A B-52H departs Minot AFB, North Dakota (USAF Photo)
Part I: A Failure of Leadership
by Nathan Hale
Author's note: Over the past five months, this blog has provided extensive coverage of last summer’s nuclear incident at Minot AFB, North Dakota. In an effort to learn more about the mishap, we’ve spoken at length with a number of experts, including some of the Air Force's leading authorities on nuclear weapons maintenance and accountability procedures. Information from those experts—and other sources—has allowed us to develop a detailed account of what went wrong at Minot. The first in our three-part series focuses on key leaders at the base and their role in the mishap.
A “perfect storm” of failed leadership, lax supervision, ineffective internal communication, inexperienced personnel and poor career field management led to last year’s nuclear incident at Minot AFB, North Dakota, resulting in the unauthorized transfer of six-nuclear tipped missiles to an installation in Louisiana.
That damning assessment was offered by former Air Force experts on nuclear weapons maintenance, security and training--retired officers and non-commissioned officer with decades of experience in that demanding profession. They are intimately familiar with the munitions—and procedures—involved in the Minot incident, having worked with Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs) that use the same warhead. Additionally, two of the experts personally know (or have served with) the senior NCOs assigned to Minot’s munitions maintenance complex at the time of the mishap.
While never assigned to the North Dakota base, the retired nuclear weapons technicians served in maintenance and leadership positions at other northern-tier nuclear units, and one of them participated in several inspections at Minot. After leaving active duty, he worked as a Defense Department consultant, and assisted in developing regulations governing the maintenance of nuclear weapons. The former inspector--and the other experts--spoke with In From the Cold on the condition of anonymity.
***
Reflecting on the Minot incident, the retired nuclear weapons specialist observed that all of the factors that contributed to the mishap were “interrelated. While he does not believe that a single failure was more important that others, he voiced strong concerns about the leadership issues that set the stage for the incident.
As a result of those errors, six Advanced Cruise Missiles, with nuclear warheads attached, were loaded on a B-52 bomber and flown to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana on 29 August. The mistake wasn’t discovered until after the bomber landed at its destination. By that time, the six warheads had been “missing” for roughly 36 hours.
The weapons mishap was a major embarrassment for the Air Force and the most serious breach of nuclear security protocols in 40 years. President Bush and Defense Secretary Robert Gates were briefed on the incident, and members of Congress called for an investigation. So far, the service has launched three separate probes of the incident; one was completed late last year; the second inquiry, headed by retired Air Force General Larry Welch, will be submitted in the coming weeks. A third panel, headed by Major General Polly Peyer, is expected to report its findings next month.
Four senior Air Force officers, including the commander of Minot’s 5th Bomb Wing, were fired from their jobs because of the incident, and the unit lost its certification for nuclear operations. Crews from Minot were responsible for loading the weapons onto the aircraft, which was assigned to Barksdale’s 2nd Bomb Wing. Additionally, the Chief Master Sergeant who served as superintendent of Minot's special weapons flight was moved to a new job; four other senior NCOs were reported demoted, and more than 60 personnel—most of them from Minot—lost their individual certification to work with nuclear weapons.
The Air Force has not published its initial report on the mishap, but the service did hold a Friday afternoon press conference in mid-October, outlining its plan for punishing those deemed culpable, and preventing future incident of that type. But the press event did not address the accident’s underlying factors and media coverage—predictably--focused on the officers who lost their jobs.
Taking a more analytical approach in assessing the incident, a former weapons inspector places much of the blame on human factors, beginning with senior NCOs assigned to Minot’s 5th Munitions Maintenance Squadron. He believes that the former chief of the unit’s special weapons flight, Chief Master Sergeant Brenda Langlois, had “a major role in the failure,” claiming that “she was poorly prepared for her job.”
“She’s an excellent award writer, but not a career field expert,” the source explained. “She had been out of maintenance, in staff jobs, for almost seven years prior to being assigned to Minot.”
