A New Home for an Old Warrior

"The Swoose," in bare-metal finish, circa 1944. The last of the early-model B-17Ds, The Swoose was recently moved to the National Museum of the U.S. Air Force, where it is slated for an extensive restoration (Wikipedia photo).

Despite the passage of time, you can still find surviving aircraft from World War II. Virtually all of them are in the hands of private collectors, or in museums. Some are still airworthy, but most spend their retirement years on the ground, carefully preserved for future generations.

Most of the old warplanes—at least those of American design--share something else in common. They were built after the United States entered the Second World War, during that remarkable industrial surge that produced over 200,000 combat aircraft in a five-year period.

To put that effort in perspective, consider these statistics: in 1940, America produced only 1,700 combat planes of all types; within three years, U.S. manufacturers were building 9,000 bombers a year, along with 44,000 other combat aircraft. When production reached its peak in 1944, American factories were churning out over 100,000 military aircraft a year, including those built for our allies.

That’s one reason “The Swoose,” is so special. Now being reassembled at the National Museum of the U.S. Air Force, located at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, “The Swoose” is not only the oldest B-17 in existence; it is also the last “D” model Flying Fortress, with its distinctive “shark fin” tail. Additionally, the bomber has the distinction of being the last surviving aircraft from the earliest days of combat in the south Pacific.

On December 8, 1941, the B-17, then nicknamed “Ole Betsy,” was part of the 19th Bombardment Group, stationed at Clark Field in the Philippines. Somehow, Ole Betsy and her crew survived the initial raid by Japanese forces that wiped out half of the U.S. bomber force in the Far East. Over the weeks that followed, the B-17 struck back at the advancing Japanese, operating from bases in the Philippines, Java and Australia.

Along the way, the bomber earned its more lasting nickname, after a combat encounter with Japanese Zeros. Sarah Parke of the Air Force Museum's public affairs staff describes the transformation:

In January 1942, during a bombing mission, enemy fighters damaged Old Betsy. The aircraft was repaired and overhauled with a replacement tail and engines from other B-17s, and a makeshift tail gun was added. Its pilot gave it a new nickname after a popular song of the time about a bird that was half-swan, half-goose --The Swoose.

Later, Gen. George Brett, commander of Allied air forces in the Southwest Pacific, used The Swoose as his personal aircraft to visit forward air bases in the combat zone. On some of these flights, the crew had to man the guns to fend off enemy attack. After it returned to the United States, it received additional modifications and served as a high-speed transport until the end of the war. Its operational retirement marked its service for the entire duration of World War II.

After the war, The Swoose escaped the scrap heap and eventually became part of the vast holdings of the Smithsonian’s National Air and Space Museum in Washington. But, as part of a “bomber” swap, the Smithsonian agreed to transfer the vintage plane to the Air Force Museum, where it will be displayed with the legendary “Memphis Belle,” flown by the first B-17 crew to complete their combat tour in Europe.

A third “Flying Fortress,” nicknamed “Shoo Shoo Baby” will complete the deal, eventually moving from Ohio to the Smithsonian’s air and space museum annex at Dulles Airport near Washington, D.C. That transfer will occur when “Memphis Belle” goes on permanent display at Wright-Patterson.

Both the F-model “Memphis Belle” and “Shoo Shoo Baby” (a B-17G) are newer aircraft, having entered the Air Corps inventory in 1942 and 1944, respectively. Memphis Belle is currently undergoing an extensive restoration at the Air Force museum, repairing the neglect and vandalism caused by years of careless display in the city that helped inspire its name.

Curators say it may take a decade to fully restore the Memphis Belle, which arrived at the Air Force Museum in 2005. While “The Swoose” is in slightly better condition, it will also require extensive restoration before going on display.

Until then, visitors to the museum can see the B-17s in the facility's restoration complex, during a “behind-the-scenes” tour offered every Friday. If you’re in the Dayton area on a Friday, it’s well worth the time.

***

ADDENDUM: As aviation buffs know, many World War II aircraft were named for wives or sweethearts; "Memphis Belle" was inspired by the girlfriend of the B-17's pilot, Captain Robert Morgan, who met her in the Bluff City. However, "The Swoose" is one of the few bombers--or any aircraft--that provided a name for a human being. Colonel Frank Kurtz, who flew the B-17 during the war, later named his daughter after the Flying Fortress. You know her as actress Swoosie Kurtz.

It's also worth noting that The Swoose was never actually on display at the National Air and Space Museum. Before its transfer to Wright-Patterson, the B-17D sat, disassembled, for more than 40 years, in various storage facilities belonging to the Smithsonian.

Where are the Ads?

John Hinderaker at Powerline had a private conversation yesterday with a “senior, elected Republican official.” During their talk, the GOP leader noted that Democrats, more than ever, are the party of special interests, as reflected by their perverse policy decisions. He offered several, often-cited examples:

* They want to destroy the secret ballot in union elections, the cornerstone of labor democracy. Why? Because they are owned by the unions.

* They allowed our ability to spy on terrorists to lapse for a period of time, thereby threatening our national security. Why? Because they are owned by the plaintiffs' lawyers who were determined to sue telecoms.

* They try to block energy production, even though they know that the effects on our economy will be disastrous. Why? Because they are owned by the Sierra Club and other "environmentalist" groups.

What Mr. Hinderaker finds surprising isn’t the fact that Democrats can be bought, but rather, their sustained treatment as the “home team of politics by essentially every reporter and editor in the business.”

We beg to disagree. When more that 80% of the national press corps pulls the lever for a Democrat during each presidential election, you can expect fawning coverage for the media’s favorite political party.

But there’s another elephant in the room (pun intended), that’s ignored by both John Hinderaker and that unnamed GOP official. Why haven’t Republicans mounted a more spirited challenge to these Democratic positions—and the special interests that support them. Some would argue that the GOP has done that; the recent FISA extension bill was a major victory for President Bush, crafted on his terms, not those of Democratic special interests.

However, the Democrats still dominated the public debate, depicting terrorist surveillance as “spying” on ordinary Americans. Recent opinion polls show that many voters still have misgivings about the program, despite proven success in identifying terrorists in our midst.

Each of the issues identified by the Republican leader positively cry out for a devastating TV ad campaigns, highlighting the dangers of these Democratic positions. Unfortunately, such ads are few and far between, even in an election year. And it’s not a shortage of cash; the RNC has more on hand than Howard Dean and the Democrats.

The real problem is a lack of political willpower. GOP leaders are unwilling to take on Democratic special interests with any consistency, fearing that some members of those groups will vote against them, or (worse yet) The New York Times might criticize them editorially. Memo to the GOP: Get over it, and get on with it. Those interest groups will never vote Republican in substantial numbers, and the Times won’t support you either.

Meanwhile, there are millions of voters who want Republicans to take a stand in favor of expanded energy production, lower taxes and winning the war on terrorism, among other issues. But effective counter punches on those issues have been relatively few and far between. One of the first rules of boxing (and politics) is the need to jab and counter-punch; in those areas, the GOP remains woefully inept.

That’s another reason that Tony Snow will be missed by the conservative rank-and-file. As presidential press secretary, Mr. Snow was an incredibly effective advocate for Bush Administration policies, and willing to take on the press corps in defending them. In many respects, Tony's daily briefings were the administration's most effective bully pulpit, and no one, repeat no one, has been able to duplicate his performance.

Will the next Tony Snow please step forward? Better yet, will someone tell the GOP that Barack Obama's flip-flops (and the Democrats' disastrous energy policies) represent political issues that are prime for exploitation, if the Republicans will rise to the occasion.

Appearing on Fox News last night, Dick Morris observed that "Drill Here, Drill Now, Pay Less," was the first position the GOP had successfully articulated in the last four years. Such is the state of Republican leadership. With all due respect to Mr. Hinderaker's friend, the GOP would be better off trying to exploit political openings, and worrying less about the same old special interests that have controlled the Democratic party for decades.

The Executive Shuffle

As it prepares for a next round of bidding in the Air Force tanker competition, Boeing is shuffling key members of its executive team.

Aviation Week reports that Dave Bowman, who’s been running the company’s C-17 unit, will now take charge of a restructured tanker division. As part of widely-anticipated management shake-up, Mr. Bowman will lead the tanker enterprise as an “entirely new and separate business unit,” reporting to the President and Chief Operation Officer of Boeing’s Integrated Defense Systems.

With the USAF expected to solicit new tanker bids in the coming weeks, this may seem like a strange time for a changing-of-the-guard in Boeing's executive suite. But according to Aviation Week’s Amy Butler, there are solid reasons for the company's move:

Bowman is well respected in the Air Force; he spearheaded efforts to keep the C-17 production line open with congressional support and with a small boost of international sales after the service discontinued funding for it. One of his tasks in the forthcoming tanker competition will be to congeal the relations between Boeing’s defense and commercial airplanes businesses. Boeing Commercial Airplanes was criticized by Air Force officials for not cooperating with the government’s desire to have full insight into the company’s pricing for the 767 platform.

