AFP has an interesting, unsigned piece on an emerging terrorist threat: radio-controlled aircraft and small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). They are readily available, relatively easy to build and operate, and extremely difficult to detect. In the hands of a terrorist organization, these "flying robots" could be used to deliver a small explosive device--or a chemical or biological payload--against "soft" targets.
As the article notes, some terrorists are already exploring this technology. Hizballah has obtained a small fleet of UAVs from Iran, and flew one over norther Israel on 11 April 2005. A videotape of the flight reportedly aired on a Hizballah TV station in Lebanon, and Israeli defense sources have reportedly confirmed a second flight as well. In both cases, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) was unaware of the intrusion until the UAV was well inside Israel's airspace, and had been sighted by ground observers. These flight(s) represented a major psychological and propaganda for Hizballah, which (until now) had no effective means of challenging the IAF's control of the Israeli skies.
With their small size (a wing span of five meters or less), use of lightweight materials, slow operating speeds and the ability to operate at low altitude, these remotely-piloted aircraft are almost impossible to detect on radar. Most of these devices have a radar cross-section that is miniscule; additionally, the "velocity gate" feature of most surveillance and target-tracking radars automatically eliminate targets operating at slow speeds, so a terrorist UAV, hang-glider or hobby aircraft would never appear on the screen--even if the radar managed to detect it.
These potential threats cover the spectrum from over-sized, radio-controlled model planes and helicopters, to hang-gliders and ultra-lights and small UAVs. Radio-controlled aircraft are inexpensive, and can be obtained on-line, or from a local hobby shop. Hang-gliders and ultra-lights are also readily available, mostly in kit forms that can be quickly assembled. UAVs are more expensive, but still within reach for a terrorist organization. And with scores of UAV manufacturers around the world (and no proliferation controls), terrorists are limited only by their financial resources and technical accumen. But even those restrictions can be easily overcome, as evidenced by Iran's transfer of UAVs to Hizballah, and the widespread use of GPS technology. GPS allows a terrorist ultralight, hang glider or UAV to navigate precisely, and reach pre-determine targets--without the use of complex data link signals that could be potentially jammed.
These types of aircraft have two limitations: a small payload, and in most cases, a relatively short range. However, these deficiencies are less important in a chemical or biological attack, where a small amount of agent, delivered to the right target by by remoted controlled ultralight or UAV, could have devastating results. The same holds true for a small, air-delivered explosive warhead, employed against such targets as oil refineries, POL storage, or power plants.
At least one expert claims that little attention has been paid to this threat. That's not entirely true. I know at least one Air Force organization that recently completed a major assessment of this threat, and the information has been presented to several high-level audiences. As for mitigation efforts, that's another story. In deployment situations, our military forces have the resources to deal with terrorist ultra-lights and UAVs (shoulder-fired SAMs, attack aircraft, helicopters), but linking them together in a viable defensive scheme remains problematic. In a homeland defense scenario, the problems are more acute, and deserve serious consideration. The potential threat from this type of technology will only grow in the years to come.
A slightly scary footnote: the article references a New Zealand engineer, Bruce Simpson, who has demonstrated how terrorists could build a crude--but effective--cruise missile for under $5,000, using off-the-shelf technology. Simpson's website recounts those efforts--and pressure from the U.S. and New Zealand governments to shut down the project.
Tuesday, May 09, 2006
Monday, May 08, 2006
Mikey Weinstein's Crusade
Air Force Major General Jack Catton is in a bit of hot water. The service has launched an inquiry over an appeal that General Catton sent from his official e-mail account, urging fellow Air Force Academy classmates to contribute to the Congressional campaign of another academy graduate.
Catton currently serves as Director of Requirements at Air Combat Command Headquarters, located at Langley AFB, Virginia. He sent the fund-raising e-mail last Thursday to about 200 former classmates, many of whom are still on active duty. Federal laws--most notably, the Hatch Act--prohibit federal employees from using their position to solicit campaign contributions, or votes for a particular candidate. Military regulations contain similar prohibitions. An Air Force spokesman told the Washington Post that "appropriate officials are inquiring into the facts surrounding these e-mails."
In his e-mail, General Catton urged his classmates to support Bentley Rayburn, a retired Air Force general now running for Congress from the Colorado Springs area. Rayburn is seeking to replace retiring Colorado Republican Joel Hefley, who has represented the district for the past 20 years. Hefley's district includes the Air Force Academy, two Air Force bases and thousands of active duty and retired personnel. Catton told fellow academy grads that "we are certainly in need of Christian men with integrity and military experience in Congress."
The Post obtained its copy of Catton's e-mail from another Air Force Academy graduate, Mike L. "Mikey" Weinstein of Albuquerque, New Mexico. If the name sounds familiar, it should be. Weinstein, an attorney and businessmen, has been in the news over the past couple of years, who is suing the Air Force over what he contends is extensive proselytizing by evangelical Christians. Weinstein contends that his sons have endured anti-Semitic remarks and discrimination while attending the Air Force Academy. One of Weinstein's sons graduated last May; the other is still a member of the cadet corps.
Predictably, Weinstein's crusade has made him something of a folk hero among the seperation of church and state crowd, the liberal left, and other assorted secularists. He's even found a second career as a professional speaker, offering his thoughts on the "Showdown in Colorado Springs," and "The Fight to Keep Church and State Separate."
We've written extensively about Weinstein's campaign, which have helped formulate an overblown religious "crisis" at the Academy, and created an unwelcome diversion away from the institution's primary mission, training future Air Force officers. Thanks (in part) to Weinstein's efforts, the academy has imposed faith sensitivity training for all assigned personnel, military and civilian. The academy also turned to the Yale Divinity School--no friend of conservative Christians--for an assessment of its religious "atmosphere" and ways to improve tolerance. Not surprisingly, the Yale team sided with Mikey Weinstein.
Make no mistake: the Air Force (and the academy) should never tolerate religious bigotry or discrimination. And there are effective ways of dealing with anti-Semitic slurs and proselytizing--including the cadet honor code and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). But those techniques won't satisfy critics like Mr. Weinstein, his friends in the MSM, or at groups like Americans United for Separation of Church and State. Ironically, this campaign to ensure religious freedom at the academy has actually produced a backlash against evangelicals--on a campus where 90% of the cadets identify themselves as Christians.
But the fallout from Weinstein's crusade has produced than sensitivity sessions. At least one officer, Brigadier General Johnny Weida, the former academy Commandant of Cadets, has seen his career derailed because of the "scandal." Weida's transgressions? Failing to rein in those pesky evangelicals (who papered the cadet dining hall with flyers for a screening of The Passion of the Christ), and delivering an address to the cadets in which General Weida said an officer's first responsibility is to his "god." Note the small "g." Weida, a self-described, born-again Christian, never told cadets to pray in the name of Jesus, Mohammed, Budda or anyone else. But that was enough to incur the wrath of Weinstein and his fellow activists. Weida left the academy last summer, his name was removed from the promotion list for Major General, and he's now in a relatively back-water position at Wright-Patterson AFB, in Ohio.
Now, Major General Catton is in the cross-hairs. Admittedly, Catton did a very dumb thing, and he probably deserves an administrative slap on the wrist. But if recent history is any indicator, Weinstein and his crusaders won't be satisfied until Catton is removed from his position, and his career is effectively ended. So much for tolerance.
****
There's one more angle to this story that merits further inquiry, IMO. General Rayburn is a 1975 graduate of the Air Force Academy; Catton graduated in 1976, Weinstein in 1977, and General Weida received his degree and commission in 1978. In other words, all four were in the cadet wing at the same time. Obviously, the wing is a large organization, typically, more than 2,000 cadets, scatterd across multiple squadrons and groups. As at a civilian university, it is quite possible to spend four years at military academy and be unfamiliar with scores of classmates.
But the wing is also a surprisingly intimate environment, where reputations are made, friendships established, and rivalries formed umder tense, demanding conditions. It would be interesting to know what relationships--if any--existed between Rayburn, Catton, Weinstein and Weida during their days in Colorado Springs. As earlier graduates, Rayburn and Catton would have been in a position to help supervise the Weinstein's Basic Cadet Training, the grueling summer orientation program for new arrivals. Did a grudge from more than three decades ago, play a role in Weinstein's crusade against the academy, and his former classmates?
Catton currently serves as Director of Requirements at Air Combat Command Headquarters, located at Langley AFB, Virginia. He sent the fund-raising e-mail last Thursday to about 200 former classmates, many of whom are still on active duty. Federal laws--most notably, the Hatch Act--prohibit federal employees from using their position to solicit campaign contributions, or votes for a particular candidate. Military regulations contain similar prohibitions. An Air Force spokesman told the Washington Post that "appropriate officials are inquiring into the facts surrounding these e-mails."
In his e-mail, General Catton urged his classmates to support Bentley Rayburn, a retired Air Force general now running for Congress from the Colorado Springs area. Rayburn is seeking to replace retiring Colorado Republican Joel Hefley, who has represented the district for the past 20 years. Hefley's district includes the Air Force Academy, two Air Force bases and thousands of active duty and retired personnel. Catton told fellow academy grads that "we are certainly in need of Christian men with integrity and military experience in Congress."
The Post obtained its copy of Catton's e-mail from another Air Force Academy graduate, Mike L. "Mikey" Weinstein of Albuquerque, New Mexico. If the name sounds familiar, it should be. Weinstein, an attorney and businessmen, has been in the news over the past couple of years, who is suing the Air Force over what he contends is extensive proselytizing by evangelical Christians. Weinstein contends that his sons have endured anti-Semitic remarks and discrimination while attending the Air Force Academy. One of Weinstein's sons graduated last May; the other is still a member of the cadet corps.
Predictably, Weinstein's crusade has made him something of a folk hero among the seperation of church and state crowd, the liberal left, and other assorted secularists. He's even found a second career as a professional speaker, offering his thoughts on the "Showdown in Colorado Springs," and "The Fight to Keep Church and State Separate."
We've written extensively about Weinstein's campaign, which have helped formulate an overblown religious "crisis" at the Academy, and created an unwelcome diversion away from the institution's primary mission, training future Air Force officers. Thanks (in part) to Weinstein's efforts, the academy has imposed faith sensitivity training for all assigned personnel, military and civilian. The academy also turned to the Yale Divinity School--no friend of conservative Christians--for an assessment of its religious "atmosphere" and ways to improve tolerance. Not surprisingly, the Yale team sided with Mikey Weinstein.
Make no mistake: the Air Force (and the academy) should never tolerate religious bigotry or discrimination. And there are effective ways of dealing with anti-Semitic slurs and proselytizing--including the cadet honor code and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). But those techniques won't satisfy critics like Mr. Weinstein, his friends in the MSM, or at groups like Americans United for Separation of Church and State. Ironically, this campaign to ensure religious freedom at the academy has actually produced a backlash against evangelicals--on a campus where 90% of the cadets identify themselves as Christians.
But the fallout from Weinstein's crusade has produced than sensitivity sessions. At least one officer, Brigadier General Johnny Weida, the former academy Commandant of Cadets, has seen his career derailed because of the "scandal." Weida's transgressions? Failing to rein in those pesky evangelicals (who papered the cadet dining hall with flyers for a screening of The Passion of the Christ), and delivering an address to the cadets in which General Weida said an officer's first responsibility is to his "god." Note the small "g." Weida, a self-described, born-again Christian, never told cadets to pray in the name of Jesus, Mohammed, Budda or anyone else. But that was enough to incur the wrath of Weinstein and his fellow activists. Weida left the academy last summer, his name was removed from the promotion list for Major General, and he's now in a relatively back-water position at Wright-Patterson AFB, in Ohio.
Now, Major General Catton is in the cross-hairs. Admittedly, Catton did a very dumb thing, and he probably deserves an administrative slap on the wrist. But if recent history is any indicator, Weinstein and his crusaders won't be satisfied until Catton is removed from his position, and his career is effectively ended. So much for tolerance.
****
There's one more angle to this story that merits further inquiry, IMO. General Rayburn is a 1975 graduate of the Air Force Academy; Catton graduated in 1976, Weinstein in 1977, and General Weida received his degree and commission in 1978. In other words, all four were in the cadet wing at the same time. Obviously, the wing is a large organization, typically, more than 2,000 cadets, scatterd across multiple squadrons and groups. As at a civilian university, it is quite possible to spend four years at military academy and be unfamiliar with scores of classmates.
But the wing is also a surprisingly intimate environment, where reputations are made, friendships established, and rivalries formed umder tense, demanding conditions. It would be interesting to know what relationships--if any--existed between Rayburn, Catton, Weinstein and Weida during their days in Colorado Springs. As earlier graduates, Rayburn and Catton would have been in a position to help supervise the Weinstein's Basic Cadet Training, the grueling summer orientation program for new arrivals. Did a grudge from more than three decades ago, play a role in Weinstein's crusade against the academy, and his former classmates?
Roberts Redux?
For most of the day, we've heard various members of Congress and the drive-by media express "concern" about General Mike Hayden's nomination to be the next CIA Director. Just a few hours ago, Senator John Kerry (you may recall, he served in Vietnam) told a firefighters' convention that he had "serious reservations" about Hayden's selection because "he is one of the main supporters of Donald Rumsfeld who helped put in place the programs of spying on Americans and has been one of the biggest defenders of it." Not exactly a pithy soundbite, but you've got to give Kerry credit for capturing all of the DNC talking points in a single sentence.
Other senators (chief among them, Pennsylvania's Arlen Spector) promised to use the confirmation hearings to ask "tough questions" about the NSA's controversial "domestic" surveillance program. You'll note the quotation marks around the word domestic, because, as another retired spook reminded me, the term does not accurately describe the NSA effort. As General Hayden explained back in January, the program covers communications between suspected terrorists or facilitators in the United States and their counterparts overseas.
You might also recall that Mr. Spector and his co-horts were prepared to ask those questions a few months ago, when the Senate had an opportunity to hold hearings on the matter. But something happened along the way. The Senate decided to take a pass on hearings, for reasons that were never quite clear. The truth is, Senate critics quickly discovered they didn't have a leg to stand on, particulary after it was disclosed that General Hayden (who was NSA Director at the time) had briefed key members of Congress from the start. The Senators also discovered ample evidence that the NSA program was run in full compliance with the law, and more importantly, it was yielding valuable information on terrorist activties.
If this kind of talk from Capitol Hill sounds vaguely familiar, it should be. Not too many months ago, Senators were vowing to grill Supreme Court nominee John Roberts on abortion and other high-profile issues. But that inquisition never quite materialized, either. In his confirmation hearings, Justice Robert dazzled everyone, demonstrating legal depth and understanding that was far beyond that, of say, Joe Biden, Ted Kennedy or the Senate stafferes that furnished their questions. The Roberts confirmation hearings never quite became a love-fest, but as the nominee kept knocking their "hard" queries out of the park, the senators decided to cut their losses, and given Roberts an up-or-down vote.
The Hayden hearings may prove to be a similar tour-de-force for the nominee. Mike Hayden isn't as telegenic as John Roberts, but when it comes to intelligence matters, no one is more knowledgable, or experienced. General Hayden has served his country as an intelligence officer for more than 40 years, in positions ranging from analyst to agency director. He will enter the hearing room loaded for bear, with a formidable grasp of intel issues that no Senator or staffer can match. And, as he demonstrated in January, General Hayden is capable of defending controversial intelligence programs with compelling facts and logic. His powerful arguments in favor of the surveillance effort are one reason why the Senate took a pass on those promised hearings a few months ago.
Any Senator wishing to go toe-to-toe with Mike Hayden on matters of intelligence management, analysis, operations or doctrine does so at his own public peril. In boxing terms, the Roberts cpmfor,atopm was a first-round knock-out, and General Hayden can deliver the same type of performance when he enters the hearing room.
****
From the "grasping at straws" department, USA Today weighed in with this howler on supposed "holes" in Hayden's resume. According to the experts at the paper, Hayden may have trouble winning confirmation because of (a) his lack of experience in HUMINT matters and (b) a lack of assignments in the Middle East. While we've noted in the past that General Hayden has never been a HUMINT officer, that does not disqualify him for the CIA job. As a career intelligence officer (with more than 35 years of experience), Hayden has led organizations with HUMINT departments, most notably the intelligence directorate (J-2) at U.S. European Command.
Additionally, most critics overlook Hayden's tour at the U.S. Embassy in Bulgaria, where he served as a defense attache. One of the primary missions of any attache is--guess what--gathering information, so the idea that Hayden lacks HUMINT skills is ludicrous. Besides, the President nominated General Hayden to run the CIA, not agent networks in the field. Hayden has more than enough experience in HUMINT to and find the right people to run the agency's field operations, and revitalize that directorate within the agency.
His supposed "lack of experience in the Middle East" is another non-starter. As DIRNSA (Director of NSA) he received daily updates on intelligence in that region, and he's made more than a few trips to that region. The NSA's recent success against terrorists are a reflection of a director who understood that threat, and empowered his people to get the job done. He can do the same thing at Langley, despite these gaping "holes" in his resume.
Other senators (chief among them, Pennsylvania's Arlen Spector) promised to use the confirmation hearings to ask "tough questions" about the NSA's controversial "domestic" surveillance program. You'll note the quotation marks around the word domestic, because, as another retired spook reminded me, the term does not accurately describe the NSA effort. As General Hayden explained back in January, the program covers communications between suspected terrorists or facilitators in the United States and their counterparts overseas.
