Monday, March 24, 2014

Southern Exposure

While much of the globe is occupied with the hunt for Flight 370 (and we plead guilty as well), there was this item in the National Journal.

Could the U.S. Face a Cruise Missile Threat from the Gulf of Mexico?

According to writer Diane Barnes, the American military has been focusing increased attention and resources on the problem:

"A 2013 military exercise pitted systems such as Patriot interceptors, Aegis warships and combat aircraft against potential cruise-missile or short-range ballistic missiles fired from the Gulf. But the drill highlighted a particular vulnerability to cruise missiles lobbed from that region, U.S. Northern Command head Gen. Charles Jacoby indicated in congressional testimony last week.
 
He said the Pentagon has "some significant challenges" in countering these missiles, but is exploring "some opportunities to use existing systems more effectively to do that." Many detailed results of the Oct. 11 drill conducted near Key West, Fla., remain classified, Jacoby said.

"The cruise-missile threat portion of that we are working on very hard," the general added at the March 13 Senate Armed Service Committee hearing, in response to a question from Senator Ted Cruz (R-Texas).

The military leader -- whose command focuses on defense of the U.S. homeland -- referenced an initiative to quickly mobilize assets against such threats in a configuration called the Joint Deployable Integrated Air and Missile Defense system."

According to the Journal, the effort falls under the Pentagon's Joint Test and Evaluation Office, which seeks to remedy operational deficiencies with "what we have."  But as one analyst told the publication, the problem is that our systems have been optimized for the ballistic missile threat.  Cruise missiles, launched from aircraft or surface vessels, present a different set of challenges.

First, they can be deployed on a number of platforms, including strategic bombers, Navy ships, submaries and even a container vessel.  Secondly, their small size and flight profile makes them extremely difficult to detect.  And if detection is delayed--assuming you actually spot them--the intercept window is very narrow.  And did we mention that cruise missiles can be easily outfitted with nuclear, chemical or biological warheads?

In his recent Congressional testimony, General Jacoby said the U.S. has been "closely following" advances in Russian cruise missile technology.  One of the scariest weapons in that arsenal is the Klub-K system, with enough range to hit targets at extended distances, but small enough to fit into a shipping container.  For a price tag of $10-20 million, you get the box, launcher and up to four missiles, which can be readied for launch in a matter of minutes.  Tucked away inside a 40-foot shipping container, the system is almost impossible to detect.

Russia Reveals New Missile Fired from Container

Artist's concept of the Klub-K system, hidden on a container vessel (Israel Defense.com)

With a range of 130km, the cruise missile could be launched well outside our coastal waters--with no warning--making it a very viable terrorist weapon.  The Klub-K is already in service with the Russian military and has been sold to various foreign customers, including India and Algeria.  Venezuela and Iran are also interested in the system, which raises fears about terrorist proliferation, and potential launches from the Gulf of Mexico.

So far, there have been no confirmed deliveries of the missile to Tehran, or Russia's friends in Caracas.  But cruise missiles are a legitimate threat to the U.S. homeland and, as noted in a recent Pentagon assessment, the number of operators will certainly increase over the next decade.  Meanwhile, our land-based defenses remain limited, and the Navy's budget for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) has been shrinking for years.  There were reports that a Russian Akula-class attack sub--an excellent cruise missile platform--went undetected for weeks in the Gulf of Mexico back in 2012.  Those claims--published in the Washington Free Beacon--were denied by the Pentagon.  

Into the Sea?

Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak said today that Flight MH370 was lost in the southern Indian Ocean more than two weeks ago.  The announcement was based on "new" satellite data that showed the Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777 went into the sea more than 1,500 miles off the western coast of Australia, dashing hopes that any passengers might have survived--and tamping down speculation the jet might have been hijacked and flown to Pakistan or Iran.

From the Washington Post:  

Reading from a prepared statement, Najib said new information from satellite data showed that the plane’s last location was “in the middle of the Indian Ocean west of Perth,” a city on Australia’s west coast.

“This is a remote location, far from any possible landing sites,” Najib said solemnly. “It is therefore with deep sadness and regret that I must inform you that, according to this new data, Flight MH370 ended in the southern Indian Ocean.”

He said the families of those on board have been informed of this “heartbreaking” news about the ill-fated Boeing 777 that vanished March 8 with 239 passengers and crew on board. He did not take questions from reporters after delivering his remarks.

Mr. Najib's statement came after an Australian search plane sighted debris in the 42,500-square mile search area that has become the focal point in the hunt for the missing jet.  Sunday's visual sighting came after French, Australian and Chinese satellites sighted large pieces of debris off the Australian coast.  While none of the wreckage has been tied to Flight 370, some of the items were of the right size and shape to have come from the lost aircraft.  Additional ships have been dispatched to the area, though it make take another day (or longer) for them to locate and recover the wreckage.

At today's press conference, the Prime Minister also reported that the British satellite communications firm Immarsat (working with that country's Air Accident Investigation Board) concluded that MH370 took a southerly route, after deviating from its planned flight from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing.  Previously, Immarsat stated that the 777 could have flown in either direction after dropping off air traffic control radar screens on 7 March.  That created a vast search area that extended from the Indian Ocean to the mountains of Kyrgyzstan.

If the wreckage is recovered--and tied to the missing jet, it would tend to suggest a "suicide-by-pilot" scenario, similar to EgyptAir Flight 990 (which crashed off Massachusetts in 1999) and SilkAir Flight 185, which went down in Indonesia two years earlier.  In both cases, U.S. investigators believed the planes were deliberately crashed by pilots, though other experts dispute those findings.

The most recent sightings may ultimately refute claims that the Malaysia flight was hijacked and flown to the Middle East, possibly for use in a future terrorist operation.  Retired Air Force Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney has repeatedly stated that the jet wound up in Pakistan, citing sources at Boeing, the plane's manufacturer, and the LIGNET intelligence group.

At this point, we should caution that McInerney's theory has not been disproved, either.  Clearly, the most recent sightings tend to place Flight 370 in the Indian Ocean, but until the wreckage is recovered, examined and confirmed as part of the missing jet, the notion that it landed somewhere else cannot be completely discounted.    

   

       



 
   

Monday, March 17, 2014

The Missing Links

Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 has been missing for 10 days now, and investigators appear to be no closer to figuring out what happened to the Boeing 777 and the 239 souls on board.

Here's the current consensus on what might have happened to that jet.  After departing Kuala Lumpur, en route to Beijing, the aircraft's transponder was switched off over the Gulf of Thailand, about 40 minutes into the flight.  Apparently, the transponder--which identifies the flight and provides heading and altitude data--was turned off shortly after the last radio contact with the jet, when co-pilot Fariq Ab Hamid said "all right, good night," to air traffic controllers.

But that wasn't the only system disabled on the Boeing 777.  Someone in the cockpit--one of the pilots or perhaps an unknown hijacker--also turned off the Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System, or ACARS.  While Malaysia Airlines opted for only a basic ACARS capability on its 777, the system still sent out electronic pings to satellites after it disappeared from air traffic control radar screens.  That indicates that Flight 370 was airborne for several hours, with enough time and fuel to fly to a host of locations on the Asian subcontinent (following a northerly route), or well across the Indian Ocean, if it took a southerly trek.  It should also be noted that ACARS transmissions would continue if the plane was on the ground as well.

There are reports that both Malaysian and Thai military radars tracked the plane, with the last apparent contact coming around 2:15 am (local time), from a post in southern Thailand.  If the blip was Flight 370, it was heading west towards the Bay of Bengal, at an altitude of 30,000 feet.  Before that, the contact had climbed to 45,000 feet, then descended as low as 5,000 feet before returning to FL300.  Some experts theorize the altitude changes were evidence of a struggle in the cockpit, while others believe the climb was used to incapacitate and finally kill the passengers and cabin crew.

Assuming this information is accurate, it begs some rather obvious questions.  First, there are more emitters on a jetliner than the transponder and ACARS.  What about the radar altimeter and weather radar, for example?  They could be easily disabled, but if the 777 dropped to low altitude--as some experts have suggested--the altimeter would be very useful, to avoid hitting terrain or the water.

