At first blush, today's Washington Post paints a disturbing picture of a loophole in survivor benefits for military members who die in the line of duty. The paper profiles at least three families struggling to survive because the military's $100,000 death gratuity cannot be paid to grandparents (and other family members) who are caring for children left behind by the service member.
The Post leads with the case of Navy Petty Officer Jamie Janek, a Naval Reservist from Iowa who was killed last year by a roadside bomb in Iraq. Before her last deployment, Petty Officer Janek directed that the death gratuity be given to her parents, apparently unaware that (by law) the benefit goes first to a surviving spouse or child. Petty Officer Janek's nine-year-old daughter will collect the death benefit (along with $400,000 in Servicemen's Group Life Insurance) when she turns 18. In the interim, her parents are laboring to meet their granddaughter's needs with limited resources. Post reporter Donna St. George offers similar tales from California and Missouri, where children from previous relationships--and their guardians--have been left without benefits.
But is this a genuine example of a cold and heartless bureaucracy with inflexible rules, or the result of hasty financial planning by military members, and inadequate advice from benefits counselors? Having worn the uniform for more than twenty years, I'd say the problem lies less with the "system," and more with military personnel who don't fully consider the long-term consequences of what might happen if they die, and who should receive their benefits.
Let me make one thing clear up front: this post is not intended as a criticism of Petty Officer Janek or the other service members listed in the Post story. All are heroes in my book, patriots who gave the last, full measure of devotion to their country. Their survivors should receive every benefit they're entitled to.
But, having been a young airman and NCO myself, I also understand that benefits decisions are sometimes made in haste--and without considering the consequences of those decisions. During my younger days, I processed through more than a few mobility lines, where service members were allowed to review (or revised) benefit information, or complete a power of attorney before deployment, all in a matter of a few minutes. It was a useful process; representatives from the JAG and personnel offices who manned the benefits and legal processing stations were always amazed at the number of personnel who were prepared to ship out--without designating survivor benefits, or granting a power of attorney to manage their affairs.
For me, stops at the JAG and benefits stations on the mobility line were usually brief, because I tried my legal and benefits documents up-to-date. But, like other service members, I never really considered some of the technical details of my benefits, and the potential impact on my estate. For example, while Mrs. Spook and I had detailed plans for the care of our children in the event that both of us died, I didn't realize that my military death gratuity wasn't payable to the designated guardians. I'm not sure if that particular fact was covered in various benefit briefings I attended down through the years, but even if it wasn't, shame on me. I should have paid more attention to something so potentially important. Luckily for me, it never became an issue.
Likewise, I believe that military personnel have an obligation to provide for all of their children. Unfortunately, there are a few service members who are willing to ignore offspring from previous marriages or relationships, because of hostile relations with the child's mother or father, or they simply don't want the added financial responsibility. I don't believe that was the case in examples cited by the Post, but it does highlight the need for the military to educate its personnel on the fine points of their benefits--and the requirement for service members to do the necessary legal and financial planning before they deploy.
Meanwhile, Congress can also play a helpful role by changing the rules on military death gratuities. Petty Officer Janek clearly wanted her parents to receive that benefit, but current laws prohibit it. Making that change would do more for the troops than passing meaningless resolutions on the War in Iraq.
Friday, February 16, 2007
Too Good to be True
As we learned during the long hunt for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, reports of an Al-Qaida leader's demise or capture are often too good to be true. Sadly, that also appears to be the case for Zarqawi's successor, Abu Ayuub al-Masri. A number of media outlets reported yesterday taht al-Masri had been wounded and captured by Iraqi security forces, after a firefight north of Baghdad. One of al-Masri's senior aides was apparently killed during that skirmish.
At Pajamas Media, Richard Miniter does a good job of sorting the wheat from the chaff, and knocks down claims that we've nabbed al-Masri. U.S. intelligence sources told Miniter that a man matching al-Masri's physical description was captured after a raid on a terrorist safehouse north of Baghdad. The suspect had no fingerprints--they had been deliberately burned off--preventing identification through that method. Subsequent DNA tests reportedly confirmed that the suspect was not the Al Qaida leader.
Miniter blames the mix-up on an Iraqi Interior Ministry that is anxious to deliver "good news" about the security situation, even if the facts don't always support their assertions. Clearly, the capture of al-Masri would have represented a major victory for coalition forces. The "new" leader of Al Qaida in Iraq is viewed as a much more skillful--and dangerous--that his brutish predecessor, al-Zarqawi.
If there's any consolation is this reported "miss," it's the sense that al-Masri's reign as Iraq's Public Enemy #1 will likely be brief. As Bill Roggio reminds us, members of Task Force 145 (the joint special ops hunter-killer team that played a critical role in locating Zarqawi) are hot on al-Masri's trail, as well. And, as Mr. Roggio points out, the noose around the former Al Qaida leader began to tighten as members of Task Force 145 rounded up senior members of Zarqawi's inner circle. A senior aide to al-Masri was captured last week, less than 24 hours after he met with his leader, suggesting that we're devloping good intelligence on the current Al Qaida leader, and may be able to neutralize him in relatively short order.
***
On a related note, Richard Miniter offers this item about "revised" terrorist tactics in Iraq:
al Qaeda has deployed a screen of antiaircraft weapons around Baghdad – in an attempt to cut off American and allied attempts at aerial reconnaissance. Al Masri is trying to force troops into dangerous ground patrols where they can killed by roadside bombs or snipers.
Where are the antiaircraft weapons and the trained operators for them coming from? “We’re still debating that,” said one military official. “But all evidence points to Iran.”
As we've noted in the past, insurgent dreams of "cutting off" aerial reconnaissance are just that --pure fantasy. Despite the recent loss of attack and transport helicopters, the U.S. still generates hundreds of chopper sorties every day in Iraq. Our UAVs and fixed-wing aircraft operate with inpunity, as evidenced by the scores of fighters and recconnaissance drones that criss-cross Iraq on a daily basis.
And, regarding that "screen" of anti-aircraft weapons that may have originated in Iran, I would not want to be a part of an Al-Qaida air defense crew, taking on the U.S. Army or the USAF in Iraq. Remember that B-1 that was observered circling Baghdad the other day? Even a single B-1 could deliver a devastating attack on a Palm Grove or other rural location that is favored by terrorist MANPAD gunners. UAVs are useful in tracking the gunners when they jump into a car and attempt to drive away, and of course, our fighters can deliver precision attacks from outside the MANPAD envelope. Factor in the Army's Apache gunships, and you've got a very lethal threat facing any terrorist air defense crew that elects to "stand and fight."
At Pajamas Media, Richard Miniter does a good job of sorting the wheat from the chaff, and knocks down claims that we've nabbed al-Masri. U.S. intelligence sources told Miniter that a man matching al-Masri's physical description was captured after a raid on a terrorist safehouse north of Baghdad. The suspect had no fingerprints--they had been deliberately burned off--preventing identification through that method. Subsequent DNA tests reportedly confirmed that the suspect was not the Al Qaida leader.
Miniter blames the mix-up on an Iraqi Interior Ministry that is anxious to deliver "good news" about the security situation, even if the facts don't always support their assertions. Clearly, the capture of al-Masri would have represented a major victory for coalition forces. The "new" leader of Al Qaida in Iraq is viewed as a much more skillful--and dangerous--that his brutish predecessor, al-Zarqawi.
If there's any consolation is this reported "miss," it's the sense that al-Masri's reign as Iraq's Public Enemy #1 will likely be brief. As Bill Roggio reminds us, members of Task Force 145 (the joint special ops hunter-killer team that played a critical role in locating Zarqawi) are hot on al-Masri's trail, as well. And, as Mr. Roggio points out, the noose around the former Al Qaida leader began to tighten as members of Task Force 145 rounded up senior members of Zarqawi's inner circle. A senior aide to al-Masri was captured last week, less than 24 hours after he met with his leader, suggesting that we're devloping good intelligence on the current Al Qaida leader, and may be able to neutralize him in relatively short order.
***
On a related note, Richard Miniter offers this item about "revised" terrorist tactics in Iraq:
al Qaeda has deployed a screen of antiaircraft weapons around Baghdad – in an attempt to cut off American and allied attempts at aerial reconnaissance. Al Masri is trying to force troops into dangerous ground patrols where they can killed by roadside bombs or snipers.
Where are the antiaircraft weapons and the trained operators for them coming from? “We’re still debating that,” said one military official. “But all evidence points to Iran.”
As we've noted in the past, insurgent dreams of "cutting off" aerial reconnaissance are just that --pure fantasy. Despite the recent loss of attack and transport helicopters, the U.S. still generates hundreds of chopper sorties every day in Iraq. Our UAVs and fixed-wing aircraft operate with inpunity, as evidenced by the scores of fighters and recconnaissance drones that criss-cross Iraq on a daily basis.
And, regarding that "screen" of anti-aircraft weapons that may have originated in Iran, I would not want to be a part of an Al-Qaida air defense crew, taking on the U.S. Army or the USAF in Iraq. Remember that B-1 that was observered circling Baghdad the other day? Even a single B-1 could deliver a devastating attack on a Palm Grove or other rural location that is favored by terrorist MANPAD gunners. UAVs are useful in tracking the gunners when they jump into a car and attempt to drive away, and of course, our fighters can deliver precision attacks from outside the MANPAD envelope. Factor in the Army's Apache gunships, and you've got a very lethal threat facing any terrorist air defense crew that elects to "stand and fight."
Thursday, February 15, 2007
There's a Reason....
...that President Bush used a portion of today's speech on the War on Terror to encourage our NATO allies to send more troops to Afghanistan, and ease restrictions on how they can be employed.
As Bill Roggio reports, NATO forces are already battling the Taliban in Helmand Province, in the southern part of Afghanisstan. Taliban forces seized key positions in the region last November, and NATO troops have launched a counter-offensive (labeled Operation Kryptonite) before the spring thaw. More than a few analysts are expecting a major Taliban offensive in the spring, and some have predicted that NATO positions could be overrun, unless some of the "reluctant" alliance members allow their troops to take a more active role in combat operations.
Will that happen? Mr. Roggio has a link to an AP story from Spain, where NATO is holding a meeting. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has been making the rounds in Spain, trying to convince NATO members to send more resources to Afghanistan, in support of a spring push against the terrorists. Not surprisingly, the response from key European allies (Germany, Spain, Italy) has been underwhelming; they question the wisdom of sending more troops, offering quotes that seem to mirror those from Democrats in Congress.
The handwriting on this one seems clear: NATO efforts in Afghanistan--as in Iraq--will largely remain a U.S. and British show, with other alliance members only providing token support. As you might imagine, those "less engaged" nations are the very ones who've adopted a garrison strategy in Afghanistan, refuse to patrol aggressively (if at all), and are most in danger from the Taliban's spring offensive. And, of course, if their positions are overrun, that will provide the pretext for these reluctant allies to end their participation, once and for all.
Back in the days of the Cold War, the standard NATO line was that our European friends would fight "to the last dollar and the last American." Afghanistan is proving (once again) that there was more than an element of truth in that joke.
As Bill Roggio reports, NATO forces are already battling the Taliban in Helmand Province, in the southern part of Afghanisstan. Taliban forces seized key positions in the region last November, and NATO troops have launched a counter-offensive (labeled Operation Kryptonite) before the spring thaw. More than a few analysts are expecting a major Taliban offensive in the spring, and some have predicted that NATO positions could be overrun, unless some of the "reluctant" alliance members allow their troops to take a more active role in combat operations.
Will that happen? Mr. Roggio has a link to an AP story from Spain, where NATO is holding a meeting. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has been making the rounds in Spain, trying to convince NATO members to send more resources to Afghanistan, in support of a spring push against the terrorists. Not surprisingly, the response from key European allies (Germany, Spain, Italy) has been underwhelming; they question the wisdom of sending more troops, offering quotes that seem to mirror those from Democrats in Congress.
The handwriting on this one seems clear: NATO efforts in Afghanistan--as in Iraq--will largely remain a U.S. and British show, with other alliance members only providing token support. As you might imagine, those "less engaged" nations are the very ones who've adopted a garrison strategy in Afghanistan, refuse to patrol aggressively (if at all), and are most in danger from the Taliban's spring offensive. And, of course, if their positions are overrun, that will provide the pretext for these reluctant allies to end their participation, once and for all.
Back in the days of the Cold War, the standard NATO line was that our European friends would fight "to the last dollar and the last American." Afghanistan is proving (once again) that there was more than an element of truth in that joke.
A Show of Force, Or.....
Pajamas Media has this interesting sighting in the skies over Baghdad. Omar Fadhil of Iraq the Model snapped a photo of an Air Force B-1 Lancer bomber, patrolling the skies over the Iraqi capital on Wednesday. The bomber circled for almost two hours, in broad daylight. Omar can't remember seeing a B-1 over Baghdad since the U.S.-led invasion almost four years ago. I'm guessing that B-1s have operated periodically in the Baghdad area since that time, but the flights may have occurred under the cover of darkness, or at higher altitudes. Observers estimate that the B-1 was cruising above the Iraqi capital at an altitude of only 3-4 kilometers (roughly 12-14,000 feet), putting it within range of shoulder-fired SAMs used by insurgents.
So why was that B-1 circling above Baghdad on Valentine's Day? At least four reasons come to mind; the first is an old-fashioned show of force--a reminder to the terrorists that the U.S. will use all available resources to secure the Iraqi capital, including airpower. With satellite-guided weapons and the new small diameter bomb, even heavy bombers like the B-1 are effective in an urban environment, allowing pinpoint strikes, with minimum collateral damage. It's been reported that radical Shia cleric Moqtada Al Sadr fled to Iran because the feared the U.S. Air Force would come calling. Based on yesterday's sighting, his fears might not have been exaggerated.
Another possibility for the aerial show is crew training/familiarization. Even in an age of satellite imagery, and "fly through" mission preparation simulations, there's no substitute for cruising over an area you may be operating in--particularly if high value targets are located in that particular neighborhood or sector. Yesterday's mission may have been something of a dress rehearsal for potential bomber strikes against terrorist strongholds in Baghdad.
There's also the possibility that the B-1 was being used as "bait," aimed at luring terrorist MANPAD gunners out in the open and getting them to take a shot at the circling bomber. The B-1's on-board defenses offer excellent protection against shoulder-fired SAMs, so there was little danger of the terrorists actually hitting the aircraft. However, if we were trying to set some sort of trap for enemy gunners, ground observers might have heard or seen other aircraft --including attack helicopters and UAVs--operating in the same area, ready to strike when the MANPAD teams revealed themselves. Omar doesn't mention the presence of other aircraft with the B-1, so it seems doubtful that the bomber was being used as MANPAD bait
The most likely scenario (in my view) is that the B-1 was "on call" for potential strikes in the Baghdad area, awaiting tasking from troops on the ground. With extended loiter times and heavy payload, bombers are ideally suited for that type of mission, prepared to attack when ground forces need them. It's a tactic that was used frequently--and successfully--in Afghanistan in 2001, and during the toppling of Saddam's regime two years later. And, if yesterday's observation is any indication, it's a tactic that may be returning to the Baghdad area.
So why was that B-1 circling above Baghdad on Valentine's Day? At least four reasons come to mind; the first is an old-fashioned show of force--a reminder to the terrorists that the U.S. will use all available resources to secure the Iraqi capital, including airpower. With satellite-guided weapons and the new small diameter bomb, even heavy bombers like the B-1 are effective in an urban environment, allowing pinpoint strikes, with minimum collateral damage. It's been reported that radical Shia cleric Moqtada Al Sadr fled to Iran because the feared the U.S. Air Force would come calling. Based on yesterday's sighting, his fears might not have been exaggerated.
Another possibility for the aerial show is crew training/familiarization. Even in an age of satellite imagery, and "fly through" mission preparation simulations, there's no substitute for cruising over an area you may be operating in--particularly if high value targets are located in that particular neighborhood or sector. Yesterday's mission may have been something of a dress rehearsal for potential bomber strikes against terrorist strongholds in Baghdad.
