Under the Umbrella

Haaretz reports that President-elect Barack Obama will offer Israel additional protection against an Iranian nuclear attack, A source close to the incoming administration says Mr. Obama will propose placing Israel under our nuclear umbrella, meaning that any Iranian nuclear strike would bring a "devastating response" from the United States.

The Obama team is not the first to suggest such a policy. Earlier this year, columnist Charles Krauthammer urged the Bush Administration to issue a "Holocaust Declaration," fashioned after President Kennedy's famous words during the Cuban Missile Crisis:

"It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear attack upon Israel by Iran, or originating in Iran, as an attack by Iran on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon Iran."

The statement, he continued, should be accompanied by a simple explanation:

"As a beacon of tolerance and as a leader of the free world, the United States will not permit a second Holocaust to be perpetuated upon the Jewish people."

Former Democratic Presidential candidate (and Secretary of State designee) Hillary Clinton offered a similar proposal during this year's campaign. During a debate with Mr. Obama in April, Mrs. Clinton suggested that the American nuclear umbrella be extended to Israel and friendly Arab states in the Middle East, as a hedge against Iran.

Dr. Krauthammer, Senator Clinton and Mr. Obama's national security advisers believe that such a declaration offers the best hope for deterring Iran. And, at first blush, it's hard to disagree. Negotiations efforts aimed at curtailing Tehran's nuclear ambitions have been a dismal failure. The same holds true for economic and political sanctions.

In terms of U.S. military options, those were essentially derailed by last year's National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) which declared that Iran suspended its nuclear weaponization program, while accelerating other efforts that will eventually lead to a bomb. It was an amazing bit of analytical gymnastics that proved--once again--that key elements of our intelligence community view the current administration as more of a threat than Tehran.

But would such a guarantee actually deter Iran? Scott Johnson at Powerline reminds us of a particularly astute observation by Middle East scholar Bernard Lewis, who observed:

"Iran's leadership comprises a group of extreme fanatical Muslims who believe that their messianic times have arrived." {For the Iranian regime] "mutually assured destruction is not a deterrent factor, but rather an inducement" because the regime's authorities believes it "can hasten the final messianic process. This is an extremely dangerous situation of which it is important to be aware."

It's also worth noting that placing Israel under our nuclear umbrella carries other risks, as we outlined in this April post. For starters, it could limit Israel's ability to defend itself. With the largest nuclear arsenal in the Middle East--and multiple delivery platforms--the Jewish State is more than capable of meeting the Iranian threat:

For argument's sake, let's say an Iranian attack achieves operational surprise, and the initial strike eliminates one-third of Israel's nuclear arsenal (highly unlikely). That still leaves Tel Aviv with almost 150 warheads for a retaliatory attack. We should also note that Israeli weapons are much more powerful than those initially available to Iran. In other words, Israel's nukes carry a far bigger punch and they would inflict far more damage and casualties--against more targets--than Iran's first strike.

Additionally, Tehran faces the daunting challenge of pinpointing and accurately hitting Israel's nuclear arsenal. True, Iranian intelligence knows the location of Israeli fighter bases and its primary missile installation, but their ability to track dispersed aircraft and missiles is severely limited. That task is further complicated by the IDF's extraordinary skills at military denial and deception. Virtually every successful campaign waged by Israeli forces has been accompanied by a detailed deception campaign, giving the IDF strategic or tactical surprise. Given that history, it's quite possible that Israel would beat Iran to the punch (with its own preemptive strike) or inflict a devastating counter-strike, utilizing aircraft and missiles that survived Tehran's initial onslaught.

So far, Israeli officials haven't exactly embraced the Obama proposal, for obvious reasons. Not only could it limit Israel's strike options, the security pledge also suggests that the U.S. is willing to come to terms with a nuclear-armed Iran. From the Israeli perspective, security guarantees against an Iranian regime with nuclear weapons are simply unacceptable:

"What is the significance of such guarantee when it comes from those who hesitated to deal with a non-nuclear Iran?" asked a senior Israeli security source. "What kind of credibility would this [guarantee have] when Iran is nuclear-capable?"

The same source noted that the fact that there is talk about the possibility of a nuclear Iran undermines efforts to prevent Tehran from acquiring such arms.

Earlier this week, Mr. Obama said he would offer Iran economic incentives for abandoning its nuclear program. If that fails, he promised to intensify sanctions against the Islamic Republic.

Readers will note that the president-elect and his advisers still haven't said what will happen when Tehran rejects those incentives and the sanctions don't work. Or (alternatively), they take a page from the North Korean playbook and accept the economic carrots, while taking their nuclear program underground. What happens then?

It's quite a jump from failed sanctions to a U.S. nuclear counter-strike. Caution--and common sense--dictate that Washington have some sort of intermediate steps, or at least allow Israel to defend itself. In its current form, the Obama's proposed policy for dealing with Iran--and ensuring Israel's security--has some rather gaping holes. No wonder Tel Aviv reacted with such skepticism.

Doing the Right Thing

Like thousands of other young Americans, Joseph Weston joined the military in search of a brighter future. Tired of his part-time position at a restaurant--and few other jobs available in his hometown of Cadillac, Michigan--Weston enlisted in the Air Force, with plans to become a jet engine mechanic.

But Weston never made it to tech school. In fact, he never completed basic training. Less than two weeks after he arrived for basic training at Lackland AFB, Texas, Weston received a stunning diagnosis from Air Force doctors. He was suffering from acute lymphoblastic leukemia, a form of blood cancer that is extremely rare--and often deadly--in adult patients.

Basic training and technical school were put on hold, as Weston began a battle to save his life. He underwent months of grueling chemotherapy that put the disease in check, but left his body weakened. Then, the USAF bureaucracy delivered a second, devastating verdict. A personnel evaluation board (PEB) determined that Weston is unfit for service, because of his leukemia.

While that was hardly surprising, the second part of the board's ruling came as a shock. The panel determined that Weston's illness was a pre-existing condition, meaning that he would be discharged without a pension or medical benefits.

But Weston's doctor disagrees with the board's decision, as Erik Holmes of Air Force Times reports:

“In my opinion, there wasn’t a way to prove that [the cancer] was there two weeks beforehand” when he started basic training, said Maj. (Dr.) Della Howell, a pediatric hematologist and oncologist at Lackland’s Wilford Hall Medical Center. “These types of leukemias ... are acute in nature so they do occur fairly rapidly. ... I didn’t think they could prove [whether] it’s pre-existing or not.”

Weston is appealing the physical evaluation board’s Oct. 29 ruling. The secretary of the Air Force Personnel Council will rule on the appeal, though there is no word when that decision will be rendered.

A spokesman for the PEB declined to comment on the case.

For now, Weston is on base at quarters provided by Fisher House, the private-public venture that offers housing and services to sick and injured military members and their families. He is undergoing a chemotherapy regimen of intravenous injections, pills, muscle injections and painful spinal taps. His treatment is scheduled to last 2½ to three years and will cost hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Without a temporary disability retirement, Weston will return to Michigan without medical benefits --and facing a likely gap in his treatment. While he would qualify for coverage through Medicaid, the Social Security disability program and the Michigan Department of Veteran's Affairs, establishing those benefits would take time, delay treatment and increase chances for a relapse.

We understand that the military isn't a social welfare agency and there are established rules for who does--and doesn't--receive benefits. But there is no indication that Weston was suffering symptoms of the disease before he reported to basic training, and Dr. Howell says it's impossible to know if the leukemia was a pre-existing condition.

That should be good enough for the Air Force, but then again, personnel boards aren't always know for rational decisions. Consider the case of Major Jill Metzger, the personnel officer who disappeared during her deployment to Kyrgyzstan a couple of years ago. Metzger claimed that she was abducted, but there is considerable evidence that she faked her disappearance. She later claimed to be suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, and was received a temporary disability retirement--the same type of discharge being sought by Joseph Weston.

Clearly, the ruling in one case should not affect a decision in another. But the Metzger case is an absolute travesty, a case that has stirred enormous discontent within the ranks. And for good reason. Metzger got her retirement (and pension) in near-record time, while scores of combat-wounded warriors from Iraq and Afghanistan are still trying to work their way through the system.

If Jill Metzger deserves benefits for her "injuries" (and we use that term loosely), how can the Air Force deny someone who is genuinely deserving, like Joseph Weston?

The Man Who (Almost) Discovered Elvis

Fred Cook died last week at the age of 83. The name may not ring a bell unless you grew up in the Mid-South, where Mr. Cook was a popular radio and TV personality for more than 50 years.

With his partner John Powell, Cook co-hosted "The Zero Hour" on WREC-AM for more than a decade during the 1960s and 70s. Even today, it's hard to describe what made the program--and the duo--so special. In some respects, it was the radio equivalent of "Seinfeld." They talked about everything (and nothing), but did it with a whimsical style that was legendary.

