We’ll begin with Max Boot, writing in today’s Los Angeles Times, on the sudden departure of Admiral William Fallon as CENTCOM Commander. As Mr. Boot observes, Fallon simply “didn’t get it” on the troop surge, pushing for further reductions of U.S. personnel in Iraq—cuts that could endanger recent security gains.
Some particularly salient thoughts:
What Fallon (and Barnett—the profile’s author) don't seem to understand is that Fallon's very public assurances that America has no plans to use force against Iran embolden the mullahs to continue developing nuclear weapons and supporting terrorist groups that are killing American soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is highly improbable that, as the profile implies, the president had any secret plans to bomb Iran that Fallon put a stop to. But there is no doubt that the president wants to maintain pressure on Iran, and that's what Fallon has been undermining.
By irresponsibly taking the option of force off the table, Fallon makes it more likely, not less, that there will ultimately be an armed confrontation with Iran.
[snip]
Barnett writes further: "Smart guy that he is, Robert Gates, the incoming secretary of Defense, finagled Fallon out of Pacific Command, where he'd been radically making peace with the Chinese, so that he could, among other things, provide a check on the eager-to-please General David Petraeus in Iraq."
It's doubtful that this was why Bush and Gates appointed Fallon. Why would they want to "check" the general charged with winning the Iraq war? But it's telling that Barnett would write this; it may be a reflection of Fallon's own thinking. Even if he wasn't appointed for this reason, Fallon has certainly seen his job as being to "check" Petraeus. The problem is that Fallon is a newcomer to the Middle East and Iraq, while Petraeus has served there for years and is the architect of a strategy that has rescued the United States from the brink of defeat.
With Fallon actively “free-lancing” on Middle East policy, it’s no wonder Mr. Gates lost confidence in him.
Incidentally, the Esquire profile that ended Admiral Fallon’s CENTCOM tour—and his military career—is now available on-line. It is, as Max Boot observes, a fawning portrait that, in some respects, undercuts Fallon’s reputation for strategic brilliance. A few examples:
And Fallon is in no hurry to call Iran's hand on the nuclear question. He is as patient as the White House is impatient, as methodical as President Bush is mercurial, and simply has, as one aide put it, "other bright ideas about the region." Fallon is even more direct: In a part of the world with "five or six pots boiling over, our nation can't afford to be mesmerized by one problem."
And if it comes to war?
"Get serious," the admiral says. "These guys are ants. When the time comes, you crush them."
Pardon us, admiral, but it would appear that Iran is more than another pot on the strategic stove. Tehran is scrambling to acquire nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems, which could be employed against U.S. forces in the region and Israel. Iran is the world’s leading state sponsor of terror, willing to launch another proxy war against the Israelis through Hizballah and Hamas.
And, if it does come to war, Iran also has the ability to shut down the Straight of Hormuz, choking off much of the world’s oil supply. Yes, we would eventually prevail against Iran, but given those variables, the Iranian pot deserves special attention.
Or, how about this little aside, found in the paragraphs that follow:
Fallon sidles up to me during a morning coffee break. "I'm in hot water again," he says.
"The White House?"
The admiral slowly nods his head.
"They say, 'Why are you even meeting with Mubarak?' " This seems to utterly mystify Fallon.
"Why?" he says, shrugging with palms extending outward. "Because it's my job to deal with this region, and it's all anyone wants to talk about right now. People here hear what I'm saying and understand. I don't want to get them too spun up. Washington interprets this as all aimed at them. Instead, it's aimed at governments and media in this region. I'm not talking about the White House." He points to the ground, getting exercised. "This is my center of gravity. This is my job."
Fallon’s willingness to publicly discuss battles with his superiors cuts to the heart of his sudden resignation. Admiral Fallon certainly understood that his comments would eventually appear in print, and knew his bosses wouldn’t be pleased. That suggests a man with little discretion, or someone who had grown weary of the CENTCOM post (less than a year into the assignment) and was looking for a way out. Whatever the reason, those aren’t exactly qualities desired in our military leader for the Middle East.
There’s one more anecdote from Barnett’s profile that suggests Fallon was a bad choice for the CENTCOM job. It actually happened when the Admiral was commander of U.S. Forces in the Pacific.
Early in his tenure at Pacific Command, Fallon let it be known that he was interested in visiting the city of Harbin in the highly controlled and isolated Heilongjiang Military District on China's northern border with Russia. The Chinese were flabbergasted at the request, but when Fallon's command plane took off one afternoon from Mongolia, heading for Harbin without permission, Beijing relented.
Fallon is lucky that the Chinese were in a charitable mood that day. Heading for Harbin without permission—into tightly-controlled airspace—Admiral Fallon risked an international incident (or worse). As Barnett notes, the hastily-arranged visit ended on a high note, with the Chinese commander meeting Fallon and even publicly acknowledging the contributions of his wife.
But was it worth the risk of heading into a military district without initial permission? Fallon would undoubtedly say yes, but it could also be argued that the Harbin jaunt demonstrated flawed judgment. And, despite China’s willingness to arrange a last-minute visit, we wonder if that slight had any long-range repercussions in Sino-U.S. relations. Last Thanksgiving, a U.S. carrier battle group was denied a port visit in China at the last-minute. Makes you wonder if that slight was “payback” for Fallon’s forced entry into Harbin a few years earlier.
***
ADDENDUM: Fallon's touch-and-go at CENTCOM also raises questions questions about his hiring process. While most of the Bush Administration's recent military appointments in the AOR have been spectacularly successful (think Petraeus and his former deputy, Lieutenant General Ray Odierno), we wonder about the thinking that put Fallon in the chain-of-command, as their superiors. Admiral Fallon was clearly the odd man out, and Mr. Gates deserves some credit for cutting his losses and making a change now. Better luck with the next hire, Mr. Secretary.
Wednesday, March 12, 2008
Tuesday, March 11, 2008
“Doc” Steps Down
Outgoing Mississippi State University President (and retired USAF General) Robert "Doc" Foglesong (MSU photo).
As a fighter pilot and military officer, the career of Robert “Doc” Foglesong seemed as limitless as the sky.
During 34 years in the U.S. Air Force, Foglesong steadily climbed the military ladder. He flew both the F-15 and F-16, and served in a variety of staff and leadership positions. At various points during his military career, Foglesong was commander of two USAF wings; he worked as Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Commander of 12th Air Force, based at Davis-Monthan AFB near Tucson. At the tine of his retirement, Foglesong was a four-star general, in charge of all U.S. Air Force elements in Europe.
Along with his military credentials, Foglesong was also a scholar. Before entering pilot training in 1972, he earned undergraduate, master’s and doctoral degrees in chemical engineering from the University of West Virginia. In an Air Force where most officers have no more than a master’s degrees, Foglesong’s Ph.D set him apart—and produced his inevitable nickname.
With that blend of advanced academic training, executive skills and proven leadership abilities, Foglesong seemed to be prime material for a college or university presidency. And sure enough, General Foglesong found employment in academia after leaving the Air Force, signing on as President of Mississippi State University in 2006.
But, less than two years after assuming that job, Foglesong’s tenure at MSU is coming to an end. Last Friday, he announced that he will leave his post no later than June 30th. In statements released by Mississippi State and the state college board, Foglesong said he is stepping down to “help the university move forward.”
Beyond that rather opaque goal, no reason was given for Dr. Foglesong’s departure. But his exodus caps a rather nasty—and running—battle with alumni, students and faculty, upset over his imperial administrative style, supposed inattention to faculty demands, and the process that brought him to MSU in the first place.
The controversy began two years ago, when Foglesong’s hiring (by the state college board and Mississippi Commissioner of Higher Education Tom Meredith) was conducted in secrecy. Many MSU alumni and supporters had no idea that Dr. Foglesong would be the university’s next president until he was introduced on the Starkville campus.
The former general earned the ire of university faculty by (reportedly) showing little interest in their concerns. According to the Columbus (MS) Dispatch, the issue came to a head last November, when critical comments from a faculty senate meeting found their way into the MSU student newspaper (surprise, surprise).
The remarks were made by a communications professor, Dr. Mark Goodman. They ran as part of an article entitled “Faculty Senate Fed Up,” which appeared in the campus paper on 20 November. In his comments—which Goodman never denied—the professor accused Foglesong of being “uninvolved in the concerns of the senate.”
“He doesn't want to hear what we have to say, he's not interested in our issues and he's going to ignore us,” the Reflector quoted Goodman as saying. “He's The General and he's turned it over to the provost to run the faculty. I don't think we should sit back and take it.”
Foglesong immediately fired back. In an on-line newsletter published in late November, the MSU president made it clear that he did not appreciate Goodman’s comments—or the fact they appeared in the press.
“First, let's remember our motto: One State - One Team. Our shared goal is to move MSU forward and demand the respect we deserve,” Foglesong wrote in a Nov. 26 online newsletter to faculty titled “Time for Some Straight Talk.”
“We can't do that by creating distrust, which leads to mediocrity, which translates into declining enrollment, lost revenue, lost faculty positions, and so on,” Foglesong continued.
[snip]
“I was warned when I got here that we have some teammates who love to hear themselves in the news,” wrote Foglesong. “I have found that to be the case in almost every organization.”
Foglesong also borrowed a comment from Goodman, who said he was “insulted” by the president’s poor attendance at faculty senate meetings. In response, the MSU president wondered if professors were also “insulted” by the accomplishments of his administration—including a 13% pay raise for faculty and staff—or if they felt embarrassment over the behavior of some of their colleagues:
“..maybe you were embarrassed by the behavior of the faculty member who hid in his closet for 20 minutes on the first day of class, then emerged to take roll after part of the class had left,” said Foglesong. “Perhaps you were offended because some faculty members ignored the warning sirens and messages during a recent tornado alert and carried on with class. I was insulted by that.”
“Unfortunately, there's more of this stuff. Wonder why this isn't in the newspaper? It's because we're bigger than that. At least most of us are,” Foglesong continued, and urged faculty and staff to take their concerns to him first, and not the media."
The beleaguered MSU president also caught flack from students. Some protested his selection, others in support of faculty grievances. And a handful of students were upset about a visit by Playboy magazine to Starkville, in search of models for a future issue. When Foglesong noted that the student newspaper had a right to report on the auditions, a leader of the anti-porn protest wondered if Playboy’s appearance would “negatively affect” the president’s reputation.
After months of battling with students, faculty and university supporters, Foglesong decided to call it quits. He’s expected to leave Starkville before the scheduled departure date, and state officials are initiating the search for his replacement.
Having served on a college faculty, we can certainly empathize with Dr. Foglesong.
Satisfying the various university constituencies is a difficult job, even for the most talented administrators. And sniping from the faculty senate never helps. Imagine a covey of tenured critics—many of them with their own pet agendas—and you’ve got some idea of what a college president faces on a daily basis.
But, in fairness, Foglesong was probably a poor choice for the MSU post, and we wonder if his nomination would have survived a public confirmation process. While no one has ever doubted Foglesong’s honesty or integrity, he had a reputation in the Air Force for being difficult and arrogant (not exactly rare qualities among fighter pilots).
One retired senior non-commissioned officer, who served under the general, described him as “jerk.” Another former Air Force member, posting on the MSU student paper's website, claimed that Foglesong's "extreme micro-managing, petty reprisals and 'dodgy' use of military funds were legendary."
So, it’s no surprise that the retired general’s brusque style rubbed faculty, students and staff members the wrong way. But, given the political leanings of most university professors, we wonder how many MSU faculty members opposed the president because of his military background.
With his departure, Foglesong becomes the second retired Air Force general to leave a high-profile education post in recent years. In 2005, former Lieutenant General Joseph Redden resigned as school superintendent in Cobb County, Georgia. Like Foglesong, General Redden also posted a number of achievements during his tenure. But he also fought with education bureaucrats, and came under fire for his proposal to buy laptop computers for every student in the system—at a cost of $70 million.
Compared to the education wars, Foglesong and Redden discovered that running a large military command or flying a combat jet is a lot easier—and a lot less stressful. Based on their experiences, we’d guess that other retired generals will think twice about applying for leadership positions at major universities, or in large public school systems.
The Cardinal Sin
The commander in charge of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is stepping down.
U.S. Navy Admiral William Fallon, the commander of U.S. Central Command for the past year, announced his retirement today, amid reports that he opposed Bush Administration policies toward Iran.
Fallon, who has served on active duty since 1967, was the subject of a recent profile in Esquire magazine entitled "The Man Between War and Peace." It depicted the CENTCOM commander as a lone voice opposed to military action against Iran's nuclear program.
While administration critics were quick to note the apparent policy split between Fallon and his boss, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, both the Admiral and Mr. Gates downplayed the differences. As the AP reports:
Gates said repeatedly that he believed talk of Fallon opposing Bush on Iran was mistaken.
"I don't think that there really were differences at all," Gates said, adding that Fallon was not pressured to leave.
"He told me that, quote, 'The current embarrassing situation, public perception of differences between my views and administration policy, and the distraction this causes from the mission make this the right thing to do,' unquote," Gates told reporters.
But in the end, the mere perception of a split between the Pentagon and the CENTCOM commander was enough to force Fallon's retirement. The recent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) virtually eliminated any prospect for U.S. military action against Iran's nuclear facilities; Public differences between Mr. Gates and the CENTCOM leader would make it even more difficult to marshal public support for future strikes.
Obviously, Admiral Fallon's sin wasn't his disagreement with Mr. Gates. Every SecDef--including Donald Rumsfeld--tolerates (read: expects) a certain degree of debate among his military advisers. But taking those arguments public is simply unacceptable. That's why CENTCOM will have a new commander by the end of this month.
And that raises a couple of questions. Namely, why did Fallon agree to the interview? Scan a few past issues, and you'll discover that Esquire is hardly a fan of the U.S. military. If the Admiral was wishing to air his views, he might have used a more tempered approach--and a different forum.
On that same note, where was Admiral Fallon's public affairs advisor? Every combatant commander has a Colonel or Captain (Navy O-6) who heads the organization's P.A. staff. It would be interesting to know what counsel Fallon's public affairs chief offered when Esquire came calling. The final decision rests with the CINC, but if Fallon was told to grant the interview, he received poor advice from his staff.
With today's announcement, speculation about possible successors began immediately. Some of the names being tossed about include Army Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, a former senior commander in Iraq (who serves as Gates' top military assistant), and Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal, a former leader of U.S. special operations in the Middle East. Another possible nominee is CENTCOM's Vice-Commander, another Army three-star who has been selected for promotion, and reassignment as commander of U.S. forces in Europe.