There's also the possibility that the B-1 was being used as "bait," aimed at luring terrorist MANPAD gunners out in the open and getting them to take a shot at the circling bomber. The B-1's on-board defenses offer excellent protection against shoulder-fired SAMs, so there was little danger of the terrorists actually hitting the aircraft. However, if we were trying to set some sort of trap for enemy gunners, ground observers might have heard or seen other aircraft --including attack helicopters and UAVs--operating in the same area, ready to strike when the MANPAD teams revealed themselves. Omar doesn't mention the presence of other aircraft with the B-1, so it seems doubtful that the bomber was being used as MANPAD bait
The most likely scenario (in my view) is that the B-1 was "on call" for potential strikes in the Baghdad area, awaiting tasking from troops on the ground. With extended loiter times and heavy payload, bombers are ideally suited for that type of mission, prepared to attack when ground forces need them. It's a tactic that was used frequently--and successfully--in Afghanistan in 2001, and during the toppling of Saddam's regime two years later. And, if yesterday's observation is any indication, it's a tactic that may be returning to the Baghdad area.
Wednesday, February 14, 2007
The Smoking Gun, Redux
The latest liberal "spin" on the discovery of Iranian weapons in Iraq is that we don't know if this represents a "conscious" policy by the Tehran government, or elements within regime. In today's Boston Globe, reporters Farah Stockman and Thanassis Cambanis eagerly sought the opinions of "experts" and self-styled Bush Administration critics, who are questioning the quality of intelligence on Iranian support for Iraqi insurgents, presented at a news conference in Baghdad on Sunday.
Daniel Serwer, a specialist at the US Institute for Peace, a Washington-based think tank, said he was not convinced that the Iranian government had decided "at the highest levels" to provide weapons to target US troops, as the three US officials told reporters.
"The question is not so much about whether there are Iranian weapons inside Iraq," said Serwer, who served as executive director of the Iraq Study Group, the bipartisan commission on Iraq. "Sure there are. The question is whether there is a conscious policy by the Iranian government or some part of the Iranian government to support lethal attacks against Americans. I haven't seen any proof of that yet."
Readers will note that Mr. Serwer's group advocated some sort of regional "dialogue" with Iran and Syria, in an effort to get the U.S. out of Iraq. Obviously, evidence of Iranian troops and weaponry being used to kill American soldiers would undercut the approach advocated by the ISG. As the group's executive director, is Mr. Serwer an unbiased observer of Iranian actions in Iraq, and their potential impact on U.S. policies? You be the judge.
Ditto for Connecticut Senator Chris Dodd, who sees parallels between the intel offered on Iranian involvement in Iraq, and information provided on Saddam's purported WMD programs before the 2003 U.S.-led invasion. Dodd, who gives new meaning to the term "partisan hack," did everything short of accusing the administration of "cooking the books" on intelligence about Iran's support for Shia militias:
"I am deeply troubled by this administration's escalating rhetoric against Iran, especially intelligence from unnamed officials that is not fully documented," Senator Christopher J. Dodd, Democrat of Connecticut, said in a statement. "It is frighteningly reminiscent of the pattern we saw in the drumbeat that led to the war with Iraq."
Clearly, intelligence assessments are never perfect, but the officials who spoke in Baghdad on Sunday offered a compelling case. Forensic evidence determined that the weaponry on display had been manufactured in Iran, and serial numbers linked the devices to suppliers in that country.
Beyond that, we can also assume that those six members of the Qods force, arrested recently in Irbil, have been talking to interrogators, and have provided more evidence of Tehran's complicity. Obviously, not all of this information is not going to be divulged to the public and the press before U.S. and Iraqi security forces have a chance to roll-up some of the terror cells, bomb-making networks and smuggling operations. The Globe sniffs that "only two" Iranian identification cards were displayed at the Baghdad news conference, ignoring reports that documents were also recovered in the raid. You may also recall that the Iranians tried to flush some of those documents down a toilet when coalition forces burst into their offices. But I'm sure the Globe would describe that as a mere coincidence, and when we put those Iranian agents in front of the cameras, the paper will claim that their "confessions" were coerced.
Meanwhile, it would be helpful if President Bush and other senior officials offered a bit more support for the recent discoveries in Iraq. In his news conference today, Mr. Bush said "he did not know" if Iran's leaders ordered the Qods force to provide IEDs to the Shia militias in Iraq. General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made similar comments yesterday in Indonesia, saying that evidence of Iranian bomb-making material in Iraq "does not translate that the Iranian government per se, for sure, is directly involved in doing this."
Give me a break. Given the relationship between the Qods force and the upper levels of Iran's government, I'd be greatly surprised if senior officials in Tehran weren't aware of what was going on. Support for the militias--and attacks on U.S. troops--has been part and parcel of Iranian policies in Iraq for more than two years. In fact, the Globe does ask one useful question, namely why it took so long for the administration to make its case against Tehran.
The answer is probably rooted in several factors, including U.S. efforts to "reassure" Iranians that we had no plans to attack their country, and EU-led diplomatic efforts to deter Tehran's nuclear ambitions. Based on available evidence, it appears that the U.S. was willing to tolerate Iranian interference in Iran (up to a point), in hopes of achieving broader, regional goals. If it took the administration four years to figure out that Iran will inevitably work against our interests, shame on them.
Unfortunately, members of the left-wing "security establishment" (yes, that is an oxymoron) are even more myopic in their views, quite willing to give Iran a pass on activities that kill U.S. soldiers. One of the more ludicrous "statistics" cited in the Globe story is the correlation of combat deaths among Shia and Sunni neighborhoods. The paper notes that only four percent of U.S. casualties occur in areas when Shia insurgents are active; by comparison, at least 60% of our combat deaths have occurred in areas when Sunni terrorists operate. Even the Globe admits that one-quarter of our combat fatalities have been recorded in an area--Baghdad--where Shia and Sunni fighters operate.
What the paper conveniently fails to mention is that Iran's support is not only limited to Shia groups; as the respected private intelligence firm Stratfor noted last month (hat tip: Lebanonwire):
"Iran's primary militant assets in Iraq are Shiite militias and unaffiliated gunmen. But Iran's support for the Iraq insurgency is not limited to its Shiite allies. Tehran also has been providing support to segments of the Sunni insurgency. Though it might sound like a contradiction for Shiite Iran to support Sunni groups in Iraq, it is not unprecedented -- and there is a certain logic behind the groups the Iranians choose to support..."
(snip)
" Tehran also wants to avoid overusing Shiite militants in Iraq in order to prevent a rift between Iraqi Shia and the United States; it intends to use its Arab Shiite allies as an instrument in consolidating its interests in Iraq. At the same time, the Iranians need to ensure that the Sunni insurgency would keep the United States tied down in Iraq so that U.S. forces would not be in a position to threaten Iran.
To those ends, Iran has had to gain some influence within the complex universe of Iraq's Sunni insurgency. The Iranians have backed certain elements of the insurgency -- such as Kurdish Islamist militant organization Ansar al-Sunnah -- that are Sunni Islamists, are not part of the jihadist alliance and are opposed to the U.S. occupation of Iraq. Many elements of Ansar al-Sunnah reportedly have been operating from inside Iran."
(snip)
"Iran actually has a long history of supporting Sunni groups under the guise of promoting pan-Islamist causes. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Hamas are two prime examples of Arab Sunni groups that have received Iranian assistance. In fact, PIJ's founders were heavily influenced by the 1979 Islamic revolution that brought the current Iranian regime to power.
In Iraq, Iranian support for Sunni militants will further complicate an already complex insurgency, making it all the more difficult for U.S. and Iraqi forces to contain it. It will also create suspicions and rifts among various Sunni groups that will cause intra-Sunni violence. On the other hand, the situation provides an opportunity for Washington to drive a wedge between the Iranians and their Iraqi Shiite allies by showing that Tehran has actually been backing their enemies. This is why Iran has tried to encourage the Sunni militants it supports to focus on U.S. and other non-Shiite targets."
But you wouldn't know that Iran has a history of backing various Sunni insurgent groups from reading the Globe's account. In fact, the only encouraging element from the entire story is that quote from an unnamed defense official, saying that the Baghdad briefing grew out of a larger decision to neutralize the Qods force in Iraq. That's a policy that makes perfect sense--and it's long over-due.
Daniel Serwer, a specialist at the US Institute for Peace, a Washington-based think tank, said he was not convinced that the Iranian government had decided "at the highest levels" to provide weapons to target US troops, as the three US officials told reporters.
"The question is not so much about whether there are Iranian weapons inside Iraq," said Serwer, who served as executive director of the Iraq Study Group, the bipartisan commission on Iraq. "Sure there are. The question is whether there is a conscious policy by the Iranian government or some part of the Iranian government to support lethal attacks against Americans. I haven't seen any proof of that yet."
Readers will note that Mr. Serwer's group advocated some sort of regional "dialogue" with Iran and Syria, in an effort to get the U.S. out of Iraq. Obviously, evidence of Iranian troops and weaponry being used to kill American soldiers would undercut the approach advocated by the ISG. As the group's executive director, is Mr. Serwer an unbiased observer of Iranian actions in Iraq, and their potential impact on U.S. policies? You be the judge.
Ditto for Connecticut Senator Chris Dodd, who sees parallels between the intel offered on Iranian involvement in Iraq, and information provided on Saddam's purported WMD programs before the 2003 U.S.-led invasion. Dodd, who gives new meaning to the term "partisan hack," did everything short of accusing the administration of "cooking the books" on intelligence about Iran's support for Shia militias:
"I am deeply troubled by this administration's escalating rhetoric against Iran, especially intelligence from unnamed officials that is not fully documented," Senator Christopher J. Dodd, Democrat of Connecticut, said in a statement. "It is frighteningly reminiscent of the pattern we saw in the drumbeat that led to the war with Iraq."
Clearly, intelligence assessments are never perfect, but the officials who spoke in Baghdad on Sunday offered a compelling case. Forensic evidence determined that the weaponry on display had been manufactured in Iran, and serial numbers linked the devices to suppliers in that country.
Beyond that, we can also assume that those six members of the Qods force, arrested recently in Irbil, have been talking to interrogators, and have provided more evidence of Tehran's complicity. Obviously, not all of this information is not going to be divulged to the public and the press before U.S. and Iraqi security forces have a chance to roll-up some of the terror cells, bomb-making networks and smuggling operations. The Globe sniffs that "only two" Iranian identification cards were displayed at the Baghdad news conference, ignoring reports that documents were also recovered in the raid. You may also recall that the Iranians tried to flush some of those documents down a toilet when coalition forces burst into their offices. But I'm sure the Globe would describe that as a mere coincidence, and when we put those Iranian agents in front of the cameras, the paper will claim that their "confessions" were coerced.
Meanwhile, it would be helpful if President Bush and other senior officials offered a bit more support for the recent discoveries in Iraq. In his news conference today, Mr. Bush said "he did not know" if Iran's leaders ordered the Qods force to provide IEDs to the Shia militias in Iraq. General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made similar comments yesterday in Indonesia, saying that evidence of Iranian bomb-making material in Iraq "does not translate that the Iranian government per se, for sure, is directly involved in doing this."
Give me a break. Given the relationship between the Qods force and the upper levels of Iran's government, I'd be greatly surprised if senior officials in Tehran weren't aware of what was going on. Support for the militias--and attacks on U.S. troops--has been part and parcel of Iranian policies in Iraq for more than two years. In fact, the Globe does ask one useful question, namely why it took so long for the administration to make its case against Tehran.
The answer is probably rooted in several factors, including U.S. efforts to "reassure" Iranians that we had no plans to attack their country, and EU-led diplomatic efforts to deter Tehran's nuclear ambitions. Based on available evidence, it appears that the U.S. was willing to tolerate Iranian interference in Iran (up to a point), in hopes of achieving broader, regional goals. If it took the administration four years to figure out that Iran will inevitably work against our interests, shame on them.
Unfortunately, members of the left-wing "security establishment" (yes, that is an oxymoron) are even more myopic in their views, quite willing to give Iran a pass on activities that kill U.S. soldiers. One of the more ludicrous "statistics" cited in the Globe story is the correlation of combat deaths among Shia and Sunni neighborhoods. The paper notes that only four percent of U.S. casualties occur in areas when Shia insurgents are active; by comparison, at least 60% of our combat deaths have occurred in areas when Sunni terrorists operate. Even the Globe admits that one-quarter of our combat fatalities have been recorded in an area--Baghdad--where Shia and Sunni fighters operate.
What the paper conveniently fails to mention is that Iran's support is not only limited to Shia groups; as the respected private intelligence firm Stratfor noted last month (hat tip: Lebanonwire):
"Iran's primary militant assets in Iraq are Shiite militias and unaffiliated gunmen. But Iran's support for the Iraq insurgency is not limited to its Shiite allies. Tehran also has been providing support to segments of the Sunni insurgency. Though it might sound like a contradiction for Shiite Iran to support Sunni groups in Iraq, it is not unprecedented -- and there is a certain logic behind the groups the Iranians choose to support..."
(snip)
" Tehran also wants to avoid overusing Shiite militants in Iraq in order to prevent a rift between Iraqi Shia and the United States; it intends to use its Arab Shiite allies as an instrument in consolidating its interests in Iraq. At the same time, the Iranians need to ensure that the Sunni insurgency would keep the United States tied down in Iraq so that U.S. forces would not be in a position to threaten Iran.
To those ends, Iran has had to gain some influence within the complex universe of Iraq's Sunni insurgency. The Iranians have backed certain elements of the insurgency -- such as Kurdish Islamist militant organization Ansar al-Sunnah -- that are Sunni Islamists, are not part of the jihadist alliance and are opposed to the U.S. occupation of Iraq. Many elements of Ansar al-Sunnah reportedly have been operating from inside Iran."
(snip)
"Iran actually has a long history of supporting Sunni groups under the guise of promoting pan-Islamist causes. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Hamas are two prime examples of Arab Sunni groups that have received Iranian assistance. In fact, PIJ's founders were heavily influenced by the 1979 Islamic revolution that brought the current Iranian regime to power.
In Iraq, Iranian support for Sunni militants will further complicate an already complex insurgency, making it all the more difficult for U.S. and Iraqi forces to contain it. It will also create suspicions and rifts among various Sunni groups that will cause intra-Sunni violence. On the other hand, the situation provides an opportunity for Washington to drive a wedge between the Iranians and their Iraqi Shiite allies by showing that Tehran has actually been backing their enemies. This is why Iran has tried to encourage the Sunni militants it supports to focus on U.S. and other non-Shiite targets."
But you wouldn't know that Iran has a history of backing various Sunni insurgent groups from reading the Globe's account. In fact, the only encouraging element from the entire story is that quote from an unnamed defense official, saying that the Baghdad briefing grew out of a larger decision to neutralize the Qods force in Iraq. That's a policy that makes perfect sense--and it's long over-due.
Mookie Hits the Road
Citing defense sources, various media outlets are reporting that radical Iraqi Shia leader Moqtada al Sadar has fled to neighboring Iran, taking key members of his Mahdi Army with him.
Senior military leaders told ABC News that al Sadr left Baghdad two or three weeks ago, and is now living in Tehran, where he has family. Senior leaders in his militia reportedly accompanied him to Iran. Their departure coincided with the start of a U.S. troop build-up in Iraq, and promises by the country's Prime Minister that al Sadr (and other militia leaders) would no longer be protected by the government.
With American troops preparing to enter--and remain--in al Sadr's Baghdad stronghold, the cleric was apparently concerned that he might become a target. One U.S. official told ABC's Martha Raddatz "He is scared he will get a JDAM (satellite-guided bomb) dropped on his house."
The sudden departure of Al Sadr and his top commanders leaves the Mahdi Army with a potential leadership vaccum in the coming months, as more U.S. troops enter Iraq. Al Sadr's minions still have the resources to carry out their daily ration of bombings and assassinations, but their ability to formulate long-term strategy may be impaired by Al Sadr's absence. Moreover, members of his militia will hardly be inspired by their leader's sudden decampment, and they may be less inclined to do Mookie's bidding while he's in exile.
Almost everyone agrees that Al Sadr's stay in Iran will be limited. Over the past three years, Al Sadr has become one of Tehran's most effective proxies in Iraq, and the Iranian government does not want his organization to wither. In fact, there's some speculation that Mookie's sudden move to Tehran may actually be some sort of "recall" by his Iranian sponsors, designed to get him out of harm's way (on a temporary basis), and facilitate discussions on future terrorist strategies in Iraq.