[snip]

The change will also allow Mr. Bowman to “bypass the typical leadership chain of command in IDS’s Global Mobility Systems divisions and deal directly with the defense sector’s leadership for the forthcoming tanker campaign.” Bowman will run the operation from Boeing’s offices in Washington state, with a smaller staff in Wichita, Kansas, where military modifications for the aircraft would be added.

Boeing apparently believes that Bowman’s military ties will serve the company well in the next round of the tanker competition. Various defense officials—including former Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne—slammed the defense contractor for its “lack of transparency” in the previous round of tanker bidding. That competition ended with the service awarding the contract to rival Northrop-Grumman, but that deal was tossed out, after the Government Accountability Office discovered flaws in the bidding process. By putting Bowman in charge, Boeing hopes to avoid similar problems in the next round of the competition.

While Mr. Bowman is well-respected in aerospace circles, he faces a tall order in the coming weeks. Along with organizing the new division, Bowman must also lead the effort to prepare Boeing’s new bid for the tanker contract. However, the defense contractor clearly believes that momentum has swung in its favor, with the GAO sustaining its protest of the last tanker contract, and a legion of lawmakers lining up in support of Boeing.

Still, Northrop-Grumman and its European partner, EADS, won’t give up without a fight. The next round of tanker bidding will be even more intense, and the stakes have never been higher. For the winner, there’s a $35 billion contract, and the promise of more work down the line, as the Air Force eventually retires other, older aircraft, also built on the venerable 707 airframe.

On the other hand, the loser in the tanker competition faces uncertainty in the defense market. As Aviation Week observes, Boeing has been on a losing streak in the military aircraft business. In recent years, the firm has lost the Joint Strike Fighter contract to rival Lockheed-Martin and is facing the end of C-17 production and a decline in orders for the F/A-18 Hornet. And, with the airliner business slowing because of skyrocketing fuel prices, Boeing could certainly use the tanker contract. Bringing it home will be Mr. Bowman’s job.

By comparison, Northrop-Grumman appears to be standing pat with leadership of its tanker team. The Air Force hopes to announce a final “winner” of the tanker competition in December. By that time, we’ll know which aerospace firm made the right managerial moves.

Today's Reading Assignment

In his WSJ column, Bret Stephens traces Israel's "Descent from Entebbe" over the past 32 years. A nation once known for its refusal to deal with terrorists--and mounting bold operations against them--now finds it easier to negotiate, with predictable results. A few sample paragraphs:

Tomorrow, the Israeli government is scheduled to release five Lebanese prisoners, including a man named Samir Kuntar – more on him in a moment – in exchange for two of its kidnapped soldiers, Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser, and information concerning the fate of airman Ron Arad, missing since 1986. The exchange might seem semiequitable, if only the three Israelis weren't all presumed dead.

[snip]

Israel's predicament is a self-inflicted wound. In 2004, Israel released some 400 prisoners, including Hezbollah cause célèbres Abdel Karim Obeid and Mustafa Dirani, in exchange for the remains of three Israeli soldiers and a living former army colonel named Elhanan Tannenbaum, described in press reports as a "businessman." It later became public that Mr. Tannenbaum's business was drug dealing.

[snip]

Now Kuntar, 45, is about to be freed. In 1979, he took an Israeli family hostage in the northern coastal town of Nahariya, shot and killed father Danny Haran and dashed the skull of his 4-year-old daughter Einat against a rock with his rifle butt. Danny's wife, Smadar, managed to hide from Kuntar in a crawl space of their apartment with two-year-old daughter Yael, whom she accidentally suffocated while trying to keep the toddler quiet. A policeman was also killed in the attack.

Kuntar was sentenced to 548 years in prison. In 1985, Palestinian terrorists seized the Achille Lauro cruise ship to win Kuntar's release. Wheelchair-bound U.S. passenger Leon Klinghoffer was murdered along the way. Kuntar has never repented and recently vowed to continue fighting once released.

[snip]

But whatever happens, Israel has once again demonstrated to its enemies that their strategy of taking hostages works. Worse, it works even when those hostages are killed. If Regev and Goldwasser are dead, the situation of Cpl. Shalit – and any other Israeli who might be taken alive by Hezbollah or its ilk – becomes infinitely more precarious.

There is, of course, another irony in all of this. The recent liberation of 15 high-profile prisoners from Colombia's FARC rebels was made possible, in part, by Israeli technology, and (presumably) training from Israeli counter-terrorism experts. Perhaps it's time for Israel to reapply those lessons at home.

Rattling the Saber

Russia is again expressing its displeasure over the planned U.S. missile shield for eastern Europe, threatening to "neutralize" any threat posed to its nuclear deterrent.

The latest comments came Monday from Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Sergei Kislyak, who renewed his country's objections during a briefing in Moscow. His comments were reprinted by the Interfax news service:

"If we see the development of systems that could reduce our deterrent potential, our military will have to take steps to neutralise the threat," Kislyak was quoted as saying at a briefing in Moscow.

He did not specify the steps that would be taken, saying "this will be decided by military specialists."

"We would prefer not to have to do this," he added.

Obviously, this isn't the first time a senior Russian official has made this sort of threat. If anything, it's a reminder that Vladimir Putin remains firmly in charge of Moscow's security policies, though he left the presidency almost three months ago.

And, it's an indication that Moscow may be trying to exploit an apparent split in the missile defense camp. Earlier this month, Poland rejected an offer to host interceptor missiles on its soil, in exchange for a U.S. promise to upgrade the nation's air defenses. Without those interceptors, the system loses its ability to shoot down hostile missiles, making it nothing more than another tracking station.

By reaffirming its opposition, Russia may believe that it can convince Poland to back out of the deal once and for all, greatly complicating missile defense plans for eastern Europe. If we're reading the tea leaves correctly, Moscow's latest "stick" may be followed by a carrot, namely an offer to sell advanced air defense systems to Poland (a NATO member), giving Warsaw a chance to upgrade its capabilities without the "complications" of the missile shield.

Convincing the Poles to back out of the missile shield is still a long shot, but the Russians are willing to give it another shot. Besides, they understand that renewed saber-rattling on missile defense resonates far beyond eastern Europe. Mr. Kislyak's remarks were also aimed at the U.S. presidential campaign, specifically at the candidate who's done a flip-flop on the defensive shield, Barack Obama.

The presumptive Democratic nominee believes that Iran is a threat, but he's opposed missile defense until a recent policy "adjustment." In other words, he has no problem criticizing Iranian missile tests--the threat which has prompted development of the defensive shield. But, when it comes to actually deploying the anti-missile system, Mr. Obama and his Democratic colleagues will usually take a pass.

That must be music to the Kremlin's ears, one reason the Russians will likely ratchet up their criticism of missile defenses between now and November. But such comments from Moscow--and their coverage in the western press--obscure the over-arching concerns that should frame this debate.

First, no one doubts Russia's ability to overwhelm the planned defensive shield, which is aimed at a limited threat from a rogue nation. So, why is Moscow so concerned? Well, as missile defenses improve, they will pose a greater challenge to Russia and anyone else that might point a nuclear-tipped missile at Europe. Having spent heavily on new strategic systems over the past decade, Moscow doesn't want that investment rendered obsolete by new defensive technology, particularly when those offensive systems can be used to bully and intimidate the west.

Russia also prefers to focus on missile defense because it doesn't want a serious discussion of its own, revised nuclear strategy. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow has increasingly relied on its nuclear arsenal for deterrence at both the strategic and regional levels. Conflicts or contingencies that would have prompted a conventional response 20 years ago would now be met with a Russian nuclear threat.

Such policies are, of course, far more destabilizing than the planned missile shield in eastern Europe. But you wouldn't know that by reading the comments of Russian officials, or their depiction in the mainstream press. Masters of maskirovka--the art of deception--the Russians have successfully recast the nuclear issue as a debate on missile defenses.

And it's more than a bit ironic. If you don't believe us, do a Google search for "U.S. missile shield Destabilizing," "SS-27 destabilizing," and "Russian Hypersonic Glide Vehicle Destabilizing." The first search--on a defensive system--produces about 155,000 hits, many of them offering negative assessments on deployment of the missile shield. On the other hand, searches on truly destabilizing systems, including the SS-27 (Russia's newest ICBM) and the hypersonic glide vehicle, produce 1,040 and 463 hits respectively.

Is it any wonder that Moscow is so anxious to rattle the saber?

Psst, Congressman…If You Really Want to Help the Military

..Then consider a repeal of the Hayden-Cartwright Act (4 USC, Section 104). This obscure federal law, passed more than 60 years ago, requires on-base military filling stations to collect taxes on the gasoline they sell. It’s the biggest reason that military customers pay the same price for gas as civilians outside the base gates.

Getting rid of Hayden-Cartwright would not only eliminate the 18.4 cents per gallon federal excise tax (24 cents a gallon for diesel), it would also remove state and local taxes from the purchase price. As this chart from gaspricewatch.com illustrates, elimination of state and local taxes would produce a further savings for young military families, already struggling to make ends meet.