The retired munitions expert also reported that Chief Langlois delegated some of her responsibilities, and spent time on activities that little to do with her job.
“I understand she spent little time in the Weapons Storage Area. She chose to groom Senior Master Sergeants, who like her, looked good on paper, but didn’t know how to lead or manage.
“In the months before the incident, she was signed up to speak at the Air Force Women’s Symposium as a leader in her career field, and at the ‘Tribute to Women in the Military’ in New Mexico as a “Trail Blazer.” The focus was on her, not on the work being done.”
As evidence of Langlois’ lax attitude, the former nuclear specialist described a Senior Munitions Manager conference, which he attended with the Chief. “We were hammering out the wording of AFI (Air Force Instruction) 21-204, the instruction that details all nuclear weapons maintenance policy, and yet she has no input. For the entire week, she had nothing to say.”
He also faulted Chief Langlois for the training problems that became evident after the incident was discovered—and a number of Minot maintenance personnel lost their certification for working on nukes.
“It’s the Chief’s job to ensure people are properly trained. Whenever you have a program as detailed and paperwork intensive as the nuclear weapons training program, it is ripe to be ‘pencil whipped.’ If you don’t watch supervisors closely they can sign people off as qualified to perform tasks when in fact they aren’t. If your quality assurance evaluator isn’t top-notch, they may certify technicians on weapons maintenance tasks when they aren’t proficient.”
The retired weapons specialist also faulted other leaders in the organization, including the senior NCOs who worked for Langlois. He reports at least four members of that group were demoted as a result of the incident, while lower-ranking personnel received lesser forms of non-judicial punishment. Sources at Minot tell In From the Cold that the demoted senior NCOs (in grades E-7 and E-8) have also been reassigned to other jobs at the base.
Unlike her top subordinates, Chief Master Sergeant Langlois did not lose a stripe because of the incident. She is currently assigned to the Air Force Smart Operations (AFSO) Office at Minot, charged with implementing Sigma Six management principles at the installation. She did not respond to an e-mail request for comments on the nuclear incident, or her role in the training process.
Junior and mid-level officers in the Minot maintenance chain also escaped serious punishment and remain on the job. “Doesn’t seem quite fair, does it?” the source asked. He thinks the double standard raises concerns about the management team still in place. “If they didn’t see how ineffective their senior NCOs were, they weren’t very effective themselves,” he observed.
Another former weapons specialist believes the leadership issues at Minot are evidence of wider problems within the nuclear weapons career field. “No one cares about nuclear weapons anymore,” he observed. “The enlisted career field is shrinking. Most of the assignments are in crappy places like North Dakota or Shreveport. By the time a troop gets to be a Senior NCO, they usually have kids in high school; no one wants to move the family to Minot, or Montana or overseas. They get out in droves.”
And for those who stay, prospects for advancement—and good assignments—are limited.
“Only one nuke troop was promoted to Chief Master Sergeant (E-9) last year. Why stay in a career field where your chances of getting promoted are so low? They have cross-trained senior NCOs from missile maintenance and even supply to fill the [nuclear] ranks because the Air Force is cutting manpower in favor of UAVs and fighters.”
The result, he says, is a career field where experience levels are dropping, particularly among the NCOs and officers who provide critical leadership.
“No officer wants to be in nukes,” the source explained. “It’s boring, picky, and can be a real career ender. The glory is in the war. Even conventional munitions is better because they get a chance to deploy to the Middle East and build up bombs for combat. Nuke techs are a drag on resources because they typically don’t deploy. Senior officers fill the key slots just to fill a square on their resumes.”
Problems at Minot also extended up the chain of command. The 5th BMW Commander who was fired because of the incident (Colonel Bruce Emig), had been on the job less than three months at the time of the unauthorized transfer. Colonel Cynthia Lundell, who ran the wing’s maintenance group, also got the axe, along with the commander of a subordinate munitions maintenance squadron.