In the interim, it might be helpful if the Iraqi government did something that might dissuade Sadr from returning to the country, such as resurrecting the murder charges against him that were "postponed" back in 2004. But I'm guessing that Prime Minister al-Malaki doesn't have the political capital--or willpower--to pull off that sort of move. There is some consolation, however, in the knowledge that Sadrist influence in the Iraqi government may wane a bit with their leader out of the country, and give al-Malaki a bit more room to maneuver. Psychologically, Al Sadr's sudden departure may offer an inadvertent boost to the troop surge and on-going security operations in Baghdad. Taking up residence in Iran, Al Sadr seems to be expressing more confidence in the surge--and its prospects for success--than the Democrats in the House and Senate.
Senior military leaders told ABC News that al Sadr left Baghdad two or three weeks ago, and is now living in Tehran, where he has family. Senior leaders in his militia reportedly accompanied him to Iran. Their departure coincided with the start of a U.S. troop build-up in Iraq, and promises by the country's Prime Minister that al Sadr (and other militia leaders) would no longer be protected by the government.
With American troops preparing to enter--and remain--in al Sadr's Baghdad stronghold, the cleric was apparently concerned that he might become a target. One U.S. official told ABC's Martha Raddatz "He is scared he will get a JDAM (satellite-guided bomb) dropped on his house."
The sudden departure of Al Sadr and his top commanders leaves the Mahdi Army with a potential leadership vaccum in the coming months, as more U.S. troops enter Iraq. Al Sadr's minions still have the resources to carry out their daily ration of bombings and assassinations, but their ability to formulate long-term strategy may be impaired by Al Sadr's absence. Moreover, members of his militia will hardly be inspired by their leader's sudden decampment, and they may be less inclined to do Mookie's bidding while he's in exile.
Almost everyone agrees that Al Sadr's stay in Iran will be limited. Over the past three years, Al Sadr has become one of Tehran's most effective proxies in Iraq, and the Iranian government does not want his organization to wither. In fact, there's some speculation that Mookie's sudden move to Tehran may actually be some sort of "recall" by his Iranian sponsors, designed to get him out of harm's way (on a temporary basis), and facilitate discussions on future terrorist strategies in Iraq.
In the interim, it might be helpful if the Iraqi government did something that might dissuade Sadr from returning to the country, such as resurrecting the murder charges against him that were "postponed" back in 2004. But I'm guessing that Prime Minister al-Malaki doesn't have the political capital--or willpower--to pull off that sort of move. There is some consolation, however, in the knowledge that Sadrist influence in the Iraqi government may wane a bit with their leader out of the country, and give al-Malaki a bit more room to maneuver. Psychologically, Al Sadr's sudden departure may offer an inadvertent boost to the troop surge and on-going security operations in Baghdad. Taking up residence in Iran, Al Sadr seems to be expressing more confidence in the surge--and its prospects for success--than the Democrats in the House and Senate.
Tuesday, February 13, 2007
Kicking the Can?
At first blush, it's tempting to describe the tentative deal between the U.S. and North Korea as an exercise in "kicking the can down the road." Pyongyang has agreed, in principle, to close down and seal its main reactor within 60 days, in exchange for 50,000 tons of fuel oil, as a first step in abandoning its nuclear weapons and research program. There were similar provisions in the ill-fated, 1994 "Agreed To Framework," which (essentially) paved the way for a covert North Korean program, which yielded the primitive nuclear device tested last fall. In light of the DPRK's demonstrated willingness to break deals and negotiate in bad faith, there is a tendency to view the accord with a great deal of suspicion, wondering how long it will last, and even speculate about when Pyongyang will make new demands that could derail the entire process.
Today's Washington Post has a good summary of the agreement--and the hurdles that remain in the implementation process. Disabling the reactor represents the next phase in a largely undefined phase of "denuclearization," which also includes discussions on plutonium fuel reserves and other efforts that will be abandoned under the accord. In return, the North will receive additional energy, humanitarian and economic assistance, up to the equivalent of 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil. The U.S. has also agreed to discuss the possible normalization of relations with the DPRK--a longstanding goal of Pyongyang--and resolve a dispute over North Korean money laundering through a Macau bank.
U.S. negotiators view the tentative agreement as a "down payment" on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, and improved relations between North Korea and its neighbors. Of course, the devil is always in the details, and the success of this agreement will (ultimately) hinge on the continued engagement of the "other" participants in the Six Party talks--particularly Japan, China and Russia. Beijing and Moscow still have considerable leverage with Kim Jong-il's regime, and their willingness to support limited sanctions against the north probably convinced Pyongyang that it was time to cut a deal. But will the Russians and Chinese be willing to continue to exert pressure on Pyongyang as the implementation process moves along? That's the $64,000 question, and a cynic would argue that the DPRK's long-time allies may lean more on the U.S. to uphold its end of the bargain, while granting North Korea more leeway in its "denuclearization" efforts.
Then, there's the question of what exactly happens to Pyongyang's accumulated nuclear technology and expertise. The "limits" of the North's nuclear efforts have never been fully documented, and the U.S. has only vague ideas about the number of scientists and engineers employed in various weapons and research programs sponsored by the DPRK. With North Korea supposedly getting out of the nuke business, what's to keep Kim Jong-il's scientists from taking their talents to Iran, North Korea, Venezuela, or other countries with nuclear ambitions.
Dealing with that possibilty represents a major challenge of the denuclearization process. To help prevent the spread of nuclear technology, is the U.S. prepared to propose some sort of extension of the Nunn-Lugar Act, which could provide stipends for unemployed North Korean nuclear engineers and researchers? Nunn-Lugar has often been hailed as an example of effective counter-proliferation efforts, but it has not prevented Russian--and even North Korean--nuclear specialists from traveling to places like Iran. Moreover, with the DPRK in dire economic straits, nuclear technology represents one of its few "viable" exports. Given that reality, it's difficult to imagine Pyongyang simply shuttering the program, and rejecting a source of badly-needed hard currency. Making matters worse, one could argue that the proliferation "horse is already out of the barn," given the apparent ties between North Korea's nuclear programs and those of other rogue states. These relationships also give Pyongyang of continuing their weapons development efforts "offshore," and outside the framework of the peninsula agreement.
Today's nuclear deal is certainly better than no deal at all, but it's easy to be pessimistic about the accord's long-term prospects for survival and implementation. North Korea got much of what it wanted in the announced deal (and so did the U.S.), but there's genuine concern that Pyongyang will--eventually--decide it wants even more, and demand concessions that Washington and Seoul simply can't grant. Or, the DPRK may simply revert to its behavior of the mid-1990s, making public efforts to "observe" the agreement, while continuing a covert nuclear program. That's why the next round of the process, when North Korea discusses the scope of its nuclear efforts, will be so important. Pyongyang has rarely been forthcoming about anything, and you can expect them to hem and haw when the U.S. submits tough questions about its nuclear activities. And don't be surprised if the "answers" to those questions come with an additional "price."
***
One final thought: liberal pundits are already drawing parallels between today's agreement and the Agreed To framework of 1994. But their analysis (typically) ignores a critical point. The 1994 deal was the result of diplomatic "free lancing" by that old dictator and terrorist coddler, Jimmy Carter. Acting on his own, Mr. Carter went to Pyongyang and proposed a deal, which the Clinton Administration elected to go along with. The Bush Administration--wisely--kept Carter out of the loop on this one, electing instead to mount a regional diplomatic approach. Hopefully, the new deal will prove more successful--and verifiable--than the 1994 accord, which proved to be a disaster, both diplomatically and militarily. We'll soon see if Mr. Bush (and his negotiators) have created a mechanism for solving the North Korean nuclear problem, or simply given the can another kick.
But the Carter deal served a useful purpose for Mr. Clinton, who was anxious to get North Korea off the table, and focus on domestic issues, like welfare reform and school uniforms. By accepting a flawed accord in 1994, Clinton kicked the North Korean can down the road, forcing his successor to deal with the problem.
Today's Washington Post has a good summary of the agreement--and the hurdles that remain in the implementation process. Disabling the reactor represents the next phase in a largely undefined phase of "denuclearization," which also includes discussions on plutonium fuel reserves and other efforts that will be abandoned under the accord. In return, the North will receive additional energy, humanitarian and economic assistance, up to the equivalent of 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil. The U.S. has also agreed to discuss the possible normalization of relations with the DPRK--a longstanding goal of Pyongyang--and resolve a dispute over North Korean money laundering through a Macau bank.
U.S. negotiators view the tentative agreement as a "down payment" on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, and improved relations between North Korea and its neighbors. Of course, the devil is always in the details, and the success of this agreement will (ultimately) hinge on the continued engagement of the "other" participants in the Six Party talks--particularly Japan, China and Russia. Beijing and Moscow still have considerable leverage with Kim Jong-il's regime, and their willingness to support limited sanctions against the north probably convinced Pyongyang that it was time to cut a deal. But will the Russians and Chinese be willing to continue to exert pressure on Pyongyang as the implementation process moves along? That's the $64,000 question, and a cynic would argue that the DPRK's long-time allies may lean more on the U.S. to uphold its end of the bargain, while granting North Korea more leeway in its "denuclearization" efforts.
Then, there's the question of what exactly happens to Pyongyang's accumulated nuclear technology and expertise. The "limits" of the North's nuclear efforts have never been fully documented, and the U.S. has only vague ideas about the number of scientists and engineers employed in various weapons and research programs sponsored by the DPRK. With North Korea supposedly getting out of the nuke business, what's to keep Kim Jong-il's scientists from taking their talents to Iran, North Korea, Venezuela, or other countries with nuclear ambitions.
Dealing with that possibilty represents a major challenge of the denuclearization process. To help prevent the spread of nuclear technology, is the U.S. prepared to propose some sort of extension of the Nunn-Lugar Act, which could provide stipends for unemployed North Korean nuclear engineers and researchers? Nunn-Lugar has often been hailed as an example of effective counter-proliferation efforts, but it has not prevented Russian--and even North Korean--nuclear specialists from traveling to places like Iran. Moreover, with the DPRK in dire economic straits, nuclear technology represents one of its few "viable" exports. Given that reality, it's difficult to imagine Pyongyang simply shuttering the program, and rejecting a source of badly-needed hard currency. Making matters worse, one could argue that the proliferation "horse is already out of the barn," given the apparent ties between North Korea's nuclear programs and those of other rogue states. These relationships also give Pyongyang of continuing their weapons development efforts "offshore," and outside the framework of the peninsula agreement.
Today's nuclear deal is certainly better than no deal at all, but it's easy to be pessimistic about the accord's long-term prospects for survival and implementation. North Korea got much of what it wanted in the announced deal (and so did the U.S.), but there's genuine concern that Pyongyang will--eventually--decide it wants even more, and demand concessions that Washington and Seoul simply can't grant. Or, the DPRK may simply revert to its behavior of the mid-1990s, making public efforts to "observe" the agreement, while continuing a covert nuclear program. That's why the next round of the process, when North Korea discusses the scope of its nuclear efforts, will be so important. Pyongyang has rarely been forthcoming about anything, and you can expect them to hem and haw when the U.S. submits tough questions about its nuclear activities. And don't be surprised if the "answers" to those questions come with an additional "price."
***
One final thought: liberal pundits are already drawing parallels between today's agreement and the Agreed To framework of 1994. But their analysis (typically) ignores a critical point. The 1994 deal was the result of diplomatic "free lancing" by that old dictator and terrorist coddler, Jimmy Carter. Acting on his own, Mr. Carter went to Pyongyang and proposed a deal, which the Clinton Administration elected to go along with. The Bush Administration--wisely--kept Carter out of the loop on this one, electing instead to mount a regional diplomatic approach. Hopefully, the new deal will prove more successful--and verifiable--than the 1994 accord, which proved to be a disaster, both diplomatically and militarily. We'll soon see if Mr. Bush (and his negotiators) have created a mechanism for solving the North Korean nuclear problem, or simply given the can another kick.
But the Carter deal served a useful purpose for Mr. Clinton, who was anxious to get North Korea off the table, and focus on domestic issues, like welfare reform and school uniforms. By accepting a flawed accord in 1994, Clinton kicked the North Korean can down the road, forcing his successor to deal with the problem.
Monday, February 12, 2007
Missile Defense Works (Again)
According to Israeli public television, the Jewish State has carried out another successful test of its Arrow II ballistic missile defense systems. As recounted in this report by AFP, the nightime test replicated the intercept of an Iranian Shahab-3 medium-range missile, which is capable of hitting Israeli territory. Israeli TV said the test was designed to "send a message" to Tehran.
Operational details of the test are sketchy, and Israel's Ministry of Defense is expected to release a statement later today. Israeli media indicates that the Arrow II successfully intercepted a missile launched from a high-altitude aircraft. The interceptor missile was launched from Palmahim AB, south of Tel Aviv.
If those accounts are accurate, the test sounds identical to those conducted earlier with the Arrow II. During those evaluations, an Israeli Air Force F-15 launched a Black Sparrow missile over the eastern Mediterranean. The missile flies a parabolic orbit, designed to mimic a Shahab-3 targeting Israel. Guided by a Green Pine battle management radar, the Arrow II intercepted the target missile, and blasted it from the sky.
The U.S. has provided extensive funding and engineering support for the Arrow II program, and key elements of that technology have been incorporated into our own BMD efforts. The Arrow II is one of the most advanced missile defense systems in the world, and the only one that is fully operational. While the most recent test was clearly aimed at Tehran, there's a message for the U.S. as well: missile defense works, and we need to press ahead with our efforts in that arena, and battle critics like Michigan Senator Carl Levin, who (given the chance) would completely gut our program, and leave us unprotected.
Operational details of the test are sketchy, and Israel's Ministry of Defense is expected to release a statement later today. Israeli media indicates that the Arrow II successfully intercepted a missile launched from a high-altitude aircraft. The interceptor missile was launched from Palmahim AB, south of Tel Aviv.
If those accounts are accurate, the test sounds identical to those conducted earlier with the Arrow II. During those evaluations, an Israeli Air Force F-15 launched a Black Sparrow missile over the eastern Mediterranean. The missile flies a parabolic orbit, designed to mimic a Shahab-3 targeting Israel. Guided by a Green Pine battle management radar, the Arrow II intercepted the target missile, and blasted it from the sky.
The U.S. has provided extensive funding and engineering support for the Arrow II program, and key elements of that technology have been incorporated into our own BMD efforts. The Arrow II is one of the most advanced missile defense systems in the world, and the only one that is fully operational. While the most recent test was clearly aimed at Tehran, there's a message for the U.S. as well: missile defense works, and we need to press ahead with our efforts in that arena, and battle critics like Michigan Senator Carl Levin, who (given the chance) would completely gut our program, and leave us unprotected.
The Smoking Gun
Thanks to the estimable Bill Roggio for his excellent summary of yesterday's U.S. military press conference, which detailed Iranian support for terrorists in Iraq. During that event, American experts provided convincing evidence that Tehran is actively aiding the insurgents with arms, weapons expertise, and training. According to coalition spokesman Maj Gen William Caldwell:
"Iran is involved in supplying explosively formed projectiles or EFPs and other material," such as "explosive charges, booby traps, mortar shells of different calibers and remote controls" to detonate IEDs to "multiple" insurgent groups." Those in attendance "were shown fragments of what the defense official said were Iranian-made weapons, including one part of an EFP and tail fins from 81-mm and 60-mm mortars." "More than 120 US and coalition troops have been killed by these things, and 620 wounded. There was a significant increase in there use over the past six months," he said.
And, General Caldwell left no doubt as to the level of complicity in Iran:
"We assess that these activities are coming from the senior levels of the Iranian government," the defense official said, 'noting that the Al-Qods brigade reports to Iran's supreme leader, the Ayatollah Ali Khamanei.' "Iranian weapons were experimented in South Lebanon by Hezbollah and were later developed," for deployment into Iraq.
The Irbil raid in early January netted the most significant evidence, as well as a senior member of the Iranian Qods Force. Six Iranians were detained in Irbil, including Mohsin Chizari, the operational commander of the Qods Force, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps specialized force that is equivalent to U.S. Special Forces. During the Irbil raid, "the Iranians were caught trying to flush documents down the toilet," and "bags of their hair were found... indicating they had tried to change their appearance." Chizari was "apprehended after slipping back into Iraq after a 10-month absence." Earlier it was reported Chizari was detained in the Baghdad raid, and subsequently released.
