To its credit, the Air Force certainly said the right things in last Friday's press conference, outlining the results of that six-week investigation into the accidental transfer of six nuclear-tipped cruise missiles between bases in North Dakota and Florida.
While emphasizing that the weapons were never outside military control--and that such incidents are exceedingly rare--Air Force officials noted that mistakes of that sort are simply intolerable, and outlined a program for preventing similar mishaps in the future. Elements of the plan include (a) the dismissal of seniors officers deemed culpable in the incident; (b) decertification of Minot's 5th Bomb Wing in critical, nuclear-related tasks; (c) the "punishment" of dozens of lower-ranking personnel involved in the mishap, many of whom were removed from the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP), which allows them to work with nuclear weapons; (d) "corrective actions to fix problems revealed by the inquiry--and return the 5th BMW to full operational status--and (e) a review of the recently completed-investigation, to determine if any criminal charges should be filed.
It certainly sounded like a comprehensive plan, particularly at 3 p.m. on a Friday afternoon, when the Air Force press conference was held. The timing of that event was no accident; like other public (and private) institutions, the USAF learned a long time ago that "bad news" is best dispensed on a Friday afternoon or evening, when the media and and audience interest are at low ebb, in anticipation of the weekend. And, to no one's surprise, the media coverage produced by the press event focused on the firing of four senior officers at Minot and Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, where the nuclear-armed B-52 landed. Other coverage highlighted the serious nature of the incident, deemed the worst breach of nuclear weapons security in more than 40 years.
But none of the articles--at least none that we've seen--spent much time on the underlying issues associated with the mishap. By all accounts, the inadvertent transfer of those nuclear-armed cruise missiles was a serious offense. Air Force officials described it as a serious violation of well-established regulations and protocols--a system that, in their words, has worked well for a long, long time. They also stressed the need for public confidence in our system for storing, protecting and transporting nuclear weapons. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said the overall goal of the investigation is to "minimize" the chances for a similar mishap in the future.
That's all well and good, but (from what we've seen so far) there has been a focus on the "mechanics" of the Minot incident, and less regard for the institutional and cultural factors that may have influenced it. Firing three Colonels and a Lieutenant Colonel got everyone's attention, as did the flurry of LORs (Letters of Reprimand) handed out to lower-ranking personnel and the decision to remove 65 airmen--of all ranks--from the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP), used to screen personnel who work with nuclear weapons. And, to drive home the "accountability" point, the service also decertified the 5th BMW on several nuclear-related tasks, leaving it unable to perform the full complement of combat missions. In light of the problems uncovered at Minot, such steps were inevitable, even welcome.
But they still don't answer the question of how that B-52 carrying six nuclear warheads flew from Minot to Barksdale, and no one knew the weapons were on board until they had been sitting on an aircraft ramp in Louisiana for almost 10 hours. The reasons for that failure go well beyond the failure of individual airmen or supervisors to conduct required checks. They suggest larger problems within the Air Force's nuclear weapons community--issues that must be addressed to prevent this sort of incident from happening in the future.
We'll begin with PRP, a topic that's been addressed frequently in this blog over the past two months. Various experts voiced concerns about how the program's been run since the mid-1990s; one retired Chief estimated that 25% of the personnel cleared for PRP shouldn't be in the program at all, due to personal or medical issues.
But, with commanders retaining the ability to "waiver" almost any sort of difficulty, more than a few "problem children" have wiggled through the system, improving manning levels, but creating additional headaches for commanders and other supervisors. We can only wonder what percentage of those 65 recently de-certified for PRP fell into that category, and what corrective measures (if any) are in place to keep them out of the program in the future. Beyond that, what steps does the Air Force propose to ensure that PRP standards are rigidly enforced?
The Minot incident also raises concerns about the Pentagon's evaluation program for nuclear-capable units. According to press reports, the 5th BMW earned high marks on a nuclear surety inspection (NSI) less than a year ago, and the wing's safety office received a command-level award for its work as well. Given the "lackadaisical attitudes" cited in the Air Force report, it seems rather odd that the NSI inspectors didn't detect that problem during their visit to Minot.
There's also the related issue of problems during those evaluations; Minot has failed an NSI within the last for years, and Barksdale achieved a minimum passing score during the same period. For both units, this lack of consistency--in an area that demands absolute, consistent adherence to standards--is disturbing, to say the least.
Indeed, there are indications that the seeds of the Minot incident were sown long before that failed inspection, or the recent, ill-fated B-52 flight to Barksdale. The Federal of American Scientists obtained a classified excerpt from the official history of Air Combat Command, the parent command of the 5th BMW. That history bemoaned declining standards for nuclear safety, security and accountability in 1998--nine years before the cruise missile debacle.
That was the same period when some of the Air Force's nuclear program managers began wondering about "shortcuts" in the PRP, with commanders "waivering" behavior that would (ordinarily) disqualify air and ground crews from working with nuclear weapons. It was also an era when some nuclear sites developed reputations as "hell holes," with troops volunteering for overseas, remote tours to escape them. A retired CMSgt who served at one of our nuclear bases in Europe recalls an influx of weapons specialists from Barksdale, who indicated that they would "do anything" to escape the Louisiana base.
Stories like that suggest long-term problems in some Air Force career fields (and installations) associated with nuclear weapons. And that represents the real "bottom line" for the current probe. Beyond fixing the obvious issues at Minot and Barksdale, the service must also address issues related to training, manning and personnel standards that are absolutely vital to any unit, particularly those that are nuclear-capable. Cutting corners on PRP or allowing young troops to deviate from checklists for weapons retirement have a way of coming back to bite you, as evidenced by the incident at Minot.
We have little doubt that the "fixes" outlined last Friday will remedy the problems discovered in North Dakota and Louisiana. But, based on what's been outlined so far, we're less convinced that the Air Force is taking a hard look at the long-term institutional issues that contributed to the mishap. Until those concerns are addressed, the service will still run the risk of another, serious incident involving "missing" nuclear weapons.
Monday, October 22, 2007
Repair Job
Colonel Paul G. Bell, the new commander of the troubled 5th Bomb Wing at Minot (USAF photo).
Colonel Paul G. Bell may just have the toughest job in the Air Force. In the wake of that highly-publicized nuclear "incident" at Minot AFB--which led to the dismissal of three senior officers on Friday--Colonel Bell has now been appointed to fix the mess at the 5th Bomb Wing, and sooner, rather than later.
Bell appears to have the requisite skills for the job. An Air Force Academy graduate and career B-52 pilot, Colonel Bell served in bomber units in California, Michigan and North Dakota as he rose through the ranks, becoming Vice-Commander of the 5th Bomb Wing (BMW) at Minot in July 2006. His "continuity" at the base was likely a factor in his promotion; the Air Force brass believes that Bell knows the organization well enough to implement corrective measures quickly, while a new commander would need time to "learn" the unit and its personnel.
The magnitude of Bell's task cannot be understated. That accidental transfer of six nuclear-tipped cruise missiles during a B-52 flight from Minot to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana has been described as the most serious breach of nuclear safety protocols in more than 40 years. According to some estimates, the warheads were officially "unaccounted for" during a 36-hour period, spanning their removal from a bunker at Minot, the flight to Barksdale, and their belated discovery on a parking lot at the Louisiana base.
As a result of the incident, at least 70 airmen have been removed from the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP), making them ineligible to work on (or near) nuclear weapons, at least temporarily. Additionally, the Air Force indicates that the 5th Bomb Wing has been "de-certified" for portions of its wartime mission, meaning the organization cannot be tasked for certain operations until the problems are fixed.
During Friday's press conference on the nuclear mishap, senior Air Force officials didn't mince words in describing the gravity of the situation:
“This was an unacceptable mistake and a clear deviation from our exacting standards,” said Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne, who led off the press briefing. “We hold ourselves accountable to the American people and want to ensure proper corrective action is taken.”
Maj. Gen. Richard Newton, the Air Force deputy chief of staff for operations, said Friday that adherence to weapons-handling standards had become lax at Minot and Barksdale.
Colonel Bell offered more muted criticism, calling the incident “a rare mistake and a breakdown in procedures” and saying he has confidence in the airmen at Minot Air Force Base. Those comments were not idle chatter; Bell understands that his officers and airmen are taking plenty of heat from all quarters and the last thing they need is a public, verbal barrage from the new wing commander. He realizes that such criticism might be viewed as hypocritical (after all, he was a part of the leadership team when the incident occurred); more importantly, Colonel Bell understands that one of the first steps in fixing the 5th BMW is creating a sense of unity. With his remarks, Colonel Bell made it clear that he's on the side of his troops--until they prove otherwise.
That's not to say the rebuilding job at Minot will be an exercise in sensitivity training--far from it. Having served in a unit that busted an Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI), we have some idea of what awaits members of the 5th Bomb Wing. Lots and lots of local exercises, focusing on the skills found deficient during the nuclear incident. The 5th BMW must pass another nuclear surety inspections (NSI) in the near future to regain its mission certification, so much of the training effort will be directed toward that goal.
But much of the inspection is also devoted to paperwork and administrative tasks, certifying that crews are cleared to work with nukes, and trained for their respective tasks. That task will be made more difficult by the recent removal of some Minot personnel for PRP. Ensuring that they can meet those standards--without simply pencil-whipping the forms--will be a major challenge. If those individuals can no longer meeting PRP standards, then the 5th BMW (and the Air Force personnel center) will face the job of locating qualified replacements and getting them to Minot.
But Colonel Bell's "to do" list doesn't end there. Returning the wing to full, mission-ready status will also require re certifying ground and air crews for nuclear tasking. For air crew personnel, that's normally an extended process, culminating in a week-long study, review and planning exercise that requires them to demonstrate their proficiency in performing a nuclear mission. As you might expect, the certification process is exacting, with no room for error. And, completing that task at Minot may be even tougher; with the wing officially decertified from nuclear tasking, the unit may have to bring in personnel from other bases to "re-certify" evaluators from the 5th BMW.
Finally, the timeline for completing these tasks is likely to be very short--probably no more than 120 days, at the most. From the Air Force's perspective, Minot's new wing commander knows the organization and what needs to be done, so it's now up to Colonel Bell to get his unit back on track. With tensions rising in the Middle East (and elsewhere), the nation can ill-afford to have a portion of its B-52 fleet unable to perform critical missions, due to the recent incident at Minot.
Colonel Bell will certainly earn his paycheck over the next few months. It's shaping up as a very busy winter at Minot AFB.
Accuracy in Reporting Department
On Friday, we identified the Commander of the 5th Operations Group at Minot as one of the Air Force officers who lost his job in connection with the "missing nukes" incident. Right job, wrong base. As we subsequently learned at a Pentagon press conference, the ops group commander who fired was part of the 2nd Bomb Wing, based at Barksdale. That's because the crew that ferried the nuclear-tipped cruise missiles from Minot to Barksdale was assigned to that wing, and fell under the control of the 2nd Operations Group.
The ops group commander at Minot, Colonel Parker Northrup III, remains on the job, and he'll be part of the leadership team tasked with fixing problems within the 5th Bomb Wing. He wish Colonel Parker continued success in his endeavors, and regret any confusion caused by our original report.
In the aftermath of the nuclear incident, Colonel Northrup's responsibilities at Minot may expand, at least temporarily. With the the former Vice-Commander (Colonel Greg Bell) now running the wing, Northrup will probably serve as both ops group commander and acting vice-commander until a replacement can be named.
The ops group commander at Minot, Colonel Parker Northrup III, remains on the job, and he'll be part of the leadership team tasked with fixing problems within the 5th Bomb Wing. He wish Colonel Parker continued success in his endeavors, and regret any confusion caused by our original report.
In the aftermath of the nuclear incident, Colonel Northrup's responsibilities at Minot may expand, at least temporarily. With the the former Vice-Commander (Colonel Greg Bell) now running the wing, Northrup will probably serve as both ops group commander and acting vice-commander until a replacement can be named.
Friday, October 19, 2007
The Hammer Falls
***UPDATE//2:54 EDT***
CNN is reporting that four officers--not five--have been relieved in connection with the incident, identifying them as the 5th Bomb Wing Commander (Minot), as well as the Commander of the 5th Maintenance Group and the 5th Munitions Maintenance Squadron, also based at Minot. The other officer reportedly dismissed from his post is the Commander of the 2nd Operations Group at Barksdale. The CNN report makes no mention of Minot's 5th Operations Group Commander, who was identified as one of the fired officers by sources we spoke with at ACC Headquarters.