Long-time WREC announcer Allan Tynes reminisced about the show (and its hosts) in a 2007 post on a radio message board. He remembers that "The Zero Hour" began, quite literally, by accident:

WREC-AM was located in the basement of the Peabody Hotel in 1964. A fire started one day and most of the power was lost for several hours. I believe John was on the air at the time doing his regular midday show. The power loss did not cause WREC to go off the air. Fred came into the control room and the two of them sat in the dark and talked on the air while firemen came and went around them searching for the fire and putting it out. The entertaining conversation they held under those circumstances must have been amazing. Listeners enjoyed it immensely for the two had caught lightning in a bottle while talking over the little bright wire there in the dark basement of the Peabody.

In the weeks that followed, Fred and John discussed the event often and gradually the idea for a program evolved. I believe the first broadcast date for "The Zero Hour" was September 1, 1964. (At least that's the date of their 3rd Anniversary Show three years later.) The format was simply the two of them talking for an hour about anything that came into their heads. The commercials were live and unrehearsed. Almost the only thing pre-produced was the theme music. The show opened with a Gong sound effect followed by a song titled, "Clinkerated Chimes" from the "Musically Mad" album by Bernie Green and the Stereo Mad-Men (RCA/1958). Yes, it had a picture of Alfred E. Newman on the cover. There were other musical themes for the various bits they did, but no structured music or produced commercials like you would hear the other 23 hours of the day on WREC.

"The Zero Hour" became a popular addition to the WREC lineup and they did the show until about 1975 or 1976, I think. Ownership of WREC changed and Fred was fired and John went with WREC(G)-TV full time. Don't ask!

[snip]

Fred and John's bits included "Fremont Filligree the Poet and Ziggy, the Organ Player", "Gunfolks", a fabulous rendition of "The 12 Days of Christmas", "Frantic Fred, the Rock DJ" and many more. John wrote the material and usually played the straight man and they were hilarious. They had guests occasionally, but most of the time it was just the two of them. If you ever heard them, there's no need for any analysis. If not, well, I'm sorry for you. They were much better than Godfrey, in my book, better than anybody else I ever heard on the air with the possible exception of Bob and Ray.

Save a few tapes in boxes or snippets loaded onto computer hard drives, there are few surviving examples of "The Zero Hour." Powell and Cook reunited (briefly) in the early 1980s, but it wasn't the same. Today, they'd have a syndication deal and hefty bank accounts, but sadly, the hosts--and their program--were decades ahead of their time.

These days, John Powell is semi-retired and living in Arkansas, though he still does some work for a small radio station in Hardy. Fred Cook remained active as a Memphis broadcaster until the end of his life, lending his booming voice to countless radio commercials. He also served as the public address announcer for University of Memphis basketball games for two decades, beginning in the early 1970s.

Mr. Cook had one other claim to fame that (might) have put his career on a very different path. In 1954, someone from Sun Records brought Cook a release from a new singer named Elvis Presley. Cook played the record for about a minute, then pulled it off the air. "That's the worst s--t I've ever heard," he exclaimed, predicting that the artist had "no future."

Sometimes, even the greats get it wrong. And for a generation of Mid-South radio listeners, there was no doubting the talent--or genius--of Fred Cook, despite his disdain for rock and roll.

R.I.P.

Expanding the Arsenal?

Israel's Channel 10 reports that Iran has tripled the number of medium-range missiles in its arsenal.

According to the report, Iran possessed 30 Shahab-3 missiles at the beginning of 2008. Currently, the country claims to have over 100 over long-range missiles capable of hitting Israel.

While the ability of the Islamic Republic to strike any point in Israel has long been known, this latest build-up potentially points to an Iranian intent to launch a protracted counter-strike against those who seek to destroy its nuclear program.

The claim was reprinted by the Jerusalem Post, which has been unable to confirm the report.

While Iran has been working feverishly to expand its missile inventory, it would be helpful to know the types of missiles included in the count. The "Shahab" designator is used for a family of missiles and space launch vehicles, with a maximum range of 1300-1600 km, depending on the variant.

Based on the North Korean "No Dong" design, most Shahab models are powered by liquid-fueled engines, although Iran has reportedly test both a solid-fuel version and even a hybrid variant, using both liquid and solid fuel technology. Intelligence analysts believe that most of Iran's medium-range missiles are still liquid fueled, giving them a longer reaction time that solid-fueled systems, and making them more vulnerable to accidents.

Indeed, Tehran's missile program has been beset by failures--airframes that explode in flight, or don't achieve their advertised range. Additionally, there have been reported problems with missile launchers. Some accounts suggest that most of Iran's Shahab launchers cannot raise a fully-fueled missile to launch position. That means a longer preparation time--and a greater chance of being detected.

The launcher issue is an important consideration for any mobile missile force. Normally, there are three to four times the number of missile airframes, in comparison to the launcher inventory. Sustaining a missile offensive hinges, to a large degree, on maintaining a viable launcher force, with a rapid reload capability--and the tactics to prevent detection of missiles in the field.

Tracking down mobile missiles remains a challenge, despite improvements in technology. A few years back, the Israelis reported great difficulty in locating missile TELs (transporter-erector-launchers) within their borders--an area that's only a fraction the size of Iran. Compounding the the problem? The IAF's limited ability to sustain an air campaign, against targets more than 1,000 miles away.

At this point, Tehran still lacks the ability to mount a continuous missile and rocket barrage against Israel, as Hizballah did in the summer of 2006. But that's not necessarily a requirement for Iran. With a chemical or nuclear warhead, Tehran needs to put only one missile on target. But that reality is tempered by another fact; Israel still retains its own, massive counter-strike capability, with an arsenal that includes an estimated 200 nuclear warheads.

Shinseki's Other Legacy

Despite a military career spanned 40 years, General Eric Shinseki will be remembered for two things: his decision as Army Chief of Staff to award black berets to all soldiers--a uniform item previously reserved for Rangers--and most famously, his 2003 observation that the occupation of Iraq would require a force of "several hundred thousand" men.

According to urban legend, Shinseki's remarks on Iraq earned him the lasting ire of the Bush Administration, which forced him into retirement. It was a charge repeated by John Kerry in the first presidential debate of 2004, a charge that, regrettably, went unanswered by the commander-in-chief.

Flash-forward four years and General Shinseki now Barack Obama's nominee to head the Veteran's Administration. Based on his qualifications, few would argue with that choice. Not only does Shinseki offer decades of executive experience, he also knows something about the obstacles facing wounded and disabled veterans. As a young Army officer in Vietnam, Shinseki stepped on a land mine and suffered a mangled left foot. He underwent multiple surgeries and extensive rehabilitation before returning to active duty.

As VA Administrator, General Shinseki will be preoccupied with treatment programs, facilities and trying to contain rising costs. In that capacity, he won't be called upon for advice on troop levels and force structure, matters that defined his tenure as the Army's senior uniformed officer.

And that's unfortunate, for a couple of reasons. First, if what liberals claim is true--Shinseki's appointment is vindication of his views on Iraq (and those of Congressional Democrats), then the general still owes us an explanation of how he arrived at those numbers, and how they square against the events that followed. Secondly, he should clarify what actions he took (or didn't take) to prepare the Army for the challenges of Iraq. On both counts, the reality of Shinseki's record is less impressive than the carefully-cultivated legend.

In fairness, the general's comments on required troop levels for Iraq were offered reluctantly, in response to questions by Michigan Senator Carl Levin. Never one to miss an opportunity for political theater, Mr. Levin was aware of previous disagreements between the Chief of Staff an then-Defense Secretary Don Rumsfeld.

So, when Shinseki was called before Congress in February 2003 (one month before the Iraq invasion), Levin seized the opportunity. After repeated questions from the Senator, Shinseki finally offered his assessment on the number of troops required to stabilize Iraq after the invasion. That gave Mr. Levin and other war critics the soundbite they were looking for.

But, as National Review's Mackubin Thomas Rubin observes, the general's estimate was less of an operational projections and more of a wild guess. Owens, a retired Marine officer and a professor at the Naval War College, reminds us that Shinseki's numbers were "a straight-line extrapolation from very different environments," an analysis by Army historians based on experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo. Tom Ricks of the Washington Post--hardly a fan of the Bush Administration--reported that the study was criticized as "naive" and "unrealistic," more of a "war college exercise" than serious planning.

Rubin also reminds us that Shinseki's numbers were based on flawed operational assumptions. His belief that Iraq would need more troops was rooted in a belief that humanitarian operations, rather than an insurgency, would drive force levels in post-war Iraq. Accordingly, Rubin says that Shinseki was "right for the wrong reasons."

But even if General Shinseki deserves some credit on the occupation force issue, then he also bears some responsibility for an Army that was (initially) ill-prepared for Iraqi insurgency. Rubin quotes Army Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling, who wrote a savage critique of Army leadership in the April 2007 issue of Armed Forces Journal; reading between the lines, it's apparent that Shinseki is among those targeted:

For the second time in a generation, the United States faces the prospect of defeat at the hands of an insurgency. In April 1975, the U.S. fled the Republic of Vietnam, abandoning our allies to their fate at the hands of North Vietnamese communists. In 2007, Iraq’s grave and deteriorating condition offers diminishing hope for an American victory and portends risk of an even wider and more destructive regional war.

