Random thoughts on almost anything and everything, with an emphasis on defense, intelligence, politics and national security matters..providing insight for the non-cleared world since 2005.
Monday, February 16, 2009
Hillary's Warning
Speaking with reporters en route to Tokyo--the first stop on her visit to Japan, South Korea, China and Indonesia--Mrs. Clinton urged Pyongyang to live up to its obligations under the Six Party Nuclear Accord. That 2007 agreement calls for the DPRK to dismantle its nuclear program, in exchange for energy assistance and various political concessions.
As the AP's Matthew Lee reports:
Her message on the plane before arrival was focused on North Korea.
"The North Koreans have already agreed to dismantling," she said. "We expect them to fulfill the obligations that they entered into." During the now-stalled "six-party talks," Pyongyang agreed to stop its weapons work in exchange for economic and other incentives.
Clinton's comments came as North Korea prepares for an expected test of its Tapeodong-2 long-range missile, capable of striking U.S. territory and military installations as far away as Hawaii and Alaska. Japanese and South Korean media outlets, citing intelligence sources, have reported that Pyongyang has shipped a TD-2 airframe and support equipment to a launch site on its eastern coast--the same location where the missile was previously tested in 2006. That launch ended in failure, when the TD-2 broke apart after only 100 seconds of flight.
Before traveling to Asia, Secretary Clinton warned the DPRK against any "provocative action and unhelpful rhetoric," a clear reference to preparations for a possible missile test.
But if those words were aimed at deterring Pyongyang, they're not having the desired effect. On Monday, the 67th birthday of Kim Jong-il, North Korea claimed it has a right to "space development," a term frequently used as cover for the TD-2 program, which is aimed primarily at building a crude ICBM.
And, Pyongyang may be closer to achieving that goal than you might believe. U.S. Air Force analysts believe that a TD-2 with a small chemical or biological payload could reach targets in the extreme western United States. The same missile with a larger conventional, nuclear or chemical warhead could strike targets throughout the Pacific Region, including important military installations in Alaska, Guam, and Hawaii.
The projected flight path of the TD-2 may carry it over Japan, so Tokyo is understandably upset, and wondering how the U.S. will handle this latest provocation from the DPRK. Mrs. Clinton will outline our planned response in her meetings with Japanese leaders, but if her public comments are any indication, Tokyo will hardly be reassured.
Indeed, the secretary's comments about North Korea--both last week and en route to Japan--are little more than diplomatic boilerplate. At this stage, it's possible that Secretary Clinton and President Obama don't want to tip their hand, and they may be offering a more detailed response plan in private talks with our Asian allies. We certainly hope so.
On the other hand, the Obama national security team clearly puts negotiations at the top of its options list for any crisis. With that in mind, it's no surprise that Mrs. Clinton would adopt a fairly mild tone toward North Korea, believing that the U.S. can "talk" Pyongyang out of the test, and keep the Six Party process on track.
Clearly, Kim Jong-il welcomes that sort of thinking, seeing another opportunity to press the U.S. for even more economic and political "carrots." That's one reason that he's pushing ahead with preparations for the TD-2 test, which could easily occur within the next month.
In fairness, the Obama Administration's approach to North Korea is not dissimilar to that of the Bush Administration. As we've noted in previous posts, the previous crew at Foggy Bottom went to great lengths to excuse and overlook Pyongyang's efforts at stalling and duplicity after agreeing to the Six Party deal two years ago. It's the sort of behavior that encourages further misbehavior by the North Koreans.
However, there was one difference between the Mr. Bush's policy towards Pyongyang and that of President Obama. When it became clear that North Korea was preparing to launch a TD-2 in 2006, Bush put ship and land-based missile interceptors on alert, and vowed to shoot it down. The subsequent in-flight failure of missile made that unnecessary, but the Bush announcement made it clear: there were limits on what would be tolerated from North Korea.
So far, the Obama team has yet to establish similar limits. That's one reason that Kim Jong-il is so anxious to test his long-range missile.
***
ADDENDUM: The Secretary of State also used her in-flight chat with reporters to take a swipe at the Bush Administration. According to the AP, Mrs. Clinton criticized Mr. Bush for abandoning the 1994 "Agreed To" framework, reached between the U.S. and North Korea during her husband's administration. She claims that Bush's rejection of the accord led to Pyongyang restarting its plutonium-based weapons program, which resulted in an abortive nuclear test in 2006. Clinton says that reports of a covert uranium enrichment program in the DPRK--the Bush team's rationale for pulling out of the agreement--remains a subject of "great debate."
Apparently, no one bothered to ask Mrs. Clinton about covert activities in North Korea during her husband's administration. By most accounts, the 1994 accord was nothing more than a sham; while Pyongyang shuttered its best-known nuclear facility, other programs kept operating, resulting in the technical breakthroughs that culminated in that partially successful test three years ago.
It's another example of the Clinton Administration failing to keep its eye on the ball. Once North Korea agreed to the 1994 deal--brokered by Jimmy Carter--Washington made the grave mistake of expecting Pyongyang to keep its word.
Saturday, February 14, 2009
More of the Same Revisionism
Today, missions flown against the German city by the U.S. Eighth Air Force and RAF Bomber Command are widely described as unnecessary; some historians even refer to them as "war crimes." From the revisionist perspective, raids on Dresden accomplished nothing of military value, but inflicted horrific casualties on civilians. By most estimates, the air raids killed thousands in a city choked with refugees, and some writers claim that the death toll reached 200,000.
As we noted two years ago, the revisionist version of what happened at Dresden now dominates historical writing on the subject. Of the four books on that subject that have been published in recent years, only one finds justification for the raid. The rest describe the raids as an abomination, and the three authors concur with the "war crime" assessment.
Now, you can add another name to that list. In a new article for Canada's National Post, Randall Hansen, a professor at the University of Toronto arrives at the same conclusion. Writing on the 64th anniversary of the Dresden raids, Hansen describes them as war crimes and takes the claim a step further, indicting the entire strategic bombing campaign against Germany during World War II:
All across Germany from 1942, the Royal Air Force and the Royal Canadian Air Force tried to win the war by destroying cities and killing civilians. Let there be no mistake: The aim was to obliterate as many cities and kill as many people as possible, and to do so until the Germans capitulated. Today, we would unequivocally describe such a strategy as a war crime. At the Nuremburg Trials, we insisted — rightly — that a war crime is such regardless of whether it was formally legal when it was committed, and regardless of whether it was committed before or after the Second World War. By these standards — standards that we the Allies created — the very area bombing of Germany was a war crime.
As you might have guessed, Professor Hansen has his own book on the subject, Fire and Fury: The Allied Bombing of Germany 1942--1945, which was published last fall. In his work, Hansen argues that RAF Bomber Command (which led the great night time raids against Dresden, Hamburg and scores of other German cities) was wedded to an outdated strategy of "area bombing," which did little damage to the Third Reich's war machine and may have prolonged the war. By comparison, Hansen claims that daylight raids by U.S. Army Air Forces B-17s and B-24s, played a more important role in securing Allied victory.
Despite the revisionist tilt in recent accounts of Bomber Command and its campaigns against Nazi Germany, those conclusions remain controversial, particularly among Canadians who fought in World War II. Their county--and countrymen--were disproportionately represented among British bomber crews who took the fight to the Third Reich.
By one estimate, at least one-sixth of Bomber Command's aircrew members were Canadian, and they suffered a significant share of the 55,000 fatalities recorded by RAF bomber crews during the war. With their participation in the bomber offensive, Hansen suggests that Canadians were partly responsible for the slaughter of thousands of innocent civilians. We're guessing that Professor Hansen won't be getting any invitations to speak at reunions of Canadian bomber squadons that served with the RAF.
But his critique is also something of a cheap shot; with the hindsight of history, it's easy to criticize the Allied bomber offensive of World War II. Given the available technology, area bombing was notoriously inaccurate, with only a small fraction of bombs landing within five miles of their intended target. Besides, the leader of Bomber Command, Sir Arthur Harris, made no secret of his intent to weaken German morale by hitting population centers and disrupting essential services. Advisers to Prime Minister Winston Churchill first suggested the strategy in 1942, and it became marching orders for Bomber Command an its leaders.
To some degree, Air Marshal Harris and his staff had no other choice. While a British leader once observed (famously) that "the bomber will always get through," his nation did little to prepare the RAF for sustained, strategic bombing during World War II. Bomber Command entered the war both under-strength and poorly-equipped for daylight missions.
After disastrous losses during the Battle of France and the Norwegian campaign, the RAF concluded--correctly--that future bombing raids would be conducted at night. The change improved crew survivability, but resulted in degraded accuracy. Without the switch, the bomber offensive against Germany might have been an "All American" show.