While acknowledging that Emig, Lundell and the squadron commander should have been proactive in addressing organizational problems, the former weapons specialist believes the break-down began well before their change-of-command ceremonies.
“Of course the last [wing] commander (Colonel Eldon Woodie) bears some responsibility. When you have as many people ignoring the rules as you do at Minot, it could not have happened overnight.” The retired nuclear inspector also noted the tendency of some units to “throttle back” after an inspection. The 5th BMW earned high marks during a 2006 Nuclear Surety Inspection, which evaluated the unit’s ability to store, maintain and handle nuclear weapons.
Despite the successful evaluation—and the scheduled change-of-command—members of the 5th BMW should have remained focused and vigilant. “That doesn’t mean the mission won’t go on,” the nuclear expert observed. “There are still inspections down the road.”
***
In the wake of the nuclear incident, Minot experienced a raft leadership changes. Colonel Emig was removed from his post in mid-October, roughly six weeks after the mishap. He was replaced by Colonel Joel Westa, the former Vice-Commander of the 36th Strategic Wing at Andersen AFB, Guam.
Lundell’s successor, Colonel Don Kirkland, arrived at Minot in November. The retired weapons expert described Kirkland as a “big dog” brought in from Minot’s parent organization (Air Combat Command headquarters), with a mandate to fix the troubled maintenance complex.
With Colonel Westa and Colonel Kirkland in place, the 5th Bomb Wing and its maintenance group launched an accelerated effort to fix problems that led to the August incident, and regain the unit’s nuclear certification. But they faced an uphill struggle.
With many of Minot’s nuclear technicians de-certified, personnel from Barksdale AFB, Louisiana were brought in to handle day-to-day weapons maintenance and other key tasks. Sources at the base indicate that more than 40 Barksdale airmen were dispatched to Minot, and the cost of their billeting and per diem created concerns about who would pay the bill, an estimated $130,000 a month.
Meanwhile, the 5th BMW began the process of recertifying its personnel for the nuclear mission. Time became an immediate concern. In early November, Colonel Westa announced that the 5th BMW hoped to complete required training and inspections, and regain its certification by mid-February. Meeting that goal meant the wing would have re-certify most of its personnel, then pass an Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection (INSI) in December, a follow-up Nuclear Surety Inspection in January and a unit compliance evaluation after that.
It was an ambitious schedule, to say the least. In preparation, members of the wing began working 12 hours a day, seven days a week. While other Air Force units looked forward to an extended holiday break, airmen of the 5th BMW were only promised a single day off—Christmas Day. Morale sagged.
But if the mood at Minot was already glum, it turned black on December 19th. That was the day that the Air Combat Command Inspector General (IG) Team released the results of the wing’s Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection (INSI). Their findings revealed continuing problems at Minot, and suggested that fixing the wing might not be as easy as first imagined.
Monday: Why Minot was given “more time” to get ready for its upcoming inspections, and a detailed look at how nuclear-tipped missiles were inadvertently loaded onto a B-52 and flown across the country. Could the same thing happen again?
That damning assessment was offered by former Air Force experts on nuclear weapons maintenance, security and training--retired officers and non-commissioned officer with decades of experience in that demanding profession. They are intimately familiar with the munitions—and procedures—involved in the Minot incident, having worked with Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs) that use the same warhead. Additionally, two of the experts personally know (or have served with) the senior NCOs assigned to Minot’s munitions maintenance complex at the time of the mishap.
While never assigned to the North Dakota base, the retired nuclear weapons technicians served in maintenance and leadership positions at other northern-tier nuclear units, and one of them participated in several inspections at Minot. After leaving active duty, he worked as a Defense Department consultant, and assisted in developing regulations governing the maintenance of nuclear weapons. The former inspector--and the other experts--spoke with In From the Cold on the condition of anonymity.
***
Reflecting on the Minot incident, the retired nuclear weapons specialist observed that all of the factors that contributed to the mishap were “interrelated. While he does not believe that a single failure was more important that others, he voiced strong concerns about the leadership issues that set the stage for the incident.