How much would they save? In some states, more than 50 cents a gallon. Multiply that by the weekly or monthly fuel consumption for a typical military family, and the savings add up. Let's say Airman Smith has a daily round-trip commute of 40 miles between her apartment and the base. Her vehicle averages 20 mpg. That's 10 gallons of gas a week, just for the trip between her residence and the office. At $4.00 a gallon, she's paying over $2,000 a year for gas. Eliminating the state and federal gas taxes saves Airman Smith at least $260 a year.

That may not sound like much, but when you're an E-4 making less than $2,000 a month in base pay, it represents a substantial savings. The proposed price break is particularly important for junior enlisted members stationed in high-cost-of-living areas like southern California or the Washington, D.C. metro region.

Attempts to repeal Hayden-Cartwright would lean to charges of "unfair competition," since base service stations could sell gas at significantly lower prices than their off-post competitors. But those claims are exaggerated, for several reasons. First, non-military customers still represent the overwhelmingly majority of consumers in most communities, including those near major bases. The idea that "civilian" gas stations would lose most of their business is ludicrous, since most consumers can't buy fuel (or anything else) on post.

Besides, those civilian outlets have been competing successfully with base gas stations for years, providing tires, parts and service at prices that match--or beat--the military outlets. Additionally, many civilian gas stations offer services not found on base, and they will retain customers who need that expertise--even if they buy gas somewhere else. Additionally, if price is an insurmountable advantage, state and local governments are free to lower their taxes, and make local retailers more competitive with military gas stations.

If the "unfair advantage" argument sounds familiar to members of the armed forces, it's because they've heard it before. At various times, worries about price-cutting and competition have been used to delay a variety of retailing initiatives on military installations, ranging from fast food restaurants, to the sale of certain appliances in base or post exchanges. Breaking down these barriers has been, to borrow a phrase, a long, hard slog.

Retired General Norman Schwartzkopf relayed an example of this obstinacy in his autobiography, It Doesn't Take a Hero. As the ranking officer at Georgia's Fort Stewart in the early 1980s, Schwartzkopf got an earful from the local business community, because the post was one of the first with a Burger King and other fast food establishments “inside the gate.” One businessman claimed his restaurant couldn’t compete and even accused Schwartzkopf of “taking food” from his family’s table.

Such fears were completely unfounded. Almost 30 years later, civilian retail and eating establishments have learned to compete effectively with their on-post counterparts. In fact, we can’t find a single example of an on-base Burger King forcing the closure of a rival establishment outside the gate. True, the on-base restaurant can sell Whoppers for less than a Burger King off-post, but that latter outlet is often open later, has more customer traffic—and higher sales margins.

Repealing Hayden Cartwright may strike some as unfair, since it would only benefit a relatively small segment of the population. But many of those individuals genuinely deserve the break. Today's junior enlisted member is typically married, with small children. Many are ineligible for base housing, or they spend years waiting for quarters to become available.

Without base housing, many young enlisted personnel live miles from the installation, wherever they can a cheap apartment or house to rent. With extended daily commutes, they have been deeply impacted by skyrocketing gas prices, and would benefit most from a repeal of the existing federal law.

In an effort to reduce domestic fuel prices, President Bush has announced plans to lift an executive ban on off-shore drilling. He should follow that action with a second order, authorizing DoD to sell fuel on-base without collecting federal, state and local taxes.

It would be a symbolic gesture, but it would put pressure on Congress to get rid of Hayden- Cartwright, once and for all. For a Democratic Congress that likes to brag about “taking care of the troops,” here’s a chance to match rhetoric with action.

No Show

As Patterico reminds us, one candidate will be conspicuously absent next month, during a planned "military town hall meeting" near Fort Hood, Texas. The candidate, in case you've haven't guessed, is Barack Obama, and his refusal to participate in the forum (scheduled for 11 August) is emerging as an issue in the campaign.

According to The New York Times, event organizers have repeatedly asked Mr. Obama to appear at the town hall meeting, but he has declined, citing scheduled conflicts. An Obama surrogate told the Times that the Senator has another event scheduled for that date:

“Senator Obama strongly supports America’s veterans and military families and has worked hard on their behalf in the Senate,” said Phillip Carter, director of Mr. Obama’s veterans effort and an Iraq war veteran. “While we unfortunately had a previously scheduled commitment on the date proposed, Senator Obama looks forward to continuing the dialogue he’s been having throughout the country with veterans on how we can better serve our men and women in uniform as they serve us.”

But there's a bit more to this story that Mr. Carter is telling. Groups sponsoring the event have indicated that the forum can be rescheduled, to accommodate Obama's schedule. But the presumptive Democratic nominee is taking a pass on the military town hall, which is expected to attract an audience of 6,000 active duty personnel, retirees, dependents and veterans. CBS has already agreed to broadcast the event, from 9-11 p.m., eastern time.

So why is Obama taking a pass? We're guessing that the Senator--and his advisors--have sized up the crowd as largely pro-Republican, despite recent claims of Democratic "inroads" among military voters. By various estimates, career officers, non-commissioned officers and retirees are much more likely to support GOP candidates than the average voter. The Fort Hood town hall meeting would probably be the most hostile audience that Obama has faced to date--a far cry from the fawning crowds that typically greet the Senator.

Obama advisers are also concerned about a possible faux pas during the forum, similar to the one he committed last week. During a press conference, the Senator said that one of his first acts as president would be to tell the "Chief Joints of Staff" to begin an immediate withdrawal from Iraq. Never mind that the Joint Chiefs of Staff serve as military advisers to the commander-in-chief, outside the operational chain. If Mr. Obama wanted a pullout from Iraq, he would have to confer with the theater commander, General Petraeus, and the newly-appointed commander of forces in that country, General Ray Odierno.

The Illinois Senator has committed enough gaffes on the campaign trail without risking a few more at Fort Hood. Those military types might pose questions beyond the candidate's frame of reference, asking why TriCare (the armed services health care plan) still delivers such lousy service; or how many brigade combat teams the Army really needs, or how many F-22s should be in the Air Force inventory.

Reading his recent interview with Military Times, it's apparent that Mr. Obama's knowledge of military issues is tissue-thin. Being a smart politician, Obama has no desire to highlight his ignorance on a national stage, before a voting group that is solidly against him.

And that's unfortunate. The military town hall forum for presidential candidates is an idea that's long overdue, and the groups sponsoring the Fort Hood event deserve tremendous credit. Mr. Obama's opponent, John McCain, also deserves plaudits for agreeing to show up.

But don't expect McCain to get a one-man, nationally-televised show next month. We're guessing that the Obama campaign is already lobbying CBS to pull the plug, and there's a good chance the network will comply. With much of the MSM already in the tank for the Democratic nominee, they have little incentive to make their candidate look bad. By the time 11 August rolls around, the Fort Hood forum will be luck to attract a cable audience.

Having His Say

Former Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne is taking a few shots on his way out. Mr. Wynne, who was forced out by Defense Secretary Robert Gates in early June, held a wide-ranging discussion with reporters and editors from Military Times earlier this week. During their conversation, Wynne blasted his former boss, and the apparent reasons for his firing.

According to Mr. Wynne, his dismissal was more the result of long-standing disagreements with Gates, rather than problems with the Air Force nuclear weapons program—the publicly-stated reason for his departure:

Gates “and I had some long-standing disputes about the funding for F-22,” Wynne said. “We had a dispute as to whether or not you should spend your time worrying about the strategic effects of the future, or you should spend your time on the war as it sits. … So I think [me] going out and viewing a little bit about what’s the future was construed as the secretary of the Air Force is distracted from [his] duties.”

The former secretary was also critical of how he was removed from office:

“If the secretary didn’t want somebody on his staff, the secretary should pick the time and the place and tell him to leave,” he said. “I’m just amazed at the circumstances. Why didn’t [he] just call me in and say, ‘Time to go’?”

Wynne learned of his dismissal while at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, during a meeting with senior USAF leaders, including the Chief of Staff, General Michael Moseley, who was also fired. Moseley was recalled to Washington during the middle of the semi-annual “Corona” conference, while Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England was dispatched to deliver the bad news. Sources also claim that England announced a halt to Corona meetings until Mr. Gates approves their resumption.

In his conversation with Military Times, Wynne accepted responsibility for last year’s accidental transfer of six nuclear weapons from Minot AFB, North Dakota, to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. But he said it was “curious” that another incident, involving the mistaken shipment of nuclear missile fuses to Taiwan, was “ascribed to his watch.” The transfer actually occurred before Wynne became Air Force Secretary, but was discovered in March of this year.

Wynne also suggested that a highly critical report on Air Force nuclear practices was the result of “cultural differences” between his service and the U.S. Navy. The report was authored by Admiral Kirkwood Donald, Chief of the Office of Naval Propulsion.

Mr. Wynne told the Times that Admiral Donald “looked at us from a Navy perspective. They see things differently than we do.” But Wynne was far from finished. During the same interview, he took a shot at Boeing, saying the defense giant “sensed defeat early on” in the Air Force tanker competition, and began building what he described as a “Pearl Harbor file,” which could later be used to force a reopening of the bidding process.

