...but the Pentagon has identified China's growing military power as a potential threat to U.S. interests in the Far East, and eventually, the CONUS.
In its annual report to Congress, the DOD said China has "the greatest potential of any nation to compete militarily with the U.S.," although its current power-projection capabilities are limited. The report echoed themes found in last year's study, which warned that Beijing's growing military forces can already alter regional military balances.
Of particular concern is China's build-up opposite Taiwan. According to the report, Beijing has deployed more than 700 short-range missiles opposite the island, giving it the ability to saturate the island's key military and port facilities, hampering the ability of U.S. forces to potentially aid Taiwan. Additionally, China's growing air and naval forces could eventually challenge American control of the seas to the east of Taiwan, further complicating our military operations in the region.
Analysts were also "surprised" by China's growing strategic forces, including recently-deployed mobile ICBMs. Those missiles are designed for more distant targets--including population centers in the western U.S. Beijing is also revamping its military doctrine, to take advantage of new technologies in satellite navigation and precision weapons.
To be sure, China's military still has some significant shortfalls. It's SSBN fleet is microscopic, and its amphibious lift capabilities remain limited. That latter deficiency represents an Achilles heel for the Chinese military machine, limiting its ability to mount an invasion of Taiwan. But, with Beijing's economy roaring along, the cost of building more landing craft and roll-on/roll-off (RoRo) ships can be easily (and eventually) overcome.
The report notes that Beijing has not fully explained the motivation for its continuing military build-up. That must be an input from Foggy Bottom. You don't need a Phd in International Relations to understand that China wants to be the regional hegemon in the Far East, and eventually bring Taiwan back into its fold. To do that, you need a powerful military, able to engage adversaries (read: the U.S.) on equal or near-equal terms. China's continuing military build-up is simply a reflection of those aims.
Tuesday, May 23, 2006
Crossing the Red Line
It received only passing attention in the press, but there are new indications that Iran is rapidly approaching an Israeli "red line" in regards to its nuclear program. For some time, Israeli leaders have stated that there is a point in the nuclear development process that Tehran will not be allowed to pass. Reaching that stage--and attempting to move beyond it--will invite Israeli military action.
Not surprisingly, the Israelis have always been a bit vague as to what constitutes the "red line" and when Tehran will reach that point. This "vagueness" was the product of two factors; first, there was genuine debate within Israeli political, military and intelligence circles as to how far Iran had progressed in its nuclear program. Secondly, the Israelis wanted to avoid tipping its hand to the international community, potentially revealing its level of knowledge about Tehran's nuclear ambitions, and military planning for dealing with the threat.
At this point, potential Israeli military strikes against Iran are just that--a potential threat. But the red line that might prompt such action is coming into focus. In a weekend interview with CNN's Wolf Blitzer, weekend, new Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said the key issue with Iran was not the production of nuclear weapons, but rather the acquisition of the know-how needed to build a bomb:
"This technological threshold is nearer than we anticipated before. This is because they are already engaged very seriously in enrichment," Olmert said. "The technological threshold is very close. It can be measured in months rather than years."
Olmert's comments indicate that his government now defines the red line in terms of the technical ability, and not a finished product. Some Israeli analysts believe that the Iranian program is progressing more rapidly than their U.S. counterparts. One recent CIA estimate said that Tehran may be a decade away from having a nuclear weapon, and would need several years to acquire the necessary knowledge. Israeli estimates suggest a much more compressed timeline, with some speculation that Iran might have its first nuclear device within two years.
The Israeli Prime Minister's warning about Iran came just weeks after his Mossad chief delivered similar, dire predictions in conversations with senior U.S. officials. As we noted at the time, Olmert's decision to send the Mossad director to Washington (in preparation for this week's U.S.-Israeli summit) was designed to not only convey Tel Aviv's concerns, but remind Washington that Israel's patience is not unlimited. Olmert's comments might have also been intended to prod stronger U.S. action against Iran, with a veiled hint that "if you don't do something, we will."
There are obvious risks in this strategy. Deciding when Iran has reached the knowledge threshhold becomes a matter of subjective intelligence analysis, with much greater margin for error. Then, there's the thorny issue of whether military strikes can eliminate enough of Iran's "knowledge base" to create long-term delays in nuclear weapons development. The British tried a similar approach with their massive raid on Germany's ballistic missile center an Peenemunde in 1943. A strike by hundreds of RAF heavy bombers killed scores of German rocket scientists and technicians, but delayed the Nazi V1 and V2 program by only nine months.
More importantly, the knowledge "red line" moves the decision-point for Israeli military action much closer. If Iran is indeed only months away from having the know-how to build a bomb, the Israel may be only weeks away from making its own decision. In his talks with Mr. Olmert, President Bush may find himself in the difficult position of trying to dissuade the Israelis from near-term military action, while making the case for continued diplomatic efforts--efforts that have yet to bear fruit.
Not surprisingly, the Israelis have always been a bit vague as to what constitutes the "red line" and when Tehran will reach that point. This "vagueness" was the product of two factors; first, there was genuine debate within Israeli political, military and intelligence circles as to how far Iran had progressed in its nuclear program. Secondly, the Israelis wanted to avoid tipping its hand to the international community, potentially revealing its level of knowledge about Tehran's nuclear ambitions, and military planning for dealing with the threat.
At this point, potential Israeli military strikes against Iran are just that--a potential threat. But the red line that might prompt such action is coming into focus. In a weekend interview with CNN's Wolf Blitzer, weekend, new Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said the key issue with Iran was not the production of nuclear weapons, but rather the acquisition of the know-how needed to build a bomb:
"This technological threshold is nearer than we anticipated before. This is because they are already engaged very seriously in enrichment," Olmert said. "The technological threshold is very close. It can be measured in months rather than years."
Olmert's comments indicate that his government now defines the red line in terms of the technical ability, and not a finished product. Some Israeli analysts believe that the Iranian program is progressing more rapidly than their U.S. counterparts. One recent CIA estimate said that Tehran may be a decade away from having a nuclear weapon, and would need several years to acquire the necessary knowledge. Israeli estimates suggest a much more compressed timeline, with some speculation that Iran might have its first nuclear device within two years.
The Israeli Prime Minister's warning about Iran came just weeks after his Mossad chief delivered similar, dire predictions in conversations with senior U.S. officials. As we noted at the time, Olmert's decision to send the Mossad director to Washington (in preparation for this week's U.S.-Israeli summit) was designed to not only convey Tel Aviv's concerns, but remind Washington that Israel's patience is not unlimited. Olmert's comments might have also been intended to prod stronger U.S. action against Iran, with a veiled hint that "if you don't do something, we will."
There are obvious risks in this strategy. Deciding when Iran has reached the knowledge threshhold becomes a matter of subjective intelligence analysis, with much greater margin for error. Then, there's the thorny issue of whether military strikes can eliminate enough of Iran's "knowledge base" to create long-term delays in nuclear weapons development. The British tried a similar approach with their massive raid on Germany's ballistic missile center an Peenemunde in 1943. A strike by hundreds of RAF heavy bombers killed scores of German rocket scientists and technicians, but delayed the Nazi V1 and V2 program by only nine months.
More importantly, the knowledge "red line" moves the decision-point for Israeli military action much closer. If Iran is indeed only months away from having the know-how to build a bomb, the Israel may be only weeks away from making its own decision. In his talks with Mr. Olmert, President Bush may find himself in the difficult position of trying to dissuade the Israelis from near-term military action, while making the case for continued diplomatic efforts--efforts that have yet to bear fruit.
Monday, May 22, 2006
Protecting Europe
As predicted in this space several months ago, the U.S. is proposing deployment of ballistic missile defenses in Europe, to protect both our allies (and, eventually) the CONUS from an Iranian missile attack. According to The New York Times, a recommendation on the site is expected to be made by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld later this summer. Eventually, the U.S. hopes to base at least 10 anti-missile interceptors at a European site by 2011. Poland and the Czech Republic are said to be the leading contenders for the anti-missile site, which would cost an estimated $1.6 billion.
Given Iran's growing missile menace, that figure may seem like a bargin, even with possible cost overruns. Iran currently has more than 200 short and medium-range ballistic missiles, capable of reaching targets as far away as Israel. Additionally, Israeli intelligence claims that Tehran recently obtained BM-25 intermediate range missiles from North Korea, athough that report has not been fully confirmed. The BM-25 would allow Iran to strike targets as far away as southern Europe, and (perhaps more importantly), it would require few modifications to carry a nuclear warhead. The BM-25 is based on the Soviet-era SS-N-6 sub-launched ballistic missile, which was designed solely for the purpose of delivering nuclear warheads. With this technological foundation, Iran will be capable of producing missiles that could target all of Europe by the end of this decade, and the CONUS within 10 years.
But deployment of the missile shield in Europe is far from assured. Russia, long concerned about any NATO or U.S. "encroachment" on its western border, is trying to stir up opposition to the plan in Poland. Beyond that, the usual alliance of socialist politicians and "green" political parties in Europe have voiced their opposition as well, intensifying debate over the proposed missile shield. European political leaders, afraid to do anything that might upset anyone, are wringing their hands over this one. Czech leaders, facing a parlimentary election in June, have avoided discussing the matter publicly, hoping it doesn't become a campaign issue. The Poles have seemed more receptive, but a deployment on their soil is far from a done deal, particularly when you factor in U.S. domestic opposition to the plan. If the Democrats regain control of the House and/or Senate this fall, missile defenses in Europe may become a moot point.
While we support the proposed deployment, there's something a little unsettling about the prospect of deploying an anti-missile shield to protect countries (Germany, France) that have done little to help the U.S. in recent years. Admittedly, the missile defenses on the continent will eventually protect the CONUS, but our European "friends" will be the immediate beneficiaries, including those who have pursued an anti-American foreign policies. Unfortunately, our missile defenses are not advanced enough to protect our true friends (Poland, Denmark, the U.K., Slovakia, Bulgaria, etc), while omitting those who have opposed us.
The U.S. has hinted at something of a partnership on this issue, promising that the proposed missile defenses will be consistent and compatible with any anti-missile interceptors developed by the Europeans. Don't hold your breath. European efforts in this area have lagged well behind the U.S., and for obvious reasons. Not only is it politically impossible to develop a European system, there was always the overriding belief that Good Ol' Uncle Sam would eventually step in, and deploy a system. That way, the Europeans can have it both ways: criticize the U.S. for being provactive (in fielding missile defenses on the continent), while, at the same time, reaping the benefits of that deployment. It happened before with the GLCM and Pershing II deployments in the 1980s, and it could well happen again, with the anti-missile base in eastern Europe.
The boys in Paris must be smiling right about now.
Given Iran's growing missile menace, that figure may seem like a bargin, even with possible cost overruns. Iran currently has more than 200 short and medium-range ballistic missiles, capable of reaching targets as far away as Israel. Additionally, Israeli intelligence claims that Tehran recently obtained BM-25 intermediate range missiles from North Korea, athough that report has not been fully confirmed. The BM-25 would allow Iran to strike targets as far away as southern Europe, and (perhaps more importantly), it would require few modifications to carry a nuclear warhead. The BM-25 is based on the Soviet-era SS-N-6 sub-launched ballistic missile, which was designed solely for the purpose of delivering nuclear warheads. With this technological foundation, Iran will be capable of producing missiles that could target all of Europe by the end of this decade, and the CONUS within 10 years.
But deployment of the missile shield in Europe is far from assured. Russia, long concerned about any NATO or U.S. "encroachment" on its western border, is trying to stir up opposition to the plan in Poland. Beyond that, the usual alliance of socialist politicians and "green" political parties in Europe have voiced their opposition as well, intensifying debate over the proposed missile shield. European political leaders, afraid to do anything that might upset anyone, are wringing their hands over this one. Czech leaders, facing a parlimentary election in June, have avoided discussing the matter publicly, hoping it doesn't become a campaign issue. The Poles have seemed more receptive, but a deployment on their soil is far from a done deal, particularly when you factor in U.S. domestic opposition to the plan. If the Democrats regain control of the House and/or Senate this fall, missile defenses in Europe may become a moot point.
While we support the proposed deployment, there's something a little unsettling about the prospect of deploying an anti-missile shield to protect countries (Germany, France) that have done little to help the U.S. in recent years. Admittedly, the missile defenses on the continent will eventually protect the CONUS, but our European "friends" will be the immediate beneficiaries, including those who have pursued an anti-American foreign policies. Unfortunately, our missile defenses are not advanced enough to protect our true friends (Poland, Denmark, the U.K., Slovakia, Bulgaria, etc), while omitting those who have opposed us.
The U.S. has hinted at something of a partnership on this issue, promising that the proposed missile defenses will be consistent and compatible with any anti-missile interceptors developed by the Europeans. Don't hold your breath. European efforts in this area have lagged well behind the U.S., and for obvious reasons. Not only is it politically impossible to develop a European system, there was always the overriding belief that Good Ol' Uncle Sam would eventually step in, and deploy a system. That way, the Europeans can have it both ways: criticize the U.S. for being provactive (in fielding missile defenses on the continent), while, at the same time, reaping the benefits of that deployment. It happened before with the GLCM and Pershing II deployments in the 1980s, and it could well happen again, with the anti-missile base in eastern Europe.
The boys in Paris must be smiling right about now.
Signing Off at CBS
Mike Wallace officially "retired" from 60 Minutes last night, 38 years after he helped inagurate the network news magazine format. Over the decades that followed, Wallace and "60 Minutes" have spawned a legion of imitators, but none have been quite as successful as Don Hewitt's pioneering format, or its legendary senior correspondent.
Appropriately, last night's installment of 60 Minutes was a tribute to Wallace, the first correspondent hired by Hewitt when he launched the show back in 1969. In those days, neither the producer nor Wallace were on the fast-track at CBS. Hewitt--one of the true innovators in television history--had been relegated to the documentary unit, after being dumped as executive producer of the CBS Evening News With Douglas Edwards in the early 1960s.
Wallace's career was also in something of a rut at the time. He lost his job as anchor of the network's morning news program, after it was moved into head-to-head competition with NBC's "Today." Making matters worse, Wallace was still viewed with some degree of suspicion in the House that Murrow Built, thanks to his previous stints as a celebrity talk show host, game show emcee, an appearance on Broadway (in the play Reclining Figure), and a lucrative gig as pitch-man for Parliment cigarettes. After the death of his son Peter in 1962, Wallace decided to devote his life to more serious pursuits, buying out his Parliment contract, and signing on with CBS News. But Wallace was hardly a "star" at the network in the late 1960s, one reason that he was available for the Hewitt's news magazine experiment.
Despite Wallace's presence, the program struggled in its early days, often finishing near the bottom of the ratings. The show didn't crack the Nielsen Top 20 until someone at CBS decided to move 60 Minutes to the 7 p.m. slot on Sunday evenings, immediately after the network's NFL broadcasts. 60 Minutes quickly climbed to the top of the ratings, becoming a showcase for Wallace's "interrogation" style of interviewing. The program also became the biggest cash cow at CBS, generating hundreds of millions of dollars in profits.
In fact, Wallace was considered so instrumental to the program's success--and CBS's bottom line--that the network changed its retirement policy, the same policy that had helped push Walter Cronkite out of the anchor chair in 1981. While Cronkite's Evening News had been #1 in the ratings for more than a decade, it couldn't match the profits generated by 60 Minutes, so Wallace was allowed to remain on the broadcast. Besides, the network had to find a way to keep another 60 Minutes alum (Dan Rather) in the fold, so Cronkite was permitted to retire.
Twenty-five years later, Rather has returned to the broadcast, after leading the Evening News into the ratings cellar, and destroying "60 Minutes II" franchise with his fraudulent "docu-gate" report. However, Rather has been only an occasional contributor to 60 Minutes over the past year or so, and there are no indications that he will assume a more prominent role with Wallace's retirement. The broadcast has plenty of highly-paid correspondents who aren't exactly anxious to share the load with Rather, not to mention the Couric factor. The incoming anchor of the CBS Evening News is also a correspondent for 60 Minutes, so more exposure for "The Dan" would mean fewer stories for the network's 16 million dollar woman.
And that brings us to the latest rumors making the rounds at Black Rock, CBS's corporate headquarters. Dan Rather's current contract with the network expires in August. One version suggests that Rather won't be offered a new deal; in other words, he's out when the contract expires. The other version indicates that CBS is offering a bottom-dollar renewal deal, with no specified duties beyond an occasional piece for 60 Minutes. In broadcast circles, it's the kind of deal you offer in hopes that the performer will refuse and retire, or decline and go somewhere else.
As Mike Wallace completes his victory lamp, it appears that CBS is preparing a different kind of send-off for Dan Rather. Stick a fork in Dan...at CBS, he appears to be done.
Appropriately, last night's installment of 60 Minutes was a tribute to Wallace, the first correspondent hired by Hewitt when he launched the show back in 1969. In those days, neither the producer nor Wallace were on the fast-track at CBS. Hewitt--one of the true innovators in television history--had been relegated to the documentary unit, after being dumped as executive producer of the CBS Evening News With Douglas Edwards in the early 1960s.
Wallace's career was also in something of a rut at the time. He lost his job as anchor of the network's morning news program, after it was moved into head-to-head competition with NBC's "Today." Making matters worse, Wallace was still viewed with some degree of suspicion in the House that Murrow Built, thanks to his previous stints as a celebrity talk show host, game show emcee, an appearance on Broadway (in the play Reclining Figure), and a lucrative gig as pitch-man for Parliment cigarettes. After the death of his son Peter in 1962, Wallace decided to devote his life to more serious pursuits, buying out his Parliment contract, and signing on with CBS News. But Wallace was hardly a "star" at the network in the late 1960s, one reason that he was available for the Hewitt's news magazine experiment.