Now, compare General Caldwell's comments with those of Rhode Island Senator Jack Reed, who discussed the Iranian connection on "Fox News Sunday." Despite the compelling evidence presented in Baghdad--which suggests involvement at the highest levels of Iran's government--Reed actually suggested that "rogue elements" in Tehran might be running the support operation.
"I think the evidence is confused. There are certainly indications, as Mr. Gates pointed out this week, that these explosive foreign projectiles seem to be coming from Iran. They've been used.
The question is is this a deliberate policy of the Iranian government at the highest levels. Is it rogue elements within the government? And then the other question is to what extent are there countervailing signals that the Iranians actually are trying to — not control, but not to further raise the stakes in Iraq.
So it's a very complicated situation."
Not being a member of the "World's Greatest Deliberative Body," my world view is considerably less nuanced than Senator Reed's. But, what we've found in Iraq seems clear enough; let's do a quick review: Forensic evidence of Iranian-produced weapons and shaped explosive devices being used against our troops. The arrest--in Iraq--of six members of Iran's Revolutionary Guards Qods Force, which reports directly to that nation's supreme leader. One of the six arrested in Irbil was a senior operational commander of the Qods force. And, that raid also netted documents that further highlighted the Iranian connection, including reports to the Supreme Leader.
As for the purpose behind these operations in Iraq, that too, seems abundantly clear: kill Americans and force the U.S. to withdraw, setting the stage for Iran to dominate the scene once we're gone. That's not the sort of operation runs by a few rogue elements in the Revolutionary Guards; it's a policy with clear ties to the highest levels of Tehran's government. Even Senator Reed, a West Point graduate, ought to be able to figure that one out.
"Iran is involved in supplying explosively formed projectiles or EFPs and other material," such as "explosive charges, booby traps, mortar shells of different calibers and remote controls" to detonate IEDs to "multiple" insurgent groups." Those in attendance "were shown fragments of what the defense official said were Iranian-made weapons, including one part of an EFP and tail fins from 81-mm and 60-mm mortars." "More than 120 US and coalition troops have been killed by these things, and 620 wounded. There was a significant increase in there use over the past six months," he said.
And, General Caldwell left no doubt as to the level of complicity in Iran:
"We assess that these activities are coming from the senior levels of the Iranian government," the defense official said, 'noting that the Al-Qods brigade reports to Iran's supreme leader, the Ayatollah Ali Khamanei.' "Iranian weapons were experimented in South Lebanon by Hezbollah and were later developed," for deployment into Iraq.
The Irbil raid in early January netted the most significant evidence, as well as a senior member of the Iranian Qods Force. Six Iranians were detained in Irbil, including Mohsin Chizari, the operational commander of the Qods Force, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps specialized force that is equivalent to U.S. Special Forces. During the Irbil raid, "the Iranians were caught trying to flush documents down the toilet," and "bags of their hair were found... indicating they had tried to change their appearance." Chizari was "apprehended after slipping back into Iraq after a 10-month absence." Earlier it was reported Chizari was detained in the Baghdad raid, and subsequently released.
Now, compare General Caldwell's comments with those of Rhode Island Senator Jack Reed, who discussed the Iranian connection on "Fox News Sunday." Despite the compelling evidence presented in Baghdad--which suggests involvement at the highest levels of Iran's government--Reed actually suggested that "rogue elements" in Tehran might be running the support operation.
"I think the evidence is confused. There are certainly indications, as Mr. Gates pointed out this week, that these explosive foreign projectiles seem to be coming from Iran. They've been used.
The question is is this a deliberate policy of the Iranian government at the highest levels. Is it rogue elements within the government? And then the other question is to what extent are there countervailing signals that the Iranians actually are trying to — not control, but not to further raise the stakes in Iraq.
So it's a very complicated situation."
Not being a member of the "World's Greatest Deliberative Body," my world view is considerably less nuanced than Senator Reed's. But, what we've found in Iraq seems clear enough; let's do a quick review: Forensic evidence of Iranian-produced weapons and shaped explosive devices being used against our troops. The arrest--in Iraq--of six members of Iran's Revolutionary Guards Qods Force, which reports directly to that nation's supreme leader. One of the six arrested in Irbil was a senior operational commander of the Qods force. And, that raid also netted documents that further highlighted the Iranian connection, including reports to the Supreme Leader.
As for the purpose behind these operations in Iraq, that too, seems abundantly clear: kill Americans and force the U.S. to withdraw, setting the stage for Iran to dominate the scene once we're gone. That's not the sort of operation runs by a few rogue elements in the Revolutionary Guards; it's a policy with clear ties to the highest levels of Tehran's government. Even Senator Reed, a West Point graduate, ought to be able to figure that one out.
Saturday, February 10, 2007
Voyeur Nation
Back in the 1950s, the patron saint of broadcast journalism, Edward R. Murrow, hosted a weekly interview show on CBS called Person to Person. Both the tone and content of the program were surprisingly light for a Murrow vehicle; while the show devoted some episodes to world leaders and politicians, there were more than a few celebrity interviews, conducted live in their homes. Many of Murrow's colleagues thought the program was beneath his talents; in their minds, it was difficult to reconcile the crusading journalist who took on Joe McCarthy with the man who chatted with Liz Taylor or Sammy Davis, Jr. on a Friday evening.
Murrow frequently claimed that he did Person to Person to help his writers "pick up a little change." In reality, Ed Murrow owned the show, and he made a lot of green from those celebrity interviews. When he left CBS, Murrow sold the rights to the show back to the network for $1 million. But the criticism never ended, nor did Murrow's willingness to do the program as long as he remained on the network's payroll. According to writer and CBS historian Gary Paul Gates, when a fellow journalist accused him of "whoring," Murrow smiled and replied, "Yes, but look at all those voyeurs."
Obviously, Ed Murrow never met Anna Nicole Smith, but he clearly understood the culture that produces such a celebrity. And, had Ms. Smith achieved her peculiar "stardom" 50 years earlier, I'm sure that Murrow would have tried to secure an interview, to satisfy his audience of voyeurs. True, he would shudder at some of the breathless coverage of Smith's life (and recent death) from the tabloids and infotainment shows, but Murrow realized that celebrities still attract an audience, and celebrity train wrecks bring in even more viewers. Even in the staid 1950s, Person to Person generated a far larger audience than his more serious journalistic enterprises, such as See It Now, and the documentaries he produced for CBS Reports.
So, in some respects, our fascination with the celebrity culture (and their personal problems) is something that existed long before Entertainment Tonight and People magazine. But, on the other hand, you've got to wonder if--or when--our voyeur nation will finally get its fill of the salacious and the titillating. Many Americans will claim that they lost interest in Ms. Smith and her tawdry life about the time her first Playboy issue was ready for the trash can. That may be true (to some extent), but there were still enough spectators to keep Smith's "career" going for almost two decades. Millions of Americans are only vaguely aware that Iran is actively pursuing nuclear weapons (which may prompt U.S. military action) but they can recite the "highlights" of Smith's life, chapter and verse.
In a certain, perverse way, Anna Nicole deserves partial credit for that. Extending one's 15 minutes of fame by a factor of 1000 (with no obvious talent beyond physical appearance) is no mean feat, particularly in a society that disposes of passe celebrities like so many used Kleenex. In fact, cynics might argue that Ms. Smith's untimely demise will actually prove an adroit career move, securing her place in the pop culture pantheon. As evidenced by James Dean, Marilyn Monroe, Jayne Mansfield and Elvis, American loves a celebrity who drops dead in the prime of life, ensuring continuing interest--and income--for decades to come. Fifty years after his death, Dean's estate still earns thousands of dollars a year in licensing and royalty fees, and Elvis became far more popular after his passing than in the latter stages of his actual career. The value of the Presley brand increased a hundred-fold in the decades after he died.
Consequently, Ms. Smith's post-mortem stay in the limelight is not only the latest example of our collective fascination with the morbid, but it also speaks volumes about a culture cast adrift from its moral moorings. Not too many years ago (perhaps in Ed Murrow's day), the excessive and outlandish behavior of celebrities would spark certain interest, but it would also produce outrage and condemnation that would shame the offender and likely, end their career. The life of Anna Nicole Smith proves once more that anything goes in our culture, and anyone who speaks out against such "alternative lifestyles" are nothing more than cultural cretins. And sadly, Ms. Smith's conduct was almost tame by some standards; alcohol and drug abuse, shameless gold-digging, an out-of-wedlock birth. Compared to the icons of gangsta rap and certain segments of the film community, Anna Nicole Smith was almost a candidate for the Young Republicans.
Which brings us back to a society that was fascinated by Anna Nicole Smith and allowed her to earn an income and fame that far exceeded her modest talents. On one hand, it supposedly proves that anyone can achieve the American dream. On the other, it also demonstrates that Ed Murrow's voyeur nation is more prone to peep than ever before.
Murrow frequently claimed that he did Person to Person to help his writers "pick up a little change." In reality, Ed Murrow owned the show, and he made a lot of green from those celebrity interviews. When he left CBS, Murrow sold the rights to the show back to the network for $1 million. But the criticism never ended, nor did Murrow's willingness to do the program as long as he remained on the network's payroll. According to writer and CBS historian Gary Paul Gates, when a fellow journalist accused him of "whoring," Murrow smiled and replied, "Yes, but look at all those voyeurs."
Obviously, Ed Murrow never met Anna Nicole Smith, but he clearly understood the culture that produces such a celebrity. And, had Ms. Smith achieved her peculiar "stardom" 50 years earlier, I'm sure that Murrow would have tried to secure an interview, to satisfy his audience of voyeurs. True, he would shudder at some of the breathless coverage of Smith's life (and recent death) from the tabloids and infotainment shows, but Murrow realized that celebrities still attract an audience, and celebrity train wrecks bring in even more viewers. Even in the staid 1950s, Person to Person generated a far larger audience than his more serious journalistic enterprises, such as See It Now, and the documentaries he produced for CBS Reports.
So, in some respects, our fascination with the celebrity culture (and their personal problems) is something that existed long before Entertainment Tonight and People magazine. But, on the other hand, you've got to wonder if--or when--our voyeur nation will finally get its fill of the salacious and the titillating. Many Americans will claim that they lost interest in Ms. Smith and her tawdry life about the time her first Playboy issue was ready for the trash can. That may be true (to some extent), but there were still enough spectators to keep Smith's "career" going for almost two decades. Millions of Americans are only vaguely aware that Iran is actively pursuing nuclear weapons (which may prompt U.S. military action) but they can recite the "highlights" of Smith's life, chapter and verse.
In a certain, perverse way, Anna Nicole deserves partial credit for that. Extending one's 15 minutes of fame by a factor of 1000 (with no obvious talent beyond physical appearance) is no mean feat, particularly in a society that disposes of passe celebrities like so many used Kleenex. In fact, cynics might argue that Ms. Smith's untimely demise will actually prove an adroit career move, securing her place in the pop culture pantheon. As evidenced by James Dean, Marilyn Monroe, Jayne Mansfield and Elvis, American loves a celebrity who drops dead in the prime of life, ensuring continuing interest--and income--for decades to come. Fifty years after his death, Dean's estate still earns thousands of dollars a year in licensing and royalty fees, and Elvis became far more popular after his passing than in the latter stages of his actual career. The value of the Presley brand increased a hundred-fold in the decades after he died.
Consequently, Ms. Smith's post-mortem stay in the limelight is not only the latest example of our collective fascination with the morbid, but it also speaks volumes about a culture cast adrift from its moral moorings. Not too many years ago (perhaps in Ed Murrow's day), the excessive and outlandish behavior of celebrities would spark certain interest, but it would also produce outrage and condemnation that would shame the offender and likely, end their career. The life of Anna Nicole Smith proves once more that anything goes in our culture, and anyone who speaks out against such "alternative lifestyles" are nothing more than cultural cretins. And sadly, Ms. Smith's conduct was almost tame by some standards; alcohol and drug abuse, shameless gold-digging, an out-of-wedlock birth. Compared to the icons of gangsta rap and certain segments of the film community, Anna Nicole Smith was almost a candidate for the Young Republicans.
Which brings us back to a society that was fascinated by Anna Nicole Smith and allowed her to earn an income and fame that far exceeded her modest talents. On one hand, it supposedly proves that anyone can achieve the American dream. On the other, it also demonstrates that Ed Murrow's voyeur nation is more prone to peep than ever before.
No New Tactics
That's the assessment of Army Vice Chief of Staff, General Richard Cody, in response to recent U.S. helicopter losses in Iraq. General Cody, a former attack helicopter pilot, is currently on a swing through the Middle East, and spoke about the recent spate of shoot-downs--and what they mean--with the AP:
"I see no change in trends" on the part of the insurgent's targeting efforts, "and I see no capability gaps" on the part of U.S. forces.
Cody said all U.S. helicopters in Iraq recently received upgraded defensive systems to protect them against known threats like anti-aircraft missiles, although he acknowledged that helicopters on combat missions face inherent dangers, including small arms fire if they fly low to avoid being targeted by missiles.
"We've been studying the heck out of this thing," he said, referring to the crashes, which began in January with the shootdown of a Black Hawk helicopter in which all 12 U.S. soldiers were killed. Later in January two Apache attack helicopters were shot down, apparently by small arms fire, killing two in each.
General Cody also emphasized the need for aviators to remain vigilant and less predictable in their operations.
"As soon as you get predictable, as soon as you get a little bit complacent, either the enemy will get you or this terrain will get you," he said, referring to the rugged, often mountainous landscape in which they fly
Unfortunately, AP military writer Robert Burns apparently didn't press General Cody on the rationale behind that recent "upgrade" in helicopter defensive systems. There are a number of reasons for such an upgrade, ranging from long-planned system improvements, to changes in the threat environment. Judging from Cody's comments, it sounds like the upgrade was in the works before the recent rash of shoot-downs, although revised IR jammer and/or flare dispenser programs can be quickly added to self-defense systems in response to increased threats.
Mr. Burns might have also asked about missile launch trends in Iraq, although Cody's remarks suggest that there hasn't been a major change in that area, either. Historically, the number of MANPAD launches against our aircraft in Iraq has been fairly consistent over the past three years, based on the limited data that I've seen. General Cody's observations suggest that the number of launches are within "normal" parameters, but the enemy is enjoying more success as of late. And, those meetings with aviators in Iraq and Afghanistan suggest that there is concern about complacency on the part of crews.
***
One final observation: Burns concludes his story with cursory data on cumulative helicopter losses in Iraq and Afghanistan, noting that the U.S. has lost "a little over 100 aircraft" since the start of combat operations, a period in which American crews have logged more than 1.4 million flying hours. That's a loss rate of roughly 7-8 choppers per 100,000 flying hours, the typical benchmark on which losses are calculated. But Burns doesn't differentiate between helicopters shot down by hostile fire, and those lost due to other causes (weather, mechanical problems, crew error). And that's an important distinction; let's assume that only half of the helicopters were downed due to enemy fire; that drops the loss rate in that category to 3 or 4 per 100,000 flying hours. That's about what you would expect in combat operations, even in relatively "permissive" environments like Iraq and Afghanistan.
"I see no change in trends" on the part of the insurgent's targeting efforts, "and I see no capability gaps" on the part of U.S. forces.
Cody said all U.S. helicopters in Iraq recently received upgraded defensive systems to protect them against known threats like anti-aircraft missiles, although he acknowledged that helicopters on combat missions face inherent dangers, including small arms fire if they fly low to avoid being targeted by missiles.
"We've been studying the heck out of this thing," he said, referring to the crashes, which began in January with the shootdown of a Black Hawk helicopter in which all 12 U.S. soldiers were killed. Later in January two Apache attack helicopters were shot down, apparently by small arms fire, killing two in each.
General Cody also emphasized the need for aviators to remain vigilant and less predictable in their operations.
"As soon as you get predictable, as soon as you get a little bit complacent, either the enemy will get you or this terrain will get you," he said, referring to the rugged, often mountainous landscape in which they fly
Unfortunately, AP military writer Robert Burns apparently didn't press General Cody on the rationale behind that recent "upgrade" in helicopter defensive systems. There are a number of reasons for such an upgrade, ranging from long-planned system improvements, to changes in the threat environment. Judging from Cody's comments, it sounds like the upgrade was in the works before the recent rash of shoot-downs, although revised IR jammer and/or flare dispenser programs can be quickly added to self-defense systems in response to increased threats.