“Here’s one of those cases where Boeing had probably assessed their prospects were dimming. I would say that they systematically began to build a case, and I’m not sure they shared everything they could have shared with the Air Force along the way,” said Wynne.

[snip]

To Wynne, it seemed Boeing was preparing a Plan B in case it lost the contract, in part by withholding information on some costs that caused the Air Force to make its own estimates.

“There’s a feeling in the Air Force that maybe we were as transparent as we could be, and maybe Boeing wasn’t as transparent as it could be,” Wynne said. “We do not feel they were as transparent as they could have been.”

As Air Force Secretary, Wynne played a leading role in last February’s decision to award the tanker contract to a team from Northrop-Grumman/EADS, which offered a design based on the Airbus A330 airframe. Boeing’s entry was based on its 767 jetliner. A protest by Boeing was eventually upheld by the Government Accountability Office, which found major flaws in the Air Force acquisition process.

On Wednesday—the same day that Mr. Wynne spoke with Military Times—the Pentagon announced that the tanker contract would be re-opened for bids. Mr. Gates also revealed that the Defense Department’s acquisition chief, John Young, would manage the latest round in the tanker competition, stripping that responsibility from the Air Force.

There is little doubt that Mike Wynne had a simmering feud with his boss, the SecDef. And, there’s probably an element of truth in Wynne’s claims that his dismissal was the result of several factors, not just the nuclear issue. But it’s also clear that the interview was aimed at patching Mr. Wynne’s tattered reputation, and settling scores with Pentagon rivals.

In reality, the legacy of Michael Wynne is mixed. He deserves credit for tacking the USAF’s recapitalization problems, and fighting hard for new aircraft. Mr. Wynne should also be commended for his leadership in researching the use of synthetic fuels in Air Force combat and support aircraft. If those programs are carried to fruition (and they should be), Wynne’s efforts will be regarded as visionary.

But those achievements must be squared against obvious failures. Wynne inherited a service beset by accountability issues that extended far beyond the nuclear program. There have been a series of scandals involving high-ranking personnel in recent years; many occurred before his watch, but Mr. Wynne did nothing to halt the ethical slide. That fact was not lost on Mr. Gates, or his predecessor, Donald Rumsfeld.

Wynne also proved inept at reading clear signals from his boss. When Gates requested an increase in UAV orbits over Iraq and Afghanistan, the Air Force Secretary and his generals dragged their feet. Instead of making the case that some drone flights are unnecessary (and a waste of resources), the Air Force tried to compare training problems in UAV units with the “collapse” of Hitler’s Luftwaffe in World War II. It was an analogy lost on Pentagon leaders, not to mention the American people.

Indeed, Mr. Wynne shared a common weakness with other, recent secretaries of the Air Force. Almost to a man (or woman) they seemed content to rest of past airpower successes, almost oblivious to a changing military environment. We can only hope that Wynne’s successor, Michael Donely, and the next Chief of Staff, General Norton Schwartz, borrow a page from General “Hap” Arnold, the legendary leader of the Army Air Corps during World War II.

As a young officer, Arnold helped ensure the future of American airpower by educating the public on its potential. Arnold and men like Ira Eaker were masters of public relations, staging highly-publicized events that highlighted the capabilities of the air arm. Compare that with the tepid, corporate media relations policy of today’s Air Force, and you’ll see one more reason the service is in trouble.

For a man who had a successful career developing (and marketing) weapons systems to the Pentagon, Mr. Wynne was woefully inept at "selling" the USAF in the halls of power, and demonstrating its relevance in a global war on terror. And sadly, that may become his ultimate legacy as Secretary of the Air Force.

Practicing in Iraq?

An Israeli Air Force F-16 (IDF photo via the Jerusalem Post)

Today’s Jerusalem Post reports that Israeli warplanes have been practicing in Iraqi airspace and landing at U.S. bases in that country, preparing for a possible strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities.

The Post account is based on shaky sources: "former" Iraqi military officers in Anbar Province, who spoke with a local news network. Media outlets in Iran have also picked up the claim. The JP says it cannot confirm the veracity of the report, but that didn’t keep them from running the story. So much for journalistic discretion.

According to Iraqi sources, "massive" nocturnal activity by Israeli jets has been noted at several "American-held bases," including "measures by the U.S. Army to increase security around the bases."

The former Iraqi officers report that IAF jets arrive during the night from Jordanian airspace, enter Iraqi territory, and land on a runway near the city of Haditha. The sources estimate that IAF pilots are rehearsing for a potential raid against Iranian nuclear sites.

By any reasonable standard, the credibility of this report is decidedly low. Given their status as former officers, it’s likely that the Iraqis are out of the loop, and may have an axe to grind with the U.S. military and their own nation’s security services. Gossip about Israeli jets in Iraq will cause problems up and down the chain-of-command, so it’s a convenient way of exacting revenge against U.S. and Iraqi authorities—the same folks who ended the officers’ military careers.

Beyond that, it’s extremely unlikely that the U.S. would allow Israeli jets to enter Iraqi airspace, or land at one of our bases. The geopolitical consequences are simply too great. Having worked for years to liberate and bring stability to Iraq—while maintaining critical alliances with the other Gulf States—the United States cannot afford to risk it all by allowing the Israeli Air Force to operate from our bases in the region.

Besides, it would be virtually impossible to conceal IAF night ops at Al Asad or any other American airbase in Iraq. Those installations, like their counterparts in the United States, operate 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Hundreds of airmen are awake and on duty in the middle of the night. Some of them would witness the arrival and departure of Israeli F-15s, F-16s and other aircraft.

In fact, a number of Americans, ranging from air traffic control specialists to maintenance personnel, would likely come in contact with the Israelis at our bases in Iraq. And despite the secrecy that would accompany IAF operations, word of that activity would eventually leak out, through U.S., rather than Iraqi channels. So far, we haven’t found a single American account that verifies the JP report. If the Israelis are operating in Iraq, they aren’t utilizing U.S. airfields.

Ordinarily, those facts would be enough to completely discredit this account. But like all good rumors, this one is vaguely plausible, if you consider a slightly different scenario. First, not all airfields in Iraq are under U.S. control. There are Saddam-era bases that remain unoccupied, or they’re under the control of other elements within Iraq.

Flying through Jordan (one of the most likely transit corridors for any IAF strike against Iran), advance elements could deploy to an empty airfield in western Iraq, or one in the Kurdish region, further north. The Iraqi installation—outside U.S. control—would serve as a forward operating base (FOB) for the attack on Iran.

Interestingly enough, that subject came up in an exchange between Israeli and U.S. military officers more than two years ago. During a general discussion of the Iranian threat—and Tel Aviv’s potential plans for countering it—an Israeli officer volunteered that the "problem" of forward basing for an Iran strike had already been solved.

His comment stunned the Americans, who were not aware of any U.S. plans to allow IAF access to our bases. Further comments from the Israelis made it clear that the planned FOB would not be a U.S. installation, and that the airfield would be used for commando and search-and-rescue forces, deployed in support of an Iranian mission.

But that raises the question of how the Israelis would sneak helicopters, transport aircraft and even jet fighters into Iraq—without our knowledge. While it is true that U.S. AWACS aircraft left Iraq several years ago, we have an extensive network of ground-based surveillance and air traffic control radars that monitor the nation’s airspace. To get around that obstacle, the Israelis would probably fly, at low altitude, from bases in southern Turkey (where they routinely deploy), to airfields in the Kurdish region.

Readers will note that none of those possibilities are mentioned in the JP article, or the Iraqi media accounts. They depict the United States. as a willing participant in an Israeli for a strike against Iran, providing basing support for IAF jets at some of our key installations in Iraq.

But that type of assistance simply isn’t in the cards—and the Israelis understand that. While the U.S. will be viewed as complicit in any Israeli strike against Iran, evidence of direct support would only make matters worse. That’s one reason that Israel has pursued other basing options for an Iran mission, understanding that it would be impossible for Washington to say "yes," and fearing that word of any agreement would be leaked to the press.

In fact, the real issue for the United States isn’t basing for Israeli jets bound for Iran. It’s what we do when those ground-based radars detect an Israeli tanker and fighter formation, heading east across Iraq. Flying through Jordanian and Iraqi airspace offers the most direct route to Iran, reducing flying time and fuel requirements. Will we scramble fighters from Balad when those blips appear on the radar scope? Or will the Israeli jets simply "squawk" the right IFF codes, and proceed with their mission?

That’s the type of assistance that the U.S. might be willing to provide for an raid on Iran. But the notion of more direct support—including base access in Iraq—is simply ludicrous.

***

ADDENDUM: For what it's worth, both the Pentagon and the Iraqi Defense Ministry have denied the report.

Iran Unveils Secret Weapon

It’s called “Photoshop.”

The New York Times reports:

As news spread across the world of Iran’s provocative missile tests, so did an image of four missiles heading skyward in unison. Unfortunately, it appeared to contain one too many missiles, a point that had not emerged before the photo appeared on the front pages of The Los Angeles Times, The Financial Times, The Chicago Tribune and several other newspapers as well as on BBC News, MSNBC, Yahoo! News, NYTimes.com and many other major news Web sites.