Two dark horse candidates are the men responsible for the success of the troop surge in Iraq, General David Petraeus and his former deputy, Lieutenant General Ray Odierno. The White House and the Pentagon would be reluctant to transfer Petraeus, who has said that recent gains in Iraq are "fragile." But, through the miracle of modern communications (and a large Baghdad staff), Petraeus could keep an eye on Iraq, while simultaneously managing the larger CENTCOM portfolio.
Putting Odierno in charge would be more problematic. He's already slated for promotion (and reassignment as the Army's Vice Chief of Staff). Beyond that, putting him at CENTCOM would put him (nominally) in charge of General Petraeus, his former subordinate.
If the President looks toward those two men for the CENTCOM job, the most likely combination would give Petraeus the CINC job, with Odierno returning once again to Iraq, to become our top military commander in that country. Someone else could fill the Vice Chief position; with Fallon's departure, filling the CENTCOM job--and preserving our gains in Iraq--will take top priority.
U.S. Navy Admiral William Fallon, the commander of U.S. Central Command for the past year, announced his retirement today, amid reports that he opposed Bush Administration policies toward Iran.
Fallon, who has served on active duty since 1967, was the subject of a recent profile in Esquire magazine entitled "The Man Between War and Peace." It depicted the CENTCOM commander as a lone voice opposed to military action against Iran's nuclear program.
While administration critics were quick to note the apparent policy split between Fallon and his boss, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, both the Admiral and Mr. Gates downplayed the differences. As the AP reports:
Gates said repeatedly that he believed talk of Fallon opposing Bush on Iran was mistaken.
"I don't think that there really were differences at all," Gates said, adding that Fallon was not pressured to leave.
"He told me that, quote, 'The current embarrassing situation, public perception of differences between my views and administration policy, and the distraction this causes from the mission make this the right thing to do,' unquote," Gates told reporters.
But in the end, the mere perception of a split between the Pentagon and the CENTCOM commander was enough to force Fallon's retirement. The recent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) virtually eliminated any prospect for U.S. military action against Iran's nuclear facilities; Public differences between Mr. Gates and the CENTCOM leader would make it even more difficult to marshal public support for future strikes.
Obviously, Admiral Fallon's sin wasn't his disagreement with Mr. Gates. Every SecDef--including Donald Rumsfeld--tolerates (read: expects) a certain degree of debate among his military advisers. But taking those arguments public is simply unacceptable. That's why CENTCOM will have a new commander by the end of this month.
And that raises a couple of questions. Namely, why did Fallon agree to the interview? Scan a few past issues, and you'll discover that Esquire is hardly a fan of the U.S. military. If the Admiral was wishing to air his views, he might have used a more tempered approach--and a different forum.
On that same note, where was Admiral Fallon's public affairs advisor? Every combatant commander has a Colonel or Captain (Navy O-6) who heads the organization's P.A. staff. It would be interesting to know what counsel Fallon's public affairs chief offered when Esquire came calling. The final decision rests with the CINC, but if Fallon was told to grant the interview, he received poor advice from his staff.
With today's announcement, speculation about possible successors began immediately. Some of the names being tossed about include Army Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, a former senior commander in Iraq (who serves as Gates' top military assistant), and Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal, a former leader of U.S. special operations in the Middle East. Another possible nominee is CENTCOM's Vice-Commander, another Army three-star who has been selected for promotion, and reassignment as commander of U.S. forces in Europe.
Two dark horse candidates are the men responsible for the success of the troop surge in Iraq, General David Petraeus and his former deputy, Lieutenant General Ray Odierno. The White House and the Pentagon would be reluctant to transfer Petraeus, who has said that recent gains in Iraq are "fragile." But, through the miracle of modern communications (and a large Baghdad staff), Petraeus could keep an eye on Iraq, while simultaneously managing the larger CENTCOM portfolio.
Putting Odierno in charge would be more problematic. He's already slated for promotion (and reassignment as the Army's Vice Chief of Staff). Beyond that, putting him at CENTCOM would put him (nominally) in charge of General Petraeus, his former subordinate.
If the President looks toward those two men for the CENTCOM job, the most likely combination would give Petraeus the CINC job, with Odierno returning once again to Iraq, to become our top military commander in that country. Someone else could fill the Vice Chief position; with Fallon's departure, filling the CENTCOM job--and preserving our gains in Iraq--will take top priority.
Monday, March 10, 2008
Good Idea, Wrong Place
The New York Times reports that the commander of U.S. forces in South Korea is urging the Pentagon to allow service members to bring their families with them on tours of duty in that country.
According to the Times, the proposal by General B.B. Bell is “recognition that the military must do more to improve the quality of life for troops — and their families — if it hopes to retain personnel despite extended deployments overseas during a time of two wars.”
“General Bell’s concept, a reversal of decades of deployment policy for South Korea, also reflects a strategic assessment that troops are less vulnerable than they once were to attack from the North — and that such an attack itself is less likely today, given the enduring American presence as a deterrent and the growth in both the size and sophistication of South Korea’s armed forces.
Families of the American troops ordered to South Korea have generally not been authorized to accompany them, a decision based on an analysis that the North-South front was far too dangerous, and the regime in the North too unpredictable, to allow dependents to join troops there. That is in stark contrast to cold war-era deployments to Germany, when troops were allowed to bring spouses and children — even in the shadow of Warsaw Pact artillery and Soviet nuclear weapons.”
Bell’s rationale for the change is well-founded. With the demands of the GWOT, many troops are arriving in South Korea after 12-15 months of combat duty in Iraq, essentially giving them back-to-back “remote” tours away from their families.
In his interview with the NYT, General Bell cited the case of one young Army Captain, five months into a Korea tour, after a year in Iraq. The father of a 2 ½ year-old-child, the Captain has spent only eight months with his daughter.
“You know, we can do better than that,” Bell said he told the Captain.
Still, the policy change would come at a steep price. As the general readily admits, accommodating thousands of military families would require substantial investments in base housing, schools, medical facilities and other elements required to support a military community. Currently, less than 10% of the 28,000 U.S. troops in South Korea are on “command-sponsored” tours that allow them to bring dependents.
According to General Bell, another 2,000 military families have moved to Korea on their own, to be with spouses or parents who are assigned there. While “non-sponsored” dependents are supposed to be barred from base facilities, the military has quietly accommodated them.
Truth is, there have always been a small number of military dependents in South Korea. In many cases, they are the Korean wives of U.S. service members, with the family support network (and language skills) to fit into the local culture and economy. A number of military members with Korean spouses volunteer for additional tours in that country, allowing their wives to remain near friends and family. It would be interesting to know how many of the 2,000 families cited by General Bell fit into that category.
From a security standpoint, we agree that the overall threat from North Korea has eased, and most Americans are now stationed well south of the DMZ. But the Land of the Morning Calm remains a dangerous place as long as Kim Jong-il holds power in Pyongyang, and his four million-man military is nothing to laugh at. And, with the rapid expansion of North Korea’s missile and WMD programs, all U.S. bases in the south are vulnerable to chemical, biological or nuclear attack.
As the Times observes, similar concerns existed in Western Europe, before the fall of the Soviet Union. But the Soviets were a more predictable adversary, and the geography provided a strategic depth that does not exist in Korea. Readers will note that neither General Bell (nor the Times) addresses the bottom-line issue for military dependents in South Korea—getting them out in the event of war.
Even in the days when there were only a handful of military families in Korea, the prospect of a Non-Essential Evacuation Operation (NEO) was daunting. Key installations—notably Youngsan Garrison in Seoul—were within range of North Korean artillery sites along the DMZ. Primary evacuation hubs, including Kimpo Airport near Seoul and Osan AB (35 miles south of the Korean capital) were also subject to enemy attack and saturation by air traffic.
Making matters worse, the close proximity of Pyongyang’s military reduces warning time for hostilities. A few years back the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) advised that warning notice for a limited North Korean thrust might be measured in hours, at best. Many NEO plans are based on advanced intel warning, allowing commanders to evacuate dependents (and other non-essential personnel) before the start of hostilities. Once the war begins, the safe evacuation of those individuals becomes a dicey proposition, particularly in a place like Korea.
That’s one more reason that General Bell’s plan strikes us as a bad idea. We fully understand his reasoning, and there’s no doubt that the troops returning from Iraq deserve more time with their families—not another “remote” assignment. But plunking down thousands of spouses and children in the middle of a potential war zone is a risky proposition, even in an era of a (slightly) diminished North Korean threat.
Besides, if the DPRK is really on its last legs--as some insist—then why should the U.S. taxpayer spend billions on infrastructure that won’t be needed 10 or 15 years down the road? The predicted demise of North Korea will, presumably, require a smaller American military presence on the Korea, one that won't require a U.S. Army division, two wings of combat aircraft, and thousands of support personnel. Moreover, plans for a large-scale, post-unification U.S. military presence in Korea—including dependents—would only stoke rising anti-Americanism in the region.
Finally, the argument for sending more military dependents to Korea seems to undercut one of the unstated benefits of the existing personnel policy. With family members back in the states, personnel on duty in South Korea could focus on the mission, maintaining the high degree of readiness needed to deter and, if necessary, repel a North Korean attack.
With more families in the ROK, commanders will have to give troops more time off and throttle back on their exercise schedules. Military members won’t complain, but at what point would concerns about family undercut training and preparation?
Commanders facing a very real North Korean threat have more important things to worry about than family housing, or the quality of the local DoDDS school. Similarly, soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines who might go into battle with minimal notice need to focus on their jobs, not worrying about how their spouses and kids will get to Kimpo—or survive a DPRK missile attack.
We have great respect for General Bell. His plan shows genuine compassion for the troops, their families and their well-being, concepts that some commanders give only lip-service. But, in our view, threat considerations and evacuation concerns still trump the idea of allowing thousands of military dependent to follow their service members to Korea. Good idea, but in the wrong place, and at the wrong time.
***
For the record, Your Humble Correspondent was a member of the Kunsan AB Class of 1992. The remote tour sucked, but I couldn’t imagine taking a wife and children to Korea, even at a base almost 200 miles from the DMZ.
According to the Times, the proposal by General B.B. Bell is “recognition that the military must do more to improve the quality of life for troops — and their families — if it hopes to retain personnel despite extended deployments overseas during a time of two wars.”
“General Bell’s concept, a reversal of decades of deployment policy for South Korea, also reflects a strategic assessment that troops are less vulnerable than they once were to attack from the North — and that such an attack itself is less likely today, given the enduring American presence as a deterrent and the growth in both the size and sophistication of South Korea’s armed forces.
Families of the American troops ordered to South Korea have generally not been authorized to accompany them, a decision based on an analysis that the North-South front was far too dangerous, and the regime in the North too unpredictable, to allow dependents to join troops there. That is in stark contrast to cold war-era deployments to Germany, when troops were allowed to bring spouses and children — even in the shadow of Warsaw Pact artillery and Soviet nuclear weapons.”
Bell’s rationale for the change is well-founded. With the demands of the GWOT, many troops are arriving in South Korea after 12-15 months of combat duty in Iraq, essentially giving them back-to-back “remote” tours away from their families.
In his interview with the NYT, General Bell cited the case of one young Army Captain, five months into a Korea tour, after a year in Iraq. The father of a 2 ½ year-old-child, the Captain has spent only eight months with his daughter.
“You know, we can do better than that,” Bell said he told the Captain.
Still, the policy change would come at a steep price. As the general readily admits, accommodating thousands of military families would require substantial investments in base housing, schools, medical facilities and other elements required to support a military community. Currently, less than 10% of the 28,000 U.S. troops in South Korea are on “command-sponsored” tours that allow them to bring dependents.
According to General Bell, another 2,000 military families have moved to Korea on their own, to be with spouses or parents who are assigned there. While “non-sponsored” dependents are supposed to be barred from base facilities, the military has quietly accommodated them.
Truth is, there have always been a small number of military dependents in South Korea. In many cases, they are the Korean wives of U.S. service members, with the family support network (and language skills) to fit into the local culture and economy. A number of military members with Korean spouses volunteer for additional tours in that country, allowing their wives to remain near friends and family. It would be interesting to know how many of the 2,000 families cited by General Bell fit into that category.
From a security standpoint, we agree that the overall threat from North Korea has eased, and most Americans are now stationed well south of the DMZ. But the Land of the Morning Calm remains a dangerous place as long as Kim Jong-il holds power in Pyongyang, and his four million-man military is nothing to laugh at. And, with the rapid expansion of North Korea’s missile and WMD programs, all U.S. bases in the south are vulnerable to chemical, biological or nuclear attack.
As the Times observes, similar concerns existed in Western Europe, before the fall of the Soviet Union. But the Soviets were a more predictable adversary, and the geography provided a strategic depth that does not exist in Korea. Readers will note that neither General Bell (nor the Times) addresses the bottom-line issue for military dependents in South Korea—getting them out in the event of war.
Even in the days when there were only a handful of military families in Korea, the prospect of a Non-Essential Evacuation Operation (NEO) was daunting. Key installations—notably Youngsan Garrison in Seoul—were within range of North Korean artillery sites along the DMZ. Primary evacuation hubs, including Kimpo Airport near Seoul and Osan AB (35 miles south of the Korean capital) were also subject to enemy attack and saturation by air traffic.
Making matters worse, the close proximity of Pyongyang’s military reduces warning time for hostilities. A few years back the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) advised that warning notice for a limited North Korean thrust might be measured in hours, at best. Many NEO plans are based on advanced intel warning, allowing commanders to evacuate dependents (and other non-essential personnel) before the start of hostilities. Once the war begins, the safe evacuation of those individuals becomes a dicey proposition, particularly in a place like Korea.
That’s one more reason that General Bell’s plan strikes us as a bad idea. We fully understand his reasoning, and there’s no doubt that the troops returning from Iraq deserve more time with their families—not another “remote” assignment. But plunking down thousands of spouses and children in the middle of a potential war zone is a risky proposition, even in an era of a (slightly) diminished North Korean threat.
Besides, if the DPRK is really on its last legs--as some insist—then why should the U.S. taxpayer spend billions on infrastructure that won’t be needed 10 or 15 years down the road? The predicted demise of North Korea will, presumably, require a smaller American military presence on the Korea, one that won't require a U.S. Army division, two wings of combat aircraft, and thousands of support personnel. Moreover, plans for a large-scale, post-unification U.S. military presence in Korea—including dependents—would only stoke rising anti-Americanism in the region.