Harris was not particularly concerned about criticisms leveled at his command over civilian casualties. He once observed that he did not "regard the whole of the remaining cities of Germany as worth the bones of one British Grenadier." Harris also suggested that the Third Reich should "reap the whirlwind" for its indiscriminate bombing of Warsaw, Rotterdam, London and other Allied cities, earlier in the war.
Revenge isn't the best justification for a bomber offensive, and it wasn't the only reason for round-the-clock strikes against Germany. Despite the relative inaccuracy of World War II bombers, the raids still inflicted damage on key Nazi facilities and production centers.
Additionally, Marshal Harris, his American counterparts and their political leaders were keenly aware that bomber attacks forced the Germans to defend their airspace with hundreds of aircraft, thousands of anti-aircraft guns and an even greater number of personnel. Without the bomber campaign, those assets--and the money that paid for them--could have diverted to German military offensives and other weapons systems.
In a 2007 essay on the bombing controversy for Commentary magazine, Algis Valiunas suggested that the debate is focused on the wrong elements. Instead of asking why the U.S. and Britain unleashed the full weight of their bombers on Hitler's Germany, we should focus on how they arrived at that position. And the answer is quite simple; rather than stopping Hitler in the 1930s, when the Nazi regime was relatively weak, the Allies tried to negotiate with Germany. When Hitler's real intentions became apparent, it was too late for anything, except overwhelming military force.
We should also remember that marshaling that force was no easy matter. The American B-17 bomber program was approved by Congress by a single vote; when Arthur Harris assumed the reigns at Bomber Command in early 1942, he inherited an organization that lacked a capable four-engine aircraft, capable of dropping significant bomb loads on German targets. Within a year, the command was mounting 1,000-plane raids on Nazi cities, applying the massive firepower that (eventually) helped win the war.
That's not revisionism, but rather, a simple statement of facts.
The Continued Decline of the NAACP
The latest example of this comes from Colorado Springs, where Rosemary Harris, President of the local NAACP Chapter, is upset. She sees something sinister in a decision by managers at the Peterson AFB Commissary, which is located in her city. The commissary recently removed a picture of Barack Obama from a sign announcing that the facility will be closed on President's Day.
"It bodes poorly for the progress that we hoped we would see in this country; we might have taken one step forward but we see many steps being taken backwards," she told the Colorado Springs Gazette on Friday. She believes the decision to remove Obama's picture was racist, and at least one commissary worker agrees.
The employee, an unidentified cashier, claims that past presidents, including Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, have appeared on the sign announcing the holiday closure. She also reports that a military retiree told her that "they're not going to have no black man on the window where he shops."
But the Defense Commissary Agency (DECA), which operates the grocery stores found on U.S. military installations around the world, provides a much different version of the kerfuffle. For starters, they say that no photographs of past presidents have appeared on the sign. Additionally, the agency said that four customers at Peterson complained about the accuracy of the sign, noting that Presidents Day is intended to honor George Washington and Abraham Lincoln, not other presidents. Associating other commanders-in-chief with the holiday is historically incorrect, so DECA decided to remove Mr. Obama's picture.
However, Ms. Harris is unimpressed. "To me it doesn't matter if its racism or politics," she told the Gazette. "It's probably some of both."
Actually, it's neither, but that doesn't grab newspaper headlines, or provide fodder for the next membership or fund-raising drive. So the Colorado Springs NAACP will (apparently) keep fighting the good fight against politically correct--but historically erroneous--signs at a local Air Force Commissary.
Forty-six years ago, local NAACP leaders were battling Jim Crow and the most virulent forms of racism. Some, like Medgar Evers, gave their lives for the struggle. Five decades later, Ms. Harris is concerned that Mr. Obama's picture doesn't appear on a closing sign for a holiday honoring George Washington and Abraham Lincoln. It's a reminder of how far we've come as a nation--and the long, sad decline of a pioneering civil rights organization.
Two years ago, African-American writer and attorney Debra J. Dickerson wondered aloud if the NAACP had "outlived its usefulness." Judging by the pointless crusade in Colorado Springs, it's hard to disagree.
Friday, February 13, 2009
Diane Feinstein: Idiot
A senior U.S. lawmaker said Thursday that unmanned CIA Predator aircraft operating in Pakistan are flown from an air base in that country, a revelation likely to embarrass the Pakistani government and complicate its counter-terrorism collaboration with the United States.
The disclosure by Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, marked the first time a U.S. official had publicly commented on where the Predator aircraft patrolling Pakistan take off and land.
At a hearing, Feinstein expressed surprise over Pakistani opposition to the campaign of Predator-launched CIA missile strikes against Islamic extremist targets along Pakistan's northwestern border. "As I understand it, these are flown out of a Pakistani base," she said.
Feinstein's revelation suggests that Washington and Islamabad have a much closer relationship on counter-terrorism issues that has been previously disclosed. In fact, Pakistan has been roundly criticized by some U.S. officials for "not doing enough" to combat terrorists that operate from its soil.
Needless to say, the Senator's inadvertent disclosure will cause all sorts of problems for the Islamabad government. Predator attacks are unpopular in Pakistan because they sometimes kill civilians, along with Al Qaida and Taliban operatives. Now, the government must deal with the revelation that the U.S. drones--and American support personnel--are operating from Pakistani soil. We're guessing that the CIA and the Air Force are already looking at new basing options.
Senator Feinstein's comments also reveal the cavalier attitude of many elected officials towards classified information. If a mere mortal (read: military member or CIA employee) divulged this information, they'd be looking at possible jail time. But, because the sensitive arrangement was disclosed by a U.S. Senator, well, it's just an unfortunate slip-of-the-lip.
Normally, we'd suggest some sort of ulterior motive for the comment, but not in this case. Widely regarded as one of the dimmest bulbs in the Senate, such remarks are simply par for the Feinsten course. It's a good thing Ms. Feinstein found her calling in the government; she'd never have a chance in the private sector, where discretion, tact (and intelligence) still count for something.
De-Bunking the Iran NIE (Again)
Barely 14 months after the intel community concluded that Tehran had suspended efforts to build a nuclear bomb (with significant caveats), the Obama Administration is talking openly about Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons.
As reporter Greg Miller notes, both President Obama and his nominee for Director of the CIA have made it clear in recent days--Iran is working feverishly to develop its first nuclear device:
In his news conference this week, President Obama went so far as to describe Iran's "development of a nuclear weapon" before correcting himself to refer to its "pursuit" of weapons capability.
Obama's nominee to serve as CIA director, Leon E. Panetta, left little doubt about his view last week when he testified on Capitol Hill. "From all the information I've seen," Panetta said, "I think there is no question that they are seeking that capability."
The language reflects the extent to which senior U.S. officials now discount a National Intelligence Estimate issued in November 2007 that was instrumental in derailing U.S. and European efforts to pressure Iran to shut down its nuclear program.
Mr. Obama's comments represent something of a position shift on the issue. John McCormack, deputy editor of the Weekly Standard blog, found this endorsement of the NIE from candidate Obama back in 2007:
"By reporting that Iran halted its nuclear weapon development program four years ago because of international pressure, the new National Intelligence Estimate makes a compelling case for less saber-rattling and more direct diplomacy. The juxtaposition of this NIE with the president's suggestion of World War III serves as an important reminder of what we learned with the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq: members of Congress must carefully read the intelligence before giving the President any justification to use military force."
Despite his apparent change-of-heart on the nuclear issue, Mr. Obama still wants diplomatic talks with Tehran. And, intelligence officials contacted by the LA Times said there is "no new evidence" to undercut the findings of the 2007 intelligence estimate. So, to some degree, both the administration and the intel community are maintaining their status quo on Iran.
But it's something of a charade, particularly on the intelligence side. Today, intel officials concede that the infamous NIE presented a "misleading" picture of Iran's nuclear program. Remember, the assessment said that Tehran had halted its work on an actual bomb design, while accelerating efforts on fundamental tasks associated with the nuclear weapons effort, including uranium enrichment and development of delivery platforms.
As for Mr. Obama and his national security team, they are well advised to take a more sober (and realistic view) toward Iran and its nuclear ambitions. But their revised view does raise a couple of questions. First, why the rush to negotiate with a regime that has been discussing the nuclear issue with the EU-3 (Germany, France and Great Britain) for years, with no discernible results. Indeed, the pace of Iran's nuclear program has actually gained momentum during this period, suggesting that Tehran used the talks as nothing more than a stalling tactic.
Secondly, there's the matter of that politicized NIE. From the moment it was released, the real purpose of the estimate was abundantly clear. By reporting that Iran had "halted" its warhead effort, intelligence officials virtually eliminated the possibility of President Bush ordering a military strike against Tehran's nuclear facilities.
With that mission accomplished, many intelligence officers have been trying to distance themselves from the NIE, pointing out the enrichment and delivery platform caveats that were downplayed in the original report. In fact, one recent intel assessment predicted that Ian will reach crucial bomb-making milestones this year.