Despite Wallace's presence, the program struggled in its early days, often finishing near the bottom of the ratings. The show didn't crack the Nielsen Top 20 until someone at CBS decided to move 60 Minutes to the 7 p.m. slot on Sunday evenings, immediately after the network's NFL broadcasts. 60 Minutes quickly climbed to the top of the ratings, becoming a showcase for Wallace's "interrogation" style of interviewing. The program also became the biggest cash cow at CBS, generating hundreds of millions of dollars in profits.
In fact, Wallace was considered so instrumental to the program's success--and CBS's bottom line--that the network changed its retirement policy, the same policy that had helped push Walter Cronkite out of the anchor chair in 1981. While Cronkite's Evening News had been #1 in the ratings for more than a decade, it couldn't match the profits generated by 60 Minutes, so Wallace was allowed to remain on the broadcast. Besides, the network had to find a way to keep another 60 Minutes alum (Dan Rather) in the fold, so Cronkite was permitted to retire.
Twenty-five years later, Rather has returned to the broadcast, after leading the Evening News into the ratings cellar, and destroying "60 Minutes II" franchise with his fraudulent "docu-gate" report. However, Rather has been only an occasional contributor to 60 Minutes over the past year or so, and there are no indications that he will assume a more prominent role with Wallace's retirement. The broadcast has plenty of highly-paid correspondents who aren't exactly anxious to share the load with Rather, not to mention the Couric factor. The incoming anchor of the CBS Evening News is also a correspondent for 60 Minutes, so more exposure for "The Dan" would mean fewer stories for the network's 16 million dollar woman.
And that brings us to the latest rumors making the rounds at Black Rock, CBS's corporate headquarters. Dan Rather's current contract with the network expires in August. One version suggests that Rather won't be offered a new deal; in other words, he's out when the contract expires. The other version indicates that CBS is offering a bottom-dollar renewal deal, with no specified duties beyond an occasional piece for 60 Minutes. In broadcast circles, it's the kind of deal you offer in hopes that the performer will refuse and retire, or decline and go somewhere else.
As Mike Wallace completes his victory lamp, it appears that CBS is preparing a different kind of send-off for Dan Rather. Stick a fork in Dan...at CBS, he appears to be done.
A Shot Across the Bow
The big news on the Sunday talk shows this week came from Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez. Appearing on ABC's "This Week," Mr. Gonzalez opined that journalists can be prosecuted for publishing classified information.
Citing an obligation to protect national security, the Attorney General also stated that the government "would not hesitate" to track phone calls made by reporters as part of a criminal leak investigation. However, Gonzalez said federal officials would not mointor reporters' phone calls on a "routine" or random basis.
In the interview, Gonzalez refused to speculate whether The New York Times should be prosecuted for publishing stories on a previously-undisclosed NSA surveillance program, which tracks suspected terrorist communications between locations in the United States and overseas. The Attorney General also indicated that the government would not randomly check journalists' phone records, in an effort to identify illegal leakers.
Mr. Gonzalez's comments suggest that criminal probes into intelligence leaks (and government personnel who provide that information) is well advanced. You'll note that the AG said that we don't engage "domestic-to-domestic" surveillance without a court order." That tends to reinforce previous speculation--in this blog and other forums--that the current dust-up over media phone records is not a product of the recently-disclosed, NSA data-mining operation, but rather, an indication of on-going criminal investigations.
As we reported previously, the pattern for this sort of probe is well-established. When classified information is leaked to the media, the "originating" agency refers the matter to the Justice Department for investigation. At that point, the agency and the FBI begin a formal inquiry, in an effort to identify the leakers and determine what laws (if any) have been broken. Over a 10-year period, beginning in the mid-1990s, there were more than 600 such referrals from our intelligence agencies to the Justice Department. During that time, there were no major prosecutions (and, as far as I can tell) no dismissals of offending employees.
All that changed when the Bush Administration decided to go after leakers in a serious way, using all the tools at its disposal. Reading between the lines, it appears as though the leak investigation(s) are well-advanced, with federal agents and prosecutors having identified both the culprits and their clients in the press. At this point, many of the dots appear to have been connected; the next step is to build a case against the offending intelligence officers and their friends in the MSM. That reality may be a reason that a government source warned ABC's Brian Ross to "get new cell phones" a couple of weeks ago. Assuming that the feds have obtained a warrant, there is a strong probability that authorities are already wading through mountains of phone records and (possibly) monitoring conversations--gathering evidence that can be presented to a federal grand jury.
Mac Ranger summed it up best: this is going to be a very interesting summer in media and intelligence circles, and the "pucker factor" is extremely high in certain elements of the intel community. Reporters will howl (and there will be a major court battle), but I believe that AG Gonzalez is right: the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to publish all forms of classified information that can jeopardize national security when it enters the public realm. In that sense, Mr. Gonzalez's comments on ABC were a final shot across the bow for the MSM. The next salvo will be fired "for effect," in the form of subpoenas and indictments.
Citing an obligation to protect national security, the Attorney General also stated that the government "would not hesitate" to track phone calls made by reporters as part of a criminal leak investigation. However, Gonzalez said federal officials would not mointor reporters' phone calls on a "routine" or random basis.
In the interview, Gonzalez refused to speculate whether The New York Times should be prosecuted for publishing stories on a previously-undisclosed NSA surveillance program, which tracks suspected terrorist communications between locations in the United States and overseas. The Attorney General also indicated that the government would not randomly check journalists' phone records, in an effort to identify illegal leakers.
Mr. Gonzalez's comments suggest that criminal probes into intelligence leaks (and government personnel who provide that information) is well advanced. You'll note that the AG said that we don't engage "domestic-to-domestic" surveillance without a court order." That tends to reinforce previous speculation--in this blog and other forums--that the current dust-up over media phone records is not a product of the recently-disclosed, NSA data-mining operation, but rather, an indication of on-going criminal investigations.
As we reported previously, the pattern for this sort of probe is well-established. When classified information is leaked to the media, the "originating" agency refers the matter to the Justice Department for investigation. At that point, the agency and the FBI begin a formal inquiry, in an effort to identify the leakers and determine what laws (if any) have been broken. Over a 10-year period, beginning in the mid-1990s, there were more than 600 such referrals from our intelligence agencies to the Justice Department. During that time, there were no major prosecutions (and, as far as I can tell) no dismissals of offending employees.
All that changed when the Bush Administration decided to go after leakers in a serious way, using all the tools at its disposal. Reading between the lines, it appears as though the leak investigation(s) are well-advanced, with federal agents and prosecutors having identified both the culprits and their clients in the press. At this point, many of the dots appear to have been connected; the next step is to build a case against the offending intelligence officers and their friends in the MSM. That reality may be a reason that a government source warned ABC's Brian Ross to "get new cell phones" a couple of weeks ago. Assuming that the feds have obtained a warrant, there is a strong probability that authorities are already wading through mountains of phone records and (possibly) monitoring conversations--gathering evidence that can be presented to a federal grand jury.
Mac Ranger summed it up best: this is going to be a very interesting summer in media and intelligence circles, and the "pucker factor" is extremely high in certain elements of the intel community. Reporters will howl (and there will be a major court battle), but I believe that AG Gonzalez is right: the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to publish all forms of classified information that can jeopardize national security when it enters the public realm. In that sense, Mr. Gonzalez's comments on ABC were a final shot across the bow for the MSM. The next salvo will be fired "for effect," in the form of subpoenas and indictments.
Friday, May 19, 2006
When a Suicide Attempt, Isn't
I've been on something of a rant against the MSM lately. I'd like to move on to other issues, but it's difficult when media outlets keep demonstrating that (a) they don't know what they're talking about, or (b) their leftist agenda colors everything they do, making it virtually impossible for them to get a story straight.
Consider this bit of breaking news from MSNBC. According to the network, there was a small uprising yesterday at the terrorist detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Prisoners wielding fans, light fixtures and other "improvised" weapons attacked guards entering a cell block, as they attempted to prevent a terrorist from committing suicide. It was the fourth reported suicide attempt of the day.
The attacks occurred in a medium-security, communal living section of the prison. When guards spotted a prisoner attempting to hang himself, they entered the cell block and were attacked by other prisoners. A Defense Department spokesman said the detainees tried to prevent guards from rescuing the terrorist who was attempting suicide. Guards were able to quell the disturbance and prevent the prisoner from committing suicide. Prisoners involved in the incident were later moved to a maximum security area of the prison.
The "unwritten" message in this account is that conditions are so harsh at "Club Gitmo" that prisoners are attempting suicide to end their misery. And dutifully, MSNBC provides the number of attempted suicides at the prison since it opened back in 2002. Naturally, there's no frame of reference--for example, how does the number of attempted suicides at Gitmo compare to other correctional facilities, just the suggestion that Gitmo is a hell-hole for detainees.
There's also no speculation as to whether the suicide attempt might have been staged, to lure guards inside for the assault. Maybe I've watched too many prison movies, but it would seem that an attack on that scale--and using the types of "weapons" cited--would require some degree of advanced planning and preparation.
To their credit, the folks at MSNBC do manage to stumble across a more likely explanation for the uprising, and Thursday's "rash" of suicide attempts. Seems that these events occurred on a day when a number of Saudi prisoners were remanded to their home country. That transfer, coupled with reports that Gitmo may be closing soon, probably had the terrorists sufficiently agitated to try something--anything--to delay a return to the harsh confines of a "real" Middle East prison. The terrorists at Gitmo understand that if the facility there actually shuts down, many of them will face their own "homecomings," and an uncertain future at the hands of their countrymen.
Thursday's uprising at Guantanamo Bay was probably motivated by three major goals: (a) Kill or seriously injure American guards; (b) Interrupt and delay the rendition process, and (c) Get the Gitmo issue back into the MSM, and re-open the debate on redention, military tribunals, and the ultimate disposition of terrorist suspects. The MSM may not realize it, but there was a lot more going on in that cellblock that a mere suicide attempt.
Consider this bit of breaking news from MSNBC. According to the network, there was a small uprising yesterday at the terrorist detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Prisoners wielding fans, light fixtures and other "improvised" weapons attacked guards entering a cell block, as they attempted to prevent a terrorist from committing suicide. It was the fourth reported suicide attempt of the day.
The attacks occurred in a medium-security, communal living section of the prison. When guards spotted a prisoner attempting to hang himself, they entered the cell block and were attacked by other prisoners. A Defense Department spokesman said the detainees tried to prevent guards from rescuing the terrorist who was attempting suicide. Guards were able to quell the disturbance and prevent the prisoner from committing suicide. Prisoners involved in the incident were later moved to a maximum security area of the prison.
The "unwritten" message in this account is that conditions are so harsh at "Club Gitmo" that prisoners are attempting suicide to end their misery. And dutifully, MSNBC provides the number of attempted suicides at the prison since it opened back in 2002. Naturally, there's no frame of reference--for example, how does the number of attempted suicides at Gitmo compare to other correctional facilities, just the suggestion that Gitmo is a hell-hole for detainees.
There's also no speculation as to whether the suicide attempt might have been staged, to lure guards inside for the assault. Maybe I've watched too many prison movies, but it would seem that an attack on that scale--and using the types of "weapons" cited--would require some degree of advanced planning and preparation.
To their credit, the folks at MSNBC do manage to stumble across a more likely explanation for the uprising, and Thursday's "rash" of suicide attempts. Seems that these events occurred on a day when a number of Saudi prisoners were remanded to their home country. That transfer, coupled with reports that Gitmo may be closing soon, probably had the terrorists sufficiently agitated to try something--anything--to delay a return to the harsh confines of a "real" Middle East prison. The terrorists at Gitmo understand that if the facility there actually shuts down, many of them will face their own "homecomings," and an uncertain future at the hands of their countrymen.
Thursday's uprising at Guantanamo Bay was probably motivated by three major goals: (a) Kill or seriously injure American guards; (b) Interrupt and delay the rendition process, and (c) Get the Gitmo issue back into the MSM, and re-open the debate on redention, military tribunals, and the ultimate disposition of terrorist suspects. The MSM may not realize it, but there was a lot more going on in that cellblock that a mere suicide attempt.
Brian Ross's Latest "Expose."
***UPDATE***
0914/PDT
Alert readers who saw last night's ABC report tell me the Air Force contract in question was for a giant video screen, allowing spectators to more easily view the Thunderbirds' aerial show. The Navy's precision flying team (The Blue Angels) already has a video system, but it didn't cost the taxpayers a dime. Following the example of various college football programs, the Navy worked a trade with the system's owner. In return for using the screen to show the Blue Angels' performance, the system's owner air commercials on the big screen, before and after the show. ABC wondered why the Air Force didn't follow the Navy's lead (a fair question), and why the screen was purchased, even though the Thunderbirds never specifically requested it. However, the report still falls far short of the mark in proving that Generals Moseley, Hornburg and Jumper somehow conspired to steer the contract to Hornburg's firm.
****
ABC News is reporting that three top Air Force generals--two retired, the other, the service's current Chief of Staff--are under investigation by the FBI for alleged contracting improprieties. On the surface, those allegations seem quite daming, particularly in light of the recent Air Force contracting scandal that sent a high-ranking civilian official to prison. But on closer examination, it appears as though ABC has omitted critical details of the purported "scandal" and the accompanying inquiry.
According to "Chief Investigative Correspondent" Brian Ross, the current Air Force Chief of Staff (General T. Michael Moseley) and his predecessor, General John Jumper, may have helped steer a contract for the USAF Thunderbirds precision flying team, to a company that had another retired four star (General Hal Hornburg) as a partner. At the time of his retirement, General Hornburg was commander of the Air Force's Air Combat Command (ACC), headquartered at Langley AFB, VA. The Thunderbirds, based at Nellis AFB near Las Vegas, fall under ACC.
ABC hasn't made Ross's video report available, and the details posted at The Blotter (Ross's ABC website) are a bit sketchy. We know the amount of the contract, but what type of equipment or services did the contract cover? I've seen a few opaque references to a "sound system," but there's no clear indication of exactly what the money was supposed to buy.
Additionally, The Blotter doesn't name the firm that now employs General Hornburg. Retired generals working for defense contractors is nothing new--what we need are specific details on the size of the firm, it's relationship with DOD, and (most importantly) whether Hornburg was actively involved in lobbying for the Thunderbirds contract, or working on other projects for the firm. The distinction is critical; many retired flag officers work for large defense firms with thousands of employees. If Hornburg was actively soliciting the Thunderbirds deal, that's one thing. But if he was merely part of a large firm that sought the bid, then ABC's charge is little more than "guilt by association."
Mr. Ross does note that the contract was eventually cancelled after a rival firm filed a formal complaint--SOP in federal contracting circles. But you won't get any real perspective on the matter until you dig into the comments section, and a post from a reader named Oxy.
1) YOU REPORT: Gen Moseley and Gen Jumper are SUBJECTS of an investigation.
TRUTH: Only retired Gen Hornburg is a subject, the others are witnesses.
2) YOU REPORT: Gen Moseley and Gen Jumper “awarded the contract.”
TRUTH: The contract was awarded by competitive bid and the selection was made in the discretion of
the Source Selection Authority, a Colonel working at Air Combat Command.
3) YOU REPORT: The contract was cancelled after the Air Force General Counsel questioned the integrity of
the process.
TRUTH: An unsuccessful bidder filed a protest and the Air Force cancelled the contract due to mistakes
in the selection process completely unrelated to either Gen Moseley or Gen Jumper.
As ABC knows (or should), the Air Force is strictly prohibited from commenting on an ongoing FBI investigation. So you incorrectly report Gen Moseley and Gen Jumper are subjects, and they can do
nothing to defend themselves. A year from now when the FBI has completed their investigation and Gen Moseley and Gen Jumper are cleared, will you report your errors? You are here to check up on our government, and I have respect and gratitude that you do, but in this case you failed to report accurately and innocent careers are being damaged.
Oxy
Reader JESH offers addtional information that was also ignored by ABC:
"...There is another side -- the truth -- which was repeatedly told to these reporters which they ignored INCLUDING the fact that this company intended to get this to the USAF FOR FREE. ABC ignored that. USAF lawyers and contracting forced this through detailed competitive bidding and knew everything about this including Hornburg's proper involvement during the one year cool down period. If a problem existed during the contracting process they would have never let it go through the process. Hornburg violated nothing -- why put a 36 year career on the line for this. Ask ABC about it. See if they post it."
Again, there are many unanswered questions in this case, but the observations of Oxy and JESH certainly cast this "scandal" in a different light. The award of "single source" contracts is a daily occurrence in the DOD, with the decision on who receives multi-million dollar contracts is often deferred to lower-ranking personnel. Both the Air Force and its largest command (ACC) are multi-billion dollar enterprises. There's no way the Air Force Chief of Staff or ACC Commander can monitor every $50 million contract awarded for goods or services.
If the Thunderbirds contract was approved by a Colonel in the ACC Contracting Office (again, SOP in the Defense Department), then it is quite possible that Moseley and Jumper had no knowledge of the deal. A more salient question might be the relationship between General Hornburg and the contracting officer. But, as JESH points out, the Air Force was well aware of potential problems with the deal, and thoroughly vetted it before allowing the contract to be approved. However, that claim is clearly missing from Ross's "expose."