Mr. Burns might have also asked about missile launch trends in Iraq, although Cody's remarks suggest that there hasn't been a major change in that area, either. Historically, the number of MANPAD launches against our aircraft in Iraq has been fairly consistent over the past three years, based on the limited data that I've seen. General Cody's observations suggest that the number of launches are within "normal" parameters, but the enemy is enjoying more success as of late. And, those meetings with aviators in Iraq and Afghanistan suggest that there is concern about complacency on the part of crews.
***
One final observation: Burns concludes his story with cursory data on cumulative helicopter losses in Iraq and Afghanistan, noting that the U.S. has lost "a little over 100 aircraft" since the start of combat operations, a period in which American crews have logged more than 1.4 million flying hours. That's a loss rate of roughly 7-8 choppers per 100,000 flying hours, the typical benchmark on which losses are calculated. But Burns doesn't differentiate between helicopters shot down by hostile fire, and those lost due to other causes (weather, mechanical problems, crew error). And that's an important distinction; let's assume that only half of the helicopters were downed due to enemy fire; that drops the loss rate in that category to 3 or 4 per 100,000 flying hours. That's about what you would expect in combat operations, even in relatively "permissive" environments like Iraq and Afghanistan.
Friday, February 09, 2007
Pelosi's Deceit
Having hit a little public relations "turbulence" over her request for a Boeing 757 for flights between California and Washington D.C., Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi is back-pedalling a bit. Ms. Pelosi said earlier today that she would be "happy" to fly commercial, if the military can't provide an aircraft that can make the trip non-stop.
Not surprisingly, Ms. Pelosi (and her supporters) are being less-than-honest about what the Air Force has offered, and what that aircraft is capable of doing. To support her transcontinental travels, the service proposed that the new speaker use the same aircraft has her predecessor, Illinois Republican Denny Hastert. After 9-11, when the speaker began using military jets on a routine basis, Hastert made the trip between D.C. and his home district on a C-37A, the Air Force's VIP transit version of a Gulfstream V. Note the C-37's range: 5500 nautical miles, more than sufficent for a cross-country jaunt, even when required fuel "minimums" and distances to divert fields are factored in. The larger C-32/Boeing 757 that Pelosi wants has the same range, and its cruising speed is slower than the Gulfstream. Of course, the C-32 carries more passengers (and is more expensive to operate), but it looks a hell of a lot more impressive when it arrives at an airport, carrying Speaker Pelosi and her entourage.
BTW, you've got to love Pelosi's argument that stopping for fuel somehow reduces the "security" of the flight. Readers will note that the MSM (and House Democrats) conveniently ignore the fact that these refueling stops would occur at Air Force bases--or other DoD installations--that are even more secure than commercial airports. On the other hand, most military personnel are Republicans, and the prospective refueling bases are in Red States, so maybe that explains Nancy's apparent paranoia over refueling.
***
If Pelosi is really concerned about staying aloft, here's a solution for her problem. Rather than opting for a mere C-32, why not upgrade all the way and request a C-17 transport. True, it has far fewer creature comforts, but it can carry far more people; heck, the Air Force could even slide a "comfort pallet" into the cargo hold, complete with airline-style seats and a lavatory that smells like it hasn't been "downloaded" in a while. The Air Force could even toss in some MREs or box lunches (a.ka. box "nasties"), served by a grouchy loadmaster. Heck, with a C-17, Pelosi could ferry the entire California Congressional delegation back home for the weekend. The accomodations wouldn't be very posh, but hey, the C-17 can be refueled in-flight, eliminating the need for those time-consuming stopovers in Jesusland.
Not surprisingly, Ms. Pelosi (and her supporters) are being less-than-honest about what the Air Force has offered, and what that aircraft is capable of doing. To support her transcontinental travels, the service proposed that the new speaker use the same aircraft has her predecessor, Illinois Republican Denny Hastert. After 9-11, when the speaker began using military jets on a routine basis, Hastert made the trip between D.C. and his home district on a C-37A, the Air Force's VIP transit version of a Gulfstream V. Note the C-37's range: 5500 nautical miles, more than sufficent for a cross-country jaunt, even when required fuel "minimums" and distances to divert fields are factored in. The larger C-32/Boeing 757 that Pelosi wants has the same range, and its cruising speed is slower than the Gulfstream. Of course, the C-32 carries more passengers (and is more expensive to operate), but it looks a hell of a lot more impressive when it arrives at an airport, carrying Speaker Pelosi and her entourage.
BTW, you've got to love Pelosi's argument that stopping for fuel somehow reduces the "security" of the flight. Readers will note that the MSM (and House Democrats) conveniently ignore the fact that these refueling stops would occur at Air Force bases--or other DoD installations--that are even more secure than commercial airports. On the other hand, most military personnel are Republicans, and the prospective refueling bases are in Red States, so maybe that explains Nancy's apparent paranoia over refueling.
***
If Pelosi is really concerned about staying aloft, here's a solution for her problem. Rather than opting for a mere C-32, why not upgrade all the way and request a C-17 transport. True, it has far fewer creature comforts, but it can carry far more people; heck, the Air Force could even slide a "comfort pallet" into the cargo hold, complete with airline-style seats and a lavatory that smells like it hasn't been "downloaded" in a while. The Air Force could even toss in some MREs or box lunches (a.ka. box "nasties"), served by a grouchy loadmaster. Heck, with a C-17, Pelosi could ferry the entire California Congressional delegation back home for the weekend. The accomodations wouldn't be very posh, but hey, the C-17 can be refueled in-flight, eliminating the need for those time-consuming stopovers in Jesusland.
The MANPAD Problem
Thanks to Powerline for spotting this Ralph Peters column on the recent spate of helicopter losses in Iraq. Peters is correct in identifying the apparent strategy behind the terrorists' renewed interest--and apparent success--in engaging our transport, surveillance and attack helicopters. As he notes, if the terrorists are successful in limiting our mobility through the skies of Iraq, that will force our troops to rely even more on road transportation, setting the stage for more IED attacks and additional casualties.
We've been covering the issue of helicopter losses in Iraq for some time; our latest post on the subject can be found here. At this point, any analysis of the subject must be accompanied by an important caveat: officially, the Pentagon isn't saying much about the losses, other than to acknowledge that at least four of the helicopters were brought down by hostile fire. Insurgents also claim to have shot down a fifth chopper (a Marine Corps CH-46 Sea Knight) earlier this week, but the military indicates that mechanical problems were responsible for that crash. Additional details would be helpful in determining whether the terrorists are using both anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) and man-portable SAMs, or if most of the losses were caused by missiles.
The distinction is important. Losses to both AAA and MANPADs would indicate that insurgent weaponry hasn't changed much--particularly if the missile losses can be traced to systems that have been in Iraq for years, such as the Russian-built SA-7/14/16. We have extensive knowledge of those systems, their performance and how to defeat them. If the enemy used older MANPADs to bring most of these choppers down, it would suggest that (a) their training and tactics have improved; (b) we've become a little too complacent and predictable in our operations, or (c) a combination of those factors. Even older MANPADs and basic air defense weapons (such as heavy machine guns) can be more effective if you've got some idea of when helicopters are likely to pass overhead, and optimum ways for attacking them.
On the other hand, there is also the chance that terrorists have, in fact, acquired more advanced MANPADs from external sources. The most likely missile in that category would be the Russian-made SA-18, which has on-board Infrared counter-Countermeasures (IRCCM), giving it some ability to resist/defeat an aircraft's defensive suite. This improvement is achieved (primarily) by "cooling" the missile seeker, making it more sensitive, and capable of engaging targets from all aspects. By comparison, early-generation MANPADS (SA-7/14; U.S-built REDEYE) do not have cooled seekers, and can only engage targets from their rear, where the IR signature is strongest.
While the SA-18 would represent an improvement in the terrorists' air defense arsenal, the system is not a world-beater by any standard. As with the older, Russian MANPADS, we have extensive knowledge of the SA-18 and methods for countering it. If the SA-18 is suspected, crews will receive additional intel information on potential employment sites and adversary tactics; at the same time, defensive gear on the choppers will also be tweaked, allowing IR jammers and flare dispensers to operate in the most effective manner.
Are we facing an upgraded MANPAD threat in Iraq? At this point, I can't say, based on information that is publicly available. If the terrorists had acquired an advanced, shoulder-fired SAM, we would also expect them to employ it against slow-moving transport aircraft that operate in the skies over Iraq. Downing a C-130 or C-17 could, potentially, generate far more casualties, yet there have been no reports of increased MANPAD launches around major air hubs. Aggressive patrolling around Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Balad and other key airfields is probably one reason. Yet despite that, we would still expect the terrorists to take a potshot at a transport or even an airliner, if they had a "new" weapon that was more likely to bring down a large aircraft. The absence of such attempts (based on what we know) tends to lessen the possibility of a "new" weapon, although that possibility certainly can't be ruled out.
In reading various reports on the recent helicopter losses, I did find this interesting tidbit: some media outlets indicate that the Defense Secretary Robert Gates and JCS Chairman General Peter Pace are reviewing procedures in the wake of these incidents. That's a bit puzzling, since reviewing (and approving) changes in tactics, techniques and procedures is something normally done far down the chain. However, Secretary Gates and General Pace would be interested in the introduction of advanced weapons systems by the enemy, particularly if the hardware can be traced to a particular supplier (read: Iran).
My prediction? In the tit-for-tat world of tactics and counter-tactics, we'll know what caused these losses very soon (if we don't already) and make the necessary operational adjustments. That's the nature of warfare.
We've been covering the issue of helicopter losses in Iraq for some time; our latest post on the subject can be found here. At this point, any analysis of the subject must be accompanied by an important caveat: officially, the Pentagon isn't saying much about the losses, other than to acknowledge that at least four of the helicopters were brought down by hostile fire. Insurgents also claim to have shot down a fifth chopper (a Marine Corps CH-46 Sea Knight) earlier this week, but the military indicates that mechanical problems were responsible for that crash. Additional details would be helpful in determining whether the terrorists are using both anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) and man-portable SAMs, or if most of the losses were caused by missiles.
The distinction is important. Losses to both AAA and MANPADs would indicate that insurgent weaponry hasn't changed much--particularly if the missile losses can be traced to systems that have been in Iraq for years, such as the Russian-built SA-7/14/16. We have extensive knowledge of those systems, their performance and how to defeat them. If the enemy used older MANPADs to bring most of these choppers down, it would suggest that (a) their training and tactics have improved; (b) we've become a little too complacent and predictable in our operations, or (c) a combination of those factors. Even older MANPADs and basic air defense weapons (such as heavy machine guns) can be more effective if you've got some idea of when helicopters are likely to pass overhead, and optimum ways for attacking them.
On the other hand, there is also the chance that terrorists have, in fact, acquired more advanced MANPADs from external sources. The most likely missile in that category would be the Russian-made SA-18, which has on-board Infrared counter-Countermeasures (IRCCM), giving it some ability to resist/defeat an aircraft's defensive suite. This improvement is achieved (primarily) by "cooling" the missile seeker, making it more sensitive, and capable of engaging targets from all aspects. By comparison, early-generation MANPADS (SA-7/14; U.S-built REDEYE) do not have cooled seekers, and can only engage targets from their rear, where the IR signature is strongest.
While the SA-18 would represent an improvement in the terrorists' air defense arsenal, the system is not a world-beater by any standard. As with the older, Russian MANPADS, we have extensive knowledge of the SA-18 and methods for countering it. If the SA-18 is suspected, crews will receive additional intel information on potential employment sites and adversary tactics; at the same time, defensive gear on the choppers will also be tweaked, allowing IR jammers and flare dispensers to operate in the most effective manner.
Are we facing an upgraded MANPAD threat in Iraq? At this point, I can't say, based on information that is publicly available. If the terrorists had acquired an advanced, shoulder-fired SAM, we would also expect them to employ it against slow-moving transport aircraft that operate in the skies over Iraq. Downing a C-130 or C-17 could, potentially, generate far more casualties, yet there have been no reports of increased MANPAD launches around major air hubs. Aggressive patrolling around Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Balad and other key airfields is probably one reason. Yet despite that, we would still expect the terrorists to take a potshot at a transport or even an airliner, if they had a "new" weapon that was more likely to bring down a large aircraft. The absence of such attempts (based on what we know) tends to lessen the possibility of a "new" weapon, although that possibility certainly can't be ruled out.
In reading various reports on the recent helicopter losses, I did find this interesting tidbit: some media outlets indicate that the Defense Secretary Robert Gates and JCS Chairman General Peter Pace are reviewing procedures in the wake of these incidents. That's a bit puzzling, since reviewing (and approving) changes in tactics, techniques and procedures is something normally done far down the chain. However, Secretary Gates and General Pace would be interested in the introduction of advanced weapons systems by the enemy, particularly if the hardware can be traced to a particular supplier (read: Iran).
My prediction? In the tit-for-tat world of tactics and counter-tactics, we'll know what caused these losses very soon (if we don't already) and make the necessary operational adjustments. That's the nature of warfare.
Wednesday, February 07, 2007
Paging Dr. Phil
In the wake of astronaut Lisa Nowak's bizzare meltdown on Monday, various psychoanalysts (professional and amateur) are trying to make sense of it all, offering their own explanations as to what went wrong.
We should point out that no psychological condition has been officially ascribed to Captain Nowak. She has been released on bail from a Florida jail, and returned to Houston, where she will (presumably) receive help with the issues that prompted her to drive 900 miles to Orlando, confront an apparent romantic rival, and allegedly spray that woman with pepper spray.
At least one comment on this blog suggested that Captain Nowak's behavior may have been triggered by a bi-polar disorder. I've known a few individuals who suffer from that condition, and they are capable of outlandish--even destructive--actions if they haven't been diagnosed, or don't take prescribed medication.
Among the mental health professionals, one Maryland psychiatrist, Dr. Jack Vaeth, is suggesting that Nowak's outburst may be the result of another condition, narcissistic personality disorder, typically found among exceptionally high achievers.
Thwarted in their ambitions or conquests, people accustomed to success, adulation and entitlement can slide into a rage or a disastrous series of decisions that can bring down their careers. His favorite example? Bill Clinton.
Vaeth teaches and practices at the Sheppard Pratt Health System hospital in Towson. He also has a private practice in Annapolis. He has no special knowledge of Nowak's case but plenty of experience with self-centered achievers.
"Certain professions are made up of narcissistic personalities, although maybe not disordered ones," Vaeth said. They include doctors, lawyers and CEOs, "high achievers who ... feel 'I have an edge on the world, and society rewards me for it.'
"They were always the teacher's pet, their parents' favorite child," he said, "so of course they're going to want to continue that. ... Everything they undertake, they're winners. And even when they lose, they learn to win better next time."
In time, they come to believe that they're entitled, invincible, "able to exploit others without being called to the mat for it."
When he lectures about the syndrome, he points to the former president.
"The whole time in the Oval Office with Monica [Lewinsky], you and I would be scared to death [of getting caught]," Vaeth said. "He's thinking, 'They'll never believe I did it.'"
When a narcissist's achievement or conquest is thwarted, he or she can fall into a rage, Vaeth said. "When the right buttons are pushed, they explode."
So far, everyone's favorite TV shrink, Dr. Phil, hasn't weighed in Captain Nowak's predicament, but you've got to believe that he's got an episode in the works. As for me, I'm waiting for Shrinkwrapped's take on the whole thing.
***
As for how this scenario plays out, I spoke with some friends who work as criminal defense lawyers and public relations experts. The lawyers expect some sort of deal to be worked out, with Nowak entering a guilty plea to lesser charges; they think the attempted murder charge is a stretch, and quite frankly, I agree. Given her record of achievement and complete lack of past criminal behavior, they expect Mowak might be sentenced to house arrest, followed by a long period of supervised probation.
On the PR end, the spin doctors project that Nowak will quietly announce her "resignation" from the astronaut corps 3-4 months down the road, after undergoing treatment for her problems. At the same time, Captain Nowak will also request retirement from the Navy; she already has 26 years of service, including her time at the Naval Academy, more than enough for retirement.