This dramatic flip-flop should be a major concern for anyone who cares about the quality and accuracy of U.S. intelligence, including the commander-in-chief. Mr. McCormack accurately summarized the issue with this observation:
If Obama and his advisers now think that the 2007 NIE is a sham, don't they have an interest in firing the people who wrote faulty intelligence? Presumably Obama believes that the role of intelligence agencies is to collect and relay accurate intelligence, and the role of political leaders is to make political decisions.
Democrats in Washington have been recently talking about a "Truth Commission" to investigate government lies and deception during the Bush years. If Mr. Obama's party is genuinely interested in the "truth," an unvarnished look at the 2007 NIE, the authors and their motivations, would be the right place to start.
Thursday, February 12, 2009
Bottom Feeding
Besides, there's not much we can say about the tragedy. A precious young child was murdered by her mother, apparently because the "demands" of parenthood interferred with her social life. In another, saner universe, Casey Anthony would be awaiting trial (without the media circus), the next step toward her appointment with death row, and that eventual encounter with the "hot shot."
But Ms. Anthony won't go quietly into the Big House or the execution chamber, not as long as their are cable news channels and 24-hour news cycles. We mention this only because the Anthony saga has hit another, new low, one that caught our attention.
Casey Anthony now has a new press representative. That's right, in the world of perpetual spin, even accused child killers need a media flack.
And Ms. Anthony's lawyers haven't hired just any spokesperson. According to Orlando Sentinel TV critic Hal Boedeker, they've retained the services of one Marti Mackenzie, who now becomes the official media guru for the defense team.
If Mackenzie's name rings a bell, it should. Back in 2007, she was hired as a spin doctor by disgraced former astronaut Lisa Nowak. Captain Nowak, as you'll recall, ran afoul of the law through the attempted assault and abduction of a romantic rival.
Mackenzie was hired in an effort to generate more favorable media coverage for Nowak, who became a national laughingstock after driving from Houston to Orlando to confront her ex-lover's new girlfriend. Nowak is still waiting for her day in court. As for Ms. Mackenzie, we're not sure what impact she's had on media coverage, but she is considered one of the "experts" in her field, and commands a hefty fee for her work.
In her latest gig, Mackenzie is facing an even greater challenge. It's hard to generate sympathy (let alone positive stories) for an accused child killer. But every suspect deserves the best available media specialist to influence press coverage, right?
We beg to differ. And we also wonder if there's a client that Ms. Mackenzie wouldn't represent. Professionals have the right (in most circumstances) to refuse their services to certain individuals, and Casey Anthony would certainly meet that criteria. There seems little doubt that Ms. Anthony killed her daughter, lied about the crime--repeatedly--and has spent the ensuring months trying to stonewall the investigation. Not exactly a sympathetic figure. Or someone who deserves a media specialist to influence the potential jury pool.
True, the Anthony family has every right to hire representatives for their daughter. And, if Mackenzie is being paid by private funds, there's not much anyone can do about it. But in the past, the spin doctor has been reimbursed by taxpayer dollars, after a public defender petitioned the court to put her on the defense team. But if Mackenzie seeks state reimbursement for her fees, it will become a different matter.
Meanwhile, the spin doctor can wallow with the rest of the bottom-feeders on the Anthony defense team.
***
ADDENDUM: Hal Boedeker reports that Ms. Mackenzie is replacing an outfit called "Press Corps Media" which included three employees who issued press releases under the same name. That sounds like the appropriate level of media representation for someone like Casey Anthony.
Walking the Line
For the magazine's 7 February edition, Mr. Thompson offers a brief profile of Army Command Sergeant Major Jeffrey Mellinger. Readers of Michael Yon's war dispatches know CSM Mellinger as iconic figure of the Iraq campaign. He served there for 33 consecutive months, as the CSM for General George Casey and later, General David Petraeus.
As Mike Yon describes it, the mission of Command Sergeant Major Mellinger was both simple and dangerous. His job was to "walk the line," serving as the eyes and ears of his commander. Get out in the field and talk to the troops (wherever they might be), then report back to the boss. Give him the straight skinny on what was going on, not some PC version of the truth.
By all accounts, CSM Mellinger excelled at the job. He had a reputation for popping up in the most dangerous locations when things were hot. During the most difficult days in Iraq, Mellinger and his small team criss-crossed Iraq, usually in a small convoy, facing the same dangers as any other solider or Marine.
As you might expect, Mellinger's convoy presented a tempting target, though there's no evidence the insurgents knew who was riding inside. During their travels, CSM Mellinger and his staff were routinely targeted by IEDs:
One young sergeant, a team member on CSM Mellinger’s crew, told me the CSM’s team has been hit 26 times so far, and when I asked the CSM, he shrugged and said, “Sounds about right.” Five of his Humvees have been destroyed by IEDs, two that he was riding in at the time. Astonishingly, nobody in his crew has even been seriously wounded. He goes into combat, but you’d have to see how he rolls to understand why nobody has been killed so far. Experience multiplied by luck.
Yon's three part series, based on his journeys with Mellinger, can be found here, here and here.
Unfortunately, you won't find much about the Sergeant Major (and his experiences in Iraq) in the Time account. Mark Thompson summarizes Mellinger's extended tour in a single paragraph, choosing (instead) to focus on his other claim to fame, as the last draftee still serving in the U.S. military.
Thirty-seven years ago, Mellinger was working as a dry wall hanger in Oregon when he received a notice from his local draft board. The future Ranger was a bit surprised, having been previously rejected when he tried to enlist in the Army and Marine Corps ("I was not a perfect child," Mellinger observed). Informed that the draft notice was no joke, Mellinger reported for basic training and developed an early dislike for the military. A conversation with his company commander--and a chance to go to Ranger School--kept him in the Army.
As the only remaining draftee on active duty, CSM Mellinger is the last embodiment of a conscription system that produced millions of "involuntary" soldiers during World War II, Korea, Vietnam and other conflicts. While Mellinger's draftee status is historically significant, it is little more than the product of time and attrition.
On the other hand, CSM Mellinger's many career accomplishments--including those in Iraq--are indicative of an outstanding soldier who has performed with distinction for almost 40 years. Long after Mellinger retires to Alaska, he will be remembered as an exceptional leader who rendered invaluable service to the Army and the country. His former boss, General Petraeus, is squarely on target in describing CSM Mellinger as a "national asset."
That's the real measure of the man--and his career.
***
ADDENDUM: Also missing from the Time account is Mellinger's standing offer to members of the press corps. During his long tour in Iraq, the CSM repeatedly invited journalists to get out of Baghdad and ride with him, to get a better feel for conditions in the country and the work being done by U.S. troops. Only one journalist took Mellinger up on the offer, a guy named Michael Yon.
The Next Test
South Korea's semi-official Yonhap news agency reported on Wednesday that Pyongyang has moved additional equipment to the Musudan-ni test site on the Sea of Japan. That account comes barely a week after media outlets in South Korea and Japan reported that North Korea had transported a TD-2 airframe to the same test facility.
The Yonhap story suggests that the DPRK is following the same pattern observed before the 2006 Tapeodong-2 test, which ended in failure after only 100 seconds of flight. Prior to that event, the North Koreans moved the missile to Musudan-ni, placed it on the launch pad and assembled the necessary support equipment to conduct and monitor the test. Pyongyang made little effort to hide its preparations, despite their proficiency at denial and deception techniques.
Almost three years later, North Korea appears equally transparent about its intentions. Kim Jong-il's regime wants the U.S.--and its allies in the region--to know that a TD-2 launch is in the offing. Pyongyang will certainly use the test--or the threat of a test--as a bargaining chip in future negotiations with Washington, Seoul and Tokyo.
While the launch of a TD-2 would be a serious provocation, the Obama Administration has said little about the matter. During yesterday's press conference at the Pentagon, Defense Secretary Robert Gates played down reports of a possible test, and even joked about the missile's past failure.
"Since the first time that they launched the missile it flew for a few minutes before crashing, the range of the Taepodong-2 remains to be seen," Gates told reporters.
"So far, it's very short."
While Gates' observation is certainly accurate, there is a certain danger in dismissing North Korea's capabilities--and its determination to field a crude ICBM. Over the last 20 years, Pyongyang has advanced from short-range FROG-7 and SCUD systems, to medium and intermediate-range systems like the TD-1 and the BM-25.
With a successful launch of the TD-2, the DPRK will raise the ante, demonstrating the ability to strike U.S. facilities across much of the Pacific. And, at some point, North Korea will develop a missile system capable of delivering a nuclear, chemical or biological warhead to the CONUS. While Pyongyang's intercontinental strike capabilities will remain meager (at best), perfection of the TD-2 will change the geopolitical calculus.
How will the Obama team deal with that possibility? At this point, no one really knows. So far, their plan for dealing with Pyongyang seems to be based on a continuation of the "Six Party Talks" (begun by the Bush Administration), and a more deliberate approach toward missile defense.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is scheduled to visit the region next week, for meetings with South Korean and Japanese leaders. While the activity at Musudan-ni will certainly come up in those conversations, there has been no indication of how Ms. Clinton will address the matter.