Mr. Ross and his team at ABC style themselves as investigative journalists, demanding answers to tough questions. In this case, it seems, Ross and company owe the public some answers as well. Without those answers, Mr. Ross's report is little more than a hit piece, filled with scandalous accusations, but missing the details needed to support those charges. Back in the days when American journalism had standards, Ross's report would have never been aired--a producer would have likely told him to keep digging, and see if he could actually substantiate those allegations. Today, Ross's shoddy work is showcased on World News Tonight. My, how times have changed.
0914/PDT
Alert readers who saw last night's ABC report tell me the Air Force contract in question was for a giant video screen, allowing spectators to more easily view the Thunderbirds' aerial show. The Navy's precision flying team (The Blue Angels) already has a video system, but it didn't cost the taxpayers a dime. Following the example of various college football programs, the Navy worked a trade with the system's owner. In return for using the screen to show the Blue Angels' performance, the system's owner air commercials on the big screen, before and after the show. ABC wondered why the Air Force didn't follow the Navy's lead (a fair question), and why the screen was purchased, even though the Thunderbirds never specifically requested it. However, the report still falls far short of the mark in proving that Generals Moseley, Hornburg and Jumper somehow conspired to steer the contract to Hornburg's firm.
****
ABC News is reporting that three top Air Force generals--two retired, the other, the service's current Chief of Staff--are under investigation by the FBI for alleged contracting improprieties. On the surface, those allegations seem quite daming, particularly in light of the recent Air Force contracting scandal that sent a high-ranking civilian official to prison. But on closer examination, it appears as though ABC has omitted critical details of the purported "scandal" and the accompanying inquiry.
According to "Chief Investigative Correspondent" Brian Ross, the current Air Force Chief of Staff (General T. Michael Moseley) and his predecessor, General John Jumper, may have helped steer a contract for the USAF Thunderbirds precision flying team, to a company that had another retired four star (General Hal Hornburg) as a partner. At the time of his retirement, General Hornburg was commander of the Air Force's Air Combat Command (ACC), headquartered at Langley AFB, VA. The Thunderbirds, based at Nellis AFB near Las Vegas, fall under ACC.
ABC hasn't made Ross's video report available, and the details posted at The Blotter (Ross's ABC website) are a bit sketchy. We know the amount of the contract, but what type of equipment or services did the contract cover? I've seen a few opaque references to a "sound system," but there's no clear indication of exactly what the money was supposed to buy.
Additionally, The Blotter doesn't name the firm that now employs General Hornburg. Retired generals working for defense contractors is nothing new--what we need are specific details on the size of the firm, it's relationship with DOD, and (most importantly) whether Hornburg was actively involved in lobbying for the Thunderbirds contract, or working on other projects for the firm. The distinction is critical; many retired flag officers work for large defense firms with thousands of employees. If Hornburg was actively soliciting the Thunderbirds deal, that's one thing. But if he was merely part of a large firm that sought the bid, then ABC's charge is little more than "guilt by association."
Mr. Ross does note that the contract was eventually cancelled after a rival firm filed a formal complaint--SOP in federal contracting circles. But you won't get any real perspective on the matter until you dig into the comments section, and a post from a reader named Oxy.
1) YOU REPORT: Gen Moseley and Gen Jumper are SUBJECTS of an investigation.
TRUTH: Only retired Gen Hornburg is a subject, the others are witnesses.
2) YOU REPORT: Gen Moseley and Gen Jumper “awarded the contract.”
TRUTH: The contract was awarded by competitive bid and the selection was made in the discretion of
the Source Selection Authority, a Colonel working at Air Combat Command.
3) YOU REPORT: The contract was cancelled after the Air Force General Counsel questioned the integrity of
the process.
TRUTH: An unsuccessful bidder filed a protest and the Air Force cancelled the contract due to mistakes
in the selection process completely unrelated to either Gen Moseley or Gen Jumper.
As ABC knows (or should), the Air Force is strictly prohibited from commenting on an ongoing FBI investigation. So you incorrectly report Gen Moseley and Gen Jumper are subjects, and they can do
nothing to defend themselves. A year from now when the FBI has completed their investigation and Gen Moseley and Gen Jumper are cleared, will you report your errors? You are here to check up on our government, and I have respect and gratitude that you do, but in this case you failed to report accurately and innocent careers are being damaged.
Oxy
Reader JESH offers addtional information that was also ignored by ABC:
"...There is another side -- the truth -- which was repeatedly told to these reporters which they ignored INCLUDING the fact that this company intended to get this to the USAF FOR FREE. ABC ignored that. USAF lawyers and contracting forced this through detailed competitive bidding and knew everything about this including Hornburg's proper involvement during the one year cool down period. If a problem existed during the contracting process they would have never let it go through the process. Hornburg violated nothing -- why put a 36 year career on the line for this. Ask ABC about it. See if they post it."
Again, there are many unanswered questions in this case, but the observations of Oxy and JESH certainly cast this "scandal" in a different light. The award of "single source" contracts is a daily occurrence in the DOD, with the decision on who receives multi-million dollar contracts is often deferred to lower-ranking personnel. Both the Air Force and its largest command (ACC) are multi-billion dollar enterprises. There's no way the Air Force Chief of Staff or ACC Commander can monitor every $50 million contract awarded for goods or services.
If the Thunderbirds contract was approved by a Colonel in the ACC Contracting Office (again, SOP in the Defense Department), then it is quite possible that Moseley and Jumper had no knowledge of the deal. A more salient question might be the relationship between General Hornburg and the contracting officer. But, as JESH points out, the Air Force was well aware of potential problems with the deal, and thoroughly vetted it before allowing the contract to be approved. However, that claim is clearly missing from Ross's "expose."
Mr. Ross and his team at ABC style themselves as investigative journalists, demanding answers to tough questions. In this case, it seems, Ross and company owe the public some answers as well. Without those answers, Mr. Ross's report is little more than a hit piece, filled with scandalous accusations, but missing the details needed to support those charges. Back in the days when American journalism had standards, Ross's report would have never been aired--a producer would have likely told him to keep digging, and see if he could actually substantiate those allegations. Today, Ross's shoddy work is showcased on World News Tonight. My, how times have changed.
The Moonbats Weigh In
I was impressed by General Hayden's opening statement and answers during yesterday's first round of his Senate confirmation hearings. The same cannot be said the Senate Moonbat Brigade, which was out in full force on Thursday, and will continue its verbal sniping today.
Some of the early exchanges between Hayden and the Senators were priceless, largely because of the lunacy of the questions. John Hinderaker of Powerline has an excellent summary of yesterday's verbal exchanges, including sound bites. In each example, General Hayden emerges as the well-reasoned voice of a senior intelligence official; the Senators as little more than snippy political hacks.
If I were a resident of Wisconsin or California, I would be embarrased at the "questions" posed by Senators Russ Feingold and Diance Feinstein. If ignorance is bliss, then both Feingold and Feinstein are happy individuals, indeed.
Expect more of the same today.
Some of the early exchanges between Hayden and the Senators were priceless, largely because of the lunacy of the questions. John Hinderaker of Powerline has an excellent summary of yesterday's verbal exchanges, including sound bites. In each example, General Hayden emerges as the well-reasoned voice of a senior intelligence official; the Senators as little more than snippy political hacks.
If I were a resident of Wisconsin or California, I would be embarrased at the "questions" posed by Senators Russ Feingold and Diance Feinstein. If ignorance is bliss, then both Feingold and Feinstein are happy individuals, indeed.
Expect more of the same today.
Thursday, May 18, 2006
The Rest of the Story
Reading this AP dispatch from London, I can't decide if it's a legitimate news story (on the first British landng of the A380 Super Jumbo jet), or a press release for Airbus, the aircraft's European manufacturer.
The AP story is filled with fun facts on the massive size of the double-decker airliner, and the infrastructure upgrades required to accomodate the A380 at London's Heathrow Airport. There's even a description of the plane's initial flight to Britain, including a pass over the factory in Wales that builds the wings for the A380.
Along the way, the AP even takes a few swipes at Boeing, noting that the A380 will soon pass the American 747 as the world's largest passenger jet. The wire service dutifully notes that Airbus has recieved 159 orders for the giant aircraft, suggesting that the 747's era of dominance is coming to an end.
What's wrong with this story?
As we noted a few months back, both Airbus (and the A380 program) are in a bit of trouble. The super jumbo was conceived when oil prices were below $40 a barrel, and a 555-passenger jetliner made economic sense. Now, with a barrel of crude hovering in the $70 range, airlines are looking for aircraft that are more fuel efficient, particularly on long-haul trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific routes. Instead of rolling out a super jumbo of its own, Boeing wisely opted for development of fuel-efficient jets., notably the 787 "Dreamliner." Over the past two years, the American manufacturer has racked up 291 firm orders for the 787, compared with only 259 for both the A380 and the A350, designed to compete directly with the Dreamliner.
Making matters worse, American airports appear to be in little hurry to expand facilities to accomodate the A380. A 2002 GAO study conservatively estimated that facility upgrades needed to accomodate New Large Aircraft (read: A380) at 10 major U.S. airports will total at least 2.1 billion dollars--a cost that will be borne (ultimately) by travelers and local taxpayers. At Heathrow, upgrades for the A380 have (so far) run $850 million. The two billion total for U.S. airports is likely low, and there is opposition in some communities (notably Los Angeles) to expand terminals and runways to handle the super jumbo. Without wide access to the U.S. market, the A380 is ultimately doomed; in other words, a passenger flying from Singapore or Hong Kong on an A380 would have to change planes in Tokyo or Sidney, adding time (and cost) to the journey.
Not surprisingly, many airlines are opting instead for the Dreamliner, or the latest-generation Boeing 777, fuel-efficient jets, capable of serving long-haul routes, and compatible with existing U.S. airport facilities. While the largest U.S. airports will inevitably expand to accomodate the A380, they will likely remain a rarity at U.S. terminals for years to come, and that will likely translate into fewer orders for Airbus.
Make no mistake: the A380 is a technical marvel. But so were the Spruce Goose, the Lockheed L-1011 and the B-70. Ultimately, none of those designs were successful, because they were the wrong aircraft at the wrong time. The same judgment may ultimately befall the A380.
But that sort of context is obviously missing from the AP story. Reading their account from London, you'd think that Airbus has driven the final stake in Boeing's coffin. In reality, nothing could be further from the truth. What are they teaching in journalism schools these days?
The AP story is filled with fun facts on the massive size of the double-decker airliner, and the infrastructure upgrades required to accomodate the A380 at London's Heathrow Airport. There's even a description of the plane's initial flight to Britain, including a pass over the factory in Wales that builds the wings for the A380.
Along the way, the AP even takes a few swipes at Boeing, noting that the A380 will soon pass the American 747 as the world's largest passenger jet. The wire service dutifully notes that Airbus has recieved 159 orders for the giant aircraft, suggesting that the 747's era of dominance is coming to an end.
What's wrong with this story?
As we noted a few months back, both Airbus (and the A380 program) are in a bit of trouble. The super jumbo was conceived when oil prices were below $40 a barrel, and a 555-passenger jetliner made economic sense. Now, with a barrel of crude hovering in the $70 range, airlines are looking for aircraft that are more fuel efficient, particularly on long-haul trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific routes. Instead of rolling out a super jumbo of its own, Boeing wisely opted for development of fuel-efficient jets., notably the 787 "Dreamliner." Over the past two years, the American manufacturer has racked up 291 firm orders for the 787, compared with only 259 for both the A380 and the A350, designed to compete directly with the Dreamliner.
Making matters worse, American airports appear to be in little hurry to expand facilities to accomodate the A380. A 2002 GAO study conservatively estimated that facility upgrades needed to accomodate New Large Aircraft (read: A380) at 10 major U.S. airports will total at least 2.1 billion dollars--a cost that will be borne (ultimately) by travelers and local taxpayers. At Heathrow, upgrades for the A380 have (so far) run $850 million. The two billion total for U.S. airports is likely low, and there is opposition in some communities (notably Los Angeles) to expand terminals and runways to handle the super jumbo. Without wide access to the U.S. market, the A380 is ultimately doomed; in other words, a passenger flying from Singapore or Hong Kong on an A380 would have to change planes in Tokyo or Sidney, adding time (and cost) to the journey.
Not surprisingly, many airlines are opting instead for the Dreamliner, or the latest-generation Boeing 777, fuel-efficient jets, capable of serving long-haul routes, and compatible with existing U.S. airport facilities. While the largest U.S. airports will inevitably expand to accomodate the A380, they will likely remain a rarity at U.S. terminals for years to come, and that will likely translate into fewer orders for Airbus.
Make no mistake: the A380 is a technical marvel. But so were the Spruce Goose, the Lockheed L-1011 and the B-70. Ultimately, none of those designs were successful, because they were the wrong aircraft at the wrong time. The same judgment may ultimately befall the A380.
But that sort of context is obviously missing from the AP story. Reading their account from London, you'd think that Airbus has driven the final stake in Boeing's coffin. In reality, nothing could be further from the truth. What are they teaching in journalism schools these days?
Striking the Right Note
I haven't been able to watch much of General Mike Hayden's confirmation hearings to be CIA Director. But, based on some soundbites I've heard (and partial transcripts I've reviewed), it appears that Hayden is striking the right notes in his testimony.
Consider his observation that the "CIA needs to get off the front page of the newspaper," both as a story and a source for stories. With the exception of a few outposts at Langley, you could almost hear the "amen" chorus across the intelligence community. Beyond members of the leakers brigade (appearing soon in a federal court near you), there is broad consensus within the intel rank-and-file that the CIA has lost its way, and needs a steady hand to get the agency back on course.
Hayden was also spot-on in his assessment that the agency has become a "political football." With assistance from malcontents on the inside, the agency has become (at least publicly) a defacto think tank for the Democratic Party. As Hayden noted, the agency's "leak" culture and various scandals have obscured the CIA's very real contributions to national security.
As we recently predicted in this space, General Hayden is more than capable of handling his interrogators in the Senate. When it comes to intelligence, he's clearly the smartest guy in the room, and second-guessers from both parties will look more foolish than informed when challenging him on various intel issues.
*****
I was also intrigued by the opening remarks of the committee chairman, Senator Pat Roberts of Kansas. Roberts praised the NSA (and its former leader, General Hayden) for its reaction to 9-11, and it's handling of those controversial programs. Senator Roberts noted that he has been to NSA and was briefed on those programs from the start. Translation: I've been in the loop since Day One, the programs are run within the letter of the law, and anyone who challenges them on "legal grounds" is playing a losing hand. Of course, the risk of looking foolish has never stopped the likes of Carl Levin or Arlen Spector. They'll keep lobbing their "tough" questions at General Hayden, and he'll keep knocking them out of the park.
Consider his observation that the "CIA needs to get off the front page of the newspaper," both as a story and a source for stories. With the exception of a few outposts at Langley, you could almost hear the "amen" chorus across the intelligence community. Beyond members of the leakers brigade (appearing soon in a federal court near you), there is broad consensus within the intel rank-and-file that the CIA has lost its way, and needs a steady hand to get the agency back on course.
Hayden was also spot-on in his assessment that the agency has become a "political football." With assistance from malcontents on the inside, the agency has become (at least publicly) a defacto think tank for the Democratic Party. As Hayden noted, the agency's "leak" culture and various scandals have obscured the CIA's very real contributions to national security.
As we recently predicted in this space, General Hayden is more than capable of handling his interrogators in the Senate. When it comes to intelligence, he's clearly the smartest guy in the room, and second-guessers from both parties will look more foolish than informed when challenging him on various intel issues.
*****
I was also intrigued by the opening remarks of the committee chairman, Senator Pat Roberts of Kansas. Roberts praised the NSA (and its former leader, General Hayden) for its reaction to 9-11, and it's handling of those controversial programs. Senator Roberts noted that he has been to NSA and was briefed on those programs from the start. Translation: I've been in the loop since Day One, the programs are run within the letter of the law, and anyone who challenges them on "legal grounds" is playing a losing hand. Of course, the risk of looking foolish has never stopped the likes of Carl Levin or Arlen Spector. They'll keep lobbing their "tough" questions at General Hayden, and he'll keep knocking them out of the park.
Waxing Nostalgic
As the mid-term elections approach, you're bound to see more articles like this one, by Fred Kaplan in Slate. Mr. Kaplan, who writes the "War Stories" column for Slate, seems to be waxing nostalgic for the good 'ol days of the Clinton Administration, and the Agreed To Framework with North Korea.
According to Kaplan, the U.S.-North Korean framework, "however flamed," kept Pyongyang from building "dozens of A-bombs" during the 1990s. He also finds it ironic that the Bush Administration appears to be going along with European efforts to provide similar incentives to Iran, in hopes of curtailing Tehran's nuclear ambitions. More on that in a moment.
As you'll recall, the deal between Washington and Pyongyang was supposed to have the same effect on North Korea's nuclear program. In exchange for the North giving up its nuclear weapons program, the U.S. and South Korea agreed to provide a package of incentives, including light-water reactors for Pyongyang, oil shipments, and assurances that the U.S. would not use nuclear weapons against North Korea. There was also an agreement for Washington and Pyongyang to move toward normalized relations, and for an expanded talks between North and South Korea.
The Agreed To Framework never lived up to expectations, and Kaplan puts most of the blame on Washington and Seoul. The "right-wingers" who then occupied the Blue House pulled out of the deal after a North Korean commando submarine washed up on the ROK's eastern shore. Influential members of Congress also opposed the notion of "rewarding" Kim Jong-il's regime, claiming that the north could not be trusted.
