help finance his tuition at a private, Christian school. Given the opportunity, a lot of other African-American students would vote with their feet, too, and that's bound to make the Democrats nervous.
But when the campaigning gets serious in the Palmetto State, Ms. Clinton, "Barry" Obama (as he was known at Harvard), and the Breck Girl may find themselves confronting an issue they hadn't planned on.
It's called school choice. As Brendan Minitier recently noted at OpinionJournal.com, the issue is gaining traction in South Carolina, and not just among Republicans. State school superintendent Jim Rex--the only Democrat to win state-wide election last fall--has endorsed school choice (but only within the public school system). Meanwhile, the Republican-controlled legislature is considering a bill that would provide tuition tax credits for middle-class parents, and a $4500 scholarship that poor kids could use at any school, public or private. And, a recent school choice rally in Columbia attracted several thousand supporters. One of the legislators who organized buses for rally participants was Democratic State Representative Curtis Brantley, an African-
American from Jasper County who (coincidentally) is a former educator.
School choice isn't law (yet) in South Carolina, but as Mr. Miniter observes, there is a clear groundswell in that direction. And that means the standard Democratic song-and-dance about preserving our government, err public schools, may not resonate as it once did. Admittedly, the issue probably won't determine the winner of next year's primary, but it will be useful in getting the Democratic candidates on record, and causing them to squirm, if only a bit.
***
Addendum: It would be nice if someone from the press asked Ms. Clinton, Mr. Obama and Mr. Edwards about the story of Rontrell Matthews--the African-American teenager profiled in Minitier's column. The question is simple: what would you do to improve education for young men like Rontrell--other than propping up failing public schools. As you'll discover in Miniter's account, Rontrell realized his old school was substandard, and took a job at a sandwich shop to help finance his tuition at a private, Christian school. Given the opportunity, a lot of other African-American students would vote with their feet, too, and that's bound to make the Democrats nervous.
Panic at the Eye
CBS fires Katie Couric's top producer.
And their solution? Bring in Richard Kaplan, that famous friend-of-Bill (Clinton) who presided over CNN's slide in the late 1990s, and more recently, ran MSNBC. AP television writer David Bauder suggests (charitably) that Kaplan's changes produced a modest ratings increase at the third-place news network, but even with those gains, MSNBC has only a fraction of the audience of Fox News Channel.
The change at CBS comes only one week after NBC sacked the executive producer of their nightly newscast. His sin? Losing the February ratings sweep to ABC. According to Nielsen, NBC Nightly News currently trails ABC's World News by only 200,000 viewers; meanwhile, Katie Couric's broadcast attracts two million fewer viewers than either ABC or NBC. Saying that Kaplan has his work cut out for him would be an understatement.
What Bauder--and the other TV writers--won't say is obvious: bringing in a MSM veteran to run a failing network newscast is the broadcast equivalent of rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic. If history is any indication (and, assuming that ABC and NBC don't do anything stupid), Kaplan will get the axe a couple of years from now, without producing any major changes in the ratings. However, the "early" change of executive producers at CBS suggests that patience with the Couric experiment is running short. Only yesterday, we suggested that Her Perkiness had four-five years to turn things around. Based on today's development--and the ever-dwindling audience for broadcast network news--I'd say that Couric's timeline is now three to four years, and shrinking fast.
And their solution? Bring in Richard Kaplan, that famous friend-of-Bill (Clinton) who presided over CNN's slide in the late 1990s, and more recently, ran MSNBC. AP television writer David Bauder suggests (charitably) that Kaplan's changes produced a modest ratings increase at the third-place news network, but even with those gains, MSNBC has only a fraction of the audience of Fox News Channel.
The change at CBS comes only one week after NBC sacked the executive producer of their nightly newscast. His sin? Losing the February ratings sweep to ABC. According to Nielsen, NBC Nightly News currently trails ABC's World News by only 200,000 viewers; meanwhile, Katie Couric's broadcast attracts two million fewer viewers than either ABC or NBC. Saying that Kaplan has his work cut out for him would be an understatement.
What Bauder--and the other TV writers--won't say is obvious: bringing in a MSM veteran to run a failing network newscast is the broadcast equivalent of rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic. If history is any indication (and, assuming that ABC and NBC don't do anything stupid), Kaplan will get the axe a couple of years from now, without producing any major changes in the ratings. However, the "early" change of executive producers at CBS suggests that patience with the Couric experiment is running short. Only yesterday, we suggested that Her Perkiness had four-five years to turn things around. Based on today's development--and the ever-dwindling audience for broadcast network news--I'd say that Couric's timeline is now three to four years, and shrinking fast.
The Defector
From Newsmax and today's Washington Post, we're learning more about Iranian General Ali Rez Asgari, the former Deputy Defense Minister and Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander who has defected to the west, and is cooperating with intelligence agencies.
In the Post account, reporter Dafna Linzer highlights Asgari's connections to Hizballah, noting that the Iranian general was instrumental in organizing the terrorist group and spent much of the 1980s and 1990s in southern Lebanon, managing Iranian support efforts. Former Israeli intelligence officials indicate that Asgari will be a treasure trove of information on Tehran's ties to the terror organization, and how the group operates:
Former Mossad director Danny Yatom, who is now a member of Israel's parliament, said..."He is very high-caliber... He held a very, very senior position for many long years in Lebanon. He was in effect commander of the Revolutionary Guards" there.
Ram Igra, a former Mossad officer, said Asgari spent much of the 1980s and 1990s overseeing Iran's efforts to support, finance, arm and train Hezbollah. The State Department lists the Shiite Lebanese group as a terrorist organization.
"He lived in Lebanon and, in effect, was the man who built, promoted and founded Hezbollah in those years," Igra told Israeli state radio. "If he has something to give the West, it is in this context of terrorism and Hezbollah's network in Lebanon.
U.S. intelligence officials also indicated that Asgari's debriefing will focus on his knowledge of Hizballah and Iran's support for terrorist organizations. Sources who spoke with the Post suggested that the former IRGC official apparently does not have detailed information on Iran's nuclear program. However, Newsmax's Kenneth Timmerman, an expert on defense and security matters, reports that Asgari was involved in secret nuclear procurement projects and manged three of Iran's missile projects in the mid-1990s.
As for General Asgari's current whereabouts, speculation is varied and vague. The Israeli paper Haaretz suggested that the defector is already in the United States. The Iranians believe he is in Europe, and other sources suggest that he is in Israel, or in an Israeli-controlled safe house in Europe. Tehran is also attempting to depict Asgari as a defector with limited value, a standard tactic in such matters.
But such claims may not be accurate. Newsmax indicates that Asgari was on an official trip from Iran to Syria when he disappeared in early February. After arriving in Damascus (to coordinate a recently-signed arms deal with the Syrians), General Asgari arranged a side-trip to Istanbul, which was also approved by officials in Tehran. Newsmax also suggests that the defection was in the works for some time; Asgari sold his home in Tehran in December, and his family left the country two days after his trip to Damascus. Iranian counter-intelligence missed those obvious indicators, and let the general slip away.
As we noted on Tuesday, Asgari's routing through Istanbul (and subsequent disappearance) was no coincidence. While it is not highly publicized, the Turks and Israelis maintain a close military and security relationship. It would be relatively easy for a Mossad team to operate in Turkey, with Ankara either "blissfully unaware" of the pending defection, or cooperating fully with Tel Aviv. By the time Tehran got wind of what happened, Asgari, his family, and his handlers were long gone.
An Iranian political analyst in Washington observed that it will "take months" for Iran to realize what it lost, referring to the damage control effort that Tehran must conduct. On the other hand, it will take us almost as long to understand what we have gained. As with any informer or defector, the information provided by General Asgari must be carefully checked and vetted against other reports and sources. The odds that Asgari is a double-agent or "plant" are decidely low, but in the spy game, you can never be too careful.
Still, as Ken Timmerman notes, there must be a lot of nervous people in Tehran.
In the Post account, reporter Dafna Linzer highlights Asgari's connections to Hizballah, noting that the Iranian general was instrumental in organizing the terrorist group and spent much of the 1980s and 1990s in southern Lebanon, managing Iranian support efforts. Former Israeli intelligence officials indicate that Asgari will be a treasure trove of information on Tehran's ties to the terror organization, and how the group operates:
Former Mossad director Danny Yatom, who is now a member of Israel's parliament, said..."He is very high-caliber... He held a very, very senior position for many long years in Lebanon. He was in effect commander of the Revolutionary Guards" there.
Ram Igra, a former Mossad officer, said Asgari spent much of the 1980s and 1990s overseeing Iran's efforts to support, finance, arm and train Hezbollah. The State Department lists the Shiite Lebanese group as a terrorist organization.
"He lived in Lebanon and, in effect, was the man who built, promoted and founded Hezbollah in those years," Igra told Israeli state radio. "If he has something to give the West, it is in this context of terrorism and Hezbollah's network in Lebanon.
U.S. intelligence officials also indicated that Asgari's debriefing will focus on his knowledge of Hizballah and Iran's support for terrorist organizations. Sources who spoke with the Post suggested that the former IRGC official apparently does not have detailed information on Iran's nuclear program. However, Newsmax's Kenneth Timmerman, an expert on defense and security matters, reports that Asgari was involved in secret nuclear procurement projects and manged three of Iran's missile projects in the mid-1990s.
As for General Asgari's current whereabouts, speculation is varied and vague. The Israeli paper Haaretz suggested that the defector is already in the United States. The Iranians believe he is in Europe, and other sources suggest that he is in Israel, or in an Israeli-controlled safe house in Europe. Tehran is also attempting to depict Asgari as a defector with limited value, a standard tactic in such matters.
But such claims may not be accurate. Newsmax indicates that Asgari was on an official trip from Iran to Syria when he disappeared in early February. After arriving in Damascus (to coordinate a recently-signed arms deal with the Syrians), General Asgari arranged a side-trip to Istanbul, which was also approved by officials in Tehran. Newsmax also suggests that the defection was in the works for some time; Asgari sold his home in Tehran in December, and his family left the country two days after his trip to Damascus. Iranian counter-intelligence missed those obvious indicators, and let the general slip away.
As we noted on Tuesday, Asgari's routing through Istanbul (and subsequent disappearance) was no coincidence. While it is not highly publicized, the Turks and Israelis maintain a close military and security relationship. It would be relatively easy for a Mossad team to operate in Turkey, with Ankara either "blissfully unaware" of the pending defection, or cooperating fully with Tel Aviv. By the time Tehran got wind of what happened, Asgari, his family, and his handlers were long gone.
An Iranian political analyst in Washington observed that it will "take months" for Iran to realize what it lost, referring to the damage control effort that Tehran must conduct. On the other hand, it will take us almost as long to understand what we have gained. As with any informer or defector, the information provided by General Asgari must be carefully checked and vetted against other reports and sources. The odds that Asgari is a double-agent or "plant" are decidely low, but in the spy game, you can never be too careful.
Still, as Ken Timmerman notes, there must be a lot of nervous people in Tehran.
Wednesday, March 07, 2007
NASA Punts
Shortly after the Lisa Nowak scandal broke, we predicted that the lovelorn astronaut would quietly "resign" from the space program in about three or four months. We also noted that Captain Nowak's departure from the space agency might create something of a problem for the U.S. Navy, which would "regain" administrative control of the senior officer.
In our relentless pursuit of accuracy, we must point out that our timeline for Nowak's departure from NASA was a bit off. The agency today announced that Captain Nowak has been fired from the astronaut corps, effective immediately. NASA officials said that the action did not indicate the agency's belief in Nowak's innoncence or guilt, but reflected the lack of an "administrative system" to handle the allegations against her. Captain Nowak is facing charges of kidnapping and assault (among others), after attacking a woman she viewed as a romantic rival. Nowak's dismissal came barely a month after her arrest--and brief confinement--in Orlando, Florida. So much for quietly easing her out the door.
In justifying its action, NASA notes--correctly--that it technically lacks the authority to punish Nowak, beyond her removal from the astronaut corps. As a career naval officer, Captain Nowak is subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), and apparently, no one at the space agency has UCMJ authority over military personnel serving as astronauts. Until now, there was apparently no need for that sort of mechanism at the agency; thanks to its rigorous screening procedures, NASA assumed that all of its astronauts--including military officers serving in the program--were of the highest ethical and moral character. As far as actually meeting those standards, Nowak and her colleagues were apparently "on their own." This highlights an important lesson for the military (and the agency), as we noted when the scandal first broke:
"...the military (apparently) needs to tighten control of personnel assigned to the astronaut office in Houston. Historically, the military has adopted a "hands off" approach to officers who qualify as astronauts. While serving with NASA, military personnel retain their rank, pay and other benefits, but supervision is minimal, and enforcement of standards is apparently lax. For example, take a look at Nowak's "official" astronaut photograph, linked here. I'm hardly an expert on Navy dress and appearance standards, but Capt Nowak's "spacesuit" hairstyle does not appear to be within military limits. If you're willing to compromise on one of the fundamental standards for any member of the armed services (dress and appearance), you're probably willing to cut corners in other areas, too."