But there have been no reports about detection of other signals from the aircraft--at least publicly.  One reason is that most of the MSM knows little about aviation, and don't know enough to ask their on-air "consultants" (or other sources) about other signals about emanating  from the 777.  The same principle extends to various intelligence agencies--including the NSA and its Australian counterpart, the Defense Signals Directorate.  If the radar altimeter or weather radar remained operational, there is a chance that NSA or DSD detected the plane later in the flight.

However, such reporting would be tempered by the reality that multiple aircraft use the same altimeter or weather radar, and if Flight 370 followed established air routes (as some believe), then it might be difficult to distinguish the Malaysian jet from other commercial jets in the area.  On the other hand, if the plane headed away from air corridors, then later emissions from other on-board emitters could provide some clues about its route and final destination.

It's also logical that various governments aren't volunteering this type of information, since it would offer insights on their ELINT collection capabilities.  In fact, if there were later intercepts of other on-board signals, then some of the routing theories are little more than red herrings, aimed at deflecting attention away from how much is really known about the final hours of that 777.

Likewise, the media might also inquire about some of those reported contacts by Malaysian and Thai military radars.  The type of equipment being used that night will offer additional information about the probability of actual detection.  Put another way, more modern, 3-D radars would be more likely to detect/track the flight than older models that require altitude tracing (from a separate radar) for accurate detection.  So far, neither government has said what type of military radar was being used and where they were located.  That would also influence the accuracy of the reported tracking.

Authorities have also failed to release the actual conversations between air traffic controllers and the missing flight.  If Malaysian controllers were doing their job, the sudden loss of Flight 370's transponder "squawk" should have prompted immediate calls to the jet.  Why not release the tapes of the final radio exchanges between the 777's flight crew and controllers on the ground?

Similarly, the air forces of Malaysia and Thailand have been mum about their actions in the hours after the passenger jet disappeared.  With an unknown aircraft transiting their airspace, why weren't jet fighters scrambled?  And what sort of conversations took place between civilian controllers and their military counter-parts?  Or, as some have suggested, did the 777 fly a carefully planned route to avoid detection, or use the resolution cell (radar shadow) of another aircraft to hide from air traffic controllers and military radar?

And what role did lax procedures or even incompetence play in the airliner's disappearance.  At least one report indicates the jet over-flew multiple Malaysian radar sites as it changed course.  But as far as we know, jet fighters were never scrambled.  Was there any contact between civilian controllers and their military counterparts after Flight 370 disappeared from radar scopes?  Officials in Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok aren't saying--at least not yet.

It is too early to say if that Boeing 777 is at the bottom of the Indian Ocean, or sitting on a remote airfield in south Asia, covered with radar-absorbent, state-of-the-art camoflague netting, awaiting to take flight on a terrorist mission.  At this juncture, the evidence would seem to suggest some sort of suicide-by-pilot, but the terrorism scenario cannot be ruled out.

Late Monday, it was reported that Israel had put its air defenses on higher alert, cognizant that if the plane was hijacked, and if it is now in the hands of terrorists on the Asian sub-continent, it is now within range of their airspace.  At least one media outlet (Fox News) claimed that some of Israel's surface-to-air missile batterys had been repositioned, and the IAF was stepping up its combat air patrols.  Prudent steps by a nation whose aerial "frontier" is located less than five minutes' flying time from Tel Aviv.  But these measures are not implemented on the the spur of the moment, in response to a threat that appears remote, at least in the eyes of so-called experts.  It's enough to make you wonder: do the Israelis know (or suspect) an aerial threat that we are dismissing as remote?              


                                                


Monday, March 10, 2014

The Mysterious Mr. Ali

Three days after it disappeared over the Gulf of Thailand, the fate of Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 officially remains a mystery.  Search teams are combing thousands of square miles of ocean, looking for remnants of the Boeing 777-200 and the 239 passengers and crew that were on the flight from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing. So far, no wreckage or other signs of a crash have been sighted; early reports that one of the jetliner's cabin doors had been spotted proved false, and long fuel slicks on the water were not connected to the missing jet, according to local authorities.

But if the physical search for clues has proven fruitless (so far), the examination of passenger manifests and other travel documents has been much more productive.  Within 24 hours of the airliner's disappearance, it was learned that two of the passengers were traveling on stolen passports, reported missing more than a year earlier by their rightful owners, an Italian and a man from Austria.  Surveillance camera footage from the gate area suggested that the passengers using the stolen passports were "not Asian in appearance."  At a press conference, a Malaysian police spokesman said one of the men looked like Italian football star Mario Balotelli, who is of Africa descent.

The U.K. Daily Mail also reports that at least five ticketed passengers failed to board the plane, though it was unclear if any of those individuals tried to check luggage for the flight--and if any bags under their names were removed from the aircraft before it left Malaysia.

But the day's most disturbing development came from Thailand, and new details on how the "mystery passengers" wound up on the flight.  From the Daily Mail account:

"A Thai travel agent who arranged the tickets for the two passengers has now said she had booked them on the flight via Beijing because they were the cheapest tickets, it has been reported.

The travel agent in the resort of Pattaya said an Iranian business contact she knew only as 'Mr Ali' had asked her to book tickets for the two men on March 1.

She had initially booked them on other airlines but those reservations expired and on March 6, Mr Ali had asked her to book them again.

She told the Financial Times she did not think Mr Ali, who paid her in cash and booked tickets with her regularly, was linked to terrorism."

Well, that's certainly reassuring.  So far, we haven't heard any details about "Mr. Ali's" other ticket purchases, but that information might prove illuminating.  It's quite possible that the Iranian businessman--if he is a terrorist operative--used previous flights as dry runs, testing transport security measures.  One of the first steps in that process would be establishing a relationship with a local travel agent who accepted cash for short-notice flights--and never asked any questions.  

In fact, Al Qaida has a long history of rehearsing airline operations before actually carrying them out.  Actor James Woods was on a Boston-to-Los Angeles flight two months before 9-11 and observed four Middle Eastern men behaving strangely.  Their actions left such an impression that Mr. Woods reported the activity to a flight attendant and the jet's first officer when it landed in California.  After the September 11th attacks, he remembered the incident and called the FBI, who sent agents to his home with photographs.  Woods recognized two of the men from his flight; one was identified as a hijacker on United Flight 77, which flew into the Pentagon; the other helped commandeer United Flight 175, which slammed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center. 

Over the years that followed, there have been several foiled plots, including the infamous shoe and underwear bombers, along with more dry runs.  Just last year, the U.S. Airline Pilots Association warned its members that terrorists were again rehearsing for possible attacks on airliners.  The memo from the pilot's union cited an incident where Middle Eastern man (on a U.S. Air flight) who ran towards the cockpit door before veering into the forward lavatory, where he spent a considerable amount of time.  At the same time, other Middle Eastern men switched seats, opened overhead bins and "generally caused a disturbance," possibly trying to distract flight attendants.  The Washington-to-Orlando flight landed safely at its destination, but the Captain refused to fly the next leg of his route until the aircraft was thoroughly checked.  While the inspection revealed signs of "tampering," the Department of Homeland Security concluded its was "not" a dry run.  

While these possible dry-runs have garnered a certain amount of media coverage, little attention is paid to the process of getting the "right" people on the flight without attracting the attention of the airlines or government security organizations.  In the days before 9-11, it was simply a matter of purchasing tickets; in fact, several of the 9-11 hijackers logged ththousands of frequent flier miles in the months leading up to the attacks, as part of the rehearsal and preparation process.  Since then, various screening measures and intelligence analysis have made it more difficult for terrorists to slip undetected on airliners, but the system is far from perfect.  Consider the cases of the shoe bomber and the underwear bomber, who were able to get on board and attempt to detonate their devices before they were stopped.       

If the loss of Flight 370 was an act of terrorism, investigators will almost certainly uncover a very detailed and well-executed plot.  Al Qaida, its affiliates and other terror groups have never lost interest in aviation targets are are constantly looking for new ways to bring down an airliner.  At this point, no one can definitely say that terrorists were behind the disappearance of the Malaysian airliner; but the few pieces now falling into place seem to fit that pattern.                    

     

         

Saturday, March 08, 2014

Lost

As the search for Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 continues, journalists and pundits are engaged in a delicate dance, edging around the scenario that seems almost inevitable; in other words, the loss of the Boeing 777-200, with 239 souls aboard, was the result of foul play, probably terrorism.