Turns out that the conservatives in Seoul and Washington were right. While Kaplan notes that the IAEA kept monitoring North Korea's heavy water reactor, the North was not living up to its end of the bargain. Shortly after the Bush Administration took office in 2001, our intelligence agencies discovered that Pyongyang had been secretly enriching uranium, and had probably produced a small inventory of nuclear weapons. The "observed compliance" at the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex (where the IAEA observed inactivity) was nothing but a ruse.
Ditto for the "negotiations" between the U.S. and North Korea on ballistic missile production. Kaplan claims that the two sides were close to reaching a deal on halting Pyongyang's missile program. History records that North Korea's missile programs continued apace during the late 1990s, with Pyongyang exporting SCUD technology to additional customers in the Middle East, and developing more advanced, long-range missiles like the TD-1 and TD-2. In fact, while the Clinton team was trying to strike a deal with Pyongyang, the North Koreans test-fired a TD-1 that sailed over Japan before splashing down in the Pacific Ocean. Tokyo was understandly upset, but the U.S. kept talking--exactly what Pyongyang wanted.
When the Bush Administration took office, they (rightfully) abandoned the tatters of the Agreed To Framework, opting instead for a regional approach, involving the two Koreas, China, Russia, Japan and the U.S. True, these talks haven't produced any real progress, but (most importantly) they haven't produced a flawed agreement that rewards Pyongyang for bad behavior. If Bush had followed Clinton's lead, we'd still be shipping fuel oil to North Korea and pressuring South Korea to complete those light-water reactors, while Pyongyang simply smiled and kept building more nuclear weapons.
Kaplan is right about one thing (in a rather indirect sense). Given the colossal failure of the Agree To Framework, it is surprising that the U.S. and its European allies are proposing a similar deal with Iran. I'll also agree with his supposition that the lack of viable alternatives is driving the the current policy. But there should be a major distinction in dealing with Iran in contrast to past negotiations with North Korea. While Mr. Clinton was happy to give North Korea wide latitude in complying with the agreement, Mr. Bush and his partners cannot give the same discretion to Tehran. "Don't trust--and verify" should be the mantra governing any potential deal with Iran.
What would that mean? For starters, full, unfettered access to all Iranian nuclear facilities, surprise inspections at all known and suspected sites, and implementation of any other measures deemed necessary for ensuring complete compliance. And those conditions are just for the nuclear issue; any "real" deal with Tehran should also address Iran's support for terrorist groups that pose a direct threat to regional security, and require that Tehran sever those ties as well.
In return, delivery of any promised "carrots" should be carefully calibrated to verified compliance by Iran. One the great failings of the framework with North Korea was the fanciful belief that Pyongyang would eventually comply, if we delivered enough fuel oil and the South Koreans built those reactors. The U.S. kept delivering fuel oil to North Korea throughout the Clinton years, long after questions about Pyongyang's compliance began to surface. Kim Jong-il must have been tickled pink; not only was American oil was flowing into his ports (giving him a chance to expand stockpiles of that badly-needed commodity), North Korea was also able to expand its nuclear arsenal, while supposedly complying with the Agreed To Framework. From Pyongyang's perspective, it was a Win-Win-Win deal.
Talk of a similar deal with Tehran is ominous, to say the least. Iran has obviously studied the North Korean model, and adopted similar strategies in dealing with the west on the nuclear issue. The first rule from Pyongyang's playbook is simple: Open a dialogue and stretch the talks out as long as possible. Rule Two: When you finally get an attractive deal, take it, and make sure the terms favor you. Rule Three: Don't give up anything in return; maintain an illusion of compliance, while continuing your nuclear efforts in secret. Rule Four: When your fraud is finally exposed, be defiant, make threats and demand more talks. When the west meekly complies, start the process all over again.
According to a recent poll, a surprising number of Americans are now equating the Clinton Administration with "The Good Old Days." But a clear analysis of his "policies" reveals that Clinton created his Era of Good Feeling, by merely postponing hard decisions on emerging threats (such as terrorism and Iran), or enterring into the poorly-conceived agreement with North Korea, that eventually blew up in our face. Confronting the Iran threat, the Bush Administration may feel that diplomacy is its only viable, short-term option. But brokering an "Agreed To" deal with Iran (long on carrots, short on sticks) would be an unmitigated disaster. No matter how much Mr. Kaplan may long for the halcyon days of Madeline Albright and the Clinton State Department, the Agrred To Framework with Pyongyang represented a low ebb for U.S. diplomacy in the post-Cold War era, and it is a model to be avoided, rather than duplicated.
According to Kaplan, the U.S.-North Korean framework, "however flamed," kept Pyongyang from building "dozens of A-bombs" during the 1990s. He also finds it ironic that the Bush Administration appears to be going along with European efforts to provide similar incentives to Iran, in hopes of curtailing Tehran's nuclear ambitions. More on that in a moment.
As you'll recall, the deal between Washington and Pyongyang was supposed to have the same effect on North Korea's nuclear program. In exchange for the North giving up its nuclear weapons program, the U.S. and South Korea agreed to provide a package of incentives, including light-water reactors for Pyongyang, oil shipments, and assurances that the U.S. would not use nuclear weapons against North Korea. There was also an agreement for Washington and Pyongyang to move toward normalized relations, and for an expanded talks between North and South Korea.
The Agreed To Framework never lived up to expectations, and Kaplan puts most of the blame on Washington and Seoul. The "right-wingers" who then occupied the Blue House pulled out of the deal after a North Korean commando submarine washed up on the ROK's eastern shore. Influential members of Congress also opposed the notion of "rewarding" Kim Jong-il's regime, claiming that the north could not be trusted.
Turns out that the conservatives in Seoul and Washington were right. While Kaplan notes that the IAEA kept monitoring North Korea's heavy water reactor, the North was not living up to its end of the bargain. Shortly after the Bush Administration took office in 2001, our intelligence agencies discovered that Pyongyang had been secretly enriching uranium, and had probably produced a small inventory of nuclear weapons. The "observed compliance" at the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex (where the IAEA observed inactivity) was nothing but a ruse.
Ditto for the "negotiations" between the U.S. and North Korea on ballistic missile production. Kaplan claims that the two sides were close to reaching a deal on halting Pyongyang's missile program. History records that North Korea's missile programs continued apace during the late 1990s, with Pyongyang exporting SCUD technology to additional customers in the Middle East, and developing more advanced, long-range missiles like the TD-1 and TD-2. In fact, while the Clinton team was trying to strike a deal with Pyongyang, the North Koreans test-fired a TD-1 that sailed over Japan before splashing down in the Pacific Ocean. Tokyo was understandly upset, but the U.S. kept talking--exactly what Pyongyang wanted.
When the Bush Administration took office, they (rightfully) abandoned the tatters of the Agreed To Framework, opting instead for a regional approach, involving the two Koreas, China, Russia, Japan and the U.S. True, these talks haven't produced any real progress, but (most importantly) they haven't produced a flawed agreement that rewards Pyongyang for bad behavior. If Bush had followed Clinton's lead, we'd still be shipping fuel oil to North Korea and pressuring South Korea to complete those light-water reactors, while Pyongyang simply smiled and kept building more nuclear weapons.
Kaplan is right about one thing (in a rather indirect sense). Given the colossal failure of the Agree To Framework, it is surprising that the U.S. and its European allies are proposing a similar deal with Iran. I'll also agree with his supposition that the lack of viable alternatives is driving the the current policy. But there should be a major distinction in dealing with Iran in contrast to past negotiations with North Korea. While Mr. Clinton was happy to give North Korea wide latitude in complying with the agreement, Mr. Bush and his partners cannot give the same discretion to Tehran. "Don't trust--and verify" should be the mantra governing any potential deal with Iran.
What would that mean? For starters, full, unfettered access to all Iranian nuclear facilities, surprise inspections at all known and suspected sites, and implementation of any other measures deemed necessary for ensuring complete compliance. And those conditions are just for the nuclear issue; any "real" deal with Tehran should also address Iran's support for terrorist groups that pose a direct threat to regional security, and require that Tehran sever those ties as well.
In return, delivery of any promised "carrots" should be carefully calibrated to verified compliance by Iran. One the great failings of the framework with North Korea was the fanciful belief that Pyongyang would eventually comply, if we delivered enough fuel oil and the South Koreans built those reactors. The U.S. kept delivering fuel oil to North Korea throughout the Clinton years, long after questions about Pyongyang's compliance began to surface. Kim Jong-il must have been tickled pink; not only was American oil was flowing into his ports (giving him a chance to expand stockpiles of that badly-needed commodity), North Korea was also able to expand its nuclear arsenal, while supposedly complying with the Agreed To Framework. From Pyongyang's perspective, it was a Win-Win-Win deal.
Talk of a similar deal with Tehran is ominous, to say the least. Iran has obviously studied the North Korean model, and adopted similar strategies in dealing with the west on the nuclear issue. The first rule from Pyongyang's playbook is simple: Open a dialogue and stretch the talks out as long as possible. Rule Two: When you finally get an attractive deal, take it, and make sure the terms favor you. Rule Three: Don't give up anything in return; maintain an illusion of compliance, while continuing your nuclear efforts in secret. Rule Four: When your fraud is finally exposed, be defiant, make threats and demand more talks. When the west meekly complies, start the process all over again.
According to a recent poll, a surprising number of Americans are now equating the Clinton Administration with "The Good Old Days." But a clear analysis of his "policies" reveals that Clinton created his Era of Good Feeling, by merely postponing hard decisions on emerging threats (such as terrorism and Iran), or enterring into the poorly-conceived agreement with North Korea, that eventually blew up in our face. Confronting the Iran threat, the Bush Administration may feel that diplomacy is its only viable, short-term option. But brokering an "Agreed To" deal with Iran (long on carrots, short on sticks) would be an unmitigated disaster. No matter how much Mr. Kaplan may long for the halcyon days of Madeline Albright and the Clinton State Department, the Agrred To Framework with Pyongyang represented a low ebb for U.S. diplomacy in the post-Cold War era, and it is a model to be avoided, rather than duplicated.
Jack Murtha Strikes Again
The anti-war left's favorite Congressman, Jack Murtha, is at it again. Yesterday, the Pennsylvania Democrat alleged that U.S. Marines committed serious atrocities against Iraqi civilians in an incident near Haditha on 19 November of last year.
According to Congressman Murtha, Marines from Kilo Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines (based at Camp Pendleton, CA), "killed innocent civilians in cold blood" after responding to a roadside bomb attack near Haditha that killed one Marine. An Iraqi human rights group claims that Marines stormed houses near the bombing site, throwing grenades and shooting civilians. The human rights group claims that at least 15 Iraqis were killed in the attack; Time magazine carried a report on the incident in its 27 March edition.
However, Murtha assures us that what actually happened at Haditha is "much worse" than what was described by Time. But careful readers will note that Murtha (in typical fashion) offers no details to support his accusations. Officially, the Marine Corps has relieved three officers of their duties in the wake of the incident, and an official investigation is on-going. But how did John Murtha get his information, and how reliable is it? Has he spoken with Marine and Navy investigators? Read interview transcripts? Reviewed forensic evidence? Heard rumors in the bar at the Army-Navy Club? Murtha won't say, and when pressed for details by Army Times, his press representative couldn't offer any amplifying details.
Sadly, such tactics are part-and-parcel of the Murtha approach. Make a sensational claim and grab some press headlines, knowing that the drive-by media won't question your charges. Afterall, Congressman Murtha served in Vietnam (so did John Kerry!), and he's a retired Colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve. In the eyes of the MSM, that makes him an unqualified expert on all matters relating to the U.S. military and ground combat in Iraq. Just a few weeks back, Jack Murtha was telling anyone who would listen that U.S. ground forces are "hard broke" after three-plus years of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. And once again, the charge was long on sensationalism, short on specifics. Since then, that "broken" force has launched a series of major operations against terrorists in Iraq, producing some notable successes. When that happened, Murtha was conspiciously silent.
If Murtha has information that might be of use to Marine and NCIS investigators, he knows how to contact them. On the other hand, if he's trying to meddle in an on-going investigation, he needs to shut up. Should any Marines face disciplinary action for the Haditha incident--and that is hardly assured--a smart defense attorney can mere cite Murtha's remarks as evidence that potential court-martial panels have been hopelessly prejudiced. A military judge might not agree with that assessment, but the impact of Murtha's comments--echoed by his buddies in the news media--could form the foundation for a legal appeal.
But that pre-supposes that atrocities were committed in Haditha last November. So far, all we have are allegation, and an on-going investigation. As a retired Marine Colonel, Jack Murtha supposedly knows enough to keep his yap shut and let the process work. But then again, doing things by the book wouldn't sustain his reputation as the media's favorite anti-war Congressman--never mind the fact that he's wrong far more often than he's right. And that raises another question: let's suppose that those Marine officers are exonerated for their actions at Haditha. If that happens, will Jack Murtha apologize to his "fellow" Marines?
According to Congressman Murtha, Marines from Kilo Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines (based at Camp Pendleton, CA), "killed innocent civilians in cold blood" after responding to a roadside bomb attack near Haditha that killed one Marine. An Iraqi human rights group claims that Marines stormed houses near the bombing site, throwing grenades and shooting civilians. The human rights group claims that at least 15 Iraqis were killed in the attack; Time magazine carried a report on the incident in its 27 March edition.
However, Murtha assures us that what actually happened at Haditha is "much worse" than what was described by Time. But careful readers will note that Murtha (in typical fashion) offers no details to support his accusations. Officially, the Marine Corps has relieved three officers of their duties in the wake of the incident, and an official investigation is on-going. But how did John Murtha get his information, and how reliable is it? Has he spoken with Marine and Navy investigators? Read interview transcripts? Reviewed forensic evidence? Heard rumors in the bar at the Army-Navy Club? Murtha won't say, and when pressed for details by Army Times, his press representative couldn't offer any amplifying details.
Sadly, such tactics are part-and-parcel of the Murtha approach. Make a sensational claim and grab some press headlines, knowing that the drive-by media won't question your charges. Afterall, Congressman Murtha served in Vietnam (so did John Kerry!), and he's a retired Colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve. In the eyes of the MSM, that makes him an unqualified expert on all matters relating to the U.S. military and ground combat in Iraq. Just a few weeks back, Jack Murtha was telling anyone who would listen that U.S. ground forces are "hard broke" after three-plus years of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. And once again, the charge was long on sensationalism, short on specifics. Since then, that "broken" force has launched a series of major operations against terrorists in Iraq, producing some notable successes. When that happened, Murtha was conspiciously silent.
If Murtha has information that might be of use to Marine and NCIS investigators, he knows how to contact them. On the other hand, if he's trying to meddle in an on-going investigation, he needs to shut up. Should any Marines face disciplinary action for the Haditha incident--and that is hardly assured--a smart defense attorney can mere cite Murtha's remarks as evidence that potential court-martial panels have been hopelessly prejudiced. A military judge might not agree with that assessment, but the impact of Murtha's comments--echoed by his buddies in the news media--could form the foundation for a legal appeal.
But that pre-supposes that atrocities were committed in Haditha last November. So far, all we have are allegation, and an on-going investigation. As a retired Marine Colonel, Jack Murtha supposedly knows enough to keep his yap shut and let the process work. But then again, doing things by the book wouldn't sustain his reputation as the media's favorite anti-war Congressman--never mind the fact that he's wrong far more often than he's right. And that raises another question: let's suppose that those Marine officers are exonerated for their actions at Haditha. If that happens, will Jack Murtha apologize to his "fellow" Marines?
Tuesday, May 16, 2006
Hugo's Used Fighter Sale
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is taking another poke at the Uncle Sam. He's threatening to sell his nation's small fleet of F-16 fighters to Iran, apparently in retaliation for a U.S. ban on arms sales to his government.
General Alberto Mueller, an advisor to Chavez, has recommended to the defense minister that Venezuela sell its 21 F-16s to another country. Mueller said he thought it was worthwhile to consider "the feasibility of a negotiation with Iran for the sale of those planes." The comments came one day after the U.S. announced a ban on additional arms sales to Venezuela, which totaled $34 million last year. Before the ban was announced, Washington had been putting a slow squeeze on Venezuela's access to American military technology. Previously, the U.S. had refused Caracas's request for upgrades to its F-16s, the most capable fighter in the Venezuelan inventory. Members of the Chavez government have also suggested that Venezuela might "share" its F-16s with Cuba, in response to the U.S. arms ban.
Short of military action, there really isn't much we can do to block the F-16 transfer to Iran or Cuba, if Chavez decides to go ahead with the deal. But careful observers will note that neither Tehran or Havana is exactly jumping up and down at the prospect of obtaining Yanqui F-16s.
And with good reason. The F-16 is more than a sleek, 80s-era fighter jet. It's a complete weapons system. If you plan to operate the F-16, you'll need simulators, extensive training, infrastructure upgrades and a massive inventory of spare parts, among other things. Needless to say, those "extras" don't come cheap. Beyond that, there's the question of where you can actually obtain the stuff you need to operate an F-16 squadron. Limited quantities of spare parts and munitions can be purchased on the gray market, and Venezuela could provide some assistance in flight and maintenance instruction; but to make the jets fully operational, a customer needs access to U.S. contractor support and technical data, which (in turn) requires approval of the U.S. government. Obviously, George Bush and Don Rumsfeld aren't about to sign off on an F-16 transfer to Iran or Cuba.