As a result of those errors, six Advanced Cruise Missiles, with nuclear warheads attached, were loaded on a B-52 bomber and flown to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana on 29 August. The mistake wasn’t discovered until after the bomber landed at its destination. By that time, the six warheads had been “missing” for roughly 36 hours.
The weapons mishap was a major embarrassment for the Air Force and the most serious breach of nuclear security protocols in 40 years. President Bush and Defense Secretary Robert Gates were briefed on the incident, and members of Congress called for an investigation. So far, the service has launched three separate probes of the incident; one was completed late last year; the second inquiry, headed by retired Air Force General Larry Welch, will be submitted in the coming weeks. A third panel, headed by Major General Polly Peyer, is expected to report its findings next month.
Four senior Air Force officers, including the commander of Minot’s 5th Bomb Wing, were fired from their jobs because of the incident, and the unit lost its certification for nuclear operations. Crews from Minot were responsible for loading the weapons onto the aircraft, which was assigned to Barksdale’s 2nd Bomb Wing. Additionally, the Chief Master Sergeant who served as superintendent of Minot's special weapons flight was moved to a new job; four other senior NCOs were reported demoted, and more than 60 personnel—most of them from Minot—lost their individual certification to work with nuclear weapons.
The Air Force has not published its initial report on the mishap, but the service did hold a Friday afternoon press conference in mid-October, outlining its plan for punishing those deemed culpable, and preventing future incident of that type. But the press event did not address the accident’s underlying factors and media coverage—predictably--focused on the officers who lost their jobs.
Taking a more analytical approach in assessing the incident, a former weapons inspector places much of the blame on human factors, beginning with senior NCOs assigned to Minot’s 5th Munitions Maintenance Squadron. He believes that the former chief of the unit’s special weapons flight, Chief Master Sergeant Brenda Langlois, had “a major role in the failure,” claiming that “she was poorly prepared for her job.”
“She’s an excellent award writer, but not a career field expert,” the source explained. “She had been out of maintenance, in staff jobs, for almost seven years prior to being assigned to Minot.”
The retired munitions expert also reported that Chief Langlois delegated some of her responsibilities, and spent time on activities that little to do with her job.
“I understand she spent little time in the Weapons Storage Area. She chose to groom Senior Master Sergeants, who like her, looked good on paper, but didn’t know how to lead or manage.
“In the months before the incident, she was signed up to speak at the Air Force Women’s Symposium as a leader in her career field, and at the ‘Tribute to Women in the Military’ in New Mexico as a “Trail Blazer.” The focus was on her, not on the work being done.”
As evidence of Langlois’ lax attitude, the former nuclear specialist described a Senior Munitions Manager conference, which he attended with the Chief. “We were hammering out the wording of AFI (Air Force Instruction) 21-204, the instruction that details all nuclear weapons maintenance policy, and yet she has no input. For the entire week, she had nothing to say.”
He also faulted Chief Langlois for the training problems that became evident after the incident was discovered—and a number of Minot maintenance personnel lost their certification for working on nukes.
“It’s the Chief’s job to ensure people are properly trained. Whenever you have a program as detailed and paperwork intensive as the nuclear weapons training program, it is ripe to be ‘pencil whipped.’ If you don’t watch supervisors closely they can sign people off as qualified to perform tasks when in fact they aren’t. If your quality assurance evaluator isn’t top-notch, they may certify technicians on weapons maintenance tasks when they aren’t proficient.”
The retired weapons specialist also faulted other leaders in the organization, including the senior NCOs who worked for Langlois. He reports at least four members of that group were demoted as a result of the incident, while lower-ranking personnel received lesser forms of non-judicial punishment. Sources at Minot tell In From the Cold that the demoted senior NCOs (in grades E-7 and E-8) have also been reassigned to other jobs at the base.