Now, the issue of "what to do" about Captain Nowak is the responsibility of the Florida courts--and the U.S. Navy. It still seems likely that the service (for now) will let the civilian justice system run its course, then determine if additional charges will be filed under the UCMJ. Nowak will almost certainly ask for retirement from active duty (if she hasn't already), but it's unlikely that the Navy will grant that request before she has her day in court. Meanwhile, the service will create some sort of "special assistant" position for her, perhaps at the Naval Air Stations at Kingsville or Corpus Christi, Texas. The job won't involve any real work, but it will keep her out of the public eye, and give her a chance to work with defense attorneys on the Florida case.
Meanwhile, there's the nagging issue of how NASA--and the Navy--will deal with Nowak's former lover, astronaut William Oefelein. A Navy Commander (O-5) and shuttle pilot, Ofelein has told police investigators that he and Nowak had a lengthy affair, but that relationship ended before he started dating Air Force Captain Colleen Shipman--the woman that Nowak attacked in Florida last month. Commander Oefelein is divorced, but Nowak was married at the time of their relationship. Adultery is still a punishable offense under the UCMJ; so is fraternization. As a Captain, Nowak outranked Oefelein. And he, in turn, outranks Shipman, violating the informal "one grade up/one grade down" rule that the military often uses in determining what is (or isn't) fraternization.
True, Commander Oefelein didn't try to attack or kidnap anyone, but he hasn't covered himself in glory in this sordid episode. As of right now, he's still a member of the astronaut corps. We'll see if NASA decides to give him the boot as well. If that happens, the Navy will have another legal (and public relations)debacle on its hands.
In our relentless pursuit of accuracy, we must point out that our timeline for Nowak's departure from NASA was a bit off. The agency today announced that Captain Nowak has been fired from the astronaut corps, effective immediately. NASA officials said that the action did not indicate the agency's belief in Nowak's innoncence or guilt, but reflected the lack of an "administrative system" to handle the allegations against her. Captain Nowak is facing charges of kidnapping and assault (among others), after attacking a woman she viewed as a romantic rival. Nowak's dismissal came barely a month after her arrest--and brief confinement--in Orlando, Florida. So much for quietly easing her out the door.
In justifying its action, NASA notes--correctly--that it technically lacks the authority to punish Nowak, beyond her removal from the astronaut corps. As a career naval officer, Captain Nowak is subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), and apparently, no one at the space agency has UCMJ authority over military personnel serving as astronauts. Until now, there was apparently no need for that sort of mechanism at the agency; thanks to its rigorous screening procedures, NASA assumed that all of its astronauts--including military officers serving in the program--were of the highest ethical and moral character. As far as actually meeting those standards, Nowak and her colleagues were apparently "on their own." This highlights an important lesson for the military (and the agency), as we noted when the scandal first broke:
"...the military (apparently) needs to tighten control of personnel assigned to the astronaut office in Houston. Historically, the military has adopted a "hands off" approach to officers who qualify as astronauts. While serving with NASA, military personnel retain their rank, pay and other benefits, but supervision is minimal, and enforcement of standards is apparently lax. For example, take a look at Nowak's "official" astronaut photograph, linked here. I'm hardly an expert on Navy dress and appearance standards, but Capt Nowak's "spacesuit" hairstyle does not appear to be within military limits. If you're willing to compromise on one of the fundamental standards for any member of the armed services (dress and appearance), you're probably willing to cut corners in other areas, too."
Now, the issue of "what to do" about Captain Nowak is the responsibility of the Florida courts--and the U.S. Navy. It still seems likely that the service (for now) will let the civilian justice system run its course, then determine if additional charges will be filed under the UCMJ. Nowak will almost certainly ask for retirement from active duty (if she hasn't already), but it's unlikely that the Navy will grant that request before she has her day in court. Meanwhile, the service will create some sort of "special assistant" position for her, perhaps at the Naval Air Stations at Kingsville or Corpus Christi, Texas. The job won't involve any real work, but it will keep her out of the public eye, and give her a chance to work with defense attorneys on the Florida case.
Meanwhile, there's the nagging issue of how NASA--and the Navy--will deal with Nowak's former lover, astronaut William Oefelein. A Navy Commander (O-5) and shuttle pilot, Ofelein has told police investigators that he and Nowak had a lengthy affair, but that relationship ended before he started dating Air Force Captain Colleen Shipman--the woman that Nowak attacked in Florida last month. Commander Oefelein is divorced, but Nowak was married at the time of their relationship. Adultery is still a punishable offense under the UCMJ; so is fraternization. As a Captain, Nowak outranked Oefelein. And he, in turn, outranks Shipman, violating the informal "one grade up/one grade down" rule that the military often uses in determining what is (or isn't) fraternization.
True, Commander Oefelein didn't try to attack or kidnap anyone, but he hasn't covered himself in glory in this sordid episode. As of right now, he's still a member of the astronaut corps. We'll see if NASA decides to give him the boot as well. If that happens, the Navy will have another legal (and public relations)debacle on its hands.
Business as Usual in Waziristan
After high-level pressure to crackdown on Taliban and Al Qaida terrorists in its territory, Pakistan responded with last week's arrests of Mullah Obaidullah, the Taliban's former Defense Minister, and two other top commanders.
But, as Bill Roggio reports, the crackdown ended almost as soon as it began. More troubling, it appears as though the "peace accords" in North and South Waziristan will remain in effect, giving the terrorists de facto control of these territories along the Afghan border.
As we've noted before, the future of Afghanistan will be largely determined by what happens in Pakistan's territorial lands, where Al Qaida and the Taliban are rebuilding their support and training structure. Business as usual in Waziristan is bad news for NATO troops across the border, and the Afghan regime they support.
But, as Bill Roggio reports, the crackdown ended almost as soon as it began. More troubling, it appears as though the "peace accords" in North and South Waziristan will remain in effect, giving the terrorists de facto control of these territories along the Afghan border.
As we've noted before, the future of Afghanistan will be largely determined by what happens in Pakistan's territorial lands, where Al Qaida and the Taliban are rebuilding their support and training structure. Business as usual in Waziristan is bad news for NATO troops across the border, and the Afghan regime they support.
The Beauty of a Guaranteed Contract
CBS anchor Couric not worried by poor ratings.
If you believe that, I've got a hot deal for ya on a bridge in Brooklyn.
You'd better believe that CBS News is concerned about the ratings; they're not paying Ms. Couric $15 million a year for ratings lower than those of her "interim anchor" predecessor, Bob Schieffer.
One thing's for sure: the network will not allow Couric to languish in third place for a decade or longer, as it did with Dan Rather. Ms. Perky has no more than five years to turn things around, and the clock is ticking. If she can't get the Evening News out of the ratings cellar, look for CBS to pull the plug around 2010-2011, and announce her "promotion" as a full-time correspondent at 60 Minutes (with a much smaller paycheck, of course).
If you believe that, I've got a hot deal for ya on a bridge in Brooklyn.
You'd better believe that CBS News is concerned about the ratings; they're not paying Ms. Couric $15 million a year for ratings lower than those of her "interim anchor" predecessor, Bob Schieffer.
One thing's for sure: the network will not allow Couric to languish in third place for a decade or longer, as it did with Dan Rather. Ms. Perky has no more than five years to turn things around, and the clock is ticking. If she can't get the Evening News out of the ratings cellar, look for CBS to pull the plug around 2010-2011, and announce her "promotion" as a full-time correspondent at 60 Minutes (with a much smaller paycheck, of course).
About Those Missile Defense Sites
Over the past few months, Russia has mounted a non-stop diplomatic and media offensive against U.S. plans to install ballistic missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic. When Moscow got wind that Washington was negotiating a basing deal with its partners in Prague and Warsaw, Russian diplomats leaned hard on their Polish and Czech counterparts, warning of potential "consequences" if they went along with the plan. With memories of a 50-year Soviet occupation still fresh in their minds, the Czechs and Poles readily agreed to host early warning radars and interceptor missiles on their soil, further infuriating the Russians.
Now, Moscow is again playing the military card, pointing out how easy it would be for Russian bombers to target--and destroy--"lightly defended" BMD complexes in Poland and the Czech Republic. A senior Russian general told the Interfax News Agency that his country's strike aircraft could target and eliminate the missile defense sites.
"Since the components of the anti-missile defence system are weakly protected, all types of our aircraft are capable of using electronic countermeasures against them and physically destroying them," Interfax quoted Lieutenant General Igor Khvorov as saying.
Khvorov also reported that Russia is modernizing its small fleet of TU-160 BLACKJACK bombers, which could be used to attack missile defense installations in eastern Europe. Russia also has a larger number of shorter-range TU-22M BACKFIRE bombers that are also capable of reaching targets in the former Soviet bloc. Khvorov's comments came only a few days after other Russian officials suggested that the BMD deployments could touch off a new arms race in Europe, with possible redeployments of theater-level ballistic missiles that were banned during the 1980s.
As with most military claims out of Russia, there is an element of truth in General Khvorov's remarks. But he also ignores several important considerations--beyond the fact that the proposed BMD deployment is aimed at Tehran, not Moscow. As we've noted before, an early warning radar and a handful of interceptor missiles wouldn't provide much protection against a full-scale Russian missile strike. But placing the BMD sites in eastern Europe does move another NATO trip-wire a bit closer to the Russian border, further reducing Moscow's leverage in the region. And there's the real rub.
Regarding the potential Russian air threat, it's worth noting that their once-massive tactical and long-range aviation arms suffered greatly after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Thousands of older fighters were retired or scrapped; bomber units saw major cutbacks, and aircrew training was reduced across the board. Some of Russia's most capable strike platforms--including the BLACKJACK--barely flew during the 1990s. More recently, Moscow has begun fielding larger numbers of more modern fighters and fighter-bombers (mostly FLANKER variants) and its bomber fleet has achieved some degree of stability, but training hours--in comparison to the U.S. or NATO countries--remain low. That translates into decreased operationaly proficiency, particularly on long-range missions against more modern air defenses.
Make no mistake; Russian fighter or bomber crews would be capable of locating and targeting two relatively large, fixed-site targets in Poland and the Czech Republic. But, given recent weaknesses in training, maintenance and logistical support, the mission described by General Khvorov would be far from a cakewalk.
The reason? Even General Khvorov realizes that additional layers of air and missile defenses can be placed around the complexes in Poland and the Czech Republic. Deploying a few Patriot batteries in those locations would create enormous problems for Russian bomber or fighter-bomber squadrons, and there's no reason that other defensive systems--including the airborne laser (ABL), THAAD, and the AEGIS/SM-2 Block IV--can't be shared with our allies, or positioned in support of BMD complexes in Poland and the Czech Republic. That would provide protection against air and missile attacks, and invite a U.S. response, if the sites were actually attacked.
Moscow also realizies that the "weak" defenses around those bases during construction will likely pale in comparison to those that may be available in a few years. What's more, the Czechs and Poles completely understand that too, another reason that Moscow's bluster isn't having much of an impact in Warsaw and Prague.
Now, Moscow is again playing the military card, pointing out how easy it would be for Russian bombers to target--and destroy--"lightly defended" BMD complexes in Poland and the Czech Republic. A senior Russian general told the Interfax News Agency that his country's strike aircraft could target and eliminate the missile defense sites.
"Since the components of the anti-missile defence system are weakly protected, all types of our aircraft are capable of using electronic countermeasures against them and physically destroying them," Interfax quoted Lieutenant General Igor Khvorov as saying.
Khvorov also reported that Russia is modernizing its small fleet of TU-160 BLACKJACK bombers, which could be used to attack missile defense installations in eastern Europe. Russia also has a larger number of shorter-range TU-22M BACKFIRE bombers that are also capable of reaching targets in the former Soviet bloc. Khvorov's comments came only a few days after other Russian officials suggested that the BMD deployments could touch off a new arms race in Europe, with possible redeployments of theater-level ballistic missiles that were banned during the 1980s.
As with most military claims out of Russia, there is an element of truth in General Khvorov's remarks. But he also ignores several important considerations--beyond the fact that the proposed BMD deployment is aimed at Tehran, not Moscow. As we've noted before, an early warning radar and a handful of interceptor missiles wouldn't provide much protection against a full-scale Russian missile strike. But placing the BMD sites in eastern Europe does move another NATO trip-wire a bit closer to the Russian border, further reducing Moscow's leverage in the region. And there's the real rub.
Regarding the potential Russian air threat, it's worth noting that their once-massive tactical and long-range aviation arms suffered greatly after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Thousands of older fighters were retired or scrapped; bomber units saw major cutbacks, and aircrew training was reduced across the board. Some of Russia's most capable strike platforms--including the BLACKJACK--barely flew during the 1990s. More recently, Moscow has begun fielding larger numbers of more modern fighters and fighter-bombers (mostly FLANKER variants) and its bomber fleet has achieved some degree of stability, but training hours--in comparison to the U.S. or NATO countries--remain low. That translates into decreased operationaly proficiency, particularly on long-range missions against more modern air defenses.
Make no mistake; Russian fighter or bomber crews would be capable of locating and targeting two relatively large, fixed-site targets in Poland and the Czech Republic. But, given recent weaknesses in training, maintenance and logistical support, the mission described by General Khvorov would be far from a cakewalk.