Her visit comes at a critical time for the region. Both Seoul and Tokyo are demanding a tougher approach toward North Korea, a position that puts them (slightly) at odds with the United States. South Korea's new, conservative president has abandoned the "Sunshine Policy" of his predecessors, demanding that North Korea comply with existing agreements as a condition for further talks and additional aid.
Tokyo is also tired of Pyongyang's games, and is still waiting for a full accounting of Japanese citizens kidnapped by North Korean agents over the past 30 years. Reconciling Japanese and South Korean demands with the U.S. position on North Korea (whatever that might be) will be one of Ms. Clinton's primary tasks during her trip to the Far East.
Meanwhile, there's the matter of how Washington should respond to Pyongyang's test preparations--a key indicator of how the Obama Administration will deal with North Korea. Prior to the 2006 TD-2 test, the U.S. announce plans to intercept the missile, if it threatened our territory. As part of that plan, land-based missile defenses in Alaska and California were placed on alert, and Navy ships with the SM-3 interceptor missile moved into the Sea of Japan.
Unfortunately, there are no indications that Mr. Obama will approve similar measures this time around. And that's rather unfortunate; both Japan and South Korea backed those steps in 2006, viewing them as a measure of America's commitment to the region, and our bi-lateral defense ties to both nations.
It's the kind of reassurance that Washington needs to demonstrate once more, as North Korea readies for another TD-2 test. Failing to provide such assurances will set the tone for future dealings with Tokyo and Seoul, and currently, the silence from Washington is deafening. So, don't be surprised if Hillary Clinton gets an extremely cool reception on her first major trip as Secretary of State.
***
ADDENDUM: Secretary Gates' dismissive comments about the TD-2 suggest there may be a disagreement between U.S. intelligence services, and their counterparts in Japan and South Korea. So far, no one in the American intelligence community--even those anonymous sources--have verified the "pending test" reports that have appeared in the regional media.
In fairness, we should note that the Japanese and ROK press have sometimes printed claims about North Korea that had no basis in fact. But in this case, the media reports are apparently based on information obtained from U.S.-operated platforms (read: electro-optical imagery satellites), whose output is shared with U.S. allies, typically at the SECRET level.
In other words, movement of the airframe container (and the support equipment) was tracked by overhead platforms, and analyzed by imagery experts in the U.S., Japan and South Korea. Analysts in Tokyo and Seoul have reached the conclusion that North Korea is preparing for a TD-2 test; the assessment of their American counterparts remains unclear. We should note, however, that South Korean and Japanese analysts are comparing current imagery to what they saw in 2006, and it apparently fits the same pattern.
On the other hand, the U.S. doesn't share products from some of its more sophisticated sensors, capable of monitoring DPRK activities in "other" spectral bands, or during periods of bad weather. Does collection from those platforms support the storyline from Tokyo and Seoul? We'll find out in the coming weeks. With an accelerated effort, North Korea could attempt a TD-2 launch toward the end of March, to coincide with the end of its annual Winter Training Cycle. That gives Mr. Obama about five weeks to prepare for that possibility and respond.
Tuesday, February 10, 2009
What Might Have Been
The venerable C-5 has been a fixture at Dover for decades, but the upgraded "M" model represents a significant improvement in capabilities. Each Galaxy modified to the "M" standard has new, more fuel-efficient engines and improved avionics. Collectively, these upgrades are supposed to enhance the operational efficiency of the C-5 fleet.
While the Galaxy remains the largest airlifter in our inventory, the aircraft has been plagued by mechanical and reliability problems throughout its long career. At various points, C-5 units have logged mission capability rates of less than 50%, meaning that more than half of the Galaxy fleet was grounded by mechanical problems, inspections and scheduled repairs.
With better engines and avionics, the Air Force believes the C-5M can achieve mission capability rates of better than 75%. That's considered the "break even" point for the upgrade program, which costs an estimated $147 million per aircraft--that's only $20 million less than the Air Force paid for the "B" model Galaxies that were acquired from Lockheed in the 1980s.
The high price tag for the C-5M upgrade program is evidence of a program that spiraled out of control. Originally, Lockheed estimated that each C-5B could be modified for about $86 million per aircraft, but cost overruns (and other issues) resulted in a final price that was nearly twice that amount. At one point, the upgrade effort actually appeared to be in danger of cancellation.
Instead, the Pentagon and Congress reached a compromise. Only the newer "B" models will receive the new engines and advanced avionics; older C-5As, which date from the 1970s, will only get a new avionics suite. They will continue to operate with older engines that are anything but fuel efficient.
That means that a portion of our heavy lift transport fleet will continue to struggle with mission capability rates and operating costs for the rest of its service life. The only other option is to retire the older "A" models (assigned mostly to ANG and Air Force Reserve units) and replace them with the slightly smaller, but more efficient, C-17.
Unfortunately, there isn't enough money in the Air Force budget to support that initiative and the service has invested too much time--and tax dollars--to pull the plug on the upgrade program. That's why the C-5 modification effort will always be haunted (to some degree) by what might have been.
What if Lockheed and the USAF had done a better job in implementing the upgrade program? What if the contractor had been able to hold the line on costs, or if the Clinton Administration made the tough call 10 years ago, and decided to replace C-5As with C-17s on a one-for-one basis?
The answers are obvious. Those early-model Galaxies would be in the Bone Yard; our strategic airlift fleet would be in much better shape, and we wouldn't be facing the daunting challenge of squeezing more service out of a costly and inefficient jet.
What if, indeed.
Today's Reading Assignment
Well worth the read.
Monday, February 09, 2009
The Last of His Kind?
Over the course of 2,500 words, writer Robert Kolker postulates that men like Captain Sullenberger may be a dying breed. When "Sully" joined the airline three decades ago, he fit the profle of his generation of pilots, and those came before. Virtually all had military experience; many of them were ex-fighter pilots and combat veterans. Sullenberger was an Air Force Academy grad who spent six years flying F-4 Phantoms before setting his sights on an airline career. He completed his initial qualification in fighters less than two years after our exit from Vietnam.
But as Mr. Kolker describes it, Captain Sullenberger still benefited from years of tactical flying, which places a premium on preparation, flying skills and split-second decision-making. It wasn't quite the "stick-and-rudder" stuff of Chuck Yeager, but close enough. In that era, the airlines paid top dollar for men with the background and experience of a Chesley Sullenberger, grooming them to assume the Captain's seat and provide that professional, reassuring image expected by the airlines--and the flying public.
So how did Sullenberger go from the industry standard to something of an anomaly? The business changed and along with it, so did the men (and women) who filled the cockpits of commercial jetliners:
"Since then, the pilot culture has done almost a 180. The maverick pilot has given way to the professional--the Captain who knows how to put his ego aside and not take unnecessary risks. The change began when the military began downsiziing after Vietnam and its talent pool dried up. The pilots of the military made room for a generation of pilots largely educated in flight schools offering four year degree programs. Candidates racked up flight hours on small commuter plans over Albuquerque and Toledo, not in fighter jets.
The planes also began to change. Where a Vietnam-era pilot could fly more or less by stick and rudder, today’s pilots fly primarily by computer. Sully, for instance, was flying the Airbus 320. On older aircraft, a pilot pulls back on a wheel attached to cables that literally pull the plane up. On an Airbus 320, he pulls back a joystick that sends a signal to the computer’s auto-throttle. If he’s doing it wrong, the computer often corrects him, thrusting if he doesn’t do it soon enough, never stalling if he pulls back too hard. Takeoff has preprogrammed speeds; the pilot just moves a lever into a notch. Practically everything about the Airbus assumes the human factor to be the most dangerous thing about the flight. Incredibly, you can go on autopilot from as low as 100 feet in the air. Although some pilots worry about overreliance on technology and the distractions it can cause, most like a tricked-out plane. Still, there’s no getting around the fact that automation has taken control away from pilots.
Of course, there's an element of truth in these observations, but Kolker's piece does create something of a false comparison between "old school" pilots like Captain Sullenberger, and those who earned their wings outside the military. Fact is, the airlines' safety record has never been stronger, despite the pressures of industry deregulation, years of financial problems--and the influx of "civilian pilots."
Indeed, other factors that have been instrumental in making commercial flying as safe as it is. The article mentions Crew Resource Management or CRM, which (interestingly enough) became a part of aviation training about the same time that Sullenberger signed on with U.S. Air. CRM, which grew out of a 1979 NASA workshop on flight safety, emphasizes interpersonal communication, leadership and decision-making in the cockpit.
Today, crew resource management is mandatory for commercial and military pilots, so Captain Sullenberger was intimately familiar with the concept and its objectives. Still, his expertise extended far beyond CRM training. As a trained accident investigator and air safety expert, Sullenberger understood the factors that can cause manageable situations to spiral out of control. His interaction with Co-pilot Jeffrey Skiles, the cabin crew (and air traffic controllers) is a textbook example of coordination, delegation and decision-making.