Unlike her top subordinates, Chief Master Sergeant Langlois did not lose a stripe because of the incident. She is currently assigned to the Air Force Smart Operations (AFSO) Office at Minot, charged with implementing Sigma Six management principles at the installation. She did not respond to an e-mail request for comments on the nuclear incident, or her role in the training process.
Junior and mid-level officers in the Minot maintenance chain also escaped serious punishment and remain on the job. “Doesn’t seem quite fair, does it?” the source asked. He thinks the double standard raises concerns about the management team still in place. “If they didn’t see how ineffective their senior NCOs were, they weren’t very effective themselves,” he observed.
Another former weapons specialist believes the leadership issues at Minot are evidence of wider problems within the nuclear weapons career field. “No one cares about nuclear weapons anymore,” he observed. “The enlisted career field is shrinking. Most of the assignments are in crappy places like North Dakota or Shreveport. By the time a troop gets to be a Senior NCO, they usually have kids in high school; no one wants to move the family to Minot, or Montana or overseas. They get out in droves.”
And for those who stay, prospects for advancement—and good assignments—are limited.
“Only one nuke troop was promoted to Chief Master Sergeant (E-9) last year. Why stay in a career field where your chances of getting promoted are so low? They have cross-trained senior NCOs from missile maintenance and even supply to fill the [nuclear] ranks because the Air Force is cutting manpower in favor of UAVs and fighters.”
The result, he says, is a career field where experience levels are dropping, particularly among the NCOs and officers who provide critical leadership.
“No officer wants to be in nukes,” the source explained. “It’s boring, picky, and can be a real career ender. The glory is in the war. Even conventional munitions is better because they get a chance to deploy to the Middle East and build up bombs for combat. Nuke techs are a drag on resources because they typically don’t deploy. Senior officers fill the key slots just to fill a square on their resumes.”
Problems at Minot also extended up the chain of command. The 5th BMW Commander who was fired because of the incident (Colonel Bruce Emig), had been on the job less than three months at the time of the unauthorized transfer. Colonel Cynthia Lundell, who ran the wing’s maintenance group, also got the axe, along with the commander of a subordinate munitions maintenance squadron.
While acknowledging that Emig, Lundell and the squadron commander should have been proactive in addressing organizational problems, the former weapons specialist believes the break-down began well before their change-of-command ceremonies.
“Of course the last [wing] commander (Colonel Eldon Woodie) bears some responsibility. When you have as many people ignoring the rules as you do at Minot, it could not have happened overnight.” The retired nuclear inspector also noted the tendency of some units to “throttle back” after an inspection. The 5th BMW earned high marks during a 2006 Nuclear Surety Inspection, which evaluated the unit’s ability to store, maintain and handle nuclear weapons.
Despite the successful evaluation—and the scheduled change-of-command—members of the 5th BMW should have remained focused and vigilant. “That doesn’t mean the mission won’t go on,” the nuclear expert observed. “There are still inspections down the road.”
***
In the wake of the nuclear incident, Minot experienced a raft leadership changes. Colonel Emig was removed from his post in mid-October, roughly six weeks after the mishap. He was replaced by Colonel Joel Westa, the former Vice-Commander of the 36th Strategic Wing at Andersen AFB, Guam.
Lundell’s successor, Colonel Don Kirkland, arrived at Minot in November. The retired weapons expert described Kirkland as a “big dog” brought in from Minot’s parent organization (Air Combat Command headquarters), with a mandate to fix the troubled maintenance complex.
With Colonel Westa and Colonel Kirkland in place, the 5th Bomb Wing and its maintenance group launched an accelerated effort to fix problems that led to the August incident, and regain the unit’s nuclear certification. But they faced an uphill struggle.
With many of Minot’s nuclear technicians de-certified, personnel from Barksdale AFB, Louisiana were brought in to handle day-to-day weapons maintenance and other key tasks. Sources at the base indicate that more than 40 Barksdale airmen were dispatched to Minot, and the cost of their billeting and per diem created concerns about who would pay the bill, an estimated $130,000 a month.