The reason? Even General Khvorov realizes that additional layers of air and missile defenses can be placed around the complexes in Poland and the Czech Republic. Deploying a few Patriot batteries in those locations would create enormous problems for Russian bomber or fighter-bomber squadrons, and there's no reason that other defensive systems--including the airborne laser (ABL), THAAD, and the AEGIS/SM-2 Block IV--can't be shared with our allies, or positioned in support of BMD complexes in Poland and the Czech Republic. That would provide protection against air and missile attacks, and invite a U.S. response, if the sites were actually attacked.
Moscow also realizies that the "weak" defenses around those bases during construction will likely pale in comparison to those that may be available in a few years. What's more, the Czechs and Poles completely understand that too, another reason that Moscow's bluster isn't having much of an impact in Warsaw and Prague.
Tuesday, March 06, 2007
Losing the Information War
Michael Fumento on why he isn't covering the troop surge in Iraq, and why the Army still doesn't understand--or appreciate--citizen journalist embeds.
But public affairs officers still bend over backwards for the MSM types who cover the war from their Baghdad hotels. In fairness, Mr. Fumento points out that some media outlets still send reporters in harm's way to get the story. But, as he noted last year, they appear to be the exception--and not the rule --in Baghdad.
What are they teaching at the Defense Information School these days?
But public affairs officers still bend over backwards for the MSM types who cover the war from their Baghdad hotels. In fairness, Mr. Fumento points out that some media outlets still send reporters in harm's way to get the story. But, as he noted last year, they appear to be the exception--and not the rule --in Baghdad.
What are they teaching at the Defense Information School these days?
The Runaway Jury?
It sounds like something out of a John Grisham novel: a jury appears headed for one verdict, only to stun the court--and the nation--when it reaches the opposite conclusion.
Of course, Grisham's book, The Runaway Jury, was a tale of jury manipulation, intrigue and double-cross in a fictional tobacco litigation case. By comparison, we may never know the machinations that took place during jury deliberations in the Lewis "Scooter" Libby case, which ended today with the panel finding the former Vice-Presidential aide guilty on four of five counts of perjury, lying to federal investigators and obstruction of justice.
History will record that Libby was originally accused of "outing" former CIA officer Valerie Plame. But Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald was unable to indict Libby--or anyone else--on that charge, because Ms. Plame, wife of Bush Administration critic Joe Wilson, was not a covert operative when her identity was revealed to columnist Robert Novak. We subsequently learned that Ms. Plame's affiliation was well known in Washington circles, and discussed by a number of power players, including Richard Armitage. But only Libby was indicted, and on charges relating to those favored prosecutorial catch-alls: perjury, lying under oath, and obstruction. Libby's attorneys blamed his changing story on a faulty memory. Court testimony revealed that other participants in the saga changed their recollections as well, but only Mr. Libby was in the dock.
Regrettably, all of this was lost on the jury, which may be remembered as one of the dimmest in recent federal court history. Only three hours before delivering their verdict, the panel sent a note to the judge, saying (essentially) that they couldn't figure out what Libby was accused of doing. I'm not an attorney, nor have I ever sat on a civilian jury. But I did cover criminal courts as a reporter, and it's not a stretch to say that today's verdict was stunning--not because of the jury's decision, but how they apparently arrived at it. As Fox News judicial analyst Andrew Napolitano noted, the Libby jury, on Day 10 of deliberations, was still asking questions it should have broached on Day One.
During my days as a reporter, I spent enough time in court houses to understand that funny things happen in jury rooms. It's a bit odd--perhaps incredible--to see how a jury can move from an elementary question about the charges to a guilty verdict on four of five counts, in the span of three hours. Perhaps the jurors were simply tired of deliberating. Maybe the foreman finally took charge of the process and convinced the other jurors that Mr. Libby was guilty of whatever he was accused of.
Over at Powerline, John Hinderaker says the handwriting was on the wall when the jury...
"came back with a question about whether the prosecution had to prove that it was "not humanly possible for someone not to recall" in order to prove Libby guilty. That, of course, is not the definition of "reasonable doubt," and the question suggested that a majority of the jury favored conviction, and was trying to overcome the objections of the minority who were applying a strict standard of proof."
Libby's attorneys are expected to appeal the verdict. I wish them well. The sentencing portion of the trial is scheduled for mid-May. I wouldn't be surprised if the judge in the case, Reggie B. Walton, sends Mr. Libby to jail. Meanwhile, former National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, who pleaded guilty to the (arguably) more serious charge of stealing classified documents from the National Archive, was sentenced to community service, a nominal fine, and loss of his security clearance for three years. You may recall that the Bush Justice Department recommended that the judge "go easy" on Mr. Berger. At the very least, they should extend the same courtesy to Scooter Libby.
***
One final thought: after my initial post, I caught one of the jurors on TV, speaking to reporters after the verdict was announced. He claimed the jury felt "sorry" for Mr. Libby, viewing him as a "fall guy" and wondering "where was Karl Rove?" That single soundbite confirms that the jury bought Mr. Fitzgerald's notion about some dark conspiracy to "out" Ms. Plame and discredit administration critics. From that, we can surmise that none of the jurors is eligible for Mensa membership, and Mr. Libby's attorney, Ted Wells, should have solid grounds for a planned appeal. As for why Mr. Rove wasn't indicted, the juror should direct that question to Mr. Fitzgerald, not members of the press.
Of course, Grisham's book, The Runaway Jury, was a tale of jury manipulation, intrigue and double-cross in a fictional tobacco litigation case. By comparison, we may never know the machinations that took place during jury deliberations in the Lewis "Scooter" Libby case, which ended today with the panel finding the former Vice-Presidential aide guilty on four of five counts of perjury, lying to federal investigators and obstruction of justice.
History will record that Libby was originally accused of "outing" former CIA officer Valerie Plame. But Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald was unable to indict Libby--or anyone else--on that charge, because Ms. Plame, wife of Bush Administration critic Joe Wilson, was not a covert operative when her identity was revealed to columnist Robert Novak. We subsequently learned that Ms. Plame's affiliation was well known in Washington circles, and discussed by a number of power players, including Richard Armitage. But only Libby was indicted, and on charges relating to those favored prosecutorial catch-alls: perjury, lying under oath, and obstruction. Libby's attorneys blamed his changing story on a faulty memory. Court testimony revealed that other participants in the saga changed their recollections as well, but only Mr. Libby was in the dock.
Regrettably, all of this was lost on the jury, which may be remembered as one of the dimmest in recent federal court history. Only three hours before delivering their verdict, the panel sent a note to the judge, saying (essentially) that they couldn't figure out what Libby was accused of doing. I'm not an attorney, nor have I ever sat on a civilian jury. But I did cover criminal courts as a reporter, and it's not a stretch to say that today's verdict was stunning--not because of the jury's decision, but how they apparently arrived at it. As Fox News judicial analyst Andrew Napolitano noted, the Libby jury, on Day 10 of deliberations, was still asking questions it should have broached on Day One.
During my days as a reporter, I spent enough time in court houses to understand that funny things happen in jury rooms. It's a bit odd--perhaps incredible--to see how a jury can move from an elementary question about the charges to a guilty verdict on four of five counts, in the span of three hours. Perhaps the jurors were simply tired of deliberating. Maybe the foreman finally took charge of the process and convinced the other jurors that Mr. Libby was guilty of whatever he was accused of.
Over at Powerline, John Hinderaker says the handwriting was on the wall when the jury...
"came back with a question about whether the prosecution had to prove that it was "not humanly possible for someone not to recall" in order to prove Libby guilty. That, of course, is not the definition of "reasonable doubt," and the question suggested that a majority of the jury favored conviction, and was trying to overcome the objections of the minority who were applying a strict standard of proof."
Libby's attorneys are expected to appeal the verdict. I wish them well. The sentencing portion of the trial is scheduled for mid-May. I wouldn't be surprised if the judge in the case, Reggie B. Walton, sends Mr. Libby to jail. Meanwhile, former National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, who pleaded guilty to the (arguably) more serious charge of stealing classified documents from the National Archive, was sentenced to community service, a nominal fine, and loss of his security clearance for three years. You may recall that the Bush Justice Department recommended that the judge "go easy" on Mr. Berger. At the very least, they should extend the same courtesy to Scooter Libby.
***
One final thought: after my initial post, I caught one of the jurors on TV, speaking to reporters after the verdict was announced. He claimed the jury felt "sorry" for Mr. Libby, viewing him as a "fall guy" and wondering "where was Karl Rove?" That single soundbite confirms that the jury bought Mr. Fitzgerald's notion about some dark conspiracy to "out" Ms. Plame and discredit administration critics. From that, we can surmise that none of the jurors is eligible for Mensa membership, and Mr. Libby's attorney, Ted Wells, should have solid grounds for a planned appeal. As for why Mr. Rove wasn't indicted, the juror should direct that question to Mr. Fitzgerald, not members of the press.
Attacking Iran
DefenseNews.com describes what an attack against Iran might look like. The scenario they paint is consistent with past speculation on the topic. A strike against Iran would be a Navy and Air Force show, with the aircraft and surface ships of the 5th fleet taking the lead role.
The story, by Defense News reporter William McMichael, does contain a few minor errors. For example, he notes that the USAF has not deployed its stealth fighters--the F-117 and F-22--to the region, nor the B-2 stealth bomber. In reality, the F-117 and F-22 would be among the last assets to arrive (to avoid tipping our hand prematurely), and the B-2 would probably start the war from its home station (Whiteman AFB, MO), flying on to Deigo Garcia after initial bombing runs over Iran.
McMichael is also a bit off in his characterization of Iran's Air Force, though much of his information comes from noted defense analyst Anthony Cordesman. Tehran actually purchased 60 F-14s from the U.S. during the days of the Shah, but today, the number of flyable Tomcats is probably less than 10. Additionally, there is convincing evidence that the F-14's "big stick," the long-range AIM-54 Phoenix missile, is no longer operational on the Iranian jets. As we reported last year, Tehran was experimenting with I-HAWK surface-to-air (SAM) missiles on their F-14s, in an effort to find a replacement for the Phoenix. There are a number of potential problems with that little science project, and no indication that it has actually been successful. At this point, Iran's remaining F-14s would be nothing more than a minor nuisance to coalition aircraft, and I don't think their AIM-54s would make much "noise" at all.
In fact, Iran's "front line" fighter is still the venerable F-4 Phantom, purchased from the U.S. more than 30 years ago. On most days, Tehran can muster no more than 30 of these jets, armed with older models of the AIM-7 Sparrow (radar-guided missile), and the AIM-9 Sidewinder, an IR missile. McMichael's "experts" are correct in noting that Iranian fighter and air defense crews must rely on a chaotic command-and-control system for guidance, making them easy targets for USAF F-15s and F-22, and Navy F/A-18s.
While Iran does have some newer aircraft in its arsenal (notably, the Russian-built MiG-29), they have suffered from operational and logistical problems, and tactically, they are employed less proficiently than the F-4s and F-14s. As for those Iraqi aircraft that "defected" to Iran in 1991, most are derelicts, or used as decoys. Bottom line: the "real" air threat faced by our forces would consist of roughly two dozen F-4s, 6-8 F-14s, and perhaps a dozen MiG-29s, thrown into combat piecemeal, if they get off the ground at all.
The article is more on track in its characterization of ground-based air defenses, although the only "medium altitude" missile system that causes any real concern is the recently-acquired SA-15. Iran's older SAMs, including the U.S.-built I-HAWK and the Chinese-produced CSA-1 (SA-2) are well known, and we have very effective countermeasures for them. Potential aircraft losses from enemy fighters, SAMs and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) would probably be very low, particularly if SA-15 batteries can be identified and targeted quickly.
The rest of the report is a pretty good read. Obviously, the real question is when the U.S. might pull the trigger on Tehran, and the Defense News story closes with recent reports (from senior U.S. officials) downplaying chances for a conflict with Iran.
Hat tip: The Mudville Gazette.
The story, by Defense News reporter William McMichael, does contain a few minor errors. For example, he notes that the USAF has not deployed its stealth fighters--the F-117 and F-22--to the region, nor the B-2 stealth bomber. In reality, the F-117 and F-22 would be among the last assets to arrive (to avoid tipping our hand prematurely), and the B-2 would probably start the war from its home station (Whiteman AFB, MO), flying on to Deigo Garcia after initial bombing runs over Iran.
McMichael is also a bit off in his characterization of Iran's Air Force, though much of his information comes from noted defense analyst Anthony Cordesman. Tehran actually purchased 60 F-14s from the U.S. during the days of the Shah, but today, the number of flyable Tomcats is probably less than 10. Additionally, there is convincing evidence that the F-14's "big stick," the long-range AIM-54 Phoenix missile, is no longer operational on the Iranian jets. As we reported last year, Tehran was experimenting with I-HAWK surface-to-air (SAM) missiles on their F-14s, in an effort to find a replacement for the Phoenix. There are a number of potential problems with that little science project, and no indication that it has actually been successful. At this point, Iran's remaining F-14s would be nothing more than a minor nuisance to coalition aircraft, and I don't think their AIM-54s would make much "noise" at all.
In fact, Iran's "front line" fighter is still the venerable F-4 Phantom, purchased from the U.S. more than 30 years ago. On most days, Tehran can muster no more than 30 of these jets, armed with older models of the AIM-7 Sparrow (radar-guided missile), and the AIM-9 Sidewinder, an IR missile. McMichael's "experts" are correct in noting that Iranian fighter and air defense crews must rely on a chaotic command-and-control system for guidance, making them easy targets for USAF F-15s and F-22, and Navy F/A-18s.