To be fair, no firm link has been established between the jet's disappearance and a terror group.  And, at this point, with no wreckage or bodies recovered, other potential causes cannot be completely ruled out.  Yes, there is a chance that some sort of catastrophic failure caused the 777 to disappear from radar and plunge into the Gulf of Thailand, a little over two hours after its departure from Kuala Lumpur.  But the Boeing jet has an impeccable safety record; before Flight 370 disappeared yesterday, the 777 had recorded only one fatal accident in nearly two decades of service, last year's Asiana crash in San Francisco, which was caused by pilot error.

Likewise, weather has not been totally ruled out as a possible factor in the crash.  But there were no storms or reports of severe turbulence along the jet's flight path, so it's difficult to imagine that a sudden, severe downdraft, in clear skies at 35,000 feet, caused the aircraft to go down.

Was it pilot error?  The pilot-in-command had been flying for Malaysia Airlines for more than 30 years, logging over 18,000 hours in the cockpit.  His co-pilot joined the airline seven years ago, and had nearly 3,000 flight hours, with much of that time in the 777.   A veteran crew was piloting the aircraft on its flight to Beijing, and it's difficult to imagine any sort of system failure that spiraled out of control, leaving the pilots unable to control the wide-body jet.

This much we know: whatever happened to Flight 370 transpired very quickly.  Tracking data indicates a slight deviation to the left of its planned route and a drop in altitude of 600 feet just before the Boeing 777 disappeared from air traffic control radars.  There was no Mayday call from the crew, suggesting a sudden catastrophic event that sent the airliner on a fatal plunge.  

What could cause such a failure?  Any number of things, from a section of windows or a cabin door blowing out at altitude, triggering a structural chain reaction that caused the airliner to fall apart.  Once again, it's a possibility, but far from likely.  A Malaysia Airlines spokesman said the aircraft was last inspected 10 days ago ("well ahead of schedule") and no problems were discovered.

An explosion could also cause a catastrophic failure, though definitive proof won't be available until the jet's wreckage is recovered from the crash site, a process that could take weeks, even months.  However, there are malfunctions that may cause an aircraft to literally blow-up in flight, such as a fuel tank explosion. Almost two years ago, a Boeing 737 crashed on approach to the airport in Islamabad, Pakistan.  The pilot radioed air traffic controllers that a fuel tank was on fire shortly before the plane went down, barely three months before its scheduled landing.  More than 130 passengers and crew died in that crash; the ill-fated jet had been in service for 32 years, and there were questions about maintenance on the aging 737.

Six years earlier, a wing tank blew up on an Indian airliner, sitting on the tarmac in Bangalore.  No passengers or crew were on the aircraft at the time, and there were no reported injuries.  Investigators believed the explosion may have been related to deteriorating electrical wiring and insulation tubes in the fuel tanks of various Boeing jets.  In 1999, the FAA ordered an emergency inspection of fuel tank wiring tubes (and the wires they shielded), over concerns about a possible explosion.

The most famous "example" of an exploding fuel tank on a jetliner occurred in the crash of TWA Flight 800, which went down over the Long Island Sound in 1996, just minutes after departing from JFK Airport in New York.  After a prolonged investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board concluded that an electrical short circuit caused fuel vapors in the center tank to explode, causing the Boeing 747 to fall from the skies, killing all 230 people aboard.  But some of the experts who participated in the original probe have refuted its findings, speculating that the explosion was caused (instead) by an external source, perhaps a missile.  

On the other hand, a bomb could produce a similar, catastrophic failure, and that possibility seems more likely, given the recent revelation that two of the passengers were traveling on stolen passports.  The original passenger manifest listed an Italian national and an Austrian as among those on the flight.  But both quickly reported that they were alive and well and on the ground when the jetliner disappeared.  The two men also claimed that their passports had been stolen, in one case, more than two years ago.  At least one of the thefts was reported to Interpol, but it's unclear if the information was shared with intelligence agencies or the airlines.

Who were the passengers traveling on those stolen passports?  At this point, no one can say, but their presence raises concerns about terrorism.  It's quite possible that a terrorist group would use someone else's identity to put a pair of suicide operatives on a jetliner.  We've also learned that tickets for the passengers with the stolen passports were sold by China Southern Airlines, which has a code share agreement with Malaysia Airlines.  There has been no information on how or when the tickets were purchased, and if that transaction should have alerted authorities.

Answers to those questions--and others--will be revealed in the days and weeks ahead.  And while few things are certain at this point, the use of stolen passports to put mysterious passengers on the plane certainly raises the specter of foul play.  It is also worth remembering that terrorist organizations have never lost their interest in aviation targets, and the Pacific region has long figured in their plotting.  We may soon learn if the bad guys have finally achieved their murderous goal.                          



    

                            

Wednesday, March 05, 2014

Oscar's Voice

First, a bit of disclosure: I'm among the majority of Americans who haven't seen one of the films that were up for best picture during Sunday's Academy Awards ceremony, televised around the world by ABC.

And I'm not alone; according to a Reuters survey released last week, roughly two-thirds of the American public have not viewed any of the nine nominees for best picture, the top award presented each by the Motion Picture Academy of Arts and Sciences.  Of course, that inconvenient stat doesn't stop Hollywood's annual orgy of self-congratulation, but it should give the studios pause: in an era when we can watch movies on demand on almost any type of electronic device, more than 60% of all Americans are ignoring the supposed cream of the annual film crop.

To be fair, the movie business is still turning a tidy profit, but increasingly, the money comes from special effects-laden summer blockbusters that bring out the teen and twenty-something audiences; animated films (which still attract kids and parents) and the occasional breakout hit that seems to transcend all demographic lines.  But in much of "flyover country," the box office isn't always boffo; borrowing from an old Variety headline, the "stix" have been nixing most Oscar-worthy pix for a long, long time.

That's one reason it's always a bit sad to watch the "In Memoriam" segment of each year's telecast.  First comes the realization that most of the stars we watched and admired have passed on, and with them, the last links to an era when Hollywood shared at least some values with its audience.

Then, there's the annual debate over "who got snubbed" in the tribute montage. Admittedly, the producers of the annual telecast face a daunting challenge; in the time allotted, they can honor about 30 members of the film community, give or take a couple.  Glenn Close, who introduced the segment during Sunday's broadcast, noted there wasn't enough time to pay tribute to everyone who passed during the previous year. So, it was inevitable that actors like Milo O'Shea, Jean Stapleton and Ralph Waite were omitted, along with director Bryan Forbes, screenwriter Mike Gray and others.

But there was one more glaring omission as well.  For 26 years, the great Hank Simms was literally the Voice of the Academy awards, providing off-screen narration of the telecast.  Mr. Simms also handled the announcing chores for numerous other awards programs, commercials, movie trailers and a host of other assignments.  Viewers of a certain age know him best as the narrator for various Quinn Martin dramas of the 1960s and 70s.

Mr. Simms was a mainstay in the voice-over community for more than 40 years.  He entered radio at the urging of his brother, after serving as an Army Air Corps maintenance officer during World War II.  He worked at stations in Kansas, Oklahoma City and Dallas before being recalled during the Korean War. Simms was working in Hawaii when he met his wife in the early 1950s; a year later, they moved to Los Angeles, where he became one of the most sought-after voice talents in the city.

His long association with Mr. Martin was a combination of talent and geography.  Simms and his family lived next door to Quinn Martin in Beverly Hills; when the producer was looking for a new voice for one of his crime dramas, he hired his neighbor.  Martin also took the unusual step of urging Mr. Simms to join the Screen Actors Guild and made him a member of the cast.  That made Simms eligible for a better insurance plan and residual payments for re-runs.  Typically, announcers received a one-time talent fee for their services, while actors received decreasing payments for the first three (or more) airings of the program in syndication.

Simms retired from Hollywood years ago, settling first in Florida and later moving to Hot Springs, Arkansas to be closer to his children.  By all accounts, he was a humble man; he rarely appeared on screen and few people recognized until they heard that distinctive baritone.  When he passed away from cancer last August (at the age of 90), he requested no funeral or memorial service on his behalf.