What about other countries who have F-16s? Well, if those countries want continued access to U.S. military hardware, they can't afford to get caught in an illegal arms transfer involving a pariah state. True, there are some exceptions to this rule (Israel's transfer of F-16 technology to China in the Lavi/F-10 program comes to mind), but it's doubtful that any current U.S. customer--especially those with a desire for future arms sales--would accept the risks entailed in supporting an illegal sale of the Venezuelan jets.
Additionally, the Iranians and Cubans already have access to fourth-generation fighter technology, thanks to their acquisition of MiG-29 FULCRUMs from Russia. The FULCRUMs y in the Iranian and Cuban inventories are, in some ways, more sophisticated than the early-generation F-16s that Hugo is trying to unload. Iran and Cuba have something else in common, too: both have had difficulty in keeping their FULCRUMs in the air, despite full access to Russian training and technical support. Without similar assistance for the F-16s, those jets would become little more than ramp decorations at some Iranian or Cuban base, slowly rusting in the sun.
Case in point: remember those Iraqi aircraft that were flown to Iran at the end of Operation Desert Storm? To date, only a handful of those fighters have returned to operational service, and only with support from the Russians. French-built Iraqi aircraft (notably Mirage F-1s) have fared even worse, spending years on the tarmac before the Iranians managed to get a few airborne. Today, most are back on the ramp, grounded by a lack of spare parts, maintenance and qualified pilots.
It's also worth remembering that simply having a fourth-generation fighter doesn't give you state-of-the-art employment capabilities. Tactically, Iranian and Cuban fighter pilots are no match for their western counterparts, and that axiom holds true for whatever airframe they might operate, including the F-16. It takes years of effort to develop the doctrine and tactics required to maximize the F-16's combat capabilities, and that's something the Venezuelans simply don't have.
Mr. Chavez may be having a fire sale down at the ol' used fighter lot, but he's going to find a dearth of serious buyers, even among our adversaries. Havana and Tehran may kick the tires a few times, but they're unlikely to conclude a deal to acquire the F-16s. Like other countries, Cuba and Iran want useable combat systems--not expensive toys that simply fill up an aircraft parking ramp. One year from now, you're likely to find Hugo's F-16s in the same spot they currently occupy--on the tarmac at a Venezuelan Air Force base.
General Alberto Mueller, an advisor to Chavez, has recommended to the defense minister that Venezuela sell its 21 F-16s to another country. Mueller said he thought it was worthwhile to consider "the feasibility of a negotiation with Iran for the sale of those planes." The comments came one day after the U.S. announced a ban on additional arms sales to Venezuela, which totaled $34 million last year. Before the ban was announced, Washington had been putting a slow squeeze on Venezuela's access to American military technology. Previously, the U.S. had refused Caracas's request for upgrades to its F-16s, the most capable fighter in the Venezuelan inventory. Members of the Chavez government have also suggested that Venezuela might "share" its F-16s with Cuba, in response to the U.S. arms ban.
Short of military action, there really isn't much we can do to block the F-16 transfer to Iran or Cuba, if Chavez decides to go ahead with the deal. But careful observers will note that neither Tehran or Havana is exactly jumping up and down at the prospect of obtaining Yanqui F-16s.
And with good reason. The F-16 is more than a sleek, 80s-era fighter jet. It's a complete weapons system. If you plan to operate the F-16, you'll need simulators, extensive training, infrastructure upgrades and a massive inventory of spare parts, among other things. Needless to say, those "extras" don't come cheap. Beyond that, there's the question of where you can actually obtain the stuff you need to operate an F-16 squadron. Limited quantities of spare parts and munitions can be purchased on the gray market, and Venezuela could provide some assistance in flight and maintenance instruction; but to make the jets fully operational, a customer needs access to U.S. contractor support and technical data, which (in turn) requires approval of the U.S. government. Obviously, George Bush and Don Rumsfeld aren't about to sign off on an F-16 transfer to Iran or Cuba.
What about other countries who have F-16s? Well, if those countries want continued access to U.S. military hardware, they can't afford to get caught in an illegal arms transfer involving a pariah state. True, there are some exceptions to this rule (Israel's transfer of F-16 technology to China in the Lavi/F-10 program comes to mind), but it's doubtful that any current U.S. customer--especially those with a desire for future arms sales--would accept the risks entailed in supporting an illegal sale of the Venezuelan jets.
Additionally, the Iranians and Cubans already have access to fourth-generation fighter technology, thanks to their acquisition of MiG-29 FULCRUMs from Russia. The FULCRUMs y in the Iranian and Cuban inventories are, in some ways, more sophisticated than the early-generation F-16s that Hugo is trying to unload. Iran and Cuba have something else in common, too: both have had difficulty in keeping their FULCRUMs in the air, despite full access to Russian training and technical support. Without similar assistance for the F-16s, those jets would become little more than ramp decorations at some Iranian or Cuban base, slowly rusting in the sun.
Case in point: remember those Iraqi aircraft that were flown to Iran at the end of Operation Desert Storm? To date, only a handful of those fighters have returned to operational service, and only with support from the Russians. French-built Iraqi aircraft (notably Mirage F-1s) have fared even worse, spending years on the tarmac before the Iranians managed to get a few airborne. Today, most are back on the ramp, grounded by a lack of spare parts, maintenance and qualified pilots.
It's also worth remembering that simply having a fourth-generation fighter doesn't give you state-of-the-art employment capabilities. Tactically, Iranian and Cuban fighter pilots are no match for their western counterparts, and that axiom holds true for whatever airframe they might operate, including the F-16. It takes years of effort to develop the doctrine and tactics required to maximize the F-16's combat capabilities, and that's something the Venezuelans simply don't have.
Mr. Chavez may be having a fire sale down at the ol' used fighter lot, but he's going to find a dearth of serious buyers, even among our adversaries. Havana and Tehran may kick the tires a few times, but they're unlikely to conclude a deal to acquire the F-16s. Like other countries, Cuba and Iran want useable combat systems--not expensive toys that simply fill up an aircraft parking ramp. One year from now, you're likely to find Hugo's F-16s in the same spot they currently occupy--on the tarmac at a Venezuelan Air Force base.
The Next "Big" Spy Scandal
There's a spy scandal brewing in southern California, but it's received little attention, except from reporters like Bill Gertz of the Washington Times.
The case began as a counter-intelligence investigation, and resulted in the arrest of a Chinese-American defense contractor, Chi Mak; his wife, Rebecca Chiu, and his brother, Tai Mak. At the time of their arrest last October, Mak and his relatives were charged with failing to register as Chinese government agents. While that's not an espionage charge, it did give federal authorities an opportunity to keep the Mak clan from fleeing the country while the investigation continues.
Now, prosecutors are apparently prepared to charge Chi Mak, Rebecca Chiu, Tai Mak and a fourth family member with conspiracy to export defense articles and attempted unlawful export of defense articles. Additionally, Chi Mak will be indicted on charges of unlawfully exporting defense articles and gathering defense information, an espionage charge. At the time of his arrest, Chi Mak was working as an electrical engineer for on Power Paragon, a Los Angeles-based defense contractor.
Authorities believe the Mak clan passed extremely sensitive defense information to the Chinese government, including data on the new Virginia-class attack submarine, and a new electro-magnetic catapult for aircraft carriers. Such information would represent an intelligence bonanza for the Chinese Navy, making it easier for them to detect (and track) U.S. subs, while improving their own sub designs. Beijing's carrier aviation program is still in its infancy, but access to electro-magnetic catapult designs could allow the Chinese to leap-frog ahead, by-passing steam-powered catapults in favor of more advanced technology.
Federal investigators reportedly found "thousands of pages" of defense documents at the home of Chi Mak after his arrest. The sensitive nature of that information led to the new charges, which will be made public as early as this week.
The Mak case highlights the espionage threat posed by the PRC, and its agents operating inside this country. Since the early 1980s, Beijing has deliberately targeted high-tech U.S. weaponry and related technology, and they've enjoyed some success. As detailed in such books as "Year of the Rat" and Mr. Gertz's own, "The China Threat," Beijing has acquired design data for advanced nuclear warheads, MIRV technology for ballistic missiles, and essentially copied our F-16 fighter, through the Israeli LAVI program. The activities of the Mak clan suggest that Beijing's espionage campaign is continuing, unabated. Tai Mak, who apparently served as a courier to Beijing, was carrying an encrypted disk with defense information when he was arrested last year at LAX.
Prosecutors are apparently moving slowly in this case, mindful of security concerns, the Wen Ho Lee debacle, and security concerns surrounding the matter. But I'll go out on a limb, and predict that more indictments are forthcoming. It will be particularly interesting to trace the employment of Chi Mak. As a defense contractor, he likely held at least a "Secret" clearance, and (given the nature of the information recovered from his home), may have held a "Top Secret" clearance and/or access to special access programs. The Virginia represents "state-of-the-art" U.S. sub technology, and disclosures about its capabilities could prove particularly damaging.
The case began as a counter-intelligence investigation, and resulted in the arrest of a Chinese-American defense contractor, Chi Mak; his wife, Rebecca Chiu, and his brother, Tai Mak. At the time of their arrest last October, Mak and his relatives were charged with failing to register as Chinese government agents. While that's not an espionage charge, it did give federal authorities an opportunity to keep the Mak clan from fleeing the country while the investigation continues.
Now, prosecutors are apparently prepared to charge Chi Mak, Rebecca Chiu, Tai Mak and a fourth family member with conspiracy to export defense articles and attempted unlawful export of defense articles. Additionally, Chi Mak will be indicted on charges of unlawfully exporting defense articles and gathering defense information, an espionage charge. At the time of his arrest, Chi Mak was working as an electrical engineer for on Power Paragon, a Los Angeles-based defense contractor.
Authorities believe the Mak clan passed extremely sensitive defense information to the Chinese government, including data on the new Virginia-class attack submarine, and a new electro-magnetic catapult for aircraft carriers. Such information would represent an intelligence bonanza for the Chinese Navy, making it easier for them to detect (and track) U.S. subs, while improving their own sub designs. Beijing's carrier aviation program is still in its infancy, but access to electro-magnetic catapult designs could allow the Chinese to leap-frog ahead, by-passing steam-powered catapults in favor of more advanced technology.
Federal investigators reportedly found "thousands of pages" of defense documents at the home of Chi Mak after his arrest. The sensitive nature of that information led to the new charges, which will be made public as early as this week.
The Mak case highlights the espionage threat posed by the PRC, and its agents operating inside this country. Since the early 1980s, Beijing has deliberately targeted high-tech U.S. weaponry and related technology, and they've enjoyed some success. As detailed in such books as "Year of the Rat" and Mr. Gertz's own, "The China Threat," Beijing has acquired design data for advanced nuclear warheads, MIRV technology for ballistic missiles, and essentially copied our F-16 fighter, through the Israeli LAVI program. The activities of the Mak clan suggest that Beijing's espionage campaign is continuing, unabated. Tai Mak, who apparently served as a courier to Beijing, was carrying an encrypted disk with defense information when he was arrested last year at LAX.
Prosecutors are apparently moving slowly in this case, mindful of security concerns, the Wen Ho Lee debacle, and security concerns surrounding the matter. But I'll go out on a limb, and predict that more indictments are forthcoming. It will be particularly interesting to trace the employment of Chi Mak. As a defense contractor, he likely held at least a "Secret" clearance, and (given the nature of the information recovered from his home), may have held a "Top Secret" clearance and/or access to special access programs. The Virginia represents "state-of-the-art" U.S. sub technology, and disclosures about its capabilities could prove particularly damaging.
Monday, May 15, 2006
Boots on the Ground
That over-used phrase has been deemed the key to securing Iraq. According to various pundits, the U.S. needs more troops on the ground to control the countryside, and bring the insurgency under control, once and for all. While additional troops would have certainly been useful, I can make the case that our troops have performed masterfully; if you don't believe me, just read those recently-captured terrorist letters where the insurgents describe their current activities as little more than a nuisance.
Funny, but the "boots on the ground" coalition won't apply the same principle to securing our southern border. President Bush's tepid plan to assigned 5,000 National Guard members to border duties (on a temporary basis) has been met with predictable "concerns" about our over-stretched military, and calls to further strengthen the Border Patrol, rather than deploy military personnel. Nebraska Senator Chuck Hagel, the junior half of the McCain-Hagel caucus, weighed in:
“We’ve got National Guard members on their second, third and fourth tours in Iraq,” Hagel said. “We have stretched our military as thin as we have ever seen it in modern times. And what in the world are we talking about here, sending a National Guard that we may not have any capacity to send up to or down to protect borders? That’s not their role.”
Perhaps I'm mistaken, but I do seem to recall something about ensuring domestic tranquility and providing for the common defense in the preamble to the Constitution. And, given the chaos that exists along our southern border, some sort of military presence seems essential to satisfy those constitutional requirements. But folks like Senator Hagel would prefer to spend a few more years recruiting (and training) more Border Patrol agents. By the time we achieve that goal, or more accurately, if we achieve that goal, another 3 or 4 million illegal immigrants will have crossed our borders, and making the crisis even worse.
Hagel's concerns actually seem premature, since President Bush will apparently propose the use of military personnel in support roles, including surveillance of the border. The work of actually trying to stop the influx of illegals will remain in the hands of overtaxed border patrol agents. In other words, we may have better information on the location and numbers of illegals attempting to enter our country, but we still won't have the necessary resources to stop them. And this is an improvement?
While the addition of surveillance assets will certainly help--assuming we can get the information into the hands of the border patrol in a timely manner--Mr. Bush's proposal already sounds like most of his immigration proposals: half-hearted, poorly conceived, and calculated with more concern about national politics than national security. The Immigration Blog has more.
Senator Hagel does have one thing in common with Mr. Bush, however. When it comes to immigration, both are woefully out of touch with the beliefs and concerns of most Americans. And, both will pay a political price for those views.
***
Postscript: If Senator Hagel doubts the importance of this issue, he might want to take a gander at the results of last week's GOP gubenatorial primary in his home state. GOP Congressman (and legendary Nebraska football coach) Tom Osborne was expected to easily defeat Governor Dave Heineman for the Republican nomination, then coast to victory against a Democratic opponent in the fall. Osborne had never received less than 80% of the vote in his past Congressional races; one of his political rivals described him as "Nebraska's God."
But Heineman defeated Osborne, in a race that hinged on the immigration issue. Heineman recently vetoed a bill that provided in-state tuition for illegal aliens at Nebraska's colleges and universities--a measure that Tom Osborne supported. Tuition rates for illegals is, admittedly, a relatively minor part of the immigration issue, but it was enough to send Tom Osborne packing. Polipundit is the only major political blog (so far) that has highlighted Osborne's stunning defeat, and the immigration issue that sealed his fate.
Funny, but the "boots on the ground" coalition won't apply the same principle to securing our southern border. President Bush's tepid plan to assigned 5,000 National Guard members to border duties (on a temporary basis) has been met with predictable "concerns" about our over-stretched military, and calls to further strengthen the Border Patrol, rather than deploy military personnel. Nebraska Senator Chuck Hagel, the junior half of the McCain-Hagel caucus, weighed in:
“We’ve got National Guard members on their second, third and fourth tours in Iraq,” Hagel said. “We have stretched our military as thin as we have ever seen it in modern times. And what in the world are we talking about here, sending a National Guard that we may not have any capacity to send up to or down to protect borders? That’s not their role.”
Perhaps I'm mistaken, but I do seem to recall something about ensuring domestic tranquility and providing for the common defense in the preamble to the Constitution. And, given the chaos that exists along our southern border, some sort of military presence seems essential to satisfy those constitutional requirements. But folks like Senator Hagel would prefer to spend a few more years recruiting (and training) more Border Patrol agents. By the time we achieve that goal, or more accurately, if we achieve that goal, another 3 or 4 million illegal immigrants will have crossed our borders, and making the crisis even worse.
Hagel's concerns actually seem premature, since President Bush will apparently propose the use of military personnel in support roles, including surveillance of the border. The work of actually trying to stop the influx of illegals will remain in the hands of overtaxed border patrol agents. In other words, we may have better information on the location and numbers of illegals attempting to enter our country, but we still won't have the necessary resources to stop them. And this is an improvement?
While the addition of surveillance assets will certainly help--assuming we can get the information into the hands of the border patrol in a timely manner--Mr. Bush's proposal already sounds like most of his immigration proposals: half-hearted, poorly conceived, and calculated with more concern about national politics than national security. The Immigration Blog has more.
Senator Hagel does have one thing in common with Mr. Bush, however. When it comes to immigration, both are woefully out of touch with the beliefs and concerns of most Americans. And, both will pay a political price for those views.
***
Postscript: If Senator Hagel doubts the importance of this issue, he might want to take a gander at the results of last week's GOP gubenatorial primary in his home state. GOP Congressman (and legendary Nebraska football coach) Tom Osborne was expected to easily defeat Governor Dave Heineman for the Republican nomination, then coast to victory against a Democratic opponent in the fall. Osborne had never received less than 80% of the vote in his past Congressional races; one of his political rivals described him as "Nebraska's God."
But Heineman defeated Osborne, in a race that hinged on the immigration issue. Heineman recently vetoed a bill that provided in-state tuition for illegal aliens at Nebraska's colleges and universities--a measure that Tom Osborne supported. Tuition rates for illegals is, admittedly, a relatively minor part of the immigration issue, but it was enough to send Tom Osborne packing. Polipundit is the only major political blog (so far) that has highlighted Osborne's stunning defeat, and the immigration issue that sealed his fate.