You might also recall that Mr. Spector and his co-horts were prepared to ask those questions a few months ago, when the Senate had an opportunity to hold hearings on the matter. But something happened along the way. The Senate decided to take a pass on hearings, for reasons that were never quite clear. The truth is, Senate critics quickly discovered they didn't have a leg to stand on, particulary after it was disclosed that General Hayden (who was NSA Director at the time) had briefed key members of Congress from the start. The Senators also discovered ample evidence that the NSA program was run in full compliance with the law, and more importantly, it was yielding valuable information on terrorist activties.
If this kind of talk from Capitol Hill sounds vaguely familiar, it should be. Not too many months ago, Senators were vowing to grill Supreme Court nominee John Roberts on abortion and other high-profile issues. But that inquisition never quite materialized, either. In his confirmation hearings, Justice Robert dazzled everyone, demonstrating legal depth and understanding that was far beyond that, of say, Joe Biden, Ted Kennedy or the Senate stafferes that furnished their questions. The Roberts confirmation hearings never quite became a love-fest, but as the nominee kept knocking their "hard" queries out of the park, the senators decided to cut their losses, and given Roberts an up-or-down vote.
The Hayden hearings may prove to be a similar tour-de-force for the nominee. Mike Hayden isn't as telegenic as John Roberts, but when it comes to intelligence matters, no one is more knowledgable, or experienced. General Hayden has served his country as an intelligence officer for more than 40 years, in positions ranging from analyst to agency director. He will enter the hearing room loaded for bear, with a formidable grasp of intel issues that no Senator or staffer can match. And, as he demonstrated in January, General Hayden is capable of defending controversial intelligence programs with compelling facts and logic. His powerful arguments in favor of the surveillance effort are one reason why the Senate took a pass on those promised hearings a few months ago.
Any Senator wishing to go toe-to-toe with Mike Hayden on matters of intelligence management, analysis, operations or doctrine does so at his own public peril. In boxing terms, the Roberts cpmfor,atopm was a first-round knock-out, and General Hayden can deliver the same type of performance when he enters the hearing room.
****
From the "grasping at straws" department, USA Today weighed in with this howler on supposed "holes" in Hayden's resume. According to the experts at the paper, Hayden may have trouble winning confirmation because of (a) his lack of experience in HUMINT matters and (b) a lack of assignments in the Middle East. While we've noted in the past that General Hayden has never been a HUMINT officer, that does not disqualify him for the CIA job. As a career intelligence officer (with more than 35 years of experience), Hayden has led organizations with HUMINT departments, most notably the intelligence directorate (J-2) at U.S. European Command.
Additionally, most critics overlook Hayden's tour at the U.S. Embassy in Bulgaria, where he served as a defense attache. One of the primary missions of any attache is--guess what--gathering information, so the idea that Hayden lacks HUMINT skills is ludicrous. Besides, the President nominated General Hayden to run the CIA, not agent networks in the field. Hayden has more than enough experience in HUMINT to and find the right people to run the agency's field operations, and revitalize that directorate within the agency.
His supposed "lack of experience in the Middle East" is another non-starter. As DIRNSA (Director of NSA) he received daily updates on intelligence in that region, and he's made more than a few trips to that region. The NSA's recent success against terrorists are a reflection of a director who understood that threat, and empowered his people to get the job done. He can do the same thing at Langley, despite these gaping "holes" in his resume.
Let the Confirmation Battle Begin
To absolutely no one's surprise (but some Congressional disappointment), President Bush today nominated Air Force General Mike Hayden to be the next Director of the CIA.
"Mike Hayden is supremely qualified for this position," said Mr. Bush in making the announcement. "He knows intelligence community from the ground up...he has been both a producer and consumer of intelligence." Hayden, the nation's highest-ranking military intelligence officer, appeared with President Bush in the Oval Office, where the nomination was announced.
We agree with the President. Hayden is a superb choice, an exceptionally effective intelligence leader who--if confirmed--can continue needed reforms at the CIA.
Unfortunately, Hayden's confirmation hearings may prove contentious. The general's role in the NSA domestic surveillance program (when he ran the National Security Agency) has some senators up in arms (paging Arlen Specter). Others are "concerned" about Hayden's status as an active duty military officer, fearing that it will give the military "too much control" over the nation's intelligence community.
As we pointed out yesterday, such "concerns" are basically a red herring. The Pentagon has long controlled the bulk of the nation's intelligence budget; afterall, they provide most of our collection assets. Additionally, there is a long history of military officers leading intelligence agencies; both the NSA director's job and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency are, by law, military positions. And, in the early days of the CIA, the agency's first three directors were uniformed officers. Even the CIA's current deputy director is a Navy admiral, though that will apparently become a civilian billet, with Hayden coming onboard.
If American is serious about reforming the CIA, then General Hayden should have confirmation hearings that focus on genuine intelligence issues, not ill-founded concerns about what uniform he wears to the office. At this juncture in the War on Terror, General Hayden (and the agency) deserve a speedy confirmation process, and a quick up-or-down vote. Hayden is hardly an unknown commodity on Capitol Hill and in the intelligence community; his outstanding record speaks for itself.
This is not, as some of the chattering class suggest, "another Harriet Miers." Hayden is the right man for the job, at the right time. If he somehow fails to win confirmation, it will only underscore my long-standing fears about Congress: when it comes to the serious busienss of intelligence reform, our representatives and Senators aren't up to the task.
Addendum: Journalist James Bamford, who has written two best-selling books about the NSA and has interviewed Hayden extensively, believes the general's chances of confirmation "have dropped below" 50%. I sincerely hope he's wrong.
"Mike Hayden is supremely qualified for this position," said Mr. Bush in making the announcement. "He knows intelligence community from the ground up...he has been both a producer and consumer of intelligence." Hayden, the nation's highest-ranking military intelligence officer, appeared with President Bush in the Oval Office, where the nomination was announced.
We agree with the President. Hayden is a superb choice, an exceptionally effective intelligence leader who--if confirmed--can continue needed reforms at the CIA.
Unfortunately, Hayden's confirmation hearings may prove contentious. The general's role in the NSA domestic surveillance program (when he ran the National Security Agency) has some senators up in arms (paging Arlen Specter). Others are "concerned" about Hayden's status as an active duty military officer, fearing that it will give the military "too much control" over the nation's intelligence community.
As we pointed out yesterday, such "concerns" are basically a red herring. The Pentagon has long controlled the bulk of the nation's intelligence budget; afterall, they provide most of our collection assets. Additionally, there is a long history of military officers leading intelligence agencies; both the NSA director's job and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency are, by law, military positions. And, in the early days of the CIA, the agency's first three directors were uniformed officers. Even the CIA's current deputy director is a Navy admiral, though that will apparently become a civilian billet, with Hayden coming onboard.
If American is serious about reforming the CIA, then General Hayden should have confirmation hearings that focus on genuine intelligence issues, not ill-founded concerns about what uniform he wears to the office. At this juncture in the War on Terror, General Hayden (and the agency) deserve a speedy confirmation process, and a quick up-or-down vote. Hayden is hardly an unknown commodity on Capitol Hill and in the intelligence community; his outstanding record speaks for itself.
This is not, as some of the chattering class suggest, "another Harriet Miers." Hayden is the right man for the job, at the right time. If he somehow fails to win confirmation, it will only underscore my long-standing fears about Congress: when it comes to the serious busienss of intelligence reform, our representatives and Senators aren't up to the task.
Addendum: Journalist James Bamford, who has written two best-selling books about the NSA and has interviewed Hayden extensively, believes the general's chances of confirmation "have dropped below" 50%. I sincerely hope he's wrong.
Sunday, May 07, 2006
The Issue of Civilian Control
There's an interesting theme that emerged on the Sunday morning talking head shows, regarding the expected nomination of General Mike Hayden to be the next CIA Director. Several Congressmen and Senators have expressed concern about Hayden's status as a military officer, saying that the CIA should be led by a civilian, and expressing fears that the CIA might somehow be "gobbled up" by the defense intelligence establishment.
Republican Congressman Peter Hoekstra of Michigan appears to be leading the charge. Appearing on "Fox News Sunday," Hokestra said that General Hayden would be "the wrong person, the wrong place at the wrong time," despite a distinguished career as an intelligence officer. Hoekstra believes Hayden's appointment would only exacerbate problems between the CIA and the DOD:
"There is ongoing tensions between this premier civilian intelligence agency and DOD as we speak...And I think putting a general in charge, regardless of how good Mike is-...is going to send the wrong signal through the agency here in Washington but also to our agents in the field around the world."
Similar comments were expressed by Senator Diane Feinstein of California, Senator Saxby Chambless of Georgia and Delaware's Joe Biden. Feinstein opined that "you can't have the military control major aspects of intelligence." More on that bit of ignorance in a second. Always eager to advance DNC talking points, the AP helpfully points out that with Hayden as CIA director, military officers would be in charge of the nation's three major spy agencies, and the Pentagon would control 80% of the intelligence budget.
To borrow a phrase from TV weatherman Lloyd Lindsay Young, well H-e-l-l-o Congressman Hoekstra, members of the Senate, and the rest of the pundit crowd. Here's a little news flash you apparently missed: the Defense Department already provides much of the nation's intelligence capabilities, and has long controlled the lion's share of the of the intel budget. Need a U-2, RC-135, or Global Hawk mission to keep tabs on Iraq? Call the Air Force. Need a sub to insert an agent team or do some covert collection work along a hostile shore? Call the Navy. Need a SOF team to gather information along the Pakistan border? Better let the Army know.
And we haven't even scratched the surface, in terms of who exploits the data collected by those (and other) DOD assets, and converts that information into finished intelligence. This might surprise Senator Feinstein, but each of the military services have extensive intel production, exploitation and dissemination (PED) operations, which make major contributions to the national intelligence effort. For example, many of the nation's linguists are military personnel, serving in one of the service cryptologic elements. In fact, the service SIGINT elements and NSA are so seamlessly integrated, it's often difficult to tell where the "civilian" agency stops, and the military element begins.
Remember those comments about the military running the three major spy agencies? Here's a salient fact you won't find in the AP report, or in a sound bite from those "concerned" Senators and Representatives. Two of the agencies cited by the AP (NSA and the Defense Intelligence Agency) have always been run by the military. Both the NSA and DIA director's positions are three-star military billets, rotated among the services. When General Hayden left NSA, he was replaced by Army Lieutenant General Keith Alexander. Another Army officer, Lieutenant General Jack Maple, is the current DIA Director, and a three-star general or admiral is expected to be the next director of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA). Nothing unusual about that.
In fact, these fears about eroding "civilian control" over intelligence are something of a red herring. Apparently, Chairman Hoekstra has forgotten that General Hayden has a civilian boss (John Negroponte) who sits atop the nation's intelligence community. Beyond that, the DNI and the agency chiefs work for another civilian, the Commander-in-Chief. The DNI, like the DCI before him, will always be a civilian--as it should be. Likewise, the military will always have a major say in running our intelligence efforts because the DOD provides a significant portion of our collection, analytical and production capabilities. That shouldn't change, either.
With the CIA at a critical crossroads in its history, it's disappointing--but entirely predictable--that Congress is suddenly worried about General Hayden's military status. If that is a genuine issue, then it can easily be fixed; we can simply hold his retirement ceremony the day before he takes charge of the CIA. The real issue should be--must be--the continued reform of a spy agency that has become bloated, less effective, and highly partisan. Sadly, that over-arching concern appears lost on the talking head set, who are more concerned about advancing personal agendas (I'm sure Hoekstra has his own choice to run the CIA) and scoring cheap political points.
Republican Congressman Peter Hoekstra of Michigan appears to be leading the charge. Appearing on "Fox News Sunday," Hokestra said that General Hayden would be "the wrong person, the wrong place at the wrong time," despite a distinguished career as an intelligence officer. Hoekstra believes Hayden's appointment would only exacerbate problems between the CIA and the DOD:
"There is ongoing tensions between this premier civilian intelligence agency and DOD as we speak...And I think putting a general in charge, regardless of how good Mike is-...is going to send the wrong signal through the agency here in Washington but also to our agents in the field around the world."
Similar comments were expressed by Senator Diane Feinstein of California, Senator Saxby Chambless of Georgia and Delaware's Joe Biden. Feinstein opined that "you can't have the military control major aspects of intelligence." More on that bit of ignorance in a second. Always eager to advance DNC talking points, the AP helpfully points out that with Hayden as CIA director, military officers would be in charge of the nation's three major spy agencies, and the Pentagon would control 80% of the intelligence budget.
To borrow a phrase from TV weatherman Lloyd Lindsay Young, well H-e-l-l-o Congressman Hoekstra, members of the Senate, and the rest of the pundit crowd. Here's a little news flash you apparently missed: the Defense Department already provides much of the nation's intelligence capabilities, and has long controlled the lion's share of the of the intel budget. Need a U-2, RC-135, or Global Hawk mission to keep tabs on Iraq? Call the Air Force. Need a sub to insert an agent team or do some covert collection work along a hostile shore? Call the Navy. Need a SOF team to gather information along the Pakistan border? Better let the Army know.
And we haven't even scratched the surface, in terms of who exploits the data collected by those (and other) DOD assets, and converts that information into finished intelligence. This might surprise Senator Feinstein, but each of the military services have extensive intel production, exploitation and dissemination (PED) operations, which make major contributions to the national intelligence effort. For example, many of the nation's linguists are military personnel, serving in one of the service cryptologic elements. In fact, the service SIGINT elements and NSA are so seamlessly integrated, it's often difficult to tell where the "civilian" agency stops, and the military element begins.
Remember those comments about the military running the three major spy agencies? Here's a salient fact you won't find in the AP report, or in a sound bite from those "concerned" Senators and Representatives. Two of the agencies cited by the AP (NSA and the Defense Intelligence Agency) have always been run by the military. Both the NSA and DIA director's positions are three-star military billets, rotated among the services. When General Hayden left NSA, he was replaced by Army Lieutenant General Keith Alexander. Another Army officer, Lieutenant General Jack Maple, is the current DIA Director, and a three-star general or admiral is expected to be the next director of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA). Nothing unusual about that.
In fact, these fears about eroding "civilian control" over intelligence are something of a red herring. Apparently, Chairman Hoekstra has forgotten that General Hayden has a civilian boss (John Negroponte) who sits atop the nation's intelligence community. Beyond that, the DNI and the agency chiefs work for another civilian, the Commander-in-Chief. The DNI, like the DCI before him, will always be a civilian--as it should be. Likewise, the military will always have a major say in running our intelligence efforts because the DOD provides a significant portion of our collection, analytical and production capabilities. That shouldn't change, either.
With the CIA at a critical crossroads in its history, it's disappointing--but entirely predictable--that Congress is suddenly worried about General Hayden's military status. If that is a genuine issue, then it can easily be fixed; we can simply hold his retirement ceremony the day before he takes charge of the CIA. The real issue should be--must be--the continued reform of a spy agency that has become bloated, less effective, and highly partisan. Sadly, that over-arching concern appears lost on the talking head set, who are more concerned about advancing personal agendas (I'm sure Hoekstra has his own choice to run the CIA) and scoring cheap political points.
Our Snaggle-Toothed Future?
If you're one of those folks who favor a single-payer, national health care system, take a look at this article from todays' edition of The New York Times.
In Britain, where dental care falls under their national health care system, the shortage of dentists has become so acute that many Brits are now doing their own extractions and other dental procedures. The Times interviewed a gentleman named William Kelly who has already pulled one of his own teeth (leaving a blackened, jagged stump), and he plans to do another extraction in the near future. By his own admission, Kelly (who hasn't seen a dentist in at least six years) can't find a national health program dentist that is willing to take him on as a new patient.
In a system where virtually all health care procedures are rationed, many British dentists arenow abandoning the national health system for private practice, where they operate without government-imposed limits on the number of fillings, cleanings and extractions that can be performed each year. According to the British Dental Association, at least 2,000 dentists left the national health plan for private practice in April alone, and more are sure to follow. Nationwide, the number of national health plan participants with access to a dentist continues to decline, and Britain's reputation for rotten teeth--long fodder for comedians both at home and abroad--seems to be emerging as a political issue.
Reading the article, you should thank their molars that we've resisted (so far) the temptation to nationalize our health care system. Few of us enjoy going to the dentist, left alone paying bills for crowns, braces, and other expensive procedures. But quality dental care remains readily available in our country, and to a certain degree, affordable.
It's also a question of personal priorities. In the photo that accompanied the Times article, I spied several tatoos on Mr. Kelly's exposed hand and arm. Apparently, he has enough money for "body art," but none for a dental work. Likewise, the Times interviewed several Brits who plan to seek dental care abroad, in countries like Hungary and India. While the cost of these "dental holidays" is lower than comparable, private treatment in London, they are not inexpensive. That suggests that many Brits are quite willing to pay for quality dental care, but they need a system which favors market forces and increased competition--not a single payer program and procedure "rationing."
National health care remains a dream of the American left, and in particular, a certain Senator from New York. If the Democrats regain control of the White House in 2008, the health care issue is likely to surface again, and some liberals will actually cite the British system as a model for the United States. If you want to take a look at American dental care under a nationalized system, look no further than Britain, and its legacy of bad teeth and (increasingly) do-it-yourself dentistry.