But that creates something of a quandry for the Navy. Currently, the service is letting the civilian justice system take its course. The Navy still has the option of filing additional charges against Nowak under the UCMJ, but it's unclear when--or if--that might happen. When Captain Nowak leaves NASA, she will again become the "property" of the USN, and there will be pressure to punish her for breaches of military conduct and discipline.
However, I don't think the Navy wants to prolong the embarassment over the Nowak incident, and would prefer to let the matter die as quickly as possible. Toward that end, I can see the service offering Nowak non-judical punishment (probably an Article 15) for her deeds, and retirement as a Commander (O-5), one grade below her present rank. On the other hand, Nowak might be allowed to leave the service at her present grade (Captain)--and without punishment--if her behavior can be attributed to a mental health disorder that went undiagnosed and untreated.
We should point out that no psychological condition has been officially ascribed to Captain Nowak. She has been released on bail from a Florida jail, and returned to Houston, where she will (presumably) receive help with the issues that prompted her to drive 900 miles to Orlando, confront an apparent romantic rival, and allegedly spray that woman with pepper spray.
At least one comment on this blog suggested that Captain Nowak's behavior may have been triggered by a bi-polar disorder. I've known a few individuals who suffer from that condition, and they are capable of outlandish--even destructive--actions if they haven't been diagnosed, or don't take prescribed medication.
Among the mental health professionals, one Maryland psychiatrist, Dr. Jack Vaeth, is suggesting that Nowak's outburst may be the result of another condition, narcissistic personality disorder, typically found among exceptionally high achievers.
Thwarted in their ambitions or conquests, people accustomed to success, adulation and entitlement can slide into a rage or a disastrous series of decisions that can bring down their careers. His favorite example? Bill Clinton.
Vaeth teaches and practices at the Sheppard Pratt Health System hospital in Towson. He also has a private practice in Annapolis. He has no special knowledge of Nowak's case but plenty of experience with self-centered achievers.
"Certain professions are made up of narcissistic personalities, although maybe not disordered ones," Vaeth said. They include doctors, lawyers and CEOs, "high achievers who ... feel 'I have an edge on the world, and society rewards me for it.'
"They were always the teacher's pet, their parents' favorite child," he said, "so of course they're going to want to continue that. ... Everything they undertake, they're winners. And even when they lose, they learn to win better next time."
In time, they come to believe that they're entitled, invincible, "able to exploit others without being called to the mat for it."
When he lectures about the syndrome, he points to the former president.
"The whole time in the Oval Office with Monica [Lewinsky], you and I would be scared to death [of getting caught]," Vaeth said. "He's thinking, 'They'll never believe I did it.'"
When a narcissist's achievement or conquest is thwarted, he or she can fall into a rage, Vaeth said. "When the right buttons are pushed, they explode."
So far, everyone's favorite TV shrink, Dr. Phil, hasn't weighed in Captain Nowak's predicament, but you've got to believe that he's got an episode in the works. As for me, I'm waiting for Shrinkwrapped's take on the whole thing.
***
As for how this scenario plays out, I spoke with some friends who work as criminal defense lawyers and public relations experts. The lawyers expect some sort of deal to be worked out, with Nowak entering a guilty plea to lesser charges; they think the attempted murder charge is a stretch, and quite frankly, I agree. Given her record of achievement and complete lack of past criminal behavior, they expect Mowak might be sentenced to house arrest, followed by a long period of supervised probation.
On the PR end, the spin doctors project that Nowak will quietly announce her "resignation" from the astronaut corps 3-4 months down the road, after undergoing treatment for her problems. At the same time, Captain Nowak will also request retirement from the Navy; she already has 26 years of service, including her time at the Naval Academy, more than enough for retirement.
But that creates something of a quandry for the Navy. Currently, the service is letting the civilian justice system take its course. The Navy still has the option of filing additional charges against Nowak under the UCMJ, but it's unclear when--or if--that might happen. When Captain Nowak leaves NASA, she will again become the "property" of the USN, and there will be pressure to punish her for breaches of military conduct and discipline.
However, I don't think the Navy wants to prolong the embarassment over the Nowak incident, and would prefer to let the matter die as quickly as possible. Toward that end, I can see the service offering Nowak non-judical punishment (probably an Article 15) for her deeds, and retirement as a Commander (O-5), one grade below her present rank. On the other hand, Nowak might be allowed to leave the service at her present grade (Captain)--and without punishment--if her behavior can be attributed to a mental health disorder that went undiagnosed and untreated.
Missile Test
Iran has successfully tested its recently-acquired TOR-M1 air defense system, according to state-run television and the stenographers at AFP.
I'll lump AFP into that less-than-distinguished school of journalism, because their story on the event has at least one major error. Check out their "file photo" of the TOR-M1 (NATO designator: SA-15/GAUNTLET) that accompanied the article. There's a little problem with that photograph --it isn't an SA-15. It's a picture of an older SA-11/GADFLY surface-to-air missile system, which is not in the Iranian inventory. Here's a picture of an SA-15; you'll note the "lack" of external missiles on that system. That's because the missiles are stored internally, for additional protection against the elements and potential battle damage. BTW, my apologies for not posting the photos directly in the blog, but the "picture" feature of Blogger isn't working, at least on my computer.
There is a noticeable difference in performance between the SA-15 and the SA-11. Both are modern SAM systems, but the GADFLY has roughly three to four times the range of the SA-15. The GAUNTLET is designed (primarily) for short-range and point defense of high value targets, while the SA-11 was originally envisioned as a replacement for the SA-6/GAINFUL, optimized for defense of armored formations and troops on the move.
I'm also a little skeptical about the "successful" test results, until I have a chance to watch the video. Watching video of missile tests, you'll typically see a shot of the missile leaving the launcher, with a quick cut to the "close-up" of the missile destroying the target. The SA-15 is more than capable of engaging a variety of targets (including tactical aircraft and cruise missiles), but given Iran's recent history of exaggerated claims, it's not beyond them to play a little "cut and paste" with the test video. I'll withhold final judgment until I see the tape.
Additionally, here are a couple of additional points to watch for in test videos. More often than not, the target drone is flying straight and level, with no maneuvering--in other words, a cooperative target that's much easier to hit. And, there's no mention of jamming or electronic countermeasures (ECM) in the test. The SA-15 has excellent capabilities in countering ECM, but (once again), it makes for an easier shot if the target isn't trying to jam your radar. Finally, there's the question of how much Russian support was required for the test; extensive contractor support would indicate potentially low proficiency levels among Iranian crews, decreasing their chances for success in combat.
Make no mistake; acquisition of the SA-15 represents a major upgrade for Iran's air defense system. But crew competency and operational proficiency have yet to be fully demonstrated. Any assessment of Tehran's capabilities with the new system must wait for more observation--and analysis--of SA-15 training and operational patterns.
I'll lump AFP into that less-than-distinguished school of journalism, because their story on the event has at least one major error. Check out their "file photo" of the TOR-M1 (NATO designator: SA-15/GAUNTLET) that accompanied the article. There's a little problem with that photograph --it isn't an SA-15. It's a picture of an older SA-11/GADFLY surface-to-air missile system, which is not in the Iranian inventory. Here's a picture of an SA-15; you'll note the "lack" of external missiles on that system. That's because the missiles are stored internally, for additional protection against the elements and potential battle damage. BTW, my apologies for not posting the photos directly in the blog, but the "picture" feature of Blogger isn't working, at least on my computer.
There is a noticeable difference in performance between the SA-15 and the SA-11. Both are modern SAM systems, but the GADFLY has roughly three to four times the range of the SA-15. The GAUNTLET is designed (primarily) for short-range and point defense of high value targets, while the SA-11 was originally envisioned as a replacement for the SA-6/GAINFUL, optimized for defense of armored formations and troops on the move.
I'm also a little skeptical about the "successful" test results, until I have a chance to watch the video. Watching video of missile tests, you'll typically see a shot of the missile leaving the launcher, with a quick cut to the "close-up" of the missile destroying the target. The SA-15 is more than capable of engaging a variety of targets (including tactical aircraft and cruise missiles), but given Iran's recent history of exaggerated claims, it's not beyond them to play a little "cut and paste" with the test video. I'll withhold final judgment until I see the tape.
Additionally, here are a couple of additional points to watch for in test videos. More often than not, the target drone is flying straight and level, with no maneuvering--in other words, a cooperative target that's much easier to hit. And, there's no mention of jamming or electronic countermeasures (ECM) in the test. The SA-15 has excellent capabilities in countering ECM, but (once again), it makes for an easier shot if the target isn't trying to jam your radar. Finally, there's the question of how much Russian support was required for the test; extensive contractor support would indicate potentially low proficiency levels among Iranian crews, decreasing their chances for success in combat.
Make no mistake; acquisition of the SA-15 represents a major upgrade for Iran's air defense system. But crew competency and operational proficiency have yet to be fully demonstrated. Any assessment of Tehran's capabilities with the new system must wait for more observation--and analysis--of SA-15 training and operational patterns.
Air Pelosi
Today's Washington Times has an interesting article that's attracting virtually no attention in the MSM. Seems that Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi is leaning on the Air Force to make a C-32 transport available for trips between Washington and her district in San Francisco. Times' reporter Rowan Scarborough has learned that one of Pelosi's key Congressional allies--Pennsylvania Representative John Murtha--has been urging the Air Force to meet Pelosi's demands, and (according to one source) accused the military of sexism by not immediately approving the speaker's request.
Pelosi's demand for a large jet is simply outrageous, but a little background is in order. After 9-11, then-speaker Dennis Hastert of Illinois was given access to a smaller, commuter-style jet, for travels between his district and Washington. Use of the aircraft was provided due to "security concerns," according to the Times. Since the Democrats took control of Congress last month, members of Pelosi's staff and her House allies have been pressuring the Pentagon to make the C-32 available for the speaker's travels. The C-32 is the military equivalent of a Boeing 757-200, with seating for up to 45 people (in very comfortable conditions), a crew of 16, and a range of more than 5,000 miles. Pelosi reportedly plans to use the aircraft to transport herself, family members, Congressional staffers and other Congressmen, between the nation's capitol and the West Coast. Needless to say, the cost of operating the C-32 is higher than the business jets used by Hastert after 9-11, or the cost of commercial travel, which was utilized by previous speakers.
Congressional Republicans have criticized the new speaker's request for the larger aircraft; one of them even dubbed the jet "Pelosi One." But the GOP is not without sin in this matter; in fact, the entire jet controversy is nicely described by one anonmyous DoD official, who says that Congress views the Air Force VIP jet fleet (based mostly at Andrews AFB), as "their Hertz rent-a-car." Members of the House and Senate frequently use the aircraft for "fact-finding" trips to various locales around the globe, on the taxpayers' dime. The Air Force is only too happy to comply; meeting Congressional transporation requests is a good way to ensure funding for more important, service-related programs. I'm told the VIP/special airlift program is run out of the office of the Air Force's Vice Chief of Staff, offering some indication of the importance attached to those Congressional missions. Air Force and House staffers are currently working to "reconcile" the Pelosi request, with existing laws governing the use of VIP aircraft. That tells me the Speaker is going to get her C-32, one way or the other.
Ms. Pelosi may be third in line for succession to the presidency, but she doesn't need a Boeing 757 airframe for trips to California. A much smaller jet--say, a C-21--should more than suffice. If additional staffers, family members and Democratic operatives need to make the trip, then let the speaker dig into her well-lined pockets and buy them an airline ticket. Not only is Ms. Pelosi a multi-millionaire; as a member of Congress, she also receives a transportation allowance each year, intended specifically for that sort of travel.
If House Republicans are genuinely interested in reforming the VIP airlift program, they might consider capping the number of aircraft in the fleet, and better accountability on how those jets are used. For every "legitimate" mission flown by these aircraft, there are too many flights that are nothing more than a waste of resources. But I'm guessing that the GOP minority won't pursue this matter very far. Assuming that Pelosi's request for the C-32 is approved--and the Republicans retake the House in 2008 or 2010--the next GOP speaker would probably like to have the aircraft as his private jet, too.
Pelosi's demand for a large jet is simply outrageous, but a little background is in order. After 9-11, then-speaker Dennis Hastert of Illinois was given access to a smaller, commuter-style jet, for travels between his district and Washington. Use of the aircraft was provided due to "security concerns," according to the Times. Since the Democrats took control of Congress last month, members of Pelosi's staff and her House allies have been pressuring the Pentagon to make the C-32 available for the speaker's travels. The C-32 is the military equivalent of a Boeing 757-200, with seating for up to 45 people (in very comfortable conditions), a crew of 16, and a range of more than 5,000 miles. Pelosi reportedly plans to use the aircraft to transport herself, family members, Congressional staffers and other Congressmen, between the nation's capitol and the West Coast. Needless to say, the cost of operating the C-32 is higher than the business jets used by Hastert after 9-11, or the cost of commercial travel, which was utilized by previous speakers.
Congressional Republicans have criticized the new speaker's request for the larger aircraft; one of them even dubbed the jet "Pelosi One." But the GOP is not without sin in this matter; in fact, the entire jet controversy is nicely described by one anonmyous DoD official, who says that Congress views the Air Force VIP jet fleet (based mostly at Andrews AFB), as "their Hertz rent-a-car." Members of the House and Senate frequently use the aircraft for "fact-finding" trips to various locales around the globe, on the taxpayers' dime. The Air Force is only too happy to comply; meeting Congressional transporation requests is a good way to ensure funding for more important, service-related programs. I'm told the VIP/special airlift program is run out of the office of the Air Force's Vice Chief of Staff, offering some indication of the importance attached to those Congressional missions. Air Force and House staffers are currently working to "reconcile" the Pelosi request, with existing laws governing the use of VIP aircraft. That tells me the Speaker is going to get her C-32, one way or the other.
Ms. Pelosi may be third in line for succession to the presidency, but she doesn't need a Boeing 757 airframe for trips to California. A much smaller jet--say, a C-21--should more than suffice. If additional staffers, family members and Democratic operatives need to make the trip, then let the speaker dig into her well-lined pockets and buy them an airline ticket. Not only is Ms. Pelosi a multi-millionaire; as a member of Congress, she also receives a transportation allowance each year, intended specifically for that sort of travel.
If House Republicans are genuinely interested in reforming the VIP airlift program, they might consider capping the number of aircraft in the fleet, and better accountability on how those jets are used. For every "legitimate" mission flown by these aircraft, there are too many flights that are nothing more than a waste of resources. But I'm guessing that the GOP minority won't pursue this matter very far. Assuming that Pelosi's request for the C-32 is approved--and the Republicans retake the House in 2008 or 2010--the next GOP speaker would probably like to have the aircraft as his private jet, too.
Tuesday, February 06, 2007
The Wrong Stuff
In his classic book The Right Stuff, Tom Wolfe noted the contradiction between the carefully crafted public image that NASA maintained for its astronauts, and their private behavior. As Mr. Wolfe reminds us, the "original seven" Mercury astronauts were all products of a military aviation culture that popularized "Flying & Drinking & Drinking & Driving," and tolerated other indiscretions as well. Wolfe never exactly "named names" in The Right Stuff but he did report that some young ladies around Cape Canaveral in the early 1960s staged a contest, to see how many astronauts they could sleep with. Wolfe also observed that among the "Mercury Seven," only John Glenn came close to meeting the "Boy Scout" image that NASA cultivated for its astronauts.
Ah, for the Good Old Days.
As you've probably heard, NASA has a new (ahem) image problem on its hands, and it has nothing to do with O-Rings, incompetent administrators, or chunks of insulation foam that doom a shuttle's reentry. This latest crisis stems from yesterday's arrest of astronaut Lisa Nowak, who faces charges of attempted kidnapping, battery, vehicle battery, and other counts. Nowak, who is also a Navy Captain (O-6), drove 900 miles from Houston to Orlando, to confront Colleen Shipman, an Air Force Captain who is her apparent rival for the affections of another shuttle astronaut, Navy Commander William Oefelein.