Meanwhile, the 5th BMW began the process of recertifying its personnel for the nuclear mission. Time became an immediate concern. In early November, Colonel Westa announced that the 5th BMW hoped to complete required training and inspections, and regain its certification by mid-February. Meeting that goal meant the wing would have re-certify most of its personnel, then pass an Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection (INSI) in December, a follow-up Nuclear Surety Inspection in January and a unit compliance evaluation after that.
It was an ambitious schedule, to say the least. In preparation, members of the wing began working 12 hours a day, seven days a week. While other Air Force units looked forward to an extended holiday break, airmen of the 5th BMW were only promised a single day off—Christmas Day. Morale sagged.
But if the mood at Minot was already glum, it turned black on December 19th. That was the day that the Air Combat Command Inspector General (IG) Team released the results of the wing’s Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection (INSI). Their findings revealed continuing problems at Minot, and suggested that fixing the wing might not be as easy as first imagined.
Monday: Why Minot was given “more time” to get ready for its upcoming inspections, and a detailed look at how nuclear-tipped missiles were inadvertently loaded onto a B-52 and flown across the country. Could the same thing happen again?
I could only read half of this trash job; it is obvious to me the "nuclear weapons specialist" so often quoted is not as familiar with Air Force operations and leadership skills as he professes.
ReplyDeleteHe complains that Chief Master Sergeants [Chiefs] -- the highest enlisted paygrade -- were not utilized in the lower grade postitions; field jobs, in other words. To do that would be a complete waste of a Chief, whose expertise lies in management far above that of turning a screwdriver. Literally anyone can be taught to turn screws; few can learn a Chief's job. At the risk of repeating myself, Chiefs are like CEOs; they are worth and earn their big bucks several times over.
As such, they have jobs relating to not just their former specific work details [their job description is much broader than that] but to leadership and management as well. They roam far afield in their taskings -- women speaking to women about their jobs and possible jobs is not unusual in today's diverse military.
To trash Chiefs and other Senior NCOs -- the top three enlisted grades -- by Monday morning quarterbacking is unworthy of a former SNCO. Especially one who professes to be a leader himself and admits being unfamiliar with Minot ops.
I speak as a retired government federal agent of 40+ years experience, 24 of which were served on active duty as a SNCO. The last 18 were as a mid-level civil servant reporting directly to the Air Staff. I didn't just assist
in writing security operations regs, I wrote them.
Mistakes were made, obviously. Trashing 60 or 70 men and women in uniform was an unworthy, cheap shot IMO. One must wonder what the "nuclear maintenance inspector" did during his Minot taskings.
fmrfed -
ReplyDeleteI have some experience in these matters, having a doctorate in experimental nuclear physics. (No, nothing to do with bombs, nor even nuclear power. Atom smashers.) And I tell you true:
One idiot with a screwdriver can foul things up so bad even the Chief Master Scientist (as it were) will need weeks to fix the problems.
It's true "Literally anyone can be taught to turn screws..." But that doesn't mean they know which screws to turn, in which order, nor how hard to turn them. When the subject is as critical as atomic bombs, atom smashers, or chemical refineries - you need a sprinkling of top-end people in among the screwdriver turners.
"Management," PFAUGH!.
It is utterly impossible that the aircrew, groundcrew, maintenance staff, arms depot staff, flight control tower and everyone right up to the CIC did not know that live nuclear weapons were loaded on the B52. IMPOSSIBLE. This is a much more serious issue than a breakdown in procedures. The nutroots over at Daily Kos have better explanations. A really in depth investigation by the FBI is in order.
ReplyDeleteFmrfed--I think you miss the point of the article (and the comments). No one was suggesting that the chief at Minot do the actual maintenance; rather, it was the failure of her management "team" that was a major, contributing factor to the accident. In the aftermath of the mishap, her leadership and management should be (rightfully) questioned.