In Britain, where dental care falls under their national health care system, the shortage of dentists has become so acute that many Brits are now doing their own extractions and other dental procedures. The Times interviewed a gentleman named William Kelly who has already pulled one of his own teeth (leaving a blackened, jagged stump), and he plans to do another extraction in the near future. By his own admission, Kelly (who hasn't seen a dentist in at least six years) can't find a national health program dentist that is willing to take him on as a new patient.
In a system where virtually all health care procedures are rationed, many British dentists arenow abandoning the national health system for private practice, where they operate without government-imposed limits on the number of fillings, cleanings and extractions that can be performed each year. According to the British Dental Association, at least 2,000 dentists left the national health plan for private practice in April alone, and more are sure to follow. Nationwide, the number of national health plan participants with access to a dentist continues to decline, and Britain's reputation for rotten teeth--long fodder for comedians both at home and abroad--seems to be emerging as a political issue.
Reading the article, you should thank their molars that we've resisted (so far) the temptation to nationalize our health care system. Few of us enjoy going to the dentist, left alone paying bills for crowns, braces, and other expensive procedures. But quality dental care remains readily available in our country, and to a certain degree, affordable.
It's also a question of personal priorities. In the photo that accompanied the Times article, I spied several tatoos on Mr. Kelly's exposed hand and arm. Apparently, he has enough money for "body art," but none for a dental work. Likewise, the Times interviewed several Brits who plan to seek dental care abroad, in countries like Hungary and India. While the cost of these "dental holidays" is lower than comparable, private treatment in London, they are not inexpensive. That suggests that many Brits are quite willing to pay for quality dental care, but they need a system which favors market forces and increased competition--not a single payer program and procedure "rationing."
National health care remains a dream of the American left, and in particular, a certain Senator from New York. If the Democrats regain control of the White House in 2008, the health care issue is likely to surface again, and some liberals will actually cite the British system as a model for the United States. If you want to take a look at American dental care under a nationalized system, look no further than Britain, and its legacy of bad teeth and (increasingly) do-it-yourself dentistry.
A Mandate for Change
Sunday's headline in The New York Times: "Exit of Spy Chief Viewed as Move to Recast Agency" merely confirms reports that have been making the rounds in the intelligence community. Namely, the reformation of the CIA is far from complete, and the next agency director (most likely, General Michael Hayden) will attempt to implement sweeping changes at Langley. When that process is complete, the CIA will be an organization devoted largely to human intelligence collection and covert ops, with less emphasis on analysis and policy formulation.
Indeed, the CIA of the future will be a shadow of its former self (no pun intended). Much of its analytical function will eventually move to other organizations, such as the National Intelligence Council--which works directly for the Director of National Intelligence, John Negroponte--or the recently-established National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC). Both are seen as more logical homes for much of the analytical capabilities that once resided at Langley, when the CIA chief also led the nation's intelligence community.
General Hayden is likely to encouter stiff resistance as he reshapes the agency. But he encountered similar resistance before, when he took control of a floundering National Security Agency in the late 1990s. Facing the dual challenges of an ossified civilian bureaucracy and the global migration to fiber optic, web-based and encrypted communications, General Hayden pushed through a reform program that made the agency more responsive to its customers.
While the agency has been criticized for failing to pinpoint the 9-11 plot before it was executed, the NSA recovered quickly from that set-back. Many observers have noted that much of our success in locating (and capturing) senior Al-Qaida officials is the result of improvements in NSA capabilties during General Hayden's tenure. He also succeeded in quieting criticism of the agency's controversial domestic surveillance program, conducting a series of high-profile interviews, speeches and press conferences, pointing out (a) the program was operating within the law; (b) key members of Congress were "in the loop from the start, and (c), the program was producing valuable information on Al-Qaida and its activities.
Hayden's effective management skills made him the longest-serving NSA director in the agency's history. While other intelligence leaders were sent packing (George Tenent), or denied chance to stay in their jobs (former DIA Director Vice-Admiral Lowell Jacoby comes to mind), Hayden was asked to stay on, eventually earning him a promotion to the DDNI post, and his fourth star.
Along with his impressive management skills, General Hayden also brings other key requirements to the CIA job. First, he has the full support of the DNI, and secondly, he shares Ambassador Negroponte's vision for reforming the intelligence community and the CIA. Agency insiders who cheered at word of Goss's depature may find soon find themselves wising he'd stayed on. There is every reason to believe that General Hayden will attempt to accelerate the pace of change at Langley, with the backing of the of his boss, and the Commander-in-Chief.
It will be an uphill battle. As NSA Director, Hayden was clearly in his element. Much of his Air Force intel career was spent in SIGINT (signals intelligence); and in some respects, many of his earlier assignments were preparation for the director's job at Fort Meade. At the CIA, Hayden will enter a realm where he has less experience, but it would be a colossal mistake for the agency's anti-Administration or anti-reform cabals to under-estimate him. He is going to Langley with a mandate for sweeping change, and General Hayden has the management skills and political savvy to make planned reforms a reality. When he retires from the CIA (assuming his tenure is at least three years) the agency will be vastly different than the one he inherited. And hopefully, much better at its assigned mission.
Indeed, the CIA of the future will be a shadow of its former self (no pun intended). Much of its analytical function will eventually move to other organizations, such as the National Intelligence Council--which works directly for the Director of National Intelligence, John Negroponte--or the recently-established National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC). Both are seen as more logical homes for much of the analytical capabilities that once resided at Langley, when the CIA chief also led the nation's intelligence community.
General Hayden is likely to encouter stiff resistance as he reshapes the agency. But he encountered similar resistance before, when he took control of a floundering National Security Agency in the late 1990s. Facing the dual challenges of an ossified civilian bureaucracy and the global migration to fiber optic, web-based and encrypted communications, General Hayden pushed through a reform program that made the agency more responsive to its customers.
While the agency has been criticized for failing to pinpoint the 9-11 plot before it was executed, the NSA recovered quickly from that set-back. Many observers have noted that much of our success in locating (and capturing) senior Al-Qaida officials is the result of improvements in NSA capabilties during General Hayden's tenure. He also succeeded in quieting criticism of the agency's controversial domestic surveillance program, conducting a series of high-profile interviews, speeches and press conferences, pointing out (a) the program was operating within the law; (b) key members of Congress were "in the loop from the start, and (c), the program was producing valuable information on Al-Qaida and its activities.
Hayden's effective management skills made him the longest-serving NSA director in the agency's history. While other intelligence leaders were sent packing (George Tenent), or denied chance to stay in their jobs (former DIA Director Vice-Admiral Lowell Jacoby comes to mind), Hayden was asked to stay on, eventually earning him a promotion to the DDNI post, and his fourth star.
Along with his impressive management skills, General Hayden also brings other key requirements to the CIA job. First, he has the full support of the DNI, and secondly, he shares Ambassador Negroponte's vision for reforming the intelligence community and the CIA. Agency insiders who cheered at word of Goss's depature may find soon find themselves wising he'd stayed on. There is every reason to believe that General Hayden will attempt to accelerate the pace of change at Langley, with the backing of the of his boss, and the Commander-in-Chief.
It will be an uphill battle. As NSA Director, Hayden was clearly in his element. Much of his Air Force intel career was spent in SIGINT (signals intelligence); and in some respects, many of his earlier assignments were preparation for the director's job at Fort Meade. At the CIA, Hayden will enter a realm where he has less experience, but it would be a colossal mistake for the agency's anti-Administration or anti-reform cabals to under-estimate him. He is going to Langley with a mandate for sweeping change, and General Hayden has the management skills and political savvy to make planned reforms a reality. When he retires from the CIA (assuming his tenure is at least three years) the agency will be vastly different than the one he inherited. And hopefully, much better at its assigned mission.
Saturday, May 06, 2006
Sticking Up for the Bad Guys
John Hinderaker at Powerline and Joe Malchow at Dartblog saw this one first, but I can't resist the temptation to chime in. Today's edition of The New York Times contains an article that somehow reaches a new low of duplicity with our enemies. In case you missed it, Timesman C.J. Chivers actually produced an article defending Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's apparent incompetence with a U.S.-made weapon in recently-discovered outtakes from the terror leader's newest propaganda video.
Earlier this week, coaliton officials in Baghdad screened the outtakes during a media briefing, taking obvious delight as Zarqawi fumbled with a Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW), used by American military forces. At one point in the sequence, the gun jams, and the terror leader is unable to clear it, requiring the assistance of another terrorist. The second insurgent simply pulls back on the on the bolt, standard procedure for inserting the first round into the chamber of an automatic weapon, or clearing a jammed round.
But that's understandable, according to Chivers. He interviews a pair of former military officers who caution against reading too much into the mistake. A third officer (still on active duty, speaking anonmyously) observes that Zarqawi can't be expected to be proficient with U.S. weapons, since most of the automatic and semi-automatic rifles used by terrorists are of "simpler" Soviet design. Chivers also notes that U.S. soldiers and Marines who use the SAW undergo "many days of training" to achieve basic proficiency with the weapon.
Excuse me, Mr. Chivers, but Zarqawi's obvious inepitude isn't even a matter of basic proficiency. Pulling back on the We talking Weapons Fundamentals 101, something that ranks right up there with "Never Point a Loaded Weapon at Someone Else" (which, by the way, Zarqawi also managed in his little outtake). The first remedy for a jam in any type of machine gun or infantry weapon is to pull back on the bolt, and clear the chamber.
If I were actually assessing Zarqawi's proficiency with the weapon, I'd have to rate him as a total incompetent; prior to the jam, we see the terrorist leader cradling the SAW in arms like Rambo, spraying rounds at random. Another lesson from Weapons 101 teaches that fire is more effective when you actually aim the weapon, by using the sight. "Spray and pray" is not an effective technique for hitting the target.
To his credit, Chivers did manage to interview--of all people--a college professor, who pointed out the propaganda value of embarassing Zarqawi. Afterall, the reason Zarqawi made the video in the first place was depict himself as a skilled and determined leader of Al-Qaida in Iraq. The tape was clearly based on similar efforts from Zarqawi's boss, Osama bin Laden, right down to the weapons sequence. However, unlike Zarqawi, bin Laden seems to have some idea of how to use an automatic weapon. In one of his most-repeated video bits, we see bin Laden firing an AK-47 from a seated position, and actually using the weapon's sight.
One of Chivers's sources claim that even the embarassing outtake could aid Zarqawi, since it depicts the terror leader as well-fed and equipped. I'd say the opposite is also true, showing a man who is content to let others do the fighting (and dying) for him. Contrary to the Times assertions, the images in the outtake are embarassing, and that's exactly why Zarqawi excluded them from his "finished" product.
Earlier this week, coaliton officials in Baghdad screened the outtakes during a media briefing, taking obvious delight as Zarqawi fumbled with a Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW), used by American military forces. At one point in the sequence, the gun jams, and the terror leader is unable to clear it, requiring the assistance of another terrorist. The second insurgent simply pulls back on the on the bolt, standard procedure for inserting the first round into the chamber of an automatic weapon, or clearing a jammed round.
But that's understandable, according to Chivers. He interviews a pair of former military officers who caution against reading too much into the mistake. A third officer (still on active duty, speaking anonmyously) observes that Zarqawi can't be expected to be proficient with U.S. weapons, since most of the automatic and semi-automatic rifles used by terrorists are of "simpler" Soviet design. Chivers also notes that U.S. soldiers and Marines who use the SAW undergo "many days of training" to achieve basic proficiency with the weapon.
Excuse me, Mr. Chivers, but Zarqawi's obvious inepitude isn't even a matter of basic proficiency. Pulling back on the We talking Weapons Fundamentals 101, something that ranks right up there with "Never Point a Loaded Weapon at Someone Else" (which, by the way, Zarqawi also managed in his little outtake). The first remedy for a jam in any type of machine gun or infantry weapon is to pull back on the bolt, and clear the chamber.
If I were actually assessing Zarqawi's proficiency with the weapon, I'd have to rate him as a total incompetent; prior to the jam, we see the terrorist leader cradling the SAW in arms like Rambo, spraying rounds at random. Another lesson from Weapons 101 teaches that fire is more effective when you actually aim the weapon, by using the sight. "Spray and pray" is not an effective technique for hitting the target.
To his credit, Chivers did manage to interview--of all people--a college professor, who pointed out the propaganda value of embarassing Zarqawi. Afterall, the reason Zarqawi made the video in the first place was depict himself as a skilled and determined leader of Al-Qaida in Iraq. The tape was clearly based on similar efforts from Zarqawi's boss, Osama bin Laden, right down to the weapons sequence. However, unlike Zarqawi, bin Laden seems to have some idea of how to use an automatic weapon. In one of his most-repeated video bits, we see bin Laden firing an AK-47 from a seated position, and actually using the weapon's sight.
One of Chivers's sources claim that even the embarassing outtake could aid Zarqawi, since it depicts the terror leader as well-fed and equipped. I'd say the opposite is also true, showing a man who is content to let others do the fighting (and dying) for him. Contrary to the Times assertions, the images in the outtake are embarassing, and that's exactly why Zarqawi excluded them from his "finished" product.
Farewell to the Hanoi Taxi
Around 9:30 this morning, the last Air Force C-141 Starlifter returned to Wright-Patterson AFB, near Dayton, Ohio, ending a career that spanned more than 40 years. The retirement had been in the works for several years; for almost a decade, the Air Force has been phasing out the C-141, replacing the venerable transports with the newer, more capable C-17 Globemaster III.
But the C-141 that landed today at Wright-Pat will be remembered as more than the last Starlifter to fly an operational mission. Back in 1973, it was the first aircraft to bring our POWs home from North Vietnam. The repatriation flights earned that particular aircraft a nickname--the "Hanoi Taxi"--and a place in military history.
The Dayton Daily News has coverage of the C-141's next-to-last hop--Friday's special "reunion" flight of more than 100 Vietnam POWs and their families. For some of the former prisoners of war, it was the first time they had seen each other (and their Freedom Bird) in more than 30 years.
Video of the event from WHIO-TV.
In retirement, the Hanoi Taxi will become part of the permanent exhibit at the National Museum of the U.S. Air Force, also located at Wright-Patterson AFB.
Today's Reading Assignment
...from the always-incisive Rick Moran at Right Wing Huthouse. In the wake of the Goss resignation, Rick asks the $64,000 question: Just How Dysfunctional are Our Intelligence Agencies? When it comes to the CIA, the answer is "very." Rick has assembled a plateful of pummeling facts from media sources and the 9-11 Commisson report, painting a picture of an agency that was in serious trouble long before Porter Goss was named DCI.
Meanwhile, critics of Goss and/or the Bush Administration are having their say, telling the WaPo's Dana Priest that the departing CIA director was ineffective, he alientated the work force, drove off senior managers, and made the situation at Langley worse, not better. Priest even rustles up a few quotes that downplay the political war between the White House and the anti-Bush cabal within the intelligence agency.
Obviously, Dana Priest has no interest in citing reports and articles that paint a very different picture of the "relations" between the Bush Administration and its critics at Langley. But, as Rick Moran reminds us, there is ample evidence of a vicious, partisan conflict pitting elements within the intelligence community squarely against the White House. Winning that war, while reforming the CIA, represent the two critical challenges facing the next director.
Addendum: for whatever it's worth, I don't believe our other spy agencies are as dysfunctional as the CIA (thank God). The Defense Intelligence Agency is in the midst of a major re-organization that will transform intel analysis within the military; NSA is infinitely better off than it was in the late 90s (thanks to General Hayden's reform plans); NGA's problems are largely external, i.e., collecting against adversaries that are increasingly aware of our overhead platforms and capabilities. The NRO has some issues regarding the next generation of spy satellites, but agency still produces technical marvels that belie its relatively small size. Even the FBI has improved its intelligence capabilities, thanks (in part) to the removal of the "Gorelick Wall" by the Bush Administration, enhancing its ability to work with other agencies.
In other words, the CIA remains the most dysfunctional member of the intelligence family. And I think General Hayden will implement the most effective solution: reassign its analytical assets to the National Intelligence Council (working under the DNI), and refocus the CIA on two core missions: HUMINT and covert ops. The result will be a CIA that is much smaller, more focused, and (ultimately) more effective.
Meanwhile, critics of Goss and/or the Bush Administration are having their say, telling the WaPo's Dana Priest that the departing CIA director was ineffective, he alientated the work force, drove off senior managers, and made the situation at Langley worse, not better. Priest even rustles up a few quotes that downplay the political war between the White House and the anti-Bush cabal within the intelligence agency.
Obviously, Dana Priest has no interest in citing reports and articles that paint a very different picture of the "relations" between the Bush Administration and its critics at Langley. But, as Rick Moran reminds us, there is ample evidence of a vicious, partisan conflict pitting elements within the intelligence community squarely against the White House. Winning that war, while reforming the CIA, represent the two critical challenges facing the next director.
Addendum: for whatever it's worth, I don't believe our other spy agencies are as dysfunctional as the CIA (thank God). The Defense Intelligence Agency is in the midst of a major re-organization that will transform intel analysis within the military; NSA is infinitely better off than it was in the late 90s (thanks to General Hayden's reform plans); NGA's problems are largely external, i.e., collecting against adversaries that are increasingly aware of our overhead platforms and capabilities. The NRO has some issues regarding the next generation of spy satellites, but agency still produces technical marvels that belie its relatively small size. Even the FBI has improved its intelligence capabilities, thanks (in part) to the removal of the "Gorelick Wall" by the Bush Administration, enhancing its ability to work with other agencies.
