Because their operation failed badly--and the Iranians had to cut their losses.
That scenario--which we've advanced in previous posts--was echoed in a Thursday op-ed piece from Amir Taheri, published in the New York Post. In his column, Mr. Taheri raises the same question we did when the Battle of Basra lurched to a sudden halt, with assistance from Tehran. If the operation was going so well, why not press ahead an inflict a political and military defeat on the Iraqi government?
Instead, the commander of the Iranian Qods Force--the same organizations that trained the equipped militants involved in the uprising--brokered a quick cease-fire with Iraqi politicians. His motivation was clear; without a cessation of hostilities, Iranian-backed insurgents faced the prospect of even greater losses, and humiliation at the hands of the Baghdad government.
And, the Iranian failure wasn't limited to Basra. Planning Shiite revolts in other regions failed to materialize. Senior clerics sided with the government, and the Iraqi Army performed well in its first major, semi-autonomous operations. Faced with a battle its proxies couldn't win, Tehran had no choice but to pull the plug.
Iran's defeat in Basra was a victory for the al-Maliki government and its security forces--though many western media outlets tried to depict it as an Iraqi version of the Tet Offensive. But any celebrations in Iraq (or elsewhere) should be tempered by this obvious reminder, offered at the end of Taheri's column: "This was just the first round. The struggle for Iraq isn't over."
Indeed, we've participated in more than a few war games that feature Iran's attempted annexation of southern Iraq, as a prelude to wider operations in the Persian Gulf. Tehran is patient, and learns from its mistakes. There will certainly be a second Battle of Basra, and perhaps sooner, rather than later.
Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts
Friday, April 11, 2008
Tuesday, November 27, 2007
A Missile by Any Other Name
Iran has announced that it has produced a "new" missile with a range of 1,200 miles, capable of reaching Israel and U.S. military bases in the Middle East.
Tehran's claims, issued by the official IRNA news agency, said the Ashoura missile was produced by factories "associated with the Iranian defense ministry." Iran's Defense Minister, Gen. Mostafa Mohammad Najjar, did not say whether his country has test-fired the missile, or plans to do so.
As the Associated Press notes, "many of Iran's weapons development claims have not been independently verified." That would be an understatement; as we've observed in previous posts, many of Tehran's claims are little more than exaggeration or pure fiction.
A couple of recent examples come to mind. Not long ago, Iran's claimed that it had developed a missile that was invisible to radar. In reality, the "stealth missile" was nothing more than an existing model coated with radar-absorbing paint (which likely peeled off in flight).
Similarly, Tehran's much-hyped high-speed torpedo was copied from a 50-year-old Russian design, and uses a pre-calculated "firing solution" (familiar to anyone who's seen a WWII submarine movie) to reach its target. That means the super torpedo has marginal capabilities against maneuvering targets, or those utilizing counter-measures. Predictably, the glaring deficiencies of those weapons systems were omitted from press reports on Iran's expanding (and supposedly, more sophisticated) military arsenal.
While open source information on the Ashoura remains limited, there is little doubt that Iran is working diligently to improve the range--and capabilities--of its missile fleet. During its annual military parade in September, Tehran unveiled its new Ghadar (Powerful) missile, which has a reported range of 1,119 miles. That's a significant improvement over Iran's other, medium-range missile systems, most notably the Shahab-3. With a range of 800 miles, the Shahab-3 has been operational for the past two years, and Iran has built new underground bases at several locations to house the missile and associated personnel.
However, the early-model Shahab-3 has a couple of serious limitations. First, because of its limited range, the missile must be based in western Iran, to reach targets in Israel. Placing the missile closer to Iran's western border increases its vulnerability to air and naval attack. Secondly, the original Shahab-3 utilizes liquid fuel for its engines. Liquid fuel is highly volatile, and even a minor mishap can trigger a massive explosion, particularly when the missile is being fueled in an enclosed space, such as an underground bunker.