Better Get Some New Cellphones
That's the admonition of an "unnamed" government official (surprise, suprise) to ABC investigative journalist Brian Ross. The source tells Ross that the government is tracking phone calls made by reporters, in an effort to root out unauthorized leaks within the government. According to Ross, he does not know how the government determined who he calls, or whether his phone records (or those of other journalists) were provided by phone companies, as part of the recently-disclosed NSA data-mining effort.
The MSM will scream long and loud about this one, but let's keep things in perspective. Under existing federal statutes, intelligence officials who divulge sensitive information to the press are likely in violation of the law. The unauthorized leak of such data results in a referral from the intelligence agency to the Justice Department, which launches a criminal probe. Federal prosecutors then have the right to gather and subpoena evidence in support of that effort, including phone records. If authorities discover a series of calls between the office phone or cell phone of an intelligence officer and Brian Ross of ABC News, well, that could certainly be relevant in identifying and prosecuting leakers.
I'm not a lawyer, but at first blush, there doesn't appear to be anything illegal about this practice, particularly if the acquisition of records followed a criminal referral to the Justice Department. The media is anxious to connect the warning to Ross as part of the NSA program, but I'm guessing that the records in question are, indeed, the result of justice department investigations into unauthorized leaks. That would indicate that the investigation is moving along quickly, and indictments of suspected leakers can be expected in the coming months. As for Mr. Ross (and other journalists), they might want to prepare for a grand jury appearance. I'm sure that federal prosecutors have lots of questions about those calls to their buddies in the intelligence community.
P.S.--Given the government's apparent interest in Mr. Ross's phone records, there's a certain irony in the photograph that accompanies his postings at "The Blotter. I'm sure that some our Photoshop artists in the blogosphere will have a lot of fun with Mr. Ross and his cellphone. When you post them, send me a link.
The MSM will scream long and loud about this one, but let's keep things in perspective. Under existing federal statutes, intelligence officials who divulge sensitive information to the press are likely in violation of the law. The unauthorized leak of such data results in a referral from the intelligence agency to the Justice Department, which launches a criminal probe. Federal prosecutors then have the right to gather and subpoena evidence in support of that effort, including phone records. If authorities discover a series of calls between the office phone or cell phone of an intelligence officer and Brian Ross of ABC News, well, that could certainly be relevant in identifying and prosecuting leakers.
I'm not a lawyer, but at first blush, there doesn't appear to be anything illegal about this practice, particularly if the acquisition of records followed a criminal referral to the Justice Department. The media is anxious to connect the warning to Ross as part of the NSA program, but I'm guessing that the records in question are, indeed, the result of justice department investigations into unauthorized leaks. That would indicate that the investigation is moving along quickly, and indictments of suspected leakers can be expected in the coming months. As for Mr. Ross (and other journalists), they might want to prepare for a grand jury appearance. I'm sure that federal prosecutors have lots of questions about those calls to their buddies in the intelligence community.
P.S.--Given the government's apparent interest in Mr. Ross's phone records, there's a certain irony in the photograph that accompanies his postings at "The Blotter. I'm sure that some our Photoshop artists in the blogosphere will have a lot of fun with Mr. Ross and his cellphone. When you post them, send me a link.
The Case for Domestic Spying
The MSM is certainly doing it's part to sustain the kerfuffle over the NSA's domestic surveillance efforts. USA Today is out with a poll suggesting that a majority of Americans, at second glance, have serious reservations about the agency's use of phone company records to establish patterns of activity that may be linked to possible terrorist cells. Last week, the paper was the first media outlet to reveal the existence of the data-mining program, which doesn't actually monitor phone calls, but (instead), looks for patterns in calls that are made and received within the United States. USA Today's survey comes on the heels of a poll by ABC News and the Washington Post which revealed strong support for the program.
It's no coincidence that the paper chose to do it's own survey, and release the results at this particular time. In the wake of last week's "exclusive" on the NSA data-mining effort, USA Today apparently wanted to increase public concerns about the program, which the paper suggests is a threat to civil liberties. Such perceptions will likely take center stage at the upcoming confirmation hearings of General Michael Hayden, President Bush's nominee to run the CIA. As a former Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), Hayden was instrumental in establishing both programs in the wake of 9-11. Opponents believe that Hayden's support for the surveillance and data-mining programs may be enough to torpedo his nomination.
John Hinderaker at Powerline has an excellent dissection of this media technique, "First Mislead, Then Poll." As he notes, the NSA surveillance program (disclosed by The New York Times last December) has been widely described as a domestic wire-tapping or spying program. In reality, the effort is aimed at international communications; at least one of the callers must be outside the CONUS. The data-mining operation utilizes information that is widely available; do a Google search on "phone records," and look a the number of services that pop up, offering to provide individual calling records, at a price.
So, what the MSM describes as a "domestic spying program" is actually an international collection effort, well within the NSA's legal and operational authority. And the phone records controversy is based on data that's available to almost anyone with a credit or debit card. But that hasn't stopped the press from couching the program in terms of a sinister effort ("a massive Pentagon database, containing the records of billions of phone calls made by ordinary citizens"), and the data-mining effort will quickly morph into another "secret spy program," just in time for the Hayden confirmation hearings, and the next round of Bush job performance polls.
From an ethical standpoint, I've always had problems with the media's habit of running a poll to generate a story. But it's even more disingenuous to run polls and write stories based on information that is misleading, and appears to support a particular political agenda. Consider the phrasing of some of the poll questions:
4. Is that mainly because you do not think the program seriously violates Americans’ civil liberties, (or is it mainly because) you think investigating terrorism is the more important goal, even if it violates some Americans’ civil liberties?
5. Do you think there would ever be circumstances in which it would be right for the government to create a database of telephone records, or would it not be right for the government to do this under any circumstances?
Not just "violates," but "seriously violates" Americans civil liberties. Talk about a leading question. Or, consider the reference to the phone records database. Never mind the fact that the government has maintained such databases for years, and they've been instrumental in convicting organized crime bosses--or, that such data is widely available to anyone with an internet connection or mailing address who wants it. So much for context.
These media techniques are also dangerous because they affect a much wider (and even more important) debate on the issue of domestic spying. Judge Richard Posner, one of the brightest minds on the federal bench (and an expert on intelligence) has a new book on the subject, due out this week. In his book (and an op-ed in today's Opinion Journal) , Judge Posner makes a persuasive case for a domestic spy agency, to conduct the type of intelligence work the MSM seems so dead-set against. As Posner notes, the lack of such an agency creates a serious gap in intelligence collection efforts, and our ability to wage a successful war on terror. We urgently need a reasoned, public debate on whether such an agency should be established, and its compatibility with our civil liberties. Unfortunately, outlets like USA Today seem content to poison the well of public sentiment before thta debate can take place.
It's no coincidence that the paper chose to do it's own survey, and release the results at this particular time. In the wake of last week's "exclusive" on the NSA data-mining effort, USA Today apparently wanted to increase public concerns about the program, which the paper suggests is a threat to civil liberties. Such perceptions will likely take center stage at the upcoming confirmation hearings of General Michael Hayden, President Bush's nominee to run the CIA. As a former Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), Hayden was instrumental in establishing both programs in the wake of 9-11. Opponents believe that Hayden's support for the surveillance and data-mining programs may be enough to torpedo his nomination.
John Hinderaker at Powerline has an excellent dissection of this media technique, "First Mislead, Then Poll." As he notes, the NSA surveillance program (disclosed by The New York Times last December) has been widely described as a domestic wire-tapping or spying program. In reality, the effort is aimed at international communications; at least one of the callers must be outside the CONUS. The data-mining operation utilizes information that is widely available; do a Google search on "phone records," and look a the number of services that pop up, offering to provide individual calling records, at a price.
So, what the MSM describes as a "domestic spying program" is actually an international collection effort, well within the NSA's legal and operational authority. And the phone records controversy is based on data that's available to almost anyone with a credit or debit card. But that hasn't stopped the press from couching the program in terms of a sinister effort ("a massive Pentagon database, containing the records of billions of phone calls made by ordinary citizens"), and the data-mining effort will quickly morph into another "secret spy program," just in time for the Hayden confirmation hearings, and the next round of Bush job performance polls.
From an ethical standpoint, I've always had problems with the media's habit of running a poll to generate a story. But it's even more disingenuous to run polls and write stories based on information that is misleading, and appears to support a particular political agenda. Consider the phrasing of some of the poll questions:
4. Is that mainly because you do not think the program seriously violates Americans’ civil liberties, (or is it mainly because) you think investigating terrorism is the more important goal, even if it violates some Americans’ civil liberties?
5. Do you think there would ever be circumstances in which it would be right for the government to create a database of telephone records, or would it not be right for the government to do this under any circumstances?
Not just "violates," but "seriously violates" Americans civil liberties. Talk about a leading question. Or, consider the reference to the phone records database. Never mind the fact that the government has maintained such databases for years, and they've been instrumental in convicting organized crime bosses--or, that such data is widely available to anyone with an internet connection or mailing address who wants it. So much for context.
These media techniques are also dangerous because they affect a much wider (and even more important) debate on the issue of domestic spying. Judge Richard Posner, one of the brightest minds on the federal bench (and an expert on intelligence) has a new book on the subject, due out this week. In his book (and an op-ed in today's Opinion Journal) , Judge Posner makes a persuasive case for a domestic spy agency, to conduct the type of intelligence work the MSM seems so dead-set against. As Posner notes, the lack of such an agency creates a serious gap in intelligence collection efforts, and our ability to wage a successful war on terror. We urgently need a reasoned, public debate on whether such an agency should be established, and its compatibility with our civil liberties. Unfortunately, outlets like USA Today seem content to poison the well of public sentiment before thta debate can take place.
Friday, May 12, 2006
A Disturbing Find
The AP is reporting that inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recently found traces of "highly enriched" (read: weapons grade) uranium at a site linked to Iran's defense establishment.
Speaking on conditions of anonymity, source at the agency indicated that the finding is preliminary, and more tests are needed to confirm that the uranium is highly enriched. But the report is disturbing, and suggests that Iran may be much further along in its nuclear enrichment efforts than previous thought. Sources told the AP that the traces discovered in Iran "approach" the density of enrichment required for nuclear warheads--90% or higher. Tehran has claimed that it is enriching uranium for nuclear power reactors, which only require a 3-5% density of enrichment.
More troubling, the IAEA sources suggest that the highly enriched sample may have come from equipment removed from Iran's Lavizan-Shian Research Center. Tehran leveled that complex in late 2004, apparently to hide nuclear weapons research that was reportedly taking place there. To cover its tracks from the IAEA (and western intelligence agencies), Iranian crews tore down several buildings at Lavizan and even removed topsoil from the site.
In fairness, there may be other explanations for the highly enriched traces of uranium found recently in Iran. During a previous episode, inspectors discovered that the weapons-grade traces were left on equipment purchased from Pakistan, through the A.Q. Kahn proliferation network. Tehran may make similar claims this time around.
Lavizan-Shian has been previously described as a "repository" of nuclear-related equipment. But the massive "deconstruction" job at that site in 2004 suggests that other activity may have been occurring as well. The facility was reportedly affiliated with an Iranian university that has long been active in Tehran's nuclear program.
A worst-case scenario (based on the IAEA discovery) would suggest that Iran's nuclear enrichment efforts were well advanced in 2004, and that Iran has shifted its enrichment work to other sites. U.S. and Israeli intelligence officials have long suspected that Iran has covert nuclear facilities; the existence of such sites would have allowed Iran to raze Lavizan, while continuing to enrich weapons-grade uranium at secret complexes. A recent Israeli assessment--delivered by the Mossad chief in Washington two weeks ago--reiterates that claim. A more advanced enrichment program, producing uranium of weapons-grade quality, would allow Iran to field nuclear weapons sooner than expected.
Despite this disturbing report, the U.S. remains committed to the diplomatic track. President Bush said recently that we are in the "early stages" of diplomacy. That statement would be ironic, especially if we learn that Iran is already in the latter stages of uranium enrichment, in its rush to build a nuclear weapon.
Speaking on conditions of anonymity, source at the agency indicated that the finding is preliminary, and more tests are needed to confirm that the uranium is highly enriched. But the report is disturbing, and suggests that Iran may be much further along in its nuclear enrichment efforts than previous thought. Sources told the AP that the traces discovered in Iran "approach" the density of enrichment required for nuclear warheads--90% or higher. Tehran has claimed that it is enriching uranium for nuclear power reactors, which only require a 3-5% density of enrichment.
More troubling, the IAEA sources suggest that the highly enriched sample may have come from equipment removed from Iran's Lavizan-Shian Research Center. Tehran leveled that complex in late 2004, apparently to hide nuclear weapons research that was reportedly taking place there. To cover its tracks from the IAEA (and western intelligence agencies), Iranian crews tore down several buildings at Lavizan and even removed topsoil from the site.
In fairness, there may be other explanations for the highly enriched traces of uranium found recently in Iran. During a previous episode, inspectors discovered that the weapons-grade traces were left on equipment purchased from Pakistan, through the A.Q. Kahn proliferation network. Tehran may make similar claims this time around.
Lavizan-Shian has been previously described as a "repository" of nuclear-related equipment. But the massive "deconstruction" job at that site in 2004 suggests that other activity may have been occurring as well. The facility was reportedly affiliated with an Iranian university that has long been active in Tehran's nuclear program.
A worst-case scenario (based on the IAEA discovery) would suggest that Iran's nuclear enrichment efforts were well advanced in 2004, and that Iran has shifted its enrichment work to other sites. U.S. and Israeli intelligence officials have long suspected that Iran has covert nuclear facilities; the existence of such sites would have allowed Iran to raze Lavizan, while continuing to enrich weapons-grade uranium at secret complexes. A recent Israeli assessment--delivered by the Mossad chief in Washington two weeks ago--reiterates that claim. A more advanced enrichment program, producing uranium of weapons-grade quality, would allow Iran to field nuclear weapons sooner than expected.
Despite this disturbing report, the U.S. remains committed to the diplomatic track. President Bush said recently that we are in the "early stages" of diplomacy. That statement would be ironic, especially if we learn that Iran is already in the latter stages of uranium enrichment, in its rush to build a nuclear weapon.
Signs of Hope
Is the Bush Administration finally going to "get serious" on the issue of border security? In recent months, the White House's efforts in that area have been seriously lacking, to say the least. First, the administration floated its "amnesty" proposal, which would have put millions of illegal aliens on the road to legal resident status, and eventually, citizenship. Not surprisingly, Hispanic groups have found the measure "too stringent," while conservatives reacted with a collective barf.
If that weren't bad enough, a California newspaper reported earlier this week that Border Patrol management has been passing information on the Minutemen border monitoring group to their Mexican counterparts. The Border Patrol denided the allegation, but the paper is standing by its story. And perhaps not coincidentally, new polls show Mr. Bush's support eroding among conservatives, particularly on issues like border security.
But there may be a glimmer of hope. The San Francisco Chronicle is reporting that the Pentagon has been tasked to develop military solutions for improving border security. These "solutions" reportedly include the potential use of National Guard troops along the border, and possible employment of surveillance assets, such as drones, to monitor the border region. Detailed proposals on how the military might be used are still being developed, but border state Congressmen who have discussed the matter with the White House are said to be "encouraged" by what they've heard.
Additionally, Drudge is running a banner (no link yet) indicating that President Bush is planning to put National Guard troops on the border. Again, we don't have specific details (yet), but this report--if accurate--is another indication that the administration may be moving toward a border plan that actually enhances our security. There is additional reporting that Bush will deliver a major, primetime speech on immigration later this month, which could provide a venue for announcing new military roles in border security.
Critics on the left will denounce this "plan" as pandering to the Republican base (and it probably is, to a minor degree). I prefer to look at it as an initiative that is decades overdue. A wide-open southern border does nothing to improve our national security--it only complicates the task of guarding against terrorist infiltration into the United States. Using the military to help secure our borders will also make it easier for Mr. Bush to implement his "guest worker" program, forcing the illegals--and the American businessmen who hire them--to play by the rules. With a largely unguarded border, there is no incentive for the illegals (or their employers) to abide by existing or proposed regulations. Putting the National Guard on the border can go a long way toward reducing the illegal influx, and steer potential immigrants, guestworkers and employers toward "legal" channels.
One cautionary note: using the guard for border security (while necessary) will place yet another burden on a military force that is increasingly stretched thin. The active duty Army is already at a 1:1 operations tempo (six months at home, six months deployed), and some elements of the national guard are approaching that schedule. If the administration is serious about this proposal, it needs to assign a cadre of southwestern-based guard units to the border mission, and pull them from future rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, the Pentagon needs to ensure that these units have the resources they need to do the job, including intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets.
As always, the devil's in the operational details. As we get a better picture of the military's role in this operation, we'll see if the Bush Administration is really serious, or simply playing election-year politics.
If that weren't bad enough, a California newspaper reported earlier this week that Border Patrol management has been passing information on the Minutemen border monitoring group to their Mexican counterparts. The Border Patrol denided the allegation, but the paper is standing by its story. And perhaps not coincidentally, new polls show Mr. Bush's support eroding among conservatives, particularly on issues like border security.