In other words, the CIA remains the most dysfunctional member of the intelligence family. And I think General Hayden will implement the most effective solution: reassign its analytical assets to the National Intelligence Council (working under the DNI), and refocus the CIA on two core missions: HUMINT and covert ops. The result will be a CIA that is much smaller, more focused, and (ultimately) more effective.
You Read it Here First
Better late than never, I suppose. Time magazine reported late last night that General Michael Hayden is expected to be named the new CIA Director on Monday. Hayden, who currently serves as Deputy Director of National Intelligence (DDNI), and is a former head of the National Security Agency (NSA), has been praised for his ability to reform intelligence organizations, and work across agency lines.
Time, Ed Driscoll and others have warned that Hayden's nomination is likely to re-ignite the Congressional "food fight" over the NSA's domestic surveillance program, which was expanded after 9-11, when General Hayden was serving as the agency's director. I disagree. There may be a few sharp questions in his confirmation hearings, but any effort to reject Hayden on the basis of the NSA program will fail, and fail quickly. Two reasons: first, we quickly learned after the program became "public," that Congress was very much in the loop; General Hayden or his deputies had briefed key members of the intelligence committee on a regular basis, and no one raised a peep until The New York Times ran its story. Secondly, all available evidence indicates that the program was run by the letter of the law, and finally, the surveillance effort had produced significant results.
It's hard to argue against a candidate who turned around the nation's largest spy agency (the NSA), even earning praise from the agency's harshest critics; reformed the SIGINT community to meet the challenges of cell phone technology, the internet and publicly-available encryption, and helped establish the DNI. Hayden's confirmation hearings may not be a slam dunk, but it will be pretty close. Perhaps the real question regarding Hayden's likely appointment is his military status. Senator Pat Roberts of Kansas, Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, suggested last night that a "military candidate" for CIA director could retire from active duty after confirmation, ensuring continued "civilian" control of the agency. Ironically, the first three DCIs were all active-duty military officers, and two retired officers have also run the CIA. General Hayden recently received his fourth star, but doesn't have enough time in grade to retire as a full general. I'm guessing President Bush can take care of that problem, if Hayden elects to retire before assuming control of the CIA.
I'm sure the folks at Time are congratulating themselves on their little scoop. But remember: we first identified Hayden as the next CIA director on Friday morning, about 12 hours before the magazine reached the same conclusion. Once again, the blogsphere runs circles around the drive-by media.
Time, Ed Driscoll and others have warned that Hayden's nomination is likely to re-ignite the Congressional "food fight" over the NSA's domestic surveillance program, which was expanded after 9-11, when General Hayden was serving as the agency's director. I disagree. There may be a few sharp questions in his confirmation hearings, but any effort to reject Hayden on the basis of the NSA program will fail, and fail quickly. Two reasons: first, we quickly learned after the program became "public," that Congress was very much in the loop; General Hayden or his deputies had briefed key members of the intelligence committee on a regular basis, and no one raised a peep until The New York Times ran its story. Secondly, all available evidence indicates that the program was run by the letter of the law, and finally, the surveillance effort had produced significant results.
It's hard to argue against a candidate who turned around the nation's largest spy agency (the NSA), even earning praise from the agency's harshest critics; reformed the SIGINT community to meet the challenges of cell phone technology, the internet and publicly-available encryption, and helped establish the DNI. Hayden's confirmation hearings may not be a slam dunk, but it will be pretty close. Perhaps the real question regarding Hayden's likely appointment is his military status. Senator Pat Roberts of Kansas, Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, suggested last night that a "military candidate" for CIA director could retire from active duty after confirmation, ensuring continued "civilian" control of the agency. Ironically, the first three DCIs were all active-duty military officers, and two retired officers have also run the CIA. General Hayden recently received his fourth star, but doesn't have enough time in grade to retire as a full general. I'm guessing President Bush can take care of that problem, if Hayden elects to retire before assuming control of the CIA.
I'm sure the folks at Time are congratulating themselves on their little scoop. But remember: we first identified Hayden as the next CIA director on Friday morning, about 12 hours before the magazine reached the same conclusion. Once again, the blogsphere runs circles around the drive-by media.
Friday, May 05, 2006
Free Fall
Speaking of spin, our friends at Reuters can always be counted on to faithfully publish the latest DNC talking points. Consider their dispatch on the impact of today's intelligence shake-up: CIA Health Questioned as Goss Quits.
Over the course of twelve paragraphs or so, the Reuters correspondent manages to quote four critics of Goss and his reform plan. Chief among them is California Congresswoman Jane Harman, the ranking Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee. According to Ms. Harman, the agency is now in "free fall," a phrase that will likely be repreated (and often) on the Sunday morning pundit shows.
There's really nothing new in any of the criticisms leveled in the Reuters report, but the headline is a rather odd choice. Insisting that the CIA is currently in "poor health" seems to suggest that the agency was in better shape before Goss arrived, or when Ms. Harman's party occupied the White House.
Such assertions are, of course, laughable. During the Clinton years, funding for our intelligence community ran as much as seven percent below what the agencies asked for--what the Democrats would describe as budget cuts. Additionally, Clinton's succession of CIA directors--James Woolsey, John Deutch and George Tenent--did little to address the agency's glaring deficiencies in collection and analysis, paving the way for the 9-11 disaster.
But Clinton doesn't deserve all of the blame. Truth be told, we're still paying for intelligence mistakes made more than three decades ago, beginning with the Pike and Church committees in the 1970s. While those panels exposed agency excesses, they also caused undue damage to our human intelligence (HUMINT) and covert operations capabilities. The CIA grew extremely risk-adverse, unwilling to try anything that might incur the wrath of Congress. This problem were exacerbated under the leadership of Jimmy Carter's DCI, Admiral Stansfield Turner, who continued the migration away from human collection and covert ops. Turner, arguably the worst DCI in the agency's history, insisted that we could gather all the information we needed with technical systems, including spy satellites. The decline in CIA HUMINT and covert ops that began under Gerald Ford, accelerated rapidly under Carter and Admiral Turner.
While there was a notable attempt to rebuild HUMINT and covert ops during the Reagan Administration, but the Iran-Contra scandal put a halt to those efforts. Analysis also suffered. In the 1980s, the conventional wisdom at Langley was that the former Soviet Union was "here to stay." Meanwhile, the agency's field agents and analysts largely missed the rise of Islamofacism, despite their support of the mujahedin in Afghanistan. Couple those failures with post-Cold War cutbacks under Bush #41 and Clinton, and the stage for massive intel failures was already set.
In other words, the decline of the CIA's "health" began long before Porter Goss arrived at Langley. Similarly, any successful effort to "save" the patient must continue for years to come. Critics and journalists suddenly concerned about the agency's "declining" health are a bit like someone who smokes two packs a day for 40 years, and wonders how they got lung cancer. Ms. Harman's comment about a spy agency in free fall makes for a good sound bite, but in reality, the CIA reached terminal velocity long before Porter Goss arrived at Langley. Is it too late to pull the rip cord?
Over the course of twelve paragraphs or so, the Reuters correspondent manages to quote four critics of Goss and his reform plan. Chief among them is California Congresswoman Jane Harman, the ranking Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee. According to Ms. Harman, the agency is now in "free fall," a phrase that will likely be repreated (and often) on the Sunday morning pundit shows.
There's really nothing new in any of the criticisms leveled in the Reuters report, but the headline is a rather odd choice. Insisting that the CIA is currently in "poor health" seems to suggest that the agency was in better shape before Goss arrived, or when Ms. Harman's party occupied the White House.
Such assertions are, of course, laughable. During the Clinton years, funding for our intelligence community ran as much as seven percent below what the agencies asked for--what the Democrats would describe as budget cuts. Additionally, Clinton's succession of CIA directors--James Woolsey, John Deutch and George Tenent--did little to address the agency's glaring deficiencies in collection and analysis, paving the way for the 9-11 disaster.
But Clinton doesn't deserve all of the blame. Truth be told, we're still paying for intelligence mistakes made more than three decades ago, beginning with the Pike and Church committees in the 1970s. While those panels exposed agency excesses, they also caused undue damage to our human intelligence (HUMINT) and covert operations capabilities. The CIA grew extremely risk-adverse, unwilling to try anything that might incur the wrath of Congress. This problem were exacerbated under the leadership of Jimmy Carter's DCI, Admiral Stansfield Turner, who continued the migration away from human collection and covert ops. Turner, arguably the worst DCI in the agency's history, insisted that we could gather all the information we needed with technical systems, including spy satellites. The decline in CIA HUMINT and covert ops that began under Gerald Ford, accelerated rapidly under Carter and Admiral Turner.
While there was a notable attempt to rebuild HUMINT and covert ops during the Reagan Administration, but the Iran-Contra scandal put a halt to those efforts. Analysis also suffered. In the 1980s, the conventional wisdom at Langley was that the former Soviet Union was "here to stay." Meanwhile, the agency's field agents and analysts largely missed the rise of Islamofacism, despite their support of the mujahedin in Afghanistan. Couple those failures with post-Cold War cutbacks under Bush #41 and Clinton, and the stage for massive intel failures was already set.
In other words, the decline of the CIA's "health" began long before Porter Goss arrived at Langley. Similarly, any successful effort to "save" the patient must continue for years to come. Critics and journalists suddenly concerned about the agency's "declining" health are a bit like someone who smokes two packs a day for 40 years, and wonders how they got lung cancer. Ms. Harman's comment about a spy agency in free fall makes for a good sound bite, but in reality, the CIA reached terminal velocity long before Porter Goss arrived at Langley. Is it too late to pull the rip cord?
Goss Steps Down
***UPDATE***
This may be administration spin, or (perhaps) we're learning what actually prompted Porter Goss to step down as CIA Director. According to ABC News, Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte was unhappy with Goss's performance, and initiated an effort to get rid of the CIA director back in mid-April. That led to a series of meetings between Goss, Negroponte and President Bush. ABC says the last meeting occurred on Wednesday, when it was decided that Goss would announce his resignation.
If this report is correct, it suggests that Negroponte is continuing to consoliate his power as DNI. When Negoponte first assumed the DNI post last April, there was concern that he would be unable to effectively control the nation's sprawling intelligence community. Goss's resignation suggests that Negroponte wants to assume more direct control over the CIA. That tends to reinforce the belief that the next agency director will be someone Negroponte knows and trusts. If that theory is correct, then Negroponte's DDNI (General Michael Hayden) may well be atop the short list of candidates to run the CIA.
***UPDATE***
1402 PDT
Carl Cameron of FNC is reporting that a replacement for Goss could be named as early as Monday. That "rapid" timeline suggests someone already in the intelligence or national security establishment--someone like a Mike Hayden; others have suggested National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley might be a candidate for the CIA job. According to his resume, Hadley has some intel experience, but as a consumer, not an analyst or producer. Given the task facing the next CIA director, I'm not sure Hadley is the right man for the post. There's also the question of whether Hadley or Hayden would want a "lateral" promotion to run the CIA. While I believe Hayden has the right resume, he has already run an intelligence agency.
Lost amid the news about Goss is another key vacancy at the top of the intelligence community. The director of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA), which provides imagery and geospatial intel products is scheduled to depart in mid-June, and a replacement has yet to be named. The current NGA director (retired Lt Gen James Clapper) was informed in March that his "contract" would not be renewed or extended. We've been told that the next NGA leader will be an active duty, three-star flag officer (a Lt Gen or Vice-Admiral), but so far, there has been little speculation as to who might replace Clapper.
***UPDATE***
1303 PDT
Mac Ranger weighs in on the CIA's change at the top. He sums up Goss's departure in two words: mission accomplished. I'm not quite ready to climb on that bandwagon (yet), but he makes a persuasive argument. According to Mac, any celebrations at Langley may be short-lived and premature.
***UPDATE***
1117 PDT
The talking heads suggest there's more to this story than is currently being reported. Bill Kristol on FNC is suggesting that some sort of scandal may be about to break. The few sources I've talked to seem genuinely surprised, with no ideal of what might have prompted this sudden change.
Chris Wallace of FNC is now saying that Goss's resignation is part of the overall White House/Administration shake-up. A White House source tells Wallace that Goss had done his job in "shaking up the agency." I've got my doubts. In his appearance in the Oval Office, Goss had the appearance of someone who had been handed his walking papers. We'll know more in the coming hours.
One more note: Goss's military aide (an Air Force Colonel) left his post at the agency last month. However, this appears to be a routine reassignment, and not a harbinger of what happened today. Indeed, the Air Force Colonel in question is moving on to a commander's billet--a definite promotion.
***
Porter Goss has announced that he is stepping down as Director of the CIA, after only one year on the job.
Liberal pundits are already spinning Goss's resignation as a sign of serious problems at Langley. In reality, the former Congressman is more a victim of bureaucratic wars. Goss was confirmed as CIA director at about the same time that Ambassador John Negroponte became the nation's first Director of National Intelligence (DNI). That represented a watershed in the history of the nation's intelligence community. For the first time, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was no longer America's top-ranking intelligence officer; instead, he became just another agency director, on the same level as the Directors of the National Security Agency (NSA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA).
The distinction is important. No longer is the CIA Director the president's primary intelligence advisor--that responsibility now belongs to John Negroponte. Additionally, the responsibility for preparing the presidential daily briefing (PDB) falls on the DNI, not the CIA. Given the scope of our intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination efforts, preparation of a single daily summary or briefing (even for the President) may sound like a routine task. But that is hardly the case; the PDB equals access, and that duty now belongs to John Negroponte, not the CIA director.
What disturbs me about the Goss resignation is the possibility that internal battles may have worn down the director, and eventually convinced him to throw in the towel. It's no secret that Goss has been fighting pitched battles against staffers who oppose Bush Administration policies, and the new management team at the CIA. Goss recently fired CIA officer Mary McCarthy for unauthorized contacts with the press, and there are hints that other agency staffers may be implicated as well. But earlier this week, the CIA launched an investigation of the agency's #3 official--a Goss appointee--in connection with the bribery scandal that sent former Congressman Randy "Duke" Cunningham to federal prison. Given the timing--and announcement--of the inquiry, there was some belief that the probe was something of a "counter-attack" by agency's anti-administration cabal.
Today's announcement clearly caught the White House by surprise. Consequently, the director's position may remain vacant for a while, and that could derail the reform campaign at Langley. To avoid that, President Bush should consider the appointment of an experienced intelligence manager who could move into the job quickly and seamlessly. IMO, one of the few men who could do that is the current Deputy Director of National Intelligence, General Mike Hayden. General Hayden isn't a CIA veteran, but he was extremely effective as Director of NSA for more than five years. During his tenure at Ft Meade, he reformed and reshaped the NSA, clearing out bureaucratic deadwood, boosting agency morale, and improving its importance.
At a critical juncture in its history, General Hayden just might be the right man for the CIA job.
This may be administration spin, or (perhaps) we're learning what actually prompted Porter Goss to step down as CIA Director. According to ABC News, Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte was unhappy with Goss's performance, and initiated an effort to get rid of the CIA director back in mid-April. That led to a series of meetings between Goss, Negroponte and President Bush. ABC says the last meeting occurred on Wednesday, when it was decided that Goss would announce his resignation.
If this report is correct, it suggests that Negroponte is continuing to consoliate his power as DNI. When Negoponte first assumed the DNI post last April, there was concern that he would be unable to effectively control the nation's sprawling intelligence community. Goss's resignation suggests that Negroponte wants to assume more direct control over the CIA. That tends to reinforce the belief that the next agency director will be someone Negroponte knows and trusts. If that theory is correct, then Negroponte's DDNI (General Michael Hayden) may well be atop the short list of candidates to run the CIA.
***UPDATE***
1402 PDT
Carl Cameron of FNC is reporting that a replacement for Goss could be named as early as Monday. That "rapid" timeline suggests someone already in the intelligence or national security establishment--someone like a Mike Hayden; others have suggested National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley might be a candidate for the CIA job. According to his resume, Hadley has some intel experience, but as a consumer, not an analyst or producer. Given the task facing the next CIA director, I'm not sure Hadley is the right man for the post. There's also the question of whether Hadley or Hayden would want a "lateral" promotion to run the CIA. While I believe Hayden has the right resume, he has already run an intelligence agency.
Lost amid the news about Goss is another key vacancy at the top of the intelligence community. The director of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA), which provides imagery and geospatial intel products is scheduled to depart in mid-June, and a replacement has yet to be named. The current NGA director (retired Lt Gen James Clapper) was informed in March that his "contract" would not be renewed or extended. We've been told that the next NGA leader will be an active duty, three-star flag officer (a Lt Gen or Vice-Admiral), but so far, there has been little speculation as to who might replace Clapper.
***UPDATE***
1303 PDT
Mac Ranger weighs in on the CIA's change at the top. He sums up Goss's departure in two words: mission accomplished. I'm not quite ready to climb on that bandwagon (yet), but he makes a persuasive argument. According to Mac, any celebrations at Langley may be short-lived and premature.
***UPDATE***
1117 PDT
The talking heads suggest there's more to this story than is currently being reported. Bill Kristol on FNC is suggesting that some sort of scandal may be about to break. The few sources I've talked to seem genuinely surprised, with no ideal of what might have prompted this sudden change.
Chris Wallace of FNC is now saying that Goss's resignation is part of the overall White House/Administration shake-up. A White House source tells Wallace that Goss had done his job in "shaking up the agency." I've got my doubts. In his appearance in the Oval Office, Goss had the appearance of someone who had been handed his walking papers. We'll know more in the coming hours.