Based on the (limited) information provided by Tehran, it's difficult to tell the differences between the Ashoura and Ghadar. Earlier this year, the Deputy Director of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency revealed that Iran is working on at least two variants of the Ghadar, a "110" model with a range of roughly 1,300 miles--similar to that of the missile displayed in September, and a Ghadar 101, believed to have a range of roughly 500 miles. It is possible that the Ashoura is simply a new name for a Ghadar or Shahab-3 variant, or it may represent a completely different missile program.
If that latter assessment proves accurate, it suggests that Tehran is looking for a solid-fuel replacement for the older Shahab-3. With a longer range, the new MRBMs could more easily target Israel, and take advantage of basing options deeper inside Iran's borders, complicating targeting by potential adversaries. Under that scenario, some of the underground complexes in western Iran would become forward operating bases for Ghadar or Ashoura variants, with primarly garrisons located well away from the Persian Gulf.
Still, it's worth noting that Iran's missile programs have proceeded slowly, and large-scale deployments of the Ghadar and/or Ashoura are probably years away. In the interim, various Shahab-3 variants will remain Tehran's primary weapon for striking Israel and reaching other medium-range targets.
And, given Iran's desire to build a massive missile force, capable of firing "hundreds" of rockets and missiles in a single salvo, some of the Shahab-3s will probably remain in service after the Ghadar and Ashoura systems become fully operational. It doesn't make much sense from a budgetary or logistical stand-point, but given Iran's strategic aims (and with oil hovering around $100 a barrel), Tehran can afford multiple, over-lapping missile programs, at least for now.
***
ADDENDUM: The linked AP story still mentions the Shahab-4 as being under development in Iran. Many analysts believe that program has been terminated, in favor of newer, solid-fueled missiles and the BM-25 system, purchased from North Korea earlier this year. As missile analyst Charles Vick notes at GlobalSecurity.org, the Ghadar family of missiles will not only provide Iran with a medium and intermediate range strike capability, they could also give Iran a potential ASAT capability.
Bill Gertz offered similar thoughts in a Washington Times article earlier this year, noting the common "heritage" among various Chinese, Pakistani, North Korean and Iranian missiles. Not surprisingly, all of those countries are also pursuing an anti-satellite capbility (to some degree), and development of a launch vehicle represents a critical step in that process.
Tehran's claims, issued by the official IRNA news agency, said the Ashoura missile was produced by factories "associated with the Iranian defense ministry." Iran's Defense Minister, Gen. Mostafa Mohammad Najjar, did not say whether his country has test-fired the missile, or plans to do so.
As the Associated Press notes, "many of Iran's weapons development claims have not been independently verified." That would be an understatement; as we've observed in previous posts, many of Tehran's claims are little more than exaggeration or pure fiction.
A couple of recent examples come to mind. Not long ago, Iran's claimed that it had developed a missile that was invisible to radar. In reality, the "stealth missile" was nothing more than an existing model coated with radar-absorbing paint (which likely peeled off in flight).
Similarly, Tehran's much-hyped high-speed torpedo was copied from a 50-year-old Russian design, and uses a pre-calculated "firing solution" (familiar to anyone who's seen a WWII submarine movie) to reach its target. That means the super torpedo has marginal capabilities against maneuvering targets, or those utilizing counter-measures. Predictably, the glaring deficiencies of those weapons systems were omitted from press reports on Iran's expanding (and supposedly, more sophisticated) military arsenal.
While open source information on the Ashoura remains limited, there is little doubt that Iran is working diligently to improve the range--and capabilities--of its missile fleet. During its annual military parade in September, Tehran unveiled its new Ghadar (Powerful) missile, which has a reported range of 1,119 miles. That's a significant improvement over Iran's other, medium-range missile systems, most notably the Shahab-3. With a range of 800 miles, the Shahab-3 has been operational for the past two years, and Iran has built new underground bases at several locations to house the missile and associated personnel.