But there may be a glimmer of hope. The San Francisco Chronicle is reporting that the Pentagon has been tasked to develop military solutions for improving border security. These "solutions" reportedly include the potential use of National Guard troops along the border, and possible employment of surveillance assets, such as drones, to monitor the border region. Detailed proposals on how the military might be used are still being developed, but border state Congressmen who have discussed the matter with the White House are said to be "encouraged" by what they've heard.
Additionally, Drudge is running a banner (no link yet) indicating that President Bush is planning to put National Guard troops on the border. Again, we don't have specific details (yet), but this report--if accurate--is another indication that the administration may be moving toward a border plan that actually enhances our security. There is additional reporting that Bush will deliver a major, primetime speech on immigration later this month, which could provide a venue for announcing new military roles in border security.
Critics on the left will denounce this "plan" as pandering to the Republican base (and it probably is, to a minor degree). I prefer to look at it as an initiative that is decades overdue. A wide-open southern border does nothing to improve our national security--it only complicates the task of guarding against terrorist infiltration into the United States. Using the military to help secure our borders will also make it easier for Mr. Bush to implement his "guest worker" program, forcing the illegals--and the American businessmen who hire them--to play by the rules. With a largely unguarded border, there is no incentive for the illegals (or their employers) to abide by existing or proposed regulations. Putting the National Guard on the border can go a long way toward reducing the illegal influx, and steer potential immigrants, guestworkers and employers toward "legal" channels.
One cautionary note: using the guard for border security (while necessary) will place yet another burden on a military force that is increasingly stretched thin. The active duty Army is already at a 1:1 operations tempo (six months at home, six months deployed), and some elements of the national guard are approaching that schedule. If the administration is serious about this proposal, it needs to assign a cadre of southwestern-based guard units to the border mission, and pull them from future rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, the Pentagon needs to ensure that these units have the resources they need to do the job, including intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets.
As always, the devil's in the operational details. As we get a better picture of the military's role in this operation, we'll see if the Bush Administration is really serious, or simply playing election-year politics.
The American People "Get It"
...even if folks inside the Beltway don't. According to a new ABC News-Washington Post poll, an overwhelming majority of Americans (63%) support the recently disclosed NSA program which collects data on phone calls made in the United States, in an effort to locate potential terrorists.
Some of the poll's findings are bound to dismay administration critics and the civil liberties crowd. Everyone from Newt Gingrich and Pat Robertson to the ACLU have expressed strong misgivings about the program, which gives the NSA access to calling records from at least three of the nation's largest phone companies, Bell South, Verizon and AT&T. However, the American people apparently "get it," even if the pundit class doesn't. Some interesting results from the poll:
--Almost half of those surveyed (44%) expressed strong support for the program; the 63% figure represents the total percentage of respondents who consider the NSA program an acceptable way to investigate terrorism.
-- A slightly larger majority (66%) said they would not be bothered if NSA collected records of personal calls they had made.
-- Another solid majority (65%) said it was more important to investigate terrorism, even if it intrudes on privacy. Only 30% said it was more important to protect privacy, even if it limits our investigative efforts
-- Over half (51%) approve of the way President Bush is handling privacy matters.
-- Only 24% of the poll's respondents "strongly object" to the program.
The previously classified program was disclosed just days before CIA nominee, General Michael Hayden, is scheduled to begin his confirmation hearings. It doesn't take a political operative to see that this latest "leak" was designed to embarass General Hayden, who ran the NSA when the program was created.
This poll is encouraging in several respects. First, it demonstrates that the American people have a deeper understanding of the war on terrorism--and what needs to be done--than most politicians and pundits give them credit for. Secondly, it suggests that General Hayden may have an easier time in his confirmation hearings than first believed. Senate critics may want to review the poll before using the hearings to air their gripes on NSA's surveillance efforts. The American people clearly don't have a problem with these programs, and senators placing themselves squarely against these efforts (and General Hayden) run the risk of alienating voters, in an election year.
Finally, there's actually some good political news in the poll for President Bush. On a day when another survey places his overall approval rating at 29%, the ABC/WaPo poll proves that the American people will support President Bush, when he does the right thing. If Mr. Bush would offer viable plans for securing the borders and addressing other critical issues, he would see his poll numbers rise, not decline.
Some of the poll's findings are bound to dismay administration critics and the civil liberties crowd. Everyone from Newt Gingrich and Pat Robertson to the ACLU have expressed strong misgivings about the program, which gives the NSA access to calling records from at least three of the nation's largest phone companies, Bell South, Verizon and AT&T. However, the American people apparently "get it," even if the pundit class doesn't. Some interesting results from the poll:
--Almost half of those surveyed (44%) expressed strong support for the program; the 63% figure represents the total percentage of respondents who consider the NSA program an acceptable way to investigate terrorism.
-- A slightly larger majority (66%) said they would not be bothered if NSA collected records of personal calls they had made.
-- Another solid majority (65%) said it was more important to investigate terrorism, even if it intrudes on privacy. Only 30% said it was more important to protect privacy, even if it limits our investigative efforts
-- Over half (51%) approve of the way President Bush is handling privacy matters.
-- Only 24% of the poll's respondents "strongly object" to the program.
The previously classified program was disclosed just days before CIA nominee, General Michael Hayden, is scheduled to begin his confirmation hearings. It doesn't take a political operative to see that this latest "leak" was designed to embarass General Hayden, who ran the NSA when the program was created.
This poll is encouraging in several respects. First, it demonstrates that the American people have a deeper understanding of the war on terrorism--and what needs to be done--than most politicians and pundits give them credit for. Secondly, it suggests that General Hayden may have an easier time in his confirmation hearings than first believed. Senate critics may want to review the poll before using the hearings to air their gripes on NSA's surveillance efforts. The American people clearly don't have a problem with these programs, and senators placing themselves squarely against these efforts (and General Hayden) run the risk of alienating voters, in an election year.
Finally, there's actually some good political news in the poll for President Bush. On a day when another survey places his overall approval rating at 29%, the ABC/WaPo poll proves that the American people will support President Bush, when he does the right thing. If Mr. Bush would offer viable plans for securing the borders and addressing other critical issues, he would see his poll numbers rise, not decline.
Thursday, May 11, 2006
Links and Nodes
It's one of the most effective tools for tracking terrorists and organized crime. It's called links and nodes analysis, and we've recently learned that the National Security Agency (NSA) has operated a program to support that effort, through phone company data. Predictably, the civil liberties crowd is positively atwitter.
Here's how the program works, according to media accounts. After 9-11, the NSA entered into a partnership with many of the nation's largest phone companies, including Verizon and Bell South. The companies provided information on calling patterns from millions of phone accounts; which numbers were called, how long the calls lasted, and the number of times a specific number was called from a certain phone. The effort did not include the actual monitoring of conversations by the NSA.
Obviously, this type of social network analysis, as it's sometimes referred to, can provide potential tip-offs about terrorist locations and activities. Imagine if such a program had been in place before 9-11, and indicated a flurry of activity between the hijackers and their bosses overseas. Such efforts might have allowed intelligence agencies and law enforcement to identify potential cells, possibly pre-empting the 9-11 attacks. As with the NSA program that actually monitors suspicious phone calls between the U.S. and overseas locations, there is no indication (yet) that the phone record/data mining operation violated the law.
Undeterred, Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania (who must believe that there's a secret wiretap on every phone) is already promising hearings on the matter. Another Republican, Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, openly wondered how "collecting phone numbers" fits in with "finding the enemies." Give me a break.
The data mining operation fits in quite well, Senator. To win the war on terror, we need to track down the bad guys. They talk on telephones, and sometimes place multiple calls to the same number. Using that data, we can identify links and nodes in the terrorist world, allowing us to better direct our surveillance efforts, and eventually, neutralize that cell. If a number in, say, Pakistan is getting a lot of traffic from the U.S., why not monitor that number? The calls may be completely innocent, but they might provide a harbinger of planned terrorist attacks. This program is only a "threat" to Americans with Osama on their speed dial, or Zawahiri in their "friends and family" calling circle.
If the Senate is really concerned about the implications of data mining, they could do us all a big favor and start digging into Able Danger. Now there's a scandal.
Here's how the program works, according to media accounts. After 9-11, the NSA entered into a partnership with many of the nation's largest phone companies, including Verizon and Bell South. The companies provided information on calling patterns from millions of phone accounts; which numbers were called, how long the calls lasted, and the number of times a specific number was called from a certain phone. The effort did not include the actual monitoring of conversations by the NSA.
Obviously, this type of social network analysis, as it's sometimes referred to, can provide potential tip-offs about terrorist locations and activities. Imagine if such a program had been in place before 9-11, and indicated a flurry of activity between the hijackers and their bosses overseas. Such efforts might have allowed intelligence agencies and law enforcement to identify potential cells, possibly pre-empting the 9-11 attacks. As with the NSA program that actually monitors suspicious phone calls between the U.S. and overseas locations, there is no indication (yet) that the phone record/data mining operation violated the law.
Undeterred, Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania (who must believe that there's a secret wiretap on every phone) is already promising hearings on the matter. Another Republican, Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, openly wondered how "collecting phone numbers" fits in with "finding the enemies." Give me a break.
The data mining operation fits in quite well, Senator. To win the war on terror, we need to track down the bad guys. They talk on telephones, and sometimes place multiple calls to the same number. Using that data, we can identify links and nodes in the terrorist world, allowing us to better direct our surveillance efforts, and eventually, neutralize that cell. If a number in, say, Pakistan is getting a lot of traffic from the U.S., why not monitor that number? The calls may be completely innocent, but they might provide a harbinger of planned terrorist attacks. This program is only a "threat" to Americans with Osama on their speed dial, or Zawahiri in their "friends and family" calling circle.
If the Senate is really concerned about the implications of data mining, they could do us all a big favor and start digging into Able Danger. Now there's a scandal.
Closing the Books
It's about time to close the books on the alleged "sex scandal" that reportedly involved General Michael Hayden, President Bush's nominee to lead the CIA. As we reported a couple of days ago, an organization called militarycorruption.com claimed that General Hayden "may" have had an affair with a married, female Air Force intelligence officer during a visit to Bosnia in 2001. At the time, General Hayden was director of the National Security Agency (NSA). The woman in question left active duty in 2004, and went to work as a civilian intelligence analyst. To date, we can find no information that can independently corroborate these allegations. Based on available evidence, it appears that General Hayden is an unwitting victim of a bitter divorce, and vengeful ex-husband--nothing more.
Unfortunately, these rumors have actually been making the rounds for a while. Left-wing muckraker Wayne Madsen mentioned them in a column about problems at NSA in April, 2005. But Mr. Madsen, who claims he was assigned to the NSA during his Navy career, has some obvious credibility problems. In the same article, he charges that the operational hub of NSA was evacuated on 9-11, to help cover-up the "shootdown" of United Flight 93 by military jets. Never mind that there isn't a single shred of credible evidence to support that allegation. And never mind that the reported evacuation was in response to an inbound, hi-jacked plane (the same Flight 93), which was apparently heading for Washington, D.C., on another suicide mission.
Militarycorruption.com has also been trafficking the Hayden story for more than a year, based largely on the claims of the woman's ex-husband (retired Air Force Major Kevin Furlong), who provided information on his ex-spouse. Furlong and his wife had recently divorced and it was, by all accounts, a very bitter and acrimonious break-up that produced (among other things) an e-mail threat against Major Furlong and his creation of a website featuring sexually explicit photographs of his former wife. A judge later ordered Furlong to remove that material from the internet.
In our own inquiry into the Hayden allegations, we've had the opportunity to examine more records relating to this case, including an Air Force IG investigation of the matter, conducted more than three years ago. The IG inquiry was based on a complaint from Major Furlong against his ex-wife. Readers will note that the IG found substantiation for only one charge, and she lated accepted non-judicial punishment (an Article 32) at Tyndall AFB, FL, on a single count of sodomy. The "evidence" was based on the videotape that her ex-husband provided. Interestingly, Furlong originally claimed that the man in the video was someone else, but the IG concluded that it was, in fact, Major Furlong. After receiving the Article 32, Mrs. Furlong (then a Captain) left the active ranks, and began a career as a civilian intel analyst, while retaining her officer's commission in the Air Force Reserve. She is currently works for a national-level agency in the Washington, D.C. area, and has refused comment on these matters.
Here is the IG report, in its entireity. It's rather lengthy, but (to date) remains the definitive document in this case. You can also review the document here, but be advised: the link is to a website that is openly hostile to the former Mrs. Furlong. We cannot independently verify any of these allegations, and until proven otherwise, the IG report remains the official record of the Air Force investigation. In reviewing the report, readers will note several instances where Major Furlong refuses to provide requested information, or comment on material he did supply to the IG, including a pornographic videotape.
Not surprisingly, retired Major Furlong believes the IG inquiry was a whitewash. Such allegations are hardly new in military circles, but we can only judge by what the 8th Air Force IG found. However, it is clear that the IG process is not automatic topcover for flag officers. Over the past decade, several generals have been punished for misdeeds, including the former Judge Advocate General of the Air Force ( a two-star flag officer), who was demoted to Colonel after it was reveled that he had engaged in a string of extra-marital affairs.
Did the former Mrs. Furlong receive preferential treatment from the Air Force? That's the claim levied by her ex-husband and a group of Air Force NCOs who have reportedly sponsored various websites on her story. But so far, that claim cannot be confirmed, and (more importantly), the connections between this woman and General Hayden appear to be virtually non-existent. The 8AF/IG could find no substantiation for claims of an affair, even among the notes of a marriage counselor where (according to Mr. Furlong) his ex-wife admitted to the affair. The fact that the counselor released the notes is rather revealing, since such information is normally protected by confidentiality laws.
Our initial assessment of this one hasn't changed; it appears to be a bitter divorce that has wormed its way onto the internet and into fringe elements of the media, on the basis of an infidelity claim that cannot be independently verified. As it stands, we think that Major Furlong, Mr. Madsen and militarycorruption.com owe General Hayden an apology.
Additionally, it appears that Major Furlong may have his own bone to pick with the Air Force. According to information on the website, Furlong was disciplined for marrying his wife when she was a Second Lieutenant and he was a Major. I'm guessing that there may be more to the story than he's admitting. Furlong apparently met his future wife when he was an ROTC instructor at the University of Texas and she was a cadet; if their romantic involvement began during that period, then Furlong himself was guilty of an inappropriate relationship.
****
A tip of the hat to a couple of pros who aided in this inquiry. Bill (not his real name) is a former investigative reporter (and Pulitzer Prize nominee) who now works as a legal investigator, specializing in financial fraud and other white-collar crimes. Tom (also an alias) is a former military counter-intelligence officer with decades of investigative experience. Collectively, Bill and Tom did much of the legwork and helped us locate several key documents, including the IG report. A sincere thanks to Bill and Tom for their assistance. We owe you one.
Unfortunately, these rumors have actually been making the rounds for a while. Left-wing muckraker Wayne Madsen mentioned them in a column about problems at NSA in April, 2005. But Mr. Madsen, who claims he was assigned to the NSA during his Navy career, has some obvious credibility problems. In the same article, he charges that the operational hub of NSA was evacuated on 9-11, to help cover-up the "shootdown" of United Flight 93 by military jets. Never mind that there isn't a single shred of credible evidence to support that allegation. And never mind that the reported evacuation was in response to an inbound, hi-jacked plane (the same Flight 93), which was apparently heading for Washington, D.C., on another suicide mission.
Militarycorruption.com has also been trafficking the Hayden story for more than a year, based largely on the claims of the woman's ex-husband (retired Air Force Major Kevin Furlong), who provided information on his ex-spouse. Furlong and his wife had recently divorced and it was, by all accounts, a very bitter and acrimonious break-up that produced (among other things) an e-mail threat against Major Furlong and his creation of a website featuring sexually explicit photographs of his former wife. A judge later ordered Furlong to remove that material from the internet.
In our own inquiry into the Hayden allegations, we've had the opportunity to examine more records relating to this case, including an Air Force IG investigation of the matter, conducted more than three years ago. The IG inquiry was based on a complaint from Major Furlong against his ex-wife. Readers will note that the IG found substantiation for only one charge, and she lated accepted non-judicial punishment (an Article 32) at Tyndall AFB, FL, on a single count of sodomy. The "evidence" was based on the videotape that her ex-husband provided. Interestingly, Furlong originally claimed that the man in the video was someone else, but the IG concluded that it was, in fact, Major Furlong. After receiving the Article 32, Mrs. Furlong (then a Captain) left the active ranks, and began a career as a civilian intel analyst, while retaining her officer's commission in the Air Force Reserve. She is currently works for a national-level agency in the Washington, D.C. area, and has refused comment on these matters.
Here is the IG report, in its entireity. It's rather lengthy, but (to date) remains the definitive document in this case. You can also review the document here, but be advised: the link is to a website that is openly hostile to the former Mrs. Furlong. We cannot independently verify any of these allegations, and until proven otherwise, the IG report remains the official record of the Air Force investigation. In reviewing the report, readers will note several instances where Major Furlong refuses to provide requested information, or comment on material he did supply to the IG, including a pornographic videotape.
Not surprisingly, retired Major Furlong believes the IG inquiry was a whitewash. Such allegations are hardly new in military circles, but we can only judge by what the 8th Air Force IG found. However, it is clear that the IG process is not automatic topcover for flag officers. Over the past decade, several generals have been punished for misdeeds, including the former Judge Advocate General of the Air Force ( a two-star flag officer), who was demoted to Colonel after it was reveled that he had engaged in a string of extra-marital affairs.