One more note: Goss's military aide (an Air Force Colonel) left his post at the agency last month. However, this appears to be a routine reassignment, and not a harbinger of what happened today. Indeed, the Air Force Colonel in question is moving on to a commander's billet--a definite promotion.
***
Porter Goss has announced that he is stepping down as Director of the CIA, after only one year on the job.
Liberal pundits are already spinning Goss's resignation as a sign of serious problems at Langley. In reality, the former Congressman is more a victim of bureaucratic wars. Goss was confirmed as CIA director at about the same time that Ambassador John Negroponte became the nation's first Director of National Intelligence (DNI). That represented a watershed in the history of the nation's intelligence community. For the first time, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was no longer America's top-ranking intelligence officer; instead, he became just another agency director, on the same level as the Directors of the National Security Agency (NSA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA).
The distinction is important. No longer is the CIA Director the president's primary intelligence advisor--that responsibility now belongs to John Negroponte. Additionally, the responsibility for preparing the presidential daily briefing (PDB) falls on the DNI, not the CIA. Given the scope of our intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination efforts, preparation of a single daily summary or briefing (even for the President) may sound like a routine task. But that is hardly the case; the PDB equals access, and that duty now belongs to John Negroponte, not the CIA director.
What disturbs me about the Goss resignation is the possibility that internal battles may have worn down the director, and eventually convinced him to throw in the towel. It's no secret that Goss has been fighting pitched battles against staffers who oppose Bush Administration policies, and the new management team at the CIA. Goss recently fired CIA officer Mary McCarthy for unauthorized contacts with the press, and there are hints that other agency staffers may be implicated as well. But earlier this week, the CIA launched an investigation of the agency's #3 official--a Goss appointee--in connection with the bribery scandal that sent former Congressman Randy "Duke" Cunningham to federal prison. Given the timing--and announcement--of the inquiry, there was some belief that the probe was something of a "counter-attack" by agency's anti-administration cabal.
Today's announcement clearly caught the White House by surprise. Consequently, the director's position may remain vacant for a while, and that could derail the reform campaign at Langley. To avoid that, President Bush should consider the appointment of an experienced intelligence manager who could move into the job quickly and seamlessly. IMO, one of the few men who could do that is the current Deputy Director of National Intelligence, General Mike Hayden. General Hayden isn't a CIA veteran, but he was extremely effective as Director of NSA for more than five years. During his tenure at Ft Meade, he reformed and reshaped the NSA, clearing out bureaucratic deadwood, boosting agency morale, and improving its importance.
At a critical juncture in its history, General Hayden just might be the right man for the CIA job.
Thursday, May 04, 2006
McGovern's Circular Firing Squad
The liberal blogosphere (yes, we occasionally visit the dark side) is euphoric over today's public "calling out" of Defense Secretary Don Rumsfeld, regarding his "lies" about WMD in Iraq. Speaking in Atlanta, Rumsfeld was sharply questioned about his 2003 statement that "we know where they are" [Iraqi weapons of mass destruction].
When Rumsfeld denied making the statement, the questioner read the quote to the defense secretary, and cited the media source. According to the liberal blogs (and the MSM), the episode left the defense secretary "speechless," if for only a moment. CNN reported that the Atlanta heckler, err...questioner was none other than retired CIA analyst (and persistent Bush Administration critic) Ray McGovern.
But Rumsfeld's critics ignore a salient fact in this game of "gotcha." What was Rumsfeld's 2003 statement based on? Intelligence reporting--much of it from McGovern's old employer, the CIA. In the late 1990s, there was a sizeable body of reporting about Iraq's WMD programs and locations of potential stockpiles, based on the reporting of multiple agencies, including the CIA. If Rumsfeld got it wrong (the final verdict on Saddam's WMD programs has not been rendered), it was because the spooks got it wrong, with the CIA leading the charge. In fact, prior to the creation of the National CounterProliferation Center, the CIA was the intelligence community lead for WMD proliferation issues, including Iraq.
The left still claims that the Administration "cherry-picked" intelligence to support its war plans, but the Robb Commission report debunks that myth. You may recall Conclusion #26 from the commission's findings:
"The Intelligence Community did not make or change any analytic judgments in response to political pressure to reach a particular conclusion, but the pervasive conventional wisdom that Saddam retained WMD affected the analytic process."
On the other hand, the Robb Report was highly critical of the CIA's efforts in detecting and reporting on WMD proliferation issues, through its Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Center (WINPAC), which served as the community's all-source center for WMD analysis. From page 212 of the report:
"...[WINPAC] was at the heart of many of the errors discussed earlier, from the mobile BW case to the aluminum tubes. Just as bad, some WINPAC analysts--and WINPAC as an institution--showed great reluctance to correct these errors, even long after they had become obvious."
On the surface, McGovern achieved his primary goal in Atlanta--creating an embarassing "media moment" for Rumsfeld that will run through today's news cycle. But look beyond the headlines, and you'll see McGovern also accomplished something that was very unintended--he reminded us of how the CIA became "screwed up" when "Veteran Intelligence Professionals" like him were running the show. Lest we forget, the intelligence failures in Iraq (and elsewhere) began at Langley, not on the E-Ring in the Pentagon.
When Rumsfeld denied making the statement, the questioner read the quote to the defense secretary, and cited the media source. According to the liberal blogs (and the MSM), the episode left the defense secretary "speechless," if for only a moment. CNN reported that the Atlanta heckler, err...questioner was none other than retired CIA analyst (and persistent Bush Administration critic) Ray McGovern.
But Rumsfeld's critics ignore a salient fact in this game of "gotcha." What was Rumsfeld's 2003 statement based on? Intelligence reporting--much of it from McGovern's old employer, the CIA. In the late 1990s, there was a sizeable body of reporting about Iraq's WMD programs and locations of potential stockpiles, based on the reporting of multiple agencies, including the CIA. If Rumsfeld got it wrong (the final verdict on Saddam's WMD programs has not been rendered), it was because the spooks got it wrong, with the CIA leading the charge. In fact, prior to the creation of the National CounterProliferation Center, the CIA was the intelligence community lead for WMD proliferation issues, including Iraq.
The left still claims that the Administration "cherry-picked" intelligence to support its war plans, but the Robb Commission report debunks that myth. You may recall Conclusion #26 from the commission's findings:
"The Intelligence Community did not make or change any analytic judgments in response to political pressure to reach a particular conclusion, but the pervasive conventional wisdom that Saddam retained WMD affected the analytic process."
On the other hand, the Robb Report was highly critical of the CIA's efforts in detecting and reporting on WMD proliferation issues, through its Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Center (WINPAC), which served as the community's all-source center for WMD analysis. From page 212 of the report:
"...[WINPAC] was at the heart of many of the errors discussed earlier, from the mobile BW case to the aluminum tubes. Just as bad, some WINPAC analysts--and WINPAC as an institution--showed great reluctance to correct these errors, even long after they had become obvious."
On the surface, McGovern achieved his primary goal in Atlanta--creating an embarassing "media moment" for Rumsfeld that will run through today's news cycle. But look beyond the headlines, and you'll see McGovern also accomplished something that was very unintended--he reminded us of how the CIA became "screwed up" when "Veteran Intelligence Professionals" like him were running the show. Lest we forget, the intelligence failures in Iraq (and elsewhere) began at Langley, not on the E-Ring in the Pentagon.
The Apple Doesn't Fall Far From the Tree
***UPDATE***
The indefatigable Michelle Malkin and Boston talk radio icon Howie Carr have discovered that Congressman Kennedy had a second accident, in Rhode Island, two weeks ago.
For those keeping track, it's been almost 24 hours since the second wreck. Still no statement from Congressman Kennedy, or his press office in D.C. Where's the MSM outrage?
****
Roll Call and Fox News are reporting that Congressman Patrick Kennedy, D-RI, was involved in a traffic "incident" on Capitol Hill early today. According to FNC correspondent Steve Centanni, Congressman Kennedy, the son of Senator Ted Kennedy, was driving with his lights off around 2:45 am, when he narrowly avoided a Capitol Police cruiser, and collided with a security barrier. Sources tell Roll Call that the younger Kennedy was staggering when he emerged from the car. However, officers on the scene were not allowed to administer a sobriety test. Supervisory officers eventually arrived on the scene and gave the Congressman a ride home. Police union representatives have asked their superiors to let officers complete their investigation.
Hey, at least he wasn't driving across a bridge. And apparently, no female "companions" were along for the ride.
The indefatigable Michelle Malkin and Boston talk radio icon Howie Carr have discovered that Congressman Kennedy had a second accident, in Rhode Island, two weeks ago.
For those keeping track, it's been almost 24 hours since the second wreck. Still no statement from Congressman Kennedy, or his press office in D.C. Where's the MSM outrage?
****
Roll Call and Fox News are reporting that Congressman Patrick Kennedy, D-RI, was involved in a traffic "incident" on Capitol Hill early today. According to FNC correspondent Steve Centanni, Congressman Kennedy, the son of Senator Ted Kennedy, was driving with his lights off around 2:45 am, when he narrowly avoided a Capitol Police cruiser, and collided with a security barrier. Sources tell Roll Call that the younger Kennedy was staggering when he emerged from the car. However, officers on the scene were not allowed to administer a sobriety test. Supervisory officers eventually arrived on the scene and gave the Congressman a ride home. Police union representatives have asked their superiors to let officers complete their investigation.
Hey, at least he wasn't driving across a bridge. And apparently, no female "companions" were along for the ride.
Spray and Pray
"Here's the ultimate fighting machine," observed Major General Rick Lynch, chief spokesman for coalition forces in Iraq, as he showed outtakes from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's latest propaganda video. The outtakes--which were captured in a recent raid by U.S. forces--show the terrorist leader unable to clear a simple jam in his machine-gun. Zarqawi calls in one of his associates to clear the jam, but in the process, the second terrorist grabs the weapon's hot barrel, burning himself in the process.
Such incompetence underscores why the insurgents in Iraq rely so heavily on roadside bombs to attack U.S. forces. A friend of mine--a retired Special Forces NCO with tours in Iraq and Afghanistan--says poor weapons skills are not uncommon among terrorists. Regarding their marksmanship, my friend is equally derisive, saying that most insurgents use the "spray and pray" method. Looks cool on videotape, but it's not an effective way to hit a target.
Regarding Zarqawi, the best news about these recent videos is that he may have provided new clues about his whereabouts. Here's hoping that we corner Zarqawi soon--and he dies with a jammed machine gun in his hands.
More thoughts on Zarqawi the "weapons expert" at Confederate Yankee.
Such incompetence underscores why the insurgents in Iraq rely so heavily on roadside bombs to attack U.S. forces. A friend of mine--a retired Special Forces NCO with tours in Iraq and Afghanistan--says poor weapons skills are not uncommon among terrorists. Regarding their marksmanship, my friend is equally derisive, saying that most insurgents use the "spray and pray" method. Looks cool on videotape, but it's not an effective way to hit a target.
Regarding Zarqawi, the best news about these recent videos is that he may have provided new clues about his whereabouts. Here's hoping that we corner Zarqawi soon--and he dies with a jammed machine gun in his hands.
More thoughts on Zarqawi the "weapons expert" at Confederate Yankee.
The Always-Helpful French
The last time we checked, diplomatic efforts to reign in Iran's nuclear program were churning along, despite Tehran's continued belligerence, and threat by Russia and China to veto sanctions presented to the U.N. Security Council.
A couple of days ago, the U.S., Great Britain and France were circulating a proposal that demands Iran cease its uranium enrichment efforts, or face the threat of further, unspecified measures. Naturally, Moscow and Beijing oppose the draft resolution, which was met with a collective yawn in Tehran.
Only the striped-pants set could view a "strongly-worded statement," and the promise vague threats in the future as "diplomatic progress." UN Ambassador John Bolton, who is both patient and an optimist, believes the UNSC may actually agree on some sort of sanctions later this summer. Let's be diplomatic (pun intended) and say that many of us remain unconvinced.
Obviously, diplomatic efforts might be more effective if those "potential threats" could be more clearly defined. The White House says all options are on the table, including possible military action. But don't tell that to our friends in Paris. Today, French Prime Minister Dominique de Vellepin said military action is "not" the solution to the Iranian nuclear problem, saying that the war in Iraq should serve as a warning against attacking Iran.
Readers will note that de Vellepin didn't offer any concrete suggestions for ending the impase, other that urging "unity" and "firmness." That pretty sums up the French "solution" for any international problem; keep talking, but don't say or promise anything that might offend a rogue state. When military action becomes imperative, leave the heavy-lifting to the Americans (and a lesser extent, the Brits), while (of course) reserving the right to criticize the policy.
In the wake of the Oil for Food scandal, we learned that French reluctance in Iraq had come at a price--literally. With Iran now on the agenda, we can only wonder how much cash is making its way from Tehran, to the pockets of French politicians. I'm not saying that de Vellepin is on the take, but I'm guessing that the mullahs have at least a few well-paid friends in Paris.
A couple of days ago, the U.S., Great Britain and France were circulating a proposal that demands Iran cease its uranium enrichment efforts, or face the threat of further, unspecified measures. Naturally, Moscow and Beijing oppose the draft resolution, which was met with a collective yawn in Tehran.
Only the striped-pants set could view a "strongly-worded statement," and the promise vague threats in the future as "diplomatic progress." UN Ambassador John Bolton, who is both patient and an optimist, believes the UNSC may actually agree on some sort of sanctions later this summer. Let's be diplomatic (pun intended) and say that many of us remain unconvinced.
Obviously, diplomatic efforts might be more effective if those "potential threats" could be more clearly defined. The White House says all options are on the table, including possible military action. But don't tell that to our friends in Paris. Today, French Prime Minister Dominique de Vellepin said military action is "not" the solution to the Iranian nuclear problem, saying that the war in Iraq should serve as a warning against attacking Iran.
Readers will note that de Vellepin didn't offer any concrete suggestions for ending the impase, other that urging "unity" and "firmness." That pretty sums up the French "solution" for any international problem; keep talking, but don't say or promise anything that might offend a rogue state. When military action becomes imperative, leave the heavy-lifting to the Americans (and a lesser extent, the Brits), while (of course) reserving the right to criticize the policy.
In the wake of the Oil for Food scandal, we learned that French reluctance in Iraq had come at a price--literally. With Iran now on the agenda, we can only wonder how much cash is making its way from Tehran, to the pockets of French politicians. I'm not saying that de Vellepin is on the take, but I'm guessing that the mullahs have at least a few well-paid friends in Paris.
The Last Word
Kudos to Federal Judge Leonie Brinkema, for cutting off Zacarias Moussaoui's last rhetorical blast this morning. As expected, the convicted Al-Qaida conspirator tried to use his sentencing as a final forum for his jihadist propaganda. According to an AP account, the always-arrogant defendant entered the courtroom flashing a victory sign, and proclaiming "God save Osama bin Laden--you will never get him."
In response, Judge Brinkema refused to let the convicted terrorist interrupt her, and reminded him of what awaits him--an isolation cell at the Supermax Prison in Colorado:
"Mr. Moussaoui, when this proceeding is over, everyone else in this room will leave to see the sun...hear the birds...and they can associate with whomever they want. You will spend the rest of your life in a supermax prison. It's absolutely clear who won...Mr. Moussaoui, you came here to be a martyr in a great big bang of glory, but to paraphrase the poet T.S. Eliot, instead you will die with a whimper."
I'm not an attorney, nor a legal scholar, so I really can't rate Judge Brinkema's handling of the Massaoui trial. From a layman's perspective, the trial dragged on far too long (IMO), and at times, Massaoui's antics reduced the proceedings to the level of low farce. I'm not sure how Judge Brinkema rates as a federal jurist, and I don't think her comments today will be remembered as one of the great utterances from the bench. But given the circumstances--and the defendant--her remarks were entirely appropriate.
In response, Judge Brinkema refused to let the convicted terrorist interrupt her, and reminded him of what awaits him--an isolation cell at the Supermax Prison in Colorado:
"Mr. Moussaoui, when this proceeding is over, everyone else in this room will leave to see the sun...hear the birds...and they can associate with whomever they want. You will spend the rest of your life in a supermax prison. It's absolutely clear who won...Mr. Moussaoui, you came here to be a martyr in a great big bang of glory, but to paraphrase the poet T.S. Eliot, instead you will die with a whimper."
I'm not an attorney, nor a legal scholar, so I really can't rate Judge Brinkema's handling of the Massaoui trial. From a layman's perspective, the trial dragged on far too long (IMO), and at times, Massaoui's antics reduced the proceedings to the level of low farce. I'm not sure how Judge Brinkema rates as a federal jurist, and I don't think her comments today will be remembered as one of the great utterances from the bench. But given the circumstances--and the defendant--her remarks were entirely appropriate.
Moussaoui's New Neighbors
After being formally sentenced in a federal courtoom this morning, convicted Al-Qaida conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui is expected to spend the rest of his life in the federal "Supermax" prison near Florence, Colorado. Yesterday, a federal jury recommended that Moussaoui serve life in prison without parole for his role in the 9-11 plot. Under federal law, the judge must impose the sentence recommended by the jury.