If CNN's information proves accurate, the firing of the 2nd Operations Group Commander will potentially raise some eyebrows. The B-52 and crew involved in the accidental transfer were reportedly assigned to Minot, putting them under the charge of the 5th Operations Group. However, if the Barksdale ops group commander had control of the missile transfer and retirement process, that would provide potential grounds for dismissal.
On the other hand--as CNN notes--the Minot bomber crew had the final responsibility for checking the aircraft (and its missile payload) before departure. CNN reports that the Air Force investigation found at least five failures to verify and inspect the missiles, including a check by the B-52's radar navigator (bombardier) before the aircraft left Minot.
***
The Air Force will hold a press conference at 3 p.m. today, to discuss its investigation into the recent, accidental transfer of six nuclear-tipped cruise missiles from North Dakota to Louisiana. While the service has not revealed the results of that inquiry, its consequences are already being felt, with the reported dismissal of two senior officers involved in the incident.
Sources at Air Combat Command Headquarters tell In From the Cold that the Commander of the 5th Bombardment Wing (BMW) at Minot AFB, North Dakota, Colonel Bruce Emig, has been removed from his post, along with the commander of the 5th Operations Group, Colonel Parker Northrup III. Word of their dismissal began circulating at Minot and ACC Headquarters this morning. ACC, located at Langley AFB in Hampton, Virginia is the parent command for CONUS-based Air Force fighter and bomber units, including the 5th BMW.
A spokesman for the base public affairs office at Minot refused comment on the report, referring this blog to the ACC public affairs office. An ACC public affairs officer said he had no information on the reported firings, and expressed surprise at the Minot statement. The ACC spokesman indicated that details on the incident investigation--including disciplinary actions--would be provided at the news conference later today.
The apparent dismissal of Colonel Emig and Colonel Northrup came only one day after the Washington Post and other media outlets reported that a number of Air Force officers could be fired because of the mishap, considered the most serious breach of U.S. nuclear safety and accountability procedures in more than forty years.
Sources cited by the Post also suggested that criminal charges might be filed in connection with the incident, although they did not specify who might be targeted for possible legal action. The paper also reported that seven lower-ranking airmen had received Letters of Reprimand (LORs) in connection with the transfer. LORs are considered non-judicial punishment and are typically imposed for less-serious offenses.
The reported firings at Minot were not considered a surprise, given the circumstances surrounding the incident. It was a B-52 assigned to Minot's only B-52 squadron--part of the 5th Operations Group--that dispatched the bomber to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana on 29 August, unaware that six missiles carried on the aircraft still had nuclear warheads. The missiles were being flown to Barksdale for de-commissioning.
While military and nuclear safety regulations dictated that the weapons be disarmed before transfer, the nuclear-tipped advanced cruise missiles were removed from their storage bunker, loaded onto the B-52 and flown to Barksdale, remaining on the aircraft parking ramp for another 10 hours before the warheads were discovered.
Air Force officials have emphasized that there was no chance of a detonation during the incident, although radioactive materials could have spilled if the aircraft had crashed. According to the Post, the warheads were accounted for during a 36-hour period that began with their removal from the storage bunker in Minot, and lasted until they were discovered at Barksdale.
Both Colonel Emig and Colonel Northrup are veteran B-52 pilots who served previous tours at Minot. Emig was chief of group plans and programs for the 5th BMW from 1999-2000, and he returned to Minot in June of this year as the wing commander. Northrup spent five years as a B-52 pilot and flight examiner at the North Dakota base (1990-1995). He took command of the 5th Operations Group in 2005, after tours at bases in Louisiana, Florida, Alabama and Korea.
Emig and Northrup were the second and third officers at Minot to lose their jobs over the transfer incident. The commander of the installation's Munitions Maintenance Squadron (MMS) was relieved from that post shortly after the mishap was disclosed in early September.
According to yesterday's Washington Post article, as many as five Air Force officers could be relieved of command in connection with the mishap. An Air Force official--speaking with the paper on the condition on anonymity--said that officers would be dismissed at both Minot and Barksdale. So far, there has been no word from the Louisiana base on dismissals related to the nuclear incident. Minot and Barksdale are home to the only remaining B-52 units in the U.S. Air Force. The massive, Cold War-era bombers are capable of carrying a variety of munitions, including nuclear bombs and missiles.
CNN is reporting that four officers--not five--have been relieved in connection with the incident, identifying them as the 5th Bomb Wing Commander (Minot), as well as the Commander of the 5th Maintenance Group and the 5th Munitions Maintenance Squadron, also based at Minot. The other officer reportedly dismissed from his post is the Commander of the 2nd Operations Group at Barksdale. The CNN report makes no mention of Minot's 5th Operations Group Commander, who was identified as one of the fired officers by sources we spoke with at ACC Headquarters.
If CNN's information proves accurate, the firing of the 2nd Operations Group Commander will potentially raise some eyebrows. The B-52 and crew involved in the accidental transfer were reportedly assigned to Minot, putting them under the charge of the 5th Operations Group. However, if the Barksdale ops group commander had control of the missile transfer and retirement process, that would provide potential grounds for dismissal.
On the other hand--as CNN notes--the Minot bomber crew had the final responsibility for checking the aircraft (and its missile payload) before departure. CNN reports that the Air Force investigation found at least five failures to verify and inspect the missiles, including a check by the B-52's radar navigator (bombardier) before the aircraft left Minot.
***
The Air Force will hold a press conference at 3 p.m. today, to discuss its investigation into the recent, accidental transfer of six nuclear-tipped cruise missiles from North Dakota to Louisiana. While the service has not revealed the results of that inquiry, its consequences are already being felt, with the reported dismissal of two senior officers involved in the incident.
Sources at Air Combat Command Headquarters tell In From the Cold that the Commander of the 5th Bombardment Wing (BMW) at Minot AFB, North Dakota, Colonel Bruce Emig, has been removed from his post, along with the commander of the 5th Operations Group, Colonel Parker Northrup III. Word of their dismissal began circulating at Minot and ACC Headquarters this morning. ACC, located at Langley AFB in Hampton, Virginia is the parent command for CONUS-based Air Force fighter and bomber units, including the 5th BMW.
A spokesman for the base public affairs office at Minot refused comment on the report, referring this blog to the ACC public affairs office. An ACC public affairs officer said he had no information on the reported firings, and expressed surprise at the Minot statement. The ACC spokesman indicated that details on the incident investigation--including disciplinary actions--would be provided at the news conference later today.
The apparent dismissal of Colonel Emig and Colonel Northrup came only one day after the Washington Post and other media outlets reported that a number of Air Force officers could be fired because of the mishap, considered the most serious breach of U.S. nuclear safety and accountability procedures in more than forty years.
Sources cited by the Post also suggested that criminal charges might be filed in connection with the incident, although they did not specify who might be targeted for possible legal action. The paper also reported that seven lower-ranking airmen had received Letters of Reprimand (LORs) in connection with the transfer. LORs are considered non-judicial punishment and are typically imposed for less-serious offenses.
The reported firings at Minot were not considered a surprise, given the circumstances surrounding the incident. It was a B-52 assigned to Minot's only B-52 squadron--part of the 5th Operations Group--that dispatched the bomber to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana on 29 August, unaware that six missiles carried on the aircraft still had nuclear warheads. The missiles were being flown to Barksdale for de-commissioning.
While military and nuclear safety regulations dictated that the weapons be disarmed before transfer, the nuclear-tipped advanced cruise missiles were removed from their storage bunker, loaded onto the B-52 and flown to Barksdale, remaining on the aircraft parking ramp for another 10 hours before the warheads were discovered.
Air Force officials have emphasized that there was no chance of a detonation during the incident, although radioactive materials could have spilled if the aircraft had crashed. According to the Post, the warheads were accounted for during a 36-hour period that began with their removal from the storage bunker in Minot, and lasted until they were discovered at Barksdale.
Both Colonel Emig and Colonel Northrup are veteran B-52 pilots who served previous tours at Minot. Emig was chief of group plans and programs for the 5th BMW from 1999-2000, and he returned to Minot in June of this year as the wing commander. Northrup spent five years as a B-52 pilot and flight examiner at the North Dakota base (1990-1995). He took command of the 5th Operations Group in 2005, after tours at bases in Louisiana, Florida, Alabama and Korea.
Emig and Northrup were the second and third officers at Minot to lose their jobs over the transfer incident. The commander of the installation's Munitions Maintenance Squadron (MMS) was relieved from that post shortly after the mishap was disclosed in early September.
According to yesterday's Washington Post article, as many as five Air Force officers could be relieved of command in connection with the mishap. An Air Force official--speaking with the paper on the condition on anonymity--said that officers would be dismissed at both Minot and Barksdale. So far, there has been no word from the Louisiana base on dismissals related to the nuclear incident. Minot and Barksdale are home to the only remaining B-52 units in the U.S. Air Force. The massive, Cold War-era bombers are capable of carrying a variety of munitions, including nuclear bombs and missiles.
Thursday, October 18, 2007
Today's Reading Assignment
From the sports page, courtesy of Jason Whitlock of the Kansas City Star and Fox Sports.
For his weekly NFL Truth column, Mr. Whitlock offers only one, on the negative impact of the hip-hop culture on the National Football League. He believes the antics of hip-hop players is one reason that the rosters of the league's leading teams, i.e., the Colts and the Patriots, have grown "whiter."
One one hand, it's disappointing that anyone is concerned with the number of black and white athletes on a given team. But, as Whitlock points out, the NFL's most successful owners and coaches have little time (or patience) for "gangsta" players that undermine their coaches and disrupt the clubhouse. He fears that conduct of Michael Vick, Pacman Jones, Larry Johnson, Terrell Owens and Chad Johnson will make it more difficult for black players trying to enter the league in the years to come.
Whitlock has long railed against the corrosive effects of hip-hop on pro sports; his column on the 2007 NBA All-Star game in Las Vegas is a classic, detailing how the league's hip-hop coterie essentially beseiged a city. Are his concerns overstated? Perhaps. Last time we checked, Larry Johnson, T.O. and Chad Johnson were still gainfully employed in the NFL, and both Michael Vick and Pacman Jones are expected to return once their legal problems are resolved.
But, as Mr. Whitlock observes, the tolerance for that "type" of player may be waning. He can't envision a coach like Tony Dungy allowing one of the bad boy Johnsons on his roster, and quite frankly, neither can we. Dungy, a man of great character and integrity, sets clear standards for his players and expects them to be met. The results speak for themselves; the Colts are defending Super Bowl champions, even if their club house is a bit dull by NFL standards.
Unfortunately, for every Tony Dungy there are plenty of coaches who let the players run the asylum. Whitlock notes the apparent "love affair" between Bengals head coach Marvin Lewis and wide receiver Chad Johnson. Lewis has repeatedly enabled Johnson's outlandish behavior, even threatening to cut players who leaked details of a locker room fight between Johnson and his coaches (which reportedly included a swing at Lewis). Meanwhile, the Bengals have devolved from a playoff team to an also-ran in less than three seasons.
In our view, Whitlock is one of the few sports columnists worth reading because he's willing to confront some of the inconvenient truths facing professional sports. Besides, his characterization of Chad Johnson as "the Flavor Flav of the gridiron" is absolutely priceless.
For his weekly NFL Truth column, Mr. Whitlock offers only one, on the negative impact of the hip-hop culture on the National Football League. He believes the antics of hip-hop players is one reason that the rosters of the league's leading teams, i.e., the Colts and the Patriots, have grown "whiter."
One one hand, it's disappointing that anyone is concerned with the number of black and white athletes on a given team. But, as Whitlock points out, the NFL's most successful owners and coaches have little time (or patience) for "gangsta" players that undermine their coaches and disrupt the clubhouse. He fears that conduct of Michael Vick, Pacman Jones, Larry Johnson, Terrell Owens and Chad Johnson will make it more difficult for black players trying to enter the league in the years to come.