Yet, for all the extraordinary skill exhibited in the ditching of US Air Flight 1549, it is not beyond the skill of other commercial pilots. When Katie Couric of CBS asked him how many other pilots could have accomplished the feat, Sullenberger replied "thousands." That may be an attempt at modesty, but its also reflects his knowledge and experience of in the world of commercial aviation, and the high standards still required for those who occupy the cockpits.
As we noted in a recent post, some professional pilots have suggested that they're really paid for about two minutes of work a year. Not the routine take-offs and landings, or the flights from one airport to another. Instead, they refer to those brief, sometimes terrifying moments that require snap judgements and may--or may not be--described in the flight checklists.
It was that sort of situation that confronted the crew of Flight 1549 last month, just moments after takeoff from La Guardia Airport. Elapsed time between the multiple bird strike and the jet's successful ditching in the Hudson? About three minutes.
Sullenberger and his crew have been rightfully described as heroes, and their actions will be studied by aviation analysts and safety experts for years to come. But does that make the US Air Captain the last of a vanishing breed?
Thankfully, no.
Better Than Expected
The group of 44 senators estimate that extending Raptor production would generate up to $12 billion in new economic activity across the country. As you might have guessed, Mr. Chambliss and Ms. Murray have a particular interest in keeping the program alive; the F-22 is assembled at the Lockheed-Martin plant in Marietta, Georgia, while key airframe components are produced at a Boeing plant near Seattle.
But efforts to "Save the Raptor" extend well beyond Capitol Hill. Supporters can sign an on-line petition, urging Mr. Obama to release funds already authorized for the Raptor program. The F-22 also has its own Facebook page. According the Danger Room's Noah Shachtman reported last week, the website that contains the petition (preserveraptorjobs.com) sits on the server of a high-powered public relations firm in Washington, D.C., that specializes in generating "grass roots support" for major corporations and their causes.
And, with President Obama expected to make his decision in early March, the F-22 battle has reached the op-ed pages of the Washington Post (and other publications). Sunday's edition of the Post featured an opinion piece by Tom Donnelly and Gary Schmitt advocating an additional $20-25 billion a year in defense spending as part of the economic stimulus package. They note that the increase in defense would satisfy Mr. Obama's three requirements for the stimulus spending (timely, targeted and temporary), while preserving thousands of U.S. jobs.
As an example of targeted defense spending, Messrs. Donnelly and Schmitt cite--you guessed it --the F-22 program. In their view, capping Raptor production at 183 aircraft (as senior defense officials have suggested) would be tantamount to "firing" 25,000 American workers directly employed by F-22 production, and the loss of another 50-70,000 jobs through the "trickle down" to various vendors that support the program. With unemployment now at 7.6%, their message is clear for politicians who will determine the F-22's fate.
Meanwhile, the Air Force is quietly doing its part to get more Raptors. Recently, the service announced that it will take the fifth-generation fighter to this year's Paris Air Show. The appearance will mark the first time that the F-22 has appeared at an overseas public venue; until now, the USAF has limited the Raptor's to carefully-controlled deployments at bases in the Far East, hoping to minimize hostile intelligence collection against the aircraft.
But with the F-22 facing an uncertain future, Lockheed and the Air Force have decided that Paris is a gamble worth taking. An impressive showing at the air show--a virtual certainty--would create support for an extended production run and (possibly) foreign sales to such allies as Australia and Japan. A few months ago, USAF officials balked at that possibility, but their decision to take the Raptor to Paris illustrate how the game has changed.
Here's another indicator: David Fulghum of Aviation Week reports that Lockheed-Martin has released proprietary data--previously classified--revealing that the F-22's stealth performance is actually better than originally expected.
The F-22's newly revealed areas of overperformance include a radar cross section that officials will only characterize as "better" than what was asked for. Pentagon officials have said privately that the desired signature from certain critical angles was -40 dBsm., the equivalent radar reflection of a steel "marble." By comparison, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter has a signature of -30 dBsm., about the size of a golfball.
Supercruise is at Mach 1.78 rather than Mach 1.5. Acceleration - although company officials would not say from what speed or at what altitude - is 3.05 sec. faster than the requirement of 54 sec. In nonafterburning, full military power, the Raptor can operate at slightly above 50,000 ft. However, it is known that the F-22 opened its aerial battles at about 65,000 ft. during its first joint exercise in Alaska, apparently using afterburner. There is also a mysterious admission that the range of the Raptor's Northrop Grumman/Raytheon active, electronically scanned array (AESA) radar has a range 5% greater than expected. That means a cushion of an additional 5-6 mi. of detection range against enemy aircraft and missiles.
[snip]
Lockheed Martin also makes an economic argument for continuing Raptor production. The F-22 unit cost in a USAF multiyear purchase is $142.6 million (average unit flyaway cost). Initial unit cost of the F-35 will be around $200 million and then start dropping as production continues. In Japan, the decision to indigenously build small numbers of F-15Js and F-2s (a larger F-16 design) drove their cost to roughly $100 million each. The Eurofighter Typhoon would likely cost even more in a small production run.
There is, of course, a certain irony in all of this. A fighter production line that seemed destined for closure a few months ago may remain open for several years, resulting in more F-22s for the USAF and, possibly, foreign customers as well. But it literally took an economic meltdown--and the potential loss of thousands of high-paying defense jobs--to unify supporters and launch a renewed push to save the Raptor.
But this rallying cry is not without its risks. Ultimately, the value of any defense program must be judged by its contributions to national security (and its economic costs) with less concern for the number of workers who will be employed. Based on the economic argument, the Navy committed a major error when it cancelled the DDG-1000 program last year.
Building the new Zumwalt-class destroyers would have meant thousands of jobs at shipyards in Maine and Mississippi, where the new ships would be produced. But with costs rising to an estimated $3 billion a ship--roughly half the cost of an aircraft carrier--and serious questions about the vessel's ability to counter enemy missile attacks, the Navy decided it could no longer afford the DDG-1000, and will end production after only two ships.
Fortunately, the F-22 doesn't have those issues. Despite occasional glitches, the Raptor remains a world-beater and would produce kill ratios of at least 30:1 against the current generation of adversary fighters. The F-22 is also the aircraft best-equipped to operate against the most advanced surface-to-air missiles, including the S-300s en route to Iran.
Will those capabilities be enough to keep the Raptor production line open? We'll know in a few weeks. In the interim, Congress (and the White House) should give strong consideration to a defense stimulus, as part of the overall economic package. Unfortunately, our elected leaders often equate military necessities with defense pork; there's the very real possibility that worthwhile programs--like the F-22--would be accompanied by billions in wasteful spending that do little to enhance national security.
Case in point: Maine's Susan Collins, one of three GOP senators to support the Obama stimulus package, is still fighting for the DDG-1000. When the Navy announced plans to curtail the program, Ms. Collins sent a letter to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, asking him to rescind the decision until a "thorough analysis" could be conducted.
Never mind that the Navy didn't want the vessel, and the move was nothing but a sop for her home-state shipyard. Senator Collins viewed the DDG-1000 purely in terms of local jobs. There's every chance of repeating that scenario, as politicians consider a defense stimulus.
Friday, February 06, 2009
Buh-Bye Manas

A KC-135 Stratotanker, on the ramp at Manas AB, Kyrgyzstan. U.S. forces will soon leave the country, following a Kyrgyz decision to end the basing agreement (Wikipedia photo)
That ad hasn't appeared in a Central Asian newspaper, but it's probably just a matter of time. As the United States and its NATO partners prepare to ramp up ground operations against the Taliban, the alliance has lost access to Manas Airbase, a critical installation located in neighboring Kyrgyzstan.
NATO's eviction from the airfield is hardly a surprise. Relations between Washington and Bishkek have been on a downward slope for some time. The so-called "Tulip Revolution" of 2005 deposed the authoritarian (but pro-western) regime of President Askar Akayev. He was eventually replaced by Kurmanbek Bakiyev, who adopted a much tougher line in dealing with the United States. Bakiyev's government narrowly approved an extension of the basing agreement in 2006.
This time around, Mr. Bakiyev cast his lot with Moscow, which worked behind the scenes to secure NATO's ouster. The Russians recently offered $2 billion in financial aid and credit to Bishkek, in exchange for giving the U.S. and its allies the boot. That's why Bakiyev announced closure of the base earlier this week, and Kyrgyz officials said there is "virtually no hope" of a reprieve.
Manas AB has long been a vital hub for operations in Afghanistan. Thousands of troops (mostly Americans) and more than 500 tons of cargo flow through the base each month, in support of the Afghan campaign. The Kyrgyz base is also essential for air refueling missions that support combat sorties over Afghanistan.