The AP has all the sordid details. Nowak reportedly wore astronaut diapers on her drive to Orlando, so she wouldn't have to stop to urinate. After confronting Shipman at the airport, Nowak reportedly sprayed her rival with pepper spray, then discarded various weapons (a steel mallet, a 4-inch knife and a BB gun) as she tried to escape. Police found a love letter from Nowak to Oefelein in her car, along with e-mails between the two astronauts. Nowak is currently being held without bond, and faces a court hearing today in Orlando.
NASA's reaction to all of this has been predictable.
NASA spokesman James Hartsfield in Houston said that, as of Monday, Nowak's status with the astronaut corps remained unchanged.
"What will happen beyond that, I will not speculate," he said.
Hartsfield said he couldn't recall the last time an astronaut was arrested and said there were no rules against fraternizing among astronauts.
But Mr. Hartsfield is ignoring a couple of important facts. First of all, each of the individuals involved in this triangle are military members, and subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Fraternization is a punishable offense under the UCMJ, given that Nowak outranks Commander Oefelein, and both apparently fall in the same chain of command (the NASA Astronaut Office). However, the good Commander isn't necessarily off the hook, either. If he willingly participated in a relationship with Nowak--and that hasn't been confirmed--then, he's guilty of fraternization as well. Captain Nowak, on the other hand, could also face adultery charges, since she's married and has three children. At the time of her arrest, Nowak described her connection with Oefelein as "more than a working relationship, but less than a romantic relationship." Somewhere, Bill Clinton must be smiling.
Oefelein may also have problems regarding his relationship with Captain Shipman. True, both are apparently single, but there has long been an informal, "one up/one down" rule on dating in the ranks; in other words, you don't date someone more than one grade above you or below you to avoid any appearance of fraternization. As a Navy Commander, Oefelein is two grades higher than Air Force Captain (O-3) Shipman. Oefelein might also face discipline if we find out that Shipman is also assigned to NASA, and in his chain of command. At this point, it may be accurate to potray Oefelein as a victim in this mess, but I'm not exactly impressed with his judgment. Oefelein may be an ace shuttle pilot, but it also looks like he's trying channel Jack Nicholson's character in Terms of Endearment.
To a casual observer, the Nowak debacle suggests a couple of things: First, NASA's vaunted psychological screening procedures must be slipping. It's difficult to fathom that someone with obvious mental problems could make the cut for the astronaut corps and actually fly a mission without her defects being exposed. Astronaut training and mission preparation are rigorous and demanding by design, aimed at weeding out anyone who can't handle extreme pressure. As a taxpayer, it's a little disturbing to think that someone who went off the deep end over a failed office romance was apparently flying on the space shuttle.
The second lesson from all of this is that the military needs to tighten control of personnel assigned to the astronaut office in Houston. Historically, the military has adopted a "hands off" approach to officers who qualify as astronauts. While serving with NASA, military personnel retain their rank, pay and other benefits, but supervision is minimal, and enforcement of standards is apparently lax. For example, take a look at Nowak's "official" astronaut photograph, linked here. I'm hardly an expert on Navy dress and appearance standards, but Capt Nowak's "spacesuit" hairstyle does not appear to be within military limits. If you're willing to compromise on one of the fundamental standards for any member of the armed services (dress and appearance), you're probably willing to cut corners in other areas, too.
One final thought: reading her NASA bio, it looks like Captain Nowak was one of the Navy's "golden girls;" an Academy grad; two post-graduate engineering degrees, and selection for the service's test pilot school. She has over 1,500 flying hours in high-performance aircraft--low for an officer of her rank--and you'll also note another thing missing from her resume: deployment time and combat experience. Nowak's resume suggests a woman who's been aiming for the shuttle since the day she entered Annapolis, with the support and encouragement of Navy leadership. And, her lack of service "with the fleet" has not hampered her advancement. Nowak apparently made Captain on time, and might have had a shot at Rear Admiral, had she not made that fateful, diaper-clad drive from Houston to Orlando.
Regarding Nowak's lack of operational experience, it is true that women were barred from combat duty during the early stages of her career, but those restrictions were gone by the mid-1990s. Instead of putting her test flight and electronic combat experience to work in the fleet, Captain Nowak signed on with NASA. She's been in Houston for more than a decade, working her way up the astronaut chain, and (apparently) lookin' for a little orbital love on the side. Meanwhile, other naval aviators have been flying the line, flying combat missions in the Balkans and the Middle East, and pulling those six month carrier deployments to the Persian Gulf and the western Pacific. It would be interesting to know what the "real" naval aviators think of Nowak, her gilded areer, and the discredit she's bringing upon NASA and the Navy.
***
Addendum: As a public service, we're organizing a "Lisa Nowak/Love Among the Stars" contest, allowing you to predict the ultimate disposition of this case. Submit your answers to the questions below to icspook86@hotmail.com. Readers with the most accurate answer in each category will receive their choice of a NASA baseball cap or coffee mug. Entry deadline is 31 March 2007. Enter as many times as you'd like. In the event of a tie, the winner will be determined by the date/time of the earliest e-mail received. Good luck, and here are your questions:
1) Predict the month/year when the Navy will announce Captain Nowak's "retirement" from the service, and the rank/pay grade she will retire at.
2) Predict the month/year when Mr. Nowak will file for divorce.
3) Predict the month/year when Captain Nowak will enter rehab.
4) Predict the month/year when Nowak will appear on "Oprah" to discuss her problem.
Ah, for the Good Old Days.
As you've probably heard, NASA has a new (ahem) image problem on its hands, and it has nothing to do with O-Rings, incompetent administrators, or chunks of insulation foam that doom a shuttle's reentry. This latest crisis stems from yesterday's arrest of astronaut Lisa Nowak, who faces charges of attempted kidnapping, battery, vehicle battery, and other counts. Nowak, who is also a Navy Captain (O-6), drove 900 miles from Houston to Orlando, to confront Colleen Shipman, an Air Force Captain who is her apparent rival for the affections of another shuttle astronaut, Navy Commander William Oefelein.
The AP has all the sordid details. Nowak reportedly wore astronaut diapers on her drive to Orlando, so she wouldn't have to stop to urinate. After confronting Shipman at the airport, Nowak reportedly sprayed her rival with pepper spray, then discarded various weapons (a steel mallet, a 4-inch knife and a BB gun) as she tried to escape. Police found a love letter from Nowak to Oefelein in her car, along with e-mails between the two astronauts. Nowak is currently being held without bond, and faces a court hearing today in Orlando.
NASA's reaction to all of this has been predictable.
NASA spokesman James Hartsfield in Houston said that, as of Monday, Nowak's status with the astronaut corps remained unchanged.
"What will happen beyond that, I will not speculate," he said.
Hartsfield said he couldn't recall the last time an astronaut was arrested and said there were no rules against fraternizing among astronauts.
But Mr. Hartsfield is ignoring a couple of important facts. First of all, each of the individuals involved in this triangle are military members, and subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Fraternization is a punishable offense under the UCMJ, given that Nowak outranks Commander Oefelein, and both apparently fall in the same chain of command (the NASA Astronaut Office). However, the good Commander isn't necessarily off the hook, either. If he willingly participated in a relationship with Nowak--and that hasn't been confirmed--then, he's guilty of fraternization as well. Captain Nowak, on the other hand, could also face adultery charges, since she's married and has three children. At the time of her arrest, Nowak described her connection with Oefelein as "more than a working relationship, but less than a romantic relationship." Somewhere, Bill Clinton must be smiling.
Oefelein may also have problems regarding his relationship with Captain Shipman. True, both are apparently single, but there has long been an informal, "one up/one down" rule on dating in the ranks; in other words, you don't date someone more than one grade above you or below you to avoid any appearance of fraternization. As a Navy Commander, Oefelein is two grades higher than Air Force Captain (O-3) Shipman. Oefelein might also face discipline if we find out that Shipman is also assigned to NASA, and in his chain of command. At this point, it may be accurate to potray Oefelein as a victim in this mess, but I'm not exactly impressed with his judgment. Oefelein may be an ace shuttle pilot, but it also looks like he's trying channel Jack Nicholson's character in Terms of Endearment.
To a casual observer, the Nowak debacle suggests a couple of things: First, NASA's vaunted psychological screening procedures must be slipping. It's difficult to fathom that someone with obvious mental problems could make the cut for the astronaut corps and actually fly a mission without her defects being exposed. Astronaut training and mission preparation are rigorous and demanding by design, aimed at weeding out anyone who can't handle extreme pressure. As a taxpayer, it's a little disturbing to think that someone who went off the deep end over a failed office romance was apparently flying on the space shuttle.
The second lesson from all of this is that the military needs to tighten control of personnel assigned to the astronaut office in Houston. Historically, the military has adopted a "hands off" approach to officers who qualify as astronauts. While serving with NASA, military personnel retain their rank, pay and other benefits, but supervision is minimal, and enforcement of standards is apparently lax. For example, take a look at Nowak's "official" astronaut photograph, linked here. I'm hardly an expert on Navy dress and appearance standards, but Capt Nowak's "spacesuit" hairstyle does not appear to be within military limits. If you're willing to compromise on one of the fundamental standards for any member of the armed services (dress and appearance), you're probably willing to cut corners in other areas, too.
One final thought: reading her NASA bio, it looks like Captain Nowak was one of the Navy's "golden girls;" an Academy grad; two post-graduate engineering degrees, and selection for the service's test pilot school. She has over 1,500 flying hours in high-performance aircraft--low for an officer of her rank--and you'll also note another thing missing from her resume: deployment time and combat experience. Nowak's resume suggests a woman who's been aiming for the shuttle since the day she entered Annapolis, with the support and encouragement of Navy leadership. And, her lack of service "with the fleet" has not hampered her advancement. Nowak apparently made Captain on time, and might have had a shot at Rear Admiral, had she not made that fateful, diaper-clad drive from Houston to Orlando.
Regarding Nowak's lack of operational experience, it is true that women were barred from combat duty during the early stages of her career, but those restrictions were gone by the mid-1990s. Instead of putting her test flight and electronic combat experience to work in the fleet, Captain Nowak signed on with NASA. She's been in Houston for more than a decade, working her way up the astronaut chain, and (apparently) lookin' for a little orbital love on the side. Meanwhile, other naval aviators have been flying the line, flying combat missions in the Balkans and the Middle East, and pulling those six month carrier deployments to the Persian Gulf and the western Pacific. It would be interesting to know what the "real" naval aviators think of Nowak, her gilded areer, and the discredit she's bringing upon NASA and the Navy.
***
Addendum: As a public service, we're organizing a "Lisa Nowak/Love Among the Stars" contest, allowing you to predict the ultimate disposition of this case. Submit your answers to the questions below to icspook86@hotmail.com. Readers with the most accurate answer in each category will receive their choice of a NASA baseball cap or coffee mug. Entry deadline is 31 March 2007. Enter as many times as you'd like. In the event of a tie, the winner will be determined by the date/time of the earliest e-mail received. Good luck, and here are your questions:
1) Predict the month/year when the Navy will announce Captain Nowak's "retirement" from the service, and the rank/pay grade she will retire at.
2) Predict the month/year when Mr. Nowak will file for divorce.
3) Predict the month/year when Captain Nowak will enter rehab.
4) Predict the month/year when Nowak will appear on "Oprah" to discuss her problem.
Monday, February 05, 2007
Get the Nobel Committee on the Horn
...Sounds like we've got shoo-in candidates for next year's awards in physics and medicine, thanks to the scientific community in Iran. That country's nut-job president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, will reportedly unveil "giant achievements" in the coming days, according to the state-run Fars press agency. Fars reports that Iran will make a "dramatic announcement on its nuclear rights on 11 February, part of a series of statements heralding reported technological and medical breakthroughs, including an herbal AIDS cure.
Naturally, the nuclear announcement is drawing the most attention. There's been considerable speculation about what Iran may reveal. The most likely scenario is some sort of announcement hailing the expansion of Tehran's nuclear centrifuge arrays, used to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear power plants--or nuclear weapons. Iran is reportedly planning to increase the number of centrifuges in operation from less than 200 to more than 3,000--a dramatic expansion, but still well below the number required to produce enough HEU for bomb production over the next year. U.S. intelligence agencies still believe that Tehran is 3-4 years away from its first bomb, an estimate that is somewhat consistent with assessments from other experts.
Beyond announcing a centrifuge expansion, Iran may also use the nuclear statement to highlight increased nuclear cooperation with North Korea, or discuss its plans to develop a space launch vehicle (SLV) that could eventually yield an ICBM, capable of hitting targets in the CONUS. As with other Iranian announcements, this one will probably be more hype than substance. But, with its state-run media and the western press acting as little more than stenographers, Tehran can claim almost anything, with little challenge from those in the press.
Iran's claims--however far-fetched--are part of a broad propaganda campaign, designed to create the image of a modern, powerful state, with developing cutting-edge technology that allows it to challenge The Great Satan and Israel. Never mind that Ahmadinejad's so-called "super weapons" are nothing of the sort. As the Nazis demonstrated decades ago, lies repeated often enough are eventually accepted as the truth. The Nobel jurors for the physics prize may not be overly impressed, but Iran's claims will resonate with its target audience in the Middle East and beyond--the same folks who support suicide bombers, global jihad and believe that the U.S. secretly engineered the 9-11 attacks to launch a war against Muslims.
The AIDS "cure" sounds even more luidcrous, but once again, there's a method behind the apparent foolishness. Tehran is aware that President Bush's African AIDS Initiative has won support for the U.S. in a part of the world where Iran also seeks influence. Iran will almost certainly offer its "herbal cure" for free, with none of the scientific or accountability strings attached to western medical programs. And, to sweeten the deal, watch for Ahmadinejad to offer certain "incentives" (read: bribes) for African officials who sign on with the Iranian offer, in return for downsizing (or even rejecting) U.S.-led AIDS programs. Never mind that Tehran's "cure" is almost certainly ineffective. The goal here is regional influence, not healing the sick. If I were the Iranian researcher behind this "cure," I wouldn't make my reservations for Stockhold, at least not yet.
Domestically, Ahmadiejad's AIDS announcement offers a quick solution for one of his country's growing social and public health problems. As outlined in this 2005 report from FrontPage magazine, Iran has a growing number of people affected by the AIDS virus. While overall infection rates remain low (in comparison to the pandemic in southern Africa), Iran's AIDS problem was deemed serious enough to spur public education and needle exchange programs under Ahmadeinjad's predecessor. The pending announcment about a herbal "cure" suggests that the Iran will take a step backward in its efforts to deal with AIDS, trumpeting a quack remedy that will only mask the problem.
BTW, it will be interesting to watch the reaction to the Iranian announcement from AIDS activists in this country. Will they be willing to call it for what it is--a likely fraud--or demand that the FDA grant "fast track" approval for trials/use in the USA.
Naturally, the nuclear announcement is drawing the most attention. There's been considerable speculation about what Iran may reveal. The most likely scenario is some sort of announcement hailing the expansion of Tehran's nuclear centrifuge arrays, used to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear power plants--or nuclear weapons. Iran is reportedly planning to increase the number of centrifuges in operation from less than 200 to more than 3,000--a dramatic expansion, but still well below the number required to produce enough HEU for bomb production over the next year. U.S. intelligence agencies still believe that Tehran is 3-4 years away from its first bomb, an estimate that is somewhat consistent with assessments from other experts.
Beyond announcing a centrifuge expansion, Iran may also use the nuclear statement to highlight increased nuclear cooperation with North Korea, or discuss its plans to develop a space launch vehicle (SLV) that could eventually yield an ICBM, capable of hitting targets in the CONUS. As with other Iranian announcements, this one will probably be more hype than substance. But, with its state-run media and the western press acting as little more than stenographers, Tehran can claim almost anything, with little challenge from those in the press.
Iran's claims--however far-fetched--are part of a broad propaganda campaign, designed to create the image of a modern, powerful state, with developing cutting-edge technology that allows it to challenge The Great Satan and Israel. Never mind that Ahmadinejad's so-called "super weapons" are nothing of the sort. As the Nazis demonstrated decades ago, lies repeated often enough are eventually accepted as the truth. The Nobel jurors for the physics prize may not be overly impressed, but Iran's claims will resonate with its target audience in the Middle East and beyond--the same folks who support suicide bombers, global jihad and believe that the U.S. secretly engineered the 9-11 attacks to launch a war against Muslims.