Whitlock has long railed against the corrosive effects of hip-hop on pro sports; his column on the 2007 NBA All-Star game in Las Vegas is a classic, detailing how the league's hip-hop coterie essentially beseiged a city. Are his concerns overstated? Perhaps. Last time we checked, Larry Johnson, T.O. and Chad Johnson were still gainfully employed in the NFL, and both Michael Vick and Pacman Jones are expected to return once their legal problems are resolved.
But, as Mr. Whitlock observes, the tolerance for that "type" of player may be waning. He can't envision a coach like Tony Dungy allowing one of the bad boy Johnsons on his roster, and quite frankly, neither can we. Dungy, a man of great character and integrity, sets clear standards for his players and expects them to be met. The results speak for themselves; the Colts are defending Super Bowl champions, even if their club house is a bit dull by NFL standards.
Unfortunately, for every Tony Dungy there are plenty of coaches who let the players run the asylum. Whitlock notes the apparent "love affair" between Bengals head coach Marvin Lewis and wide receiver Chad Johnson. Lewis has repeatedly enabled Johnson's outlandish behavior, even threatening to cut players who leaked details of a locker room fight between Johnson and his coaches (which reportedly included a swing at Lewis). Meanwhile, the Bengals have devolved from a playoff team to an also-ran in less than three seasons.
In our view, Whitlock is one of the few sports columnists worth reading because he's willing to confront some of the inconvenient truths facing professional sports. Besides, his characterization of Chad Johnson as "the Flavor Flav of the gridiron" is absolutely priceless.
Bent Spear
Defense Secretary Robert Gates will be briefed tomorrow on the Air Force's investigation into the accidental transfer of six nuclear-tipped cruise missiles from North Dakota to Louisiana on 29 August. According to the Washington Post, Mr. Gates will receive an update on the service's six-week investigation into the security breach, and plans to punish personnel deemed culpable in the incident.
The Post is reporting that at least five Air Force officers will be relieved of command in connection with the incident, and several enlisted members will receive letters of reprimand. Sources familiar with the investigation tell the Post that officers will be relieved at both bases involved in the incident, Minot AFB, North Dakota and Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. A Colonel commanding one of wings is likely to be the highest-ranking officer relieved of his post, the official said.
Sources tell the Post that the Air Force is also considering filing criminal charges against one or more individuals involved in the incident. However, a final decision on who might be charged has not been made. An Air Force official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said the most likely charges would be dereliction of duty, or willful disobedience of an order.
The expected personnel actions and disciplinary measures would be the most severe ever imposed by the Air Force in connection with a nuclear weapons incident. One of the officials who spoke with the paper said the service intends to send the message that it is "getting back to the roots of accountability," following a series of highly-publicized incidents and scandals that resulted in minimal punishment for those involved.
In discussing the nuclear incident, one official observed that the Air Force is "determined to do better" than its handling of the 1994 shoot down of two Army Blackhawk helicopters by F-15 fighters over northern Iraq. That incident resulted in the deaths of 26 U.S. and Allied military personnel, but the two pilots received only non-judicial punishment.
The only officer court-martialed in connection with the Blackhawk incident, Capt Jim Wang, was a controller on an AWACS aircraft that was directing the F-15s. Wang was acquitted, largely because the court martial panel felt that he was being made a scapegoat. A number of Air Force officers were later punished administratively by then-Air Force Chief of Staff General Ron Fogelman, who discovered that some involved in the incident had been submitted for awards and plum assignments.
More recently, the Air Force has also been tarred by a pair of sex scandals involving general officers. Major General Thomas Fiscus, the service's senior legal officer, was accused of a string of inappropriate relationships with female subordinates, and sexual harassment charges were brought against Brigadier General Richard Hassan who ran the Air Force's Senior Leader Management Office. Both Fiscus and Hassan were allowed to retire at a lower grade, raising accusations of lenient treatment for general officers accused of misconduct.
So far, no Air Force generals have been implicated in the Minot incident, although one source told the Post that an announcement on administrative and punitive moves could be delayed, if the service decides that disciplinary actions need to go higher up the chain of command.
In our estimation, that scenario seems unlikely. The August incident involved the inadvertent movement of six nuclear warheads on missiles being retired from the inventory of the 5th Bomb Wing, based at Minot. The commander of that unit is a Colonel (O-6), as is the commander of the 2nd Bomb Wing at Barksdale, which "received" the B-52 carrying the missiles. Given that "operational chain," it's hard to see how a general officer might be charged with misconduct, unless they were aware of improper actions related to the missile transfer and retirement effort, or tried to "cover up" the incident.
Tomorrow's Air Force report is expected to be delivered by Major General Douglas Raaberg, the Director of Operations for Air Combat Command, which controls the bomb wings at Minot and Barksdale. Raaberg, a veteran B-1 and B-2 pilot, was appointed to lead the investigation shortly after the incident. Sources at Langley AFB, VA (where Raaberg is stationed) say the general has worked exclusively on the nuclear incident since it occurred, an indication of the importance attached to the accident and the Air Force investigation.
The inadvertent transfer prompted transmission of a "Bent Spear" message to Secretary Gates and President Bush, signifying a significant nuclear incident that did not involve the detonation of a device, the jettisoning or a weapon, or creation of a public hazard. The Minot-to-Barksdale flight was the first by a nuclear-armed aircraft (without required authorization) in more than 40 years.
Making matters worse, the presence of nuclear weapons on the missiles was missed by munitions technicians at Minot who routinely handle the devices. Then, the nuclear-tipped cruise missiles sat on the B-52 at Minot (without the required level of security) for 25 hours, before the bomber departed for Barksdale. After that, it would take ground crews another nine hours to discover the error. All told, the six warheads were officially "missing" for 36 hours.
It will be interesting to learn how the report delivered to Mr. Gates addresses the "institutional factors" that played a role in the mishap. A recent Washington Post article outlined some of those concerns, including reorganization of the Air Force's Nuclear or N-Staff, which tracks nuclear weapons maintenance and security. The article also raises concern about declining standards in nuclear-capable units, as reflected in a string of failures during nuclear surety inspections in 2003. One of the units that failed that year was Minot's 5th Bomb Wing; Barksdale received an unsatisfactory rating in 2005, although both units received passing grades during more recent inspections.
Beyond the issues of training, security and evaluation, there's the legitimate question of who's handling our nuclear weapons. As we've detailed in previous posts, there are serious concerns about the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP), which certifies aircrews, missileers, maintenance personnel, security specialists (and others) to work with nuclear weapons. Under the present PRP system, commanders have the final say on who is certified, with wide latitude to "waiver" medical, financial and conduct problems that would otherwise prevent certification.
From our perspective, efforts to fix the problems associated with the August transfer must include a hard look at PRP and how it's being administered. By some accounts, commanders were cutting corners with PRP standards a decade ago, certifying personnel who should have never been authorized to work with nuclear weapons. That alone didn't cause the Minot mishap, but it's evidence of increasingly lax standards in an area that requires rigid--and uncompromising--enforcement.
Preventing similar incidents in the future dictates an overhaul of PRP, but it's unclear if the Air Force has the stomach for that sort of reform. After all, making PRP work requires everyone--supervisors, commanders, the medics and the personnel system--to do their jobs, and risk the manning and production problems that could arise by refusing to certify marginal personnel, or decertifying those that don't meet standards. That's the "other" accountability issue that the Air Force must address in correcting problems that led to those "missing" nukes.
***
Lest we forget, DoD has also commissioned a second, independent inquiry into the weapons incident, led by retired Air Force General Larry Welch. So far, there's been no word on when General Welch's panel will conclude its investigation and release their findings.
The Post is reporting that at least five Air Force officers will be relieved of command in connection with the incident, and several enlisted members will receive letters of reprimand. Sources familiar with the investigation tell the Post that officers will be relieved at both bases involved in the incident, Minot AFB, North Dakota and Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. A Colonel commanding one of wings is likely to be the highest-ranking officer relieved of his post, the official said.
Sources tell the Post that the Air Force is also considering filing criminal charges against one or more individuals involved in the incident. However, a final decision on who might be charged has not been made. An Air Force official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said the most likely charges would be dereliction of duty, or willful disobedience of an order.
The expected personnel actions and disciplinary measures would be the most severe ever imposed by the Air Force in connection with a nuclear weapons incident. One of the officials who spoke with the paper said the service intends to send the message that it is "getting back to the roots of accountability," following a series of highly-publicized incidents and scandals that resulted in minimal punishment for those involved.
In discussing the nuclear incident, one official observed that the Air Force is "determined to do better" than its handling of the 1994 shoot down of two Army Blackhawk helicopters by F-15 fighters over northern Iraq. That incident resulted in the deaths of 26 U.S. and Allied military personnel, but the two pilots received only non-judicial punishment.
The only officer court-martialed in connection with the Blackhawk incident, Capt Jim Wang, was a controller on an AWACS aircraft that was directing the F-15s. Wang was acquitted, largely because the court martial panel felt that he was being made a scapegoat. A number of Air Force officers were later punished administratively by then-Air Force Chief of Staff General Ron Fogelman, who discovered that some involved in the incident had been submitted for awards and plum assignments.
More recently, the Air Force has also been tarred by a pair of sex scandals involving general officers. Major General Thomas Fiscus, the service's senior legal officer, was accused of a string of inappropriate relationships with female subordinates, and sexual harassment charges were brought against Brigadier General Richard Hassan who ran the Air Force's Senior Leader Management Office. Both Fiscus and Hassan were allowed to retire at a lower grade, raising accusations of lenient treatment for general officers accused of misconduct.
So far, no Air Force generals have been implicated in the Minot incident, although one source told the Post that an announcement on administrative and punitive moves could be delayed, if the service decides that disciplinary actions need to go higher up the chain of command.
In our estimation, that scenario seems unlikely. The August incident involved the inadvertent movement of six nuclear warheads on missiles being retired from the inventory of the 5th Bomb Wing, based at Minot. The commander of that unit is a Colonel (O-6), as is the commander of the 2nd Bomb Wing at Barksdale, which "received" the B-52 carrying the missiles. Given that "operational chain," it's hard to see how a general officer might be charged with misconduct, unless they were aware of improper actions related to the missile transfer and retirement effort, or tried to "cover up" the incident.
Tomorrow's Air Force report is expected to be delivered by Major General Douglas Raaberg, the Director of Operations for Air Combat Command, which controls the bomb wings at Minot and Barksdale. Raaberg, a veteran B-1 and B-2 pilot, was appointed to lead the investigation shortly after the incident. Sources at Langley AFB, VA (where Raaberg is stationed) say the general has worked exclusively on the nuclear incident since it occurred, an indication of the importance attached to the accident and the Air Force investigation.
The inadvertent transfer prompted transmission of a "Bent Spear" message to Secretary Gates and President Bush, signifying a significant nuclear incident that did not involve the detonation of a device, the jettisoning or a weapon, or creation of a public hazard. The Minot-to-Barksdale flight was the first by a nuclear-armed aircraft (without required authorization) in more than 40 years.
Making matters worse, the presence of nuclear weapons on the missiles was missed by munitions technicians at Minot who routinely handle the devices. Then, the nuclear-tipped cruise missiles sat on the B-52 at Minot (without the required level of security) for 25 hours, before the bomber departed for Barksdale. After that, it would take ground crews another nine hours to discover the error. All told, the six warheads were officially "missing" for 36 hours.
It will be interesting to learn how the report delivered to Mr. Gates addresses the "institutional factors" that played a role in the mishap. A recent Washington Post article outlined some of those concerns, including reorganization of the Air Force's Nuclear or N-Staff, which tracks nuclear weapons maintenance and security. The article also raises concern about declining standards in nuclear-capable units, as reflected in a string of failures during nuclear surety inspections in 2003. One of the units that failed that year was Minot's 5th Bomb Wing; Barksdale received an unsatisfactory rating in 2005, although both units received passing grades during more recent inspections.
Beyond the issues of training, security and evaluation, there's the legitimate question of who's handling our nuclear weapons. As we've detailed in previous posts, there are serious concerns about the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP), which certifies aircrews, missileers, maintenance personnel, security specialists (and others) to work with nuclear weapons. Under the present PRP system, commanders have the final say on who is certified, with wide latitude to "waiver" medical, financial and conduct problems that would otherwise prevent certification.