Finally, the argument for sending more military dependents to Korea seems to undercut one of the unstated benefits of the existing personnel policy. With family members back in the states, personnel on duty in South Korea could focus on the mission, maintaining the high degree of readiness needed to deter and, if necessary, repel a North Korean attack.
With more families in the ROK, commanders will have to give troops more time off and throttle back on their exercise schedules. Military members won’t complain, but at what point would concerns about family undercut training and preparation?
Commanders facing a very real North Korean threat have more important things to worry about than family housing, or the quality of the local DoDDS school. Similarly, soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines who might go into battle with minimal notice need to focus on their jobs, not worrying about how their spouses and kids will get to Kimpo—or survive a DPRK missile attack.
We have great respect for General Bell. His plan shows genuine compassion for the troops, their families and their well-being, concepts that some commanders give only lip-service. But, in our view, threat considerations and evacuation concerns still trump the idea of allowing thousands of military dependent to follow their service members to Korea. Good idea, but in the wrong place, and at the wrong time.
***
For the record, Your Humble Correspondent was a member of the Kunsan AB Class of 1992. The remote tour sucked, but I couldn’t imagine taking a wife and children to Korea, even at a base almost 200 miles from the DMZ.
The Arms Race in Space (as Reported by the NYT)
Analyzing the potential arms race in space, it’s hard to find reporting that’s more disingenuous than a piece that appeared in Sunday’s New York Times .
Written by Steve Lee Myers, the article begins (accurately enough) by outlining the potentially devastating consequences of a war in space. Debris from destroyed satellites and kill vehicles would crowd the lower reaches of space, making it virtually unusable for commercial purposes. The global economy might collapse, and our military forces—heavily-reliant on space-based systems—would face paralysis.
So, who does the Times blame for the militarization of space? If you answered the United States, give yourself a gold star and move to the head of the class:
In the weeks since an American rocket slammed into an out-of-control satellite over the Pacific Ocean, officials and experts have made it clear that the United States, for better or worse, is already committed to having the capacity to wage war in space. And that, it seems likely, will prompt others to keep pace
[snip]
Whatever Pentagon assurances there have been to the contrary, the destruction of a satellite more than 130 miles above the Pacific Ocean a week earlier, on Feb. 20, was an extraordinary display of what General Chilton had in mind — a capacity that the Pentagon under President Bush has tenaciously sought to protect and enlarge.
So, in other words, that Chinese ASAT test in January 2007—13 months before the satellite shoot-down—was an effort to keep up with the United States. We suppose the same logic also applies to a 2006 incident, when a powerful, ground-based Chinese laser tracked an American reconnaissance satellite. That episode suggested that Beijing would use the weapon to target U.S. overhead platforms in wartime.
And, Mr. Myers is quite happy to lump the recent satellite intercept in the same category as the Chinese ASAT test, despite major differences between the two events. The spysat shoot-down was, officially a “one-time” event, conducted through modifications to an existing ballistic missile defense platform. The intercept occurred at altitudes much lower than the Chinese ASAT test, which targeted a defunct weather satellite, almost 600 miles above the earth.
Transforming the U.S. system--an SM-3 surface-to-air missile--into a true satellite killer would require extensive modifications to the SAM and its naval launch platform, an AEGIS cruiser or destroyer. By comparison, the Chinese kill vehicle and laser are stand-alone ASAT systems, developed through national-level programs, funded lavishly by the Beijing government over the past decade.
While the Times admits that the 2007 Chinese event shattered a long-standing ban on ASAT testing, it was, to hear them tell, simply the PRC's attempt to match the United States. Never mind that the last U.S. ASAT test occurred in 1986, and our "official" program was shuttered after that. Or, that our reported "black" ASAT programs pale in comparison to known Chinese efforts.
As we've noted before, there is a place for serious negotiations on the militarization of space. But those talks should not follow the outline proposed by Beijing, which wants broad concessions from the U.S., while protecting its own capabilities. That's why we believe the Bush Administration should offer a broad-based treaty in the near future. The response from Beijing will determine, once and for all, if PRC leaders are serious about the demilitarization of space, or merely intent on preserving their systems. We wonder how the NYT would spin that.
Written by Steve Lee Myers, the article begins (accurately enough) by outlining the potentially devastating consequences of a war in space. Debris from destroyed satellites and kill vehicles would crowd the lower reaches of space, making it virtually unusable for commercial purposes. The global economy might collapse, and our military forces—heavily-reliant on space-based systems—would face paralysis.
So, who does the Times blame for the militarization of space? If you answered the United States, give yourself a gold star and move to the head of the class:
In the weeks since an American rocket slammed into an out-of-control satellite over the Pacific Ocean, officials and experts have made it clear that the United States, for better or worse, is already committed to having the capacity to wage war in space. And that, it seems likely, will prompt others to keep pace
[snip]
Whatever Pentagon assurances there have been to the contrary, the destruction of a satellite more than 130 miles above the Pacific Ocean a week earlier, on Feb. 20, was an extraordinary display of what General Chilton had in mind — a capacity that the Pentagon under President Bush has tenaciously sought to protect and enlarge.
So, in other words, that Chinese ASAT test in January 2007—13 months before the satellite shoot-down—was an effort to keep up with the United States. We suppose the same logic also applies to a 2006 incident, when a powerful, ground-based Chinese laser tracked an American reconnaissance satellite. That episode suggested that Beijing would use the weapon to target U.S. overhead platforms in wartime.
And, Mr. Myers is quite happy to lump the recent satellite intercept in the same category as the Chinese ASAT test, despite major differences between the two events. The spysat shoot-down was, officially a “one-time” event, conducted through modifications to an existing ballistic missile defense platform. The intercept occurred at altitudes much lower than the Chinese ASAT test, which targeted a defunct weather satellite, almost 600 miles above the earth.
Transforming the U.S. system--an SM-3 surface-to-air missile--into a true satellite killer would require extensive modifications to the SAM and its naval launch platform, an AEGIS cruiser or destroyer. By comparison, the Chinese kill vehicle and laser are stand-alone ASAT systems, developed through national-level programs, funded lavishly by the Beijing government over the past decade.
While the Times admits that the 2007 Chinese event shattered a long-standing ban on ASAT testing, it was, to hear them tell, simply the PRC's attempt to match the United States. Never mind that the last U.S. ASAT test occurred in 1986, and our "official" program was shuttered after that. Or, that our reported "black" ASAT programs pale in comparison to known Chinese efforts.
As we've noted before, there is a place for serious negotiations on the militarization of space. But those talks should not follow the outline proposed by Beijing, which wants broad concessions from the U.S., while protecting its own capabilities. That's why we believe the Bush Administration should offer a broad-based treaty in the near future. The response from Beijing will determine, once and for all, if PRC leaders are serious about the demilitarization of space, or merely intent on preserving their systems. We wonder how the NYT would spin that.
Friday, March 07, 2008
Today's Reading Assignment
..."Lessons From the General," an interview with Lieutenant General Ray Odierno, in today's New York Post. Nominated for his fourth star, Odierno recently returned from Iraq, where he served as day-to-day commander of military operations. In that role, General Odierno was responsible for implementing the surge strategy of his boss, General David Petraeus. The results of Odierno's work--and that of his troops--speak for themselves.
The general's conversation with Post columnist Ralph Peters was ride-ranging, but one particular comment caught our eye:
In the what's-new department, the Army's prospective vice chief is convinced that "We need to better understand the cyber-world piece. . . It's critical to our enemies." In that field and in our information operations, we still have to come to grips with everything from practical capabilities to laws.
It's not just about the enemy anymore. It's about the environment . . . the population, sectarian considerations, perceptions . . . or tribal politics, as in Iraq. What kind of government do you have to deal with, for example?"
As Peters indicate, General Odierno's next assignment will carry him back to the Pentagon, where he will serve as the Army's Vice Chief of Staff. After successive tours in Iraq, Odierno clearly understands the "cyber-world" piece. We hope he'll share that expertise with other military leaders--including those in blue--whose notions about "information warfare" and the blogosphere are decidedly dated.
The general's conversation with Post columnist Ralph Peters was ride-ranging, but one particular comment caught our eye:
In the what's-new department, the Army's prospective vice chief is convinced that "We need to better understand the cyber-world piece. . . It's critical to our enemies." In that field and in our information operations, we still have to come to grips with everything from practical capabilities to laws.
It's not just about the enemy anymore. It's about the environment . . . the population, sectarian considerations, perceptions . . . or tribal politics, as in Iraq. What kind of government do you have to deal with, for example?"
As Peters indicate, General Odierno's next assignment will carry him back to the Pentagon, where he will serve as the Army's Vice Chief of Staff. After successive tours in Iraq, Odierno clearly understands the "cyber-world" piece. We hope he'll share that expertise with other military leaders--including those in blue--whose notions about "information warfare" and the blogosphere are decidedly dated.
Blame McCain
Last time we checked, Senator John McCain had barely secured enough delegates to win the GOP presidential nomination. The convention is still months away, as is the general election. And, if he manages to beat his Democratic opponent, McCain won't be sworn-in as Commander-in-Chief until January of next year.
Still, it's never too early to blame a presidential contender for a problem or issue, particularly if might reverberate with the electorate. Consider this headline from today's Financial Times:
Pelosi points finger at McCain on Boeing.
In other words, the House Speaker is blaming Mr. McCain for a recent Air Force decision on a new tanker contract. That decision, announced last Friday, awarded the $40 billion contract to a U.S.-European consortium, led by Northrop-Grumman. That ended a 50-year relationship between the service and Boeing, which has provided the bulk of the USAF tanker fleet since the early 1950s.
To be fair, Ms. Pelosi has a point. Largely through the efforts of Senator McCain, an Air Force plan to lease 767 tankers from Boeing was scuttled almost five years ago. McCain was an early critic of the deal, claiming that the lease would be more expensive than buying new refueling aircraft.
His criticism of the lease plan intensified after it was discovered that Boeing offered jobs to the Air Force's senior procurement official and two of her family members. That official--Darlene Druyun--eventually went to jail on corruption charges, as did Boeing's former Chief Financial Officer.
Revelations of wrong-doing forced the Air Force to cancel the lease deal, and re-open the tanker contract for new bids. The decision announced last week represented the culmination of that process, with the USAF opting for the Northrop-Grumman entrant, which is based on the Airbus A330 airliner.
In other words, John McCain opposed the tanker lease more than five years ago, and in hindsight, his efforts to block the deal were well-founded.
But, because his opposition blocked the contract for Boeing, McCain becomes a convenient target for "outsourcing" American jobs. Along with Nancy Pelosi, other politicians are weighing in, setting their sights squarely on Senator McCain. As the AP reports:
"I hope the voters of this state remember what John McCain has done to them and their jobs," said Rep. Norm Dicks, D-Wash., whose state would have been home to the tanker program and gained about 9,000 jobs.
Having made sure that Iraq gets new schools, roads, bridges and dams that we deny America, now we are making sure that France gets the jobs that Americans used to have," said Rep. Rahm Emanuel, D-Ill. "We are sending the jobs overseas, all because John McCain demanded it."
Boeing's Republican supporters have been equally vocal in denouncing McCain:
"John McCain will be the nominee and I will support him, but if John McCain believes that Airbus or EADS is the company for our Air Force tanker program he's flat-out wrong - and I'll tell him that to his face," said Rep. Dave Reichert, R-Wash.
Rep. Todd Tiahrt, a Kansas Republican whose district includes a Boeing plant that could have gained hundreds of new jobs from the tanker program, said McCain's role in killing the earlier deal is likely to become an election issue. Both of the leading Democratic candidates for president, Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, have criticized the Air Force decision.
"I think we absolutely will hear more about it," Tiahrt said. "We'll hear it mostly from the Democrats and they have every right to be concerned."
And, speaking of Mrs. Clinton, she offered similar thoughts on the campaign trail last week. Over to you, Senator Obama.
But the Boeing issue may prove to be a double-edged sword, assuming the McCain campaign is willing to exploit it. By siding with Boeing, Pelosi, Emanuel, Dicks (and other politicians) are aligning themselves with a corrupt deal and corrupt officials. It wouldn't be very hard to create a campaign ad, juxtaposing video of Darlene Druyun in prison garb, and shots of Boeing's Democratic friends. Close with the reminder that McCain's actions (purportedly) saved the taxpayer $6 billion, by taking on "special interests." Sounds like a winner to us.
Obviously, McCain's record in defense matters is far from perfect. Still, given the tanker deal's sordid history, the Arizona Senator clearly occupies the political and moral high ground. His actions may not win friends in Boeing's executive suite, or votes in the Puget Sound region. But with a little effective counter-punching, McCain can put the Democrats (and other members of the Boeing lobby) on the defensive.
Someone ought to ask Ms. Pelosi why she supports a company that paid a record, $600-million fine for the corrupt tanker deal--and why the same firm should have the inside track for the "replacement" contract.
Still, it's never too early to blame a presidential contender for a problem or issue, particularly if might reverberate with the electorate. Consider this headline from today's Financial Times:
Pelosi points finger at McCain on Boeing.
In other words, the House Speaker is blaming Mr. McCain for a recent Air Force decision on a new tanker contract. That decision, announced last Friday, awarded the $40 billion contract to a U.S.-European consortium, led by Northrop-Grumman. That ended a 50-year relationship between the service and Boeing, which has provided the bulk of the USAF tanker fleet since the early 1950s.
To be fair, Ms. Pelosi has a point. Largely through the efforts of Senator McCain, an Air Force plan to lease 767 tankers from Boeing was scuttled almost five years ago. McCain was an early critic of the deal, claiming that the lease would be more expensive than buying new refueling aircraft.
His criticism of the lease plan intensified after it was discovered that Boeing offered jobs to the Air Force's senior procurement official and two of her family members. That official--Darlene Druyun--eventually went to jail on corruption charges, as did Boeing's former Chief Financial Officer.
Revelations of wrong-doing forced the Air Force to cancel the lease deal, and re-open the tanker contract for new bids. The decision announced last week represented the culmination of that process, with the USAF opting for the Northrop-Grumman entrant, which is based on the Airbus A330 airliner.
In other words, John McCain opposed the tanker lease more than five years ago, and in hindsight, his efforts to block the deal were well-founded.
But, because his opposition blocked the contract for Boeing, McCain becomes a convenient target for "outsourcing" American jobs. Along with Nancy Pelosi, other politicians are weighing in, setting their sights squarely on Senator McCain. As the AP reports:
"I hope the voters of this state remember what John McCain has done to them and their jobs," said Rep. Norm Dicks, D-Wash., whose state would have been home to the tanker program and gained about 9,000 jobs.