However, the early-model Shahab-3 has a couple of serious limitations. First, because of its limited range, the missile must be based in western Iran, to reach targets in Israel. Placing the missile closer to Iran's western border increases its vulnerability to air and naval attack. Secondly, the original Shahab-3 utilizes liquid fuel for its engines. Liquid fuel is highly volatile, and even a minor mishap can trigger a massive explosion, particularly when the missile is being fueled in an enclosed space, such as an underground bunker.
Based on the (limited) information provided by Tehran, it's difficult to tell the differences between the Ashoura and Ghadar. Earlier this year, the Deputy Director of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency revealed that Iran is working on at least two variants of the Ghadar, a "110" model with a range of roughly 1,300 miles--similar to that of the missile displayed in September, and a Ghadar 101, believed to have a range of roughly 500 miles. It is possible that the Ashoura is simply a new name for a Ghadar or Shahab-3 variant, or it may represent a completely different missile program.
If that latter assessment proves accurate, it suggests that Tehran is looking for a solid-fuel replacement for the older Shahab-3. With a longer range, the new MRBMs could more easily target Israel, and take advantage of basing options deeper inside Iran's borders, complicating targeting by potential adversaries. Under that scenario, some of the underground complexes in western Iran would become forward operating bases for Ghadar or Ashoura variants, with primarly garrisons located well away from the Persian Gulf.
Still, it's worth noting that Iran's missile programs have proceeded slowly, and large-scale deployments of the Ghadar and/or Ashoura are probably years away. In the interim, various Shahab-3 variants will remain Tehran's primary weapon for striking Israel and reaching other medium-range targets.
And, given Iran's desire to build a massive missile force, capable of firing "hundreds" of rockets and missiles in a single salvo, some of the Shahab-3s will probably remain in service after the Ghadar and Ashoura systems become fully operational. It doesn't make much sense from a budgetary or logistical stand-point, but given Iran's strategic aims (and with oil hovering around $100 a barrel), Tehran can afford multiple, over-lapping missile programs, at least for now.
***
ADDENDUM: The linked AP story still mentions the Shahab-4 as being under development in Iran. Many analysts believe that program has been terminated, in favor of newer, solid-fueled missiles and the BM-25 system, purchased from North Korea earlier this year. As missile analyst Charles Vick notes at GlobalSecurity.org, the Ghadar family of missiles will not only provide Iran with a medium and intermediate range strike capability, they could also give Iran a potential ASAT capability.
Bill Gertz offered similar thoughts in a Washington Times article earlier this year, noting the common "heritage" among various Chinese, Pakistani, North Korean and Iranian missiles. Not surprisingly, all of those countries are also pursuing an anti-satellite capbility (to some degree), and development of a launch vehicle represents a critical step in that process.
Friday, November 16, 2007
Decision Time?
Today's U.K. Guardian report on Iran's nuclear program is largely a rehash of points we've already made. Citing the recently-released IAEA report on Tehran's nuclear efforts, the Guardian notes that Iran now has upwards of 3,000 centrifuges in operation, an array that could produce enough enriched uranium for one nuclear weapon a year, assuming that sufficient purity levels are attained.
And, as the paper observes, the 3,000 centrifuge array may represent a "red line" for potential military action. Allowing Iran to operate the centrifuges for a sustained period--and add more to the operation--would allow Tehran to master the production of nuclear fuel, an important step in developing nuclear weapons. The U.S. has long stated that Iran will not be allowed to obtain nukes, but it's unclear at what point we would employ military force. Similar red lines exist for Israel, which views Tehran's nuclear program and long-range missile forces with growing apprehension.
In some respects, the IAEA report underscore the inability of that organization--and the larger international community--to deal with the Iranian nuclear threat. Former U.N. arms inspector David Kay (who would never be described as a neocon or a John Bolton clone) said that the IAEA assessment tries to "put a happy face on a worsening situation."