From our perspective, efforts to fix the problems associated with the August transfer must include a hard look at PRP and how it's being administered. By some accounts, commanders were cutting corners with PRP standards a decade ago, certifying personnel who should have never been authorized to work with nuclear weapons. That alone didn't cause the Minot mishap, but it's evidence of increasingly lax standards in an area that requires rigid--and uncompromising--enforcement.
Preventing similar incidents in the future dictates an overhaul of PRP, but it's unclear if the Air Force has the stomach for that sort of reform. After all, making PRP work requires everyone--supervisors, commanders, the medics and the personnel system--to do their jobs, and risk the manning and production problems that could arise by refusing to certify marginal personnel, or decertifying those that don't meet standards. That's the "other" accountability issue that the Air Force must address in correcting problems that led to those "missing" nukes.
***
Lest we forget, DoD has also commissioned a second, independent inquiry into the weapons incident, led by retired Air Force General Larry Welch. So far, there's been no word on when General Welch's panel will conclude its investigation and release their findings.
Wednesday, October 17, 2007
With a Wink and a Nod
Such good friends. Putin and Ahmadeinjad meet in Tehran (AP photo)
There's been no shortage of headlines from this week's meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. First, there was talk of an possible assassination plot against the Russian leader, but he went ahead with the visit anyway. From our perspective, it sounded like a bit of disinformatizya, but Putin's decision to press ahead certainly reinforced his desired, tough-guy image.
Then, there was his announcement that countries in the Caspian Sea basin should not be used as staging areas for attacks on other nations in that region. It was a clearly veiled threat at potential U.S. action against Iran--and Azerbaijan, which has been mentioned as a possible forward base for American military forces operating against Tehran. Putin's declaration is, essentially, the latest iteration of Moscow's long-held belief that it should call the shots in the Caspian region, and control most of its vast oil reserves.
But the most critical aspect of Putin's talks with Ahmadinejad concerned Iran's nuclear ambitions. And, in that regard, many of the Russian president's comments were both predictable and dangerous, reaffirming Moscow's plans to fulfill contracts with Iran, and giving Tehran tacit approval to pursue its nuclear ambitions. On Tuesday, Mr. Putin said that Iran should be allowed to pursue its nuclear program for peaceful purposes--despite evidence that Tehran is trying to develop nuclear weapons. As CNN reported:
Putin said that he and the other leaders agreed that "peaceful nuclear activities must be allowed" in the region.
"The Iranians are cooperating with Russian nuclear agencies and the main objectives are peaceful objectives," he said.
Of course, the primary focus of that cooperation has been the nuclear reactor at Bushehr, and Putin's comments suggest that the project is moving forward, despite a recent impasse between Russia and Iran over missed payments. In an interview with the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), Mr. Putin said there are "no political reasons" for the delay in completing the plant, and told reporters that Russia will "honor its undertaking" in the project. He also suggested that "outdated equipment" in the original, German design was the primary reason for the delay, and that the older hardware should be replaced.
While the equipment issue gives Russia a potential excuse for stretching out project completion, Putin's remarks seem to indicate that the Bushehr project is getting back on track--assuming, of course, that the payment problem has been resolved. And, we expect an announcement on that matter will be forthcoming. As noted in previous posts, the Bushehr reactor represents a multi-billion dollar investment for the Iranian government, and vast profits for the Russian construction firms that are completing the facility. The project is simply too important to simply abandon, or allow even longer delays in its construction.
Mr. Putin has invited Ahmadienjad to Moscow for another meeting in the near future, and that may provide the forum for a "final" announcement on completing the Bushehr reactor. Iran's nutjob-in-chief was certainly delighted by Putin's offer, and equally pleased by the comments of the Russian president. By issuing a warning to Iran's chief enemy (the United States), describing Iran's nuclear program as peaceful and recommitting his country to the Bushehr project, Vladimir Putin said everything Ahmadinejad could have hoped for--and then some.
Putin's remarks were the statecraft equivalent of a wink and a nod, letting Tehran know that Moscow will not oppose its nuclear ambitions, and it will not support calls for tougher sanctions against Iran. If the centrifuges at Esfahan are spinning a little bit faster today, it's because Iran just got the green light from its most important nuclear "partner."
Put another way: we've just inched a step closer toward military action against Tehran.
Today's Reading Assignment
The New York Post, on the wisdom of not declaring victory over Al Qaida in Iraq, despite recent--and substantial--progress on the ground.
The Chicago Experiment
Monday, the Chicago Public School (CPS) system dedicated the city's first high school run by the U.S. Marine Corps. Ceremonies at the Marine Military Academy, located on Chicago's Near West Side, came a few days after the school system announced plans to open an Air Force-themed academy during the 2009 school year. When that school starts operations, Chicago will be the only city with four high school "military academies" (one for each branch of service), plus Junior ROTC detachment at more than three dozen other schools. All told, CPS operates the largest Junior ROTC program of any school system in the country.
For city school officials, the rationale for creating the military academies is clear. As the Chicago Tribune reports:
District officials say the military-themed schools give students more choices and provide an opportunity to enroll in schools that provide structure, discipline and a focus on leadership. They say the schools emphasize academics, not recruitment.
We have to think outside the box, and what existed before simply did not work for far too many students," said Chicago Public Schools Chief Arne Duncan. "These schools are popular and have waiting lists, so that tells me parents want more of them."
In fact, the military academies are so popular that the school system received 7,000 applications last year for the 700 available slots. The service academies are located in poor neighborhoods, and many parents and students welcome the structured, disciplined environment provided by the new schools. All of the military academies offer a college prep curriculum, and the Marine Academy will offer internships with the Chicago-based Argonne National Laboratories, offering additional learning opportunities for students interested in science and math.
Not surprisingly, the school system's embrace of Junior ROTC and military academies doesn't sit well with anti-war activists and certain members of the education establishment. They claim that the program is little more than a thinly-veiled recruiting effort that "unfairly" targets minority youngsters. A Fox News report on the Marine Academy's opening featured interviews with two "activists" that recited those familiar (but false) charges.
First of all, anyone with even a passing knowledge of the Junior ROTC program knows that it is aimed at building better citizens, not producing a new generation of military recruits. While each JROTC program is run by retired officers and NCOs, their instruction emphasizes self-respect, discipline, teamwork, and individual responsibility, within a military setting.
And there's little evidence that Chicago's military schools and JROTC detachments are producing a flood of enlistees for local armed forces recruiters. According to figures cited in the Fox News report, only about 7% of the students currently enrolled in Chicago's JROTC programs--including the service academies--enlist in the military after high school. It's a figure that's consistent with figures postulated by Dr. David Segal of the University of Maryland and other researchers. More than a decade ago, Dr. Segal calculated that 6-8% of high school males represent the group most likely to enlist. Segal's data--and anecdotal information from the CPS--indicate that Chicago's military schools and JROTC programs will never be the fertile "recruiting ground" claimed by anti-war protesters.
As for critics within the education bureaucracy, they fret that the military academies lag behind other schools on achievement tests, and in the number of students that go on to college. According to the Tribune, pass rates on the 2006 Illinois high school state exam ranged from 9 to 30 percent, below the Chicago average of 32%. None of the military academies met federal No Child Left Behind testing standards last year. However, there is a certain irony in that comparison. Supporters of traditional educational programs typically downplay the importance of state and federal testing, or claim the standards are unobtainable. But, they become a convenient bludgeon for targeting military schools, viewed as a threat to the education status quo.
But supporters of the schools point out--correctly--that the service academies are fairly new and need time to jel. Additionally, critics fail to note that the military schools are much more orderly and disciplined than the failing institutions they replaced, with lower rates of absenteeism, truancy and school violence. Over time, the disciplinary foundation being established at the service academies will produce an education environment that fosters learning and higher scores on achievement tests. More importantly, the students, parents and teachers involved with the service academies genuinely want to be there, creating a sense of ownership and dedication that is also essential for success.
Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley expressed similar expectations at Monday's dedication ceremony for the Marine Military Academy. "Be not afraid of the criticism you have," Daley said. "You get stronger because of the criticism against the military academies, because you are going to outperform."
It's somewhat rare for us to agree with a Democrat, but Mayor Daley got it right. Military academies don't represent a single solution for the nation's public education woes, but in the right environment--and with the backing of school officials and politicians--they can make a difference. That's why Chicago's bold experiment deserves continued support--and a chance to succeed.
For city school officials, the rationale for creating the military academies is clear. As the Chicago Tribune reports:
District officials say the military-themed schools give students more choices and provide an opportunity to enroll in schools that provide structure, discipline and a focus on leadership. They say the schools emphasize academics, not recruitment.
We have to think outside the box, and what existed before simply did not work for far too many students," said Chicago Public Schools Chief Arne Duncan. "These schools are popular and have waiting lists, so that tells me parents want more of them."
In fact, the military academies are so popular that the school system received 7,000 applications last year for the 700 available slots. The service academies are located in poor neighborhoods, and many parents and students welcome the structured, disciplined environment provided by the new schools. All of the military academies offer a college prep curriculum, and the Marine Academy will offer internships with the Chicago-based Argonne National Laboratories, offering additional learning opportunities for students interested in science and math.
Not surprisingly, the school system's embrace of Junior ROTC and military academies doesn't sit well with anti-war activists and certain members of the education establishment. They claim that the program is little more than a thinly-veiled recruiting effort that "unfairly" targets minority youngsters. A Fox News report on the Marine Academy's opening featured interviews with two "activists" that recited those familiar (but false) charges.
First of all, anyone with even a passing knowledge of the Junior ROTC program knows that it is aimed at building better citizens, not producing a new generation of military recruits. While each JROTC program is run by retired officers and NCOs, their instruction emphasizes self-respect, discipline, teamwork, and individual responsibility, within a military setting.
And there's little evidence that Chicago's military schools and JROTC detachments are producing a flood of enlistees for local armed forces recruiters. According to figures cited in the Fox News report, only about 7% of the students currently enrolled in Chicago's JROTC programs--including the service academies--enlist in the military after high school. It's a figure that's consistent with figures postulated by Dr. David Segal of the University of Maryland and other researchers. More than a decade ago, Dr. Segal calculated that 6-8% of high school males represent the group most likely to enlist. Segal's data--and anecdotal information from the CPS--indicate that Chicago's military schools and JROTC programs will never be the fertile "recruiting ground" claimed by anti-war protesters.
As for critics within the education bureaucracy, they fret that the military academies lag behind other schools on achievement tests, and in the number of students that go on to college. According to the Tribune, pass rates on the 2006 Illinois high school state exam ranged from 9 to 30 percent, below the Chicago average of 32%. None of the military academies met federal No Child Left Behind testing standards last year. However, there is a certain irony in that comparison. Supporters of traditional educational programs typically downplay the importance of state and federal testing, or claim the standards are unobtainable. But, they become a convenient bludgeon for targeting military schools, viewed as a threat to the education status quo.
But supporters of the schools point out--correctly--that the service academies are fairly new and need time to jel. Additionally, critics fail to note that the military schools are much more orderly and disciplined than the failing institutions they replaced, with lower rates of absenteeism, truancy and school violence. Over time, the disciplinary foundation being established at the service academies will produce an education environment that fosters learning and higher scores on achievement tests. More importantly, the students, parents and teachers involved with the service academies genuinely want to be there, creating a sense of ownership and dedication that is also essential for success.
Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley expressed similar expectations at Monday's dedication ceremony for the Marine Military Academy. "Be not afraid of the criticism you have," Daley said. "You get stronger because of the criticism against the military academies, because you are going to outperform."
It's somewhat rare for us to agree with a Democrat, but Mayor Daley got it right. Military academies don't represent a single solution for the nation's public education woes, but in the right environment--and with the backing of school officials and politicians--they can make a difference. That's why Chicago's bold experiment deserves continued support--and a chance to succeed.
Monday, October 15, 2007
Alert the Nobel Committee
You have to give Congressional Democrats credit, in the most perverse sense of that word.
In their effort to undercut the War in Iraq, they've left no option unexplored.
Tried to cut off military funding. That didn't work.
Proposed "balancing" home and deployment time for troops--severely limiting the ability of military commanders to put enough troops in the field. Couldn't pass that one, either.
Created arbitrary deadlines for a military withdrawal. Soundly--and wisely--rejected.