These debacles are not attributable to individual failures, but rather to a crisis in an entire institution: America’s general officer corps. America’s generals have repeated the mistakes of Vietnam in Iraq. First, throughout the 1990s our generals failed to envision the conditions of future combat and prepare their forces accordingly. Second, America’s generals failed to estimate correctly both the means and the ways necessary to achieve the aims of policy prior to beginning the war in Iraq. Finally, America’s generals did not provide Congress and the public with an accurate assessment of the conflict in Iraq

It's also worth remebering that General Shinseki was in a position to affect the Army that went to war in the spring of 2003. While it's barely mentioned in his biography, Shinseki spent more than two years (in the late 1990s) as the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations. In that post, General Shinseki is best remembered as an advocate for programs (and training) that still reflected a Cold War mindset.

Four years later, as the service's Chief of Staff, he was still fighting the same battles. One of his first showdowns with Don Rumsfeld was over the Crusader artillery system, an out sized, costly weapons system that was envisioned for the Fulda Gap, not the mountains of Afghanistan. And, we can't find any evidence of Shinseki fighting hard against the force cutbacks that hollowed our ground forces in the 1990s.

In other words, General Shinseki bears more than a little responsibility for our early failures in Iraq. But, because his force estimates put him squarely opposite the Bush Administration, his contributions to those problems are quietly forgotten.

No wonder Barack Obama nominated him for the VA. Whatever his faults, the president-elect is savvy enough to avoid unnecessary battles; sending Shinseki back to the Pentagon would have raised embarrassing (though valid) questions about his role in preparing the Army for Afghanistan and Iraq.

Mumbai Calling

Today's Wall Street Journal has a timely editorial on one of the critical--but under-reported-- lessons from the recent terrorist attack in Mumbai. As the Journal observes, the days of carnage in India serve as a stark reminder of how easily terrorists can mount a major strike.

Preventing a similar attack in the U.S. requires more than military might; it takes extraordinary effort and coordination between federal, state and local officials. But the local end of that effort may be in jeopardy, judging from recent letters between New York Police Commissioner Ray Kelly and U.S. Attorney General Michael Mukasey. As the Journal describes it, the anti-anti terror lobby has constrained Bush Administration intelligence programs, making it "harder to intercept terrorists before they strike."

Those constraints are having a major impact at the local level, where Commissioner Kelley--and other local counter-terrorism officials--claim that current intelligence laws are limiting their ability to prevent the next Mumbai. As the WSJ explains:

The city and the Justice Department are feuding over the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA, the 1978 domestic wiretapping law that was amended this year and requires a warrant to listen in on suspected foreign terrorists. Mr. Kelly says that Justice's FISA policies are "unduly constraining" his high-priority "international terrorism investigations in the greater New York area."

Two city applications for electronic surveillance, one in June and the other in September, got quashed -- not by the FISA court, but by Justice's own legal team. As a municipal outfit, the police intelligence division cannot appeal directly to the special FISA panel of rotating judges but must instead work through DOJ. Both cases are classified.

Mr. Kelly was furious and let Mr. Mukasey know it in a searing critique. Someone leaked the October correspondence late last month, and though each party blames the other, both have since walked back from public conflict. In any event, whoever leaked made his point. Mr. Kelly's letter exposed a "lack of urgency and excessive time lags" in processing FISA applications; as well as a bureaucracy that insists on "frequently long and unjustifiable delay," even "weeks of delay." This is disturbing enough given fast-moving terror plots.

But Mr. Kelly's main criticism -- "an unnecessarily protracted, risk-averse process that is dominated by lawyers, not investigators and intelligence collectors" -- is far more troubling. He believes that Justice is applying "inappropriately high standards of probable cause" that stop "close cases," which "involve considerable uncertainty," from ever going before a FISA judge.

Kelly's critique affirms the critique of the current system. Running wiretap requests through the FISA system is slow and sometimes cumbersome. And, the standards apparently established by Justice Department lawyers mean that some surveillance requests will never be approved. We can only wonder what terrorist plots may be percolating right now, because a wiretap petition failed to meet the requirements of probable cause.

The Journal reminds us that the real problem isn't federal standards, or the impatience of the NYPD. It's FISA itself:

FISA was passed before the advent of disposable cell phones, encrypted emails and high-speed fiber optic networks. Now we live in a world where terrorist communications that originate in, say, Peshawar happen to move through U.S. switching networks. The executive branch already possesses the Constitutional authority to monitor such communications, but Democrats and the political left claimed it was "illegal" under FISA.

Then the anti-antiterror bar filed multibillion-dollar lawsuits against the telecom companies whose good-faith assistance after 9/11 made such surveillance possible. The goal was to shut down the program, and the telcos made it clear they couldn't cooperate without Congress's blessing. Forced to choose between a Democratic deal that gave the companies legal immunity or giving up a key U.S. antiterror tool, President Bush chose the former. The price -- the one Commissioner Kelly is paying -- was narrowing the government's antiterror wiretapping powers.

What Democrats have done, in essence, is to insert an unelected judiciary into the wartime chain of command. As Mr. Kelly notes, this is producing a "lack of accountability" and "the lack of transparency into the inner workings of the FISA process." If some faceless FISA judge denies a surveillance request from Mr. Kelly and New Yorkers die as a result, that judge will answer to no one. Under current FISA rules, we won't even know who that judge is. Meanwhile, the very Members of Congress who insisted on FISA's limitations will blame the executive branch that they put under the supervision of those anonymous judges.

And, the power of those judges will likely increase under an Obama Administration and a Democratic-controlled Congress. Meanwhile, the terrorists keep plotting and Kelly's comments are a stark reminder that we are not immune from future attacks--particularly if we entrust key decisions to lawyers, not security officials.

Now,, That's What We Call Border Security

As Noah Shactman at the Danger Room notes, the U.S. government has been trying (with marginal success) to implement "high-tech" surveillance systems along our southern border. Current plans call for a series of "sensor towers," which will monitor the border and feed data to monitoring stations.

However, the so-called "virtual fence" has been affected by technical problems and staggering costs. Last May, Boeing announced plans to revamp the prototype, and it's still unclear how much we'll pay for the system. By one (inflated) estimate, the fence will cost between $300 million and $1.7 billion per mile; but even at a lower price, there are legitimate questions about how much security it will provide, and the long-term expenditures required to keep the sensors --and the technicians who monitor them--on the job.

Meanwhile, the Israelis have taken the concept of high-tech border security to another level. Aviation Week's Ares defense blog reports that the IDF is now operating remote-controlled weapons stations along the "hot" border with Gaza.

Developed by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, the network consists of weapons towers, mounting a remotely-controlled 7.62 mm or 50-caliber weapon, linked to an observation station. The observation post, manned mostly by female soldiers, monitors border activity around the clock. When an attempted border penetration (or other suspicious activity) is detected, operators can direct one or more towers to engage the targets. In addition to the tower-mounted guns, observers can also employ precision-guided missiles.

Obviously, we'll never have anything like the Israeli system in our country--that is, until terrorists detonate a nuke in an American city, and the plot is traced through our porous borders. There's nothing like mass casualties and a verified threat to change your way of thinking.

N/T: The Danger Room.

Warning Signs

On the 67th anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor, The New York Times is revisiting one of the key controversies surrounding that debacle. For years, urban legends--and a few historians --have claimed that U.S. intelligence intercepted a prearranged diplomatic message, providing a final warning of the pending strike.

The so-called "winds execute" message was a coded weather report, notifying Japanese diplomats around the world of a pending conflict with the United States, Great Britain or the Soviet Union. Upon receipt of the message, Tokyo's envoys were supposed to initiate the destruction of classified material and equipment, in preparation for war.

"East wind rain" was the signal for a looming conflict with the U.S. But was the signal actually transmitted, and did it provide a significant clue for American political leaders in Washington, and military commanders around the globe? According to a newly-published work, written by historians for the National Security Agency (NSA), the answer to the transmission question is a tentative yes, but it did not provide an unambiguous attack warning, as some have insisted.

In the history, “West Wind Clear,” published by the agency’s Center for Cryptologic History, the authors, Robert J. Hanyok and the late David Mowry, attribute accounts of the message being broadcast to the flawed or fabricated memory of some witnesses, perhaps to deflect culpability from other officials for the United States’ insufficient readiness for war. A Congressional committee grappled with competing accounts of the “winds execute” message in 1946, by which time the question of whether it had been broadcast had blown into a controversy. The New York Times described it as a “bitter microcosm” of the investigation into American preparedness.

[snip]

In an interview, Mr. Hanyok said there were several lessons from the controversy that reverberate today. He said that some adherents of the theory that the message was sent and seen were motivated by an unshakable faith in the efficacy of radio intelligence, and that when a copy of the message could not be found they blamed a cover-up — a reminder that no intelligence-gathering is completely foolproof.

Washington also missed potential warning signs because intelligence resources had been diverted to the Atlantic theater, he said, and the Japanese deftly practiced deception to mislead Americans about the whereabouts of Tokyo’s naval strike force.