While Iran does have some newer aircraft in its arsenal (notably, the Russian-built MiG-29), they have suffered from operational and logistical problems, and tactically, they are employed less proficiently than the F-4s and F-14s. As for those Iraqi aircraft that "defected" to Iran in 1991, most are derelicts, or used as decoys. Bottom line: the "real" air threat faced by our forces would consist of roughly two dozen F-4s, 6-8 F-14s, and perhaps a dozen MiG-29s, thrown into combat piecemeal, if they get off the ground at all.
The article is more on track in its characterization of ground-based air defenses, although the only "medium altitude" missile system that causes any real concern is the recently-acquired SA-15. Iran's older SAMs, including the U.S.-built I-HAWK and the Chinese-produced CSA-1 (SA-2) are well known, and we have very effective countermeasures for them. Potential aircraft losses from enemy fighters, SAMs and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) would probably be very low, particularly if SA-15 batteries can be identified and targeted quickly.
The rest of the report is a pretty good read. Obviously, the real question is when the U.S. might pull the trigger on Tehran, and the Defense News story closes with recent reports (from senior U.S. officials) downplaying chances for a conflict with Iran.
Hat tip: The Mudville Gazette.
The General Vanishes
Update/11:12 a.m. PST. Brian Ross of ABC is reporting that General Asghari, along with his family, fled to a "European country," and he is cooperating with the U.S. I'm still betting that he will eventually wind up here, largely for security reasons. It will be very interesting to learn the reasons for his defection, and whether he was a long-term operative for U.S. intelligence. On the plus side, we can glean a lot of valuable information from this former IRGC officer. The downside is the potential loss of an "inside" source, particularly if he was someone who provided information for a period of years, much like Ryszard Jerzy Kukliński, the legendary Polish Army Colonel who was one of our most important spies during the Cold War.
Hat tip: Discarded Lies.
***
From AFP, here's an intriguging story about a senior Iranian general who "disappeared" during a visit to Turkey last month. Turkish police indicate that Ali Reza Asghari went missing three days after he checked into an Istanbul Hotel, and has not been heard from since.
Asghari, who served as Deputy Defense Minister during the "reformist" administration of former President Mohammad Khatami, was also a senior commander in Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), and reportedly has detailed knowledge of that nation's nuclear program, and its ties to Hizballah. Israeli media reports that Asghari previously served as Iran's top liaison with various terrorist groups (including Hizballah), and was in charge of "special" IRGC missions in southern Lebanon in the 1980s.
The general's disappearance has touched off speculation that he has defected to the west, or was abducted by either U.S. or Israeli intelligence agents. That speculation was further fueled by rumors--as yet unsubstantiated--that Asghari disappeared after U.S. troops arrested five Iranian officials in the Iraqi city of Irbil, and accused them of providing support to terrorists targeting American troops. According to one account, information uncovered in the Irbil raid led U.S. agents to Asghari in Turkey.
As for the Israelis, they have their own reasons for going after Asghari. His tenure in southern Lebanon coincided with the disappearance of an Israeli Air Force navigator--Ron Arad--who was shot down in 1986. Some reports suggest that Arad was eventually transferred to the IRGC, and Israel has long maintained that Iran holds the key to determining the airman's fate. Asghari's knowledge of the Arad case, coupled with his access to Iran's nuclear secrets, provide powerful motives for an Israeli abduction.
Of course, rumors about an "abduction" may be nothing more than a cover story for a defection. In most media accounts about his disappearance, Asghari is identified as a "former" IRGC official, suggesting that he had retired from active duty. His close ties to the Khatami regime may have made Asghari suspect in the eyes of the current government, particularly if the general was viewed as a potential spy. Tehran launched a crackdown against spies inside its nuclear program two years ago, believing that some officials were passing information to western intelligence agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency. If Asghari was a spy, the trip to Turkey (and his subsequent disappearance) may have simply been the first steps in a pre-arranged escape plan, arranged by the CIA or the Mossad.
There are other possibilities as well. As a former senior military officer, Asghari likely had a hand in planning and coordinating periodic crack-downs against ethnic Kurds in northwestern Iran and southeastern Turkey, making him a target for abduction and murder by Kurdish militants. There's also the chance that Iranian agents, believing that the general was a spy or about to defect, followed Asghari to Turkey and killed him, using speculation about a U.S. or Israeli abduction to cover their tracks.
At this point, my first hunch leans toward the defection scenario. If a Kurdish group assassinated Asghari, there likely would have been some sort of public claim, along with the dumping of his body to confirm the hit. By comparison, Asghari's "vanishing act" in Istanbul suggests someone who wanted to disappear, and probably had some help in the process.
And it's no coincidence that Asghari disappeared in Turkey. Both the U.S. and Israel have strong military and security ties to Ankara, making it easier for a CIA or Mossad team to mount a defection (or abduction) operation, with cooperation--or at least a blind eye--from Turkish authorities. Judging from the tone of the AFP report, it sounds like Ankara isn't overly concerned about Asghari's disappearance, suggesting that it probably knows more about the situation than it's willing to disclose. If I had to guess, I'd say that Asghari is currently in a safe house in the U.S. or Israel, and being debriefed by a hand-picked team of intelligence agents.
***
ADDENDUM: The linked report says that Tehran is sending a team of diplomats to conduct a search for the missing general. That means the initial effort (led by Iranian intelligence operatives), failed. The diplomats will try to lean on Ankara for more information, while the Turks will smile politely and pledge their "full cooperation." However, the odds are low that the diplomats will glean any significant information. Tehran understands that Asghari has flown the coop, the trail has grown cold, and the diplomatic trip is little more than a prefunctory, face-saving effort.
Hat tip: Discarded Lies.
***
From AFP, here's an intriguging story about a senior Iranian general who "disappeared" during a visit to Turkey last month. Turkish police indicate that Ali Reza Asghari went missing three days after he checked into an Istanbul Hotel, and has not been heard from since.
Asghari, who served as Deputy Defense Minister during the "reformist" administration of former President Mohammad Khatami, was also a senior commander in Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), and reportedly has detailed knowledge of that nation's nuclear program, and its ties to Hizballah. Israeli media reports that Asghari previously served as Iran's top liaison with various terrorist groups (including Hizballah), and was in charge of "special" IRGC missions in southern Lebanon in the 1980s.
The general's disappearance has touched off speculation that he has defected to the west, or was abducted by either U.S. or Israeli intelligence agents. That speculation was further fueled by rumors--as yet unsubstantiated--that Asghari disappeared after U.S. troops arrested five Iranian officials in the Iraqi city of Irbil, and accused them of providing support to terrorists targeting American troops. According to one account, information uncovered in the Irbil raid led U.S. agents to Asghari in Turkey.
As for the Israelis, they have their own reasons for going after Asghari. His tenure in southern Lebanon coincided with the disappearance of an Israeli Air Force navigator--Ron Arad--who was shot down in 1986. Some reports suggest that Arad was eventually transferred to the IRGC, and Israel has long maintained that Iran holds the key to determining the airman's fate. Asghari's knowledge of the Arad case, coupled with his access to Iran's nuclear secrets, provide powerful motives for an Israeli abduction.
Of course, rumors about an "abduction" may be nothing more than a cover story for a defection. In most media accounts about his disappearance, Asghari is identified as a "former" IRGC official, suggesting that he had retired from active duty. His close ties to the Khatami regime may have made Asghari suspect in the eyes of the current government, particularly if the general was viewed as a potential spy. Tehran launched a crackdown against spies inside its nuclear program two years ago, believing that some officials were passing information to western intelligence agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency. If Asghari was a spy, the trip to Turkey (and his subsequent disappearance) may have simply been the first steps in a pre-arranged escape plan, arranged by the CIA or the Mossad.
There are other possibilities as well. As a former senior military officer, Asghari likely had a hand in planning and coordinating periodic crack-downs against ethnic Kurds in northwestern Iran and southeastern Turkey, making him a target for abduction and murder by Kurdish militants. There's also the chance that Iranian agents, believing that the general was a spy or about to defect, followed Asghari to Turkey and killed him, using speculation about a U.S. or Israeli abduction to cover their tracks.
At this point, my first hunch leans toward the defection scenario. If a Kurdish group assassinated Asghari, there likely would have been some sort of public claim, along with the dumping of his body to confirm the hit. By comparison, Asghari's "vanishing act" in Istanbul suggests someone who wanted to disappear, and probably had some help in the process.
And it's no coincidence that Asghari disappeared in Turkey. Both the U.S. and Israel have strong military and security ties to Ankara, making it easier for a CIA or Mossad team to mount a defection (or abduction) operation, with cooperation--or at least a blind eye--from Turkish authorities. Judging from the tone of the AFP report, it sounds like Ankara isn't overly concerned about Asghari's disappearance, suggesting that it probably knows more about the situation than it's willing to disclose. If I had to guess, I'd say that Asghari is currently in a safe house in the U.S. or Israel, and being debriefed by a hand-picked team of intelligence agents.
***
ADDENDUM: The linked report says that Tehran is sending a team of diplomats to conduct a search for the missing general. That means the initial effort (led by Iranian intelligence operatives), failed. The diplomats will try to lean on Ankara for more information, while the Turks will smile politely and pledge their "full cooperation." However, the odds are low that the diplomats will glean any significant information. Tehran understands that Asghari has flown the coop, the trail has grown cold, and the diplomatic trip is little more than a prefunctory, face-saving effort.
Monday, March 05, 2007
A Tale of Two Cities
Enterprise, Alabama has begun burying the victims of last week's killer tornado. Funerals were held today for some of the students who died when the storm struck their high school, and more services will follow in the coming days.
Yet, despite the community's anguish, Enterprise is already on the road to recovery. And, more remarkably, the town is coming back without waiting for the federal government to ride to the rescue. Yes, FEMA is in Enterprise, coordinating relief efforts and taking applications for government assistance. But much of the real work is being done by local residents and people from nearby communities, lending a hand to their neighbors in need.
This column, by Chrissy Littledale of the Pensacola (FL) News-Journal, nicely captures the spirit of Enterprise, and those offering support to the storm victims.
Meanwhile, back in New Orleans, a security guard was murdered early today, at a FEMA-operated trailer park for victims of Hurricane Katrina. The killing was the city's 32nd homicide so far this year. Posters at the NOLA.com "Crime and Safety" message board expressed little surprise over the murder, claiming that the New Orleans Police Department has not conducted sweeps of the park to pick up known criminals. And, if that weren't enough, residents of another FEMA park in nearby Hammond, were ordered to vacate that location over the weekend, due to health and safety concerns.
Make no mistake; the amount of destruction in Enterprise pales in comparison to southeast Louisiana. By one account, the Enterprise tornado left a track about eight miles long and about a half-mile wide. Hurricane Katrina devasated thousands of square miles in Louisiana, Mississippi and even Alabama.
But, on the other hand, no one can dispute that Enterprise didn't suffer in last week's storm. In the end, it doesn't really matter if a hurricane or tornado destroyed you home, or snuffed out the life of a family member. The final result is the same; you try to recover, rebuild and move on.
What's the difference between Enterprise and New Orleans? I'd say it could be summed up in one word: attitude. After the tornado, most of the folks in Enterprise rolled up their sleeves and went to work, first focusing their attention on neighbors who had experienced the greatest losses. Almost 18 months after Katrina, some residents of New Orleans are still waiting for the federal government to make it right. They will likely be disappoiinted.
One more thing: the difference between Enterprise and New Orleans isn't race. African-Americans make up about 25% of population in the Alabama town, and the twister's path of destruction cut across both racial and economic lines.
Enterprise will be back. The jury on New Orleans is still out.
Yet, despite the community's anguish, Enterprise is already on the road to recovery. And, more remarkably, the town is coming back without waiting for the federal government to ride to the rescue. Yes, FEMA is in Enterprise, coordinating relief efforts and taking applications for government assistance. But much of the real work is being done by local residents and people from nearby communities, lending a hand to their neighbors in need.
This column, by Chrissy Littledale of the Pensacola (FL) News-Journal, nicely captures the spirit of Enterprise, and those offering support to the storm victims.
Meanwhile, back in New Orleans, a security guard was murdered early today, at a FEMA-operated trailer park for victims of Hurricane Katrina. The killing was the city's 32nd homicide so far this year. Posters at the NOLA.com "Crime and Safety" message board expressed little surprise over the murder, claiming that the New Orleans Police Department has not conducted sweeps of the park to pick up known criminals. And, if that weren't enough, residents of another FEMA park in nearby Hammond, were ordered to vacate that location over the weekend, due to health and safety concerns.
Make no mistake; the amount of destruction in Enterprise pales in comparison to southeast Louisiana. By one account, the Enterprise tornado left a track about eight miles long and about a half-mile wide. Hurricane Katrina devasated thousands of square miles in Louisiana, Mississippi and even Alabama.
But, on the other hand, no one can dispute that Enterprise didn't suffer in last week's storm. In the end, it doesn't really matter if a hurricane or tornado destroyed you home, or snuffed out the life of a family member. The final result is the same; you try to recover, rebuild and move on.