Since Mr. Simms announced his last Oscars telecast, producers have employed a variety of announcers and voice-over artists, including Tom Kane and Randy Thomas.  Mr. Kane, Ms. Thomas and their contemporaries have done a fine job, but with all due respect, they can't hold a candle to Hank Simms.

That's why some of us who have slaved over a hot microphone in a previous life were waiting for an acknowledgement or nod to the man whose voice was synonymous with the Oscars, the Emmys and other television events.  Unfortunately, it never came.  To its credit, the Academy of Television Arts and Sciences posted a tribute to Mr. Simms last fall, but the motion picture industry--to our knowledge--has not. Maybe because he was "only" an announcer, and not one of the luminaries who paraded across the stage.  But if the Oscars represent the film industry's "biggest night," then Hank Simms made his own contribution to the ceremony, with peerless narration that set the tone for the telecast.

From You Tube, here's Mr. Simms opening the 1981 Academy Awards, hosted by Johnny Carson. You may recall that telecast was delayed 24 hours, following the attempted assassination of President Reagan. Needless to say, the quality of the hosts has declined since then--with the exception of a few years when Billy Crystal was in his prime.                                              

Monday, March 03, 2014

Fantasy as Foreign Policy (Today's Reading Assignment)

As the situation in Ukraine continues to unravel, at least one newspaper has awakened to the reality of our feckless foreign policy.  Call it a policy couched in fantasy, not reality.  A couple of excerpts:

FOR FIVE YEARS, President Obama has led a foreign policy based more on how he thinks the world should operate than on reality. It was a world in which “the tide of war is receding” and the United States could, without much risk, radically reduce the size of its armed forces. Other leaders, in this vision, would behave rationally and in the interest of their people and the world. Invasions, brute force, great-power games and shifting alliances — these were things of the past. Secretary of State John F. Kerry displayed this mindset on ABC’s “This Week” Sunday when he said, of Russia’s invasion of neighboring Ukraine, “It’s a 19th century act in the 21st century.”

[snip]

"..it’s also true that, as long as some leaders play by what Mr. Kerry dismisses as 19th-century rules, the United States can’t pretend that the only game is in another arena altogether. Military strength, trustworthiness as an ally, staying power in difficult corners of the world such as Afghanistan — these still matter, much as we might wish they did not. While the United States has been retrenching, the tide of democracy in the world, which once seemed inexorable, has been receding. In the long run, that’s harmful to U.S. national security, too.
As Mr. Putin ponders whether to advance further — into eastern Ukraine, say — he will measure the seriousness of U.S. and allied actions, not their statements. China, pondering its next steps in the East China Sea, will do the same. Sadly, that’s the nature of the century we’re living in."

Incidentally, this indictment of the Obama Doctrine was written by those notorious right-wingers at the Washington Post.  Paraphrasing LBJ's famous words of almost 50 years ago, if Mr. Obama has lost the Post, then's he lost the left-wing media establishment, the same constituency that has propped up his failed presidency for the past five years.

But all is not lost.  In the same edition of that paper, Post columnist David Ignatius suggested that Russian President Vladimir Putin had committed a fatal blunder:

"What Putin misunderstands most is that the center of gravity for the former Soviet Union has shifted west. Former Soviet satellites such as Poland and the Czech Republic are prosperous members of the E.U. The nations that made up what was once Yugoslavia have survived their bloody breakup, and most have emerged as strong democracies. Ukraine was set to join this movement toward the European Union last November when Yanukovych suddenly suspended trade and financial talks with the E.U. and accepted what amounted to a $15 billion bribe from Putin to stay in Russia’s camp. To the tens of thousands of courageous Ukrainians who braved the cold and police brutality to protest, Yanukovych’s submission to Moscow looked like an attempt to reverse history."

Those observations may be true, but they are of little consolation to millions of Ukrainians who face a new era of living under Russian domination and oppression.  After bravely rising up against a corrupt regime, they were rewarded by Putin's move into Crimea, and little more than diplomatic hand-wringing from the west. The Russian president didn't pay a price for his 2008 conflict with neighboring Georgia and so far, there is no indication the west will take significant action over the crisis in Ukraine.

Moreover, with the U.S. retreating on the world stage, there is little reason for our partners to believe that we will back up our rhetoric with actions.  One of Mr. Obama's early acts as President was to cancel planned ballistic missile defense facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic, a move that was part of the supposed "re-set" in relations between Washington and Moscow.   The significance of that decision was not lost in Warsaw and Prague; even if we wanted to move troops and aircraft to the region in a show of force, there is no guarantee those governments would go along.  Why should they, when recent history suggests the U.S. will cut and run whenever it suits us?

To be sure, there has been a great wave of democracy that has swept over eastern Europe over the past 25 years.  But that wave may ebb at the eastern border of Poland and if it does, we will share in the blame.      
   

    

Saturday, March 01, 2014

Empty Words

Late Friday, with words of more Russian troops arriving in Ukraine's Crimea Region, President Obama got tough:

"Delivering a blunt warning to Moscow, President Barack Obama expressed deep concern Friday over reported military activity inside Ukraine by Russia and warned "there will be costs" for any intervention.

He did not say what those costs might be.

Obama called on Russia to respect the independence and territory of Ukraine and not try to take advantage of its neighbor, which is undergoing political upheaval."

Then, with that bit of unpleasantness out of the way, Mr. Obama went off to a Democratic National Committee event.  The record will show that Russian President Vladimir Putin was unimpressed with Obama's rhetoric.  I don't think National Review's Victor Davis Hanson got an advance copy of the President's remarks, but he was prescient in describing our "useless outrage" over Russia's military moves. After all, we've been down this road before:

Over the last five years, Obama has issued serial deadlines to Iran to cease and desist from its ongoing enrichment of uranium. All the while, more Iranian centrifuges went on line.
Later, Obama turned from deadlines to red lines. He threatened Syrian president Bashar Assad with one about using chemical weapons. “A red line for us,” the president warned, “is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized.”
Assad moved over that American red line, using chemical weapons to gas his own people, and is now winning the war against the Syrian insurgents. In the end, an embarrassed Obama was reduced to denying that he had ever issued a red line in the first place: “I didn’t set a red line. The world set a red line.”

[snip]

Although the U.S. alone seems to honor its promised deadlines of withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq, the world’s aggressors sense that the Obama administration’s bluster will be followed by more bluster. Therefore, they have decided to risk aggrandizements while they can. In the mind of Vladimir Putin, today Ukraine, tomorrow the Baltic States or Eastern Europe. In the minds of the Iranian theocrats, if chemical WMD are okay in Syria, why not nuclear WMD in Iran? In China’s view, when Japan backs off, why shouldn’t Taiwan, South Korea, or the Philippines?

That's why Mr. Putin is more concerned about his next move in the Crimea that any potential response from Washington.  To be sure, there is little the U.S. can do militarily; Ukraine is literally in Putin's back yard and Russia's naval basing agreement with Kiev gives him a convenient excuse for moving troops into the area. Moscow's rubber-stamp Senate has already given the Russian President authority for military action, and his cronies in the Crimea have asked Putin for assistance.  Now, it's just a matter of how quickly Russia's military airlift units can deliver additional forces to the region.   

But that doesn't mean the United States and its allies are not without options. Putin bought his way into the middle of the situation by agreeing to pay off $15 billion in Ukranian debt (and presumably, a little on the side for the country's corrupt former leadership, now believed hiding somewhere in Russia).  When Ukraine's citizens demanded closer ties with Europe and the west, Mr. Obama and his partners couldn't cobble together a bail-out package that is less than our annual foreign aid bill.

And while direct military intervention is not an option, there are steps the U.S. can take around the periphery of Ukraine's borders.  We currently have small military detachments in Poland; the U.S. should consider rotating deployments of F-16s and F-15Es from other locations in Europe (and the United States), to Lansk AB, similar to our bomber deployments to the Far East.  

Washington should also consider a larger naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea regions; we dispatched two ships during the Sochi Olympics (ostensibly to assist with potential counter-terror operations),  Unfortunately, that operation ended badly when one of the vessels, a destroyer, ran aground during a port call in Turkey.  