“The problem with the conspiracy theory,” Mr. Hanyok said, “is that it diverted attention from the real substantive problems, the major issue being the intelligence system was so bureaucratized.”

Hanyok's claims are certainly valid--but only up to a point. For starters, serious students of our intelligence puzzle at the time of Pearl Harbor have long dismissed the significance of the "winds" message. Certainly the Japanese established such a system; it was outlined in a diplomatic message transmitted on 19 November 1941. But did Tokyo insert the message into a radio newscast in the days before Pearl Harbor? Evidence suggests that the Japanese made such a broadcast, but only after the attack was concluded:

“In the end, the winds code never was the intelligence indicator or warning that it first appeared to the Americans, as well as to the British and Dutch,” they wrote. “In the political realm, it added nothing to then current view in Washington (and London) that relations with Tokyo had deteriorated to a dangerous point. From a military standpoint, the winds coded message contained no actionable intelligence either about the Japanese operations in Southeast Asia and absolutely nothing about Pearl Harbor.

“In reality,” they concluded, “the Japanese broadcast the coded phrase(s) long after hostilities began — useless, in fact, to all who might have heard it.”

But excerpts of the NSA monograph--and the Times story--ignore the larger question of what warnings were available to U.S. officials. Recent books on the subject, including Robert Stinnett's Day of Deceit (2000) and George Victor's more recent The Pearl Harbor Myth: Rethinking the Unthinkable reveal that military and civilian leaders had at least 16 warnings of the attack, ranging from vague to clear.

These included the so-called "bomb plot messages," which divided the naval anchorage into a grid, to be used in planning attack runs on Pearl Harbor; decrypted intercepts by British and Dutch intelligence, which indicated that Japanese carriers were en route to Pearl Harbor, and radio direction finding that put the enemy fleet in Hawaiian waters on the night of 6 December 1941. As Victor writes, given that the Navy's "30-year expectation" that Japan would start a war with an attack on Pearl Harbor, "even one warning, from a reliable source," should have been taken seriously.

But dissemination of available information was uneven, and it's apparent that much of it was withheld from the commanders at Pearl Harbor, Navy Admiral Husband Kimmel and Army Lieutenant General Walter Short. While a number of mid-level intelligence officers urged sharing recently-received information with the Hawaiian command, their requests were rejected by superiors.

As a result, Kimmel and Short remained in the dark, concerned more about sabotage than the threat of surprise attack. When Japanese planes arrived on the morning of 7 December, they found our aircraft parked wingtip-to-wingtip, and most of the Pacific Fleet floating peacefully at anchor. Almost 70 years later, we can only speculate how Kimmel, Short and their subordinates would have reacted to the data that was denied them--and the extent of the information conspiracy within the U.S. government.

***
ADDENDUM: As Stinnett recounts in his book, Roosevelt seemed stunned by our losses at Pearl Harbor. "They caught our ships like lame ducks," he exclaimed to his Coordinator of Information, Colonel "Wild Bill" Donovan, who went on to head the OSS during World War II. But Donovan later disclosed that Roosevelt seemed "less surprised" by the attack than others at the White House, and claimed that "warnings" had been sent to Pearl Harbor in advance. Needless to say, there is no record of any advisory from the Commander-in-Chief.

Additionally, Stinnett provides another fascinating anecdote in the hours after the attack. CBS newsman Edward R. Murrow was invited for dinner at the White House days before the debacle. After supper, Murrow and Donovan participated in a private meeting with FDR.

After his session with the President, an agitated Murrow returned to his hotel room and paced the floor, unable to sleep. "It's the biggest story of my life," he told his wife Janet, "but I don't know if it's my duty to tell it or forget it." Whatever Murrow learned in that conversation with Roosevelt has never been disclosed. He carried that secret to his grave.

Beating the Rap

While military prosecutors claim an overall conviction rate of 98%, some defendants still manage to beat air-tight cases, raising questions about favoritism and double-standards in the armed forces justice system.

Case in point: Air Force attempts to court-martial Colonel Michael Murphy, the former head of the service's Legal Operations Agency. Murphy was on the fast-track for flag rank until it was discovered that the career JAG lacked an essential requirement for any military lawyer.

He didn't have a law license.

Colonel Murphy served as an Air Force attorney for more than 20 years despite being disbarred in two states, Texas and Louisiana. Murphy was disbarred in Texas for failing to file an appeal for a client, then lied about his past problems when applying for admittance to the Louisiana bar. When Louisiana learned about Murphy's previous difficulties, he was disbarred in that state as well.

But Murphy never divulged his problems to the Air Force, either, and he advanced steadily until the deception was discovered in 2007. A subsequent investigation resulted in charges of failing to obey a general regulation, conduct unbecoming an officer and larceny. At that point, most legal experts considered Murphy's conviction an all-but-done deal.

Fast forward a couple of years, and the case against Colonel Murphy is in tatters. Last September, the trial judge ruled that Murphy couldn't be punished for his crimes, even if he is convicted. The decision was based on the Bush Administration's refusal to release details of Murphy's classified duties as a member of the White House Military Office, where he served until 2005. Without that information, the judge decided, Murphy's lawyers would be unable to prove that their client had served honorably in the past.

Air Force attorneys have appealed the decision, but analysts believe it's a long shot. In any event, the Murphy courts-martial is now on hold, and there is some speculation that the remaining charges against him may be dismissed. At that point, the Colonel would be allowed to retire, pension intact.

And sadly, Murphy may not be the only officer to dodge a major legal bullet. The folks at MilitaryCorruption.com have been following the case of Navy Lieutenant Commander Rebecca Dickinson. Readers may recall that Commander Dickinson is the former Naval Academy staff member who supplemented her income by working as a high-priced call girl.

In fact, Dickinson worked for the notorious "D.C. Madam," Deborah Jean Pelfrey. Her "girls" performed favors for hundreds of rich and powerful clients in the nation's capital, and Pelfrey's arrest and prosecution made a lot of people nervous.

But Pelfrey carried most of her secrets to the grave. She committed suicide at her mother's home in Florida, not long after her conviction.

By comparison, Commander Dickinson won't be spending any time in jail. Despite admitting that she serviced over 200 clients (at $275 a pop, pun intended), Dickinson worked a plea deal with prosecutors, and wasn't prosecuted for her crimes.

The Navy seemed equally anxious to make the matter "go away," since some of Dickinson's clients were high-ranking military officers. As punishment for her role in the world's oldest profession, Dickinson received a reduction in grade, to lieutenant. However, she'll still receive her pension (worth an estimated $2330 a month) and other retirement benefits.

Libertarians--and others--have long argued that prostitution is a "victimless crime," and offenders don't deserve harsh punishment. But we'd argue that Dickinson's case is a bit different, given her status as a naval officer with a security clearance. For her indiscretions, Dickinson deserved more than a reduction in grade.

But in the military justice system, what you know, who you know (and the favors they perform) can sometimes trump official investigations and criminal prosecutions. That certainly seems to be the case with Colonel Murphy, and that former naval officer who worked as a hooker.

Big Day for Missile Defense

You could almost hear the champagne corks popping, from Vandenburg AFB to Washington.

Barely two hours ago--around 3:30 p.m., eastern time--an interceptor missile from the California base slammed into a target missile over the eastern Pacific Ocean. The test simulated the intercept of a long-range ballistic missile, like those being developed by North Korea and Iran.

Politically, today's test came at a particularly critical moment for the missile defense program. President-elect Barack Obama has voiced opposition to "unproven" missile defense systems, suggesting he may terminate them. The successful intercept provided a major boost for one of the key components of the missile defense shield, demonstrating the ability of ground-based interceptors to engage long-range ballistic threats.

The threat-representative missile was launched at 3:04 p.m. from Kodiak, Alaska, followed 19 minutes later by the interceptor missile. Over the next six minutes, the defensive missile maneuvered into the target's predicted orbit and delivered its kill vehicle, which destroyed the target missile.

Today's test featured several new operational wrinkles, as described by the Missile Defense Agency:

This was the first time an operational crew located at the alternate fire control center at Ft. Greely, Alaska remotely launched the interceptor from Vandenberg AFB. In previous interceptor launches from Vandenberg, military crews at the fire control center at Schriever AFB, Colo. remotely launched the interceptor.

The target was successfully tracked by a transportable AN/TPY-2 radar located in Juneau, Alaska, a U.S. Navy Aegis BMD ship with SPY-1 radar, the Upgraded Early Warning Radar at Beale Air Force Base, Calif., and the Sea-Based X-band radar. Each sensor sent information to the fire control system, which integrated the data together to provide the most accurate target trajectory for the interceptor.

The interceptor’s exoatmospheric kill vehicle is the component that collides directly with a target warhead in space to perform a "hit to kill" intercept using only the force of the collision to totally destroy the target warhead.

Initial indications are that all components performed as designed. Program officials will evaluate system performance based upon telemetry and other data obtained during the test.

According to MDA, today's test was the 37th successful hit-to-kill intercept (in 47 attempts) since 2001. But even that number is a bit misleading; most of the unsuccessful tests occurred in the early years of that period. As missile defense technology evolved, so has its accuracy and reliability.