Operating from Manas, U.S. and NATO tankers can provide maximum offloads to fighter, bomber and reconnaissance aircraft operating in Afghanistan. Staging from other locations would not only decrease on-station time for refueling aircraft, it would also require the generation of additional sorties, to make up for longer transit times and reduced offload capabilities.
As we've noted previously, air refueling is one of those critical "force multipliers" that is often taken for granted, at least outside the military. But sustaining air operations in South Asia requires a robust tanker capability, and that means access to airfields in the region. That's why the loss of Manas is a serious blow.
To be fair, the Kyrgyz decision can't be blamed on the Obama Administration. They inherited a deteriorating relationship from the Bush team, and it was probably too late to avert the loss of Manas AB. On the other hand, there's no evidence that the new national security team was properly focused on this issue--until it was too late.
As a fallback plan, the White House, State Department and DoD are trying to repair relations with Uzbekistan, in hopes of regaining access to airfields in that country. U.S. forces were booted from that country four years ago, after Washington criticized the country's heavy-handed response to civil unrest, which resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths.
The loss of Manas will put even more pressure on overland supply routes into Afghanistan. Those lines of communication have grown increasingly tenuous over the past year. Taliban fighters routinely interdict supply lines through Pakistan, forcing the U.S. to seek new routes through Russian territory. Those corridors will remain open only as long as Moscow allows.
Could Washington have averted the expulsion from Kyrgyzstan? Diplomats and the pol-mil crowd at the Pentagon will be debating that one for years. But it's clear that the U.S. didn't help itself in the matter. By losing access to Uzbek airfields, Washington gave Bishkek--and Moscow --even more leverage in the matter.
There is also evidence that we didn't pay enough attention to resurgent Russian influence in its former Central Asian republics. Moscow literally "bought" Manas back for a cool $2 billion, more than the United States was willing to pay. Now, military planners are reportedly contemplating a "new" air route through the United Arab Emirates.
While our basing rights in that country are secure, the air bridge from the Persian Gulf is approximately 40% longer. That means more flights, more fuel and more expense to meet current operational requirements. Those costs will rise even more with the planned troop surge in Afghanistan.
Finally, we wonder if a couple of high-profile "incidents that involved U.S. military personnel influenced the Kyrgyz decision. In December 2006, a local truck driver was shot and killed at Manas AB by a U.S. military member, who claimed the man threatened him with a knife. While the service member was exonerated, the shooting was widely condemned by Kyrgyz politicians and in the local press.
The fatal incident came only three months after the purported "kidnapping" of Air Force Major Jill Metzger, a personnel officer on a temporary duty assignment to Manas. Metzger disappeared from a shopping trip to a Biskek mall, then reappeared three days later with wild claims of a kidnapping and long-distance dash from her captors (the Major is a champion marathon runner).
Teams of FBI agents and representatives of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) quickly descended on Kyrgyzstan and discovered that Metzger's "story" had more holes that a block of Swiss cheese. But by that time, Major Metzger was back in the United States, claiming that the incident had left her with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Incredibly, an Air Force board agreed, and Metzger was placed on temporary disability retirement list--with full pay--less than a year later.
Since then, Major Metzger has participated in at least one marathon and other running events. That's a rather remarkable feat, given the fact that many PTSD victims are unable to leave their homes. We rather doubt that Metzger has given much thought to U.S.-Kyrgyz relations since leaving Manas, but give credit where it's due: in her own, feckless way, the good Major created an international incident and helped undermine ties between Washington and Bishkek. And the Air Force has allowed her the perpetuate the fraud.
Maybe the proposed air route from Dubai to Afghanistan could be called the "Metzger Corridor."
Cutting the Stockpile
Apparently, all those years with Bill were excellent preparation for carrying out ill-advised or foolhardy tasks. From that ill-fated national health care plan to ignoring her husband's many indiscretions, Ms. Clinton is adept at handling chores that most of us would summarily reject.
Consider her newest priority as Secretary of State. Ms. Clinton has informed Congress (and her staff) that she wants early talks with Russia on "sharply reducing" the size of both nation's nuclear arsenals. The goal is a replacement for the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which limits the U.S. and Russia to 6,000 nuclear warheads each.
Some wonder if a new accord is even necessary--but both countries are far below that total. The U.S. stockpile is believed to be at 2,300 warheads, and the Russian inventory is even lower. But Secretary Clinton and President Barack Obama are aiming for even greater reductions. How low are they willing to go? The Administration hasn't said--at least publicly. But, as with other Obama proposals, there are grave risks that may outweigh potential benefits.
Obviously, much has changed since the Cold War, when the United States and the former Soviet Union had thousands of nuclear-capable ICBMs, long-range bombers and ballistic missile subs deployed against each other. The reductions in nuclear stockpiles that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall were prudent measures, based on new geopolitical realities.
But the world has been anything but stagnant since the early 1990s. New threats have emerged, including the burgeoning superpower called the People's Republic of China. Beijing has invested heavily in strategic systems over the past two decades, and is now fielding new generations of mobile missiles (with a limited ability to strike the United States) and a new fleet of ballistic missile subs. More than a decade ago, a PLA general pointedly asked an American counterpart if Washington was "willing to trade Los Angeles for Taipei," an obvious reference to Beijing's growing strategic power.
So far, there's been no discussion of a similar deal with the PRC. Not that it really matters; China's military build-up shows no sign of slowing, and it's doubtful that Beijing would would accept a treaty that might deny them potential parity with the United States.
Russia is also in the midst of a nuclear modernization program. Older rail and land-mobile ICBMs are being replaced by the new SS-27. A naval variant of the missile has been developed for the next generation of Russian missile subs, which will enter the fleet in the coming years. Moscow has also added to its squadron of TU-160 Blackjack bombers, augmenting the Cold War era TU-95 Bear H. Russia would welcome a deal with the United States, particularly one that would "lock in" recent modernization efforts, while forcing deeper cuts in aging American systems.
Then, there's the larger question of what constitutes a sufficient nuclear deterrence in the 21st Century. Fact is, the U.S. arsenal has experienced a dramatic decline over the past 20 years, not just in terms of quantity, but in reliability and modernity as well.
The United States hasn't designed (or produced) a new nuclear warhead since the 1980s. Our ICBM force consists of three Minuteman III wings, based in North Dakota, Wyoming and Montana. Those missiles rolled off the Boeing assembly line in the early 1970s. But they're practically new in comparison to our B-52s, which still form the backbone of our nuclear bomber force. The newest "Buff" was delivered to the Air Force in 1962.
A number of military leaders, including Defense Secretary Robert Gates and General Kevin Chilton, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, have been pressing for modernization of our nuclear forces. In recent media interviews, Chilton noted that the United States hasn't conducted a nuclear test in more than a decade, raising questions about the potential reliability of our arsenal.
But the problems don't end there. Our "atomic infrastructure," which provides the intellectual and technical expertise needed to build nuclear weapons, is equally dated. Key production facilities date back more than forty years, and many of the scientists and engineers who built our last generation of "nukes" are approaching retirement age. To date, there has been no systemic effort to renew our production capabilities, or train a new generation of nuclear experts.
What does that mean for the Clinton-Obama plan to cut our strategic arsenal? For starters, the proposed accord will further reduce our aging stockpile and delivery systems, further reducing their deterrent value. And talk about "sharp reductions" in strategic weapons makes modernization programs an even tougher sell. That's one reason General Chilton launched his recent media offensive, trying to convince anyone who would listen that nuclear modernization is a critical issue, regardless of how large--or small--our forces might be.
Sadly, Kevin Chilton's warnings received little attention outside The Wall Street Journal, the blogosphere, and the military press. There's also no record of Ms. Clinton or President Obama consulting with General Chilton before announcing their plans for a START replacement.
As with other issues, the Obama team appears content to set the security agenda, with minimal input from their military advisers. By all appearances, Ms. Clinton has her marching orders, and she's determined to strike a deal with the Kremlin, with little regard for the long-term consequences.
Thursday, February 05, 2009
The Comprehensive Approach
Perhaps someone ought to ask the president how that approach is faring, given Tuesday's space launch in Iran. It received little attention in the United States, but Tehran's successful orbiting of a small satellite represents a milestone for the Islamic Republic. After years of trying, Iranian engineers have mastered the technologies associated with multi-stage rockets and putting a small package in orbit around the earth.
That puts Iran in a relatively exclusive club; since the beginning of the Space Age more than 50 years ago, only 10 nations have managed to put a satellite into orbit. While the Iranian craft is crude by our standards, Tehran can still boast about its accomplishment. A number of wealthier and more technologically advanced nations--including South Korea, Brazil and Australia--are still working on their own indigenous launch systems. With Tuesday's launch, Iran officially has a space program, and the bragging rights that go with it.
But more importantly, the satellite launch represents an important breakthrough for Iran's ballistic missile program. The same technology that put that satellite in orbit can be easily refined, improving the accuracy and payload of the missiles which double as space boosters.