Smear the U.S. commander in Iraq through an activist group-sponsored ad in The New York Times? Blew up in their faces.
So, it was back to the drawing board, and now they've hit on a strategy that, at first blush, appears to have some traction. Last week, Nancy Pelosi and her Democratic colleagues in the house passed a resolution, condemning Turkey for the "genocide" of 1.5 million Armenians during World War I.
At first, the measure seemed a little odd. The event occurred almost 95 years ago. Relations between Ankara and Yerevan are still rocky, but both sides have expressed a willingness to continue their dialogue, and establish relations without any preconditions. And, from our perspective, Turkey has become an important U.S. ally (and NATO partner) over the past 60 years. Our bases in Turkey provide important logistical support for the War in Iraq.
Which, of course, is why the Democrats passed the resolution in the first place. In the guise of "human rights," the Dems sponsored a resolution guaranteed to upset Ankara, and (potentially) jeopardize the flow of personnel, equipment and fuel into Iraq. As Defense Secretary Robert Gates explained:
70 percent of the U.S. air cargo to Iraq flies through Turkey. He said 70 percent of the fuel requirements of the U.S. military in Iraq also moves through neighboring Turkey.
Officials said Turkey also serves as the route for new U.S. armored vehicles to Iraq. They cited the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected, or MRAP, vehicles, designed to withstand improvised explosive devices.
"For those who are concerned that we get as many of these Mine Resistant Ambush Protected heavy vehicles into Iraq as possible, 95 percent of those vehicles today are being flown into Iraq through Turkey," Gates said on Oct. 12.
And naturally, that means nothing to Ms. Pelosi, Mr. Hoyer, and the rest of the House Democratic leadership. The only issue that counts is gaining the upper hand on Iraq, and forcing some sort of withdrawal. If that means jeopardizing relations with Turkey, so be it.
It's a "strategy" that is absolutely feckless and completely beneath contempt. But the Democrats are willing to try anything in their efforts to undermine the war, even if endangers American troops in Iraq, or inflames NATO's critical southern flank. In their calculus, domestic politics trumps everything, including the war effort and critical diplomatic ties.
The U.S. does not brook genocide. But passing a resolution 95 years after the fact--and with obvious ulterior motives--does nothing to honor the victims. In fact, it actually cheapens a supposed show of support, making the genocide measure little more than a political stunt, aimed at ending a war that Democrats once supported--but now oppose.
Such is the state of today's Democratic Party.
P.S.--Did we mention that, thanks to the Democrats' resolution, Turkey is now considering an invasion of northern Iraq, a move that would destablizie the most secure (and prosperous) region of the country? Trying to stop the war in Iraq, they could easily trigger a new conflict, while re-igniting religious and ethnic hatreds that date back thousands of years. Alert the Norwegian Nobel Committee. At this pace, House Democrats will be serious contenders for next year's Peace Prize.
In their effort to undercut the War in Iraq, they've left no option unexplored.
Tried to cut off military funding. That didn't work.
Proposed "balancing" home and deployment time for troops--severely limiting the ability of military commanders to put enough troops in the field. Couldn't pass that one, either.
Created arbitrary deadlines for a military withdrawal. Soundly--and wisely--rejected.
Smear the U.S. commander in Iraq through an activist group-sponsored ad in The New York Times? Blew up in their faces.
So, it was back to the drawing board, and now they've hit on a strategy that, at first blush, appears to have some traction. Last week, Nancy Pelosi and her Democratic colleagues in the house passed a resolution, condemning Turkey for the "genocide" of 1.5 million Armenians during World War I.
At first, the measure seemed a little odd. The event occurred almost 95 years ago. Relations between Ankara and Yerevan are still rocky, but both sides have expressed a willingness to continue their dialogue, and establish relations without any preconditions. And, from our perspective, Turkey has become an important U.S. ally (and NATO partner) over the past 60 years. Our bases in Turkey provide important logistical support for the War in Iraq.
Which, of course, is why the Democrats passed the resolution in the first place. In the guise of "human rights," the Dems sponsored a resolution guaranteed to upset Ankara, and (potentially) jeopardize the flow of personnel, equipment and fuel into Iraq. As Defense Secretary Robert Gates explained:
70 percent of the U.S. air cargo to Iraq flies through Turkey. He said 70 percent of the fuel requirements of the U.S. military in Iraq also moves through neighboring Turkey.
Officials said Turkey also serves as the route for new U.S. armored vehicles to Iraq. They cited the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected, or MRAP, vehicles, designed to withstand improvised explosive devices.
"For those who are concerned that we get as many of these Mine Resistant Ambush Protected heavy vehicles into Iraq as possible, 95 percent of those vehicles today are being flown into Iraq through Turkey," Gates said on Oct. 12.
And naturally, that means nothing to Ms. Pelosi, Mr. Hoyer, and the rest of the House Democratic leadership. The only issue that counts is gaining the upper hand on Iraq, and forcing some sort of withdrawal. If that means jeopardizing relations with Turkey, so be it.
It's a "strategy" that is absolutely feckless and completely beneath contempt. But the Democrats are willing to try anything in their efforts to undermine the war, even if endangers American troops in Iraq, or inflames NATO's critical southern flank. In their calculus, domestic politics trumps everything, including the war effort and critical diplomatic ties.
The U.S. does not brook genocide. But passing a resolution 95 years after the fact--and with obvious ulterior motives--does nothing to honor the victims. In fact, it actually cheapens a supposed show of support, making the genocide measure little more than a political stunt, aimed at ending a war that Democrats once supported--but now oppose.
Such is the state of today's Democratic Party.
P.S.--Did we mention that, thanks to the Democrats' resolution, Turkey is now considering an invasion of northern Iraq, a move that would destablizie the most secure (and prosperous) region of the country? Trying to stop the war in Iraq, they could easily trigger a new conflict, while re-igniting religious and ethnic hatreds that date back thousands of years. Alert the Norwegian Nobel Committee. At this pace, House Democrats will be serious contenders for next year's Peace Prize.
Now, For a Bit of Shameless Self-Promotion..
Today is the deadline for nominations for the 2007 Weblog Awards. Throwing caution (and humility) to the wind, we've submitted our efforts for consideration in two categories, Best Blog (might as well aim for the top), and Best Individual Blogger for our founder, Nate Hale, aka Spook86.
If you believe our work is worthy of recognition in those (or other) areas, well we certainly won't discourage you from seconding those existing nominations, or submitting us in other categories. However, we should point out that "In From the Cold" is probably a poor choice for "Best Liberal Blog," "Best Pet Blog," and "Best Food Blog." (Darn, we should have posted that banana pudding recipe and those puppy photos last week).
On another note, this blog recently reached a minor milestone, recording its 1,000,000th page view last week. We are thankful for (and humbled by) your continued readership and support. We're also very cognizant that our "reach" is very small, compared to the big boys (and girls) of the blogosphere.
Still, this blog was never founded to be the biggest (or the most widely read). Our goal remains the same today as it was back on February 28, 2005: to providing insight and information on defense, intelligence and national security issues that you won't find any where else. Our success is measured in your continued patronage and feedback.
And for that, we are eternally grateful.
If you believe our work is worthy of recognition in those (or other) areas, well we certainly won't discourage you from seconding those existing nominations, or submitting us in other categories. However, we should point out that "In From the Cold" is probably a poor choice for "Best Liberal Blog," "Best Pet Blog," and "Best Food Blog." (Darn, we should have posted that banana pudding recipe and those puppy photos last week).
On another note, this blog recently reached a minor milestone, recording its 1,000,000th page view last week. We are thankful for (and humbled by) your continued readership and support. We're also very cognizant that our "reach" is very small, compared to the big boys (and girls) of the blogosphere.
Still, this blog was never founded to be the biggest (or the most widely read). Our goal remains the same today as it was back on February 28, 2005: to providing insight and information on defense, intelligence and national security issues that you won't find any where else. Our success is measured in your continued patronage and feedback.
And for that, we are eternally grateful.
The Right Stuff
Brigadier General Chuck Yeager at Edwards AFB, California, last month (Air Force Times)
Sixty years ago yesterday, an unusual sound echoed across the skies of Southern California's high desert. High above the dry lake bed runway of Muroc Field--later renamed Edwards AFB --the Bell X-1 became the first manned aircraft to fly faster than the speed of sound, and produce that distinctive thundering sound, subsequently dubbed the sonic boom.
At the controls of the X-1 was Air Force Captain Chuck Yeager, whose exploits were later immortalized in the book and film The Right Stuff, and Yeager's own autobiography. While Yeager had been a legendary figure in aviation circles since his days as a P-51 fighter pilot in World War II, he was relatively unknown to the general public until Tom Wolfe (and Yeager himself) began to catalogue his extraordinary career.
Before The Right Stuff, Yeager's extraordinary accomplishments had been somewhat eclipsed by the U.S. space program, which made heroes of the early astronauts. Yeager and his fellow test pilots derided them as "spam in a can," noting that while the astronauts were essentially "along for the ride," test pilots were actually in control of their experimental aircraft and rocket planes. One of the final sequences of the film version of The Right Stuff depicts Yeager narrowly escaping from an F-104 over Edwards, a vivid reminder of the dangers he faced as a test pilot. And that push to take aircraft past the sound barrier--to the edge of space--began on that October day in 1947.
Sadly, the Air Force Times article on the anniversary of Yeager's history-making flight omits a couple of important details, richly recounted in both The Right Stuff and Yeager. First, his selection for the flight was based largely on cost considerations. As an Air Force Captain, Yeager was making $283 a month at the time; civilian test pilots were demanding bonuses of more than $100,000 for the trans-sonic flight, believed by some to be an impossibility. Since Yeager would do the mission for his modest Captain's salary, he got the nod.
And, of course, there's the little matter of some broken ribs, suffered during a horse ride two nights before. Fearing that flight surgeons would ground him from the mission--and they would have--Yeager sought treatment from a local veterinarian, and told only his wife and fellow test pilot Jack Ridley about the injury. It was Ridley who, famously, rigged a broom handle that allowed Yeager to seal the hatch of the X-1 and make the historic flight, despite terrific pain from those broken ribs.
Six decades later, Chuck Yeager (who retired from the Air Force as a Brigadier General in 1975) is still an active pilot. Last month, he was at the controls of an F-16 that soared above Edwards and zoomed past Mach 1, producing that same sound that thundered across the desert 60 years earlier. Not bad for for a guy who retired from the Air Force 33 years ago, and will celebrate his 85th birthday next February. When it comes to The Right Stuff, Chuck Yeager still has it. In spades.
Sunday, October 14, 2007
Targeting a Reactor?
Bit by bit, we're learning more about last month's Israeli air strike against that Syrian nuclear facility. Today's edition of The New York Times reports that Israeli jets targeted an unfinished nuclear reactor. Once completed--and in operation--the reactor's spent fuel could have been reprocessed into material for nuclear weapons.
As the Times notes, there are still many unanswered questions about the facility that was targeted. We don't know the precise location of complex, and there's no word on how far construction had progressed. Additionally, it's unclear how long Damascus had been working on the reactor; the Times account suggests that the Israelis brought it to our attention earlier this year, hinting that our intelligence agencies may have missed early indications of construction activity at the site.
Also unclear is the amount of assistance provided by North Korea and Iran. Both U.S. and Israeli officials say that the Syrian reactor--apparently in the early stages of construction--was based on the North Korean facility at Yongbyon, instrumental in Pyongyang's development of nuclear weapons. The Yongbyon reactor was shut down earlier this year, under the Six Party Accord between North Korea, the United States, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia.
However, as former U.N. Ambassador John Bolton observed on Fox News Channel this morning, continued revelations about nuclear ties between Pyongyang and Damascus raise serious questions about continuation of the Six Party talks. The Israeli air strike came only three days after a North Korea ship docked at a Syrian port, reportedly delivering a nuclear-related cargo. Mr. Bolton--and others--have wondered how much of Pyongyang's supposedly "surrendered" nuclear program was merely exported, to Syria and other client states.