Given his campaign rhetoric, most analysts still think that Mr. Obama may cut some missile defense programs. But the string of recent successes--including a successful firing of the Airborne Laser last month and February's dramatic intercept of a failing U.S. spy satellite by naval based-missile defense systems--will make that effort more difficult.

It's worth noting that the interceptor missile used in today's test was launched from the Ronald Reagan Missile Defense Site at Vandenburg. The Gipper's Dream, once derided as little more than science fiction, is steadily advancing toward reality.

Going it Alone

The Jerusalem Post reports that Israel is "drawing up plans to attack Iran's nuclear facilities," and is prepared to strike "without U.S. backing."

Officials in the Israeli Defence Ministry told the Post that while they prefer to act in consultation with the US, they were preparing plans that would allow them to act in isolation.

"It is always better to coordinate," a senior Defence Ministry official told the newspaper. "But we are also preparing options that do not include coordination."

But the day after the Post report appeared, Israeli defense officials appeared to back away from those claims, telling the U.K. Times a unilateral strike by the IDF would "probably fail" to take out all of Iran's nuclear facilities. That would leave Israel potentially vulnerable to an Iranian counter-strike, particularly after Tehran develops nuclear weapons.

“We could not risk an operation which would only partially succeed," one defence official told The Times.

Still, that unnamed defense official and at least one member of the Parliament refused to rule out the option of a unilateral attack. "There is always the option of Israel going it alone. It just does not seem like a good option at present time,” the Knesset member told the Times.

In fact, the thrust of both the Post account and the Times article are misleading. The Israelis have always understood that the chances for a joint attack against Iran are virtually nil, for obvious political reasons. Additionally, the Israeli government realizes that last year's National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) virtually eliminated the possibility of a preemptive U.S. strike. Given those realities, a unilateral Israeli attack is probably the only short-term military option for dealing with the Iranian nuclear threat.

That's why Israeli planning is based on the "go it alone" option. When Israeli Air Force officers outlined strike options with their USAF counterparts two years ago, the plans did not call for any American involvement. The Israelis even described options for forward basing--arrangements made without U.S. consultation.

As we've noted in previous posts, Israel has more than sufficient military power to mount an air strike against Iran. Two of the three potential routes (through Turkey and around the Arabian Peninsula) would take Israeli jets outside U.S.-controlled airspace.

Obviously, the most direct routing--across Iraq--would send IAF fighters through skies patrolled by the U.S. military. But the presence of American aircraft does not preclude the Iraq route. Even without the Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) codes mentioned in the Times account, the Israelis could still send their strike package through Iraq, and face only a moderate risk.

We base that assessment on several factors. First, in the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom (and the end of Saddam's air force), we removed AWACS aircraft and Patriot batteries from the country. Radar coverage of Iraq is now based largely on ground sites and controllers, who vector our fighters toward suspicious tracks. Due to terrain and other factors, ground based radar often has coverage gaps, particularly at low altitude, that could be exploited by an in-bound strike package.

Secondly, assuming that the Israeli formation is detected, it wouldn't be difficult to discern their intentions, based on its likely heading and composition. At that point, American commanders would face an immediate--and crucial decision--do they send our fighters against the IAF, or simply watch them go by? There's ample reason to believe that we would let the Israelis pass, knowing their destination.

Besides, the U.S. will be accused of complicity in the attack, regardless of our actual reaction. Just one more reason to let the Israelis pass, and make our protests later, through diplomatic channels.

However, with a new administration taking office, Israel may be less inclined to jeopardize its relationship with Washington. That's one reason that a flight path across southern Turkey may be Israel's most viable option. Taking advantage of rugged terrain and various deception options, IAF jets could fly through Turkish airspace with even lower odds of detection. In fact, many U.S. assessments of Israeli strike profiles are based on routing through Turkey, rather than Iraq.

This much we know: with Iran's nuclear program continuing apace, Israel's moment of decision is rapidly approaching. The Israeli government has long been prepared to "go it alone." The real question is when the "execute" order might be issued.

***

More on the Israeli decision-making process (and possible strike scenarios) from Rick Moran at RightWing Nuthouse.

Shadow War

The world's military powers are spending billions on information warfare (IW), but--for obvious reasons--they don't publicize their capabilities. As a result, we only get occasional glimpses of the growing battle in cyberspace, as illustrated by Russian attacks against Estonian computer networks in 2007, and more recently, against Georgian systems during the run-up to this summer's war with the Tbilisi government.

American capabilities in IW remain equally guarded, but there are occasional displays that make their way into the public arena. Earlier this year, at least three of Al Qaida's most important propaganda websites were shut down for over a month, after a series of cyber-attacks. While the culprits were never officially identified, western intelligence agencies were at the top of the list. The U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) has been following terrorist communications for years and has robust--though little-publicized--capabilities in cyber-attack.

Israel has also been busy in recent months, as detailed in a couple of items posted at Strategy Page. First, Israeli spooks hacked into the Syrian phone network and sent thousands of voice and text messages, offering a $10 million reward for information on missing Israeli soldiers. Syrian intelligence viewed the intrusion differently, speculating that the Israelis were actually trying to recruit spies.

The Israelis have also been active in Lebanon, inserting messages into Hizballah radio and TV broadcasts for the past two years. The Israeli messages point out errors in terrorist claims, or simply ridicule the organization. Israeli intelligence has also mounted a spam campaign against the insurgent's cell phone network, disseminating anti-Hizballah messages via voice and text.

These campaigns have an obvious propaganda value, but they also send a clear message to Israel's foes. The same tools used to "hack" terrorist communications networks can also be used to take them down. And so far, the insurgents seem (almost) powerless to stop it.

Information operations will be an essential part of all future conflicts, including those in the Middle East. Based on what little we've seen, the Israelis seem well-prepared to exploit the cyber realm in future campaigns against their foes.

Lest we forget, Syria's air defense network (reportedly) went dark before last year's IAF attack on that nuclear facility. As a result, Israeli jets flew unscathed across hundreds of miles of hostile territory, and returned without a scratch. That suggests a highly successful, targeted network attack that paralyzed Syrian air defenses and their supporting C2 network. It's the same technique that could be applied to Iran, as part of a strike against their nuclear facilities.

***
ADDENDUM: Speaking of Iran, it seems that the Israelis are already at work on that IW target. The Tehran government has admitted that a recently-executed spy allowed Israeli technicians to install monitoring devices on computer equipment bought by Iran. Apparently, some of the IT gear was delivered to facilites supporting Tehran's weapons program. More than likely, that intelligence coup provided valuable insights into Iran's nuclear development effort--and, quite possibly, the ability to "crash" those computer networks at a later date.

Bracing for that 3 A.M. Call

Before too long, British bookies will be taking bets on which early-morning crisis call Barack Obama will take first. Experts are now warning that the president-elect is facing a veritable "hornet's nest" in the Middle East, led by the prospect that Iran will have a nuclear bomb within a year.

Interestingly, predictions of impending crises from the West Bank to the Persian Gulf came from the Council on Foreign Relations and the Brookings Institution--organizations that are anything but unfriendly to the next commander-in-chief. The think tanks outlined their concerns in a joint report entitled Restoring the Balance, which offered a blue print for U.S. policy in the Middle East.

Gary Samore, one of the authors, said that the level of alarm over the “hornet’s nest” facing the President-elect in the Middle East, and the need for the swift adoption of previously untested approach, had inspired the decision to write policy for him. “New administrations can choose new policies but they can’t choose next contexts,” Mr Samore said.

The report paints a grim picture of the problems in the region but asserts that Mr Obama is still in a strong position. For the first time since the Iranian revolution the leadership in Tehran has endorsed the idea of talking directly with Washington, as Mr Obama has suggested. Falling oil prices also provide an opportunity, restricting Iran’s means to sponsor terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah that act as its proxy in the region.

As you might expect, the smart folks at Brookings and the CFR like the idea of a new diplomatic offensive. They believe the time is right to engage Iran, Syria and other adversaries in the region, an idea that Mr. Obama has also endorsed.

Unfortunately, the report (or at least the U.K. Telegraph's article on it) ignores a rather important question: What exactly, does the U.S. hope to gain from new talks with Tehran and Damascus? Readers will recall that Washington fully endorsed years of negotiations between the so-called "EU-3" (Britain, France and Germany) and Iran.

To date, those conversations have produced no concessions from Tehran on its nuclear program. Indeed, Iran's efforts to acquire nukes have actually accelerated during that period, leading to the dire prediction in the think tank report.

Having cast its lot with Tehran, Syria also would seem to be a poor candidate for negotiations. Readers will recall that Damascus has also spurred various overtures in recent years, and even launched a covert nuclear program during that time. Like its Iranian allies, the Syrians also see their power on the ascendancy. At this juncture, they have little incentive for serious negotiations, with Iran about to achieve an over-arching goal--the development of nuclear weapons--and Damascus will reap the benefits of that acquisition.

The policy wonks at Brookings and CFR would counter that Tehran is now in a weakened position, thanks to the recent, dramatic drop in oil prices. And, since Damascus depends on Iran for political, economic and military support, the Syrians would have little choice but follow Tehran's lead.