"The main issue is that Iran now has 3,000 centrifuges," he said. "The report doesn't even judge the quality of the information being offered, but it's clear it is giving minimal answers."
Indeed, even the nuclear agency acknowledges that Tehran's cooperation has been "reactive rather than proactive." In other words, getting information out of Iran has been the inspection equivalent of pulling teeth. While the IAEA commended Iran for providing access to individuals and answering questions, it seems clear that such cooperation has been reluctant, at best.
So, do these events genuinely place the U.S. and its allies at a decision point for military action?
And, as the paper observes, the 3,000 centrifuge array may represent a "red line" for potential military action. Allowing Iran to operate the centrifuges for a sustained period--and add more to the operation--would allow Tehran to master the production of nuclear fuel, an important step in developing nuclear weapons. The U.S. has long stated that Iran will not be allowed to obtain nukes, but it's unclear at what point we would employ military force. Similar red lines exist for Israel, which views Tehran's nuclear program and long-range missile forces with growing apprehension.
In some respects, the IAEA report underscore the inability of that organization--and the larger international community--to deal with the Iranian nuclear threat. Former U.N. arms inspector David Kay (who would never be described as a neocon or a John Bolton clone) said that the IAEA assessment tries to "put a happy face on a worsening situation."
"The main issue is that Iran now has 3,000 centrifuges," he said. "The report doesn't even judge the quality of the information being offered, but it's clear it is giving minimal answers."
Indeed, even the nuclear agency acknowledges that Tehran's cooperation has been "reactive rather than proactive." In other words, getting information out of Iran has been the inspection equivalent of pulling teeth. While the IAEA commended Iran for providing access to individuals and answering questions, it seems clear that such cooperation has been reluctant, at best.
So, do these events genuinely place the U.S. and its allies at a decision point for military action?
At this juncture, we still believe the answer is "no." Despite claims that plans for an Iran operation are "up to date," we have not seen a build-up of air and naval forces that would likely signal an attack. The U.S. has also done nothing (at least officially) to discourage on-going diplomatic efforts, included tougher sanctions.
However, progress on that track is decidedly slow; as the Guardian notes, a planned U.N. security council meeting on sanctions, scheduled for Monday, has been postponed because the Chinese delegation is unable to attend. Both Beijing and Moscow--with extensive economic and military ties to Iran--are urging more diplomacy before new sanctions are imposed. Both Russia and China remained opposed to any military action against Tehran.
Against that backdrop--and with U.S. military forces stretched thin by on-going conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan--the Bush Administration appears hesitant to pull the trigger. That's one reason that Tehran remains bellicose in official statements on its nuclear program, and refuses to back down. At this point, Iran believes it has little to fear from pressing ahead with its nuclear ambitions, even if it has pushed the west to a decision time.
Thursday, October 25, 2007
The Globe Gets it Wrong
The Boston Globe is owned by The New York Times Company, which acquired the paper--in 1993--at an over-inflated price. Consistently and overwhelmingly liberal in its editorial positions, the Globe meshes well with its sister publication in New York City, despising most things conservative and virtually all positions advocated by the Bush Administration.
Consider today's Globe editorial on recent "threats" from Mr. Bush and Vice-President Cheney towards Iran. Not surprisingly, the paper's editorial board considers those comments most unhelpful, threatening potential diplomacy with Tehran.
PRESIDENT BUSH and Vice President Cheney have been issuing public warnings both to Iran and to other major powers about Iran's refusal to suspend uranium enrichment. These unsubtle threats could be meant merely to persuade Iran's leaders to negotiate seriously with their European interlocutors, Britain, France, and Germany. But the threats might also be part of an administration buildup to an attack on Iran.
In either case, Bush and Cheney misunderstand the need to match means and ends. And there could hardly be a worse time for Bush to be berating needed European partners on the Iranian nuclear issue. Earlier this month in Tehran, Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered a proposal for resolving the nuclear issue directly to Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Some Iranian commentators even hinted that Putin delivered a sobering message that the American war threats need to be taken seriously.