Here's the photo in question, with the duplications highlighted by the Times' photo editors.



The "first" doctored photo of the Iranian missile test, with duplications circled (New York Times photo illustration)

Looking at the photo, it’s easy to see it was digitally altered. The trajectories, exhaust plumes and clouds of smoke for two of the missiles are identical. Apparently, some enterprising Iranian decided to make the missile display more impressive, using Photoshop to add another launch to the image.

And, western news outlets eagerly ran the photograph, until the deception was finally discovered. According to the Times notes that Agence France-Presse originally ran the doctored image, which was picked up by scores of newspapers and on-line media outlets. Interestingly, the Associated Press ran a similar photograph, showing three simultaneous rocket launches. A fourth rocket can be seen on its launcher, in the foreground.


The AP image of the missile test, obtained from the same Iranian source and distributed today. Note the berm next to the launcher in the foreground. It appears higher and more rounded than in the first photo. Additionally, a small dirt pile, visible in the first photo, is missing from the second shot, apparently replaced by the launcher and support vehicle (AP photo via The New York Times).

Both the AP and Agence France-Press obtained their images from Sepah News, the media arm of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). The AP got its picture on Thursday, while Agence France-Press obtained the “four-launch” photo a day earlier.

But, it’s hard to tell if the AP image is any more authentic than the “doctored” shot distributed by AFP. Take a look at the later image, and compare it to the Wednesday photo, obtained by AFP. An earthen berm, which appears just above the fence line, looks higher and more rounded in the AP photo. Additionally, a small mound of earth next to the berm (and visible in the AFP shot), is missing in the Associated Press image--apparently replaced by the rocket launcher and a support vehicle.

Why does that matter? Because the missiles, plumes and exhaust clouds in both photographs are the same, with the exception of the “extra” launch in the AFP image. The berm changes and that missing mound of dirt (the launcher and support vehicle) suggest that the AP shot may have been doctored as well.

Dirt work is frequently conducted in support of missile tests; launch areas are often groomed or leveled, making the ground more stable for TEL (transporter/erector/launcher) vehicles. But such activity would leave tell-tale signs, such as tire or track marks from heavy equipment.

Those signs are missing from the AP photograph (or we can't see them because of the angle of the image). The referenced dirt pile, clearly visible in the AFP image, simply disappears in the later photo. It would be easy to simply delete the dirt pile with Photoshop and insert the launch vehicle and the support truck, or vice versa.

Our guess is that the second photo is a blended image. Note the launcher is on a slight incline; that suggests a presurveyed (and prepared) launch site, extremely common among older rocket and missile systems. The launcher and support vehicle probably arrived at the site hours after the launch, and after additional dirt work was completed. To create a more "dramatic effect," the Iranian Photoshop artist simply placed that activity against the backdrop of the earlier launch. The launch vehicle seen in the AP image was probably deployed for the second round of missile tests, conducted today.

Charles Johnson at Little Green Footballs was among the first to note the use of Photoshop in Iranian military displays. Unfortunately, many MSM outlets have a less critical eye, allowing the Iranians to plant their exaggerated claims in western publications and broadcast outlets with nary a challenge. The Times deserves credit for spotting the obvious fabrication in the missile photographs, but such reporting has been the exception, rather than the rule.

In fact, the most serious analysis of Iranian military claims can be found in the blogs, including this one. As we’ve noted in previous posts, Tehran’s displays of armed might sometimes laughable, if you only bother to take a closer look.

But give Iran some credit. It takes a certain amount of chutzpah to pass off a World War II torpedo as an unbeatable naval weapon, or advertise a 50-year old rocket design, coated with radar-absorbing paint, as a “stealth missile.” And it takes a lazy, gullible press to fall for those claims, hook, line and sinker.

For what it’s worth, AFP has now retracted the image, calling it “apparently digitally altered.”

Apparently?

***
As an alternate theory, some analysts suggest that the missile in the foreground was erased because it failed to launch. However, that still doesn't explain the apparent "dirt work" between Wednesday's photo, and the image obtained by the AP on Thursday.

New Eye in the Sky

Israel's latest Airborne Early Warning/ISR aircraft, the Eitam, will be displayed publicly for the first time today. The surveillance platform, built on a Gulfstream G550 airframe, was photographed at an airport in Ireland earlier this year, enroute to Israel. It will be used to keep track of events in Iran and other locations (photo courtesy of airliners.net)

Israel says it will publicly display a new spy plane, capable of monitoring activity in Iran.

The aircraft is a modified Gulfstream G550, nicknamed the “Eitam” by the Israelis. Delivery of the first aircraft occurred earlier this year, and that jet was officially transferred to the Israeli Air Force in March. Today’s event will be the first time that the Eitam has been shown to the public.

RFDesign, an engineering publication, offered this description of the aircraft's capabilities in its February 2008 issue:

The EL/W-2085 AEW system is a long-range, high-performance, multisensor AEW that combines airborne early warning, tactical surveillance of airborne and surface targets, and the gathering of signal intelligence.

The four sensors feeding the AEW system are radar, IFF, ESM/ELINT and CSM/COMINT. The data generated by all of the sensors is continuously cross-correlated. This data is then combined with an automatically initiated active search by one sensor for specific targets detected by other sensors. A radar with conformal phased array antennas provides simultaneous coverage and instantaneous focus on selected targets. The advanced radar has several conformal phased array antennas that are mounted on the fuselage of the aircraft and provide up to a full 360-degree coverage.

In other words, the Eitam offers state-of-the art detection and surveillance of ground and air targets, at extended ranges. And, with access to a variety of intelligence sensors, information developed on the aircraft can be quickly fused and correlated into a larger battle picture, provided instantly to the mission crew and commanders on the ground.

More remarkably, the system is operated from a business jet platform, much smaller than other AEW, AWACS or SIGINT platforms like the E-3, RC-135, or the British Nimrod. Utilizing the G550 will produce considerable savings in operating costs, and it provides limited “cover” for potential missions.

Flying over the Persian Gulf, the Eitam would be virtually indistinguishable from other business jets, until it turns on its active sensors. And, since the aircraft uses advanced technology, it probably employs various techniques to minimize or mask its active signals, reducing detection probabilities.

Make no mistake: Eitam is anything but a stealth aircraft. But its signature is considerably smaller than most AWACS or SIGINT platforms, and by using common deception techniques (civilian air corridors, commercial callsigns), the Israelis can mount productive collection missions, relatively close to Iranian airspace.

But the new aircraft is not a panacea. Operating from safe corridors in the Persian Gulf or Arabian Sea, the Eitam will not be able to “see” everything of interest in Iran. And, there’s the chance that Iran might figure out operational patterns in those areas and eventually try an intercept mission, although deficiencies in Iran’s air defenses reduce prospects for success.

Israel also has the option of flying collection missions in the airspace of Turkey, its primary ally in the Muslim world. An orbit over southeastern Turkey would reduce risks for the Eitam crew, but limit the amount of Iranian territory that could be covered.

Today’s public display will serve two purposes, reassuring an increasingly nervous Israeli public, while sending a clear signal to Iran. The Eitam is no direct threat to Tehran’s nuclear program, but it highlights Israeli superiority in the realm of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. Putting the aircraft on display, the Israelis are showing Iran they have another, advanced airborne platform for keeping tabs on their adversary's activities, a capability that Iran sorely lacks.

Try, Try Again

A Boeing artist's concept of the Air Force's next-generation tanker, based on its 767 airframe (Boeing illustration via Aviation Week)

With any luck, we’ll know the “latest” winner of the Air Force tanker competition in December, more than five years after the process first began.

The new deadline was announced yesterday by senior Defense Department officials, who outlined procedures for re-opening the contract bidding process. They told a Pentagon press conference that a new request for proposals (RFP) is expected late this month, or in early August. That will allow the competing firms, Boeing and Northrop-Grumman, to re-bid “wholly new proposals,” with the winner being announced by the end of the year.

While movement in the long-delayed tanker program is certainly welcome news, yesterday’s announcement was another black eye for the Air Force. During yesterday’s press conference, the same DoD officials (Defense Secretary Robert Gates; acting Air Force Secretary Mike Donley and Pentagon Acquisition Chief John Young) revealed new plans for handling the tanker bids.

Under the modified acquisition process, Mr. Young’s office will not only make the final selection, it will also lead a newly-formed, source selection advisory committee. Normally, most of those advisory functions (short of final selection) are performed by the military services.

Washington Democratic Congressman Norman Dicks explained the reason for change rather succinctly, observing that “no one trusts the Air Force.” That might be an understatement. After screwing up the process two times previously, the service has been given a backseat in the third round of contract bidding. Think of it as Mr. Gates affirmation that Air Force acquisition is hard broke.

The latest round of bidding became necessary when the Government Accountability Office found flaws in the service’s last tanker choice, announced earlier this year. In a highly-controversial decision, the Air Force selected Northrop-Grumman to build its next generation of air refueling planes, using the Airbus A330 airframe.