Having made sure that Iraq gets new schools, roads, bridges and dams that we deny America, now we are making sure that France gets the jobs that Americans used to have," said Rep. Rahm Emanuel, D-Ill. "We are sending the jobs overseas, all because John McCain demanded it."
Boeing's Republican supporters have been equally vocal in denouncing McCain:
"John McCain will be the nominee and I will support him, but if John McCain believes that Airbus or EADS is the company for our Air Force tanker program he's flat-out wrong - and I'll tell him that to his face," said Rep. Dave Reichert, R-Wash.
Rep. Todd Tiahrt, a Kansas Republican whose district includes a Boeing plant that could have gained hundreds of new jobs from the tanker program, said McCain's role in killing the earlier deal is likely to become an election issue. Both of the leading Democratic candidates for president, Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, have criticized the Air Force decision.
"I think we absolutely will hear more about it," Tiahrt said. "We'll hear it mostly from the Democrats and they have every right to be concerned."
And, speaking of Mrs. Clinton, she offered similar thoughts on the campaign trail last week. Over to you, Senator Obama.
But the Boeing issue may prove to be a double-edged sword, assuming the McCain campaign is willing to exploit it. By siding with Boeing, Pelosi, Emanuel, Dicks (and other politicians) are aligning themselves with a corrupt deal and corrupt officials. It wouldn't be very hard to create a campaign ad, juxtaposing video of Darlene Druyun in prison garb, and shots of Boeing's Democratic friends. Close with the reminder that McCain's actions (purportedly) saved the taxpayer $6 billion, by taking on "special interests." Sounds like a winner to us.
Obviously, McCain's record in defense matters is far from perfect. Still, given the tanker deal's sordid history, the Arizona Senator clearly occupies the political and moral high ground. His actions may not win friends in Boeing's executive suite, or votes in the Puget Sound region. But with a little effective counter-punching, McCain can put the Democrats (and other members of the Boeing lobby) on the defensive.
Someone ought to ask Ms. Pelosi why she supports a company that paid a record, $600-million fine for the corrupt tanker deal--and why the same firm should have the inside track for the "replacement" contract.
Over There and Gone Forever, Redux
President Bush and Frank Buckles, the nation's only surviving World War I veteran, at the White House on Thursday (AP Photo via Air Force Times)
The a man believed to be the nation’s only surviving soldier from World War I paid a visit to the White House yesterday. President Bush warmly greeted 107-year-old Frank Buckles, who lied about his age to enlist in the Army in 1917. As the Mr. Bush told reporters during a brief photo op:
“Mr. Buckles’ mind is sharp, his memory is crisp, and he’s been sharing with me some interesting anecdotes,” Bush said in the Oval Office. Buckles, in a wheelchair to Bush’s right, sat quietly with his hands clasped as the president spoke during a short photo opportunity.
Bush said that before reporters came into the room, Buckles had recalled chatting with Gen. John J. Pershing, a legendary figure from World War I.
[snip]
“Mr. Buckles has a vivid recollection of historic times,” Bush said. “And one way for me to honor the service of those who wear the uniform in the past and those who wear it today is to herald you, sir, and to thank you very much for your patriotism and your love for America.”
As we’ve noted in the past, Frank Buckles has led a remarkable life. While he never saw combat in the Great War, Buckles endured extreme hardship during World War II. Working as the manager of a steamship company office in Manila, Buckles was captured when Japanese overran the Philippines. He spent three years in a POW camp before being liberated by American troops in 1945.
As the last, surviving link to a generation that saved Europe 90 years ago, Mr. Buckles’ is certainly deserving of the recognition he’s received. Call it an overdue acknowledgement of the service by millions who wore the uniform during World War I.
They came home to a few parades—and a large measure of indifference. There were no education benefits for returning veterans, promises of health care, or guaranteed home loans. Doughboys like Frank Buckles quickly faded into civilian life. A last appreciation for their accomplishments didn’t come until much later, when the last of them began to pass on.
Among the major conflicts of the 20th Century, World War I is the only one without a national memorial. The closest thing you’ll find in the nation’s capital is the District of Columbia memorial, a Peristyle Doric Temple that honors local residents who served in the “War to End All Wars.”
Bounded by the Capitol ground on the east, Independence Avenue on the South, 15th Street on the West, and Constitution Avenue on the north, the D.C. memorial is both modest and remarkable, one of the first to list all district residents who lost their lives in the war, regardless of race or gender.
In 2003, the Washington, D.C. Preservation League added the World War I Memorial to its list of “Most Endangered” places. It made the list again three years later. According to preservationists, the memorial has suffered from years of neglect--a problem compounded by a running debate over who was responsible for the memorial. A records check finally determined that the National Park Service (NPS) was responsible for World War I Memorial.
Unfortunately, the NPS has done little to preserve or restore the structure. There’s no signage to explain the memorial and the lighting is poor. Money that could be used to repair the monument is reserved for the larger (and better known) memorials that line the National Mall.
Just a short walk from where President Bush met with Frank Buckles, the D.C. World War I Memorial is following the fate of those it honors. Almost a century after the conflict it commerrates, and 77 years after its dedication, the World War I Memorial is fading into disrepair and obscurity, with little thought of the sacrifice it represents.
Frank Buckles—and the rest of that all-but-lost generation—deserve better.
Thursday, March 06, 2008
Look Ma, No Chutes
No jumping, please. The USAF plans to eliminate parachutes for tanker crews.
Air Force Times reports that the service has figured out a new way to save money--get rid of parachutes carried on KC-135 tankers.
According to a press release cited by the paper, "the likelihood a KC-135 crew member would ever need to use a parachute is extremely low." The parachutes cost too much — in acquisition, maintenance and training — to make up for their relative uselessness on Stratotankers, according to the news release. Inspecting parachutes before flights is also extremely time-consuming, the Air Force claims.
Quite frankly, I think the idea makes a lot of sense. As one boom operator observed, if the aircraft is controllable, the crew isn't going to bail out. If it's out-of-control, the odds of reaching your chute, snapping it on and getting out the door are well...practically non-existent.
During my own days as a crew dog, I flew on a battle management platform. Our crew capsule was mounted in the cargo bay of a modified C-130. With a full battle staff, we had up to 15 people inside the capsule, which was also crammed with communications equipment, computer displays, seats and personal gear.
Saying it was a bit crowded in the back end of our aircraft would be an understatement. Still, our accommodations were almost spacious compared to other platforms. During a mission over Bosnia, we had an RAF warrant officer fly along with us. He was a linguist on a Nimrod SIGINT aircraft. As he described it, the crew compartment of his aircraft was crammed with kit, and an average of 25 linguists, EWOs and ELINT operators.
While the Air Force thoughtfully provided parachutes for our C-130s, bailing out would have required a Bolshoi-like ballet. Imagine coordinating the movements of 15 crew members; everyone had to stand up, grab the chute (from beneath their console), strap it on; line up, de-pressurize the aircraft, open the capsule and parachute doors, and then bail out.
By the time that happened, we figured, the plane would have crashed, or we could make an emergency landing. The same logic applies to a KC-135. Retire the chutes and save a little weight and money. If nothing else, the life support troops will be happy.
Besides, at one time it was considered poor form to jump out of a stricken aircraft. If it was good enough for Frank Luke and Eddie Rickenbacker, it ought to be good enough for today's Air Force. Live in fame or go down in flames. Literally.
***
One thing we don't understand about the Air Force press release is the reference to "harnesses that will secure them to the airplane" when they're in danger of falling out. In our experience, the only time a tanker crew would face that risk is loading or off-loading cargo. And, as we noted in a recent post, the cargo-hauling mission of our tanker fleet is often over-stated.
Giving it Away On-Line?—Dissecting an OPSEC Case Study
A recent Air Force briefing suggests that an on-line forum revealed extensive information about the F-22 fighter, but much of the data was already in the public arena. Was it a violation of Operational Security (OPSEC)--or simply a veiled effort to discourage internet activity by military personnel?
Part II of II
By Nate Hale
In December 2007, a "vigilant witness" approached members of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), the service’s clandestine investigative service. The "witness"—an AFOSI term for a confidential informant—voiced concerns about suspicious information regarding the F-22 stealth fighter, posted at a popular on-line forum about military and civilian aircraft.
The tip eventually mushroomed into an OSI inquiry. Monitoring the website—and its participants—government agents found literally hundreds of posts about the F-22, the Air Force’s newest fighter jet which incorporates sensitive, state-of-the art technology. By one estimate, posts on the stealth jet attracted new users to the forum, and generated almost 70,000 page views.
More disturbingly, the probe revealed that many of the posts had been written by an Air Force F-22 pilot. For more than 18 months, the pilot (who used the handle dozerf22) shared information about his aircraft and responded to on-line queries. That raised concerns about a potential breach of operations security (OPSEC), through the disclosure of sensitive data in a public forum—in this case, a website that could be easily accessed by potential adversaries, anxious to learn more about the F-22.
Concerns about the possible, on-line disclosure of critical data were recently summarized in an OPSEC case study, reportedly produced by the AFOSI, the Navy’s Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security.
According to a PowerPoint briefing based on their analysis, "Dozer’s" various postings provided a wealth of information on issues relating to the F-22, including aircraft "lot" numbers at different bases; the function of specific doors and flaps on the fifth-generation fighter; fuel loads and their impact on performance, the status of radar upgrades, and operational details about the jet’s weapons systems. A copy of the briefing--which is unclassified--was obtained by this blog.
But the study fails to address an essential question; how much of the information discussed by the F-22 pilot—and other forum participants—was already in the public domain, provided through press releases and media coverage, or through on-line comments on other web sites?
The answer to that question is surprising, and suggests that OPSEC concerns raised by the assessment may be overstated. Using search engines available to anyone the internet, In From the Cold found scores of references to the F-22, covering many of the topics addressed by Dozer at the aircraft site he frequented. That "discovery" tends to confirm something suggested by the various queries cited in the OPSEC study. Based on the tone and phrasing of their questions, any foreign "spies" on the forum were looking for confirmation of already-available information.
Consider a question about the Raptor’s lack of a Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS), which slaves the aircraft’s weapons to the pilot’s line of sight. The Air Force’s decision to forego this capability in the F-22 has been discussed publicly for more than eight years, and Aviation Week’s Bill Sweetman provided an update on the issue last June:
Most fighters today are available with a high off-boresight missile and its essential complement, a helmet-mounted display (HMD) to point it accurately at its intended victim. Big exception: the air-dominance F-22 Raptor. Plans to put the USAF-standard Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS) on the Raptor were deferred some years ago, the intention being to use the JSF's bug-eyed helmet instead, but there is still no firm timetable for either that or the AIM-9X missile, leaving the F-22 as the only fighter limited to the old AIM-9M. Program executive vice-president and general manager Larry Lawson defers the question to the air force.
The most logical answer is that there is only so much money and only so many test assets available and that the USAF's priorities are elsewhere. Just getting under way are development tests of the GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb, which quadruples the fighter's count of air-to-ground weapons and - launched a t high altitude and supersonic speed - gives it a 60-mile standoff range. Weapon releases are due late in 2008 and the SDB should enter service on the F-22 in 2010.
Similarly, another Aviation Week piece—from January 2007--detailed the F-22’s ability to locate mobile ground targets and share information with other platforms. The article was based on the fighter’s first deployment outside the CONUS--to a major exercise in Alaska. Aviation Week writers David A. Fulghum and Michael J. Fabey were invited to watch the exercise, and they interviewed a number of participants. From their report:
The F-22's advanced electronic surveillance sensors also provided additional awareness of ground activity.
"I could talk to an EA-6B Prowler electronic attack crew and tell them where a surface-to-air missile site was active so they would immediately know where to point their electronic warfare sensors," Tolliver says. "That decreased their targeting time line considerably."
In addition, the F-22 can use its electronic surveillance capabilities to conduct precision bombing strikes on emitters--a capability called destruction of enemy air defenses.
"And future editions of the F-22 are predicted to have to have their own electronic attack capability so that we'll be able to suppress or nonkinetically kill a site like that," he says.
The same account described the Raptor’s impressive abilities in air-to-air combat, providing details sought by questioners on the aviation forum:
The F-22 is proving it's a dogfighter after all.
While it wasn't part of a hard-turning furball, an F-22--with its Amraams and Sidewinders expended--slipped into visual range behind an F-16 and undetected made a simulated kill with its cannon during the stealth fighter's first large-scale exercise and deployment outside the continental U.S.
Those and other revelations about the F-22's emerging capabilities are increasingly important as the first combat unit, the U.S. Air Force's 27th Fighter Sqdn., begins its initial Air Expeditionary Force deployment this month to an undisclosed site. And the first F-22 unit, the 94th Fighter Sqdn., will participate in Red Flag in February.
The gun kill is a capability Air Force planners hope their F-22s won't use. The fighter is designed to destroy a foe well beyond his visual and radar range. Within visual-range combat and, in particular, gun kills are anachronisms. In amassing 144 kills to no losses during the first week of the joint-service Northern Edge exercise in Alaska last summer, only three air-to-air "kills" were in the visual arena--two involving AIM-9 Sidewinders and one the F-22's cannon.
[snip]
With its high-resolution radar, the F-22 can guarantee target altitudes to within a couple of hundred feet. Its ability to identify an aircraft is "sometimes many times quicker than the AWACS," he says. "It was a combination of high-resolution sensors and being closer to the targets."
The F-22's radar range is described only as being more than 100 mi. However, it's thought to be closer to 125-150 mi., which is much farther than the standard F-15's 56-mi. radar range. New, active electronically scanned radar technology--optimized for digital throughput--is expected to soon push next-generation radar ranges, in narrow beams, out to 250 mi. or more.
[snip]
In Alaska, because the F-22 remained far forward at high altitude, with an advanced radar it could monitor rescue missions that the AWACS 150 mi. away could not. "We could see the helicopters down in the valleys and protect them," Tolliver says.
In addition to AWACS, the F-22 also can feed data to the RC-135 Rivet Joint signals intelligence aircraft to improve situational awareness of the battlespace.
"If a Rivet Joint is trying to get triangulation [on a precise emitter location], he can get more [voice] information" from an F-22, Keys says. "If an AWACS sees a heavy group 40 mi. to the north, Raptor can come up and say it's two F-18s, two F-15s and four F-16s."
It also proved easy to find information on another forum topic—Dozer’s planned move to a new assignment. In June 2006, an Air Force press release identified him as the commander of the "Ready Elmendorf" detachment, who would command the first F-22 squadron at the Alaskan base.