Still, Bush last week warned world leaders, "if you're interested in avoiding World War III, it seems like you ought to be interested in preventing" Iran "from having the knowledge necessary to make a nuclear weapon." At best, this was an unnecessary declaration.
From our perspective, it's the Globe that doesn't understand the means and ends of the Iranian equation. President Bush has waited patiently while the European 3--Great Britain, France and Germany--attempt to negotiate with Tehran. Those talks have dragged on for more than three years, and so far, the diplomats have nothing to show for it, aside from vague promises to keep on talking. Meanwhile, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has made it quite clear that his country has no intention of abandoning its nuclear program, which will almost certainly yield a weapon by 2015 (according to CIA estimates), and perhaps much, much sooner.
As for that sobering message from Mr. Putin, we seem to remember that he also vowed to continue assistance for Iran's nuclear program, specifically the reactor at Bushehr which is being completed by Russian contractors. If Russia were genuinely serious about deterring Tehran's nuclear ambitions, Mr. Putin might have linked the Bushehr project to Iran's abandonment of its weapons program, complete with rigorous, no-notice inspections and full transparency. But the Russian leader has placed no such demands on Iran. Seems that his "sobering" message was more of a wink and a nod, assuring Ahmadeinjad that Moscow remains in his corner, and will oppose more serious efforts at sanctions in the U.N. Security Council.
The same holds true for China, which is heavily invested in developing Iran's oil reserves, and depends on Iranian energy exports to fuel its economic growth. Beijing also values Tehran as a customer for its arms industry; just yesterday, it was reported that China will sell at least 24 of its advanced J-10 fighters to Iran over the next three years, and Beijing's past sales of radars, surface-to-air missile and air defense computers have earned billions in hard currency.
Indeed, as Victor Davis Hanson observes, virtually everyone claims to oppose a nuclear-armed Iran, but when push comes to shove, no one seems to be doing much about it. Moscow and Beijing have their own agendas; the Arab states fear the reaction of their own populations if they support military action against Iran, and the Europeans seem to believe that diplomacy can always carry the day.
Against that backdrop, Mr. Bush and Mr. Cheney have suggested that Iran needs to get serious in its talks with the EU-3, or face potential military consequences. And despite hand-wringing from the Globe and its friends on the left, there are no firm indications that the administration is actively preparing for war against Tehran. Talk about military planning is just that--talk. The U.S. has maintained operational plans for Iran (and other countries) for decades; the ominous articles published in recent months reflect the only the periodic revision of those plans, and not the implementation of new strategies to attack Tehran.
Likewise, U.S. military deployments to the Persian Gulf remain routine. Any strike against Iran would be preceded by a build-up of American and allied forces in the region, a move that clearly hasn't happened (so far). For now, the Pentagon is preoccupied with the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. That widely-touted air and sea campaign against Iran's nuclear facilities doesn't appear to be in the offing, at least for now.
In fact, a final decision about military action against Iran will likely be made by the next commander-in-chief--quite possibly, a Democrat. We can only wonder what the Globe's position would be if Mr. Bush's successor, say Hillary Rodham Clinton, issues the same sort or warnings against Iran, or ups the ante with increased force deployments and clearly-stated "red lines" for conflict. Knowing the Globe (and its parent company), they would probably applaud a Democratic president for a "forceful" foreign policy, while condemning Mr. Bush for "ignoring" the Iranian threat.
Consider today's Globe editorial on recent "threats" from Mr. Bush and Vice-President Cheney towards Iran. Not surprisingly, the paper's editorial board considers those comments most unhelpful, threatening potential diplomacy with Tehran.
PRESIDENT BUSH and Vice President Cheney have been issuing public warnings both to Iran and to other major powers about Iran's refusal to suspend uranium enrichment. These unsubtle threats could be meant merely to persuade Iran's leaders to negotiate seriously with their European interlocutors, Britain, France, and Germany. But the threats might also be part of an administration buildup to an attack on Iran.