However, prospects for an increased military presence in eastern Europe and adjacent waters are just about zero.  Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel just unveiled plans to further slash the military budget, so there won't be a lot of money for additional, long-term deployments.  In fact, the Hagel-Obama plan calls for retirement of Air Force's A-10 and U-2 fleets (almost 400 aircraft), and some analysts believe other platforms will be heading for the boneyard as well.  Fewer airplanes means more personnel reductions, and less for operations and maintenance.  In other words, don't look for F-16 or Strike Eagle squadrons at Lansk (or any other Polish bases) any time soon.  

Economic sanctions against Russia are another possibility, but once again, don't hold your breath.  Mr. Obama seems to go out of his way to avoid antagonizing Vladimir Putin, who (as a former KGB agent) knows weaknesses when he sees it.  From the Kremlin's perspective, going into the Crimea is a no-brainer, since they have nothing to fear from the Ukraine and its erstwhile friends in the West.  

Maybe that's what President Obama meant when he told Putin's predecessor (read: sock puppet) that he would have "more flexibility" during his second term.  With Obama in the White House for another three years, Putin and his thugs apparently have the green light to do whatever they choose.  This isn't the first time Mr. Putin has thrown down the gauntlet to his American counterpart.  It won't be the last.  And don't think this latest example of U.S. weakness is going unnoticed in Tehran or Beijing, either.           
***
ADDENDUM:  Various media outlets are reporting that Mr. Obama skipped a national security meeting on Ukraine this afternoon.  Maybe he believed the preliminary intel assessments that Russia was bluffing; as late as Thursday evening, the bright boys and girls in our intelligence community were assuring decision makers that Moscow had no plans to invade by the Crimea, based on various factors, including an absence of medical units among potential invasion units and the lack of SIGINT activity that suggested Russian units would soon cross the border.  We should note that President Obama spent 90 minutes on the phone with Putin on Saturday--perhaps explaining his absence from the NSC meeting--but the conversation clearly achieved nothing.    
    




Tuesday, February 25, 2014

Gutted

To no one's surprise, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel announced Monday that the U.S. military will undergo even more dramatic cuts in the years to come.  The proposed reductions include:

- Shrinking the Army to its smallest size since before World War II.  Under Hagel's plans, the number of soldiers on active duty would drop from 520,000 today, to between 440-450,000 by 2019.   That's a net reduction of 15%, and some experts believe the final cuts may be well over 100,000.

- Retiring entire fleets of USAF aircraft, including more than 340 A-10 close air support fighters and 32 U-2 reconnaissance platforms.  The service previously announced plans to get rid of 22,500 airmen this year alone, and elimination of the Warthog and Dragon Lady will permit even more cuts among operations and support personnel in the years to come.

- A reduction of 20,000 soldiers from the National Guard, reducing the number of troops in that component to 335,000.  Another 10,000 troops will exit the Army Reserve, reducing end strength to 195,000.

- Transferring all AH-64 Apache attack currently assigned to the Guard to active-duty units, in exchange for more UH-60 Blackhawks, deemed more "suitable" for disaster relief and other civil support missions.

- Reducing the Marine Corps by 8,000, leaving that service with a total of 182,000 personnel.

- Ending production of the Navy's troubled littoral combat ship program (LCS) at 32 vessels, rather than the 52 originally planned.

- "Laying up" 11 of the USN's 22 cruisers while they are modernized.  The move will allow the Navy to keep 11 active carriers.

General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, appeared with Hagel at the announcement and said military leaders are "willing" to accept the proposed cuts over the sequestration process, which would mean even bigger reductions in personnel and hardware.

Describing the Hagel plan as deeply flawed would be an understatement.  For starters, there's the notion of gutting the Army, which will lose 10 combat brigades and even larger numbers of support troops.  That's roughly akin to an entire corps, plus all the equipment and personnel who keep the trigger pullers in action. The Army Chief of Staff, General Ray Odierno, has already warned the planned cuts will put his service dangerously close to levels where it cannot fight a major war overseas and sustain other operations (such as training) here at home.

Army commanders are also angry about the retirement of the A-10.  In truth, the USAF has been trying to get rid of the CAS platform for years, but it has never found another fighter that can deliver support to ground forces like the Warthog.  Surviving F-16s and some of the new F-35 stealth fighters are supposed to replace the A-10, but neither aircraft can carry the ordnance--or survive battle damage like the venerable "Hog."

The U-2 Dragon Lady has been around even longer than the A-10, but it has been constantly updated and still provides an impressive collection capability.  More importantly, the U-2 is much cheaper to operate than its designated replacement the RQ-4, Global Hawk.  Writing recently in Forbes, noted defense analyst Dr. Loren Thompson noted why the venerable Dragon Lady is a better choice than Global Hawk for many missions, including those in the Pacific region:

"For starters, U-2 could fly much higher — at 70,000 feet versus 55,000 feet — which meant sensors carried on the spy plane could see considerably farther. The U-2 could also carry 67% more payload (5,000 pounds versus 3,000 pounds), and had over twice as much space as Global Hawk in which to arrange its mission equipment. In addition, the U-2′s on-board power generation capacity was nearly twice that of Global Hawk, meaning its diverse sensors could be operated simultaneously to collect many types of intelligence
.
These differences help explain why U-2 has a much higher mission-success rate in the Pacific theater than Global Hawk does — 96% versus 55% — and is selected for missions much more frequently.  When an aircraft operates at 50,000-55,000 feet as Global Hawk does, it can’t fly above some of the storms encountered in the Pacific the way U-2 can. Global Hawk’s weather limitations are compounded by the absence of a de-icing system, which means it cannot fly through clouds for prolonged periods and thus is confined to operating in fair weather — unlike all the manned aircraft in the Air Force fleet."

Guess we'd better hope that the Chinese and North Koreans restrict their military activities to periods of good weather.  Never mind that the Korean peninsula is subject to frequent rain in the spring and summer, and lots of snow and ice in the winter.  Or that typhoons tend to frequent the western Pacific (including the Taiwan Strait) during the late summer and fall.  But that's the sort of logic behind the Hagel plan.

Likewise, the idea of idling 11 Ticonderoga-class cruisers sounds like a good idea, since it allows the Navy to keep all of its current carriers.  But the cruisers play an important role in protecting the carriers at sea; with fewer cruisers available, that will mean more deployments for those that remain and for destroyers equipped with the Aegis air defense/battle management system.  More frequent deployments also means more money for maintenance and upkeep.  I'm hardly a math scholar, but I don't see how mothballing 11 cruisers frees up enough money to support a DDG force that will be more heavily taxed than ever AND keep our carriers in operation.  And if you believe that all of the "laid up" cruisers will eventually return to the fleet, we've got a bridge in Brooklyn you might be interested in.

Mr. Hagel's wishful thinking extends to other areas as well.  The planned down-sizing of the Marine Corps by 8,000 personnel?  The numbers we've seen suggest the Corps will absorb much larger cuts, with end strength closer to 150,000 and not 180,000.  Don't forget: there has been plenty of talk over the past year about the Corps and its "search for a mission" in today's environment.  If the Marine Corps is becoming strategically irrelevant (as some in the Pentagon would like to believe), then how do you justify the larger force?

There are also planned cuts in pay and benefits too, including virtual elimination of subsidy for military commissaries.  Did we mention that more than 5,000 military families are currently on food stamps, and without the full commissary benefit, they will find it more difficult to feed their spouses and children?  There will also be reductions in the monthly housing allowance for active-duty personnel, and higher fees and co-pays for everyone using the Tricare.

The impact of all of this is easy to predict: military readiness will drop precipitously, at a time when the world is becoming a more dangerous place.  Military members with marketable skills and career options will vote with their feet, taking valuable expertise (and years of experience) with them.  That will leave us with armed forces that are not only lacking equipment and training, but the skilled personnel that form the heart of an all-volunteer military.

Which brings us to Mr. Hagel's coup de grace, at least on the pay and benefits side.  During yesterday's speech, he indicated that future decisions on compensation will follow the lead of a Pentagon panel which recommended wholesale changes to the retirement system.  In other words, 20-year retirement (with pension) will soon be a thing of the past, replaced by a new, 401K-type scheme that will cover virtually everyone who serves, but you can't start collecting until the "normal" retirement age.