There were also multiple references to aircraft tail numbers and production lots—two other bits of sensitive information identified in the OPSEC study. A Lockheed-Martin media release from March 2002 listed the tail numbers and delivery location for aircraft in Production Lot 3. The highly popular defense site GlobalSecurity.org has even more information the F-22 production schedule, including the number of aircraft in each lot.
With that information—and a January, 2007 entry from defense-update.org, it was possible to calculate the introduction of Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars in the F-22 fleet, and the number of aircraft with that capability. Those sources—and others—were the first to report what Dozer later confirmed; incorporation of AESA technology in the Raptor began with Lot 5 jets.
Google and Yahoo searches also turned up substantial reporting—and speculation—about reported training between the Raptor and Royal Air Force Eurofighter Typhoons. According to various accounts, the Typhoons deployed to Nellis AFB, Nevada in 2005, and participated in mock dogfights with the F-22, with (supposedly) surprising results. Aviation Week provided a summary of the event in its October 3, 2005 issue:
Unconfirmed reports--that is, rumors-- making the rounds in European aerospace industry circles contend that Royal Air Force Eurofighter Typhoons, temporarily operating from Nellis AFB, Nev., were able to pick up U.S. Air Force F/A-22s on their radars, stealth notwithstanding. Similar reports appeared during the 1991 Iraq war concerning the ability of British ships, using large radar arrays, to detect the F-117 and, in later conflicts, the B-2. U.S. officials confirm that the Typhoons were at Nellis to fly with the 422nd Test & Evaluation Sqdn. However, they discount that the Typhoons had seen an F/A-22 in full-configuration stealth. First, they say, the Typhoons and F/A-22s were never in the air at the same time. Second, the F/A-22s always have an enhanced signature for positive air control, except when they go to war or when the range has been cleared for F/A-22-only operations"
Other unclassified sources offered details on the Raptor’s supercruise abilities. Then-Air Force Chief of Staff General John Jumper alluded to the jet’s performance after a 2005 flight:
"Today I flew the Raptor at speeds exceeding (Mach 1.7) without afterburners," General Jumper said. "To be able to go that fast without afterburners means that nobody can get you in their sights or get a lock-on. The aircraft’s impressive stealth capability, combined with its super cruise (capability), will give any adversary a very hard time."
An F-22 pilot at Langley AFB, Virginia was even more revealing. As he told Defense Daily in February of last year:
Raptor pilots are cleared to fly the aircraft up to Mach 2.0 and altitudes up to 50,000 feet, he said.
"To be able to operate at those altitudes at milpower is not something I am used to in an Eagle," he said.
This combination of speed and altitude offers advantages when firing one of the F-22's complement of air-to-air missiles, such as Raytheon's [RTN] AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM), against an opponent, he said.
"If I am at 50,000 feet and going Mach 2, that AMRAAM loves that. It will go forever and it will give [the missile] increased endgame energy," he said.
Other open-source publications suggest that the Raptor can operate at altitudes approaching 65,000 feet.
For virtually every example cited by the OPSEC study, it was possible—with only a little effort—to find other sources that provided as much (if not more) information on questions addressed by the F-22 pilot in the on-line forum.
And, that doesn’t account for intelligence gathering by our adversaries. In some cases (say Dozer’s comments about F-22s pulling alert at Langley), such claims could be confirmed by spy satellites, which could spot aircraft configured for alert duty.
The same holds true for assessments on the Raptor’s various external features. The aircraft has appeared at numerous airshows that are open to the public, with ample opportunities for close-up photography. U.S. intelligence agencies have devoted considerable resources to such collection efforts in the past; there is no reason to believe that our adversaries don’t engage in similar efforts, using hand-held photos, along with classified data, to determine the capabilities and performance features of American aircraft.
So, if much of the information discussed by Dozer on-line was already available in other sources, why did four government agencies devote considerable time (and effort) to their OPSEC study?
For one thing, it’s their job. Ferreting out security threats in cyberspace represents a growth industry, particularly for organizations like the AFOSI and NCIS. The F-22 incident could be used to justify greater on-line surveillance of military personnel and IT systems—and the budgets needed to support that mission.
Secondly, there is little doubt that web sites, chat rooms and discussion boards represent a security risk. Sometimes, the simple confirmation of a bit of data can save time and money for hostile intelligence powers, or allow them to focus collection on higher-priority targets. "Waaay too many spies on this forum," observed one poster, questioning the disclosure of F-22 information on the discussion board.
But the Raptor case also highlights the conundrum facing the Air Force and other military organizations in the information age. While the service can limit or block internet access on its own systems, personnel can still access—and participate--in blogs, chat rooms, message boards and other forums from computers at home, in libraries or other locations.
Faced with that reality, the USAF has imposed even tighter information restrictions. Last month, the service began blocking virtually all websites with "blog" or "blogspot" in their URL. The service maintains that blogs are not legitimate news outlets, and shouldn’t be available to airmen at work.
By comparison, the U.S. Army takes a slightly more liberal approach, allowing soldiers to blog, but mandating that commanders approve their posts before publication. However, the Army has also banned access to many blogs and other websites through its computer systems.
While the military has long maintained that individual blogs and other internet venues pose a security risk, that claim runs counter to the Pentagon’s own data. Last August, Noah Shachtman of the defense site The Danger Room published results of an Army OPSEC audit, which revealed that official military sites pose a far greater security threat than blogs:
The audits, performed by the Army Web Risk Assessment Cell between January 2006 and January 2007, found at least 1,813 violations of operational security policy on 878 official military websites. In contrast, the 10-man, Manassas, Virginia, unit discovered 28 breaches, at most, on 594 individual blogs during the same period.
The results were obtained by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, after the digital rights group filed a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act.
Against that backdrop, opponents argue, the military needs a more coherent policy on internet activity and information sharing. As illustrated by the case of the F-22 pilot, members of the armed forces will inevitably find a way to blog, or share their thoughts on-line, regardless of "official restrictions" or other forms of discouragement.
Rather than trying to deflect the information tsunami, critics say it might be easier for the military to set realistic guidelines for on-line activity, and train personnel to required standards.
Part II of II
By Nate Hale
In December 2007, a "vigilant witness" approached members of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), the service’s clandestine investigative service. The "witness"—an AFOSI term for a confidential informant—voiced concerns about suspicious information regarding the F-22 stealth fighter, posted at a popular on-line forum about military and civilian aircraft.
The tip eventually mushroomed into an OSI inquiry. Monitoring the website—and its participants—government agents found literally hundreds of posts about the F-22, the Air Force’s newest fighter jet which incorporates sensitive, state-of-the art technology. By one estimate, posts on the stealth jet attracted new users to the forum, and generated almost 70,000 page views.
More disturbingly, the probe revealed that many of the posts had been written by an Air Force F-22 pilot. For more than 18 months, the pilot (who used the handle dozerf22) shared information about his aircraft and responded to on-line queries. That raised concerns about a potential breach of operations security (OPSEC), through the disclosure of sensitive data in a public forum—in this case, a website that could be easily accessed by potential adversaries, anxious to learn more about the F-22.
Concerns about the possible, on-line disclosure of critical data were recently summarized in an OPSEC case study, reportedly produced by the AFOSI, the Navy’s Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security.
According to a PowerPoint briefing based on their analysis, "Dozer’s" various postings provided a wealth of information on issues relating to the F-22, including aircraft "lot" numbers at different bases; the function of specific doors and flaps on the fifth-generation fighter; fuel loads and their impact on performance, the status of radar upgrades, and operational details about the jet’s weapons systems. A copy of the briefing--which is unclassified--was obtained by this blog.
But the study fails to address an essential question; how much of the information discussed by the F-22 pilot—and other forum participants—was already in the public domain, provided through press releases and media coverage, or through on-line comments on other web sites?
The answer to that question is surprising, and suggests that OPSEC concerns raised by the assessment may be overstated. Using search engines available to anyone the internet, In From the Cold found scores of references to the F-22, covering many of the topics addressed by Dozer at the aircraft site he frequented. That "discovery" tends to confirm something suggested by the various queries cited in the OPSEC study. Based on the tone and phrasing of their questions, any foreign "spies" on the forum were looking for confirmation of already-available information.
Consider a question about the Raptor’s lack of a Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS), which slaves the aircraft’s weapons to the pilot’s line of sight. The Air Force’s decision to forego this capability in the F-22 has been discussed publicly for more than eight years, and Aviation Week’s Bill Sweetman provided an update on the issue last June:
Most fighters today are available with a high off-boresight missile and its essential complement, a helmet-mounted display (HMD) to point it accurately at its intended victim. Big exception: the air-dominance F-22 Raptor. Plans to put the USAF-standard Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS) on the Raptor were deferred some years ago, the intention being to use the JSF's bug-eyed helmet instead, but there is still no firm timetable for either that or the AIM-9X missile, leaving the F-22 as the only fighter limited to the old AIM-9M. Program executive vice-president and general manager Larry Lawson defers the question to the air force.
The most logical answer is that there is only so much money and only so many test assets available and that the USAF's priorities are elsewhere. Just getting under way are development tests of the GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb, which quadruples the fighter's count of air-to-ground weapons and - launched a t high altitude and supersonic speed - gives it a 60-mile standoff range. Weapon releases are due late in 2008 and the SDB should enter service on the F-22 in 2010.
Similarly, another Aviation Week piece—from January 2007--detailed the F-22’s ability to locate mobile ground targets and share information with other platforms. The article was based on the fighter’s first deployment outside the CONUS--to a major exercise in Alaska. Aviation Week writers David A. Fulghum and Michael J. Fabey were invited to watch the exercise, and they interviewed a number of participants. From their report:
The F-22's advanced electronic surveillance sensors also provided additional awareness of ground activity.
"I could talk to an EA-6B Prowler electronic attack crew and tell them where a surface-to-air missile site was active so they would immediately know where to point their electronic warfare sensors," Tolliver says. "That decreased their targeting time line considerably."
In addition, the F-22 can use its electronic surveillance capabilities to conduct precision bombing strikes on emitters--a capability called destruction of enemy air defenses.
"And future editions of the F-22 are predicted to have to have their own electronic attack capability so that we'll be able to suppress or nonkinetically kill a site like that," he says.
The same account described the Raptor’s impressive abilities in air-to-air combat, providing details sought by questioners on the aviation forum:
The F-22 is proving it's a dogfighter after all.
While it wasn't part of a hard-turning furball, an F-22--with its Amraams and Sidewinders expended--slipped into visual range behind an F-16 and undetected made a simulated kill with its cannon during the stealth fighter's first large-scale exercise and deployment outside the continental U.S.
Those and other revelations about the F-22's emerging capabilities are increasingly important as the first combat unit, the U.S. Air Force's 27th Fighter Sqdn., begins its initial Air Expeditionary Force deployment this month to an undisclosed site. And the first F-22 unit, the 94th Fighter Sqdn., will participate in Red Flag in February.
The gun kill is a capability Air Force planners hope their F-22s won't use. The fighter is designed to destroy a foe well beyond his visual and radar range. Within visual-range combat and, in particular, gun kills are anachronisms. In amassing 144 kills to no losses during the first week of the joint-service Northern Edge exercise in Alaska last summer, only three air-to-air "kills" were in the visual arena--two involving AIM-9 Sidewinders and one the F-22's cannon.
[snip]
With its high-resolution radar, the F-22 can guarantee target altitudes to within a couple of hundred feet. Its ability to identify an aircraft is "sometimes many times quicker than the AWACS," he says. "It was a combination of high-resolution sensors and being closer to the targets."
The F-22's radar range is described only as being more than 100 mi. However, it's thought to be closer to 125-150 mi., which is much farther than the standard F-15's 56-mi. radar range. New, active electronically scanned radar technology--optimized for digital throughput--is expected to soon push next-generation radar ranges, in narrow beams, out to 250 mi. or more.
[snip]
In Alaska, because the F-22 remained far forward at high altitude, with an advanced radar it could monitor rescue missions that the AWACS 150 mi. away could not. "We could see the helicopters down in the valleys and protect them," Tolliver says.
In addition to AWACS, the F-22 also can feed data to the RC-135 Rivet Joint signals intelligence aircraft to improve situational awareness of the battlespace.
"If a Rivet Joint is trying to get triangulation [on a precise emitter location], he can get more [voice] information" from an F-22, Keys says. "If an AWACS sees a heavy group 40 mi. to the north, Raptor can come up and say it's two F-18s, two F-15s and four F-16s."
It also proved easy to find information on another forum topic—Dozer’s planned move to a new assignment. In June 2006, an Air Force press release identified him as the commander of the "Ready Elmendorf" detachment, who would command the first F-22 squadron at the Alaskan base.
There were also multiple references to aircraft tail numbers and production lots—two other bits of sensitive information identified in the OPSEC study. A Lockheed-Martin media release from March 2002 listed the tail numbers and delivery location for aircraft in Production Lot 3. The highly popular defense site GlobalSecurity.org has even more information the F-22 production schedule, including the number of aircraft in each lot.
With that information—and a January, 2007 entry from defense-update.org, it was possible to calculate the introduction of Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars in the F-22 fleet, and the number of aircraft with that capability. Those sources—and others—were the first to report what Dozer later confirmed; incorporation of AESA technology in the Raptor began with Lot 5 jets.
Google and Yahoo searches also turned up substantial reporting—and speculation—about reported training between the Raptor and Royal Air Force Eurofighter Typhoons. According to various accounts, the Typhoons deployed to Nellis AFB, Nevada in 2005, and participated in mock dogfights with the F-22, with (supposedly) surprising results. Aviation Week provided a summary of the event in its October 3, 2005 issue:
Unconfirmed reports--that is, rumors-- making the rounds in European aerospace industry circles contend that Royal Air Force Eurofighter Typhoons, temporarily operating from Nellis AFB, Nev., were able to pick up U.S. Air Force F/A-22s on their radars, stealth notwithstanding. Similar reports appeared during the 1991 Iraq war concerning the ability of British ships, using large radar arrays, to detect the F-117 and, in later conflicts, the B-2. U.S. officials confirm that the Typhoons were at Nellis to fly with the 422nd Test & Evaluation Sqdn. However, they discount that the Typhoons had seen an F/A-22 in full-configuration stealth. First, they say, the Typhoons and F/A-22s were never in the air at the same time. Second, the F/A-22s always have an enhanced signature for positive air control, except when they go to war or when the range has been cleared for F/A-22-only operations"
Other unclassified sources offered details on the Raptor’s supercruise abilities. Then-Air Force Chief of Staff General John Jumper alluded to the jet’s performance after a 2005 flight:
"Today I flew the Raptor at speeds exceeding (Mach 1.7) without afterburners," General Jumper said. "To be able to go that fast without afterburners means that nobody can get you in their sights or get a lock-on. The aircraft’s impressive stealth capability, combined with its super cruise (capability), will give any adversary a very hard time."