What's the difference between Enterprise and New Orleans? I'd say it could be summed up in one word: attitude. After the tornado, most of the folks in Enterprise rolled up their sleeves and went to work, first focusing their attention on neighbors who had experienced the greatest losses. Almost 18 months after Katrina, some residents of New Orleans are still waiting for the federal government to make it right. They will likely be disappoiinted.
One more thing: the difference between Enterprise and New Orleans isn't race. African-Americans make up about 25% of population in the Alabama town, and the twister's path of destruction cut across both racial and economic lines.
Enterprise will be back. The jury on New Orleans is still out.
Don't Trust--and Verify, Part II
Here's today's reading assignment, courtesy of former U.N. Ambassador John Bolton, writing at OpinionJournal.com.
Ambassador Bolton finds plenty of "politicized intelligence" associated with the recent announcement that North Korea will (supposedly) give up its nuclear program, in exchange for energy and economic assistance from the U.S. Despite assurances from unnamed "senior officials" that we've reached a workable deal with North Korea, Mr. Bolton notes the recent drop in our intelligence community's "confidence level" about the DPRK's uranium enrichment efforts--a critical component of its nuclear efforts. More troubling, the U.S. and its Six Party partners are not demanding aggressive and intrusive verification efforts, to ensure Pyongyang's compliance, realizing that North Korea would never agree to such inspections.
Bolton clearly believes that Kim Jong-il cannot be trusted, and prospects for "fixing" the verification issue in future talks are doomed. We agree with Mr. Bolton, and said similar things about the trustworthiness of North Korea last fall.
Ambassador Bolton finds plenty of "politicized intelligence" associated with the recent announcement that North Korea will (supposedly) give up its nuclear program, in exchange for energy and economic assistance from the U.S. Despite assurances from unnamed "senior officials" that we've reached a workable deal with North Korea, Mr. Bolton notes the recent drop in our intelligence community's "confidence level" about the DPRK's uranium enrichment efforts--a critical component of its nuclear efforts. More troubling, the U.S. and its Six Party partners are not demanding aggressive and intrusive verification efforts, to ensure Pyongyang's compliance, realizing that North Korea would never agree to such inspections.
Bolton clearly believes that Kim Jong-il cannot be trusted, and prospects for "fixing" the verification issue in future talks are doomed. We agree with Mr. Bolton, and said similar things about the trustworthiness of North Korea last fall.
This Should Come as No Surprise
China has announced that its military budget will increase by almost 18% this year, continuing a string of double-digit increases that began more than a decade ago.
Officially, Beijing's military spending will spend $44.94 billion on defense this year, a hike of almost $7 billion over the 2006 defense budget. A spokesman for the PRC legislature defended the increase as "quite modest," compared to the military outlays of the United States, Britain, France and Japan. And, obligingly, the Associated Press notes that the current U.S. defense budget is $523 billion, more than 12 times what Beijing spends.
But, as we've noted before, the figures released by the PRC government never tell the full story. Much of Beijing's defense spending remains hidden, concealed inside various "enterprises" run by the People's Liberation Army, or simply omitted from the "official" budget. A 2006 Heritage Foundation assessment estimates China's "real" defense spending is between $65-90 billion a year, giving the PRC the world's third largest defense budget (after the U.S. and Russia). More importantly, neither Washington nor Moscow has ever sustained the type of budgetary increases generated by Beijing over the past decade.
In a 2002 analysis of the PRC defense budget, the U.S.-China Commission (USSC) estimated that Beijing's actual defense outlays may be two or three times higher than the official claims, thanks (in part) to those creative budgeting and accounting pratices:
"...there is no consensus as to where its ‘hidden resources’ of military financing lie and how large its actual defense spending really is."12 The missing money is either hidden in other budgets or simply not calculated.13 The official budget does not cover several areas, including: indigenously made weapons and equipment production; some Research Development Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) costs; funding the People’s Armed Police (PAP) and reserves; funds for large foreign weapon systems procurement; funds directly allocated to military factories under control of the General Armaments Department (GAD); and foreign military aid."
"...Additional resources are provided to the PLA by state and local jurisdictions through cost-sharing arrangements, by profits generated through PLA-run enterprises not yet divested, from the production and sale of products and services, through funding allocations from other ministries, and from receipts generated by foreign military sales and transfers. As a result, the official budget is vastly understated; the range of annual estimated defense funding runs from $20 billion to $140 billion. The most recent Department of Defense estimate puts the real defense budget at about $65 billion, which is roughly three times the official claims, or just under 5 percent of the GDP." [And remember: this was the estimate for 2002]
And, unlike the U.S. (where roughly half our defense budget goes for personnel compensation and benefits), China can put much of its expenditures into hardware and training:
A different way to assess the size and trends of the military budget is to look at expenditure per soldier. Based upon the $65 billion DOD estimate of China’s military spending and the assumption that PLA downsizing from 2,470,000 to 1,970,000 personnel has been completed, the expenditure per soldier in 2002 would be closer to $33,000. The comparable U.S. and Japan's published expenditures are $213,208 for United States and $192,649 for Japan.20 Based upon the $65 billion defense spending estimate, the optimistic projections of sustained average GDP growth of 8 percent and average annual defense budget increases of 20 percent, spending per soldier in the downsized PLA in 2010 would be a respectable $170,220. It should be noted that these static expenditure comparisons ignore what the money is being spent on, for example, how much is for modernization and buildup and how much it buys in the local economy.
Clearly, how much China spends on defense is open to debate. But one thing is apparent: Beijing is making good on its plans to become a regional and global power, spending the money required to substantially improve its conventional and nuclear forces. And, funded in part by a huge trade surplus with the U.S., China's military build-up will only continue.
Officially, Beijing's military spending will spend $44.94 billion on defense this year, a hike of almost $7 billion over the 2006 defense budget. A spokesman for the PRC legislature defended the increase as "quite modest," compared to the military outlays of the United States, Britain, France and Japan. And, obligingly, the Associated Press notes that the current U.S. defense budget is $523 billion, more than 12 times what Beijing spends.
But, as we've noted before, the figures released by the PRC government never tell the full story. Much of Beijing's defense spending remains hidden, concealed inside various "enterprises" run by the People's Liberation Army, or simply omitted from the "official" budget. A 2006 Heritage Foundation assessment estimates China's "real" defense spending is between $65-90 billion a year, giving the PRC the world's third largest defense budget (after the U.S. and Russia). More importantly, neither Washington nor Moscow has ever sustained the type of budgetary increases generated by Beijing over the past decade.
In a 2002 analysis of the PRC defense budget, the U.S.-China Commission (USSC) estimated that Beijing's actual defense outlays may be two or three times higher than the official claims, thanks (in part) to those creative budgeting and accounting pratices:
"...there is no consensus as to where its ‘hidden resources’ of military financing lie and how large its actual defense spending really is."12 The missing money is either hidden in other budgets or simply not calculated.13 The official budget does not cover several areas, including: indigenously made weapons and equipment production; some Research Development Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) costs; funding the People’s Armed Police (PAP) and reserves; funds for large foreign weapon systems procurement; funds directly allocated to military factories under control of the General Armaments Department (GAD); and foreign military aid."
"...Additional resources are provided to the PLA by state and local jurisdictions through cost-sharing arrangements, by profits generated through PLA-run enterprises not yet divested, from the production and sale of products and services, through funding allocations from other ministries, and from receipts generated by foreign military sales and transfers. As a result, the official budget is vastly understated; the range of annual estimated defense funding runs from $20 billion to $140 billion. The most recent Department of Defense estimate puts the real defense budget at about $65 billion, which is roughly three times the official claims, or just under 5 percent of the GDP." [And remember: this was the estimate for 2002]
And, unlike the U.S. (where roughly half our defense budget goes for personnel compensation and benefits), China can put much of its expenditures into hardware and training:
A different way to assess the size and trends of the military budget is to look at expenditure per soldier. Based upon the $65 billion DOD estimate of China’s military spending and the assumption that PLA downsizing from 2,470,000 to 1,970,000 personnel has been completed, the expenditure per soldier in 2002 would be closer to $33,000. The comparable U.S. and Japan's published expenditures are $213,208 for United States and $192,649 for Japan.20 Based upon the $65 billion defense spending estimate, the optimistic projections of sustained average GDP growth of 8 percent and average annual defense budget increases of 20 percent, spending per soldier in the downsized PLA in 2010 would be a respectable $170,220. It should be noted that these static expenditure comparisons ignore what the money is being spent on, for example, how much is for modernization and buildup and how much it buys in the local economy.
Clearly, how much China spends on defense is open to debate. But one thing is apparent: Beijing is making good on its plans to become a regional and global power, spending the money required to substantially improve its conventional and nuclear forces. And, funded in part by a huge trade surplus with the U.S., China's military build-up will only continue.
So, What's the Story?
Predictably, Congress has jumped into the middle of the growing scandal at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington. At least two Congressional committees will launch hearings into the matter today; one of the panels will actually meet on the grounds at Walter Reed, where wounded veterans in an outpatient facility have endured sub-standard living conditions, and bureaucratic snafus that delayed follow-up treatment, sometimes for months. These problems were highlighted in recent Washington Post reports, and the paper is continuing its investigation into veterans' health care.
In today's installment in their series, Post reporters Dana Priest and Anne Hull highlight problems at other military heath care facilities around the country, including those run by the Veterans Administration. Some of the problems reported at those institutions sound similar to conditions at Walter Reed; over-crowded billeting accomodations for wounded service members; poor living conditions in some barracks or dormitories and mounds of red tape that make it difficult to get needed treatment in a timely manner.
There is one caveat to this most recent Post report--one that the paper doesn't offer. Many of the complaints cited by Priest and Hull were submitted to the paper by e-mail, or culled from on-line military and veterans' forums. While I have no reason to dobut the validity of these claims, there is no indication that anyone from the Post has actually visited the military hospitals at Ft Knox and Ft Campbell in Kentucky; Ft Dix, New Jersey, and Fort Irwin, California--all run by the U.S. Army.
Anyone see a pattern here? Army health care is suffering for various reasons, including chronic under-funding in the 1990s. As the service reduced the number of soldiers on active duty, it made corresponding cuts in its military heath-care system, with little regard for future conflicts and potential casualties. If the first Gulf War was a template, then much of the heavy lifting would be done by airpower, with ground forces waging a short, decisive land campaign after the air component finished its job. Under that sceanario, casualties among ground forces would be limited and relatively light, allowing the Army to downsize its medical system.
At the same time, advances in military medicine were dramatically improving survival prospects for troops wounded on the battlefield. Injuries that proved fatal in the past were now survivable, thanks to improvements in trauma care and the perfection of a medevac system that delivers wounded soldiers to field hospitals within minutes, and to major military medical centers in Germany or the U.S. within 24 hours of the incident. With more troops surviving their wounds, that created the potential for larger numbers of service personnel requiring months of outpatient care and rehabilitation, but that scenario was not reflected in Army budgets or programming priorities. Extended occupations of hostile areas--with significant casualties--were simply not factored in recent Army and Pentagon budgets.
And the blame doesn't end with the Army. During the Vietnam War, there was a major expansion of the military health care system and VA facilities, to accomodate large numbers of wounded from those conflicts. When I entered the Air Force in the early 1980s, even the smallest base hospitals could accomodate combat casualties, and provide both short and medium-term care. A friend of mine, who worked at an installation hospital in South Carolina, told me that his facility could handle as many as 100 wounded troops, if required, by opening up a vacant wing of the hospital, and squeezing more beds into existing rooms. That may not sound like much, but multiply that capacity by the number of Air Force installations with "small" hospitals, and you'll see that there was a significant "surge" capacity.
So, what happened to those extra beds? Eliminated in budget cuts, beginning in the late 80s and stretching well into the next decade. By that time, "outsourcing" had become the rule of thumb. Military dependents were sent to civilian hospitals (to save money), and many AF hospitals became little more than glorified clinics, performing only minor surgery. Military patients requiring more complex procedures were sent "downtown," or flown to larger military medical facilities.
But the cutbacks weren't limited to the smaller military hospitals. In the early 1990s, I was stationed at Keesler AFB, on the Mississippi Gulf Coast. Keesler is the second-largest hospital in the Air Force; only Wilford Hall Medical Center in San Antonio is larger. But even in that era, Keesler was losing "capacity." A hospital built to handle hundreds of wounded in the Vietnam era could accomodate only a fraction of that 20 years later. I don't have any current statistics for Keesler, or some of the "other" major Air Force hospitals (Wright-Patterson, Andrews, Travis, etc), but it would be interesting to know how the reduction in their "surge" capacity has affected military health care in the GWOT. Again, there was no malicious intent in these reductions; based on the "perceived" threat environment, the military saw a chance to save money, and downsized its health care network.
Today's Post article also lists complaints about the VA medical system, where many wounded vets seek treatment after being discharged. Anyone with even a rudimentary knowledge of the agency and its workings knows that VA health care has been "hard broke" for years. Veterans and retirees with "other" health care options make it a point to avoid the system, whenever possible. Large numbers of Iraq and Afghanistan veterans entering the VA network will only make the situation worse, and certainly, our wounded warriors deserve better than that.
But wait a minute. Not long ago, the VA was being touted as model for the nation, and (potentially) a blueprint for some sort of universal health care system. This article from Time (27 August 2006) touts high-tech advances in the VA's development of computerized medical records and a high-tech system for quickly dispensing prescriptions. That "state-of-the-art" system doesn't exactly square with the complaints listed in the most recent Post article.