There's an element of truth in that assessment, but it also ignores the game-changing impact of the Iranian nuclear program. So close to achieving its goal, Tehran has no incentive to abandon its weapons development efforts. Why give up a program that will forever alter the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East and make Iran's position that much stronger?

That's the harsh reality facing the next administration. Diplomacy is fine, but so far, no one wants to talk about what happens when the talks fail. One of Mr. Obama's first early-morning calls may deliver the somber news that Iran has produced its first nuke, and is thumbing its nose at the global community. At that point, the time for negotiations is probably over. What comes next?

***

And, if that's not enough, a separate report warns that the U.S. should expect a nuclear or biological terrorist attack by 2013. The assessment, which will be published tomorrow, claims that the margin of safety in America is "shrinking, not growing," despite billions of dollars in new spending on homeland security. Produced by the bi-partisan Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, the report says that insurgents' deficiencies in those areas could be easily overcome, if they find scientists willing to share their expertise.

The document also describes Pakistan as the "intersection" of weapons of mass destruction, and terrorist efforts to gain those capabilities.

How Ookie Went Broke in the Big House

Sports Illustrated's Rick Reilly has the details, from bankruptcy papers filed by the former NFL star.

Some of the expenditures are rather revealing. Along with the "usual expenses" (high-powered lawyers like Billy Martin don't work cheap), Vick also spent thousands of dollars on everything from his family, to a stable of race horses he once owned. Incidentally, Vick told the court that "he doesn't know the name" of the man who cares for his horses.

But our favorite item was a $65,000 expenditure, used to purchase a 2007 Infiniti for his fiancee. She keeps the car parked near the Leavenworth, Kansas prison where Vick is housed, so she'll have something to drive during her visits.

Cost of a cab ride from the Kansas City airport to Leavenworth: $60.

The next NFL star to join Vick on the "prison-and-bankruptcy" roster? Plaxico Burress of the New York Giants, who seems determined to throw away his pro football career, and that recently-signed, $35 million contract.

Missed Signals

To no one's surprise, the investigation into last week's terror attack in Mumbai has already exposed missed warning signs, ignored intelligence and poor coordination among agencies that were supposed to protect residents of India's largest city and its foreign visitors.

Consider, for example, an October warning that was passed from U.S. intelligence agencies to their counterparts in India. American intel officials warned the Indians of a possible attack "from the sea against hotel and business centers in Mumbai."

According to ABC News, the advisory even listed potential targets for the strike, including the Taj Mahal hotel. Those suspicions were largely confirmed a month later, when India's SIGINT organization intercepted a satellite phone conversation from a number linked to Lashkar e Taiba, the terror group believed responsible for last week's attack. That phone call also revealed a possible sea-borne attack in the Mumbai area.

And, if that's not enough, the head of the local fisherman's association claims he wrote a letter to government officials a month before the terrorist strike, asking them to investigate "strange" boats at coastal villages near Mumbai. He never received an answer. It is now believed that the terrorists commandeered a fishing boat for the final leg of their journey from the sea.

In fairness, not all of the information was pigeon-holed by Indian security services. The chairman of the group which owns the Taj Mahal hotel tells CNN that security was temporarily increased after a warning was received in the weeks before the attack. However, the added measures were later removed, and the official claims that even the extra security "could not have stopped what took place."

But it is also apparent that much of Mumbai--including the city's security forces--were completely unprepared for last week's strike. That's one reason the attack dragged on for almost 60 hours, resulting in the deaths of almost 200 people.

Unfortunately, breakdowns in communications and threat warning are almost inevitable, given the fact that most police agencies are not cleared for classified information. Ever wonder why public threat advisories are so vaguely worded? In many cases, they're based on information supplied to law enforcement that is equally cryptic.

Obviously, some of that is by design; authorities don't want to tip their hand to the terrorists, or compromise on-going investigations. But in other instances, vague warnings reflect the classification "wall" that exists between intelligence organizations and local law enforcement. The problem that persists in this country as well, although some larger municipalities are establishing their own intelligence organizations, allowing them to access some classified data. It's almost a sure bet that the police department in Mumbai was unaware of those intercepted phone calls, and their potential implication for local security.

As India begins a lengthy investigation into last week's attacks, there are legitimate questions about what signs might be missed in the coming months. With rising military tensions between India and Pakistan, both governments will rely on their intelligence agencies for accurate detection, tracking--and assessment--of their adversary's intentions.

While intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities have improved on both sides, serious gaps remain. And, the task of keeping tabs with the other side has been made more complex by advances in denial and deception. Pakistan, for example, has invested heavily in D&D technology in recent years, designing and building nuclear storage bunkers that blend easily into surrounding terrain.

Islamabad has also created an elaborate network of shell companies and front organizations to hide its nuclear programs and facilities. In some cases, western intelligence agencies must sort through a dizzying array of phony designations and locations in pinpointing nuclear facilities. Pakistan has also developed a satellite warning program that allows them to conceal sensitive activities when western ISR platforms are overhead.

India has made similar strides in its deception efforts. Delhi's nuclear efforts remain equally close-guarded and its tactical D&D programs are, in some respects, even more advanced than those in Pakistan. The Indian military is one of the leading customers of Saab-Barracuda, the Swedish producer of state-of-the-art deception equipment. Saab-Barracuda actually has a factory in India, and virtually all of its output is for that nation's military.

Elaborate secrecy and lavish spending on D&D technology creates the same problem for India and Pakistan. Neither country has a particularly complete (or accurate) understanding of their arch-rival's intentions. And that leads to further miscalculations, as evidenced by the 1999 Kargil Crisis. Despite significant troop deployments--and fighting--in the region (part of the disputed Kashmir territory), there was no indication that either side was preparing for a full-scale invasion.

But without accurate intelligence, both countries misjudged the situation in Kargil (and its potential consequences). As the crisis continued, India and Pakistan prepared for a possible nuclear exchange. Western intelligence analysts later discovered that nuclear weapons were removed from storage and placed with delivery platforms. The revelation suggested gross miscalculations on both sides, or a much lower thresh hold for nuclear conflict than was previously thought.

In such an environment, the margin for error is extraordinarily high--and the potential consequences are even higher. That's why we should worry about what signs are now being missed on the Asian sub-continent, and in our own intelligence agencies. Imagery evidence of the near-nuclear conflict in Kargil wasn't discovered for almost a year. Concerns about what's being missed in the current India-Pakistan standoff extend well beyond their borders.

Mumbai Post-Mortem

The terrorist siege in Mumbai ended just hours ago, but experts are already offering their critique of how Indian officials handled the situation.

And the reviews are anything but kind. The New York Daily News was one of the first out of the box, quoting unnamed American experts who described Indian commandos as "clownish," suggesting that poor tactics and equipment problems led to a "Munich moment."

This wasn't the SAS digging knuckleheads out of some embassy," the chagrined official said.
Hesitating may have cost lives at places like the Mumbai Jewish community center, experts said.

"It's just like Columbine," insisted former FBI Hostage Rescue Team leader Danny Coulson, referring to the 1999 Colorado high school massacre. "If they're slaughtering people, you've got to go in."

Grenades were still blowing out windows at the Taj on live TV 48 hours after the horror began.
Indian authorities "were caught completely unaware," said Vince Cannistraro, a retired CIA counterterror chief.

Supposedly elite commandos appeared to be lacking standard tools: tear gas and masks, laser-sighted guns and stun grenades.

Questions about the response underscored by another, disturbing realization: the carnage in Mumbai was perpetrated by only 10 terrorists. At one location (the Taj Mahal Hotel), a single, surviving gunman kept counter-terrorism teams at bay for more than 24 hours before he was finally eliminated. Various reports suggest that terrorists had detailed knowledge of their targets, while police and military elements had trouble getting floor plans for the buildings they had to storm.

Still, any analysis of the Indian response should be tempered by this rather obvious fact: the ultimate "failures" in Mumbai represented the final mistakes in a long string of blunders that began months, even years, before the terrorist attacks.

The list begins with India's immigration and domestic security policies. Like most democracies, Delhi allows freedom of movement within its borders, even among foreign visitors. Nothing wrong with that, but it does mandate some vigilance in keeping track of who's in your country, and their potential ties to hostile regimes. Preliminary information suggests that at least one terrorist was a Pakistani national, and his team was "in constant contact" with a foreign country (you can guess which one) throughout the operation.

But planning for the terror strike began far in advance. Without going too far out on a limb, we'll predict that the investigation will reveal extensive preparations and planning, conducted with outside assistance. That type of activity (typically) produces a spike in chatter between various conspirators, and is often detected by signals intelligence elements. It will be interesting to learn what India's SIGINT element knew in the weeks leading up to the attack, and what information--if any--was conveyed to counter-terrorism officials.

At this point, it appears that such data was closely held--if it existed. There's no evidence that anyone in the Indian security apparatus tried to disrupt the plot, which moved steadily toward execution. The line of lapsed defenses includes Delhi's Navy and coastal security forces. By some accounts, the terrorists were delivered to the waters off Mumbai by a trawler, which was ignored as it approached the city.