We've expressed similar misgivings about the Six Party process, but the Bush Administration appears committed to the deal. Meanwhile, it's a safe bet that U.S. and Israeli intelligence analysts are carefully reviewing current and former images of known (and suspected) Syrian WMD facilities. The same "export" program that led to that reactor construction project almost certainly brought other, related technologies to Assad's Syria. Along with the reactor, it's likely that Damascus is working on other facilities, used to enrich uranium, produce plutonium, fabricate weapons, or simply store nuclear hardware.
In other words, there are other undiscovered elements of Syria's nuclear program. And, unfortunately, those assets are less readily detected, or they can be easily concealed in dual-purpose facilities, such as underground tunnels or even an ordinary warehouse. Work on other aspects of a nuclear program can continue, although destroying (or seriously damaging) the reactor represents a major setback for Damascus. With the reactor on hold--at least for now--the Syrians might well attempt to obtain fissile material from an outside source, allowing them to experiment with uranium enrichment until they can create their own, indigenous method for producing nuclear fuel.
Which brings us to the remnants of North Korea's program, and Iran's own enrichment efforts. Bottom line: the IAF may be visiting Syria again, as other aspects of the program are uncovered. We can only hope the spooks are as adept at spotting other elements of Assad's nuclear puzzle, before it's too late.
As the Times notes, there are still many unanswered questions about the facility that was targeted. We don't know the precise location of complex, and there's no word on how far construction had progressed. Additionally, it's unclear how long Damascus had been working on the reactor; the Times account suggests that the Israelis brought it to our attention earlier this year, hinting that our intelligence agencies may have missed early indications of construction activity at the site.
Also unclear is the amount of assistance provided by North Korea and Iran. Both U.S. and Israeli officials say that the Syrian reactor--apparently in the early stages of construction--was based on the North Korean facility at Yongbyon, instrumental in Pyongyang's development of nuclear weapons. The Yongbyon reactor was shut down earlier this year, under the Six Party Accord between North Korea, the United States, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia.
However, as former U.N. Ambassador John Bolton observed on Fox News Channel this morning, continued revelations about nuclear ties between Pyongyang and Damascus raise serious questions about continuation of the Six Party talks. The Israeli air strike came only three days after a North Korea ship docked at a Syrian port, reportedly delivering a nuclear-related cargo. Mr. Bolton--and others--have wondered how much of Pyongyang's supposedly "surrendered" nuclear program was merely exported, to Syria and other client states.
We've expressed similar misgivings about the Six Party process, but the Bush Administration appears committed to the deal. Meanwhile, it's a safe bet that U.S. and Israeli intelligence analysts are carefully reviewing current and former images of known (and suspected) Syrian WMD facilities. The same "export" program that led to that reactor construction project almost certainly brought other, related technologies to Assad's Syria. Along with the reactor, it's likely that Damascus is working on other facilities, used to enrich uranium, produce plutonium, fabricate weapons, or simply store nuclear hardware.
In other words, there are other undiscovered elements of Syria's nuclear program. And, unfortunately, those assets are less readily detected, or they can be easily concealed in dual-purpose facilities, such as underground tunnels or even an ordinary warehouse. Work on other aspects of a nuclear program can continue, although destroying (or seriously damaging) the reactor represents a major setback for Damascus. With the reactor on hold--at least for now--the Syrians might well attempt to obtain fissile material from an outside source, allowing them to experiment with uranium enrichment until they can create their own, indigenous method for producing nuclear fuel.
Which brings us to the remnants of North Korea's program, and Iran's own enrichment efforts. Bottom line: the IAF may be visiting Syria again, as other aspects of the program are uncovered. We can only hope the spooks are as adept at spotting other elements of Assad's nuclear puzzle, before it's too late.
Thursday, October 11, 2007
A Parting (Cheap) Shot
Virginia Congresswoman Jo Ann Davis, 1950-2007.
A memorial service was held today in Gloucester, Virginia for Congresswoman Jo Ann Davis. Ms. Davis, who represented Virginia's First Congressional District for three terms, passed away last Saturday at the age of 57, after a two-year battle with breast cancer.
Congresswoman Davis will be rightfully remembered as a highly effective legislator who worked tirelessly for military, ship building and veteran's programs. Her district covers much of Virginia's Tidewater Peninsula, home to a number of key military installation, including Langley AFB, the Yorktown Naval Weapons Station, and Fort Eustis. Ms. Davis was also a champion of the Navy's ship-building program, securing contracts for the massive Northrup-Grumman shipyard in Newport News, which provided jobs for many of her constituents.
Jo Ann Davis's climb to Capitol Hill was nothing short of remarkable. She grew up poor in Hampton, Virginia, the daughter of a city bus driver. After graduating from high school, she attended a local business college and worked as a secretary before becoming a stay-at-home mom for her two sons. Later, as her children grew older and her husband pursued his career as a firefighter, Ms. Davis returned to the business world, becoming a very successful real estate agent and broker. She entered politics as a GOP outsider in 1996, winning a seat in Virginia's House of Delegates, before moving on to Congress four years later, after the death of long-time incumbent Herb Batemen.
So how did the largest daily newspaper on the Virginia peninsula--the Newport News Daily Press--remember Jo Ann Davis in today's coverage? Along with an article on last night's visitation service, held at a Denbigh church, the paper saw fit to include this little side-bar item:
The paper goes on to report that "The airport has had a heavy volume of private jets this morning -- reportedly more than two dozen -- because of a CEO conference in Williamsburg and the memorial service in Gloucester for U.S. Rep. Jo Ann Davis."
Give me a break. Admittedly, the Newport News-Williamsburg Airport doesn't have the traffic volume of Chicago's O'Hare Airport--or even Norfolk International, for that matter--but in today's travel environment, a 30-45 minute flight delay is so commonplace, it's hardly newsworthy.
In fact, I took a quick look at the FAA's Northeast Region (which includes airports from Viriginia to Maine) which revealed that some of the usual suspects--JFK and La Guardia Airports in New York; Newark Airport in New Jersey and Philadelphia International were experiencing delays of 30 minutes to one hour. But you won't see any sidebar stories about the delays in on-line editions of the Boston Globe, the New York Post or the Philly newspapers. (For the record, the reported delays were current as of 3:29 pm, EDT).
Besides, all those private jets that arrived in Virginia today filed flight plans for the trip, and they were in the FAA system. So, the traffic wasn't unexpected, and since they parked at the airport's general aviation ramp, the private jets weren't much of an impediment for the airlines that operate from Newport News. And, as the paper reports, they didn't create any delays. So where's the story?
On the other hand, reporting on the "influx" of private aircraft does allow the Daily Press to perpetuate that stereotype of "rich Republicans" who jetted in for the memorial service, creating possible delays for "ordinary" travelers. Readers will also note that the paper's reporter, Mike Holtzclaw, didn't bother to call the general aviation terminal and ask how many of the jets were connected to the CEO conference in Williamsburg, and the number associated with the Davis memorial service. No need to provide amplifying data that might interfere with a convenient stereotype.
The Daily Press may claim that their story was a testament to Davis's popularity--a woman with friends and supporters from all walks of life. But, by posting the "private jet" story, the paper also took a final, cheap (and grossly unfair) shot at a woman who was an exceptional public servant, and anything but the archetypal "rich" Republican that's implied by the aviation angle.
Next time an important Democratic politician passes away in Tidewater, we'll be waiting to see if the Daily Press provides a private jet count for their memorial service.
Bear Watching
Over the past few months, we've written at length about the recent increase in flight activity by Russian long-range bombers, including their venerable TU-95 Bears.
Not surprisingly, the surge in flight activity is being closely followed by the intelligence community. We're told that the Air Force recently hosted the first-ever Russian bomber Tactics and Analysis Team (BTAT?) meeting at Elmendorf AFB, Alaska. The forum was patterned after long standing tactics and analysis teams (TATs) that analyze fighter activity in other parts of the world. The very first TAT was convened in Europe during the early 1970s; since then, similar meetings have analyzed tactical activity in locations as diverse as China, North Korea, the Russian Far East, and even Cuba.
We're told that the spooks who gathered in Alaska view the jump in bomber flights as significant, but there's some debate over the threat such missions pose. In some respects, the Russian bomber force is making up for lost time; long-range missions against North America and northern Europe virtually stopped with the end of the Cold War. The recent sorties will help Russian bomber units rebuild operational proficiency and crew skills that were largely lost during the 1990s.
Thanks to budget cuts during that era--and force reductions mandated by arms control treaties--the Russian bomber force of today is a shadow of its former self, something that intel analysts can agree on. Still, the recent resumption in long-range in long-range flight activity is something that bears watching, as evidenced by creation of the BTAT.
As for a resumption of Bear flights against the U.S. east coast, analytical opinion appears mixed. Some experts agree with our position--a short-term TU-95 mission along our eastern seaboard is inevitable, allowing Russia to flex its military muscle, and send a political signal to the Bush Administration.
However, other analysts believe that Russian bomber flights in the coming months will follow recent patterns, with more profiles against Alaska, the north Atlantic (Norway and Great Britain), and possibly, U.S. installations in the Far East. They believe an east coast run will come later, after crews log more flight hours, and logistical arrangements in Cuba or Venezuela (i.e., fuel for the return flight) have been secured.
Not surprisingly, the surge in flight activity is being closely followed by the intelligence community. We're told that the Air Force recently hosted the first-ever Russian bomber Tactics and Analysis Team (BTAT?) meeting at Elmendorf AFB, Alaska. The forum was patterned after long standing tactics and analysis teams (TATs) that analyze fighter activity in other parts of the world. The very first TAT was convened in Europe during the early 1970s; since then, similar meetings have analyzed tactical activity in locations as diverse as China, North Korea, the Russian Far East, and even Cuba.
We're told that the spooks who gathered in Alaska view the jump in bomber flights as significant, but there's some debate over the threat such missions pose. In some respects, the Russian bomber force is making up for lost time; long-range missions against North America and northern Europe virtually stopped with the end of the Cold War. The recent sorties will help Russian bomber units rebuild operational proficiency and crew skills that were largely lost during the 1990s.
Thanks to budget cuts during that era--and force reductions mandated by arms control treaties--the Russian bomber force of today is a shadow of its former self, something that intel analysts can agree on. Still, the recent resumption in long-range in long-range flight activity is something that bears watching, as evidenced by creation of the BTAT.
As for a resumption of Bear flights against the U.S. east coast, analytical opinion appears mixed. Some experts agree with our position--a short-term TU-95 mission along our eastern seaboard is inevitable, allowing Russia to flex its military muscle, and send a political signal to the Bush Administration.
However, other analysts believe that Russian bomber flights in the coming months will follow recent patterns, with more profiles against Alaska, the north Atlantic (Norway and Great Britain), and possibly, U.S. installations in the Far East. They believe an east coast run will come later, after crews log more flight hours, and logistical arrangements in Cuba or Venezuela (i.e., fuel for the return flight) have been secured.
Today's Reading Assignment
Ralph Peters, on the price of Pakistan's appeasement, in today's New York Post.
The Latest Twist
It's been five weeks since Israeli warplanes reportedly struck a Syrian nuclear facility near the Iraqi border, destroying "nuclear material" that was apparently supplied by North Korea.
We say "reportedly" because the raid has been confirmed in only the vaguest terms by Israeli officials, although there's been plenty of speculation in the press and the blogs (including this one) about the target that was hit, and how the air strike was carried out.
However, the closest any Israeli leader has come to an official acknowledgment was a statement by former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Speaking on 19 September, he confirmed that the raid had occurred 13 days earlier, but offered only vague details of the mission. Privately, some Israeli officials have stated that the air strike targeted a Syrian nuclear complex that was equipped by North Korea, but they did not specify where the facility was located.
Tel Aviv's refusal to discuss the raid in detail is certainly understandable. As noted in previous posts, the mission was (apparently) a stunning success, and the Israelis don't want to reveal operational details of how they surprised the Syrians--again.
By most accounts, the raid unfolded quickly, in the middle of the night. A small formation of Israeli jets flew hundreds of miles through hostile airspace, struck the target and returned home safely, unmolested by Syrian air defenses. Some accounts suggest that a team of Israeli commandos also participated in the raid, highlighting targets with laser designators, or grabbing equipment or material from the targeted facility, depending on which version you believe.
There is also speculation that the commando force (and their transport helicopters) were pre-positioned in a neighboring country, reducing flight time and exposure in reaching the target. Basing support from a regional ally--say, Turkey--is another reason that Israel is reluctant to discuss the raid.