The "Supermax" is considered the most secure prison in the federal system. It was built in the early 1990s, after the murder of two guards highlighted security problems at the existing facility in Marion, Illinois. The prison at Florence is reserved for the most dangerous inmates in federal custody; 22% of the prisoners at the Supermax have killed other prisoners, and 35% have assaulted guards. Consequently, most of the population at Florence spend 23 hours a day inside their cells; for exercise, prisoners spend an hour in another concrete cubicle. Club Fed, it ain't:
Along with the "hard core" prisoners of the federal system, the Supermax is also home for some of the most notorious federal inmates--"special" prisoners whose incarceration is intended to be as hash as possible. FBI traitor Robert Hanssen is serving his life sentence at the prison, along with Unabomber Ted Kaczynski, Oklahoma City bombing conspirator Terry Nichols, terrorist bomber Eric Rudolph, shoe bomber Richard Reid, and OmarAbdel-Rahman, the "blind sheik" who master-minded the first World Trade Center bombing.
While isolation at the Supermax will deny Moussaoui the spotlight he craves, it's a bit disappointing that Moussaoui will spend most of his time away from other inmates. My personal preference for Moussaoui would be the federal prison in Atlanta, a high security facility where inmates are less isolated. In that environment, the convicted Al Qaida terrorist could (perhaps) meet the business end of a shiv, and save the U.S. taxpayers a lot of money on future incarceration costs..
Addendum: I'm told that Amnesty International has problems with the Supermax Facility, and the practice of isolating prisoners for up to 23 hours a day. On second thought, the Colorado prison just might be the right spot for Moussaoui.
The "Supermax" is considered the most secure prison in the federal system. It was built in the early 1990s, after the murder of two guards highlighted security problems at the existing facility in Marion, Illinois. The prison at Florence is reserved for the most dangerous inmates in federal custody; 22% of the prisoners at the Supermax have killed other prisoners, and 35% have assaulted guards. Consequently, most of the population at Florence spend 23 hours a day inside their cells; for exercise, prisoners spend an hour in another concrete cubicle. Club Fed, it ain't:
Along with the "hard core" prisoners of the federal system, the Supermax is also home for some of the most notorious federal inmates--"special" prisoners whose incarceration is intended to be as hash as possible. FBI traitor Robert Hanssen is serving his life sentence at the prison, along with Unabomber Ted Kaczynski, Oklahoma City bombing conspirator Terry Nichols, terrorist bomber Eric Rudolph, shoe bomber Richard Reid, and OmarAbdel-Rahman, the "blind sheik" who master-minded the first World Trade Center bombing.
While isolation at the Supermax will deny Moussaoui the spotlight he craves, it's a bit disappointing that Moussaoui will spend most of his time away from other inmates. My personal preference for Moussaoui would be the federal prison in Atlanta, a high security facility where inmates are less isolated. In that environment, the convicted Al Qaida terrorist could (perhaps) meet the business end of a shiv, and save the U.S. taxpayers a lot of money on future incarceration costs..
Addendum: I'm told that Amnesty International has problems with the Supermax Facility, and the practice of isolating prisoners for up to 23 hours a day. On second thought, the Colorado prison just might be the right spot for Moussaoui.
Wednesday, May 03, 2006
Justice is Served?
A federal jury in Alexandria, Virginia has sentenced convicted Al-Qaida conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui to life in prison for his role in the 9-11 plot. The jury rejected prosecutors' request that Moussaoui receive the death penalty.
Today's verdict is a bitter pill for 9-11 families, who hoped that Moussaoui would be sentenced to death. But deliberations dragged out over seven days, and in the end, jurors were not convinced that Moussaoui's role as a conspirator--who was already in jail at the time of the 9-11 attacks--was deserving of capital punishment. I think most people can understand that, had it not been for an alert FBI agent, Moussaoui would have been the "20th hijacker" on 9-11, and attempted to fly a comandeered jet into an American target. Unfortunately, such logic was lost on the jurors in Alexandria. My heart goes out to the 9-11 families who believed that a death sentence for Moussaoui would bring some sense of closure and justice.
The real lesson of the Moussaoui trial, IMO, is the wisdom of keeping Al-Qaida terrorists out of our nation's court systems. The process of investigating, trying and convicting Zarcarias Moussaoui has, for the record, stretched out over four years and consumed millions of tax dollars. At times, the trial took on the appearance of low farce, with Moussaoui alternately affirming and denying his terrorist affiliations, firing his attorneys, and even attempting to represent himself. Multiply the Moussaoui trial by the number of Al-Qaida suspects facing legal action, and you'll get some idea of the quagmire that would result from giving terrorists full constitutional rights.
I'm guessing that Moussaoui will eventually wind up in the federal "Supermax" prison in Colorado, where he'll spend 23 hours a day locked in his cell. I would have much preferred to see him strapped to a gurney, awaiting that final "hot shot," but for a terrorist who seemed to relish the public spotlight--and the opportunity to make a mockery of our courts--the hard anonymity of the supermax may be a fitting punishment.
Today's verdict is a bitter pill for 9-11 families, who hoped that Moussaoui would be sentenced to death. But deliberations dragged out over seven days, and in the end, jurors were not convinced that Moussaoui's role as a conspirator--who was already in jail at the time of the 9-11 attacks--was deserving of capital punishment. I think most people can understand that, had it not been for an alert FBI agent, Moussaoui would have been the "20th hijacker" on 9-11, and attempted to fly a comandeered jet into an American target. Unfortunately, such logic was lost on the jurors in Alexandria. My heart goes out to the 9-11 families who believed that a death sentence for Moussaoui would bring some sense of closure and justice.
The real lesson of the Moussaoui trial, IMO, is the wisdom of keeping Al-Qaida terrorists out of our nation's court systems. The process of investigating, trying and convicting Zarcarias Moussaoui has, for the record, stretched out over four years and consumed millions of tax dollars. At times, the trial took on the appearance of low farce, with Moussaoui alternately affirming and denying his terrorist affiliations, firing his attorneys, and even attempting to represent himself. Multiply the Moussaoui trial by the number of Al-Qaida suspects facing legal action, and you'll get some idea of the quagmire that would result from giving terrorists full constitutional rights.
I'm guessing that Moussaoui will eventually wind up in the federal "Supermax" prison in Colorado, where he'll spend 23 hours a day locked in his cell. I would have much preferred to see him strapped to a gurney, awaiting that final "hot shot," but for a terrorist who seemed to relish the public spotlight--and the opportunity to make a mockery of our courts--the hard anonymity of the supermax may be a fitting punishment.
Today's Reading Assignments
...from Monday's New York Sun, "The Darfur Double Standard."
Hat tip: Michelle Malkin.
Addendum: The Sun editorial board and Michelle do a nice job of capturing the hypocrisy of the liberal left, who oppose the war in Iraq while supporting intervention in Darfur. But there's another element to this obvious contradiction, one that is rarely mentioned by the libs, the drive-by media, or for that matter, the blogosphere.
Intervention in the Sudan would put the U.S. in confrontation with the Khartoum government and some of its friends, many of who are tolerated, even lionized by the left. Let's begin with sundry Palestinian terrorist organizations, including Islamic Jihad, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and the rest of the ususal suspects. All have offices in the Sudan, and use the country for recruiting, fund-raising and training. Take a look at a Sudanese military training facility, and you'll often find Arabs and other Middle Easterners in the ranks, receiving instruction courtesy of Khartoum. If the U.S. intervenes in Darfur, these organizations will side with their Sudanese hosts, and launch attacks against American military forces in Sudan (and elsewhere). Will the left continue to support the same Palestinian "freedom fighters" who oppose a U.S. military operation they actually endorse?
Then, there's the equally thorny Al-Qaida issue. Despite their formal "expulsion" from Sudan in 1996, bin Laden's organization still maintains an active presence in the country. There have been persistent reports of Al-Qaida elements within the Sudanese military, and some refugees from Darfur claim that AQ terrorists and other Arab fighters take part in attacks against Sudanese villagers. The same Hollywood left that has opposed our anti-terrorism efforts in Iraq--where Al-Qaida is one of our primary adversaries--apparently believes that Darfur is a better place to take on the enemy. Why Sudan? Well, that's where the reasoning starts to get fuzzy. The only reason I can discern is because Darfur has become the cause du jour for left coast liberals.
Debbie Schlussel's recent post ("Big Phonies") does an equally outstanding job in highlighting Hollywood's blatant hypocrisy on Darfur and the War on Terrorism.
Hat tip: Michelle Malkin.
Addendum: The Sun editorial board and Michelle do a nice job of capturing the hypocrisy of the liberal left, who oppose the war in Iraq while supporting intervention in Darfur. But there's another element to this obvious contradiction, one that is rarely mentioned by the libs, the drive-by media, or for that matter, the blogosphere.
Intervention in the Sudan would put the U.S. in confrontation with the Khartoum government and some of its friends, many of who are tolerated, even lionized by the left. Let's begin with sundry Palestinian terrorist organizations, including Islamic Jihad, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and the rest of the ususal suspects. All have offices in the Sudan, and use the country for recruiting, fund-raising and training. Take a look at a Sudanese military training facility, and you'll often find Arabs and other Middle Easterners in the ranks, receiving instruction courtesy of Khartoum. If the U.S. intervenes in Darfur, these organizations will side with their Sudanese hosts, and launch attacks against American military forces in Sudan (and elsewhere). Will the left continue to support the same Palestinian "freedom fighters" who oppose a U.S. military operation they actually endorse?
Then, there's the equally thorny Al-Qaida issue. Despite their formal "expulsion" from Sudan in 1996, bin Laden's organization still maintains an active presence in the country. There have been persistent reports of Al-Qaida elements within the Sudanese military, and some refugees from Darfur claim that AQ terrorists and other Arab fighters take part in attacks against Sudanese villagers. The same Hollywood left that has opposed our anti-terrorism efforts in Iraq--where Al-Qaida is one of our primary adversaries--apparently believes that Darfur is a better place to take on the enemy. Why Sudan? Well, that's where the reasoning starts to get fuzzy. The only reason I can discern is because Darfur has become the cause du jour for left coast liberals.
Debbie Schlussel's recent post ("Big Phonies") does an equally outstanding job in highlighting Hollywood's blatant hypocrisy on Darfur and the War on Terrorism.
Accuracy in Blogging Department
In a recent post, we reported that convicted spies Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen both passed polygraph tests during their careers at the CIA and FBI, respectively. Actually, Ames was allowed to continue in his post, despite "questionable" polygraph results. Hanssen, on the other hand, was never polygraphed during his FBI career, spent mostly in the bureau's counter-intelligence division.
We were accurate in noting that both Ames and Hanssen were familiar with techniques for defeating lie detector tests. Those skills--coupled with the "old boy" network at Langley--helped Ames continue his traitorous deeds well into the 1990s, compromising numerous CIA assets inside the former Soviet Union. The FBI's failure to polygraph Hanssen also helped perpetuate his spy career--and it's a big reason that all agency employees now take lie detector tests, on a recurring basis.
We were accurate in noting that both Ames and Hanssen were familiar with techniques for defeating lie detector tests. Those skills--coupled with the "old boy" network at Langley--helped Ames continue his traitorous deeds well into the 1990s, compromising numerous CIA assets inside the former Soviet Union. The FBI's failure to polygraph Hanssen also helped perpetuate his spy career--and it's a big reason that all agency employees now take lie detector tests, on a recurring basis.
The IG Strikes Back
ABC News reported yesterday that the CIA Inspector General's office has launched a investigation of the agency's #3 official, Kyle "Dusty" Foggo. The probe centers on Foggo's relationship with two defense contractors accused of bribing former California Congressman Randy "Duke" Cunningham and DOD officials.
In response to the ABC report, the CIA released a statement noting that "it is standard practice for the IG--an aggressive, independent watchdog--to look into assertions that mention agency officers." The agency also announced that Mr. Foggo will remain in his post as the CIA's Executive Director (essentially, the agency's top administrator) during the investigation.
The probe is not unexpected. Reports about Foggo's ties to the contractors have swirled for months, and it is certainly within the purview of the CIA IG to look into possible improprieties. But the timing of the investigation--or at least the announcement--is a bit curious.
Lest we forget, the IG is Mary McCarthy's old shop. I'm not saying there's a link between her recent dismissal and the investigation into Foggo, but it is a bit odd that word of the inquiry leaked to the media--and prompted an official CIA statement--just days after McCarthy was fired for unauthorized contacts with the press. Given Foggo's position within the agency--and potential implications of the bribery scandal--a probe was probably inevitable, and at some point, the agency would be forced to acknowledge the inquiry. But it looks like someone at Langley was anxious to get the story in the press, and tar a key member of Porter Goss's new management team. Perhaps one of McCarthy's former IG colleagues saw an opportunity to exact a little revenge, by playing the leak game one more time.
There is a better way to handle this problem. While the probe is underway, Foggo should be placed on an unpaid leave of absence. If he's cleared, he can return to his post. If he's indicted, he can resign or be fired. Certainly, there's nothing illegal about him remaining on the job during the investigation, but the move strikes me as incredibly tone deaf. Just as the Goss team was beginning to make some headway against their internal leakers and critics, the Foggo inquiry will forment charges that CIA leadership is corrupt and ineffective--and providing a convenient distraction from the leak scandal.
You can expect the Foggo investigation to work its way into Democratic and media talking points in the coming days. For those types, this investigation is almost a godsend, shifting the media spotlight--and public scrutiny--away from the leak problem, and onto the CIA's top administrator. Mr. Foggo could do himself (and the agency) a favor by taking a leave of absence until the investigation is completed, thwarting efforts by the anti-Bush cabal to reframe the agency's problems in terms of its executive director. If Mr. Foggo acted illegally or improperly he deserves to be punished. However, amid the hubub surrounding this investigation, it's important to remember that the real scandal at Langley involves those who leak for personal and partisan agendas, with reckless disregard for national security.
One final thought: the Foggo probe reportedly focuses on his relationship with the defense contractors while serving as a mid-level procurement supervisor, based in Europe. In that capacity, Foggo oversaw secret contracts for CIA programs in Europe. Foggo is described as a close friend of one of the contractors, Brent Wilkes. But outlines of the investigtion suggest that Wilkes and his partners had contacts with numerous officials in the national security establishment. That raises an interesting question: did other CIA contracting officials know Wilkes and his fellow conspirators, and if so, are they being investigated? Given the size of the agency and its contracting programs, it seems likely that Wilkes and his partners might have had contact with multiple CIA procurement officers. If that is the case--and the probe is restricted to only Mr. Foggo-- it would suggest that the investigation is more a product of diversion and revenge, than a "real" inquiry into possible wrong-doing.
In response to the ABC report, the CIA released a statement noting that "it is standard practice for the IG--an aggressive, independent watchdog--to look into assertions that mention agency officers." The agency also announced that Mr. Foggo will remain in his post as the CIA's Executive Director (essentially, the agency's top administrator) during the investigation.
The probe is not unexpected. Reports about Foggo's ties to the contractors have swirled for months, and it is certainly within the purview of the CIA IG to look into possible improprieties. But the timing of the investigation--or at least the announcement--is a bit curious.
Lest we forget, the IG is Mary McCarthy's old shop. I'm not saying there's a link between her recent dismissal and the investigation into Foggo, but it is a bit odd that word of the inquiry leaked to the media--and prompted an official CIA statement--just days after McCarthy was fired for unauthorized contacts with the press. Given Foggo's position within the agency--and potential implications of the bribery scandal--a probe was probably inevitable, and at some point, the agency would be forced to acknowledge the inquiry. But it looks like someone at Langley was anxious to get the story in the press, and tar a key member of Porter Goss's new management team. Perhaps one of McCarthy's former IG colleagues saw an opportunity to exact a little revenge, by playing the leak game one more time.
There is a better way to handle this problem. While the probe is underway, Foggo should be placed on an unpaid leave of absence. If he's cleared, he can return to his post. If he's indicted, he can resign or be fired. Certainly, there's nothing illegal about him remaining on the job during the investigation, but the move strikes me as incredibly tone deaf. Just as the Goss team was beginning to make some headway against their internal leakers and critics, the Foggo inquiry will forment charges that CIA leadership is corrupt and ineffective--and providing a convenient distraction from the leak scandal.
You can expect the Foggo investigation to work its way into Democratic and media talking points in the coming days. For those types, this investigation is almost a godsend, shifting the media spotlight--and public scrutiny--away from the leak problem, and onto the CIA's top administrator. Mr. Foggo could do himself (and the agency) a favor by taking a leave of absence until the investigation is completed, thwarting efforts by the anti-Bush cabal to reframe the agency's problems in terms of its executive director. If Mr. Foggo acted illegally or improperly he deserves to be punished. However, amid the hubub surrounding this investigation, it's important to remember that the real scandal at Langley involves those who leak for personal and partisan agendas, with reckless disregard for national security.
One final thought: the Foggo probe reportedly focuses on his relationship with the defense contractors while serving as a mid-level procurement supervisor, based in Europe. In that capacity, Foggo oversaw secret contracts for CIA programs in Europe. Foggo is described as a close friend of one of the contractors, Brent Wilkes. But outlines of the investigtion suggest that Wilkes and his partners had contacts with numerous officials in the national security establishment. That raises an interesting question: did other CIA contracting officials know Wilkes and his fellow conspirators, and if so, are they being investigated? Given the size of the agency and its contracting programs, it seems likely that Wilkes and his partners might have had contact with multiple CIA procurement officers. If that is the case--and the probe is restricted to only Mr. Foggo-- it would suggest that the investigation is more a product of diversion and revenge, than a "real" inquiry into possible wrong-doing.