As the attack unfolded, security and counter-terrorism forces were already behind the power curve. Responding to multiple attacks--unfolding at the same time--Indian forces were initially overwhelmed, and their tactical and equipment issues compounded the problem. Making matters worse, two of their most experienced counter-terror officers died early in the siege, in gun battles with the bad guys. Leading from the front isn't always the best idea.

Meanwhile, the terrorists were communicating with each other via text messaging, cell phone conversations and satellite phones. Television and radio coverage from the Indian media (and the western press) provided invaluable information on the government's response, allowing gunmen to adjust their tactical plans. It would not be surprising to learn that the remaining hostages in the Jewish Center died as commandos fast-roped onto the roof of the building--an event carried live on Indian TV, in broad daylight.

The details of these mistakes will become increasingly clear in the coming weeks, as the Delhi government conducts various inquiries into the terrorist attack and its aftermath. But the tragedy already offers a cautionary tale for the U.S. and other potential terror targets. While it is easy to criticize the Indian response, their failures bear an eerie resemblance to our own mistakes into the run-up to 9-11.

But we're beyond that, right? After all, the U.S. has spent billions on homeland security over the past eight years, closing the gaps that existed before that fateful day in 2001.

True, security has improved. But our borders are still porous, immigration remains a mess and there are serious issues in the sharing of intelligence information with local law enforcement. In other words, we remain vulnerable to the same, root problems that allowed a handful of terrorists to wreak havoc in Mumbai, and paralyze that city for almost three days.

The Enemy Within?

Shirwa Ahmed blew himself up last month, in a suicide bombing in northern Somalia. Ordinarily, such an event would attract little attention. In Somalia, where Al Qaeda has long sought an operational base, such events are not uncommon.

But Ahmed was a naturalized U.S. citizen who spent years in the Twin Cities before returning to his native land. And, more ominously, dozens of Somalis still in Minnesota have disappeared since Shirwa Ahmed launched his suicide attack. KSTP-TV in Minneapolis reports that federal authorities are now trying to determine if Ahmed was part of a terrorist recruiting network in this country:

More than a dozen young men of Somali descent, mostly in their 20s, from the Minneapolis area have recently disappeared, U.S. law enforcement officials tell 5 EYEWITNESS NEWS. All are thought to be associates of Ahmed. U.S. officials suspect most of the young men have departed for Somalia to fight in ongoing violence there or to train in terrorist camps. Family members of the young men are said to be distraught, trying to figure to out what happened to them, sources say.

So far, the investigation has not uncovered credible evidence of a plot targeting the U.S. but American officials want to track down all these young men before they can say for certain what this is or is not, according to ABC News. Sources say the situation is being closely monitored by senior law enforcement and intelligence officials in Washington.

CIA Director Michael Hayden recently voiced his concern about increased fighting in Somalia and the Horn of Africa and the desire of Al Qaeda to strengthen it's ties in Somalia.

According to General Hayden, the terrorist group is trying to rebuild its operational network in Somalia, two years after an Ethiopian-led invasion that crippled Al Qaeda's local operations.

Now, the question is whether that rebuilding effort extends to the U.S. homeland.

***
ADDENDUM: Another Minneapolis TV station, KMSP, estimates that at least 20 Somali men have left the Twin Cities in recent months. The "missing" men are believed to have retured to their homeland to participate in the Somali civil war, in which Al Qaida is a key player.

Ookie Cops Another Plea

The disgusting saga of Michael Vick took another turn today, this time in a Virginia courtroom.

Vick, the former Falcons star now serving a federal prison sentence for a dogfighting conviction, returned to the Old Dominion to face state charges on the same crimes.

Appearing briefly in a Surry County court, Vick entered a guilty plea to state dogfighting charges. He received a three-year suspended sentence--far less than the 10 years in prison he could have faced.

Vick's move is designed to speed his release from prison and return to the NFL. By clearing up the state charges against him, Vick becomes eligible for transfer to a halfway house, where he can spend the rest of his prison sentence.

Once the NFL's highest-paid player, Vick is now scheduled for release on 20 July 2009. He is now housed at the federal prison in Leavenworth, Kansas but the halfway house will probably be closer to his Virginia home. After release, Vick will be on probation through 2012.

After today's 20-minute hearing, members of Vick's family expressed relief that his legal ordeal is apparently coming to an end. But no one suggested that the proceeding was, to some degree, unnecessary. In many respects, the hearing was little more than a show trail, designed to help local authorities save face.

Make no mistake; we have no sympathy for Mike Vick. The one-time Virginia Tech phenom, who goes by the handle of "Ookie" is a cruel-hearted thug who actually deserved more prison time for his crimes. Lest we forget, Vick and his "Bad Newz Kennels" sent dozens of animals to their death in pursuit of his barbaric hobby, dogfighting.

But the NFL star's brutal pastime could have ended much earlier--if local officials had intervened. Neighbors around Vick's former estate near Smithfield, Virginia noticed something was afoot when he began constructing a massive kennel complex on the property--before building a $700,000 mansion.

There were also complaints about unusual activity at the home; the large number of pit bulls kept on the estate; crowds gathering on the weekend and suspicious sounds coming from the kennel area. But those complaints were ignored by the Surry County Sheriff's office and (as far as we can tell) they never warranted attention from the local prosecutor, Gerald Poindexter.

In fact, Vick's dogfighting ring wasn't discovered until April, 2007, when a police officer from Hampton, Virginia went to the house to question the quarterback's cousin, who had been arrested on marijuana charges. Disturbed by what he saw, the officer alerted state and county authorities.

A subsequent search of the property yielded compelling evidence of dogfighting activity. Officers discovered the carcasses of dead animals, scores of scarred dogs and "rape stands" in Vick's kennel, but Mr. Poindexter urged a "go slow" approach. Two months after the initial search, the prosecutor told local reporters that he "didn't have a single investigative report" in his files.

Meanwhile, U.S. attorney Chuck Rosenberg built an air-tight case against Vick and secured the pro quarterback's first plea deal in August 2007, only four months after the initial property search. State charges didn't come until after Vick went to federal prison.

Poindexter's "handling" of the case sparked outrage in Surry County, and a write-in campaign against the prosecutor. Unfortunately, he won re-election last year, and will remain on the job until 2011. Cynics say that's about the time that Michael Vick would have faced state dogfighting charges--had Mr. Poindexter been left to his own devices.

Half-Right

In our estimation, Air Force lawyers got it half-right in their arguments Friday before the service's Court of Criminal Appeals in Washington, D.C.

As we noted last week, the arguments were connected to the courts-martial of Colonel Michael Murphy, the former Commander of the Air Force Legal Operations Agency. He faces multiple counts of conduct unbecoming an officer, failure to obey a general regulation and larceny, after it was discovered that he served as a JAG for more than 20 years without a law license.

But even if he is convicted, Murphy may never spend a day in prison, or suffer any other penalties. In September, the trial judge ruled that Colonel Murphy could not be punished, because defense lawyers have been denied information on his classified duties as a member of the White House Military Office. Murphy served with that organization before assuming command of the legal operations office in 2005.

Without information from the White House, the judge ruled, Murphy's lawyers could not present the "good airman" defense at sentencing, which might reduce (or mitigate) potential sanctions.

In their arguments last Friday, Air Force prosecutors argued that the trial judge, Army Colonel Stephen Henley abused his authority and failed to consider less drastic alternatives. They also claimed the judge's ruling set a dangerous precedent, suggesting personnel with classified backgrounds could be "immune" from prosecution.

We understand that attorneys often present the "worst case" in their arguments. But it's silly to say that individuals with security clearances--or those who serve in sensitive billets--are immune from prosecution. More than a few former intel types and snake eaters have wound up in Leavenworth, proving that you can successfully prosecute military members with covert backgrounds. As a result, we don't think the "immune from prosecution" argument will carry much weight with the Chief Appeals Court Judge, Colonel James Wise.

On the other hand, we believe the prosecution team is on solid ground in stating that Judge Henley overstepped his bounds. With a 20+ military career behind him, Murphy and his legal team can cite countless examples of his past, "exemplary" service in mounting the "good airman" defense.

With only a limited knowledge of the appeals court and its rulings, we can't say how Judge Wise will rule in this matter. But it is relatively rare for an appellate court to reverse a trial judge, in both the civilian and military justice systems. That's why we'd be surprised to see Judge Wise to overturn the decision of his Army colleague.

But this is one case where a reversal appears to be in order. Allowing Murphy to go unpunished --and retire with a full pension--would set the worst possible precedence.

Environmental Irony

It's no secret that the broadcast networks have been shedding viewers at an alarming rate. And, as the economy sinks into a recession, the dinosaur nets face not only eroding audience levels, but declining advertising revenues as well.

So, how are the suits in the executive suite responding? As they normally do, with job cuts and ratings stunts.

Consider, for example, NBC's "Green" initiative. Touting its environmental "commitment," the network has created a website, instructing viewers on how they can "green" their routine, and they've worked the storyline into all of their shows.