In either case, Bush and Cheney misunderstand the need to match means and ends. And there could hardly be a worse time for Bush to be berating needed European partners on the Iranian nuclear issue. Earlier this month in Tehran, Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered a proposal for resolving the nuclear issue directly to Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Some Iranian commentators even hinted that Putin delivered a sobering message that the American war threats need to be taken seriously.
Still, Bush last week warned world leaders, "if you're interested in avoiding World War III, it seems like you ought to be interested in preventing" Iran "from having the knowledge necessary to make a nuclear weapon." At best, this was an unnecessary declaration.
From our perspective, it's the Globe that doesn't understand the means and ends of the Iranian equation. President Bush has waited patiently while the European 3--Great Britain, France and Germany--attempt to negotiate with Tehran. Those talks have dragged on for more than three years, and so far, the diplomats have nothing to show for it, aside from vague promises to keep on talking. Meanwhile, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has made it quite clear that his country has no intention of abandoning its nuclear program, which will almost certainly yield a weapon by 2015 (according to CIA estimates), and perhaps much, much sooner.
As for that sobering message from Mr. Putin, we seem to remember that he also vowed to continue assistance for Iran's nuclear program, specifically the reactor at Bushehr which is being completed by Russian contractors. If Russia were genuinely serious about deterring Tehran's nuclear ambitions, Mr. Putin might have linked the Bushehr project to Iran's abandonment of its weapons program, complete with rigorous, no-notice inspections and full transparency. But the Russian leader has placed no such demands on Iran. Seems that his "sobering" message was more of a wink and a nod, assuring Ahmadeinjad that Moscow remains in his corner, and will oppose more serious efforts at sanctions in the U.N. Security Council.
The same holds true for China, which is heavily invested in developing Iran's oil reserves, and depends on Iranian energy exports to fuel its economic growth. Beijing also values Tehran as a customer for its arms industry; just yesterday, it was reported that China will sell at least 24 of its advanced J-10 fighters to Iran over the next three years, and Beijing's past sales of radars, surface-to-air missile and air defense computers have earned billions in hard currency.
Indeed, as Victor Davis Hanson observes, virtually everyone claims to oppose a nuclear-armed Iran, but when push comes to shove, no one seems to be doing much about it. Moscow and Beijing have their own agendas; the Arab states fear the reaction of their own populations if they support military action against Iran, and the Europeans seem to believe that diplomacy can always carry the day.
Against that backdrop, Mr. Bush and Mr. Cheney have suggested that Iran needs to get serious in its talks with the EU-3, or face potential military consequences. And despite hand-wringing from the Globe and its friends on the left, there are no firm indications that the administration is actively preparing for war against Tehran. Talk about military planning is just that--talk. The U.S. has maintained operational plans for Iran (and other countries) for decades; the ominous articles published in recent months reflect the only the periodic revision of those plans, and not the implementation of new strategies to attack Tehran.
Likewise, U.S. military deployments to the Persian Gulf remain routine. Any strike against Iran would be preceded by a build-up of American and allied forces in the region, a move that clearly hasn't happened (so far). For now, the Pentagon is preoccupied with the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. That widely-touted air and sea campaign against Iran's nuclear facilities doesn't appear to be in the offing, at least for now.
In fact, a final decision about military action against Iran will likely be made by the next commander-in-chief--quite possibly, a Democrat. We can only wonder what the Globe's position would be if Mr. Bush's successor, say Hillary Rodham Clinton, issues the same sort or warnings against Iran, or ups the ante with increased force deployments and clearly-stated "red lines" for conflict. Knowing the Globe (and its parent company), they would probably applaud a Democratic president for a "forceful" foreign policy, while condemning Mr. Bush for "ignoring" the Iranian threat.
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