Boeing protested the decision, claiming (among other things) that Northrop-Grumman had been given “extra credit” for offering a larger aircraft, criteria not found in the original contract specifications. A GAO review upheld the Boeing protest, determining that the Air Force made a number of “significant errors” in making its decision and setting the stage for a new round of competition.

During yesterday’s press conference, Mr. Young suggested that the new bidding process might be streamlined. Air Force requirements for the tankers haven’t changed. The Pentagon’s source selection advisory panel may have to re-calculate program cost and capability values, but the “data haul” won’t be as intensive as in past rounds of bidding.

Young said he hopes to make a “valid” acquisition decision as soon as possible, while speeding the delivery of new aircraft. The USAF hopes to have the first of its advanced tankers in service by 2013, replacing Eisenhower-era KC-135s.

However, the Pentagon’s acquisition czar hasn’t offered a plan for fixing the Air Force procurement process. Last month’s GAO ruling stunned the USAF , and yesterday’s announcement of a modified acquisition process was, essentially, a no-confidence vote in the service's acquisition corps, now led by Assistant Air Force Secretary Sue Payton.

Repairing the service’s acquisition system is a job that will fall on Mr. Donley and the next Air Force Chief of Staff, General Norton Schwartz. Amid the host of problems now facing the service, the acquisition mess ranks at the top of the list, and for obvious reasons. The Air Force has other big-ticket programs that are also in acquisition limbo, most notably the contract for new combat search-and-rescue helicopters, or CSAR-X.

When the service selected Boeing’s HH-47 as the winner in November 2006, the decision was met with a formal protest from losing bidders Northrop-Grumman and Sikorsky. Sure enough, the GAO upheld that protest, forcing the Air Force to start over again. Almost two years later, the CSAR and special ops communities are still waiting for a new helicopters to replace the aging, under-sized HH-60 Pave Hawks that now make up the Air Force rescue fleet.

Loren Thompson, the respected airpower analyst at the Washington-based Lexington Institute said last month’s GAO ruling “raises the question of whether the Air Force knows what it is doing.” Ensuing events—including Mr. Gates’ decision to strip the service’s acquisition authority in the tanker deal—have done nothing to challenge that assessment. Reversing that perception (and fixing the procurement process) will require all of the miracle-working skills that Mr. Donley and General Schwartz can muster.

Our Thoughts on Those Iranian Missile Tests

...now posted at Pajamas Media.

Watch Out, He’s Going to Snap

The latest Democratic attempt to discredit John McCain’s military service is nothing short of pathetic. Speaking last week at something called the "Aspen Ideas Festival," former President Bill Clinton warned that "it’s just a matter of time before a former POW snaps, and relives the nightmare of his imprisonment."

In his remarks, Mr. Clinton compared Senator McCain to former South Africa President Nelson Mandela, who spent 27 years as a political prisoner. According to Clinton, Mr. Mandela once told him that he had "let go" of his anger toward his captors to be truly free.

Then, he suggested that former POWs could lose control at any time.

"It’s just like if you know anybody who’s ever been a POW for any length of time, you will see you go along for months or maybe even years, and then something will happen and it will trigger all those bad dreams and they will come back, and it may not last 30 seconds," he said.

In response, McCain wondered where Mr. Clinton got his expertise. I wondered the same thing. To our knowledge, Clinton has never been held captive, let alone tortured (unless you count his marriage to Hillary). On the other hand, Senator McCain knows a little bit about the subject, having spent almost six years in the Hanoi Hilton.

More importantly, Mr. McCain—like the vast majority of former POWs—seems to have weathered the experience remarkably well. That seems to match my own, anecdotal experience on the topic. As a young airman in the early 1980s, I came to know three ex-POWs, all Air Force fighter pilots who had been shot down over North Vietnam. Their time in captivity ranged from a few months, to more than five years.

But all shared a common trait; they were quiet, personable and exceptionally well-balanced. And, they all struck me as remarkably unflappable. Enduring the hell of a prison camp tends to produce that effect; prolonged periods of isolation, deprivation and torture give you a new perspective on life and liberty.

All of the POWs that I knew resumed their military careers, returned to flying status and eventually retired as Colonels. No, I wasn’t privy to their inner-most thoughts, and didn’t know the details of their private lives, but it was clear that all three men had come to terms their POW ordeal and resumed a normal, productive existence.

And, for what it's worth, Dick Morris reminded us a few months back that Bill has his own, nasty tendency to blow up (and even become violent), at the slightest provocation. According to Morris, he was once physically attacked by Clinton (then governor of Arkansas), after he threatened to leave the campaign.

And he’s worried about McCain snapping?

I hate to lump former POWs with a scatological ex-President, but Mr. Clinton would do well to emulate the men who returned from the Hanoi Hilton and the few who survived Viet Cong imprisonment in the south. After their release, most led exemplary lives, remarkably free of misconduct and scandal. Unfortunately, you can’t say the same thing about Bill Clinton.

But, give Bubba some credit. He's on message with the DNC talking points, as the attempting "Swift-Boating" of John McCain continues.

Shameless Self-Promotion Department

Pajamas Media asked me for an assessment of today's Iranian missile test. It should be up in a few hours, and I'll post a link when it appears.

In summary, Tehran's missile salvo demonstrated nothing new in terms of military capabilities. But, the tepid response of Democratic presidential nominee Barack Obama--and the signal it sends to Tehran--speak volumes about where this issue is headed, if he becomes our next Commander-in-Chief. Suffice it to say, Mr. Obama is proposing a solution that clearly won't work, and his strategy will only embolden Iran.

Nothing to See Here, Just Keep Moving

From the AP: US removes uranium from Iraq.

And not trace amounts either; according to the story, more than 500 tons of yellowcake was evacuated from Iraq during a secret operation that lasted more than three months.

Obviously, it takes more than yellowcake to make a nuclear weapon. And the stockpile discovered in Iraq apparently dated from the first Gulf War. But someone in Saddam's regime apparently felt it was important enough to keep the stuff around.

And didn't we learn--after Operation Iraqi Freedom--that Saddam had been shopping for centrifuges? Again, not enough to build a bomb, but another key element in that process.

Back to you, Ambassador Wilson.

Remembering Operation Vittles

Sixty years ago, this month, West Berlin was facing starvation and eventual capitulation to Soviet forces.

Less than three weeks earlier, on 12 June, the Russians announced that the autobahn leading to the city from western sectors was closed "for repairs." Over the days that followed, rail and barge traffic were also cut off, a blatant violation of the "right of passage" guarantees that had existed since the end of World War II. The strategy to force the allies from Berlin culminated with a final statement, revealing that the Soviet sector would not supply food to the western-occupied sections of the city.

The allies could hardly afford to "surrender" West Berlin and give Moscow a tremendous geopolitical and psychological victory. But there was legitimate debate as to "how far" the west would go in defending the city. Despite the deployment of nuclear-capable B-29s to western Europe, the military defense of Berlin was considered a near-impossibility.

With Soviet forces surrounding the city's western sectors, allied forces in Berlin would be quickly overwhelmed, with the prospect of staggering civilian casualties. Were the western allies willing to risk World War III to defend the city?

The commander of the U.S. occupation zones, General Luicius Clay, believed that conflict would not be necessary. In his estimation, the Soviets were bluffing--they did not want a war over Berlin. He initially proposed sending an armored column down the autobahn toward Berlin, with instructions to fire if it were stopped or attacked. While President Truman rejected that proposal as too risky, he agreed with Clay's assessment that Berlin could not be abandoned.

With surface traffic to Berlin cut off, the Allies began contemplating an airlift. The prospect of resupplying West Berlin by air seemed daunting, but previous events suggested the operation had an outside shot at success. First, the western powers were guaranteed air access to the city, thanks to a 1945 agreement with the Soviets which granted three air corridors into Berlin.

Secondly, a limited airlift to the western sectors was already underway. For several months, the RAF transports had been resupplying the British garrison in Berlin by air. As part of the planning process, the Brits calculated airflift requirements to sustain the entire city. The RAF estimate, based on a 1700-calorie daily diet for Berliners, suggested that an airlift was feasible.

On June 25, 1948, the airlift began, with 32 U.S. C-47 transports hauling food, milk and medicine to the city. The British effort began three days later. By the second week, aircrews were hauling 1,000 tons of supplies a day into Berlin's three major airports. But is was clear that an expanded airlift would be required, to sustain the city during a sustained blockade.

Organizing that effort fell on the shoulders of Lieutenant General William Tunner, one of the legendary "captains" of airpower who forged the Army Air Corps during World War II, and the independent U.S. Air Force that followed in 1947.

But Tunner was something of a rarity; unlike Curtis LeMay, Carl Spaatz and Jimmy Doolittle, who gained fame as bomber commanders, General Tunner was best known as a transport pilot. He organized the "Hump" airlift between India and China during World War II, providing the aerial lifeline that kept Allied forces in the fight, despite the physical barrier of the Himalayan Mountains.