Not that any one's paying attention. NBC's prime time audience ratings are down by double-digits this year, and a lot of GE executives can't wait until Super Bowl Sunday to recoup lost audiences and advertising. In the interim, their network is limping along with its environmental theme, looking for any hook or storyline to advance their eco-marketing ploy.

Even NBC's enormously popular (and profitable) "Today Show" is not immune. Last week, as part of the November sweeps, NBC news dispatched Today newsreader Ann Curry to climb Africa's Mount Kilimanjaro and report on its disappearing ice cap, supposedly the result of global warming.

But as Michelle Malkin and Newsbusters report, the network wound up with egg on its face. Given only three weeks to train, Ms. Curry never made the summit. And, her reporting on Kilimanjaro's vanishing snow cap was based more on hype, rather than fact.

With a little baisc research (you know, the stuff journalists are supposed to do before embarking on a story), Marc Sheppard of Newsbusters found that deforestation, not global warming, is the real reason for the shrinking ice mass on Africa's highest peak.

In an October of 2003 Nature Magazine piece, Betsy Mason explained why researchers blamed not global warming, but deforestation:

"Without the forests' humidity, previously moisture-laden winds blew dry. No longer replenished with water, the ice is evaporating in the strong equatorial sunshine."

A June 2007 study published in American Scientist, found that Kilimanjaro's melting had been going on for more than a century and most had occurred prior to 1953, when atmospheric CO2 levels were quite low. "Complex interacting factors" including a process called sublimation, which "occurs at below-freezing temperatures and converts ice directly to water vapor without going through the liquid phase" were cited.

That same year, South African nuclear physicist Dr. Kelvin Richard Kemm wrote in Engineering News that "It is not hot air melting the ice, but direct sunlight." Unlike the American Scientist team, Dr. Kemm stated as "scientific fact that there has been no measurable atmospheric warming in the region of Kilimanjaro,"based on satellite measurements of the region since 1979.

So what is causing the ice cap to melt? Once again, due to deforestation by locals "there is much less wet air moving up the mountain than there used to be, so less ice forms at the top."

Another effect of deforestation "mainly due to extensive farming" was named as recently as this August, in a report compiled by researchers Nicholas Pepin and Martin Schaefer of Britain`s Portsmouth University, who spent 11 days surveying the mountain`s glaciers. They too explained the drying effect a lack of forests cause, adding that:

"Loss of humidity automatically leads to a reduction in cloud cover. Clouds play a crucial role in protecting ice from sunrays, with fewer sunrays meaning faster freezing of water."

Mr. Sheppard also discovered that the NBC crew ignored basic safety guidelines for high altitude acclimation, increasing their risk for potentially-serious medical problems. But the snow-job had to go on, and Ms. Curry was a willing dupe.

Of course, a televised expedition to Africa is an expensive proposition, so NBC-Universal is facing an accounting challenge. How do you pay for a ratings stunt, with minimal impact on the corporate bottom line?

That brings us to GE's newest broadcast acquisition, The Weather Channel. While Ann Curry and her crew were climbing Kilimanjaro, the weather outlet was announcing major budget cuts. At least three on-camera meteorologists have been dropped, and in a bit of environmental irony, The Weather Channel's entire environmental unit was dropped.

Best known for such programs as "The Climate Code," and "Forecast Earth," the environmental crew offered no pretense of objectivity on its pet issue, global warming. In fact, their "climate expert," Dr. Heidi Cullen, once suggested that broadcast meteorologists should lose their credentials if they challenged the "scientific consensus" on the subject.

Despite heavy promotion, the environmental show never attracted much of an audience, and efforts to turn Cullen into a TV star were equally disastrous. "The Climate Code" was quietly cancelled, and Dr. Cullen was relegated into a secondary role on "Forecast Earth," fronted by former CNN (and MSNBC) anchor Natalie Allen.

While few viewers will mourn the TV demise of Heidi Cullen, the cutbacks also claimed two Weather Channel veterans, Dave Schwartz and Cheryl Lemke. While Ms. Lemke was something of an acquired taste (her broadcast style always struck us as mechanical an dull), Mr. Schwartz was one of the most popular on-camera mets at TWC. Not only was he adept at explaining the science of meteorology, he also reflected something rare at the channel: a genuinely engaging personality.

In their place, NBC will likely insert some of the younger (and cheaper) talent from "Weather Plus," the meteorology channel it started a few years ago. "Weather Plus" never caught on with viewers, prompting GE to spend more than $1 billion acquiring The Weather Channel from Norfolk-based Landmark Communications. The deal was finalized just months before the financial markets (and GE stock) tanked.

Still, General Electric is determined to turn its broadcast operations around. While the highly-paid anchors of "Today" are in no danger of losing their jobs (or a salary cut), meteorologists at The Weather Channel are definitely in danger. NBC and its parent corporation can't afford two weather outlets, and they'll run the "name" channel just as cheaply as they can.

Modernizing the Nuclear Arsenal

Over the past year, much attention has been paid to the "human" element of our nuclear arsenal. Embarrassing incidents at Minot AFB, North Dakota and Hill AFB, Utah prompted a comprehensive review of the Air Force's nuclear enterprise, and generated reforms aimed at bolstering experience and accountability among personnel who protect, service and handle nuclear weapons.

But the technology of our nuclear inventory also requires serious attention. The Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, Air Force General Kevin Chilton, emphasized that point in an interview with The Wall Street Journal. Among the world's major nuclear powers, the United States is the only one not investing in new weapons technology. As a result, our deterrent rests on an aging arsenal, with declining reliability, and yes, increasing safety concerns.

As General Chilton explained to the Journal's Melanie Kirkpatrick:

"We've done a pretty good job of maintaining our delivery platforms," the general says, by which he means submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles and intercontinental bombers. But nuclear warheads are a different story. They are Cold War legacies, he says, "designed for about a 15- to 20-year life." That worked fine back when "we had a very robust infrastructure . . . that replenished those families of weapons at regular intervals." Now, however, "they're all older than 20 years . . . . The analogy would be trying to extend the life of your '57 Chevrolet into the 21st century."

Gen. Chilton pulls out a prop to illustrate his point: a glass bulb about two inches high. "This is a component of a V-61" nuclear warhead, he says. It was in "one of our gravity weapons" -- a weapon from the 1950s and '60s that is still in the U.S. arsenal. He pauses to look around the Journal's conference table. "I remember what these things were for. I bet you don't. It's a vacuum tube. My father used to take these out of the television set
in the 1950s and '60s down to the local supermarket to test them and replace them."

And here comes the punch line: "This is the technology that we have . . . today." The technology in the weapons the U.S. relies on for its nuclear deterrent dates back to before many of the people in the room were born.

The general then pulls out another prop: a circuit board that he holds in the palm of his hand. "Compare that to this," he says, pointing to the vacuum tube. "That's just a tiny, little chip on this" circuit board. But replacing the vacuum tube with a chip isn't going to happen anytime soon. The Department of Energy can't even study how to do so since Congress has not appropriated the money for its Reliable Replacement Warhead program.

But it's more than simply designing modern warheads. Chilton notes that the U.S. has also abandoned its infrastructure for building nuclear weapons. Manufacturing capabilities atrophied after the "newest" weapons were produced 20 years ago, and there has been no effort to sustain production facilities. Additionally, many of the experts who produced the last generation of nuclear weapons are approaching retirement age, but there has been little effort to train the next generation of scientists and engineers. The StratCom CINC describes the problem bluntly:

"The last individual to have worked on an actual nuclear test in this country, the last scientist or engineer, will have retired or passed on in the next five years." The younger generation has no practical experience with designing or building nuclear warheads.

General Chilton is lobbying hard for Reliable Replacement Warhead Program (RRWP), which would allow the U.S. to modernize its nuclear arsenal--and force necessary investments in research and manufacturing. Better technology, he observes, would produce a nuclear arsenal that is more reliable and less vulnerable to terrorism. Chilton told the WSJ that it's now possible to design "terrorist-proof" devices that cannot be detonated if they fall into the wrong hands.

Still, the new warhead program promises to be a tough sell. President-elect Barack Obama has talked about a nuclear-free world, so it's doubtful that he would invest in a new generation of weapons. But RRWP has a powerful ally in Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who will likely stay on for the first year of Obama's administration. We can only hope that Dr. Gates can convince the incoming commander-in-chief to change his mind.

***

General Chilton told the Journal that our nuclear delivery platforms are in better shape that the weapons they carry. But that assessment is charitable, in some respects. While introduction of the Ohio-class SSBNs (and the Trident D-5 missile) modernized the sea leg of our nuclear triad, the land-based elements are getting long in the tooth. Minuteman III ICBMs date from the 1970s (though some missiles received newer warheads from the Peacekeeper missile when that system was phased out). Meanwhile, B-52Hs--which rolled off the Boeing assembly line in 1962--remain the backbone of our land-based bomber force.

Despite their age, both the Minuteman III and B-52 retain relatively high mission-capability rates. That's a testament to the young men and women who maintain those systems. Not surprisingly, most are far younger than the aircraft and missiles they work on.