Some details of the Iranian launch have not been revealed, but the Safir ("Messenger") rocket is believed to be a two-stage configuration, combining a Shahab-3 medium range missile and a North Korean-built second stage. The Shahab-3 can already reach targets in Israel; the two-stage variant could deliver warheads to much or Europe--or beyond.
Pyongyang's support for the Iranian program cannot be over-stated. North Korea gave Tehran its first SCUDs 20 years ago, and remains a key supplier of ballistic missile technology. Iran's primary weapon for striking Israel (the Shahab-3) is based on Pyongyang's No Dong design, and Tehran's longer-range missiles contain a wide range of North Korean components.
But the list of export customers does't end there. Kim Jong-il's regime has also been instrumental in providing missile technology to other countries, including Syria, Pakistan and Egypt. North Korea remains the largest proliferator of ballistic missile systems in the world. By some estimates, missile technology and associated equipment represents Pyongyang's only viable export, and a critical source of hard currency.
So, how does this impact that much-desired "comprehensive" approach? For starters, it illustrates the limitations of diplomacy. Simply stated, there aren't enough carrots to persuade a country (like Iran) to abandon its missile or nuclear programs. For more than three years, representatives from the EU-3 (Great Britain, France and Germany) have been trying to persuade Tehran to abandon its nuclear efforts. Today, Iran is closer than ever to having a nuclear weapon, although it's still willing to talk with European emissaries.
North Korea offers a similar example. The so-called Six Party Talks, sponsored by the U.S. and Pyongyang's neighbors in northeast Asia, yielded an agreement after years of fits and starts. While the agreement will (supposedly) end the DPRK nuclear program, there is no guarantee of success.
Quite the opposite; given North Korea's propensity for cheating, there is ample reason to believe that Kim Jong-il will simply "milk" the accord for increased aid, while retaining a covert weapons production capability and a small nuclear stockpile. It's worth remembering that Pyongyang was up to its usual tricks during the Six Party negotiations. While its diplomats haggled in Beijing, North Korea dispatched other representatives to conclude new missile deals, and build a nuclear facility in Syria, later destroyed by the Israeli Air Force.
Then how should the Obama Administration deal with Iran and North Korea, assuming that diplomacy fails? At the very least, the White House shouldn't dilute options that offer potential protection from missiles--tipped with chemical, biological or nuclear warheads--launched by Tehran or Pyongyang.
But there are disturbing signs that Mr. Obama and his fellow Democrats may do just that. Despite growing threats from rogue states, the nation's ballistic missile defense program is facing an uncertain future, at best. As Michael Tremoglie notes in today's Philadelphia Bulletin, the Obama team has vowed a "pragmatic" and "cost effective" approach to missile defense.
That means exacting test criteria that developmental systems may never be able to meet. It will delay operational deployments of tracking radars and interceptor missiles in locations where such defenses are needed. A proposed BMD site in eastern Europe is now apparently on hold; that assessment is based on Russia's recent decision to cancel an offensive missile deployment along the Polish border. Apparently, Moscow received assurances that the U.S. will "go slow" on extending its missile shield to its newest NATO allies.
Meanwhile, Iran is celebrating its latest advance in missile technology and North Korea may be preparing to test its long-range Tapeo Dong 2 missile. On the day that Tehran launched its first satellite, intelligence analysts detected a possible TD-2 airframe, en route to a test site on North Korea's eastern coast. The facility is the same one where Pyongyang conducted a similar launch in 2006, but that missile exploded after less than 100 seconds of flight.
It's readily apparent that both Iran and North Korea are testing the new president; the timing of these events is anything but coincidental. The Obama Administration has every right to develop its own strategy for dealing with rogue states, but these policy options should also address the worst-case scenario: the very real prospect that negotiations and economic incentives will fail.
At that point, the U.S. and its allies will face the prospect of Iran and North Korea, both armed with nuclear weapons and the delivery systems to reach distant targets, including portions of the United States. As we face that critical moment, the importance of missile defense has never been more apparent.
A "comprehensive approach" is fine, but policies that limit or reject critical options are deeply misguided, in political-speak. We would use another word: dangerous.
At Last
While we'd pay to watch that cat fight, a little background is in order. Beyonce played Etta James in the 2008 film Cadillac Records, which chronicled the rise of recording impresario Leonard Chess. Best known for promoting black artists when the major labels were lily-white, Mr. Chess is crediting with discovering such talents as Howlin' Wolf, Muddy Waters, Chuck Berry, Bo Diddley and, of course, Ms. James.
Perhaps she was upset with the movie (which bombed at the box office), although James praised Beyonce when the film was first released. But that good will has apparently evaporated; before a show in Seattle last week, Ms. James took shots at both the pop diva and President Barack Obama. Not only did she vow to whip Beyonce's hindquarters, she also referred to Obama as "Your big-eared president," and said "He's not my president" at least twice.
TMZ.com has the audio. It's remarkable, to say the least.
So, how does the president figure in all of this? In case you haven't heard, Beyonce serenaded the First Couple with her version of "At Last" at one of the Inaugural Balls last month. There's no indication that Ms James was invited to perform her signature song at the event, so it's no surprise that she's a bit upset. But if the tape is any indication, it sounds like Ms. James' disdain for Obama pre-dates the inauguration.
Needless to say, this little dust-up has created an indelicate situation in the recording industry and the MSM, where political correctness is the first order of business. As you might have guessed, coverage of the incident has been largely limited to the blogosphere, internet gossip sites and the entertainment media. A black artist criticizing her fellow performer--and the nation's first black president--is a matter they'd rather avoid.
After six decades in the music business--and personal battles against everything from racism to heroin addiction--it's rather doubtful that Etta James will apologize. As for Beyonce, her reps have declined comment. Apparently, they understand that it's poor form to pick on your musical elders, particularly one with the chops of Ms. James.
A member of the Rock & Roll, Blues, Rockabilly and Grammy Halls of Fame, Etta James is one of those performers who have met the test of time, and seem genuinely worthy of the "legend" title. Sustaining a music career for more than 50 years is no mean feat. She's earned the right to have her say.
Meanwhile, we wonder what would happen if a white performer--say, a country music artist--made similar remarks about Barack Obama. Can anyone say career suicide?
Tuesday, February 03, 2009
Collision Course
CENTCOM commander Gen. David Petraeus, supported by Defence Secretary Robert Gates,
tried to convince President Barack Obama that he had to back down from his campaign pledge to withdraw all U.S. combat troops from Iraq within 16 months at an Oval Office meeting Jan. 21.
But Obama informed Gates, Petraeus and Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen that he wasn't convinced and that he wanted Gates and the military leaders to come back quickly with a detailed 16-month plan, according to two sources who have talked with participants in the meeting.
Obama's decision to override Petraeus's recommendation has not ended the conflict between the president and senior military officers over troop withdrawal, however. There are indications that Petraeus and his allies in the military and the Pentagon, including Gen. Ray Odierno, now the top commander in Iraq, have already begun to try to pressure Obama to change his withdrawal policy.
A network of senior military officers is also reported to be preparing to support Petraeus and Odierno by mobilising public opinion against Obama's decision.
Petraeus was visibly unhappy when he left the Oval Office, according to one of the sources. A White House staffer present at the meeting was quoted by the source as saying, "Petraeus made the mistake of thinking he was still dealing with George Bush instead of with Barack Obama."
You can almost hear the White House source chuckle in recounting their version of events. It sounds vaguely reminiscent of Mr. Obama's "I won" comment, during a meeting with Congressional Republicans last week. To the victor goes the spoils; as the new decider-in-chief, President Obama gets to chart our policy in Iraq (and other global hotspots).
But dismissing the advice of senior generals is usually a bad idea, as Mr. Obama will eventually discover. While some dispute his version of events, if Gareth Porter is correct, then President Obama is facing a posssible revolt among his senior military advisers. Mobilizing public support through the media is not something that flag officers particularly enjoy, given their inherent distrust of the press. Their willingness to consider that option suggests a growing rift between the Commander-in-Chief and his senior military advisers.
More disturbingly, Mr. Obama's preferred withdrawal plan flies in the face of current realities in the Middle East. As Bret Stephens notes in today's WSJ, Iraq is becoming a U.S. bulwark in the Middle East. The gains achieved by the troop surge are holding, and Iraqi forces are assuming a lead role in securing the country. Last weekend's election was a stunning success, and a model for the Arab word.
Still, the situation in Iraq is not irreversible, one reason that Mr. Gates, General Petraeus and General Odierno favor an extended American draw down. Mr. Stephens observes that not all American "pillars" in the Middle East have met the test of time. In some cases, the bulwark of yesteryear (think Iran) is today's despotic regime that now threatens regional security. Other long-standing American allies, including Pakistan and Turkey) face an uncertain future, at best.