As we've noted before, the 20-year retirement program has been a foundation of the military recruiting and personnel system for decades.  There are literally thousands of NCOs and officers who joined the armed forces out of high school, with a goal of spending two decades in uniform, in exchange for a retirement check in their late 30s (or early 40s), and the opportunity to launch a second career.

Not only has the 20-year system provided a steady flow of exceptionally-qualified recruits, it has also helped us maintain a youthful force.  As Secretary Hagel may recall from his Vietnam days, you need young men (and women) in their early 20s to do most of the heavy lifting in a military.  The lure of 20-year retirement encourages young Americans to volunteer for those jobs, then move on to other endeavors as they reach middle age.  True, we are living longer as a society and there are many people in their 40s and 50s who are in better shape than youngsters 20 years their junior.  But it's equally true that you don't want an infantry company or a Marine platoon with a median age somewhere around 40.

Mr. Hagel maintains that something must be done to reduce personnel costs, which account for roughly half of the Pentagon's budget.  One option is replacing Tricare with on-base health care for retirees and dependents.  Even routine procedures (such as an appendectomy) may be 10 or 20 times more expensive at a civilian facility, in comparison to a base hospital.  Fully funding military health care and bringing retirees and dependents back on post could generate real savings.

A little perspective is also in order: Hagel and his bean counters rail against the "excessive" cost of military pensions but in reality, that program costs the taxpayers only $4 billion a year, or about 25% of our foreign aid budget.  Fact is: you can't balance the federal budget on the backs on men and women who served their country faithfully and honorably for more than 20 years, and now expect Uncle Sam to live up to his end of the bargain.  Hacking away at the military (while the big entitlement programs go untouched) is an exercise in fecklessness.  But it's about what you'd expect from Chuck Hagel and his boss--the same guy who could save us a cool trillion by giving up on his failed vision for national health care.                                            

Wednesday, February 19, 2014

A Military that Looks Like America

At this point in his tenure, you'd think that Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel would be preoccupied with budget cuts, force reductions, and the litany of threats our military must guard against every day.

But Mr. Hagel's agenda has undergone a slight revision; near the top of his "to-do" list is re-instilling ethics in the armed forces.  Alarmed by a series of personal conduct scandals, Hagel is preparing to appoint a flag officer as an "ethics adviser," presumably with marching orders to implement new directives and training programs to fix the problem.

There is a certain irony in a career politician demanding ethical behavior from members of the armed forces.  But Secretary Hagel has little choice; the military is currently awash with incidents involving illegal, immoral or inexcusable behavior.  Here are just a few examples:

- Dozens of Air Force missile launch officers at Malmstrom AFB, Montana were suspended from their duties after it was discovered they cheated on a routine qualification exam.  Some of the officers reportedly texted correct answers to their colleagues, to avoid failing the test.  Investigators say cheating was rampant, encourage by superiors, and passing the exam with a perfect score was the only sure path to advancement.

- The Navy is investigating its own cheating scandal, involving enlisted instructors at its nuclear power school in Charleston, South Carolina.  At least 20 senior enlisted members are accused of cheating on tests that help them qualify to operate nuclear reactors on aircraft carriers and submarines.  It is the Navy's fifth cheating scandal in the past seven years; all have involved reactor technicians and their training and certification programs.  

- Air Force Major General Michael Carey was dismissed last fall as Commander of 20th Air Force--which oversees the service's ICBM wing--amid reports of misconduct during an official visit to Russia.  An official probe confirmed that Carey (among other things) drank heavily during the trip, offended his hosts and consorted with women who might be a security risk.  In fairness, we should point out that other sources identify the women as members at the British Embassy in Moscow.

- Another senior officer in the nuclear chain, Navy Vice Admiral Tim Giardina, was fired in October 2013 after it was discovered that he used counterfeit chips while gambling at an Indian casino in Iowa.  At the time, Giardina was Vice Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, which is in charge of the nation's nuclear forces.

- Three other Navy officers--including an NCIS agent--have been implicated in a bribery scandal.  They are accused of arranging port visits that benefited Glen Defense Marine, a long-time vendor in the Pacific Region.  In return, the company's CEO, Leonard Francis, provided cash, gifts, vacations and prostitutes for the officers.  At least two Navy admirals have been suspended in connection with the case, though they have not been charged with any wrong-doing.

- The Navy also relieved the command and master chief of a Florida-based missile unit after it was discovered their personnel had solicited adult-entertainment businesses in a fund-raising effort for a submarine ball.  The unit's commander, Captain John Heatherington, also received non-judicial punishment for failing to stop the fund-raising appeal, which included strip clubs and other seedy establishments.  

And if that's not bad enough, there are two new scandals involving lower-ranking personnel who engaged in behavior that is disgraceful and disrespectful, at best.

-A photo of Air Force Staff Sergeant Cherish Byers "tongue-kissing" the POW-MIA symbol went viral earlier this month, much to the embarrassment of her commanders at Fairchild AFB, Washington and the rest of the service.  James Cody, the Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force, said "appropriate action will be taken at the appropriate level." In a Facebook posting, Byers said the photo was three years old, and taken at a point when she "didn't care."  Now facing potential punishment, Sergeant Byers has apparently had a change of heart.       

- Then, there is the group of National Guard soldiers who decided to take a group photo surrounding a flag-draped casket used to train honor guard personnel.  Many of the soldiers are mugging for the camera and the shot--which was posted by a Wisconsin guard member--and is captioned "we put the fun in funeral."  The same solider, Specialist Terry Harrison, also posted a selfie with the comment, "It's so damn cold out...why have a funeral outside...someone's getting a jacked-up flag."    

Against that backdrop, it's tempting to say that Mr. Hagel needs to impose a month-long "stand down" for ethics training.  To be sure, the military has always had its share of scandals, but this recent barrage suggests that standards of conduct, discipline and integrity have slipped badly.

But you can say the same thing about the country they serve.  Kentucky Senator Rand Paul was recently criticized when he mentioned Bill Clinton's infamous affair with Monica Lewinsky.  Then as now, we're being told that it was a "private matter," even if it did involve the Commander-in-Chief.  The same holds true for various other Clinton-era scandals, including Hillary's remarkable luck as a cattle futures trader; those missing records from her Little Rock law firm and the politically-fueled purge of the White House travel office.  Examples of inappropriate, shady or even illegal conduct now deemed "irrelevant."

Still, the Clintons don't have a monopoly on sleazy behavior.  Newt Gingrich has his own history of marital infidelity.  Former National Security Adviser Sandy Burger was caught smuggling classified documents out of the national archive (an act blamed on personal "sloppiness") and received a slap on the wrist--loss of his security clearance for only three years.

The list goes on.  Harry Reid has become a wealthy man at the public trough, engaging in questionable land deals along the way. Jesse Jackson and Al Sharpton, have claimed the job title of "activist" for much of their adult lives and become millionaires in the process.  Former Republican Congressman Randy Cunningham (a fighter ace in Vietnam) sold his soul for $2.4 million in bribes.  He was released from federal prison last year, but retains his military and congressional pensions. William Jefferson of Louisiana, who served in the House with Mr. Cunningham, is still in prison on 13-year sentence for corruption charges.  And just last week Mr. Jefferson's former mayor, Ray Nagin, was convicted of bribery.

How does this relate to the military?  It's simple; our armed forces are a reflection of the society they serve.  If America is doing its best impersonation of a dead fish and rotting from the head, it's inevitable that some military members will mimic their civilian counterparts. That doesn't excuse it and what's worse, the armed forces seem increasingly tolerant of bad behavior.  General Carey and Admiral Giardina will retire at flag rank and some of the cheaters at Charleston and Malmstrom will survive as well.  That doesn't speak well for a profession that has always held itself to the highest standards of conduct and integrity.

But, as we observed earlier, there is an element of hypocrisy in the current push for military ethics.  If Mr. Hagel is serious about the subject, he might start on the E-ring and the senior officers who populate those offices.  Many were on duty on the night of September 11, 2012, when four Americans died in Benghazi and the full might of the American military was never mustered to assist them.  Almost two years later, we know very little about the actions of our senior officers that night, along with those of the Commander-in-Chief.