Did the former Mrs. Furlong receive preferential treatment from the Air Force? That's the claim levied by her ex-husband and a group of Air Force NCOs who have reportedly sponsored various websites on her story. But so far, that claim cannot be confirmed, and (more importantly), the connections between this woman and General Hayden appear to be virtually non-existent. The 8AF/IG could find no substantiation for claims of an affair, even among the notes of a marriage counselor where (according to Mr. Furlong) his ex-wife admitted to the affair. The fact that the counselor released the notes is rather revealing, since such information is normally protected by confidentiality laws.
Our initial assessment of this one hasn't changed; it appears to be a bitter divorce that has wormed its way onto the internet and into fringe elements of the media, on the basis of an infidelity claim that cannot be independently verified. As it stands, we think that Major Furlong, Mr. Madsen and militarycorruption.com owe General Hayden an apology.
Additionally, it appears that Major Furlong may have his own bone to pick with the Air Force. According to information on the website, Furlong was disciplined for marrying his wife when she was a Second Lieutenant and he was a Major. I'm guessing that there may be more to the story than he's admitting. Furlong apparently met his future wife when he was an ROTC instructor at the University of Texas and she was a cadet; if their romantic involvement began during that period, then Furlong himself was guilty of an inappropriate relationship.
****
A tip of the hat to a couple of pros who aided in this inquiry. Bill (not his real name) is a former investigative reporter (and Pulitzer Prize nominee) who now works as a legal investigator, specializing in financial fraud and other white-collar crimes. Tom (also an alias) is a former military counter-intelligence officer with decades of investigative experience. Collectively, Bill and Tom did much of the legwork and helped us locate several key documents, including the IG report. A sincere thanks to Bill and Tom for their assistance. We owe you one.
Wednesday, May 10, 2006
Raking Through the Muck
Yesterday, we reported on salicious allegations involving General Michael Hayden, President Bush's nominee to be the next CIA Director. The information was reported on the website of an organization called militarycorruption.com. In reviewing their "evidence," we found it to be a case of "he said/she won't comment." The "he" in this case is retired Air Force Major Kevin Furlong, who says his ex-wife admitted to having affairs with General Hayden (and other men). Major Furlong's former wife has refused to comment on the matter. However, she did win a court case against her ex-husband, forcing him to remove sexually explicit pictures of her from the internet.
After our first posting on the subject, we received e-mails and links from a number of alert readers, directing us to cached copies of former websites devoted to "Captain amErika" (the term militarycorruption.com uses in referring to her, due to "legal" considerations.) The websites make a number of accusations against this woman; however, we were unable to open and review any of the "cached" attachments, so it is difficult, if not impossible, to verify any of these claims.
Additionally, the ties between this woman and General Hayden appear tenuous at best. The material we reviewed said they met in the Balkans in 2001, when Captain amErika was deployed there and Hayden (then director of NSA) paid a visit to SIGINT personnel and organizations in that region. We don't have details on General Hayden's trip (yet), but it sounds like one of those routine "see the troops" visits that senior officers make on a routine basis. These visits typically include multiple sites and briefings over a compressed schedule; under those circumstances, it seems highly unlikely that a three-star flag officer would commence an affair with someone he just met. Neither the former website (nor militarycorruption.com) have evidence of any subsequent contacts between this officer and General Hayden--other than the alleged comments to her former husband, hardly an impartial observer.
The former website also insinuates that General Hayden may have played a role in securing civilian employment for the individual, after she left her last Air Force assignment at Tyndall AFB, FL. We have confirmed that the individual in question is currently employed by a certain, three-letter intelligence agency which is headquartered at an Army post in Maryland. Our contacts even provided the individual's office phone numbers and e-mail addresses, which we will not publish. Additionally, we do not know the circumstances that led to her employment at the agency. However, as an experienced intelligence officer with the requisite security clearances, she certainly met the basic criteria for employment at the organization.
It is worth noting the civil service system is designed to prevent nepotism and cronyism in hiring, although the process is far from foolproof. Even agency directors have only limited influence in hiring personnel, particularly for entry and middle-level positions. These safeguards are designed to prevent episodes like one I witnessed in my own military career. At a large USAF intelligence organization, I watched the commander try to browbeat a civilian human resources manager into hiring a waitress from a local steakhouse as a GS-12 analyst. The waitress was extremely attractive, but she had no professional experience in the intel field, and no college degree. The HR manager rightly refused and stood her ground. The Colonel became so incensed that he suspended the HR manager for five days. She filed a grievance against the Colonel and won, and his career ended not long after that incident. Admittedly a three-star general has more influence than a mere O-6, but the same rules still apply. It's hard to imagine someone as sharp as Mike Hayden trying to circumvent the personnel process to hire an alleged paramour than he apparently hadn't seen in almost three years.
After our first review of the "Hayden file," we observed that the purported evidence was "as thin as orphanage gruel." Twenty-four hours later, our initial assessment hasn't changed. If the information in the website is correct--and that's a big "if"--then Capt amErika has issues that raise questions about her personal conduct, ethical standards and ability to hold a Top Secret security clearance. But the information linking her to the CIA nominee is paper thin, and the MSM would be well-advised to think long and hard before running with this one.
Regarding the folks who "broke" this story, my message remains unchange: put up or shut up. The available evidence tells only one side of the divorce case, that of an unhappy ex-husband. If you're serious about pursuing this story, publish court records and other public documents from the Furlong's divorce case, and make a FOIA request for relevant military records. Without that information, you've got a story that even the National Enquirer wouldn't touch, long on allegation, short on demonstrable facts.
And in fairness, you might want to point out that Major Furlong apparently met his ex-wife while serving as one of her college ROTC instructors. If that's the case--and if their relationship began at that point--then retired Major Furlong was potentially guilty of serious misconduct during his military career. Any sort of romantic involvement between superiors and subordinates remains illegal under the UCMJ, something that Major Furlong should have known. Sounds like someone else in this sordid affair may have a few skeletons in his closet, too.
Excuse me, while I head for the bathroom. After this exercise in sewage sifting, I definitely need a shower.
After our first posting on the subject, we received e-mails and links from a number of alert readers, directing us to cached copies of former websites devoted to "Captain amErika" (the term militarycorruption.com uses in referring to her, due to "legal" considerations.) The websites make a number of accusations against this woman; however, we were unable to open and review any of the "cached" attachments, so it is difficult, if not impossible, to verify any of these claims.
Additionally, the ties between this woman and General Hayden appear tenuous at best. The material we reviewed said they met in the Balkans in 2001, when Captain amErika was deployed there and Hayden (then director of NSA) paid a visit to SIGINT personnel and organizations in that region. We don't have details on General Hayden's trip (yet), but it sounds like one of those routine "see the troops" visits that senior officers make on a routine basis. These visits typically include multiple sites and briefings over a compressed schedule; under those circumstances, it seems highly unlikely that a three-star flag officer would commence an affair with someone he just met. Neither the former website (nor militarycorruption.com) have evidence of any subsequent contacts between this officer and General Hayden--other than the alleged comments to her former husband, hardly an impartial observer.
The former website also insinuates that General Hayden may have played a role in securing civilian employment for the individual, after she left her last Air Force assignment at Tyndall AFB, FL. We have confirmed that the individual in question is currently employed by a certain, three-letter intelligence agency which is headquartered at an Army post in Maryland. Our contacts even provided the individual's office phone numbers and e-mail addresses, which we will not publish. Additionally, we do not know the circumstances that led to her employment at the agency. However, as an experienced intelligence officer with the requisite security clearances, she certainly met the basic criteria for employment at the organization.
It is worth noting the civil service system is designed to prevent nepotism and cronyism in hiring, although the process is far from foolproof. Even agency directors have only limited influence in hiring personnel, particularly for entry and middle-level positions. These safeguards are designed to prevent episodes like one I witnessed in my own military career. At a large USAF intelligence organization, I watched the commander try to browbeat a civilian human resources manager into hiring a waitress from a local steakhouse as a GS-12 analyst. The waitress was extremely attractive, but she had no professional experience in the intel field, and no college degree. The HR manager rightly refused and stood her ground. The Colonel became so incensed that he suspended the HR manager for five days. She filed a grievance against the Colonel and won, and his career ended not long after that incident. Admittedly a three-star general has more influence than a mere O-6, but the same rules still apply. It's hard to imagine someone as sharp as Mike Hayden trying to circumvent the personnel process to hire an alleged paramour than he apparently hadn't seen in almost three years.
After our first review of the "Hayden file," we observed that the purported evidence was "as thin as orphanage gruel." Twenty-four hours later, our initial assessment hasn't changed. If the information in the website is correct--and that's a big "if"--then Capt amErika has issues that raise questions about her personal conduct, ethical standards and ability to hold a Top Secret security clearance. But the information linking her to the CIA nominee is paper thin, and the MSM would be well-advised to think long and hard before running with this one.
Regarding the folks who "broke" this story, my message remains unchange: put up or shut up. The available evidence tells only one side of the divorce case, that of an unhappy ex-husband. If you're serious about pursuing this story, publish court records and other public documents from the Furlong's divorce case, and make a FOIA request for relevant military records. Without that information, you've got a story that even the National Enquirer wouldn't touch, long on allegation, short on demonstrable facts.
And in fairness, you might want to point out that Major Furlong apparently met his ex-wife while serving as one of her college ROTC instructors. If that's the case--and if their relationship began at that point--then retired Major Furlong was potentially guilty of serious misconduct during his military career. Any sort of romantic involvement between superiors and subordinates remains illegal under the UCMJ, something that Major Furlong should have known. Sounds like someone else in this sordid affair may have a few skeletons in his closet, too.
Excuse me, while I head for the bathroom. After this exercise in sewage sifting, I definitely need a shower.
Tuesday, May 09, 2006
The Slime-ing of General Hayden
It was probably inevitable, given today's "gotcha" media/political environment, and the CIA's own resistance to change. This story will probably enter the news cycle in the coming hours, and become part of a campaign to "slime" General Mike Hayden, the president's nominee to take over that troubled spy agency. At first glance, the charge that General Hayden might have had an extra-maritial affair seems shaky, the evidence as thin as orphanage gruel. But the lack of demonstrable facts hasn't stopped the political class and the MSM in the past. We'll see what happens this time.
The accusation against General Hayden is being reported by an organization called militarycorruption.com, run by several ex-military and media types. The organization prides itself on "fighting for the truth...exposing the corrupt." Judging from their website, the organization seems to spend a lot of time on sex-related cases, and allegations of misconduct by senior officers and other high-ranking officials. Some of their cases are well known, such as the former Air Force Judge Advocate General, demoted and forced into retirement for a string of affairs during his military career. Other investigations by the website are obscure, and have received little attention--even in military circles.
But the Hayden accusation is bound to be a block-buster. According to the organization's website, General Hayden "might" have had an extra-marital affair with with a then-married, female NSA officer which militarycorruption.com identifies as "Captain Amerika." No timeline is given for the affair, and the website refuses to name her for "legal reasons." The accuser in this case is the woman's ex-husband, identified as "former" Air Force Major Kevin Furlong. Major Furlong told the organization that his ex-wife admitted having affairs with Hayden and other men. In return, Furlong reportedly posted nude pictures of his ex-wife on the internet, until a judge ordered him to remove them. There's obviously no love lost between Furlong and his ex-wife, who was never accused of misconduct, and later promoted to major.
Militarycorruption.com won't provide any details on Furlong's military career (describing him as "former" rather than "retired' suggests he left the Air Force before serving 20 years--it would be interesting to know why he left early, and under what circumstances). Additionally, the organization will not disclose his current location, other than to say he lives in Texas. Sorry, but when you level that sort of charge against a presidential nominee, you give up some measure of your right to privacy. Additionally, the website has no copies of the Furlongs' divorce filings (which should be public record), documents that are central to this accusation. And, of course, the former Mrs. Furlong is only identified by the moniker "Captain Amerika" because of "legal reasons" (read: threatened lawsuit).
In other words, what we have are an accusation of an obviously disgruntled ex-husband, with no proof to support his allegations other than "his word." By even internet standards, that's extraordinarily skimpy "evidence" (and I use that term advisedly). But that hasn't stopped the folks at militarycorruption.com from running with the story. And, given the opposition marshalling against General Hayden, the accusation may well gain traction in the coming days, providing a potential mechanism for derailing the nomination.
For the record, I don't know General Hayden and never worked for him. My only knowledge of the man and his conduct comes from indivduals who have worked with him and for him over the past three decades. Without fail, they describe him as an exceptional leader with impeccable character. There's also the little matter of his "vetting" for the NSA and DDNI posts. While no background check is completely fool-proof, it is doubtful that Hayden would have been nominated as Negroponte's deputy if there was any evidence of past misconduct. Ditto for his selection for the CIA post.
My message to militarycorruption.com is simple: put up or shut up. You've floated a scandalous accusation against one of the nation's top intelligence officials--a charge that could potentially end his career. Offer more substantial proof, or drop the story and apologize to General Hayden. Publish copies of the Furlongs' divorce filings and other relevant, public documents. Tell us more about Major Furlong, and under what circumstances he left the Air Force. Tell us about the legal actions that forced him to remove those nude photos of his wife from the internet, and what impact--if any--it had on his military career. And, most importantly, make Furlong available for interviews with other bloggers and journalists.
As it stands, this "story" stinks to high heaven--salicious charges, but little in the way of hard evidence to back them up. But most media types never let the "facts" get in the way of advancing their agenda, and I'm sure they'd welcome the opportunity to "slime" General Hayden. I'm willing to bet $100 that both the NYT and WaPo have reporters on their way to Texas, in search of the mysterious Major Furlong.
***UPDATE***
1232 PDT
In a 2004 posting at militarycorruption.com about this alleged affair, Furlong is identified as a "retired" major, indicating that he served long enough to qualify for a pension. However, there are still lots of questions behind his allegations--questions that deserve answers.
The accusation against General Hayden is being reported by an organization called militarycorruption.com, run by several ex-military and media types. The organization prides itself on "fighting for the truth...exposing the corrupt." Judging from their website, the organization seems to spend a lot of time on sex-related cases, and allegations of misconduct by senior officers and other high-ranking officials. Some of their cases are well known, such as the former Air Force Judge Advocate General, demoted and forced into retirement for a string of affairs during his military career. Other investigations by the website are obscure, and have received little attention--even in military circles.
But the Hayden accusation is bound to be a block-buster. According to the organization's website, General Hayden "might" have had an extra-marital affair with with a then-married, female NSA officer which militarycorruption.com identifies as "Captain Amerika." No timeline is given for the affair, and the website refuses to name her for "legal reasons." The accuser in this case is the woman's ex-husband, identified as "former" Air Force Major Kevin Furlong. Major Furlong told the organization that his ex-wife admitted having affairs with Hayden and other men. In return, Furlong reportedly posted nude pictures of his ex-wife on the internet, until a judge ordered him to remove them. There's obviously no love lost between Furlong and his ex-wife, who was never accused of misconduct, and later promoted to major.
Militarycorruption.com won't provide any details on Furlong's military career (describing him as "former" rather than "retired' suggests he left the Air Force before serving 20 years--it would be interesting to know why he left early, and under what circumstances). Additionally, the organization will not disclose his current location, other than to say he lives in Texas. Sorry, but when you level that sort of charge against a presidential nominee, you give up some measure of your right to privacy. Additionally, the website has no copies of the Furlongs' divorce filings (which should be public record), documents that are central to this accusation. And, of course, the former Mrs. Furlong is only identified by the moniker "Captain Amerika" because of "legal reasons" (read: threatened lawsuit).
In other words, what we have are an accusation of an obviously disgruntled ex-husband, with no proof to support his allegations other than "his word." By even internet standards, that's extraordinarily skimpy "evidence" (and I use that term advisedly). But that hasn't stopped the folks at militarycorruption.com from running with the story. And, given the opposition marshalling against General Hayden, the accusation may well gain traction in the coming days, providing a potential mechanism for derailing the nomination.
For the record, I don't know General Hayden and never worked for him. My only knowledge of the man and his conduct comes from indivduals who have worked with him and for him over the past three decades. Without fail, they describe him as an exceptional leader with impeccable character. There's also the little matter of his "vetting" for the NSA and DDNI posts. While no background check is completely fool-proof, it is doubtful that Hayden would have been nominated as Negroponte's deputy if there was any evidence of past misconduct. Ditto for his selection for the CIA post.
My message to militarycorruption.com is simple: put up or shut up. You've floated a scandalous accusation against one of the nation's top intelligence officials--a charge that could potentially end his career. Offer more substantial proof, or drop the story and apologize to General Hayden. Publish copies of the Furlongs' divorce filings and other relevant, public documents. Tell us more about Major Furlong, and under what circumstances he left the Air Force. Tell us about the legal actions that forced him to remove those nude photos of his wife from the internet, and what impact--if any--it had on his military career. And, most importantly, make Furlong available for interviews with other bloggers and journalists.
As it stands, this "story" stinks to high heaven--salicious charges, but little in the way of hard evidence to back them up. But most media types never let the "facts" get in the way of advancing their agenda, and I'm sure they'd welcome the opportunity to "slime" General Hayden. I'm willing to bet $100 that both the NYT and WaPo have reporters on their way to Texas, in search of the mysterious Major Furlong.
***UPDATE***
1232 PDT
In a 2004 posting at militarycorruption.com about this alleged affair, Furlong is identified as a "retired" major, indicating that he served long enough to qualify for a pension. However, there are still lots of questions behind his allegations--questions that deserve answers.
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