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Saturday, October 08, 2005

Letter From Zawahiri

I was on the road earlier this week, when U.S. officials released that intercepted letter from Al-Qaida's #2 man (Ayman al-Zawahiri) to the terrorist leader in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. It is, in many respects, a remarkable communique, and offers some insights into enemy strategy and current capabilities.

Judging from the letter, these are tough times for Al-Qaida's senior leadership, holed up along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Zawahiri asks al-Zarqawi for more information on the status of the insurgency in Iraq, saying that Al-Qaida leaders should know "at least as much as the enemy." His request tends to confirm recent claims by Pakistani intelligence officials, who recently told 60 Minutes that Al-Qaida's senior leaders are increasingly isolated and ineffective, forcing the terrorist organization to remain in a decentralized operating mode.

Zawahiri also asks al-Zarqawi to send money, suggesting that Al-Qaida's senior leadership is short of cash. That would suggest that U.S.-led efforts to cut off terrorist funding sources are having an impact, making it more difficult for Al-Qaida to finance future operations.

Despite the request for money and information, the letter is also critical of al-Zarqawi's tactics in Iraq. Zawahiri encourages al-Zarqawi to stop beheading abductees, claiming such measures are hurting the cause. He also complains about attacks against Iraqi civilian, saying that the Arab man in the street doesn't understand why so many fellow Muslims are dying.

The letter was apparently written in July, and we don't have al-Zarqawi's response. If he were truthful, Al-Qaida's man in Iraq would have to report that the issue there is also in doubt. While the insurgency remains resilient in parts of Baghdad and western Iraq, it has suffered major defeats in Fallujah, and more recently, Mosul. Zarqawi's ability to win the campaign in Iraq--and provide support to Al-Qaida's senior leadership--is doubtful, at best.

But the communique is also troubling, for several reasons. First, it illustrates that Al-Qaida leaders can still communicate, to some degree. Secondly, it reaffirms that the terrorist organization has larger plans, beyond Iraq. In his letter, Zawahiri talks about taking the war to other countries, including Syria and Egypt, after victory is secured in Iraq. Zawahiri identifies Iraq as the primary battefield in the War on Terror, calling it "the place for the greatest battle of Islam in this era." Such verbage suggests that Al-Qaida is prepared to stay the course in Iraq, and indicating why we must be prepared to do the same.

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