Colleagues describe Tunner as a man who could instantly "bring order out of chaos." That skill was instrumental to the success of the "Hump" operation, which existed at the end of the supply and maintenance chain. Tunner had more resources to work with in the Berlin Airlift, but the geopolitical stakes were infinitely higher.

General Tunner took command of the operation on 27 July 1948, and faced an immediate crisis. Flying to Berlin, he learned that a C-54 had crashed on landing in the city; a second transport blew out its tires trying to avoid the wreck, and a third aircraft ground-looped on an adjacent runway, shutting down the airport.

To prevent a greater calamity, Tunner radioed all aircraft to return to base. In a matter of days, he implemented changes that improved operational efficiency and safety. All missions were flown under instrument flying rules, regardless of actual weather conditions. Pilots got one shot at landing in Berlin; if they botched their approach, the plane and its cargo returned to base.

He also discovered that it took as long to unload a two-engine C-47 as it did the larger C-54. The smaller aircraft were quickly phased out of the airlift. Tunner enlisted German civilians to unload the aircraft, and hired attractive young frauleins to drive the snack trucks that carried refreshments to the crews. That eliminated ground delays, caused by air crews strolling to the terminal for a drink and a sandwich. With crews restricted to their aircraft in Berlin, offloading proceeded much more quickly, allowing more missions to be flown each day.

General Tunner also understood the importance of public relations on a global stage. He liked "Operation Vittles," the nickname given to the operation, and looked for other ways to highlight the airlift's success. When he heard that a young pilot named Gail Halvorsen was dropping candy to children in Berlin, he dubbed the effort "Operation Little Vittles," and made it a part of his publicity effort. Eventually, thousands of American children and candy companies donated more than three tons of sweets to the effort. It was a powerful rebuke to communist claims that the airlift wasn't working.

The winter of 1948-49 posed special challenges. Weather conditions were often bad, and the requirements for more coal pushed daily cargo requirements past 6,000 tons. But Tunner, his staff and the airlift crews met those demands. They hired former Luftwaffe ground crews to service the aircraft and repair the operating surfaces at Templehof and Gatow, the primary airfields in West Berlin. Newly-developed ground approach radar allowed aircraft to operate in weather that would have prevented landings in the past.

By the spring of 1949, the airlift was in high gear. Not even harassment by Soviet fighters and anti-aircraft guns could stop the steady flow of food, coal and medical supplies to Berlin. Over Easter weekend, Tunner pulled out all the stops, delivering over 12,000 tons of coal in a 24-hour period, without a single accident. By the end of that month, the operation was providing more supplies than the city had received by ground before the airlift began.

With the allies able to meet the city's needs by air, the Soviets had a change of heart. Not long after Tunner's Easter spectacular, Moscow signaled that it was willing to end the blockade. An agreement was concluded in only eight days, and road and rail traffic began moving to Berlin once more in mid-May. The U.S. and its partners had won an important, early victory in the Cold War, thanks (in large part) to an air commander who brought order out of chaos.

***

ADDENDUM: General Tunner was later instrumental in organizing airlift operations in Korea, allowing U.N. forces to sustain their resistance during the dark summer of 1950. But, in typical Air Force fashion, Tunner never received his fourth star, and retired in 1960. He died in 1983, secure in his reputation as the father of American airlift, and forces that evolved into the Military Air Transport Service, Military Airlift Command and Air Mobility Command.



Tunner

The Seeds of Success

We may never know the full details of Wednesday's successful mission in Colombia that freed 15 hostages, including three American military contractors and former presidential candidate Ingrid Bentacourt.

And that's just as well. With Colombia's FARC terrorists now on the run, there's no point in divulging operational details that might jeopardize future missions. Suffice it to say that yesterday's rescue effort was a turning point in the 40-year war between the FARC and the Colombian government. Less than a decade ago, the marxist-inflenced guerillas seemed to be on the verge of winning; now, after a series of stunning setbacks, the FARC appears headed for defeat.

Colombia's remarkable transition is the result of two, interrelated events. The first is Plan Colombia, the U.S. assistance package aimed at reforming Colombia's military and curbing the narco and terrorist violence that once gripped that country. Despite objections from some Congressional Democrats, the plan was implemented in 2000, with the promise of billions in U.S. military aid that began flowing to Bogata.

The second critical event was the 2002 election of Alvaro Uribe as Colombia's president. Uribe's predecessor tried to make a deal with the FARC--granting the terrorists large swaths of territory. It was a fool's errand; the emboldened terrorists simply stepped up their attacks, overruning several Colombian military bases in or near FARC strongholds.

In fact, the situation was so grim that on Uribe's inaguration day six years ago, the terrorists were surrounding Bogata and Colombia's army had been largely reduced to a garrison force, incapable of sustained operations in FARC territory. Making good on Uribe's promise to take the fight to the enemy would require a massive overhaul of the nation's military.

Under the tutlege of American trainers--mostly Army Green Berets--the Colombians began weeding out corrupt or incompetent officers, while elevating and training a new generation of military leaders. A Green Beret Major, who was interviewed by the Los Angeles Times earlier this year, describe the creation of elite, 28-man commando teams, organized and equipped to carry out long, intelligence-gathering missions in terrorist regions, or lighting strikes against insurgent targets. One of those units carried out during Wednesday's daring rescue mission.

It has been a remarkable transformation. Not too many years ago, a U.S. diplomat in Bogota referred to the Colombian military as the "Apple Dumpling Gang," in reference to a
Disney movie about a gang of bumbling criminals. Compare that to the highly-trained Colombian commando unit that organized and executed the rescue mission.

Much of the credit belongs to President Uribe and his military, who accepted (and institutionalized) U.S. advice and support. As that Army Major told the LAT, it took the Colombians a while to "buy in" on the idea of using highly-trained, small units to take on the FARC, instead of the large, heavily-armed formations of years past.

Toward that goal, the Colombian Army now has significant numbers of elite troops, with skills roughly equal to U.S. soliders who've completed the first phase of Ranger training. That doesn't put them on a par with U.S. Special Forces or the British SAS, but by rest-of-the-world standards, the Colombians are high speed--and getting better by the day.

The rapid improvement of Colombia's military is also a testament to the American training teams that have worked diligently over the past eight years. Readers will recall that Plan Colombia has long been controversial, and a frequent target for criticism by Congressional Democrats. But to their credit, politicians of both parties stuck with the plan, and it paid off in the Colombian jungle on Wednesday.

In spades.

***

ADDENDUM: Various U.S. officials indicate that our role in the operation was limited to planning and intelligence support. But don't underestimate the importance of that assistance. In fact, there's a parallel from the early 1980s, which also resulted in the successful release of an American hostage. Brigadier General James Dozier was taken captive by Italy's Red Brigades terrorist organization, which staged a number of high-profile kidnappings and executions, including that of former Prime Minister Aldo Moro.

After Dozier's capture, Italian authorities had difficulty in locating the kidnappers and welcomed U.S. assistance. A team from the National Security Agency penetrated Red Brigade communications; that information, along with HUMINT developed by the Italians, led to a daring raid that secure General Dozier's release.

The rescue essentially broke the back of the terrorist group, and the Italians quickly rolled up the remaining cells. Within a decade, the Red Brigades had all-but-disappeared. One of the group's final attacks occured at Aviano AB in 1993. A gunman claiming allegiance to the group tried to spray a U.S. military dormitory with automatic weapons fire; he was quickly captured by Italian police when his getaway driver sped away--before the mission was complete.

Senator Hypocrite

Wesley Clark’s deplorable comments on John McCain’s war record prompted questions for another Democratic "military expert," Virginia Senator Jim Webb. His remarks took a different tack, but were equally despicable. Appearing on MSNBC’s execrable Countdown with Keith Olberman, Senator Webb urged McCain to "tone down" the emphasis on his military record:

"I think what we really need to work on over the next four, five months, and it goes back to the speech that Sen. Obama gave [Monday] and this little fight that I've been watching and that is, we need to make sure that we take politics out of service," Webb said. "People don't serve their country for political issues."

He continued: "And John McCain's my long-time friend, if that is one area that I would ask him to calm down on, it`s that, don't be standing up and uttering your political views and implying that all the people in the military support them because they don't, any more than when the Democrats have political issues during the Vietnam War. Let's get the politics out of the military, take care of our military people, or have our political arguments in other areas."

Describing Webb as a hypocrite would be charitable. During his successful 2006 run against George Allen, Mr. Webb had no problem running on his record in Vietnam, where he won the Navy Cross as a Marine infantry officer. And, for that matter, Webb even used his own son’s military service as a campaign prop, stumping across the Old Dominion in a pair of the young man’s combat boots.

We also wonder where Mr. Webb was in 2004, when John Forbes Kerry used his Vietnam experience as the centerpiece of his presidential bid. Apparently, the former Navy Secretary had no problem with Mr. Kerry campaigning on his military service. But when John McCain reminds voters that he served with valor as a naval aviator and POW, well, it’s time to take politics out of service.

Jim Webb was a superb combat leader and he’s (arguably) the best novelist of the Vietnam era. But as a politician, he’s morphed into a feckless hack, cut from the same cloth as General Clark and former Air Force Chief of Staff Merrill "Tony" McPeak, who criticized McCain for being "too fat" last week.