ReplyDeleteBeyond that, someone has to ask about officer leadership as well--beyond the group and squadron commanders who were fired. According to sources familiar with the situation, the same field grade and company grade officers are still in place and most (apparently) escaped punishment. Why should anyone expect them to be more effective this time around?
Ouhttp://susankatzkeating.blogspot.com/2008/01/loose-nukes-special-report.htmltstanding reporting. I've linked to this on my blog.
ReplyDeleteSorry about that mishmash above. I meant to write, Outstanding reporting. I've linked to this post on my blog.
ReplyDeleteI'm a former aviation Marine NCO.
ReplyDeletePutting someone into a NCOIC slot after 7 years out of specialty strikes me as a recipe for disaster.
When I was in the USMC, we had a nearly ironclad rule that forbade assigning people out of specialty for more than 3 years. The few times that someone did break the rule, we quickly regretted it.
Meh.
ReplyDeleteAs far as the officers go... they're 21M which is munitions maintenance and one career field covers conventional and special weapons.
The enlisted folks are 2W2s and are nuclear weapons specialists. I agree that the career field is rapidly turning into a backwater. That said, the one Chief stripe that came out this year is proportional to the number of eligibles. It's not like there were 1,000 2W2 E-8s competing for it.
The munitions flight CMSgt sets an important tone. You're either in charge or you're not, and you're either responsible or you're not. If your folks mishandle six nukes on your watch then you suck as a Chief. That's not a judgment call, that's a fact.
Weapon storage areas tend to get lax if they don't have aggressive leaders. Behind a triple fence, in a locked building and inside a locked bay 2W2s often don't get the supervision they deserve.
This comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteHaving been a late cold war nuke guy, who was stationed at Grand Forks in field level maintenance, spent time in depot level maintenance and in USAFE (GLCM). Even as a first termer, I had tons of experience with logistical movements and just cannot get my mind around how this could even happen. I cant understand how no one at any of the many steps/checks involved in "moving" warheads and/or their delivery vehicles didnt say "what the heck is going on here?" Blows my mind! God help us all.
ReplyDeleteThis comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDelete[sarcasm on]
ReplyDeleteWhat do you expect, all the good baggage handlers work for the airlines.
With the over whelming number of bombers being loaded 24x7, you've got to expect some mistakes.
[sarcasm off]
As an afsc 31274 in the 70s we were constantly being hammered by SAC, 3901st, 15th AF, IG, and 12th AF surprise inspections twice a year by each. We spent a minimum of 8 hours of training on a simulator every 60 days. Any screw-up meant loosing ones certification and tons of remedial training.. Not fun. Then take into account an E-3 at the time was making <$170 a month.
A quote..
The 3901st Strategic Missile Evaluation Squadron, keepers and defenders of the faith. This was SAC's missile Praetorian Guards, or, in the opinion of some, SAC's version of the S.S. The 3901st was tasked with evaluating all SAC missile crews based upon the concept of "standardization." The 3901st was like a cold virus, unavoidable and unwelcome.
From what I understand in reading the General's report, these morons got so lazy they started poorly marking the nukes. Making them nearly impossible to identify.. This is sounds more like an admin problem.
However one would think the ass hats would take a little more pride in their job and show some initiative.
Jesus H Christ. I was an 411X0 EMT ICBM Team Chief with the 44OMMS as Ellsworth, SD and NOTHING like this ever happened. When the (01st) SMES arrived we were ready and always up to the task. Two-man policy and PRP were always to the letter.
ReplyDeleteBuddy, this Chief needs to be put out on her butt. What a waste of Pay Grade, High Heels, and Lipstick...
Retired E-7
Ben
Jesus H Christ. I was an 411X0 EMT ICBM Team Chief with the 44OMMS as Ellsworth, SD and NOTHING like this ever happened. When the (01st) SMES arrived we were ready and always up to the task. Two-man policy and PRP were always to the letter.