In her latest blog post for The Wall Street Journal, Peggy Noonan wonders what happens to a country where the decadent elites engage in all sorts of reprehensible behavior, openly mocking the people they supposedly serve.

We may soon find out.     




                            

                           

Friday, February 14, 2014

The Map

It's long been a point of conjecture: where were U.S. military forces on the night of September 11, 2012 (when our consulate in Benghazi came under attack), and could any of them have rendered assistance to the American diplomats and security contractors at that facility.

Members of the Obama Administration and senior defense officials have long claimed that our forces were poorly positioned to render assistance.  But determining the exact location of those assets--particularly Navy strike groups--has been nearly impossible.  Until now.

Responding to a FOIA request from retired Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Randall R. Schmidt (who is  investigating the military response to the attack), the Navy finally provided an unclassified graphic depicting the location of its ships in the Mediterranean and Middle East on the fateful day.  Colonel Schmidt, in turn, gave a copy of the map to Judicial Watch, which released it to various media outlets.  A reproduction of the map is provided below:

Disposition of U.S. Naval forces in the Med and the Middle East on the night of the attack on our consulate in Benghazi, Libya (Lieutenant Colonel Randall Schmidt via Judicial Watch)  

A look at the graphic seems to buttress both sides of the argument.  Yes, there were significant Navy assets on station from the Strait of Gilbratar to the Persian Gulf, but none were in close proximity to Benghazi, where waves of terrorists assaulted the consulate, killing four Americans.  This is particularly true of our carrier battle groups, which are often among the first assets tasked in response to any emergency.  When Al-Qaida-linked militants launched their attacks on the diplomatic facility, both the USS Eisenhower and the USS Enterprise, along with their escorts, were roughly three thousand miles away in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, respectively.  Navy public affairs officials told Colonel Schmidt that it would have taken as long as seven days for the "Ike" to make the transit to the central Med, with a slightly shorter transit time for the Enterprise.   

Of course, the p.r. flacks don't make mention of the air wings embarked on both carriers, which could span that difference in a matter of hours.  But getting even a modest air package off the deck would have required diplomatic clearance/overflight rights, and enough tanker support to get F/A-18s from the Gulf to Benghazi, a flight that would take a minimum of six hours, with sufficient in-flight refueling and optimal routing.  Factoring in the time needed to plan and coordinate the flight, and it's readily apparent the carriers could not respond to events in Benghazi in a timely manner.  

Yet, the Navy was not without options on that fateful night.  By our count, there were at least five surface vessels (all destroyers) deployed across the Med that night; the USS McFaul (east of Gibraltar); the USS Laboon (in port at Souda Bay, Crete); the USS Forrest Sherman (underway northeast of the island), and the USS Cole and USS Jason Dunham, on ballistic missile defense patrol in the eastern Mediterranean. 

All of those vessels are equipped with variants of the BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missile.  Collectively, those five destroyers had dozens of Tomahawks that could be employed against the terrorists in Benghazi, including newer variants that can be rapidly retargeted.  And lest we forget, there was at least one UAV over the consulate during much of the attack, providing a potential source of coordinates.  

Would cruise missiles be an optimum choice for this scenario?  Hardly.  There was a risk of collateral damage, and given the flight time for the missiles (anywhere from 45 minutes to a couple of hours), it is possible that some of the terrorists would disperse before the Tomahawks arrived.  However, since the attack lasted for hours, there is also a good chance that cruise missiles would have killed scores of bad guys, since information from the UAV could have been used to update target locations while the missiles were en route.  And, it's quite likely that targeting officers had previously identified terrorist facilities in the Beghazi which could have been targeted as well.  Even if the Tomahawks weren't an ideal weapon, they were the best option available. 

Of course, the launch order never came.  Much of what happened that night at the White House, the Pentagon and the State Department has never been revealed, and for obvious reasons.  There is an ample body of evidence that suggests the Benghazi consulate was involved in arms smuggling to the Syrian rebels, a program that apparently began with then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and former CIA Director David Petraeus.  The plan to funnel arms from Libya to Syria was the subject of at least two major articles in The New York Times, so the link is hardly the product of right-wing conspiracy theorists. 

Existence of the arms transfer operation--along with the purported "lack" of military assets--was enough to send our leaders scrambling for the tall grass as terrorists attacked our consulate.  We still don't know what President Obama was up to during much of that evening; he was at the White House, but save his late afternoon meeting with the SecDef and JCS Chairman--and a 10 pm phone call with Hillary Clinton--the Commander-in-Chief was off the radar.  Ms. Clinton was on a diplomatic mission to the Far East at the time, but she, too, was remarkably uninvolved.  The same might be said of Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and General Martin Dempsey, the nation's senior military officer.  Despite months of Congressional probing, we still don't know what they did after meeting with the President, and informing him of the attack on the consulate. 

The administration narrative from that night suggests that nothing could have been done to assist our diplomats and security contractors in Benghazi.  But that explanation doesn't wash; clearly there was time for a cruise missile strike (at a very minimum) and there have been other hints about military assets that were expected to arrive.  Why, for example, did former SEALs (who responded to the consulate attack) actively "paint" targets with their laser designators? From their training and combat experience, Ty Woods and Glen Doherty knew that jihadists use their cell phones to spot individuals employing laser designators.  So, Woods and Doherty would not have used those devices unless air assets were overhead, or expected very shortly.                                   
They never arrived, and the two men were later killed by accurate mortar fire.  Meanwhile, millions of dollars in cruise missiles remained in their launch tubes on Navy ships positioned around the Med, waiting for the launch command that never came.     

Tuesday, February 11, 2014

Today's Reading Assignment

Prioritizing Patriot...a couple of opinion pieces on the need to continue upgrades to our venerable air defense system, from (Ret) Major General Richard Rowe, writing at The Hill, and Colonel John Venable (USAF, Ret) at National Review on-line.  Both acknowledge the current, austere military procurement environment (and that's an understatement).  But they also emphasize that--even in the sequestration era--keeping the Patriot system updated and viable in a necessity.     

Friday, January 31, 2014

A "Culture of Fear"

More bad news for the boys and girls in blue: the cheating scandal among Air Force nuclear missile launch officers at Malmstrom AFB, Montana is growing. 

The Associated Press reports that 90 launch officers--roughly half the number assigned to Malmstrom--have been implicated in the scandal, which involved texting correct answers to a monthly certification exam.  Early reports suggested that a smaller number of missileers had been identified in the cheating scandal, which grew out of a separate drug investigation.

So why were so many launch officers cheating on the exam?  Air Force officials are placing part of the blame on a "culture of fear" among missileers, who worried that their careers would end if they didn't achieve a perfect score.   From the AP account, via Air Force Times:

"...“These tests have taken on, in their eyes, such high importance, that they feel that anything less than 100 could well put their entire career in jeopardy” even though they only need a score of 90 to pass, said [Air Force Secretary Deborah] James. “They have come to believe that these tests are make-it-or-break-it.”


The launch officers didn’t cheat to pass the test, “they cheated because they felt driven to get 100 percent,” she said.

Of the 92 officers implicated so far, as many as 40 were involved directly in the cheating, Wilson said. Others may have known about it but did not report it."

Previous reports on problems in the Air Force nuclear enterprise have indicated other problems, including low morale, frustration and job dissatisfaction.  Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel recently ordered a full investigation into the nation's nuclear forces, and Secretary James (along with the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Mark Welsh) recently visited nuclear bases in North Dakota, Wyoming and Montana. 

If this sounds like a case of bureaucratic deja vu, it should.  After the infamous, unauthorized "transfer" of nuclear-tipped cruise missiles from Minot AFB, North Dakota to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana in 2007, the Air Force spent months--and billions of your tax dollars--to fix its nuclear units.  When progress in that effort lagged, the-Defense Secretary Robert Gates fired the Air Force Secretary and the Chief of Staff.  But there have been more problems since the "fix" was completed, and Hagel's directive suggests that he is growing impatient. 

We've outlined permanent fixes for the USAF's nuclear woes in previous posts, and it's anything but rocket science (no pun intended).  Pick the right people, train them to exacting standards, demand full accountability and reward them for outstanding performance.  Individuals who can't measure up should be weeded out of the force as soon as possible.  Sitting in a Minuteman III launch control center with   the keys to unleash nuclear destruction is not a job for slackers, malcontents or whiners. 