The AIDS "cure" sounds even more luidcrous, but once again, there's a method behind the apparent foolishness. Tehran is aware that President Bush's African AIDS Initiative has won support for the U.S. in a part of the world where Iran also seeks influence. Iran will almost certainly offer its "herbal cure" for free, with none of the scientific or accountability strings attached to western medical programs. And, to sweeten the deal, watch for Ahmadinejad to offer certain "incentives" (read: bribes) for African officials who sign on with the Iranian offer, in return for downsizing (or even rejecting) U.S.-led AIDS programs. Never mind that Tehran's "cure" is almost certainly ineffective. The goal here is regional influence, not healing the sick. If I were the Iranian researcher behind this "cure," I wouldn't make my reservations for Stockhold, at least not yet.
Domestically, Ahmadiejad's AIDS announcement offers a quick solution for one of his country's growing social and public health problems. As outlined in this 2005 report from FrontPage magazine, Iran has a growing number of people affected by the AIDS virus. While overall infection rates remain low (in comparison to the pandemic in southern Africa), Iran's AIDS problem was deemed serious enough to spur public education and needle exchange programs under Ahmadeinjad's predecessor. The pending announcment about a herbal "cure" suggests that the Iran will take a step backward in its efforts to deal with AIDS, trumpeting a quack remedy that will only mask the problem.
BTW, it will be interesting to watch the reaction to the Iranian announcement from AIDS activists in this country. Will they be willing to call it for what it is--a likely fraud--or demand that the FDA grant "fast track" approval for trials/use in the USA.
Changing Tactics--Again
After losing four helicopters to hostile fire in the past two weeks, the U.S. military is vowing to modify its employment tactics.
If this sounds vaguely familiar, it should. There was a similar review and change of tactics in early 2006, after the U.S. lost three helicopters (an AH-64 Apache gunship, an OH-58 Kiowa scout helicopter and a UH-60 Blackhawk transport) in a fourteen-day period. A total of 16 American military personnel died in those incidents; in the latest round of helicopter losses, 21 service members and military contractors have been killed.
The recent spate of shoot-downs has raised the same fears expressed thirteen months ago, namely that insurgents may be using more sophisticated weapons, increasing the potential threat to helicopters and slower-moving conventional aircraft. There is some evidence that Saddam's regime obtained Russian-made SA-18 shoulder-fired SAMs before the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. The SA-18 is a more advanced man-portable missile, with an improved ability to reject aircraft counter-measures. However, to my knowledge, the SA-18 has never been confirmed in the terrorists' arsenal; for the most part, they still rely on older man-portable SAMs (such as the SA-7/14/16), RPGs and automatic weapons fire to engage our aircraft, with middling success.
And that's an important point, one that is always ignored by the MSM. While Reuters notes that "dozens" of U.S. helicopters have been downed by insurgents, they fail to mention that such losses represent only a total fraction of the hundreds of helicopter sorties flown daily in Iraq [emphasis mine]. In fact, cumulative loss rates (per 100,000 hours of flying time) have decreased since the invasion of Iraq in 2003. An occasional spike in chopper losses--tragic though it might be--does little to change those statistics.
Indeed, the recent jump in shootdowns obscures an essential fact, one that you'll never read in a wires service dispatch: Iraq remains a permissive operating environment for U.S. tactical aircraft, allowing us to fly and employ ordnance at will. The terrorists have not been able--nor will they be able--to transform the skies of Iraq into an updated version of the Soviet misadventure in Afghanistan, where American-made Stinger missiles (coupled with poor tactical employment) practically drove Russian helicopters from the skies.
After the slight surge in helicopter losses in 2006, there was a noticeable decrease in successful enemy attacks until the latest rash of shoot-downs last month. That suggests that our earlier "tactical adjustment" achieved its desired goals. For good reason, the military never releases exact details of its modified tactics, but the 2006 adjustment apparently included changes in operating patterns. The U.S. has a long history of operational predictability, and that may be part of the problem in Iraq. Conducting chopper flights at certain times (and along specific flight routes) may be convenient from a scheduling or air traffic control perspective, but it may also allow the enemy to decipher operational patterns, and establish potential ambush times/locations. Creating a little more variance in our ops cycle could (again) go a long way toward reducing helicopter losses.
On the other hand, if the recent shoot-downs are the result of "new" missiles in insurgent hands, well, we have a solution for that problem as well. The U.S. has detailed knowledge of MANPADs made by Russia, China, North Korea and Iran, among other producers. Analysis of fragments and missile warhead remnants, retrieved from the wreckage of the downed choppers, will quickly pin-point which system(s) are responsible, and determine what changes--if any--should be made in our on-board countermeasures and operating tactics. Collectively, that should be enough to minimize the threat, allowing us to continue our highly effective helicopter operations across Iraq.
***
Previous posts on this topic here and here.
If this sounds vaguely familiar, it should. There was a similar review and change of tactics in early 2006, after the U.S. lost three helicopters (an AH-64 Apache gunship, an OH-58 Kiowa scout helicopter and a UH-60 Blackhawk transport) in a fourteen-day period. A total of 16 American military personnel died in those incidents; in the latest round of helicopter losses, 21 service members and military contractors have been killed.
The recent spate of shoot-downs has raised the same fears expressed thirteen months ago, namely that insurgents may be using more sophisticated weapons, increasing the potential threat to helicopters and slower-moving conventional aircraft. There is some evidence that Saddam's regime obtained Russian-made SA-18 shoulder-fired SAMs before the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. The SA-18 is a more advanced man-portable missile, with an improved ability to reject aircraft counter-measures. However, to my knowledge, the SA-18 has never been confirmed in the terrorists' arsenal; for the most part, they still rely on older man-portable SAMs (such as the SA-7/14/16), RPGs and automatic weapons fire to engage our aircraft, with middling success.
And that's an important point, one that is always ignored by the MSM. While Reuters notes that "dozens" of U.S. helicopters have been downed by insurgents, they fail to mention that such losses represent only a total fraction of the hundreds of helicopter sorties flown daily in Iraq [emphasis mine]. In fact, cumulative loss rates (per 100,000 hours of flying time) have decreased since the invasion of Iraq in 2003. An occasional spike in chopper losses--tragic though it might be--does little to change those statistics.
Indeed, the recent jump in shootdowns obscures an essential fact, one that you'll never read in a wires service dispatch: Iraq remains a permissive operating environment for U.S. tactical aircraft, allowing us to fly and employ ordnance at will. The terrorists have not been able--nor will they be able--to transform the skies of Iraq into an updated version of the Soviet misadventure in Afghanistan, where American-made Stinger missiles (coupled with poor tactical employment) practically drove Russian helicopters from the skies.
After the slight surge in helicopter losses in 2006, there was a noticeable decrease in successful enemy attacks until the latest rash of shoot-downs last month. That suggests that our earlier "tactical adjustment" achieved its desired goals. For good reason, the military never releases exact details of its modified tactics, but the 2006 adjustment apparently included changes in operating patterns. The U.S. has a long history of operational predictability, and that may be part of the problem in Iraq. Conducting chopper flights at certain times (and along specific flight routes) may be convenient from a scheduling or air traffic control perspective, but it may also allow the enemy to decipher operational patterns, and establish potential ambush times/locations. Creating a little more variance in our ops cycle could (again) go a long way toward reducing helicopter losses.
On the other hand, if the recent shoot-downs are the result of "new" missiles in insurgent hands, well, we have a solution for that problem as well. The U.S. has detailed knowledge of MANPADs made by Russia, China, North Korea and Iran, among other producers. Analysis of fragments and missile warhead remnants, retrieved from the wreckage of the downed choppers, will quickly pin-point which system(s) are responsible, and determine what changes--if any--should be made in our on-board countermeasures and operating tactics. Collectively, that should be enough to minimize the threat, allowing us to continue our highly effective helicopter operations across Iraq.
***
Previous posts on this topic here and here.
Saturday, February 03, 2007
Long Overdue
On the eve of Super Bowl XLI, the NFL released this year's list of selectees for the Pro Football Hall of Fame. Suffice it to say that the list for 2007 is a bit controversial, as it always is. More than a few fans and media types (outside Dallas) expressed misgivings about the selection of former Cowboys wide receiver Michael Irvin, whose off-field problems sometimes overshadowed his accomplishments on the gridiron. Irvin will be enshrined at Canton with lesser numbers than former Redskins' wide receiver Art Monk or Buffalo's great Andre Reed, both of whom were rejected by the selection committee.
There is less controversy surrounding the rest of this year's inductees. Bruce Matthews, the Oilers and Titans lineman started games at all five offensive line positions during a stellar, 19-year career, became only the 60th player to be selected for the Hall of Fame on his first ballot. Other selectees for the Class of 2007 include: Thurman Thomas, the Bills running back who was the league's MVP in 1991, and is one of only three backs to finish with 10,000 yards rushing and over 400 receptions; Roger Wehrli, the St Louis Cardinals cornerback who picked off 40 passes in his career, and was named to the NFL's "All Decade" Team for the 1970s; Charley Sanders, the Detroit Lions tight end who helped redefine that position in a decade-long career that ended in 1977, and Gene Hickerson, the great Cleveland Browns pulling guard who blocked for three Hall of Fame running backs--Jim Brown, Bobby Mitchell and Leroy Kelly.
Among this year's inductees, Hickerson has waited the longest for elevation to the Hall of Fame --29 years. He played his last game with the Browns in 1973, capping a 15-year career with the club. During that tenure, he was named to the Pro Bowl six times, voted to the league's "All Decade" team for the 1960s, and played in four NFL championship games, the forerunner to the Super Bowl.
Such accolades were a testament to Hickerson's skill, in an era when the game was much different. In the run-oriented offenses of the 1960s, offensive guards were prized for their ability to "pull" and lead the sweep, blocking downfield for their running backs. For much of his career, Hickerson was lead blocker for Jim Brown, who still ranks (for my money) as the greatest running back every to play the game. Brown has long maintained that Hickerson belongs in the hall:
"He was one of the best pulling guards that ever played," said Brown, who led the league in rushing eight times. "He had unbelievable speed and mobility and was the best lineman we had. He blocked downfield, something guys today can't do. Nobody knows blockers better than the guys who ran behind him, and I for one am proud that he is in the Hall of Fame. He was the best blocker on a good blocking team."
Hickerson was a product of the University of Mississippi, back in the days when John Vaught's Rebels were a national football power. Vaught favored linemen who were fast and mobile, despite the fact that his teams were better known for their passing attacks, and produced only one thousand-yard rusher in 20 years. Hickerson played fullback at his high school in Tennessee, but switched to tackle at Ole Miss. When the Browns discovered his speed, they moved him to guard, and the rest, as they say, is history.
Well, almost. Browns fans and Hickerson's former teammates have long wondered why it took the Hall of Fame so long to recognize his achievements. Before Hickerson joined the Browns, there had been on seven 1,000-yard rushers in the history of the league; with #66 anchoring the Browns offensive line, Cleveland had nine 1,000-yard runners in Hickerson's first 10 years in the NFL. At the time of Hickerson's retirement, Brown was #1 on the NFL's career rushing list; Leroy Kelly was #4, and Mitchell was bound for Canton as well. But some argued that Brown, whose blend of speed and power revolutionized the running back position, didn't need much of an offensive line to be effective, and neither did Kelly.
The "other" knock against Hickerson and the Browns is that they never won a championship in the early Super Bowl era, dominated by Vince Lombardi's Packers. Green Bay's victories in Super Bowls I and II brought adulation to members of that team, including the Packers' star guard, Jerry Kramer, who wrote about his exploits in the best seller Instant Replay. Kramer's career numbers never matched Hickerson's, but those early championships, coupled with the book's success, led many to equate the "pulling guard" position with Jerry Kramer, and not Gene Hickerson. Asked to describe the difference between Kramer and Hickerson, one veteran NFL writer said: "Gene was a much better player; Jerry wrote a book."
While Hickerson was a finalist for the hall under the "regular" selection process in the early 1980s, the required votes proved elusive, and he reportedly grew bitter over the process. Notified earlier this year that a veteran's committee had again nominated him for Canton, Hickerson replied "I though that was supposed to happen about 20 years ago." Last Saturday, receiving word of his selection, Hickerson was more gracious, saying: "I am honored to be joining such an elite group of individuals and to be remembered as one of the best linemen of all time..It was such a relief to finally get the phone call."
Some would describe it as recognition that is long overdue.
There is less controversy surrounding the rest of this year's inductees. Bruce Matthews, the Oilers and Titans lineman started games at all five offensive line positions during a stellar, 19-year career, became only the 60th player to be selected for the Hall of Fame on his first ballot. Other selectees for the Class of 2007 include: Thurman Thomas, the Bills running back who was the league's MVP in 1991, and is one of only three backs to finish with 10,000 yards rushing and over 400 receptions; Roger Wehrli, the St Louis Cardinals cornerback who picked off 40 passes in his career, and was named to the NFL's "All Decade" Team for the 1970s; Charley Sanders, the Detroit Lions tight end who helped redefine that position in a decade-long career that ended in 1977, and Gene Hickerson, the great Cleveland Browns pulling guard who blocked for three Hall of Fame running backs--Jim Brown, Bobby Mitchell and Leroy Kelly.
Among this year's inductees, Hickerson has waited the longest for elevation to the Hall of Fame --29 years. He played his last game with the Browns in 1973, capping a 15-year career with the club. During that tenure, he was named to the Pro Bowl six times, voted to the league's "All Decade" team for the 1960s, and played in four NFL championship games, the forerunner to the Super Bowl.
Such accolades were a testament to Hickerson's skill, in an era when the game was much different. In the run-oriented offenses of the 1960s, offensive guards were prized for their ability to "pull" and lead the sweep, blocking downfield for their running backs. For much of his career, Hickerson was lead blocker for Jim Brown, who still ranks (for my money) as the greatest running back every to play the game. Brown has long maintained that Hickerson belongs in the hall:
"He was one of the best pulling guards that ever played," said Brown, who led the league in rushing eight times. "He had unbelievable speed and mobility and was the best lineman we had. He blocked downfield, something guys today can't do. Nobody knows blockers better than the guys who ran behind him, and I for one am proud that he is in the Hall of Fame. He was the best blocker on a good blocking team."
Hickerson was a product of the University of Mississippi, back in the days when John Vaught's Rebels were a national football power. Vaught favored linemen who were fast and mobile, despite the fact that his teams were better known for their passing attacks, and produced only one thousand-yard rusher in 20 years. Hickerson played fullback at his high school in Tennessee, but switched to tackle at Ole Miss. When the Browns discovered his speed, they moved him to guard, and the rest, as they say, is history.
Well, almost. Browns fans and Hickerson's former teammates have long wondered why it took the Hall of Fame so long to recognize his achievements. Before Hickerson joined the Browns, there had been on seven 1,000-yard rushers in the history of the league; with #66 anchoring the Browns offensive line, Cleveland had nine 1,000-yard runners in Hickerson's first 10 years in the NFL. At the time of Hickerson's retirement, Brown was #1 on the NFL's career rushing list; Leroy Kelly was #4, and Mitchell was bound for Canton as well. But some argued that Brown, whose blend of speed and power revolutionized the running back position, didn't need much of an offensive line to be effective, and neither did Kelly.
The "other" knock against Hickerson and the Browns is that they never won a championship in the early Super Bowl era, dominated by Vince Lombardi's Packers. Green Bay's victories in Super Bowls I and II brought adulation to members of that team, including the Packers' star guard, Jerry Kramer, who wrote about his exploits in the best seller Instant Replay. Kramer's career numbers never matched Hickerson's, but those early championships, coupled with the book's success, led many to equate the "pulling guard" position with Jerry Kramer, and not Gene Hickerson. Asked to describe the difference between Kramer and Hickerson, one veteran NFL writer said: "Gene was a much better player; Jerry wrote a book."
While Hickerson was a finalist for the hall under the "regular" selection process in the early 1980s, the required votes proved elusive, and he reportedly grew bitter over the process. Notified earlier this year that a veteran's committee had again nominated him for Canton, Hickerson replied "I though that was supposed to happen about 20 years ago." Last Saturday, receiving word of his selection, Hickerson was more gracious, saying: "I am honored to be joining such an elite group of individuals and to be remembered as one of the best linemen of all time..It was such a relief to finally get the phone call."
Some would describe it as recognition that is long overdue.
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