So, what's the real story? Behind that dilapadated building and those bureaucratic snafus at Walter Reed, you'll find a military health care system was "downsized" and "outsourced" throughout the 1990s. And, many of the decisions that produced the current scandal at Walter Reed were made before 9-11; for example, the Post barely mentions that the military has been trying to close Walter Reed for years, and consolidate operations at Bethesda Naval Hospital outside Washington--the facility where members of Congress are treated. Walter Reed is slated for closing on the most recent BRAC list, making it a lower priority for funding, despite the influx of wounded from Iraq and Afghanistan.
As for the VA, the system was never as good as Time advertised, but such articles did serve a political purpose, suggesting that government-sponsored health care could be as good, or even better than the private sector. And, it's no coincidence that some of the magazine's favorite politicians (Hillary Clinton and Barrack Obama come to mind) are pushing national health care in their presidential campaigns. The "real" VA is on display in that annecdote from today's Post story, where staffers argue over who has to bathe a badly wounded soldier from Iraq, and his parents discover that the young man was burned because a nurse left him in a shower too long.
Truth be told, the problems in military health care (and the VA) began long before Dana Priest stumbled into Building 18 at Walter Reed. And, they will continue long after the Congressional hearings end, and the Post moves on to its next scandal du jour. The real question is whether the current problems at Walter Reed--and continuing difficulties in the VA network--will be enough to prompt genuine change, and introduce market-oriented solutions into the system. The military clearly needs to develop a mechanism for increasing its surge capacity, perhaps leasing space at underused civilian facilities, or (borrowing a page from the Civil Reserve Air Fleet), paying part of the costs for building local hospitals, in exchange for access to those institutions, as needs warrant. Or, the answer might be as simply as reopening some of those smaller, near-dormant base hospitals, and utilizing them to care for wounded warriors.
As for the VA, I think Congress had the right idea in the early 90s, when key members advocated scrapping the system altogether, and starting anew. Contrary to what the folks at Time might think, the VA health care network remains woefully inefficient, and it's hardly a model for the nation. If anything good comes out of the Walter Reed scandal--other than improving care and accomodations for wounded troops--it will be the needed "debunking" of recent myths involving the VA and the supposed quality of its care.
If the Post is genuinely serious about this issue--and I have my doubts--they need to dig much deeper on this issue, and examine the underlying causes. The Post editorial board and a Democratic Congress will be tempted to dump this scandal at the feet of the Bush Administration--and they are not without blame. But some of the decisions that led to the problems at Walter Reed (and within the VA) were made years ago, and those retired officials and generals need to held accountable, too.
***
On one of those talking head shows over the weekend, retired Army Major General Bob Scales said the scandal at Walter Reed was evidence of a service that was "underfunded" for the past decade. General Scales is right--to a point. Certainly, the Army didn't fare as well in the budget wars as the Air Force or the Navy. Still, the service was the master of the resources it received, and somewhere in the chain, the Army brass decided to save money in its health care system, leading to some of the conditions on display at Walter Reed. Unfortunately, Scales' comments are merely the latest variation on the theme that "Don Rumsfeld screwed the Army." I reality, the service did a pretty fair job of screwing itself, pouring billions into weapons systems that were later scrapped (Comanche helicopter, the Crusader self-propelled howitzer), while pinching pennies in other areas, including health care.
In today's installment in their series, Post reporters Dana Priest and Anne Hull highlight problems at other military heath care facilities around the country, including those run by the Veterans Administration. Some of the problems reported at those institutions sound similar to conditions at Walter Reed; over-crowded billeting accomodations for wounded service members; poor living conditions in some barracks or dormitories and mounds of red tape that make it difficult to get needed treatment in a timely manner.
There is one caveat to this most recent Post report--one that the paper doesn't offer. Many of the complaints cited by Priest and Hull were submitted to the paper by e-mail, or culled from on-line military and veterans' forums. While I have no reason to dobut the validity of these claims, there is no indication that anyone from the Post has actually visited the military hospitals at Ft Knox and Ft Campbell in Kentucky; Ft Dix, New Jersey, and Fort Irwin, California--all run by the U.S. Army.
Anyone see a pattern here? Army health care is suffering for various reasons, including chronic under-funding in the 1990s. As the service reduced the number of soldiers on active duty, it made corresponding cuts in its military heath-care system, with little regard for future conflicts and potential casualties. If the first Gulf War was a template, then much of the heavy lifting would be done by airpower, with ground forces waging a short, decisive land campaign after the air component finished its job. Under that sceanario, casualties among ground forces would be limited and relatively light, allowing the Army to downsize its medical system.
At the same time, advances in military medicine were dramatically improving survival prospects for troops wounded on the battlefield. Injuries that proved fatal in the past were now survivable, thanks to improvements in trauma care and the perfection of a medevac system that delivers wounded soldiers to field hospitals within minutes, and to major military medical centers in Germany or the U.S. within 24 hours of the incident. With more troops surviving their wounds, that created the potential for larger numbers of service personnel requiring months of outpatient care and rehabilitation, but that scenario was not reflected in Army budgets or programming priorities. Extended occupations of hostile areas--with significant casualties--were simply not factored in recent Army and Pentagon budgets.
And the blame doesn't end with the Army. During the Vietnam War, there was a major expansion of the military health care system and VA facilities, to accomodate large numbers of wounded from those conflicts. When I entered the Air Force in the early 1980s, even the smallest base hospitals could accomodate combat casualties, and provide both short and medium-term care. A friend of mine, who worked at an installation hospital in South Carolina, told me that his facility could handle as many as 100 wounded troops, if required, by opening up a vacant wing of the hospital, and squeezing more beds into existing rooms. That may not sound like much, but multiply that capacity by the number of Air Force installations with "small" hospitals, and you'll see that there was a significant "surge" capacity.
So, what happened to those extra beds? Eliminated in budget cuts, beginning in the late 80s and stretching well into the next decade. By that time, "outsourcing" had become the rule of thumb. Military dependents were sent to civilian hospitals (to save money), and many AF hospitals became little more than glorified clinics, performing only minor surgery. Military patients requiring more complex procedures were sent "downtown," or flown to larger military medical facilities.
But the cutbacks weren't limited to the smaller military hospitals. In the early 1990s, I was stationed at Keesler AFB, on the Mississippi Gulf Coast. Keesler is the second-largest hospital in the Air Force; only Wilford Hall Medical Center in San Antonio is larger. But even in that era, Keesler was losing "capacity." A hospital built to handle hundreds of wounded in the Vietnam era could accomodate only a fraction of that 20 years later. I don't have any current statistics for Keesler, or some of the "other" major Air Force hospitals (Wright-Patterson, Andrews, Travis, etc), but it would be interesting to know how the reduction in their "surge" capacity has affected military health care in the GWOT. Again, there was no malicious intent in these reductions; based on the "perceived" threat environment, the military saw a chance to save money, and downsized its health care network.
Today's Post article also lists complaints about the VA medical system, where many wounded vets seek treatment after being discharged. Anyone with even a rudimentary knowledge of the agency and its workings knows that VA health care has been "hard broke" for years. Veterans and retirees with "other" health care options make it a point to avoid the system, whenever possible. Large numbers of Iraq and Afghanistan veterans entering the VA network will only make the situation worse, and certainly, our wounded warriors deserve better than that.
But wait a minute. Not long ago, the VA was being touted as model for the nation, and (potentially) a blueprint for some sort of universal health care system. This article from Time (27 August 2006) touts high-tech advances in the VA's development of computerized medical records and a high-tech system for quickly dispensing prescriptions. That "state-of-the-art" system doesn't exactly square with the complaints listed in the most recent Post article.
So, what's the real story? Behind that dilapadated building and those bureaucratic snafus at Walter Reed, you'll find a military health care system was "downsized" and "outsourced" throughout the 1990s. And, many of the decisions that produced the current scandal at Walter Reed were made before 9-11; for example, the Post barely mentions that the military has been trying to close Walter Reed for years, and consolidate operations at Bethesda Naval Hospital outside Washington--the facility where members of Congress are treated. Walter Reed is slated for closing on the most recent BRAC list, making it a lower priority for funding, despite the influx of wounded from Iraq and Afghanistan.
As for the VA, the system was never as good as Time advertised, but such articles did serve a political purpose, suggesting that government-sponsored health care could be as good, or even better than the private sector. And, it's no coincidence that some of the magazine's favorite politicians (Hillary Clinton and Barrack Obama come to mind) are pushing national health care in their presidential campaigns. The "real" VA is on display in that annecdote from today's Post story, where staffers argue over who has to bathe a badly wounded soldier from Iraq, and his parents discover that the young man was burned because a nurse left him in a shower too long.
Truth be told, the problems in military health care (and the VA) began long before Dana Priest stumbled into Building 18 at Walter Reed. And, they will continue long after the Congressional hearings end, and the Post moves on to its next scandal du jour. The real question is whether the current problems at Walter Reed--and continuing difficulties in the VA network--will be enough to prompt genuine change, and introduce market-oriented solutions into the system. The military clearly needs to develop a mechanism for increasing its surge capacity, perhaps leasing space at underused civilian facilities, or (borrowing a page from the Civil Reserve Air Fleet), paying part of the costs for building local hospitals, in exchange for access to those institutions, as needs warrant. Or, the answer might be as simply as reopening some of those smaller, near-dormant base hospitals, and utilizing them to care for wounded warriors.
As for the VA, I think Congress had the right idea in the early 90s, when key members advocated scrapping the system altogether, and starting anew. Contrary to what the folks at Time might think, the VA health care network remains woefully inefficient, and it's hardly a model for the nation. If anything good comes out of the Walter Reed scandal--other than improving care and accomodations for wounded troops--it will be the needed "debunking" of recent myths involving the VA and the supposed quality of its care.
If the Post is genuinely serious about this issue--and I have my doubts--they need to dig much deeper on this issue, and examine the underlying causes. The Post editorial board and a Democratic Congress will be tempted to dump this scandal at the feet of the Bush Administration--and they are not without blame. But some of the decisions that led to the problems at Walter Reed (and within the VA) were made years ago, and those retired officials and generals need to held accountable, too.
***
On one of those talking head shows over the weekend, retired Army Major General Bob Scales said the scandal at Walter Reed was evidence of a service that was "underfunded" for the past decade. General Scales is right--to a point. Certainly, the Army didn't fare as well in the budget wars as the Air Force or the Navy. Still, the service was the master of the resources it received, and somewhere in the chain, the Army brass decided to save money in its health care system, leading to some of the conditions on display at Walter Reed. Unfortunately, Scales' comments are merely the latest variation on the theme that "Don Rumsfeld screwed the Army." I reality, the service did a pretty fair job of screwing itself, pouring billions into weapons systems that were later scrapped (Comanche helicopter, the Crusader self-propelled howitzer), while pinching pennies in other areas, including health care.
Friday, March 02, 2007
Knowing When to Shut Up (and Let the Locals Talk)
Our thoughts and prayers are with the good people of Enterprise, Alabama; Americus, Georgia, and other areas hard-hit by yesterday's tornadoes and severe thunderstorms. As someone who spent most of his adult life in tornado alley, I know what they're going through. My elderly parents barely survived an F3 tornado that pummeled their home town less than a year ago. Their lives were saved by early warning from the National Weather Service and the local media, and by knowing what do do when a tornado threatened their community.
By comparison, it's always a bit interesting to watch the cable channels as they try to cover these destructive storms. Judging from some of the anchor comments I've heard, many of their talking heads (and their producers) know next-to-nothing about tornadoes, and the safety precautions associated with that particular weather threat. Perhaps we should be thankful that twisters don't routinely threaten New York or Los Angeles; I could only imagine the hysteria--and misinformation--associated with that type of coverage.
For example, after we learned that the high school in Enterprise had been hit by the storm, one cable anchor (perhaps on Fox) asked why school wasn't dismissed early, so students could presumably get home before the storm. As it turns out, the school was planning for dismissal when the twister struck, but the idea of relasing students early to dodge a storm threat is usually a bad idea, something than an anchor in New York might not understand. In rural areas--like Enterprise--most kids travel to and from school in buses or their family automobile. Leaving school to avoid a tornado theat, they could actually wind up driving into the path of a storm, particularly on "country" bus routes that take an hour--or longer--to complete.
As a result, many districts have a policy of keeping students at school until the threat has passed. In view of what happened at Enterprise High School, that might not seem like a smart idea, but it's based on sound reasoning and careful analysis of past tornadic events. ONe of the nation's worst tornado disaster involving a school occurred in April 1967, when a twister hit a school in Belvidere, Illinois, as they departed from the day. Thirteen students died, and more than 300 were injured; many of the victims were elementary students, already loaded onto buses in front of the school complex. Had the storm struck a few minutes earlier (while the students were still inside the building), the number of dead and injured would have been greatly reduced.
On another network, I heard an anchor ask a meteorologist how long the tornado threat would last. Apparently, she had heard that some people in Enterprise spent a couple of hours in their basement, as multiple severe storms passed through the area. To her credit, the weathercaster pointed out the difference between a tornado watch (conditions are favorable for development) and a tornado warning (a twister has been sighted, or indicated by Doppler Radar; take cover now). Judging from her question, the anchor seemed to suggest that all normal activity stops when a watch is issued, and students should be sent home from school. Again, I'm betting that the newsbabe in question hasn't spent a lot of time in the south or Midwest. Back in the Land of Faulkner (where I still have a home), you learn to keep an eye on the sky until the sirens sound, or your NOAA weather radio goes off. At that point, you follow the safety plan for your particular location.