To be sure, there are more exciting jobs in the Air Force, and if dissatisfied missileer are looking for something a little less routine, they might consider cross-training.  But they should also remember that the career grass always looks better on the other side of the AFSC fence.  Just ask the security forces officer who (along with his airmen) spends more time in the missile field--in the weather--protecting strategic assets.  Or the supply officer who is responsible for millions of dollars in logistics and personnel, but only gains attention when a needed item is on back-order, or one of his specialists screws up. 

Then, there's the maintenance officer who struggles to ensure that his wrench-benders can keep aging aircraft in service.  Or the intel guy whose analysis is deemed incorrect by everyone from aircrews to the wing commander.  Even pilots aren't immue from duty that doesn't live up to its original billing.  A lot of young men and women who dreamed of strapping on an F-22 now spend their day flying a drone by remote control, convinced that their peers who fly "real" aircraft  will get the promotions and choice assignments. 

Which leads us to another point: why are junior officers so worried about promotion.  Most missile launch crews consist of a junior Captain (who serves as the crew commander) and a lieutenant, who functions as the deputy.  And, it's not unusual to find a First Lieutenant as the MCC and a new "butter bar" as his deputy.  Did we mention that the promotion rate from O-1 to O-2 is around 99%, and more than 95% o all First Lieutenants make Captain, even in missile squadrons.  Put another way: it's a long way from your first or second tour as a launch officer and the first "real" promotion board that considers you for advancement to Major (O-4).  Plenty of time for a young officer to do the "right" things that will get them that gold oak leaf, or make a mistake that will kill their chances.  Flunking one certification test should not be enough to wreck a career. 

As a remider, your humble correspondent was never a launch officer.  But I was an aircrew member for several years, meaning I had to meet certification standards for my position, including periodic written evaluation and at least one check-ride a year.  I also served as an aircrew instructor and flight examiner, meaning that I've also been one of the "black hats" that evaluates crew performance.  In my experience, failures on written exams and check-rides were extremely rare and when there was a failure, the crew member was quickly re-certified after remedial training and another airborne evaluation.  Put another way: I can't remember a single failed check-ride that ended someone's career.

Having said that, I can also empathize with the crew dogs at Malmstrom, Minot and F.E. Warren.  As the Air Force down-sizes (along with the rest of the U.S. military), there will be significant personnel cuts, and junior officers are a prime target, along with first-term airmen and mid-career NCOs.  As a survivor of two reduction-in-force (RIF) exercises in the USAF, I can only say that the best way to avoid the axe is to do a superior job and separate yourself from the rest of the herd.   Obviously, cheating on a certification test is not the way to achieve separation. 

As noted in a recent post, the best way to rebuild the ICBM business is by recruiting (and retaining) better people.  That's why we've suggested that more missileers be drawn from the ranks of prior-service officers who earn their commissions through Air Force Officer Training School.  Many of those individuals have 4-10 years of experience before becoming an officer.  They're more experienced, more mature, and less likely to engage in the idiocy that is now plaguing missile squadrons. 

One thing is certain: the USAF ICBM force needs to get its house in order--and quickly.  Lest they forget, the current commander-in-chief favors slashing the U.S. nuclear asenal, and his Defense Secretary, Mr. Hagel, has publicly advocated the elimination of land-based nuclear missiles.  More screw-ups in places like Minot, Malmstrom and F.E. Warren could provide just enough ammunition to eliminate land-based ICBMs from our strategic inventory, once and for all.  That is truly something to fear.                                      

                               

Wednesday, January 29, 2014

The Mess Down South

There are at least a couple of "teachable" moments from the winter storm that has paralyzed much of the south. 

First, as is often the case during a weather-related debacle, there are the inevitable claims that "we didn't know it [the storm] was coming.  But that wasn't the case in Atlanta.  Marshall Shepherd, a professor of meterology at the University of Georgia, notes that the National Weather Service issued a winter weather advisory for much of the state--including the metro area--on Monday morning, almost 36 hours before the storm arrived:

"...Watches and Warnings were issued in advance of the snow event and with plenty of time for decisions to be made. Here is text directly from the National Weather Service website on MONDAY at 4:55 am:


CLAYTON-COBB-DEKALB-GWINNETT-HENRY-NORTH FULTON-ROCKDALE-

SOUTH FULTON- INCLUDING THE CITIES OF...ATLANTA...CONYERS...DECATUR...

EAST POINT...LAWRENCEVILLE...MARIETTA

455 AM EST MON JAN 27 2014

...WINTER STORM WATCH IN EFFECT FROM TUESDAY MORNING THROUGH

WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON...

Early on Tuesday morning well before the crack of dawn (3:39 am to be exact), the National Weather Service issued a Winter Storm Warning with expectations of 1-2 inches of snow. Even for the mountain counties of Georgia, Winter Weather Advisories were issued."   

Someone might ask Georgia Governor Nathan Deal and Atlanta Mayor Kasim Reed if they bothered to check the local forecast on Monday or Tuesday.  Ditto for the school superintendents who decided to hold classes with a winter storm heading their way.

And even for those who insist that the NWS warning came later, you can argue there was still enough time to cancel classes in Metro Atlanta (and other areas), preventing kids--and teachers--from being stranded at school.  At mid-day Wednesday, many of those youngsters and educators were still on campus, after a night of sleeping in their classrooms, or on the gymnasium floor.  In some cases, parents walked miles to school to stay with their kids.  There were also stories of teachers trudging through the snow to get medicine for students with serious medical conditions, and restaurants that remained open, providing food to kids stranded on school buses.  

So, what made it imperative to hold school on Tuesday?  For starters, administrators don't like to interrupt the school calendar, especially if it means "make-up days" during spring break, on the weekend, or after the scheduled end of the school year.  There's also the matter of informing school staff, some of whom arrive for work before 5 am. 

But there's a fiscal component as well--and it goes beyond the cost of heating empty buildings, or recalling buses that may have started their routes.  As we've noted in the past, schools make every effort to continue classes until early afternoon, because a significant portion of their funding is tied to the federal school lunch program.  The more kids who are eligible for free or reduced meals, the more money a district collects each year. 

And since the feds keep tabs on the number of students who are fed each day, there is an incentive for schools to remain in session past lunch time.  In some districts, more than 75% of students participate in the lunch program, so keeping them out of the cafeteria for a couple of days could have an impact on the system's finances.  We're not saying that was the primary factor behind yesterday's closing decision, but it is a fiscal reality that schools cannot ignore.

It's also a "use or lose" situation.  If allocated money isn't spent, the district may receive less funding in the future.  Colorado school officials are currently under fire for not spending $700,000 allocated for school lunches in recent years.  The state spends about $175 million a year for school lunches; 97% of that money comes from the federal government.  Flexible spending rules also allow districts to use money tied to the program for other purposes, such as administrative costs. 

Government also plays a role in another teachable moment from yesterday's disaster.  At a press conference this morning in Atlanta, reporters asked Mayor Reed about the "slow response" to the snow emergency, and what he might do differently, if confronted with a similar situation in the future.  Without missing a beat, Reed proposed a "staggered" release plan for schools, government offices and businesses, to prevent the sudden flood of vehicles that created massive gridlock on Atlanta's freeway system.  

A staggered release plan sounds good in theory, but (so far) no one has asked Mayor Reed how you actually implement such a system.  Yes, you can establish a uniform dismissal time for local schools, but how do you tell a private business when they can let their employees go home?  The same holds for local government offices, where such decisions are often left to on-site managers--and rightfully so.  If I'm running the local social services office and most of my employees need to pick-up their kids from school (which are closing early), how can I keep them at work for another couple of hours--and off the road?             

There's a better solution, and it involves training and preparing for "worst case" scenarios; making tough calls before a situation becomes a crisis, and "encouraging" local officials to do the same thing.  Had schools in Georgia and Alabma been closed on Tuesday, much of the chaos that unfolded later in the day could have been easily avoided. 

Atlanta will never have a snowplow fleet that equals Chicago, and it doesn't make much sense to stockpile vast quantities of salt and road treatment chemicals that may be used only twice during a decade.  But leadership at the state and local levels can mitigate winter weather emergencies by being proactive and making the right decision.