We’ve come to expect that sort of drivel from Clark and McPeak, living examples of the politically-driven, "perfumed princes" that the late David Hackworth railed about for more than 50 years. And sadly, those comments on Countdown are typical of Jim Webb, the one-time warrior who eagerly reinvented himself as a professional politician.

Red Lines

Jonathan Karl of ABC News gets today's prize for reporting the obvious--or, at least getting the Pentagon's take on it.

Military officials tell Mr. Karl that Israel "could carry out an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities before the end of the year," with "enormous" repercussions for the United States and the rest of the world. Duh. In other words, the Pentagon sources that spoke with the ABC correspondent are saying the same thing as other analysts, both here and abroad.

A senior defense official told ABC News there is an "increasing likelihood" that Israel will carry out such an attack, a move that likely would prompt Iranian retaliation against, not just Israel, but against the United States as well.

The official identified two "red lines" that could trigger an Israeli offensive. The first is tied to when Iran's Natanz nuclear facility produces enough highly enriched uranium to make a nuclear weapon. According to the latest U.S. and Israeli intelligence assessments, that is likely to happen sometime in 2009, and could happen by the end of this year.

Nothing particularly revelatory there. In fact, a former Mossad chief said the same thing a few days ago. With Iran steadily expanding its centrifuge cascade at Natanz--and increasing its ability to produce enriched uranium--Israel's window for crippling that process is closing fast. At some point over the next two years, Iran will have enough material for a bomb (or perhaps multiple bombs), and ship it to another site for integration. Once that occurs, Tehran's nuclear genie is out of the bottle, and derailing its weapons program becomes infinitely more difficult.

The official also tells Mr. Karl that the second "red line" concerns an Iranian purchase of an advanced air defense system, such as the Russian-built SA-20. Similar to the U.S. Patriot, the SA-20 is a highly capable anti-aircraft and anti-missile system. More recent versions of the Favorite (as the Russian call it), have a maximum range of at least 120 nautical miles, and the newest missiles, now entering operational service, can engage targets up to 250 miles away.

While the SA-20 has long been on Iran's wish list, there is no hard evidence that Tehran has actually acquired the system. But, that moment may be approaching. In Congressional testimony last March, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, General Mike Maples, reported that Iran was "close" to getting the SA-20.

Exactly how close? General Maples didn't say--at least publicly. But last December, Iranian officials announced they had signed a contract for the SA-20, a claim that Russia vigorously denied. So far, the available evidence seems to support Moscow's version of events.

In the past, Tehran has balked at the SA-20's high cost. Vietnam bought the system a few years ago, paying $300 million for 12 launchers, missiles, radars and support vehicles. While the current price is believed to be higher, Iran can easily afford the purchase, with oil now trading at $140 a barrel.

Readers will recall that the Iranian military has bought advanced air defense equipment from Russian in recent years. A deal for the short-range SA-15 SAM system was concluded in late 2005; deliveries began in November of the following year and were completed in less than three months.

Acquisition of the SA-15 greatly improved Iran's point defense of key facilities, but the system has a serious weakness. With a range of less than six miles, the TOR-1M (Russian designation) cannot engage tactical aircraft employing standoff weapons, including JDAM. Consequently, the SA-15 might be more effective in an "ambush" role, along potential air routes that might be used by Israeli jets. However, that tactic would mean fewer missiles for close-in protection of its nuclear facilities.

Obviously, Iran could use a long-rage, state-of-the-art SAM system to complement the SA-15, covering large areas that are now defended by older systems like the Chinese CSA-1, the Russian-built SA-5, or the U.S.-made I-HAWK, acquired in the early 1970s. Those SAMs pose a relatively minor threat to a potential Israeli strike package.


On the other hand, the presence of SA-20 batteries in Iran would clearly impact tactical planning by the Israeli Air Force. As we observed many months ago, the task of getting to Iran would limit the size of the IAF strike package; trying counter the SA-20 threat would force the Israelis to devote more assets to the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). That means more anti-radiation missiles on the pylons and fewer bombs--further reducing the operational margin for error.

Still, Iran would be foolish to underestimate the IAF. The Israelis have other methods for hammering an air defense system (think SOF teams and information operations), tools that were reportedly used in the strike on that Syrian nuclear site last year. During that strike, the IAF flew across Syria and back again, apparently without being detected. They wouldn't necessarily need the same level of surprise against Iran--just enough delay or confusion in the air defenses to get the strike package in, and bombs on target.

And, Iran's air defense network is certainly vulnerable to that type of attack. Elements of its command-and-control (C2) system remain antiquated, and subject to spoofing and saturation. In some instances, Iranian air defense crews have come dangerously close to shooting down civilian airliners and routinely fire on military aircraft that stray off course.

But Tehran's air defenses are improving, slowly and steadily. Acquisition of the SA-20 will happen eventually, and probably sooner rather than later. Given their druthers, the Israelis would prefer to attack before the Favorite arrives in Iran. The potential presence of the SA-20 isn't a show-stopper for the Israelis, but it is a red-line that will influence any decision on striking Iran's nuclear facilities.

Not Quite Dead Yet

Among its other problems, the U.S. Air Force is facing a crisis in electronic combat (EC).

At issue is what type(s) of jammers will be available to support USAF, joint-service and allied strike packages in the decades to come. As you’ll recall, the Air Force retired its EF-111 Ravens in the late 1990s, opting to rely on Navy and Marine Corps EA-6Bs for jamming support until new platforms became available after 2012.

Trouble is, most of those new systems—including UAV-based jammer and a previously-proposed B-52 electronic combat variant—have been cancelled, victims of budget issues and technical problems. Making matters worse, the Air Force agreement with the Navy, which covered EA-6B support, is set to expire in four years.

As we noted in a recent post, prospects for extending the agreement are virtually nil. While the Navy is buying 86 of the new EF-18 “Growlers,” those numbers are only sufficient to support USN operations and training. The same holds true for the EA-6Bs that will remain in the Marine Corps inventory.

That’s not to say the Air Force is without electronic combat options. Advanced Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars on the F-22 and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter can be used in a jamming role. Those aircraft also present a more difficult target for enemy radars, thanks to their stealth design.

But, with large numbers of non-stealthy strike aircraft projected to remain in the inventory through 2020, the Air Force still needs dedicated, stand-off jammers to reduce their vulnerability from ground-based air defenses. That’s one reason that the B-52 EC option isn’t quite dead—at least not yet.

According to Graham Warwick of Aviation Week, Boeing and several system suppliers have received contracts to “mature technology” for an Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) pod that could be flight-tested on a B-52 by 2012. If successful, the pod could lead to a more extensive jamming system, give the venerable bomber another shot as a stand-off EC platform, suppressing enemy radars for other strike aircraft.

The initial effort outlined in Aviation Week article is fairly modest—at least in terms of dollars. The three-year contracts given to Boeing and its partners total only $15 million—less than one percent of the funding allocated to the B-52 Stand-Off Jammer System (SOJS). More than $7 billion was spent on that project before it was cancelled in 2006, due to cost overruns.

If all goes well, the second phase of the AEA pod program would spend up to $350 million on two prototype pods, with flight testing in four years. As a Boeing official explained, the pod will use jammers already found on (or planned for) the EF-18, and the system will fit easily on the B-52:

To reduce costs, the pods are planned to have the same size, weight and center of gravity as underwing fuel tanks carried by the earlier B-52D. The pods would house high-power phased arrays providing jamming in two low bands and one mid band, principally to counter early-warning radars.

To power the pods, Boeing plans to add generators to the B-52, which presently has them on only four of its eight engines. There would be an electronic-attack processor and a dedicated display at the existing electronic-warfare officer’s station.

Boeing is teamed with Northrop Grumman, its partner on the U.S. Navy’s electronic-attack EA-18G Growler. “We will leverage off the EA-18’s controls and displays and Northrop Grumman’s electronic attack expertise to keep it affordable,” said Jeff Weis, the Boeing program manager.

The AEA development effort is actually a prelude to planned Core Component Jammer (CCJ), envisioned as a cost-efficient alternative to the cancelled B-52 SOJS. While all Buffs were scheduled for the SOJS upgrade, only a limited number will carry the CCJ—another tip toward saving money.

Boeing executives (and the Air Force) believe that the core jammer system could enter operational service in ten years. That would be welcome news but it also raises the question of what happens during that six-year stretch between 2012 and 2018, the period between the end of the Navy support agreement, and arrival of the first operational CCJ pods.

It’s just one more quandary awaiting the next Air Force Chief of Staff, General Norton Schwartz. Looking at the long list of critical issues facing the USAF, a senior Congressional aide said last month that the service needs a “miracle worker” as CofS.

We can’t disagree; while the EC issue is vitally important, in today’s Air Force, it wouldn't make the “Top 10” list of problems now facing the service. In a nutshell, General Schwartz is inheriting a mess. He’ll need all of his miracle-working skills (and then some) to resolve the jammer problem—and more pressing matters—that now confront the Air Force.