For it's part, Damascus has also been rather quiet since the air strike. Early claims that Syrian air defenses had driven off the IAF were quickly dismissed. Suffice it to say that Damascus's SAM sites, AAA batteries and fighter aircraft have a remarkably poor record in engaging Israeli aircraft. Indeed, the IAF has long demonstrated an ability to enter Syrian airspace at will and achieve its operational goals, often embarrassing Damascus in the process.
When the Syrians actually mount a defensive effort--as they did during the 1982 Bekka Valley campaign--their losses have often been staggering. The IAF shot down 80 Syrian jets in air battles over the Bekka Valley (with no losses of their own), and destroyed a number of SAM sites as well.
More recently, Syrian air defenses have simply failed to react during Israeli incursions into their air space, a response observed during a 2003 raid against a Palestinian terrorist camp near Damascus, and last month's attack on the nuclear facility. In both cases, the passive response was the result of several factors, including Israeli counter-measures, confusion in Damascus's air defense system, and a reluctance by Syrian commanders to directly challenge the IAF.
Unfortunately, such a timid response doesn't play well in Bashir Assad's dictatorship, or among his allies in the Middle East. That's why Damascus is trying a new propaganda ploy, suggesting that the Israeli raid never occurred. Government minders recently escorted a small group of journalists (including Hugh Naylor of The New York Times) to an agricultural reserach facility in Deir ez Zor, in eastern Syria, trying to prove that the complex was not the target of that Israeli airstrike.
As Mr. Naylor reports, the field trip was carefully contrived, but hardly convincing. For starters, the Israelis have never named the facility that was targeted by the air strike. The Deir ez Zor research complex was mentioned in an article by Israeli journalist Ron Ben-Yishai, who managed to slip into Syria and photograph himself in front of the research center. That little embarrassment--after all, Israelis are not allowed to enter Syria, let alone travel around the country--made the press tour an imperative.
During their visit, Naylor and the other journalists saw cultivated fields and research labs, but (obviously) no signs of a recent air raid or nuclear activity. The Times reporter did observe that the agricultural facility seems to employ a large number of graphic designers, and oddly enough, they seemed to know how Mr. Ben-Yishai entered their country (on a European passport, one volunteered. "It was definitely a German passport," added another "graphic designer."
That sort of clumsy propaganda effort is about what you'd expect from the Assad government, which doesn't understand that the usual lies, spooned out to a fearful Syrian public, don't work as well with western reporters--even representatives of The New York Times. And, it sounds like Mr. Assad's spin doctors could use a little remedial training in getting their stories straight. The "no air raid" tour came just days after the Syrian President told the BBC that Israeli jets struck "empty buildings," which was a departure from original claims that air defenses chased away the IAF.
However, the media excursion to Deir ez Zor does make a couple of things clear. The "non-existent" raid was a clear humiliation for the Assad government and its vaunted air defense network. And for a supposed "non-event," the Syrians are spending an unusual amount of time on damage control, an effort that will only intensify speculation about the Israeli air strike, and Damascus's own nuclear ambitions.
We say "reportedly" because the raid has been confirmed in only the vaguest terms by Israeli officials, although there's been plenty of speculation in the press and the blogs (including this one) about the target that was hit, and how the air strike was carried out.
However, the closest any Israeli leader has come to an official acknowledgment was a statement by former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Speaking on 19 September, he confirmed that the raid had occurred 13 days earlier, but offered only vague details of the mission. Privately, some Israeli officials have stated that the air strike targeted a Syrian nuclear complex that was equipped by North Korea, but they did not specify where the facility was located.
Tel Aviv's refusal to discuss the raid in detail is certainly understandable. As noted in previous posts, the mission was (apparently) a stunning success, and the Israelis don't want to reveal operational details of how they surprised the Syrians--again.
By most accounts, the raid unfolded quickly, in the middle of the night. A small formation of Israeli jets flew hundreds of miles through hostile airspace, struck the target and returned home safely, unmolested by Syrian air defenses. Some accounts suggest that a team of Israeli commandos also participated in the raid, highlighting targets with laser designators, or grabbing equipment or material from the targeted facility, depending on which version you believe.
There is also speculation that the commando force (and their transport helicopters) were pre-positioned in a neighboring country, reducing flight time and exposure in reaching the target. Basing support from a regional ally--say, Turkey--is another reason that Israel is reluctant to discuss the raid.
For it's part, Damascus has also been rather quiet since the air strike. Early claims that Syrian air defenses had driven off the IAF were quickly dismissed. Suffice it to say that Damascus's SAM sites, AAA batteries and fighter aircraft have a remarkably poor record in engaging Israeli aircraft. Indeed, the IAF has long demonstrated an ability to enter Syrian airspace at will and achieve its operational goals, often embarrassing Damascus in the process.
When the Syrians actually mount a defensive effort--as they did during the 1982 Bekka Valley campaign--their losses have often been staggering. The IAF shot down 80 Syrian jets in air battles over the Bekka Valley (with no losses of their own), and destroyed a number of SAM sites as well.
More recently, Syrian air defenses have simply failed to react during Israeli incursions into their air space, a response observed during a 2003 raid against a Palestinian terrorist camp near Damascus, and last month's attack on the nuclear facility. In both cases, the passive response was the result of several factors, including Israeli counter-measures, confusion in Damascus's air defense system, and a reluctance by Syrian commanders to directly challenge the IAF.
Unfortunately, such a timid response doesn't play well in Bashir Assad's dictatorship, or among his allies in the Middle East. That's why Damascus is trying a new propaganda ploy, suggesting that the Israeli raid never occurred. Government minders recently escorted a small group of journalists (including Hugh Naylor of The New York Times) to an agricultural reserach facility in Deir ez Zor, in eastern Syria, trying to prove that the complex was not the target of that Israeli airstrike.
As Mr. Naylor reports, the field trip was carefully contrived, but hardly convincing. For starters, the Israelis have never named the facility that was targeted by the air strike. The Deir ez Zor research complex was mentioned in an article by Israeli journalist Ron Ben-Yishai, who managed to slip into Syria and photograph himself in front of the research center. That little embarrassment--after all, Israelis are not allowed to enter Syria, let alone travel around the country--made the press tour an imperative.
During their visit, Naylor and the other journalists saw cultivated fields and research labs, but (obviously) no signs of a recent air raid or nuclear activity. The Times reporter did observe that the agricultural facility seems to employ a large number of graphic designers, and oddly enough, they seemed to know how Mr. Ben-Yishai entered their country (on a European passport, one volunteered. "It was definitely a German passport," added another "graphic designer."
That sort of clumsy propaganda effort is about what you'd expect from the Assad government, which doesn't understand that the usual lies, spooned out to a fearful Syrian public, don't work as well with western reporters--even representatives of The New York Times. And, it sounds like Mr. Assad's spin doctors could use a little remedial training in getting their stories straight. The "no air raid" tour came just days after the Syrian President told the BBC that Israeli jets struck "empty buildings," which was a departure from original claims that air defenses chased away the IAF.
However, the media excursion to Deir ez Zor does make a couple of things clear. The "non-existent" raid was a clear humiliation for the Assad government and its vaunted air defense network. And for a supposed "non-event," the Syrians are spending an unusual amount of time on damage control, an effort that will only intensify speculation about the Israeli air strike, and Damascus's own nuclear ambitions.
Wednesday, October 10, 2007
Don't Get Your Hopes Up
According to the Washington Post, U.S. intelligence officials will "investigate" allegations that someone in the government improperly leaked a secretly-obtained Al Qaida propaganda tape, alerting the terror group to a gap in its computer security that has since been secured.
Ross Feinstein, a spokesman for the director of national intelligence, said officials are looking into the leak allegation by the SITE Intelligence Group, which passed the video on to the White House and the director of national intelligence's office before its leak.
"At this point, we don't think there was a leak from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or the National Counterterrorism Center," Feinstein said.
Mr. Feinstein's comments are essentially a rehash of what's already been said about the tape controversy. In bureaucrat-speak, his comments could be translated as "We'll go through the motions, but there's really no interest (or incentive) to find the leaker."
We base that observation on several factors. First, as we've noted in previous posts, the record of the intelligence community and the Justice Department in locating (and punishing) leakers is laughable. Over a 10-year period, beginning in the mid-1990s, there were more than 500 inquiries into the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, which often would up in the media. The number of leakers brought to justice? Approximately zero. In fact, you'd be hard-pressed to find in the intelligence or security apparatus that was internally disciplined or censured during that period.
The sad fact is that lots of people--too many of them--are willing to disclose classified information, for a variety of reasons. Administration officials leak to support their agenda; their opponents do it for the same reason. Others disclose sensitive data to embarrass rival agencies while enhancing their own standing in budget battles and bureaucratic turf wars. Other leaks are aimed at foreign governments, letting them know that the U.S. is aware of their activities, and prepared to take action, if necessary.
In today's pervasive "leak culture," it's little wonder that offenders go unpunished. The FBI--which is responsible for investigating these crimes--has admitted that its probes usually hit a dead end because it receives little cooperation from the intel community. With the leak already on the front page of The New York Times or WaPo (and its agenda purpose satisfied), there's little reason to cooperate with the FBI. Memories get fuzzy, files disappear, and stories from possible suspects suddenly match. After a few months, the inquiry loses steam and the matter is quietly dropped.
And, lest we forget, these are investigations based on the actual disclosure of classified information. In the matter of the SITE tape, there is ample evidence that the video was never classified. SITE obtained the tape clandestinely and asked government officials to keep it SECRET, but (so far) there's no indication that the bin Laden video was ever classified. Indeed, how can you stamp "Secret" on a product that was available to the company's subscribers, and was discussed by other commercial intel firms--and media outlets--before SITE passed it along to the intel community?
To fill the bureaucratic "square," there will be something of an inquiry into how the SITE tape made its way from the bureaucracy to ABC News. But if you're expecting a hard-hitting investigation that actually fingers the culprit(s), you'll be sorely disappointed. Besides, there are far more serious--and damaging--leaks that merit a serious review, and genuine punishment for the offenders. Put another way: if we can't find (and sanction) the "real" leakers, we shouldn't get too excited over disclosure of an Al Qaida tape that was obtained "outside" intelligence channels.
Ross Feinstein, a spokesman for the director of national intelligence, said officials are looking into the leak allegation by the SITE Intelligence Group, which passed the video on to the White House and the director of national intelligence's office before its leak.
"At this point, we don't think there was a leak from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or the National Counterterrorism Center," Feinstein said.
Mr. Feinstein's comments are essentially a rehash of what's already been said about the tape controversy. In bureaucrat-speak, his comments could be translated as "We'll go through the motions, but there's really no interest (or incentive) to find the leaker."
We base that observation on several factors. First, as we've noted in previous posts, the record of the intelligence community and the Justice Department in locating (and punishing) leakers is laughable. Over a 10-year period, beginning in the mid-1990s, there were more than 500 inquiries into the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, which often would up in the media. The number of leakers brought to justice? Approximately zero. In fact, you'd be hard-pressed to find in the intelligence or security apparatus that was internally disciplined or censured during that period.
The sad fact is that lots of people--too many of them--are willing to disclose classified information, for a variety of reasons. Administration officials leak to support their agenda; their opponents do it for the same reason. Others disclose sensitive data to embarrass rival agencies while enhancing their own standing in budget battles and bureaucratic turf wars. Other leaks are aimed at foreign governments, letting them know that the U.S. is aware of their activities, and prepared to take action, if necessary.
In today's pervasive "leak culture," it's little wonder that offenders go unpunished. The FBI--which is responsible for investigating these crimes--has admitted that its probes usually hit a dead end because it receives little cooperation from the intel community. With the leak already on the front page of The New York Times or WaPo (and its agenda purpose satisfied), there's little reason to cooperate with the FBI. Memories get fuzzy, files disappear, and stories from possible suspects suddenly match. After a few months, the inquiry loses steam and the matter is quietly dropped.
And, lest we forget, these are investigations based on the actual disclosure of classified information. In the matter of the SITE tape, there is ample evidence that the video was never classified. SITE obtained the tape clandestinely and asked government officials to keep it SECRET, but (so far) there's no indication that the bin Laden video was ever classified. Indeed, how can you stamp "Secret" on a product that was available to the company's subscribers, and was discussed by other commercial intel firms--and media outlets--before SITE passed it along to the intel community?