Tuesday, May 02, 2006
Crips and Bloods in BDUs
There's a disturbing report in today's Chicago Sun-Times about the appearance of gang symbols and graffitti in Iraq. This activity is a product of U.S. soliders who have maintained gang affiliations while in uniform. Members of rival gangs maintain a truce while serving in the military--even fighting side-by-side. But once they return to their home turf, all bets are off.
While it doesn't receive a lot of attention, there has been gang activity in the military for years, particularly in the Army and Marine Corps. Annecdotal evidence suggests that some gang leaders encourage some members to join the military, acquiring weapons and combat skills that might be useful when they return to civilian life--and the gangs.
Some of the Army officials interviewed by the Sun-Times believe the potential threat is overstated. But I believe the hand-writing is on the wall for big-city police departments around the country. If even a few of these highly-trained, urban warfare experts return to the gangs--and share their skills with others--local police need to invest in similar training and equipment for their officers.
While it doesn't receive a lot of attention, there has been gang activity in the military for years, particularly in the Army and Marine Corps. Annecdotal evidence suggests that some gang leaders encourage some members to join the military, acquiring weapons and combat skills that might be useful when they return to civilian life--and the gangs.
Some of the Army officials interviewed by the Sun-Times believe the potential threat is overstated. But I believe the hand-writing is on the wall for big-city police departments around the country. If even a few of these highly-trained, urban warfare experts return to the gangs--and share their skills with others--local police need to invest in similar training and equipment for their officers.
Joining the De-Bunking Brigade
A hat tip to A.J. Strata and Tom McGuire for being the first to debunk NBC reporter David Shuster's ridiculous report on "Hardball" last night. For those of you that missed the show, Shuster reported that CIA operative Valerie Plame was tracking Iran's acquisition of nuclear technology at the time her cover was "blown," imparing the intelligence community's ability to follow that issue.
As A.J. and Tom point out, such claims are asinine. Given the threat posed by Iran's nuclear weapons program, it's absurd to think that the revelation of a single analyst could actually make a difference. Lest we forget, Ms. Plame had not been "undercover" for years, and was apparently working as a desk analyst at Langley when her identity was revealed in Bob Novak's column. It doesn't take an agency insider to realize that Ms. Plame was merely one of dozens of analysts following that important issue.
To confirm my suspicions, I called a former colleague, still active in the trade. I asked him to use a tool on INTELINK (the classified intranet of the intelligence community) that allows searchers to locate analysts by their speciality, or area of interest. No names and agency affiliations, I told him. Just run a quick analyst search, using the terms "Iran" and "nuclear weapons." See what kind of a list it generates.
He called back a few minutes later. His search had produced scores of analysts--well over a hundred, in fact (he wouldn't reveal the exact number). And incidentally, the search results did not include military analysts that follow Iran's nuclear program. Adding them to the pool would further increase the number of analysts working that issue. And, I have no doubt that a similar number of analysts were assigned to the problem back three years ago, when Ms. Plame was still working at Langley.
Like so much of the Plame affair, claims that Valerie's "outing" caused grave damage to national security are demonstrably false, even laughable. Whatever her duties back in 2003, she was likely an insignificant cog in a vast analytical machine that monitors Iran's nuclear program. I say "insignificant" because she apparently spent more time lobbying for her husband's trip to Niger than performing serious analytical work. Her retirement from the intelligence community has hardly been a death blow for our Iranian analytical efforts.
For the record, I once had great respect for David Shuster. As an enterprising TV reporter in Little Rock, his dogged pursuit of former Arkansas Governor Jim Guy Tucker led to the governor's indictment and conviction on corruption charges. Since he moved to Washington, Shuster's become just another member of the drive-by media, gleefully reciting the day's talking points from the anti-Bush cabal. Someone should ask Shuster how it feels to be a sell-out, partisan hack, masquerading as a journalist.
As A.J. and Tom point out, such claims are asinine. Given the threat posed by Iran's nuclear weapons program, it's absurd to think that the revelation of a single analyst could actually make a difference. Lest we forget, Ms. Plame had not been "undercover" for years, and was apparently working as a desk analyst at Langley when her identity was revealed in Bob Novak's column. It doesn't take an agency insider to realize that Ms. Plame was merely one of dozens of analysts following that important issue.
To confirm my suspicions, I called a former colleague, still active in the trade. I asked him to use a tool on INTELINK (the classified intranet of the intelligence community) that allows searchers to locate analysts by their speciality, or area of interest. No names and agency affiliations, I told him. Just run a quick analyst search, using the terms "Iran" and "nuclear weapons." See what kind of a list it generates.
He called back a few minutes later. His search had produced scores of analysts--well over a hundred, in fact (he wouldn't reveal the exact number). And incidentally, the search results did not include military analysts that follow Iran's nuclear program. Adding them to the pool would further increase the number of analysts working that issue. And, I have no doubt that a similar number of analysts were assigned to the problem back three years ago, when Ms. Plame was still working at Langley.
Like so much of the Plame affair, claims that Valerie's "outing" caused grave damage to national security are demonstrably false, even laughable. Whatever her duties back in 2003, she was likely an insignificant cog in a vast analytical machine that monitors Iran's nuclear program. I say "insignificant" because she apparently spent more time lobbying for her husband's trip to Niger than performing serious analytical work. Her retirement from the intelligence community has hardly been a death blow for our Iranian analytical efforts.
For the record, I once had great respect for David Shuster. As an enterprising TV reporter in Little Rock, his dogged pursuit of former Arkansas Governor Jim Guy Tucker led to the governor's indictment and conviction on corruption charges. Since he moved to Washington, Shuster's become just another member of the drive-by media, gleefully reciting the day's talking points from the anti-Bush cabal. Someone should ask Shuster how it feels to be a sell-out, partisan hack, masquerading as a journalist.
The Looming Showdown
The nuclear standoff between Iran and the west is quickly gathering speed. Amid all the rhetoric and posturing, there are clear signs that a military confrontation is only months--if not weeks--away. And, if recent statements and events are any indication, it will Israel that strikes the first blow. Simply stated, the new Olmert government is running out of time, patience--and options.
From the Iranian side, there has been no cessation in the war of words--nor any serious effort to resolve the nuclear impasse. Just today, a senior Iranian military official vowed that Tehran would target Israel "first," if the U.S. does "anything evil." The Iranian officer--a Rear Admiral in the Revolutionary Guards Navy--did not specify the type of action that would trigger a response from Tehran, and he did not say how Iran might target Israel. Iran has a small number of medium-range ballistic missiles (SHAHAB-3) that are capable of hitting Israeli targets with conventional, chemical or biological warheads. Additionally, Iranian-sponsored terrorist groups could carry out attacks inside Israel and the Iranian Air Force has a small number of aircraft that could reach Israeli territory (although their prospects of carrying out a successful strike are dim, at best).
Iran's growing bellicosity suggests it has little to fear from the upcoming UNSC debate over its nuclear program. Russia and China have reportedly told Iran that they oppose sanctions and military action, leaving the timid UN with no real options for punishing Iran. That's the diplomatic equivalent of a green light for Tehran to continue its nuclear program and rachet up the rhetoric. The U.S. has refused to take the military option off the table, but demonstrated no real appetite for using it, at least over the short haul. As we noted yesterday, the current U.S. strategy seems to revolve around the upcoming UNSC debate; if that fails to produce any meaningful results, then the issue will be raised at the G8 Summit in July.
I'm not a diplomat, so perhaps I don't understand the potential impact of that "approach." In other words, if the UNSC fails to act--and that seems to be the most likely option--how can we expect the G8 to take meaningful action, with some of the participants (read: Russia) already in Tehran's pocket, and others (read: The Europeans) worried about terrorist attacks and possible interruptions in their oil supplies. A discussion at the G8 would be fine, if the participants had some sort of concrete game plan to dealing decisively with Iran, with all options open for consideration. As it stands, the potential discussion will be just that--more talk, with no real threat to back it up.
For Israel, the Iran issue is moving rapidly beyond the discussion stage, and becoming a matter of national survival. Last week's blunt assessment of the Iranian nuclear program--delivered by the Mossad chief during meetings in Washington--suggests that Tel Aviv is prepared to act, regardless of U.S. policy. Israel's reported discovery of covert Iranian nuclear sites adds new urgency to the equation; the existence of such sites would speed Tehran's development of a bomb, and reduce the Israeli window for carrying out a preemptive military strike.
Earlier this year, we observed that Israeli military action was unlikely during the incapacitation of former Prime Minister Sharon, the election of a new government, and Ehud Olmert's transition to power. That period is now passed, as evidenced by the tone of last week's meetings in Washington, and the likely grim tone of the U.S.-Israeli summit scheduled for later this month. When Olmert meets with President Bush on 23 May, I expect he will deliver a message that mirrors that of the Mossad chief. Israel is gravely concerned about the rapid progression of Iran's nuclear program, and if the U.S. doesn't take action, the Israeli Defense Forces will.
For the past year, the Israelis have given diplomacy a chance to work, and their patience has been rewarded with pointless talks, increasingly heated rhetoric from Iran, and an expansion of Tehran's nuclear efforts. The reported discovery of those covert facilities in Iran have likely ended any Israeli hope for a negotiated settlement, and raised prospects for a preemptive Israeli strike. It's difficult to forecast when such an attack might take place--the Israelis are masters at hiding military preparations--but you might want to circle some moonless nights in late spring or early summer, before the sandstorm "season" begins in the Middle East. An Israeli strike against Iran may no longer be a matter of "if" but "when."
From the Iranian side, there has been no cessation in the war of words--nor any serious effort to resolve the nuclear impasse. Just today, a senior Iranian military official vowed that Tehran would target Israel "first," if the U.S. does "anything evil." The Iranian officer--a Rear Admiral in the Revolutionary Guards Navy--did not specify the type of action that would trigger a response from Tehran, and he did not say how Iran might target Israel. Iran has a small number of medium-range ballistic missiles (SHAHAB-3) that are capable of hitting Israeli targets with conventional, chemical or biological warheads. Additionally, Iranian-sponsored terrorist groups could carry out attacks inside Israel and the Iranian Air Force has a small number of aircraft that could reach Israeli territory (although their prospects of carrying out a successful strike are dim, at best).
Iran's growing bellicosity suggests it has little to fear from the upcoming UNSC debate over its nuclear program. Russia and China have reportedly told Iran that they oppose sanctions and military action, leaving the timid UN with no real options for punishing Iran. That's the diplomatic equivalent of a green light for Tehran to continue its nuclear program and rachet up the rhetoric. The U.S. has refused to take the military option off the table, but demonstrated no real appetite for using it, at least over the short haul. As we noted yesterday, the current U.S. strategy seems to revolve around the upcoming UNSC debate; if that fails to produce any meaningful results, then the issue will be raised at the G8 Summit in July.
I'm not a diplomat, so perhaps I don't understand the potential impact of that "approach." In other words, if the UNSC fails to act--and that seems to be the most likely option--how can we expect the G8 to take meaningful action, with some of the participants (read: Russia) already in Tehran's pocket, and others (read: The Europeans) worried about terrorist attacks and possible interruptions in their oil supplies. A discussion at the G8 would be fine, if the participants had some sort of concrete game plan to dealing decisively with Iran, with all options open for consideration. As it stands, the potential discussion will be just that--more talk, with no real threat to back it up.
For Israel, the Iran issue is moving rapidly beyond the discussion stage, and becoming a matter of national survival. Last week's blunt assessment of the Iranian nuclear program--delivered by the Mossad chief during meetings in Washington--suggests that Tel Aviv is prepared to act, regardless of U.S. policy. Israel's reported discovery of covert Iranian nuclear sites adds new urgency to the equation; the existence of such sites would speed Tehran's development of a bomb, and reduce the Israeli window for carrying out a preemptive military strike.
Earlier this year, we observed that Israeli military action was unlikely during the incapacitation of former Prime Minister Sharon, the election of a new government, and Ehud Olmert's transition to power. That period is now passed, as evidenced by the tone of last week's meetings in Washington, and the likely grim tone of the U.S.-Israeli summit scheduled for later this month. When Olmert meets with President Bush on 23 May, I expect he will deliver a message that mirrors that of the Mossad chief. Israel is gravely concerned about the rapid progression of Iran's nuclear program, and if the U.S. doesn't take action, the Israeli Defense Forces will.
For the past year, the Israelis have given diplomacy a chance to work, and their patience has been rewarded with pointless talks, increasingly heated rhetoric from Iran, and an expansion of Tehran's nuclear efforts. The reported discovery of those covert facilities in Iran have likely ended any Israeli hope for a negotiated settlement, and raised prospects for a preemptive Israeli strike. It's difficult to forecast when such an attack might take place--the Israelis are masters at hiding military preparations--but you might want to circle some moonless nights in late spring or early summer, before the sandstorm "season" begins in the Middle East. An Israeli strike against Iran may no longer be a matter of "if" but "when."
Monday, May 01, 2006
Mission to Washington
Kudos to Rick Moran at RightWing Nuthouse, for his timely insights on recent meetings between the head of Israel's Mossad, and his counterparts in Washington. As Rick observes, last week's sessions are remarkable in a couple of respects. First of all, it is worth noting that the new Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, sent his spy chief (Meir Dagan) to Washington, setting the stage for his meeting with President Bush later this month. It is also remarkable that "news" about the meeting apparently came from Israeli sources--and not the U.S. intelligence community--suggesting that the recent "anti-leak" campaign is having some success.
Pressing into intelligence officials into service as diplomats isn't exactly new (George Tenent was sent on several errands to the Middle East by Bill Clinton), but Dagan's mission to Washington certainly establishes a somber tone for discussions about Iran, and upcoming talks between the Israeli Prime Minister and Mr. Bush. As the Times of London noted, Dagan is not given to diplomatic courtesies; the former commando is described as tough and blunt, and he apparenty conveyed a very serious message from Tel Aviv regarding Iran's nuclear intentions.
According to the Sunday Times of London, the Mossad now believes that the Iranians have covert uranium enrichment sites, in addition to their "declared" facilities. That would allow Tehran to continue its pursuit of nuclear weapons, while officially "suspending" enrichment activities, possibly to avoid UN sanctions or military strikes. It's a possibility that we've covered on numerous occasions, and it certainly can't be discounted now.
Consider the example of North Korea, which (in some respects) seems to be a model for Tehran. You may recall that Pyongyang agreed to give up its nuclear program back in 1994, part of the infamous "Agreed To" framework hammered out by ex-president-turned-dictator-coddler Jimmy Carter. As part of the deal, Pyongyang even allowed the IAEA to install video surveillance cameras in its Yongbyon nuclear complex. For the next seven years, the cameras recorded inactivity at Yongbyon, while the North Koreans continued their nuclear program at covert sites. Iran certainly has the capacity to play a similar shell game with a reluctant UN and the equally ineffective IAEA. In fact, some analysts believe Tehran's willingness to discuss possible diplomatic deals all-but-confirms the existence of a covert program.
According to the Israelis, Iran is much further ahead in its nuclear efforts than previously believed, and could be within one year of having an atomic bomb. By comparison, some U.S. observers believe Iran is three to six years away from nuclear weapons, and at least one official estimate puts the timetable at closer to a decade.
Dagan's message to the U.S. was apparently terse and serious: here's what we know about the Iranian program, and we're prepared to act if you don't. If media reports are accurate, the reaction from American officials reflected concern, but not panic. According to the Times, the U.S. reportedly plans to raise the issue at the G8 Summit in July, if the UNSC fails to act in the interim. That approach suggests that Washington still favors the diplomatic track, and believes it has time for more negotiation before military action might be necessary. It's a gamble that appears increasingly uncomfortable for the new Israeli government.
In many respects, the policy question boils down to which side has the better intelligence. In terms of technical capabilities, the U.S. has the edge, but Israeli HUMINT is without peer in the Middle East. And while Tel Aviv is not above using intelligence to advance its particular point of view, but I don't believe their claims about covert Iranian nuclear facilities are exaggerated or wildly inaccurate. Indeed, at this stage of the game, the existence of covert nuclear sites are almost a given; any realistic estimate of Tehran's program must account for that possibility, both for diplomatic purposes--and potential strike planning. That's the unvarnished, bottom-line message that Mr. Dagan apparently delivered in Washington last week.
Pressing into intelligence officials into service as diplomats isn't exactly new (George Tenent was sent on several errands to the Middle East by Bill Clinton), but Dagan's mission to Washington certainly establishes a somber tone for discussions about Iran, and upcoming talks between the Israeli Prime Minister and Mr. Bush. As the Times of London noted, Dagan is not given to diplomatic courtesies; the former commando is described as tough and blunt, and he apparenty conveyed a very serious message from Tel Aviv regarding Iran's nuclear intentions.
According to the Sunday Times of London, the Mossad now believes that the Iranians have covert uranium enrichment sites, in addition to their "declared" facilities. That would allow Tehran to continue its pursuit of nuclear weapons, while officially "suspending" enrichment activities, possibly to avoid UN sanctions or military strikes. It's a possibility that we've covered on numerous occasions, and it certainly can't be discounted now.