An F-22 pilot at Langley AFB, Virginia was even more revealing. As he told Defense Daily in February of last year:
Raptor pilots are cleared to fly the aircraft up to Mach 2.0 and altitudes up to 50,000 feet, he said.
"To be able to operate at those altitudes at milpower is not something I am used to in an Eagle," he said.
This combination of speed and altitude offers advantages when firing one of the F-22's complement of air-to-air missiles, such as Raytheon's [RTN] AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM), against an opponent, he said.
"If I am at 50,000 feet and going Mach 2, that AMRAAM loves that. It will go forever and it will give [the missile] increased endgame energy," he said.
Other open-source publications suggest that the Raptor can operate at altitudes approaching 65,000 feet.
For virtually every example cited by the OPSEC study, it was possible—with only a little effort—to find other sources that provided as much (if not more) information on questions addressed by the F-22 pilot in the on-line forum.
And, that doesn’t account for intelligence gathering by our adversaries. In some cases (say Dozer’s comments about F-22s pulling alert at Langley), such claims could be confirmed by spy satellites, which could spot aircraft configured for alert duty.
The same holds true for assessments on the Raptor’s various external features. The aircraft has appeared at numerous airshows that are open to the public, with ample opportunities for close-up photography. U.S. intelligence agencies have devoted considerable resources to such collection efforts in the past; there is no reason to believe that our adversaries don’t engage in similar efforts, using hand-held photos, along with classified data, to determine the capabilities and performance features of American aircraft.
So, if much of the information discussed by Dozer on-line was already available in other sources, why did four government agencies devote considerable time (and effort) to their OPSEC study?
For one thing, it’s their job. Ferreting out security threats in cyberspace represents a growth industry, particularly for organizations like the AFOSI and NCIS. The F-22 incident could be used to justify greater on-line surveillance of military personnel and IT systems—and the budgets needed to support that mission.
Secondly, there is little doubt that web sites, chat rooms and discussion boards represent a security risk. Sometimes, the simple confirmation of a bit of data can save time and money for hostile intelligence powers, or allow them to focus collection on higher-priority targets. "Waaay too many spies on this forum," observed one poster, questioning the disclosure of F-22 information on the discussion board.
But the Raptor case also highlights the conundrum facing the Air Force and other military organizations in the information age. While the service can limit or block internet access on its own systems, personnel can still access—and participate--in blogs, chat rooms, message boards and other forums from computers at home, in libraries or other locations.
Faced with that reality, the USAF has imposed even tighter information restrictions. Last month, the service began blocking virtually all websites with "blog" or "blogspot" in their URL. The service maintains that blogs are not legitimate news outlets, and shouldn’t be available to airmen at work.
By comparison, the U.S. Army takes a slightly more liberal approach, allowing soldiers to blog, but mandating that commanders approve their posts before publication. However, the Army has also banned access to many blogs and other websites through its computer systems.
While the military has long maintained that individual blogs and other internet venues pose a security risk, that claim runs counter to the Pentagon’s own data. Last August, Noah Shachtman of the defense site The Danger Room published results of an Army OPSEC audit, which revealed that official military sites pose a far greater security threat than blogs:
The audits, performed by the Army Web Risk Assessment Cell between January 2006 and January 2007, found at least 1,813 violations of operational security policy on 878 official military websites. In contrast, the 10-man, Manassas, Virginia, unit discovered 28 breaches, at most, on 594 individual blogs during the same period.
The results were obtained by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, after the digital rights group filed a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act.
Against that backdrop, opponents argue, the military needs a more coherent policy on internet activity and information sharing. As illustrated by the case of the F-22 pilot, members of the armed forces will inevitably find a way to blog, or share their thoughts on-line, regardless of "official restrictions" or other forms of discouragement.
Rather than trying to deflect the information tsunami, critics say it might be easier for the military to set realistic guidelines for on-line activity, and train personnel to required standards.
Wednesday, March 05, 2008
Giving it Away On-Line?—Dissecting an OPSEC Case Study
The F-22 Raptor in flight. Did a veteran fighter pilot disclose sensitive data about the Air Force's newest fighter, or simply discuss information that was already available in the public domain?
Part I of II
By Nate Hale
Part I of II
By Nate Hale
Asked to justify restrictions on certain forms of internet activity by military personnel—on government computers—DoD officials invariably cite concerns about operations security (OPSEC). In an increasingly wired world, the Pentagon is worried that adversaries can glean sensitive or even classified information from blogs, chat rooms and other on-line forums.
Noah Shachtman (who runs the widely-read defense blog, The Danger Room) has written extensively about this issue; his most recent post on the topic (which contains quotes from this blogger) can be found here. Mr. Shachtman’s reporting confirms what many already suspect; the Air Force—and other military organizations--see little value in blogs, and are moving aggressively to limit access through its IT network:
"The Air Force is tightening restrictions on which blogs its troops can read, cutting off access to just about any independent site with the word "blog" in its web address. It's the latest move in a larger struggle within the military over the value -- and hazards -- of the sites. At least one senior Air Force official calls the squeeze so "utterly stupid, it makes me want to scream."
And sure enough, retired Air Force Colonel Tom Ehrhard (now a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments) invoked the OPSEC issue in defending the crackdown. As he told Noah Shachtman:
"It is increasingly clear that active exploitation could take advantage of airmen and civilians who want to inform and correct the often outrageous, false assertions on these blogs. In doing so, it is easy for well-meaning insiders to violate operational security (OPSEC) tenets, either directly or tangentially. We are in a different world today when it comes to sensitive military information, and foreign intelligence operatives surely understand this and will exploit it. As a former member of Strategic Air Command, where OPSEC was (rightly) an obsession, this has been obvious to me for some time in reading aerospace-oriented blogs. This policy strikes me as a timely reminder to Air Force professionals that they should be on guard when blogging, because someone is watching."
Underscoring the potential threat, the Air Force is now circulating a PowerPoint presentation entitled “CyberOPSEC: An F-22 Case Study,” detailing information about the service’s state of the art fighter that appeared “on a popular public website about military and civilian aircraft.” Apparently, the source for much of the data was a Raptor pilot, who posted under the handle “dozerF22.” A copy of the briefing was obtained by In From the Cold.
The implication of the study--reportedly compiled by the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), the Navy’s Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security—is clear. By participating in the forum, answering questions about the F-22 and providing personal information, “Dozer” displayed questionable judgment and might have disclosed valuable information about the nation’s newest stealth fighter. The referenced assessment is “Unclassified/Open Source,” so discussion in public forums does not betray any classified or sensitive information.
Discovering Dozer’s identity wasn’t very difficult, according to the presentation. The pilot’s public profile listed both his name and military e-mail address. And, if that weren’t enough, another poster on the forum quickly testified to Dozer’s reputation as a fighter jock:
Discovering Dozer’s identity wasn’t very difficult, according to the presentation. The pilot’s public profile listed both his name and military e-mail address. And, if that weren’t enough, another poster on the forum quickly testified to Dozer’s reputation as a fighter jock:
"For those who don't know, Dozer is one heck of a fighter pilot.
Then-Capt Dozer, a flight leader with the 'Grim Reapers' of the 493rd FS RAF Lakenheath, UK, on night one of Operation Allied Force led a package of four F-15Cs and four F-16CJs protecting the first wave of F-117A Night Hawks flying over Serbia. Engaging a charging MiG, he launched missiles through the formation of F-117s, ending in the MiG exploding about 1,000 feet off the nose of one of the Night Hawks. The pilot ejected safely out of the MiG-29 fireball.
Dozer encountered some more MiGs later in the conflict and scrambled the night the F-117A, callsign Vega31, Col Zelko, was shot down and rescued (More details and Dozer's photo in the hard-to-find book "Stealth Down," by Ross Simpson).
An honor to be able to chat with a pilot that has been there and done that.
Kevin
Aero-engineer
The pilot’s on-line profile also included his picture in a flight suit (name and rank clearly visible), with an F-22 in the background.
Over the months that followed, postings by Dozer and other forum participants attracted quite an audience, according to the OPSEC analysis. The board’s F-22 discussion logged over 700 posts, which were read more than 68,000 times. New users “came out of the woodwork,” the study claims, creating new accounts and posting questions for the F-22 pilot. The queries covered a broad range of technical, tactical and performance issues for the Raptor. Some sample questions:
· “That rocks…so is a JHMCS (Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing System) or equivalent going to be included in the upgrades along with the AIM-9X (air-to-air missile)?
· “With the upgraded air to ground capabilities, will this allow the Raptor to attack mobile/moving targets in addition to autonomously identifying ground targets?“
· “What are your opinions regarding the effectiveness of the 20mm cannon on the F-22?”
· “It has been said that 2-3 RAF Eurofighters have been sent to Nellis AFB for testing and training…might you confirm this information and tell us some details about the result of Raptor versus Typhoon up to now?
· “You mentioned you are moving up north. Where are you heading?”
· "It is said that Raptor nowadays can supercruise with the speed of around Mach 2. Could you make a confirmation or comment for this declaration?”
· “I just want to know if that was the fastest pitch the Raptor can achieve?”
· “If the Raptor was to carry external stores would it loose its ability to supercruise straight away?”
· “With the upgraded air to ground capabilities, will this allow the Raptor to attack mobile/moving targets in addition to autonomously identifying ground targets?“
· “What are your opinions regarding the effectiveness of the 20mm cannon on the F-22?”
· “It has been said that 2-3 RAF Eurofighters have been sent to Nellis AFB for testing and training…might you confirm this information and tell us some details about the result of Raptor versus Typhoon up to now?
· “You mentioned you are moving up north. Where are you heading?”
· "It is said that Raptor nowadays can supercruise with the speed of around Mach 2. Could you make a confirmation or comment for this declaration?”
· “I just want to know if that was the fastest pitch the Raptor can achieve?”
· “If the Raptor was to carry external stores would it loose its ability to supercruise straight away?”
One participant even asked about a specific feature on the F-22’s fuselage, posting a photo of the area in question with the query: "Dozer, what does this picture show?
Over the months that followed, the F-22 pilot responded to scores of questions, offering general information on the radars carried by Raptor variants; the location—and function-- of engine bleed air and bypass doors; the accuracy of aircraft weight numbers published in another aviation forum, and the date when his new unit (located in Alaska) would receive its last jets. A few of his replies are listed below:
· “I think the fuel numbers are not classified.”
· “The F-22 is not sitting alert in Alaska; however, we occasionally pulled a very tiny amount of alert at Langley.”
· “The pace will really pick up in August, both aircraft and pilots (in Alaska)
· “No they aren’t modified, and they have the older generation radar. The AK and beyond tails (although Langley does have three Lot 5 tails) are the ones with the next generation radar.”
· “The F-22 is not sitting alert in Alaska; however, we occasionally pulled a very tiny amount of alert at Langley.”
· “The pace will really pick up in August, both aircraft and pilots (in Alaska)
· “No they aren’t modified, and they have the older generation radar. The AK and beyond tails (although Langley does have three Lot 5 tails) are the ones with the next generation radar.”
According to the study’s authors, months of on-line questions and answers revealed a number of details about the F-22, ranging from its basing status, to the function of specific flaps and doors, and details on how various weapons systems operate. Other responses “confirmed and denied performance rumors,” discussed the status of radar upgrades, and covered “issues with thrust vectoring.”
Judging from the OPSEC presentation, readers would think that the on-line forum provided a veritable treasure trove of information on the Air Force’s newest fighter. But a closer examination of the study--and its conclusions--reveals that much of the information “disclosed” on the discussion board had been circulating for months—even years—before Dozer and other participants weighed in.
Tomorrow: A look at earlier discussions and media reporting on F-22 capabilities, deployments and operational issues. Did Dozer’s on-line comments represent a genuine OPSEC violation—or was it largely a rehash of information already available to the public and potential adversaries? And, what does the incident say about existing military policies on information disclosure and on-line activities?
Tuesday, March 04, 2008
Tankers and Politics
Once upon a time, announcement of a DoD contract meant that someone won, and someone lost.
Now, it merely signals the next round of political jockeying and protests in the defense procurement game.
Consider last Friday’s award of a $35 billion contract for new tanker aircraft to Northrop-Grumman and its European partner, EADS. By accepting their proposal, the Pentagon rejected a rival bid from Boeing, which offered a refueling variant of its 767 jetliner.
But the matter is far from settled. With so much money—and thousands of jobs—at stake, Boeing will almost certainly protest the Pentagon’s decision. And the aerospace giant is mobilizing its allies on Capitol Hill, who are already demanding investigations.
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi was one of the first out of the gate, saying the Air Force decision “raised serious questions.”
After that, the rhetoric only intensified. Les Blumenthal of the McClatchy Newspapers Washington bureau quotes Washington Senator Patty Murray (“the contract "puts our war-fighting ability in the hands of a foreign government") and Republican Senator Pat Roberts of Kansas (the Air Force used an "Alice in Wonderland" approach in awarding the contract to a French company with no experience in making tankers). Can you guess where Boeing planned to build those 767 tankers?
Obviously, Boeing and its supporters aren’t going down without a fight.
But it’s also appropriate to ask how much of a fight they’re willing to put up. Under Pentagon acquisition rules, losing firms are allowed to file a protest, a process that can last up to a year. Boeing has every right to question the Air Force’s decision, and demand a fair review of the process.
Unfortunately, haggling over the tanker deal could last well beyond the protest period. Factor in political considerations—including the obligatory hearings, briefings and legislative maneuvering—and the fight over the new tanker might drag on for years.
Fact is the competition apparently won by the Northrop-Grumman/EADS team came four years after the Pentagon’s first effort to acquire new tankers. In 2003, the Air Force announced plans to lease 100 767 tankers from Boeing, a proposal that also attracted Congressional attention.
With Arizona Senator John McCain in the lead, House and Senate leaders pounced on the proposed lease, noting that it would be more expensive than buying new aircraft. The deal was subsequently derailed by revelations that the Air Force’s former top procurement civilian, Darlene Druyun, had been recruited by Boeing during lease negotiations. She later served a nine-month prison sentence on corruption charges..
In hindsight, McCain’s criticism of the original tanker deal was certainly valid. And, it could also be argued that re-opening of the contract resulted in a better deal for the Air Force and the taxpayer, through the acquisition of a larger aircraft (the KC-30) with greater fuel off-load and transport capabilities.