In other words, the U.S. needs all the stable, friendly regimes it can find in the Middle East. But Mr. Obama seems more intent on placating his supporters on the liberal fringe, who've been clamoring for an American pullout since 2003. The President seems willing to risk progress paid for in blood and treasure to full fill a campaign promise--with less regard for what happens after we leave.
If this sounds familiar, it should. Just days into his presidency, Mr. Obama signed an executive order to shut down the terrorist prison at Guantanamo Bay by next year. Where those suspects will be incarcerated (or face justice) has not been determined. Maybe the administration should change its mantra from "Change We Can Believe In," to "Don't Sweat the Details."
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ADDENDUM: We should also note that the Obama-Petraeus collision has a political component. General Petraeus's successful strategy in Iraq caused a fair amount of consternation for Obama and his fellow Democrats. Kicking and screaming, they had to finally admit that the troop surge worked, and was eminently preferable to their "cut and run" approach. With the Democrats now in the White House, they can finally tell General Petraeus to "shut up and color," exacting a measure of revenge for upsetting their original Iraq "strategy."
The friction in the Oval Office is also a prelude to 2012. In some GOP circles, Petraeus is already being mentioned as a potential Senate or Vice-Presidential candidate in four years. By forcing a showdown over Iraq, Obama can tarnish the general's reputation, force him to resign, or even engineer a dismissal. Any of those scenarios would damage the general politically, a calculation that isn't lost on the White House.
You read it here first: The brilliant military career of General David Petraeus will end at CENTCOM.
Sunday, February 01, 2009
Advance the Clock
And it may be time to advance the hands yet again. Benjamin Netanyahu, the man who will most likely be the next Prime Minister of Israel, has reiterated his determination to halt Tehran's nuclear ambitions. In a TV interview just weeks before the Israeli election, Mr. Netanyahu stated flatly that "Iran will not be armed with a nuclear weapon."
In an interview with Israel's Channel 2 TV, Netanyahu said if elected prime minister his first mission will be to thwart the Iranian nuclear threat. Netanyahu, the current opposition leader and head of the hardline Likud party, called Iran the greatest danger to Israel and to all humanity.
When asked if stopping Iran's nuclear ambitions included a military strike, he replied: "It includes everything that is necessary to make this statement come true."
Mr. Netanyahu's remarks were part of an interview with all three candidates for Prime Minister. Opinion polls show Netanyahu with a lead over Ehud Barak's Labor Party, and and Kadima's Tipi Livni, just nine days before the election.
The interview format was odd, at least by American standards. While the candidates were together in a Channel 2 studio, they did not debate each other. Instead, they responded to questions from You Tube users. Netanyahu was the only candidate asked about the Iranian threat; Mr. Barak (the current Defense Minister) and Ms. Livni, the Foreign Minister, were asked about how they would respond to the Hamas rocket threat.
Netanyahu's comments were the latest indication that the next Israeli government will deal decisively with Iran. Last week, the respected International Institute for Strategic Studies predicted that Tehran will have enough fissile material for at least one nuclear weapon by the end of 2009.
While that doesn't mean that Iran will have a ready-made bomb within twelve months, it is a reminder that Tehran is approaching the point of no return. As their stockpile of enriched uranium continues to grow, the Iranians will be able to create a small nuclear arsenal, even if Israel strikes key nuclear sites. Timing for the attack is also being influenced by Tehran's pending acquisition of the S-300 air defense system. When the S-300 achieves operational capability--probably later this year--Israeli operational planning will become much more complicated.
The third factor is the recent change in the White House, and Israeli perceptions that Barack Obama will be more conciliatory toward Iran. So far, the new president has done little to dissuade that notion. There are unconfirmed reports that the administration is crafting a new letter to the Iranian leadership, and just lask week, Mr. Obama said he wanted a "comprehensive approach" toward Iran, with diplomacy (presumably) taking the lead.
It's little wonder that Israel feels increasingly isolated, and believes it has no choice but to deal with Iran on its own. Mr. Netanyahu's remarks don't guarantee an Israeli attack, but prospects for that option have certainly increased, given the likelihood that Likud will win next week's election.
We'd say President Obama's "comprehensive solution" will soon be overcome by events. The strike clock now reads 90 seconds to midnight--and ticking.
Saturday, January 31, 2009
Worst Idea of the Week, Redux
Case in point: The Air Force's next-generation tanker program. As readers of this blog--and other defense forums--are painfully aware, the service's efforts to field new air refueling planes has been mired in scandal and partisan bickering for most of this decade. The first attempt, a lease deal with Boeing, was scuttled after it was revealed that the USAF's senior acquisition official had secured employment guarantees for herself (and members of her family) with the defense contractor.
More recently, a contract with Northrop-Grumman and its European partner, EADS, was cancelled after the Government Accountability Officer upheld a protest from Boeing. Both teams are now in the process of submitting new bids, but regardless of who wins, there will almost certainly be a new round of protests and delays.
That means that Air Force tanker units won't be getting new aircraft until 2013--at the earliest. Meanwhile, the service has grounded a number of its older KC-135s, which rolled off the Boeing assembly line during the Eisenhower Administration. As more tankers reach retirement age, the USAF will find it more difficult to sustain air refueling mission, a critical component of combat and mobility operations worldwide.
How to resolve the tanker impasse? A growing number of defense officials and analysts believe the only solution is a "split buy," purchasing equal numbers of new refueling aircraft from Boeing and Northrop-Grumman/EADS.
As Amy Butler of Aviation Week reports, the split buy option will be a topic of conversation when Pennsylvania Congressman Jack Murtha visits the Alabama plant where the Northrop-Grumman tanker would be built. Murtha's endorsement is considered essential in mustering Congressional support for the split buy option.
So far, the King of Defense Pork has not revealed his position on the issue. But convincing Congressman Murtha and his colleagues may not be difficult. In the early stages of a recession, no politician wants any part of a decision that would elminiate thousands of high-paying aerospace jobs, many of them filled by union members.
That's why officials close to the tanker program say dual sourcing by is the "only politically palatable way" to move forward. Under the split buy approach, Boeing and Northrop-Grumman would build 90 tankers each, creating (or saving) more than 80,000 defense jobs across the country.
What exactly will the Air Force--and taxpayers--be getting for their money? While buying tankers from two different contractors will win support on Capitol Hill (and in places like Mobile, Alabama and Seattle), dual sourcing is a terrible idea, for a number of reasons.
First, there's the issue of unit cost. Buying fewer aircraft from a particular supplier drives up the price tag. The B-2 became a billion dollar bomber because the projected purchase dropped from 132 aircraft, to only 21. Both the Boeing and Northrop-Grumman tankers are based on commercial airliners, but the same production rules apply. Buying 90 aircraft from one contractor and the same number from another will raise the project's cost well beyond the current $40 billion dollars.
Still, the duplication doesn't end there. To support two different tankers, the USAF will be required to create two aircrew training programs, and separate schools for technicians who will maintain the Boeing aircraft and those assigned to the Northrop-Grumman jet.
Keeping the new tankers will require different maintenance and logistics systems, and a major re-working of operational plans. The twin-engine KC-767 (based on the Boeing airliner) and the Northrop-Grumman tanker (built on the Airbus A330) have different offload capabilities, cargo capacities and operational "footprints." In some situations, the KC-767 can operate from forward airfields that can't handle the larger Airbus. On the other hand, the Northrop-Grumman entry is better suited for some longer-range missions.
At least one key official has expressed opposition to the split buy option. In a recent interview with Aviation Week, Defense Secretary Robert Gates noted that buying both tankers would "greatly complicate" the Air Force's life, leaving the service with four different refueling aircraft in the inventory (the USAF plans to retain some KC-135s along with the KC-10s it purchased in the 1980s). As Dr. Gates observed, the multiple training, logistics and maintenance systems would quickly become an expensive "nightmare."
Unfortunately, that reality doesn't exactly square with Washington politics--and the reality of today's hyper-partisan defense procurement process. Fact is, the "split buy" idea has been around for some time. It surfaced several years ago, when the Pentagon suggested successive rounds of tanker purchases, under programs dubbed KC-X and KC-Y. That idea was quickly shelved, in favor of a single "buy" for 179 tankers, provided by a single vendor.
But the dual purchase proposal made a comeback last summer, after the Northrop-Grumman contract was cancelled. Former Air Force Secretary Mike Wynne--a veteran of years in the defense industry--suggested that a split buy might be the only option. As the economy declines (and political pressures build), support for the "two tanker" scheme has only grown.
Purchasing different refueling aircraft from both Boeing and Northrop-Grumman is simply unfathomable, but apparently, it's an idea whose time has come. It's a testament to a broken defense procurement system and the politics of defense pork. Forty billion dollars is too much money to ignore; that's why a growing number of folks--in the Pentagon, the defense industry and on Capitol Hill--are willing to saddle the Air Force with an additional tanker it doesn't need, and stick taxpayers with the bill.