One final note: as a "reformed" school teacher, I've spent plenty of time crouched in the hallways with my students, because of a tornado threat. Thankfully, my school was never struck, and I can only imagine what the students and teachers in Enterprise experienced yesterday. But, I cannot recall a single instance when school was dismissed early for a tornado or severe thunderstorm threat. Despite the tragedy in Alabama, it normally makes more sense to keep the students and faculty in the school building, rather than taking chances on the road.
But a lot of that "common sense" is lost on media types from the Big Apple. That's why they'd be better off by leaving tornado coverage to the folks who actually know the story--their local affiliates. Just tell your New York anchors to shut up, and plug in to the feed from a local station like WSFA-TV (the NBC station in Montgomery, AL, which was first on scene in Enterprise), or WBRC, the Fox affiliate in Birmingham that provided expert, wall-to-wall coverage of storms in central Alabama. Both FNC and MSNBC did that from time-to-time on Thursday, but the insistence of network anchors to "get a word in" added nothing to the coverage, and actually detracted from the local effort.
***
ADDENDUM: This story (from the U.K. Daily Mail) also hints that school officials screwed up by not dismissing classes early.
"Twister victims were told to stay in school"
But, you'll also note that the article states that weather conditions had grown so bad by 11 a.m. that students could not be sent home early. Based on everything I've read, I think the school officials in Enterprise made a difficult--but correct--call.
BTW, check out the comments threat for the Daily Mail story. A woman from London claims that most U.S. homes are built "out of cardboard" and wonders why the U.S. government allows this practice in 2007 (remember: it's George Bush's fault). Needless to say, her misinformed post attracted a lot of American responses, including many from tornado-prone areas. They set her straight on U.S. home construction, and tornado safety.
By comparison, it's always a bit interesting to watch the cable channels as they try to cover these destructive storms. Judging from some of the anchor comments I've heard, many of their talking heads (and their producers) know next-to-nothing about tornadoes, and the safety precautions associated with that particular weather threat. Perhaps we should be thankful that twisters don't routinely threaten New York or Los Angeles; I could only imagine the hysteria--and misinformation--associated with that type of coverage.
For example, after we learned that the high school in Enterprise had been hit by the storm, one cable anchor (perhaps on Fox) asked why school wasn't dismissed early, so students could presumably get home before the storm. As it turns out, the school was planning for dismissal when the twister struck, but the idea of relasing students early to dodge a storm threat is usually a bad idea, something than an anchor in New York might not understand. In rural areas--like Enterprise--most kids travel to and from school in buses or their family automobile. Leaving school to avoid a tornado theat, they could actually wind up driving into the path of a storm, particularly on "country" bus routes that take an hour--or longer--to complete.
As a result, many districts have a policy of keeping students at school until the threat has passed. In view of what happened at Enterprise High School, that might not seem like a smart idea, but it's based on sound reasoning and careful analysis of past tornadic events. ONe of the nation's worst tornado disaster involving a school occurred in April 1967, when a twister hit a school in Belvidere, Illinois, as they departed from the day. Thirteen students died, and more than 300 were injured; many of the victims were elementary students, already loaded onto buses in front of the school complex. Had the storm struck a few minutes earlier (while the students were still inside the building), the number of dead and injured would have been greatly reduced.
On another network, I heard an anchor ask a meteorologist how long the tornado threat would last. Apparently, she had heard that some people in Enterprise spent a couple of hours in their basement, as multiple severe storms passed through the area. To her credit, the weathercaster pointed out the difference between a tornado watch (conditions are favorable for development) and a tornado warning (a twister has been sighted, or indicated by Doppler Radar; take cover now). Judging from her question, the anchor seemed to suggest that all normal activity stops when a watch is issued, and students should be sent home from school. Again, I'm betting that the newsbabe in question hasn't spent a lot of time in the south or Midwest. Back in the Land of Faulkner (where I still have a home), you learn to keep an eye on the sky until the sirens sound, or your NOAA weather radio goes off. At that point, you follow the safety plan for your particular location.
One final note: as a "reformed" school teacher, I've spent plenty of time crouched in the hallways with my students, because of a tornado threat. Thankfully, my school was never struck, and I can only imagine what the students and teachers in Enterprise experienced yesterday. But, I cannot recall a single instance when school was dismissed early for a tornado or severe thunderstorm threat. Despite the tragedy in Alabama, it normally makes more sense to keep the students and faculty in the school building, rather than taking chances on the road.
But a lot of that "common sense" is lost on media types from the Big Apple. That's why they'd be better off by leaving tornado coverage to the folks who actually know the story--their local affiliates. Just tell your New York anchors to shut up, and plug in to the feed from a local station like WSFA-TV (the NBC station in Montgomery, AL, which was first on scene in Enterprise), or WBRC, the Fox affiliate in Birmingham that provided expert, wall-to-wall coverage of storms in central Alabama. Both FNC and MSNBC did that from time-to-time on Thursday, but the insistence of network anchors to "get a word in" added nothing to the coverage, and actually detracted from the local effort.
***
ADDENDUM: This story (from the U.K. Daily Mail) also hints that school officials screwed up by not dismissing classes early.
"Twister victims were told to stay in school"
But, you'll also note that the article states that weather conditions had grown so bad by 11 a.m. that students could not be sent home early. Based on everything I've read, I think the school officials in Enterprise made a difficult--but correct--call.
BTW, check out the comments threat for the Daily Mail story. A woman from London claims that most U.S. homes are built "out of cardboard" and wonders why the U.S. government allows this practice in 2007 (remember: it's George Bush's fault). Needless to say, her misinformed post attracted a lot of American responses, including many from tornado-prone areas. They set her straight on U.S. home construction, and tornado safety.
Fixing Walter Reed
The Commander of Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, Major General George Weightman, was fired yesterday, after the Army said it had lost confidence in his ability to lead, following disclosures about sub-standard living conditions for wounded service members receiving out-patient care at the facility. Weightman's dismissal came less than two weeks after the Washington Post published a two-part series on squalid living conditions for some soldiers at Walter Reed, and bureaucratic nightmares that prevented others from getting the care they need.
But was it fair to get rid of Weightman, a West Point graduate and career Army physician who took over the top post at Walter Reed only six months ago? Many of the soldiers and officials contacted by the Post say that the problems at the hospital began well before Weightman assumed command. That may be one reason that the Army has named Weightman's predecessor, Army Lieutenant General Kevin Kiley, as acting commander of Walter Reed, with a mandate to fix the difficulties ASAP. There is considerable evidence that Kiley has been aware of problems at Walter Reed for years, and is being given one last chance to correct the situation.
Was General Weightman a scapegoat for facility problems and management issues that began before his watch? The answer to that question is probably a qualified "yes," with the understanding that (a) if serious problems are discovered during your tenure, the guy with the stars is the first to get the axe, and (b) General Weightman, despite his considerable skills as a physician and administrator, appeared to be either blind or tone-deaf during his last tour at Walter Reed. Decrepit living conditions at Building 18 apparently did not improve during his tenure; bureuacratic snafus remained a serious problem, and (apparently, unknown to him) there were WaPo reporters hanging out at the facility, gathering information for their expose.
From what I've gathered, General Weightman was either unaware of these issues, or unable to demonstrate progress toward their resolution, so in that regard, his dismissal was warranted. I would also argue that Kiley probably deserved to get the boot as well, but Defense Secretary Robert Gates has decided to keep the Army Surgeon General on the job, at least for now. Kiley will likely be remembered as the only top doctor in the service's history whose job performance --and continuation as surgeon general--was based on his ability to fix specific problems at a single military hospital. And, I'm guessing if the situation at Walter Reed doesn't improve significantly in the next six months, General Kiley may find himself in an earlier-than-planned retirement.
But the problems at Walter Reed don't end with the General Weightman or General Kiley. Based on my reading of the Post series, I get the impression that both were served by a woefully inefficient staff, unable to deal with festering problems, or (as required) elevate them to command level and demand proper resolution. In one example cited by the Post, a staffer received money to order recreational equipment for patients in Building 18, but that request was delayed by an administrator who feared the order would trigger an audit. When the request was finally approved by the admininistrator, the money was no longer available, and the process had to start all over again.
There also appears to have been a lack of initiative and creativity among the hosptial staff. The Post reports that some patients had been moved to off-base hotels and apartments, to ease over-crowding. If conditions in Building 18 were that bad, why not shut the building down, and put everyone capable of residing off-post in contract quarters, with the necessary transportation, logistical and support services needed to support patients at those locations. Yes, it's a more expensive approach, but it would have saved the Army from a major public relations debacle, and allowed faster repairs to Building 18.
Then, there's the idea of using self-help and GI labor to complete some of the repairs. Somewhere out there in the vast expanses of the DoD, you'll find an Air Force Prime BEEF or Navy Seabee unit that could do most of the work, in minimal time, with the necessary planning and coordination. And, if contractng rules prohibit the use of military engineering units, then the Army has to find some way to fast-track a rehab of Building 18, while arranging long-term off-base quarters and support services for patients. Given the high-level interest in conditions at Walter Reed, it should not be difficult to accomplish. This is not rocket science, folks; it's the type of planning and execution effort that any competent military organization should be able to pull off with ease. We'll soon find out if the staff at Walter Reed is up to the task.
I will agree with General Weightman on one point. The Post's recent series on the hospital was unfair in the sense that it focused solely on problems in Building 18 and the out-patient care program. The world-class. life-saving care delivered by the medical center's doctors was largely ignored by the paper; in one section, the reporters actually contrasted the "spit-and-polish" amputee section (Ward #57), with the relative squalor of Building 18. Could the series have been a bit more balanced? Perhaps. But there have been plenty of articles about the miraculous combat medical system that has saved countless lives in Iraq and Afghanistan. Soldiers who survived because of that care deserve better than Building 18, and a system that often "forgets" them during long-term follow-up services.
The Post provided a public service by pointing out the problems at Walter Reed; now they owe us a follow-up report on facilities where these issues have (apparently) been resolved. For example, we haven't heard of similar problems at Bethesda Naval Medical Center in D.C.; Brooke Army Medical Center in Texas, or the Air Force's Sprawling Wilford Hall Medical Center in San Antonio. The public has as much right to know what's being done correctly at these (and other) military hospitals, just as they need to know about the difficulties at Walter Reed.
***
Finally, there is one slight irony in this debate over military health care. Not too long ago, liberal politicians were citing the military health system in general (and the VA in particular) as models for a national health care program. Having dealt with military heath care facilities and providers for more than 20 years, I can assure you that the squalor discovered at Walter Reed is--thankfully--rare. On the other hand, the bureaucratic indifference and incompetence is not. And remember: the VA and military health systems deal with a relatively small number of patients. Now, imagine those problems writ large, in a nation-wide, single-payer system. I have seen the future of national health care, and believe me, you don't want it.
But was it fair to get rid of Weightman, a West Point graduate and career Army physician who took over the top post at Walter Reed only six months ago? Many of the soldiers and officials contacted by the Post say that the problems at the hospital began well before Weightman assumed command. That may be one reason that the Army has named Weightman's predecessor, Army Lieutenant General Kevin Kiley, as acting commander of Walter Reed, with a mandate to fix the difficulties ASAP. There is considerable evidence that Kiley has been aware of problems at Walter Reed for years, and is being given one last chance to correct the situation.
Was General Weightman a scapegoat for facility problems and management issues that began before his watch? The answer to that question is probably a qualified "yes," with the understanding that (a) if serious problems are discovered during your tenure, the guy with the stars is the first to get the axe, and (b) General Weightman, despite his considerable skills as a physician and administrator, appeared to be either blind or tone-deaf during his last tour at Walter Reed. Decrepit living conditions at Building 18 apparently did not improve during his tenure; bureuacratic snafus remained a serious problem, and (apparently, unknown to him) there were WaPo reporters hanging out at the facility, gathering information for their expose.
From what I've gathered, General Weightman was either unaware of these issues, or unable to demonstrate progress toward their resolution, so in that regard, his dismissal was warranted. I would also argue that Kiley probably deserved to get the boot as well, but Defense Secretary Robert Gates has decided to keep the Army Surgeon General on the job, at least for now. Kiley will likely be remembered as the only top doctor in the service's history whose job performance --and continuation as surgeon general--was based on his ability to fix specific problems at a single military hospital. And, I'm guessing if the situation at Walter Reed doesn't improve significantly in the next six months, General Kiley may find himself in an earlier-than-planned retirement.
But the problems at Walter Reed don't end with the General Weightman or General Kiley. Based on my reading of the Post series, I get the impression that both were served by a woefully inefficient staff, unable to deal with festering problems, or (as required) elevate them to command level and demand proper resolution. In one example cited by the Post, a staffer received money to order recreational equipment for patients in Building 18, but that request was delayed by an administrator who feared the order would trigger an audit. When the request was finally approved by the admininistrator, the money was no longer available, and the process had to start all over again.