Consider the example of North Korea, which (in some respects) seems to be a model for Tehran. You may recall that Pyongyang agreed to give up its nuclear program back in 1994, part of the infamous "Agreed To" framework hammered out by ex-president-turned-dictator-coddler Jimmy Carter. As part of the deal, Pyongyang even allowed the IAEA to install video surveillance cameras in its Yongbyon nuclear complex. For the next seven years, the cameras recorded inactivity at Yongbyon, while the North Koreans continued their nuclear program at covert sites. Iran certainly has the capacity to play a similar shell game with a reluctant UN and the equally ineffective IAEA. In fact, some analysts believe Tehran's willingness to discuss possible diplomatic deals all-but-confirms the existence of a covert program.
According to the Israelis, Iran is much further ahead in its nuclear efforts than previously believed, and could be within one year of having an atomic bomb. By comparison, some U.S. observers believe Iran is three to six years away from nuclear weapons, and at least one official estimate puts the timetable at closer to a decade.
Dagan's message to the U.S. was apparently terse and serious: here's what we know about the Iranian program, and we're prepared to act if you don't. If media reports are accurate, the reaction from American officials reflected concern, but not panic. According to the Times, the U.S. reportedly plans to raise the issue at the G8 Summit in July, if the UNSC fails to act in the interim. That approach suggests that Washington still favors the diplomatic track, and believes it has time for more negotiation before military action might be necessary. It's a gamble that appears increasingly uncomfortable for the new Israeli government.
In many respects, the policy question boils down to which side has the better intelligence. In terms of technical capabilities, the U.S. has the edge, but Israeli HUMINT is without peer in the Middle East. And while Tel Aviv is not above using intelligence to advance its particular point of view, but I don't believe their claims about covert Iranian nuclear facilities are exaggerated or wildly inaccurate. Indeed, at this stage of the game, the existence of covert nuclear sites are almost a given; any realistic estimate of Tehran's program must account for that possibility, both for diplomatic purposes--and potential strike planning. That's the unvarnished, bottom-line message that Mr. Dagan apparently delivered in Washington last week.
The Long Distance War
One of the more popular phrases in military circles today is "persistent surveillance." As the concept implies, near-continuous surveillance makes it more difficult for an enemy to operate, even in guerilla wars like Iraq and Afghanistan. Attacks can sometimes be prevented or even deterred if an adversary knows that a drone is overhead--and trained eyes are watching the pictures it provides.
Even its more ardent supporters would acknowledge that persistent surveillance is still a work in progress, but the Air Force (in particular) has made tremendous progress in recent years. The service has created an architecture called the Dedicated Common Ground System or DCGS, that links surveillance drones over distant battlefields with intelligence nodes half a world away.
This story, from a newspaper in Newport News, Virginia, provides both a fascinating--and personal--perspective on persistent surveillance in action. From their operator consoles at Langley AFB, intelligence specialists monitor live UAV feeds from Iraq, provide instant analysis, and pass information back to combatants on the ground.
As reporter Stephanie Heinatz notes, the airmen at Langley are thousands of miles from the Sunni Triangle or Khandahar Province, but they are very much involved in the fight--and it takes an emotional toll. There are lows (such as watching an undetected roadside bomb take out a HUMVEE, real time), but there are rewards as well. The intelligence group commander recalls walking into the facility to find his crew "going crazy." They had just found their third, unexploded roadside bomb of the day--and likely saved American lives in the process.
A personal note: I've been inside one of these facilities on a couple of occasions, and the technology is impressive. But even more impressive are the young men and women sitting at the console, relaying information to their comrades in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many of the specialists at Langley (and other locations) are junior airmen, serving their first tour of duty. They deserve our gratitude--and respect.
Even its more ardent supporters would acknowledge that persistent surveillance is still a work in progress, but the Air Force (in particular) has made tremendous progress in recent years. The service has created an architecture called the Dedicated Common Ground System or DCGS, that links surveillance drones over distant battlefields with intelligence nodes half a world away.
This story, from a newspaper in Newport News, Virginia, provides both a fascinating--and personal--perspective on persistent surveillance in action. From their operator consoles at Langley AFB, intelligence specialists monitor live UAV feeds from Iraq, provide instant analysis, and pass information back to combatants on the ground.
As reporter Stephanie Heinatz notes, the airmen at Langley are thousands of miles from the Sunni Triangle or Khandahar Province, but they are very much involved in the fight--and it takes an emotional toll. There are lows (such as watching an undetected roadside bomb take out a HUMVEE, real time), but there are rewards as well. The intelligence group commander recalls walking into the facility to find his crew "going crazy." They had just found their third, unexploded roadside bomb of the day--and likely saved American lives in the process.
A personal note: I've been inside one of these facilities on a couple of occasions, and the technology is impressive. But even more impressive are the young men and women sitting at the console, relaying information to their comrades in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many of the specialists at Langley (and other locations) are junior airmen, serving their first tour of duty. They deserve our gratitude--and respect.
Detecting Lies
Powerline has a link to an interesting story in today's Washington Post on the alleged effectiveness of polygraphs. The Post essentially states the obvious--lie detector tests aren't always accurate; in fact, their greatest benefit may be as an intimidation tool. A nervous examinee, worried about what the polygraph is indicating, may simply break down and confess misdeeds, even if the machine failed to detect the physiological changes that are often associated with lying.
Polygraphs are back in the news because of the Mary McCarthy case. The veteran CIA officer was recently fired after she supposedly failed several polygraph exams, and admitted unauthorized contacts with reporters. The CIA is one of several federal agencies that use polygraphs for prospective and current employees; the FBI is another. In fact, virtually all of the bureau's agents and other employees--including the director--undergo a polygraph exam every five years. The FBI increased its use of lie detectors in the wake of the Robert Hanssen spy scandal; the CIA is reportedly ramping up polygraphs in an effort to catch leakers.
The Post is quick to note that two spies (Hanssen and CIA turncoat Rick Ames) passed polygraph tests, while hundreds of "innocent" people failed. What the paper fails to mention is that lie detectors are often useful in detecting inconsistencies in the way an examinee responds; while the answer may appear "truthful," the individual may tell the story a different way on the third or fourth time around, or there may be subtle changes in physiology or body language, suggesting that deception efforts may be underway. The paper also fails to report that both Hanssen and Ames were trained in counter-polygraph techniques, so the fact they passed is hardly surprising. The vast majority of examinees have not received that training, so lie detectors should be more reliabile in testing those individuals--an important distinction carefully omitted by the Post.
The Post asks whether it's fair to use a device whose reliability is only fair, at best. A better question might be: what other tool does the government have at its disposal to ferret out spies and leakers? The explosion of media leaks over the past 20 years coincided with a period when polygraph employment was not widespread. As the paper notes, President Reagan scaled back plans to increase the use of polygraphs during the 1980s. Would there have been fewer leaks if Reagan had allowed implementation of the original proposal? We can only speculate, but the "permissive" environment of the past two decades has done little to discourage the public disclosure of classified information. If the increased use of polygraphs produces a decline in leaks, then the program is probably a sound investment, even if the WaPo loses some potential sources.
A personal note: I have undergone a polygraph examination, in connection with a clearance for a special access program. I would not describe it as a pleasant experience, but it was not the stuff of third-rate spy movies, either. The examiner was courteous and completely professional; he did everything possible to put me at ease, realizing that a polygraph is inevitably a stressful experience. And, contrary to the Post account, I did not find the polygraph to be justification for some sort of grand inquisition. The examiner stuck to a basic set of questions, which were administered several times. He seemed satisfied with my responses; prehaps I've led an exceedingly dull life, or I did what you're supposed to do during a polygraph--tell the truth.
Happily, I passed my exam and was read into the program a few weeks later. BTW, a modern polygraph is nothing like its depiction on TV or in the movies. The wildly fluctuating needles have been replaced by a laptop, linked to the examinee through a set of minimally invasive "leads" that measure physiological changes. The examinee can't see the laptop screen, so he or she has no way of knowing what the device is measuring--and what it may reveal about the individual's "truthfulness."
Polygraphs are back in the news because of the Mary McCarthy case. The veteran CIA officer was recently fired after she supposedly failed several polygraph exams, and admitted unauthorized contacts with reporters. The CIA is one of several federal agencies that use polygraphs for prospective and current employees; the FBI is another. In fact, virtually all of the bureau's agents and other employees--including the director--undergo a polygraph exam every five years. The FBI increased its use of lie detectors in the wake of the Robert Hanssen spy scandal; the CIA is reportedly ramping up polygraphs in an effort to catch leakers.
The Post is quick to note that two spies (Hanssen and CIA turncoat Rick Ames) passed polygraph tests, while hundreds of "innocent" people failed. What the paper fails to mention is that lie detectors are often useful in detecting inconsistencies in the way an examinee responds; while the answer may appear "truthful," the individual may tell the story a different way on the third or fourth time around, or there may be subtle changes in physiology or body language, suggesting that deception efforts may be underway. The paper also fails to report that both Hanssen and Ames were trained in counter-polygraph techniques, so the fact they passed is hardly surprising. The vast majority of examinees have not received that training, so lie detectors should be more reliabile in testing those individuals--an important distinction carefully omitted by the Post.
The Post asks whether it's fair to use a device whose reliability is only fair, at best. A better question might be: what other tool does the government have at its disposal to ferret out spies and leakers? The explosion of media leaks over the past 20 years coincided with a period when polygraph employment was not widespread. As the paper notes, President Reagan scaled back plans to increase the use of polygraphs during the 1980s. Would there have been fewer leaks if Reagan had allowed implementation of the original proposal? We can only speculate, but the "permissive" environment of the past two decades has done little to discourage the public disclosure of classified information. If the increased use of polygraphs produces a decline in leaks, then the program is probably a sound investment, even if the WaPo loses some potential sources.
A personal note: I have undergone a polygraph examination, in connection with a clearance for a special access program. I would not describe it as a pleasant experience, but it was not the stuff of third-rate spy movies, either. The examiner was courteous and completely professional; he did everything possible to put me at ease, realizing that a polygraph is inevitably a stressful experience. And, contrary to the Post account, I did not find the polygraph to be justification for some sort of grand inquisition. The examiner stuck to a basic set of questions, which were administered several times. He seemed satisfied with my responses; prehaps I've led an exceedingly dull life, or I did what you're supposed to do during a polygraph--tell the truth.
Happily, I passed my exam and was read into the program a few weeks later. BTW, a modern polygraph is nothing like its depiction on TV or in the movies. The wildly fluctuating needles have been replaced by a laptop, linked to the examinee through a set of minimally invasive "leads" that measure physiological changes. The examinee can't see the laptop screen, so he or she has no way of knowing what the device is measuring--and what it may reveal about the individual's "truthfulness."
Losing the War
I don't know if champagne is chilling somewhere in the Pentagon, but perhaps it should be. While the media was reporting an "increase" in U.S. combat deaths over the weekend, there were continuing signs that the insurgency is losing its steam, and that terrorist ring-leader Musab al-Zarqawi's days are numbered.
Zarqawi is putting on a brave front. Last week, he released a new video, showing his face on camera for the first time. Inspired by the bin Laden school of jihadist video, we saw Zarqawi firing an assault rifle, clad in a suicide vet and supposedly directing terrorist operations. It was, altogether, a pitiful display, designed to demonstrate that Zarqawi remains relevant in the insurgency.
Let's being with Zarqawi's status as "leader" of Al Qaida in Iraq. There have been peristent reports that the fugitive Jordanian has been removed from his leadership position, due to his penchant for killing innocent Iraqis by the score. Zarqawi's decision to mimic bin Laden on the tape was no accident; by emulating "the Sheik" on his propaganda tape, Zarqawi hoped to demonstrate that he remains worthy of leading Al Qaida troops in Iraq.
Zarqawi has also unveiled a new strategy for battling the U.S.-led "crusaders" in Iraq. Over the weekend, he announced plans to "raise an Army" to confront coalition forces directly. This tactic is designed to create the impression of a powerful, growing insurgency, now able to take on U.S. troops in conventional-style attacks. In reality, the strategy is intended to paper over a glaring deficiency in Zarqawi's organization: a declining number of foreign-born fighters willing to undertake "martyrdom" operations.
If Zarqawi is serious about a more "conventional" insurgency, it it tantamout to an admission of defeat. You may recall that the terrorists tried more "direct" attacks in the early days of the U.S. occupation of Baghdad. Hundreds, perhaps thousands of terrorists died when they tried to challenge U.S armored columns, backed by attack helicopters. The failure of that stage of the insurgeny forced the adoption of other measures, notably the roadside bomb campaign--the only terrorist tactic that has achieved any degree of success in Iraq. Recruiting and training a terrorist "army" will presumably divert resources away from the bombing campaign, another indication that things aren't going well for the jihadists.
Then, there's the question of where Zarqawi will recruit his fighters. True, the assorted fanatics will keep filtering across the border from Syria (and the Iranians may supply a few martyrdom candidates as well), but Iraq is proving a less fertile ground for new terrorists. Over the weekend, a senior Iraqi government official indicated that leaders of seven major insurgent groups are talking about a settlement to end their role in the insurgency. We're heard this kind of talk before--and I won't believe it until I see the terrorists stacking their weapons in Iraqi Army garrisons--but the "surrender" of these groups would be a powerful blow to the terrorists--and Zarqawi's plans. It's certainly hard to raise an Army when a large group of potential recruits decides to give up the struggle.
And, if that weren't enough, there's word that the dragnet around Zarqawi has tightened a bit more. Michelle Malkin reported over the weekend that U.S. special forces came close to nabbing the terrorist leader in a recent raid. Again, we've heard this type of report before, but there appears to be a major difference between this "close call" and a previous incident, when Zarqawi stumbled into a U.S. roadblock and had to flee on foot. According to Marine Corps Times, a veritable "all-star" team of SOF units has been assembled in Baghdad, and they're hot on the trail of Zarqawi. These units, operating as part of Task Force 145, include elements of SEAL Team 6, Delta Force, the British Special Air Service, U.S. Army Rangers, and the Air Force's 24th Special Tactics Squadron (combat controllers and pararescue specialists), among others. While it is true that SOF elements have been in the Sunni triangle since before the fall of Baghdad, this concentration suggests that the hunt for high-value targets has taken on a new urgency, and better intelligence is fueling the search.
Zarqawi might want to keep that suicide vest handy. It might come in handy very soon.
Zarqawi is putting on a brave front. Last week, he released a new video, showing his face on camera for the first time. Inspired by the bin Laden school of jihadist video, we saw Zarqawi firing an assault rifle, clad in a suicide vet and supposedly directing terrorist operations. It was, altogether, a pitiful display, designed to demonstrate that Zarqawi remains relevant in the insurgency.
Let's being with Zarqawi's status as "leader" of Al Qaida in Iraq. There have been peristent reports that the fugitive Jordanian has been removed from his leadership position, due to his penchant for killing innocent Iraqis by the score. Zarqawi's decision to mimic bin Laden on the tape was no accident; by emulating "the Sheik" on his propaganda tape, Zarqawi hoped to demonstrate that he remains worthy of leading Al Qaida troops in Iraq.
Zarqawi has also unveiled a new strategy for battling the U.S.-led "crusaders" in Iraq. Over the weekend, he announced plans to "raise an Army" to confront coalition forces directly. This tactic is designed to create the impression of a powerful, growing insurgency, now able to take on U.S. troops in conventional-style attacks. In reality, the strategy is intended to paper over a glaring deficiency in Zarqawi's organization: a declining number of foreign-born fighters willing to undertake "martyrdom" operations.
If Zarqawi is serious about a more "conventional" insurgency, it it tantamout to an admission of defeat. You may recall that the terrorists tried more "direct" attacks in the early days of the U.S. occupation of Baghdad. Hundreds, perhaps thousands of terrorists died when they tried to challenge U.S armored columns, backed by attack helicopters. The failure of that stage of the insurgeny forced the adoption of other measures, notably the roadside bomb campaign--the only terrorist tactic that has achieved any degree of success in Iraq. Recruiting and training a terrorist "army" will presumably divert resources away from the bombing campaign, another indication that things aren't going well for the jihadists.
Then, there's the question of where Zarqawi will recruit his fighters. True, the assorted fanatics will keep filtering across the border from Syria (and the Iranians may supply a few martyrdom candidates as well), but Iraq is proving a less fertile ground for new terrorists. Over the weekend, a senior Iraqi government official indicated that leaders of seven major insurgent groups are talking about a settlement to end their role in the insurgency. We're heard this kind of talk before--and I won't believe it until I see the terrorists stacking their weapons in Iraqi Army garrisons--but the "surrender" of these groups would be a powerful blow to the terrorists--and Zarqawi's plans. It's certainly hard to raise an Army when a large group of potential recruits decides to give up the struggle.
And, if that weren't enough, there's word that the dragnet around Zarqawi has tightened a bit more. Michelle Malkin reported over the weekend that U.S. special forces came close to nabbing the terrorist leader in a recent raid. Again, we've heard this type of report before, but there appears to be a major difference between this "close call" and a previous incident, when Zarqawi stumbled into a U.S. roadblock and had to flee on foot. According to Marine Corps Times, a veritable "all-star" team of SOF units has been assembled in Baghdad, and they're hot on the trail of Zarqawi. These units, operating as part of Task Force 145, include elements of SEAL Team 6, Delta Force, the British Special Air Service, U.S. Army Rangers, and the Air Force's 24th Special Tactics Squadron (combat controllers and pararescue specialists), among others. While it is true that SOF elements have been in the Sunni triangle since before the fall of Baghdad, this concentration suggests that the hunt for high-value targets has taken on a new urgency, and better intelligence is fueling the search.
Zarqawi might want to keep that suicide vest handy. It might come in handy very soon.
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