But the process also delayed acquisition of badly-needed refueling planes, designed to replace aircraft purchased during the Eisenhower administration. We’ve written extensively about problems with aging KC-135Es, assigned mostly to Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units. Some of those aircraft are no longer flyable and their replacements won’t enter the USAF inventory for another 5-6 years.
Sadly, that forecast is decidedly optimistic. It took almost five years to untangle the last tanker mess, and it could take even longer this time around. In an election year, with thousands of jobs at stake and all that money on the table, Congressional efforts to scuttle the new tanker contract are inevitable. We can expect endless hearings on the issue, along with legislative amendments and, of course, various earmarks.
After all, if Ted Kennedy can fund a jet engine the Air Force doesn’t want (to the tune of $1 billion), we can easily envision Pat Roberts, Patty Murray, Nancy Pelosi and their friends setting aside money for a “next-generation tanker aircraft,” while working to defund the Northrop-Grumman aircraft. Boeing has already indicated that it can build a larger tanker—based on the 777 airframe—and its Congressional supporters will quickly rally to that cause.
Will that result in a better refueling platform for the Air Force? That remains to be seen. Meanwhile, those KC-135Es aren’t getting any younger, and our current tanker “shortfall” will only grow worse over time. In a rational world, the Pentagon and Congress would be working together to get new tankers into the inventory as soon as possible. But in the realm of politically-charged defense acquisitions, operational needs often take a back seat to jobs, jobs, jobs and defense dollars for the folks back home.
That’s why we won’t be surprised if the “new” tanker deal comes undone, and we’re still arguing over a KC-135 replacement in 2012. After all, if Congress could thwart the original tanker lease plan—and more recently, force re-bidding of the CSAR-X contract-- then spoiling the Northrop-Grumman/EADS program should be a piece of cake.
Now, it merely signals the next round of political jockeying and protests in the defense procurement game.
Consider last Friday’s award of a $35 billion contract for new tanker aircraft to Northrop-Grumman and its European partner, EADS. By accepting their proposal, the Pentagon rejected a rival bid from Boeing, which offered a refueling variant of its 767 jetliner.
But the matter is far from settled. With so much money—and thousands of jobs—at stake, Boeing will almost certainly protest the Pentagon’s decision. And the aerospace giant is mobilizing its allies on Capitol Hill, who are already demanding investigations.
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi was one of the first out of the gate, saying the Air Force decision “raised serious questions.”
After that, the rhetoric only intensified. Les Blumenthal of the McClatchy Newspapers Washington bureau quotes Washington Senator Patty Murray (“the contract "puts our war-fighting ability in the hands of a foreign government") and Republican Senator Pat Roberts of Kansas (the Air Force used an "Alice in Wonderland" approach in awarding the contract to a French company with no experience in making tankers). Can you guess where Boeing planned to build those 767 tankers?
Obviously, Boeing and its supporters aren’t going down without a fight.
But it’s also appropriate to ask how much of a fight they’re willing to put up. Under Pentagon acquisition rules, losing firms are allowed to file a protest, a process that can last up to a year. Boeing has every right to question the Air Force’s decision, and demand a fair review of the process.
Unfortunately, haggling over the tanker deal could last well beyond the protest period. Factor in political considerations—including the obligatory hearings, briefings and legislative maneuvering—and the fight over the new tanker might drag on for years.
Fact is the competition apparently won by the Northrop-Grumman/EADS team came four years after the Pentagon’s first effort to acquire new tankers. In 2003, the Air Force announced plans to lease 100 767 tankers from Boeing, a proposal that also attracted Congressional attention.
With Arizona Senator John McCain in the lead, House and Senate leaders pounced on the proposed lease, noting that it would be more expensive than buying new aircraft. The deal was subsequently derailed by revelations that the Air Force’s former top procurement civilian, Darlene Druyun, had been recruited by Boeing during lease negotiations. She later served a nine-month prison sentence on corruption charges..
In hindsight, McCain’s criticism of the original tanker deal was certainly valid. And, it could also be argued that re-opening of the contract resulted in a better deal for the Air Force and the taxpayer, through the acquisition of a larger aircraft (the KC-30) with greater fuel off-load and transport capabilities.
But the process also delayed acquisition of badly-needed refueling planes, designed to replace aircraft purchased during the Eisenhower administration. We’ve written extensively about problems with aging KC-135Es, assigned mostly to Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units. Some of those aircraft are no longer flyable and their replacements won’t enter the USAF inventory for another 5-6 years.
Sadly, that forecast is decidedly optimistic. It took almost five years to untangle the last tanker mess, and it could take even longer this time around. In an election year, with thousands of jobs at stake and all that money on the table, Congressional efforts to scuttle the new tanker contract are inevitable. We can expect endless hearings on the issue, along with legislative amendments and, of course, various earmarks.
After all, if Ted Kennedy can fund a jet engine the Air Force doesn’t want (to the tune of $1 billion), we can easily envision Pat Roberts, Patty Murray, Nancy Pelosi and their friends setting aside money for a “next-generation tanker aircraft,” while working to defund the Northrop-Grumman aircraft. Boeing has already indicated that it can build a larger tanker—based on the 777 airframe—and its Congressional supporters will quickly rally to that cause.
Will that result in a better refueling platform for the Air Force? That remains to be seen. Meanwhile, those KC-135Es aren’t getting any younger, and our current tanker “shortfall” will only grow worse over time. In a rational world, the Pentagon and Congress would be working together to get new tankers into the inventory as soon as possible. But in the realm of politically-charged defense acquisitions, operational needs often take a back seat to jobs, jobs, jobs and defense dollars for the folks back home.
That’s why we won’t be surprised if the “new” tanker deal comes undone, and we’re still arguing over a KC-135 replacement in 2012. After all, if Congress could thwart the original tanker lease plan—and more recently, force re-bidding of the CSAR-X contract-- then spoiling the Northrop-Grumman/EADS program should be a piece of cake.
The Wrong Stuff
The feckless Wesley Clark is at it again. Apparently, the Clinton campaign has selected the retired general as point man for attacking John McCain’s military record. During a recent conference featuring former flag officer who have endorsed Hillary Clinton for President, General Clark claimed that Senator McCain--a retired Navy Captain and former POW--has the "wrong military experience" to be Commander-in-Chief. Byron York has a summary of Clark’s comments at NRO’s The Corner:
In the national security business, the question is, do you have — when you have served in uniform, do you really have the relevant experience for making the decisions at the top that have to be made? Everybody admires John McCain's service as a fighter pilot, his courage as a prisoner of war. There's no issue there. He's a great man and an honorable man. But having served as a fighter pilot — and I know my experience as a company commander in Vietnam — that doesn’t prepare you to be commander-in-chief in terms of dealing with the national strategic issues that are involved. It may give you a feeling for what the troops are going through in the process, but it doesn't give you the experience first hand of the national strategic issues.
If you look at what Hillary Clinton has done during her time as the First Lady of the United States, her travel to 80 countries, her representing the U.S. abroad, plus her years in the Senate, I think she's the most experienced and capable person in the race, not only for representing am abroad, but for dealing with the tough issues of national security.
Speaking just after Clark, retired Admiral William Owens, former vice chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, said, "I would just say that I agree with Wes on that."
Reading between the lines, Clark's comments are more than an endorsement of Mrs. Clinton; they smack of the elitism and snobbishness that once dominated the upper ranks of the nation's military. General Clark was saying, in effect, that John McCain is unqualified to be Commander-in-Chief because he never reached flag rank or held the theater or unified command jobs that provide "first hand" experience on national security issues.
In other words, Senator McCain never became a "member of the club" populated by active duty and retired generals and admirals like Clark and Owens. The implied message of Clark's remarks underscores the gulf that separates full Colonels (and Navy Captains) from the ranks of generals and admirals. True, a Colonel or Captain is only one grade below a Brigadier General or Rear Admiral (Lower Half), but there's a vast difference in pay, prestige and responsibility.
The number of general or flag officers that may serve on active duty is limited by law; for the Army, that total is 302; the Navy is authorized 216 flag officers, while the Air Force and Marine Corps have 279 and 80 general officers, respectively. To illustrate hard it is to reach the flag ranks, consider this statistic: the Air Force has roughly 30 Colonels for every Brigadier General in its ranks; the other services have similar ratios. Becoming a flag officer puts you in very rarefied air, indeed.
And, some current and former members of the fraternity tend to look down their noses at those who failed to make the cut--particularly those who enter politics and (occasionally) make life difficult for senior military leaders. Needless to say, John McCain wouldn't win any popularity contests among certain segments of the flag officer crowd.
He's been relentless (some would say short-sighted) on certain military issues, including Air Force procurement. We've written extensively about Senator McCain's crusade against the
ill-fated Boeing tanker lease, almost single-handily forcing cancellation of the deal. In the process, McCain rubbed a lot of senior officers the wrong way; his opposition of the tanker lease torpedoed the career of at least one Air Force General who had been nominated for command of U.S. forces in the Pacific. Did we mention that the CINCPAC job has always been a Navy billet, and McCain's own father once held that post?
Truth be told, there's a lot of accumulated bad blood between some senior military officers and Senator McCain. That hardly disqualifies him from becoming Commander-in-Chief; indeed, McCain's detailed knowledge of military issues would make it more difficult for the Pentagon (and Congress) to sneak favored "pork barrel" projects into the DoD budget. Additionally, the Senator is hardly unschooled in strategic issues, with more than 25 years of Congressional service on various defense and foreign affairs committees.
More laughable is the notion that Hillary Clinton's "experience" as First Lady somehow trumps McCain's resume on defense and security issues. Heading a U.S. delegation to some backwater country hardly compares to Mr. McCain's legislative resume and three decades of service as a naval officer. And don't get us started on Barack Obama. Suffice it to say that Mrs. Clinton is a veritable Clausewitz in comparison to the Illinois Senator.
In fairness, there are legitimate concerns about McCain as a prospective Commander-in-Chief. His stand against the nomination of Air Force General Gregory Martin for the CINCPAC post was absolutely shameful. McCain used Martin's tertiary involvement in the tanker lease--the general was never accused of any wrong-doing--to kick an exceptional officer to the curb, and ensure that CINCPAC remain in Navy hands. The episode suggests that a President McCain wouldn't be above service politics, particularly on pet issues and programs.
Still, Senator McCain is far better prepared to lead the nation's armed forces than either of his Democratic rivals. And no amount of political posturing by retired flag officers, past animosity between McCain and senior Pentagon officials--or old-fashioned military elitism--can change that.
***
We're also reminded of another contrast between Mr. McCain and General Clark. As a POW in North Vietnam, McCain made propaganda statements for the enemy only after a prolonged period of severe torture that pushed him past the breaking point. To this day, McCain views his statements as dishonorable.
By comparison, General Clark gladly (and infamously) posed for photographs wearing the hat of Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic, one of the Balkans most infamous war criminals. The Clinton State Department advised against the meeting, but Clark forged ahead. And, to our knowledge Clark has never apologized for the episode. That speaks volumes about the man who happily touts Hillary Clinton's "experience" to be Commander-in-Chief
In the national security business, the question is, do you have — when you have served in uniform, do you really have the relevant experience for making the decisions at the top that have to be made? Everybody admires John McCain's service as a fighter pilot, his courage as a prisoner of war. There's no issue there. He's a great man and an honorable man. But having served as a fighter pilot — and I know my experience as a company commander in Vietnam — that doesn’t prepare you to be commander-in-chief in terms of dealing with the national strategic issues that are involved. It may give you a feeling for what the troops are going through in the process, but it doesn't give you the experience first hand of the national strategic issues.
If you look at what Hillary Clinton has done during her time as the First Lady of the United States, her travel to 80 countries, her representing the U.S. abroad, plus her years in the Senate, I think she's the most experienced and capable person in the race, not only for representing am abroad, but for dealing with the tough issues of national security.
Speaking just after Clark, retired Admiral William Owens, former vice chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, said, "I would just say that I agree with Wes on that."
Reading between the lines, Clark's comments are more than an endorsement of Mrs. Clinton; they smack of the elitism and snobbishness that once dominated the upper ranks of the nation's military. General Clark was saying, in effect, that John McCain is unqualified to be Commander-in-Chief because he never reached flag rank or held the theater or unified command jobs that provide "first hand" experience on national security issues.
In other words, Senator McCain never became a "member of the club" populated by active duty and retired generals and admirals like Clark and Owens. The implied message of Clark's remarks underscores the gulf that separates full Colonels (and Navy Captains) from the ranks of generals and admirals. True, a Colonel or Captain is only one grade below a Brigadier General or Rear Admiral (Lower Half), but there's a vast difference in pay, prestige and responsibility.
The number of general or flag officers that may serve on active duty is limited by law; for the Army, that total is 302; the Navy is authorized 216 flag officers, while the Air Force and Marine Corps have 279 and 80 general officers, respectively. To illustrate hard it is to reach the flag ranks, consider this statistic: the Air Force has roughly 30 Colonels for every Brigadier General in its ranks; the other services have similar ratios. Becoming a flag officer puts you in very rarefied air, indeed.
And, some current and former members of the fraternity tend to look down their noses at those who failed to make the cut--particularly those who enter politics and (occasionally) make life difficult for senior military leaders. Needless to say, John McCain wouldn't win any popularity contests among certain segments of the flag officer crowd.
He's been relentless (some would say short-sighted) on certain military issues, including Air Force procurement. We've written extensively about Senator McCain's crusade against the
ill-fated Boeing tanker lease, almost single-handily forcing cancellation of the deal. In the process, McCain rubbed a lot of senior officers the wrong way; his opposition of the tanker lease torpedoed the career of at least one Air Force General who had been nominated for command of U.S. forces in the Pacific. Did we mention that the CINCPAC job has always been a Navy billet, and McCain's own father once held that post?
Truth be told, there's a lot of accumulated bad blood between some senior military officers and Senator McCain. That hardly disqualifies him from becoming Commander-in-Chief; indeed, McCain's detailed knowledge of military issues would make it more difficult for the Pentagon (and Congress) to sneak favored "pork barrel" projects into the DoD budget. Additionally, the Senator is hardly unschooled in strategic issues, with more than 25 years of Congressional service on various defense and foreign affairs committees.
More laughable is the notion that Hillary Clinton's "experience" as First Lady somehow trumps McCain's resume on defense and security issues. Heading a U.S. delegation to some backwater country hardly compares to Mr. McCain's legislative resume and three decades of service as a naval officer. And don't get us started on Barack Obama. Suffice it to say that Mrs. Clinton is a veritable Clausewitz in comparison to the Illinois Senator.