ReplyDeleteBuddy, this Chief needs to be put out on her butt. What a waste of Pay Grade, High Heels, and Lipstick...
Retired E-7
Ben
fmrfrd-
ReplyDeleteActually, I think the "nuclear weapons specialist" DOES know what he's talking about. Yes, we all know that a chief isn't supposed to be a wrench-turner. Staff sergeants aren't even supposed to be turning a wrench. But we all know that if you don't know how something is put together, you don't know if it is right or not. (That could apply to a weapon or a car or just the way the organization is put together.)
As far as the women speaking to women thing, I can tell you that it is well known that when Chief Langlois was a CDCs (Career Development Courses) back in 1996, she took every single female 2W2X1 going through tech school into her office and gave them a speech about being a female 2w2. She has always been someone who has tried to use her position as a female to earn her staus instead of being a mediocre enlisted person in a competitive environment; she always gave the impression of someone who wanted to be remembered as the WOMAN who made it big, not as a person. Stop and remember that favoring either gender IS discrimination.
SNCOs are suppoed to be better than NCOs and airmen. And if you claim 24 years as a SNCO, you are delusional, to say the least. Perhaps you meant 24 years enlisted, which is very different. And how long did it take you to make SSgt and MSgt?
Mistakes WERE made. I can only see it as systematic failure of first the command structure, then the training, and finally of the individuals integrity in performing procedures in the manner the know to be correct.
I can say that this sort of incident could not have happened if even one person involved in the total process would have followed all of the right procedures. The whole two-person concept is meant to keep any one person from making a mistake with nuclear weapons.
oI know Colonel Cynthia Lundell from a previous assignment. Lack of good judgment is her trademark. I do not believe for one second that she did not know there were problems, but true to form, she'll blame her predecessor in lieu of taking thre responsibility. I have to wonder if she even realizes now the seriousness of this "breach." I am grateful that this time, she got the axe and not some poor NCO doing the job with very little to do it with.
ReplyDeleteI have an idea for those of you who claim to be "experts" and "former 2W2's"....you old S.O.B's are lying unless you called yourself a 463...and if you didn't, it means you got out or were kicked out for SUCKING AT YOUR JOB! Which implies that YOU were part of the problem which you preach so loudly against in anonymity. Anyway, back to my idea. Why don't you move on with your life? If you're "in exile" it means you couldn't handle your job and were probably one of the SNCO's who got fired, but still got to keep your line number for SMSgt. If you're a "former weapons inspector" it means you don't know what the new regulations say. Let me say this: I challenge....no, I DARE any of you to take me and my boys on in a MX tech op. The 2W2's at Minot right now are the best we've ever seen. Did that sound too angry?
ReplyDeleteRetired IYAAYAS 461 - 2W0 assigned to that WSA from 1997 to 2000. I was in total shock & disbelief when I heard. 20 years experience in this arena and I absolutely have no doubt that so many levels of failure were involved. Everyone involved in management and execution of the transfer(from the initial message to designate, configure, segregate, transport, load, preflight, etc.) of these trainers failed. Canning CO's and Chief was totally justified!!! Shame on you all-you have failed our nation, Air Force, and those who worked so hard to train you to do your duty.
ReplyDeleteRetired IYAAYAS 461 - 2W0 assigned to that WSA from 1997 to 2000. I was in total shock & disbelief when I heard. 20 years experience in this arena and I absolutely have no doubt that so many levels of failure were involved. Everyone involved in management and execution of the transfer(from the initial message to designate, configure, segregate, transport, load, preflight, etc.) of these trainers failed. Canning CO's and Chief was totally justified!!! Shame on you all-you have failed our nation, Air Force, and those who worked so hard to train you to do your duty.
ReplyDeleteI would like to inform one and all about my new novel The Minot Mission - at Trafford.com, Barnes & Noble and Amazon -- Stephen Knight
ReplyDelete