There also appears to have been a lack of initiative and creativity among the hosptial staff. The Post reports that some patients had been moved to off-base hotels and apartments, to ease over-crowding. If conditions in Building 18 were that bad, why not shut the building down, and put everyone capable of residing off-post in contract quarters, with the necessary transportation, logistical and support services needed to support patients at those locations. Yes, it's a more expensive approach, but it would have saved the Army from a major public relations debacle, and allowed faster repairs to Building 18.
Then, there's the idea of using self-help and GI labor to complete some of the repairs. Somewhere out there in the vast expanses of the DoD, you'll find an Air Force Prime BEEF or Navy Seabee unit that could do most of the work, in minimal time, with the necessary planning and coordination. And, if contractng rules prohibit the use of military engineering units, then the Army has to find some way to fast-track a rehab of Building 18, while arranging long-term off-base quarters and support services for patients. Given the high-level interest in conditions at Walter Reed, it should not be difficult to accomplish. This is not rocket science, folks; it's the type of planning and execution effort that any competent military organization should be able to pull off with ease. We'll soon find out if the staff at Walter Reed is up to the task.
I will agree with General Weightman on one point. The Post's recent series on the hospital was unfair in the sense that it focused solely on problems in Building 18 and the out-patient care program. The world-class. life-saving care delivered by the medical center's doctors was largely ignored by the paper; in one section, the reporters actually contrasted the "spit-and-polish" amputee section (Ward #57), with the relative squalor of Building 18. Could the series have been a bit more balanced? Perhaps. But there have been plenty of articles about the miraculous combat medical system that has saved countless lives in Iraq and Afghanistan. Soldiers who survived because of that care deserve better than Building 18, and a system that often "forgets" them during long-term follow-up services.
The Post provided a public service by pointing out the problems at Walter Reed; now they owe us a follow-up report on facilities where these issues have (apparently) been resolved. For example, we haven't heard of similar problems at Bethesda Naval Medical Center in D.C.; Brooke Army Medical Center in Texas, or the Air Force's Sprawling Wilford Hall Medical Center in San Antonio. The public has as much right to know what's being done correctly at these (and other) military hospitals, just as they need to know about the difficulties at Walter Reed.
***
Finally, there is one slight irony in this debate over military health care. Not too long ago, liberal politicians were citing the military health system in general (and the VA in particular) as models for a national health care program. Having dealt with military heath care facilities and providers for more than 20 years, I can assure you that the squalor discovered at Walter Reed is--thankfully--rare. On the other hand, the bureaucratic indifference and incompetence is not. And remember: the VA and military health systems deal with a relatively small number of patients. Now, imagine those problems writ large, in a nation-wide, single-payer system. I have seen the future of national health care, and believe me, you don't want it.
Thursday, March 01, 2007
More Trouble on Broadcast Row
...and it couldn't happen to a more deserving bunch of folks.
Top Producer Out at NBC 'Nightly News. Apparently, Mr. Williams is displeased after Charlie Gibson and ABC supplanted him at the top of the ratings heap. Pssst...hate to tell this to you, but your audience is only a fraction of what it was 20 years ago. Most of your viewers abandoned the networks years ago, and more are jumping ship every month. Consider these numbers: NBC Nightly News has lost an average of 570,000 viewers over the last year, but ABC's World News has gained only 60,000. What happened to the "other" 510,000 viewers who used to watch Nightly News? Moved to cable. Or the internet. And they won't be back.
One thing's for sure, those half-million "missing" viewers aren't flocking to the Perky One and the CBS Evening News. Since assuming the anchor chair last September, her audience has lost 120,000 viewers, compared to last year. Ms. Couric's $15 million-a-year paycheck is looking like a really smart investment, eh Mr. Moonves?
Top Producer Out at NBC 'Nightly News. Apparently, Mr. Williams is displeased after Charlie Gibson and ABC supplanted him at the top of the ratings heap. Pssst...hate to tell this to you, but your audience is only a fraction of what it was 20 years ago. Most of your viewers abandoned the networks years ago, and more are jumping ship every month. Consider these numbers: NBC Nightly News has lost an average of 570,000 viewers over the last year, but ABC's World News has gained only 60,000. What happened to the "other" 510,000 viewers who used to watch Nightly News? Moved to cable. Or the internet. And they won't be back.
One thing's for sure, those half-million "missing" viewers aren't flocking to the Perky One and the CBS Evening News. Since assuming the anchor chair last September, her audience has lost 120,000 viewers, compared to last year. Ms. Couric's $15 million-a-year paycheck is looking like a really smart investment, eh Mr. Moonves?
From the Newest Member of the CFR
I suppose there were a few snickers when the Council on Foreign Relations recently announced that actress Angelina Jolie had been invited to join that august group. True, Ms. Jolie's formal education ended with high school, and she doesn't have any particular expertise in foreign affairs or military matters, but she is a U.N. Goodwill Ambassador who has worked actively on refugee, adoption and poverty issues. Besides, Ms. Jolie looks great in those tight-fitting slacks and tops she favors during those U.N.-sponsored, photo-op visits to third world locales.
Apparently anxious to prove that her membership in the CFR isn't based on her celebrity, Ms. Jolie penned an op-ed for yesterday's Washington Post, describing the continuing humanitarian crisis in Darfur, and her proposed solution for the problem, which centers on "delivering justice" for the victims of the Jinjaweed militias.
Clearly, the victims of Darfur deserve "justice," and there are many ways of delivering it. But Ms. Jolie seems to pin her hopes on the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague, which recently announced plans to prosecute a former Sudanese official and a Janjaweed leader for "crimes against humanity." It took the court almost two years to bring these charges, and indictments against only two alleged participants--in a conflict with no shortage of killers and conspirators--seems pitiful, to say the least. A couple of show trials may be reassuring to a Hollywood liberal, but it won't provide much relief to the victims of Darfur.
Moreover, Ms. Jolie places undue faith in an organization that many Americans--including President Bush--have rightly opposed. Five years ago, Mr. Bush announced cancellation of the U.S. signature on the ICC implementation treaty, noting that it would interfer with our national soverignity and possibly lead to politically-motivated prosecutions. Genuine concerns that U.S. military personnel could be targeted the ICC prompted Senate passage of special protective legislation in 2002, allowing the president to use "all means necessary" to obtain the release of any U.S. or allied personnel detained by the court.
The wisdom of this measure is illustrated in Italy's continuing attempts to arrest U.S. personnel involved in the 2003 abduction of a radical Egyptian cleric in Milan. While most of the Americans are identified as CIA operatives, at least one is an Air Force officer, a former security forces squadron commander at Aviano AB, Italay, where the cleric was taken--and purportedly tortured--after his abduction. Had the U.S. remained a signatory to the ICC treaty (something Ms. Jolie would likely support), Italy could have simply referred the matter to the court, and those Americans might be in the dock today. And, speaking of "justice," what are the odds that CIA agents and a U.S. military officer could actually receive a fair trial from the ICC?
But Ms. Jolie is either unaware--or unconcerned--about such matters, nor does she express any misgivings about the ICC's "go easy" approach toward the real criminals of Darfur. And that brings us to the "missing" element of the op-ed, namely her refusal (or inability) to consider more viable courses of action in addressing the crisis. Let's begin with the global War on Terrorism. The Janjaweed militias exist (in large part) because the Sudanese government supports them. And the Khartoum regime is also the host of numerous terrorist groups, including various Palestinian factions and Al Qaida. Over the past two years, there have been credible reports of terrorists training with the Sudanese military; one overhead image reportedly showed a driving course for car bombers at an army base near Khartoum. More recently, there has been more additional of Al Qaida providing direct training and support for the killers in Darfur. So, successful prosecution of the war on terror is a key step toward easing the suffering in Darfur.
Toward that over-arching goal, Ms. Jolie (and the other Darfur activists) might also consider the creation of a military force to deal with the Janjaweed, along the lines of the recent, successful operation in Somalia. Hollywood activists have long lobbied for the deployment of U.S. peacekeepers in Darfur, but that's a mission better-suited for a neighboring army and local resistance groups, trained by American special operations forces and backed (as required) by U.S. airpower. That may not square with the "blue helmet" approach favored by limousine liberals, but it would certainly be more effective than another U.N. or OAS-led "peacekeeping" mission--or the transfer of our combat troops from critical missions in Iraq or Afghanistan.
In fairness, I don't believe that Ms. Jolie is insincere in her concern about Darfur and other humanitarian crises. She has paid her own way for various trips to visit refugee camps, and she adopted a young Cambodian boy before that became fashionable among the entertainment elites. But, given her supposed credibility in foreign affairs (as conferred by the CFR invitation), Ms. Jolie impresses me as an uninformed and unserious observer of the world scene. Suggesting that the ICC represents a key element in ending the atrocities in Darfur is nothing short of myopic--the very type of solution you'd expect to hear at a Hollywood cocktail party.
Had that op-ed come from anyone else (say, a student at the National War College), it would have never been published in the Washington Post, or anywhere else. But, because it was written by a movie star, the article gained a prominent spot in the paper's opinion section. Never mind that her "proposal" is naive, even ludicrous. Running a piece by A Hollywood Star is a good way to spice up an otherwise staid op-ed section. Ditto for those symposia at the CFR.
Apparently anxious to prove that her membership in the CFR isn't based on her celebrity, Ms. Jolie penned an op-ed for yesterday's Washington Post, describing the continuing humanitarian crisis in Darfur, and her proposed solution for the problem, which centers on "delivering justice" for the victims of the Jinjaweed militias.
Clearly, the victims of Darfur deserve "justice," and there are many ways of delivering it. But Ms. Jolie seems to pin her hopes on the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague, which recently announced plans to prosecute a former Sudanese official and a Janjaweed leader for "crimes against humanity." It took the court almost two years to bring these charges, and indictments against only two alleged participants--in a conflict with no shortage of killers and conspirators--seems pitiful, to say the least. A couple of show trials may be reassuring to a Hollywood liberal, but it won't provide much relief to the victims of Darfur.
Moreover, Ms. Jolie places undue faith in an organization that many Americans--including President Bush--have rightly opposed. Five years ago, Mr. Bush announced cancellation of the U.S. signature on the ICC implementation treaty, noting that it would interfer with our national soverignity and possibly lead to politically-motivated prosecutions. Genuine concerns that U.S. military personnel could be targeted the ICC prompted Senate passage of special protective legislation in 2002, allowing the president to use "all means necessary" to obtain the release of any U.S. or allied personnel detained by the court.
The wisdom of this measure is illustrated in Italy's continuing attempts to arrest U.S. personnel involved in the 2003 abduction of a radical Egyptian cleric in Milan. While most of the Americans are identified as CIA operatives, at least one is an Air Force officer, a former security forces squadron commander at Aviano AB, Italay, where the cleric was taken--and purportedly tortured--after his abduction. Had the U.S. remained a signatory to the ICC treaty (something Ms. Jolie would likely support), Italy could have simply referred the matter to the court, and those Americans might be in the dock today. And, speaking of "justice," what are the odds that CIA agents and a U.S. military officer could actually receive a fair trial from the ICC?
But Ms. Jolie is either unaware--or unconcerned--about such matters, nor does she express any misgivings about the ICC's "go easy" approach toward the real criminals of Darfur. And that brings us to the "missing" element of the op-ed, namely her refusal (or inability) to consider more viable courses of action in addressing the crisis. Let's begin with the global War on Terrorism. The Janjaweed militias exist (in large part) because the Sudanese government supports them. And the Khartoum regime is also the host of numerous terrorist groups, including various Palestinian factions and Al Qaida. Over the past two years, there have been credible reports of terrorists training with the Sudanese military; one overhead image reportedly showed a driving course for car bombers at an army base near Khartoum. More recently, there has been more additional of Al Qaida providing direct training and support for the killers in Darfur. So, successful prosecution of the war on terror is a key step toward easing the suffering in Darfur.
Toward that over-arching goal, Ms. Jolie (and the other Darfur activists) might also consider the creation of a military force to deal with the Janjaweed, along the lines of the recent, successful operation in Somalia. Hollywood activists have long lobbied for the deployment of U.S. peacekeepers in Darfur, but that's a mission better-suited for a neighboring army and local resistance groups, trained by American special operations forces and backed (as required) by U.S. airpower. That may not square with the "blue helmet" approach favored by limousine liberals, but it would certainly be more effective than another U.N. or OAS-led "peacekeeping" mission--or the transfer of our combat troops from critical missions in Iraq or Afghanistan.
In fairness, I don't believe that Ms. Jolie is insincere in her concern about Darfur and other humanitarian crises. She has paid her own way for various trips to visit refugee camps, and she adopted a young Cambodian boy before that became fashionable among the entertainment elites. But, given her supposed credibility in foreign affairs (as conferred by the CFR invitation), Ms. Jolie impresses me as an uninformed and unserious observer of the world scene. Suggesting that the ICC represents a key element in ending the atrocities in Darfur is nothing short of myopic--the very type of solution you'd expect to hear at a Hollywood cocktail party.
Had that op-ed come from anyone else (say, a student at the National War College), it would have never been published in the Washington Post, or anywhere else. But, because it was written by a movie star, the article gained a prominent spot in the paper's opinion section. Never mind that her "proposal" is naive, even ludicrous. Running a piece by A Hollywood Star is a good way to spice up an otherwise staid op-ed section. Ditto for those symposia at the CFR.
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