To fill the bureaucratic "square," there will be something of an inquiry into how the SITE tape made its way from the bureaucracy to ABC News. But if you're expecting a hard-hitting investigation that actually fingers the culprit(s), you'll be sorely disappointed. Besides, there are far more serious--and damaging--leaks that merit a serious review, and genuine punishment for the offenders. Put another way: if we can't find (and sanction) the "real" leakers, we shouldn't get too excited over disclosure of an Al Qaida tape that was obtained "outside" intelligence channels.
The Ultimate Military Phony
These days, you almost need a scorecard to keep track of all the military phonies that keep cropping up.
Just this morning, the mayor of Atlantic City, New Jersey (Bob Levy) announced his resignation from office. You'll recall that Mr. Levy disappeared almost two weeks ago, after questions were raised about his military service. Levy, who served in the Army for more than 20 years, stated falsely that he was a Green Beret, and later admitted that he had misrepresented his military career.
Unfortunately for Mr. Levy, the federal Stolen Valor Act--passed in 2005--make it a crime to make false claims about military service or honors. Various media reports indicate that Levy is the target of a probe over his Green Beret "service" (which was featured prominently in his 2005 mayoral campaign), and charges that he may have falsely claimed the Combat Infantryman's Badge, using that award to obtain additional veteran's benefits. At the time of his resignation, Levy had just emerged from rehab, for treatment of unspecified ailments. For the record, Mr. Levy is a Democrat, though you'd be hard-pressed to find the party affiliation in any press accounts of his scandal.
Still, as military phonies go, Bob Levy is something of a piker compared to the latest fraud who was literally unearthed--or, more correctly, will soon be unearthed--in New York City. By all accounts, Mr. Levy actually served in the U.S. military and even earned a couple of Bronze Stars during two tours in Vietnam. At this point, the same can't be said for New York phony who literally stole a burial plot from a vet. As the AP reports (via Military Times):
When Willie Hayes’ family began arranging his burial at a veterans’ cemetery, they were shocked to learn that the body of a man with the same name, Social Security number and military honors was already there.
Now the family wants the impostor, who was buried in 2003, removed from Calverton National Cemetery on Long Island.
“If he didn’t serve in the Army, he shouldn’t be there. It’s not fair to the veterans. He stole my brother’s identity,” Hayes brother, Sylvester, said in a telephone interview Monday.
The real Willie Hayes, who died Sept. 30 at age 59, was buried Friday, but only after the family and a funeral home in Harlem provided Calverton with documentation of his military service, including the medals he earned.
Calverton, which is run by the Department of Veterans Affairs, issued a statement Monday saying it was looking into the matter.
“This was an unusual occurrence for Calverton National Cemetery and our staff will continue to work with county, state and federal government officials to determine the exact identity of the other Willie Hayes,” the statement said.
The cemetery said it had verified the information for the Willie Hayes who died last month and authorized the funeral service and burial last week.
A call for comment to VA was answered with a recording that said it was closed for the holiday.
Isaiah Owens, the funeral home owner who helped arrange the burial, said it was difficult to learn the impostor’s real identity because he had no relatives and his burial was arranged by the city.
Perhaps a better question is how the "other" Willie Hayes had the necessary documentation or information for burial in a VA cemetery. According the Veteran's Administration, establishing criteria for burial in one of its cemetaries requires detailed information:
"...the veteran's discharge document; report of casualty; or the veteran's full name; military rank; branch of service; dates of entry and discharge; serial, social security, and/or VA claim numbers; date and place of birth; and date of death.Arranging Burial in a VA National Cemetery.
It appears that the impostor was either a first-class identity thief, or someone in the city and/or VA bureaucracy helped "grease the skids" in arranging his burial. We would hope that the AP--or a New York media outlet--would ask the city and the Veteran's Administration what documentation was provided to arrange burial for the impostor, and where it came from.
The VA owes an apology to the real Mr. Hayes and his surviving family members. Had the agency demanded the same level of documentation back in 2003--when the impostor was buried--the Hayes family would have been spared the bureaucratic hurdles that delayed their loved one's burial.
Meanwhile, we can only wonder how many other phonies are interred at VA cemeteries. For the moment, we know of at least one, still buried at Calverton on Long Island.
Just this morning, the mayor of Atlantic City, New Jersey (Bob Levy) announced his resignation from office. You'll recall that Mr. Levy disappeared almost two weeks ago, after questions were raised about his military service. Levy, who served in the Army for more than 20 years, stated falsely that he was a Green Beret, and later admitted that he had misrepresented his military career.
Unfortunately for Mr. Levy, the federal Stolen Valor Act--passed in 2005--make it a crime to make false claims about military service or honors. Various media reports indicate that Levy is the target of a probe over his Green Beret "service" (which was featured prominently in his 2005 mayoral campaign), and charges that he may have falsely claimed the Combat Infantryman's Badge, using that award to obtain additional veteran's benefits. At the time of his resignation, Levy had just emerged from rehab, for treatment of unspecified ailments. For the record, Mr. Levy is a Democrat, though you'd be hard-pressed to find the party affiliation in any press accounts of his scandal.
Still, as military phonies go, Bob Levy is something of a piker compared to the latest fraud who was literally unearthed--or, more correctly, will soon be unearthed--in New York City. By all accounts, Mr. Levy actually served in the U.S. military and even earned a couple of Bronze Stars during two tours in Vietnam. At this point, the same can't be said for New York phony who literally stole a burial plot from a vet. As the AP reports (via Military Times):
When Willie Hayes’ family began arranging his burial at a veterans’ cemetery, they were shocked to learn that the body of a man with the same name, Social Security number and military honors was already there.
Now the family wants the impostor, who was buried in 2003, removed from Calverton National Cemetery on Long Island.
“If he didn’t serve in the Army, he shouldn’t be there. It’s not fair to the veterans. He stole my brother’s identity,” Hayes brother, Sylvester, said in a telephone interview Monday.
The real Willie Hayes, who died Sept. 30 at age 59, was buried Friday, but only after the family and a funeral home in Harlem provided Calverton with documentation of his military service, including the medals he earned.
Calverton, which is run by the Department of Veterans Affairs, issued a statement Monday saying it was looking into the matter.
“This was an unusual occurrence for Calverton National Cemetery and our staff will continue to work with county, state and federal government officials to determine the exact identity of the other Willie Hayes,” the statement said.
The cemetery said it had verified the information for the Willie Hayes who died last month and authorized the funeral service and burial last week.
A call for comment to VA was answered with a recording that said it was closed for the holiday.
Isaiah Owens, the funeral home owner who helped arrange the burial, said it was difficult to learn the impostor’s real identity because he had no relatives and his burial was arranged by the city.
Perhaps a better question is how the "other" Willie Hayes had the necessary documentation or information for burial in a VA cemetery. According the Veteran's Administration, establishing criteria for burial in one of its cemetaries requires detailed information:
"...the veteran's discharge document; report of casualty; or the veteran's full name; military rank; branch of service; dates of entry and discharge; serial, social security, and/or VA claim numbers; date and place of birth; and date of death.Arranging Burial in a VA National Cemetery.
It appears that the impostor was either a first-class identity thief, or someone in the city and/or VA bureaucracy helped "grease the skids" in arranging his burial. We would hope that the AP--or a New York media outlet--would ask the city and the Veteran's Administration what documentation was provided to arrange burial for the impostor, and where it came from.
The VA owes an apology to the real Mr. Hayes and his surviving family members. Had the agency demanded the same level of documentation back in 2003--when the impostor was buried--the Hayes family would have been spared the bureaucratic hurdles that delayed their loved one's burial.
Meanwhile, we can only wonder how many other phonies are interred at VA cemeteries. For the moment, we know of at least one, still buried at Calverton on Long Island.
A Measure of Protection, Redux
About eighteen months ago, we noted that El Al, Israel's state-owned airline, had installed missile protection systems on all of its aircraft. The decision followed an unsuccessful attack on an Israeli charter jet taking off from Mobassa, Kenya in 2002. In that incident, Al Qaida-linked terrorists launched a shoulder-fired, SA-7 "Grail" at the 757, which missed its target. The attack on the Israeli jet is cited as the first against a civilian airliner operating outside a war zone, and was a major factor in El Al's plan to protect its fleet.
As the man-portable (MANPAD) surface-to-air missile threat persists, Israel is now taking additional steps to safeguard civilian aircraft. The Jerusalem Post is reporting that Israel's security cabinet has approved a new, Israeli-made defensive system for protecting commercial aircraft against missile attacks. Development of the system will begin next year. According to the Post, the research effort will also include technology that will make it more difficult for hijacked or unidentified aircraft to penetrate Israeli airspace.
As with many announcements from Israeli government, this one is deliberately vague. Reading between the lines, it appears the Israelis will install a more advanced missile defense system on civilian aircraft in the near future. Additionally, the government is also allocating money to "fortify" jetliners with existing technology, already found on Israeli Air Force (IAF) aircraft. That indicates that all of Israel's civilian aircraft will receive missile protection gear over the near term, giving them the self-defense capability already found on El Al jetliners. The more advanced missile defense system will eventually be retrofitted on Israel's commercial fleet, once development and testing is complete.
The decision to put defensive suites on more jetliners was apparently prompted by terror groups' plans to target Israeli aircraft, and the availability of more advanced MANPADS. Existing self-defense systems are designed primarily for older, first and second-generation missiles, like the Russian-designed SA-7 and SA-14. Most of the self-protection suites utilize sensors that detect a missile launch, then direct a burst of laser energy to confuse or blind the MANPAD seeker.
However, some of the existing systems are less effective against more advanced shoulder-fired SAMs, notably the Russian SA-18 and the American.-made STINGER. While export of the latest versions of the STINGER have been strictly controlled by the U.S. government, the SA-18 is believed to be widely available on the world arms market, and some of the missiles could be in the hand of terrorist organizations. With longer range, better maneuverability and the ability to defeat some defensive systems, the threat posed by the SA-18 (and other, newer MANPADS) clearly influenced the Israeli decision.
While Israel's commercial aviation fleet is only a fraction of the United States, the expanded defensive effort won't be cheap. Outfitting El Al's 29 jetliners reportedly cost at least $1.1 million per aircraft, and installing missile defense systems on other commercial aircraft will be equally expensive. Additional funding will be required for outfitting those aircraft with the more advanced defensive suite, which enters development in 2008. Apparently, the Israelis believe it's money well-spent, given the potential economic and psychological impact of losing a civilian airliner to a terrorist MANPAD.
Meanwhile, the effort to provide a similar level of protection to U.S. jetliners is inching forward. The Department of Homeland Security is evaluating prototype systems developed by British Aerospace (BAE) and Northrup Grumman, but so far, that equipment has not met reliability standards mandated by DHS. Incidentally, there is no indication that the Israeli systems are better than those being tested in the United States, but Tel Aviv decided the threat warrants an immediate deployment, instead of waiting for more reliable equipment.
Results of the DHS evaulation will be briefed to Congress in 2008, and the Associated Press reported last year that it could take two decades to outfit all U.S. passenger aircraft with a self-defense system. That's assuming, of course, that lawmakers, the airlines and aircraft maufacturers can agree on a system, and find a way to pay for the installation. By one estimate, it could cost $5 billion to install missile defense suites on aircraft operated by the "mainline" carriers. Outfitting passenger aircraft for smaller airlines and charter carriers would be even more expensive.
Still, that cost could be underwritten with a slight surcharge on tickets--about $1 on an existing New York to Los Angeles flight. As Aviation Week has noted, that tax would be enough to fund not only the equipment and its installation, it would also pay for the extra fuel burned by the increased weight/drag of the missile defense system.
From our perspective, it's a small price to pay for defending the flying public against a growing threat. Unfortunately, the leisurely pace of our development and evaluation efforts means it will be years before passengers on U.S. carriers have the same level of protection afforded to those flying El Al, or other Israeli airlines. Unlike DHS, the Israelis understand that the MANPAD threat to airliners can't wait for a better or more cost effective system. We can only pray that our bureaucrats--and airline passengers--don't have to learn that lesson the hard way.
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