In fairness, there are legitimate concerns about McCain as a prospective Commander-in-Chief. His stand against the nomination of Air Force General Gregory Martin for the CINCPAC post was absolutely shameful. McCain used Martin's tertiary involvement in the tanker lease--the general was never accused of any wrong-doing--to kick an exceptional officer to the curb, and ensure that CINCPAC remain in Navy hands. The episode suggests that a President McCain wouldn't be above service politics, particularly on pet issues and programs.
Still, Senator McCain is far better prepared to lead the nation's armed forces than either of his Democratic rivals. And no amount of political posturing by retired flag officers, past animosity between McCain and senior Pentagon officials--or old-fashioned military elitism--can change that.
***
We're also reminded of another contrast between Mr. McCain and General Clark. As a POW in North Vietnam, McCain made propaganda statements for the enemy only after a prolonged period of severe torture that pushed him past the breaking point. To this day, McCain views his statements as dishonorable.
By comparison, General Clark gladly (and infamously) posed for photographs wearing the hat of Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic, one of the Balkans most infamous war criminals. The Clinton State Department advised against the meeting, but Clark forged ahead. And, to our knowledge Clark has never apologized for the episode. That speaks volumes about the man who happily touts Hillary Clinton's "experience" to be Commander-in-Chief
Monday, March 03, 2008
More Nuclear Problems at Minot
For the second time in less than three months, a unit at Minot AFB, North Dakota has earned low marks on a nuclear surety inspection.
In From the Cold has learned that Minot's 91st Space Wing failed portions of a Joint Nuclear Surety Inspection (JNSI), administered in late January by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The evaluation from that agency was held concurrently with a similar inspection from by the Air Force Space Command Inspector General (IG) team. The wing passed the Space Command NSI, allowing it to retain its nuclear mission certification.
A source familiar with events at Minot reports that the 91st Wing's failing mark from DTRA was based on a security error. Speaking on the condition of anonymity, the source revealed that agency evaluators were allowed to enter an area with nuclear weapons without required escorts. While DTRA personnel were authorized to be in the area, regulations required that they be escorted.
The failing grade from the threat reduction agency did not affect scores from the space command NSI. Sources report that the 91st earned passing grades from the command inspection team, and the unit's nuclear certification was not in jeopardy. Space Command evaluators reportedly disagreed with the DTRA security write-up, and the violation was not mentioned in their NSI report.
Once known at the Defense Nuclear Agency, the DTRA reports directly to the Pentagon's Joint Staff, monitoring the safety and security of the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile. Regulations require that DTRA conduct an evaluation of nuclear-capable units every five years. Air Force major commands inspect their nuclear units every 18 months.
As in the case of the Minot event, DTRA evaluations are conducted simultaneously with major command (MAJCOM) nuclear surety inspections. Air Force Space Command is the parent organization for the 91st, which is responsible for 150 Minuteman III ICBMs, located in underground complexes across northwestern North Dakota.
The missile wing's problems in the DTRA evaluation came less than two months after Minot's 5th Bomb Wing earned a "Not Ready" rating during an Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection (INSI). That evaluation, carried out by members of the Air Combat Command (ACC) Inspector General team, came in response to last year's nuclear mishap involving wing personnel.
During that incident, Minot crews mistakenly loaded six nuclear-tipped cruise missiles
onto a B-52 bomber from Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. The mistake wasn't discovered for almost 30 hours, well after the aircraft landed at the Louisiana installation. Four senior Air Force officers were fired because of the mishap, and the service has conducted three subsequent probes into the accident.
In response to the mishap, the service has announced plans for more than 100 changes in its nuclear handling and security policies, to prevent similar incidents in the future. Results of the various inquiries were briefed to members of the Senate Armed Services Committee last month. Meanwhile, the bomber unit has been working to regain its nuclear certification, a process that will include several major inspections.
The first step in that evaluation process, an Initial Nuclear Surety Inspecion, was conducted in December. Though not considered a failing grade, the 5th Bomb Wing's "not ready" rating for the INSI will require the unit to repeat that evaluation. The remake of that inspection is currently scheduled for late March.
If the bomber unit passes that hurdle, it will receive a nuclear surety inspection in late May. The latter evaluation represents one of the wing's last major hurdles in regaining its nuclear mission certification, which was lost after last year's transfer mishap.
Asked about the missile unit's DTRA evaluation, a spokeswoman for the 91st Space Wing referred reporters to Air Force Space Command. A media affairs representative at the command headquarters did not immediately return calls for comment.
Air Force public affairs policy has long discouraged the release or discussion of inspection results. In a press release issued earlier this month, Space Command offered congratulations to the 91st, saying that results of the evaluation "speak for themselves."
The 91st wing commander, Colonel Marty Whelan, offered similar thoughts in his own statement, stating that unit personnel "did a great job" during the evaluation.
A former Air Force nuclear weapons expert, who has reviewed the 91st NSI report, was less charitable in his assessment. "Not a good start for the year at Minot," he observed, noting the the poor marks earned by the 5th Bomb Wing and 91st Space Wing in recent evaluations.
While DTRA evaluations are conducted less frequently than major command NSIs, they cover similar criteria. Nuclear inspection teams representing the various commands are required to evaluate areas covered by DTRA, helping units prepare for periodic reviews by the joint staff organization.
In From the Cold has learned that Minot's 91st Space Wing failed portions of a Joint Nuclear Surety Inspection (JNSI), administered in late January by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The evaluation from that agency was held concurrently with a similar inspection from by the Air Force Space Command Inspector General (IG) team. The wing passed the Space Command NSI, allowing it to retain its nuclear mission certification.
A source familiar with events at Minot reports that the 91st Wing's failing mark from DTRA was based on a security error. Speaking on the condition of anonymity, the source revealed that agency evaluators were allowed to enter an area with nuclear weapons without required escorts. While DTRA personnel were authorized to be in the area, regulations required that they be escorted.
The failing grade from the threat reduction agency did not affect scores from the space command NSI. Sources report that the 91st earned passing grades from the command inspection team, and the unit's nuclear certification was not in jeopardy. Space Command evaluators reportedly disagreed with the DTRA security write-up, and the violation was not mentioned in their NSI report.
Once known at the Defense Nuclear Agency, the DTRA reports directly to the Pentagon's Joint Staff, monitoring the safety and security of the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile. Regulations require that DTRA conduct an evaluation of nuclear-capable units every five years. Air Force major commands inspect their nuclear units every 18 months.
As in the case of the Minot event, DTRA evaluations are conducted simultaneously with major command (MAJCOM) nuclear surety inspections. Air Force Space Command is the parent organization for the 91st, which is responsible for 150 Minuteman III ICBMs, located in underground complexes across northwestern North Dakota.
The missile wing's problems in the DTRA evaluation came less than two months after Minot's 5th Bomb Wing earned a "Not Ready" rating during an Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection (INSI). That evaluation, carried out by members of the Air Combat Command (ACC) Inspector General team, came in response to last year's nuclear mishap involving wing personnel.
During that incident, Minot crews mistakenly loaded six nuclear-tipped cruise missiles
onto a B-52 bomber from Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. The mistake wasn't discovered for almost 30 hours, well after the aircraft landed at the Louisiana installation. Four senior Air Force officers were fired because of the mishap, and the service has conducted three subsequent probes into the accident.
In response to the mishap, the service has announced plans for more than 100 changes in its nuclear handling and security policies, to prevent similar incidents in the future. Results of the various inquiries were briefed to members of the Senate Armed Services Committee last month. Meanwhile, the bomber unit has been working to regain its nuclear certification, a process that will include several major inspections.
The first step in that evaluation process, an Initial Nuclear Surety Inspecion, was conducted in December. Though not considered a failing grade, the 5th Bomb Wing's "not ready" rating for the INSI will require the unit to repeat that evaluation. The remake of that inspection is currently scheduled for late March.
If the bomber unit passes that hurdle, it will receive a nuclear surety inspection in late May. The latter evaluation represents one of the wing's last major hurdles in regaining its nuclear mission certification, which was lost after last year's transfer mishap.
Asked about the missile unit's DTRA evaluation, a spokeswoman for the 91st Space Wing referred reporters to Air Force Space Command. A media affairs representative at the command headquarters did not immediately return calls for comment.
Air Force public affairs policy has long discouraged the release or discussion of inspection results. In a press release issued earlier this month, Space Command offered congratulations to the 91st, saying that results of the evaluation "speak for themselves."
The 91st wing commander, Colonel Marty Whelan, offered similar thoughts in his own statement, stating that unit personnel "did a great job" during the evaluation.
A former Air Force nuclear weapons expert, who has reviewed the 91st NSI report, was less charitable in his assessment. "Not a good start for the year at Minot," he observed, noting the the poor marks earned by the 5th Bomb Wing and 91st Space Wing in recent evaluations.
While DTRA evaluations are conducted less frequently than major command NSIs, they cover similar criteria. Nuclear inspection teams representing the various commands are required to evaluate areas covered by DTRA, helping units prepare for periodic reviews by the joint staff organization.
At one time, a failing mark from DTRA inspectors would result in the same grade for the overall evaluation. Under current guidelines, grades from command inspectors drive the unit's final rating. Organizations cited for mistakes by DTRA are required to implement corrective actions, and report those measures to the agency.
Experts interviewed by In From the Cold said the problem discovered at the 91st Space Wing could be easily remedied, and they believe that corrective measures have already been implemented.
Saturday, March 01, 2008
A Few Thoughts on the Tanker Deal
The KC-30, which will serve as the Air Force's next-generation tanker (Northrop-Grumman photo)
Aviation circles and Wall Street are still abuzz over the Air Force's decision to award a $40-billion contract for new aerial tankers to a Northrop-Grumman/Airbus consortium. Announcement of that choice represented a major blow to rival Boeing, which had supplied most of the service's aerial refuelers for the past 50 years.
Defense and business analysts are rightly hailing Friday's announcement as a major win for Northrop-Grumman and its European partner EADS, the military division of Airbus. Not only did the U.S.-European team secure a deal for 179 new tankers, they also positioned their firm to capture billions in follow-on contracts.
Both the USAF and U.S. Navy operate a variety of surveillance, command-and-control and intelligence collection platforms built on the venerable Boeing 707 design--the same airframe used in the older KC-135s that will be replaced by the new tanker. As the older C2, surveillance and spy aircraft reach the end of their service life, those missions could easily be transferred to the same Northrop-Grumman/EADS platform, based on the Airbus A330.
Justifying its decision, the Air Force noted that the European jet beat the Boeing design (a variant of the 767 jetliner) in four of five categories, including fuel offload--the most important consideration for any aerial tanker--cargo capacity, troop hauling, and aeromedical evacuation.
But those arguments are something of a red herring; aerial tankers--as their name implies--are designed primarily to refuel other aircraft in flight. Their abilities as cargo haulers, troop haulers and air ambulances pale in comparison to platforms like the C-17, which were specifically designed for that mission.
Moreover, tankers like the KC-135, KC-10 and the KC-45 (the Air Force designation for the new refueler) need special equipment to load or unload cargo, and they can't accommodate oversized equipment. We're also reminded that virtually all troops heading to a war zone now travel on charter jets, so the "troop carrier" role is a relatively minor consideration, to boot.
Still, the Northrop-Grumman/EADS tanker offers a clear advantage in the tanker mission and that alone was enough to justify the Air Force's decision. Boeing and its Congressional backers are clearly upset, but in hindsight, it seems clear that the aviation giant made critical errors in pitching the KC-767 as the next-generation tanker.
First, as posters on this (and other) forums have observed, the Boeing's decision to offer the 767 seems based, in part, on corporate desires to sustain production of that airframe. Without an Air Force tanker order, Boeing was looking at a short-term end for 767 production. Building more airframes for the Air Force would allow the company to keep the assembly line open for years to come, and generate more orders in the process.
At a "per unit" cost of $25-30 million less than the A330, Boeing believed the 767's pricetag would provide a strong selling point, as would its smaller "footprint" and the ready availability's of spare parts, based on the large number of airframes already in service.
Oddly enough, Boeing elected not to offer a tanker version of its hot-selling 777 wide-body jetliner, or innovative 787 "Dreamliner." The 787 was still in development when the Air Force asked for bids on a new tanker, so it wasn't a realistic contender for the contract.
As for the 777, Boeing has never fully explained its rationale for excluding that airframe. However, production of a military 777 would strain the company's production capabilities, and possibly slow deliveries to commercial customers. Still, a tanker variant of the "Triple-7" would have more than matched the A330's off-load and transport capabilities, and the wide-body is surprisingly fuel efficient, one reason it has become a favorite of long-haul airlines.
But Boeing's biggest blunder was, arguably, it's initial plan to lease 767 tankers to the Air Force. First approved in 2003, the deal was later abrogated when it was learned that the aircraft manufacturer had offered jobs to the service's senior civilian contracting official and two members of her family. The contracting official, Darlene Druyun, later served a 9-month prison sentence and two Boeing executives were convicted as well.
Not only did the tanker lease result in a huge fine, it also made Boeing "radioactive" in terms of future, big-ticket contracts. With an already-tight procurement budget, the Air Force did not want a rehash of the tanker lease controversy. And, with Northrop-Grumman offering more capability (at a slightly higher price), the service found it easy to justify the KC-30, heading off potential criticism that would come with a new Boeing deal.
Obviously, Boeing still rakes in billions of defense contracting dollars each year. But there is no question that the company's ability to win new Pentagon deals has been impacted by the ill-fated tanker lease. When Boeing received an Air Force contract for new search-and-rescue helicopters in 2006, competitors immediately cried foul, and the deal was re-opened for bidding.
At last report, a final decision on the helicopter program (better known as CSAR-X) has been delayed until later this year. A few months ago, most industry insiders still believed that Boeing would still win the contract. In the wake of last week's tanker announcement, some analysts now believe that Sikorsky or another U.S.-European team--led by Lockheed-Martin--may wind up with the contract. That would represent another body blow for Boeing, already reeling from the tanker decision and production woes with the Dreamliner.
So far, no one's erecting billboards around the Boeing plants in Seattle, St. Louis or Wichita, asking "The Last Person Out of (City's Name), to "Please Turn Out the Lights." Those were the signs that appeared in Everett, Washington in the late 1960s, before the 747 jetliner arrived and literally secured Boeing's future. Almost 40 years later, the aircraft manufacturer is a much more diversified--and financially secure--company. But it's also clear that Boeing's military division is facing tough times ahead, and many of the company's problems are clearly self-inflicted.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)