Former Army Private Steven D. Green has entered a not guilty plea to charges of rape and murder in connection with the deaths of a young Iraqi girl and members of her family. The crimes allegedly occurred in March of this year, when Green was serving with the 101st Airborne Division in Iraq. Green was honorably discharged from the Army in May, apparently after being diagnosed with an "anti-social personality disorder." Four other soldiers, still on active duty, face similar charges in the case.
According to media reports, Green served for about a year on active duty before being discharged for psychiatric reasons. The Army hasn't divulged Green's diagnosis, but his discharge has all the elements of a "rush job," someone who was hustled out of the service because mental health professionals determined he was a risk to himself, and other soldiers. Over my 20-year-military career, I witnessed a couple of similar incidents; in a bureaucracy not designed for speed, it was amazing how quickly the military could get rid of someone when it became necessary.
It's unclear if Green's sudden discharge was related to the reported crimes in Iraq. But in the era of the "strategic corporal" and the "three block war," it's worth asking why Green was allowed to enlist in the military. Admittedly, recruiters and drill instructors can't catch every bad egg that winds up in a military uniform, but it is disconcerting that Green not only finished basic training, but wound up in a combat unit, carrying a loaded weapon. And, when his problems became obvious, the Army hustled to get him out of uniform, and back on the street.
Obviously, Mr. Green deserves his day in court, but the system that allowed a mentally ill individual to enter the U.S. Army deserves renewed scrutiny. And, more distressingly, the alleged massacre in Iraq is not the first time a mentally disturbed individual has killed unsuspecting victims. Back in 1994, the U.S. Air Force had a similar episode, with equally murderous results.
On June 20, 1994, former Airman First Class Dean Mellberg entered the hospital at Fairchild AFB, near Spokane, Washington. Mellberg was upset after being discharged from the Air Force for psychiatric reasons and went on a shooting spree, killing five persons and wounding 23 others. The rampage finally ended when a base security policeman, on bicycle patrol, shot Mellberg dead in the hosptial parking lot.
During the subsequent investigation, it was determined that Mellberg had long aroused suspicions from co-workers and supervisors. There were serious concerns about his behavior during Mellberg's first assignment at Cannon AFB, New Mexico, where he served as a maintenance specialist in the early 1990s. But rather than getting Mellberg out of uniform--and into a treatment program--the leadership at Cannon decided to pass the buck, and arranged a transfer to Fairchild. Apparently, there were concerns that discharging Mellberg from his squadron at Cannon would make the "unit look bad," and besides, it was easier to arrange a transfer than initiate the documentation for a psychiatric discharge. That process was finally concluded at Fairchild, but once again, there was little concern for what Mellberg might do, once he was booted from service. The answer to that question became painfully obvious on that June day in 1994.
While I have nothing but respect for military recruiters and those who train new recruits, the Green and Mellberg cases illustrate that we can do a better job in screening those entering the military. As Chief Buddy once observed, military leadership really does begin at the recruiting office. Even with increased pressure to meeting recruiting and training quotas, the military must be willing to make the first quality cuts at the front door, and bar admission for those who aren't qualified, or exhibit symptoms of severe psychiatric disorders. When the book is finally closed on former Private Green, we wil probably discover that his problems were evident early in his military career, but no one bothered to do the right thing--until it was too late.
Monday, July 10, 2006
Examining the Options
Deeply concerned over last week's North Korean missile tests, the Japanese government is reportedly studying its own constitution, to determine if a pre-emptive strike against Pyongyang's missile sites would violate Japanese law, which bars the use of force in settling international disuptes.
Rattled by North Korea's recent launch of seven missiles, several Japanese officials have openly discussed measures for improving the nation's defense, including creation of a legal framework that would allow pre-emptive attacks against DPRK missile facilities. As Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe recently observed:
"If we accept that there is no other option to prevent an attack ... there is the view that attacking the launch base of the guided missiles is within the constitutional right of self-defense. We need to deepen discussion," he observed.
Obviously, such talk will generate renewed concern among Japan's neighbors, who suffered greatly at the hands of Tokyo's military forces during World War II. But such fears are exaggerated, at the very least. The Japan of today bears no resemblance to the militaristic society of the 1930s and 40s. Japan's post-war constitution, partially drafted by General Douglas MacArthur's JAG staff, contains strict limitations on the nation's military, including the prohibition on offensive attacks.
These legal measures, coupled with Japan's own war experiences, have created a strong pacifist streak within Japanese society that is reflected in its military. Tokyo has mounted only one troop deployment since World War II, a small, support mission to Iraq that will end in the coming months. The deployment was largely unpopular with segments of the Japanese public, which viewed it as inconsistent with the post-war constitution. Japanese military units are referred to as "self-defense" forces, and their equipment and doctrine reflects a true defensive orientation. Development of even a modest offensive capability would require several years, an investment of billions of dollars--and convincing the Japanese public to support such a plan.
Still, Japan's mere willingness to examine potential "offensive options" underscores Tokyo's growing frustration with the North Korean missile tests, and a perceived lack of support from its neighbors in the region. China and Russia are unwilling to back draft UN resolutions on the missile issue, and South Korea (in a nod to domestic politics) has accused Tokyo of inflaming the situation.
That, of course, leaves the U.S. in a difficult position. The Bush Administration has been trying to develop a regional consensus on the issue, and Tokyo's support has been both valued and welcome. But increasingly, the U.S. and Japan find themselves isolated on the issue, with little tangible support from Moscow, Beijing or Seoul. If North Korea continues its missile and WMD programs, Japan has every right to expand its military forces and consider potential offensive options--a prospect that will clearly infuriate the Chinese, South Koreans and Russians. In that scenario, what would President Bush (or more likely, his successor) do? Undermine a critical alliance with Japan, or risk antagonizing key trading partners in the region?
While Japan weighs its military options for the future, the missile episode has (if nothing else) provided a dramatic wake-up call for Tokyo. Facing a growing missile threat from North Korea (and China's own, massive military build-up), Japan has come to the sobering realization that it lives in an increasingly dangerous part of the world, and responsibility for its defense begins not in Washington, but in Tokyo. The Chinese, Russians and South Koreans won't be happy, but Japan (and the U.S.) will be more secure if Tokyo improves its military capabilites to deal with regional threats.
Rattled by North Korea's recent launch of seven missiles, several Japanese officials have openly discussed measures for improving the nation's defense, including creation of a legal framework that would allow pre-emptive attacks against DPRK missile facilities. As Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe recently observed:
"If we accept that there is no other option to prevent an attack ... there is the view that attacking the launch base of the guided missiles is within the constitutional right of self-defense. We need to deepen discussion," he observed.
Obviously, such talk will generate renewed concern among Japan's neighbors, who suffered greatly at the hands of Tokyo's military forces during World War II. But such fears are exaggerated, at the very least. The Japan of today bears no resemblance to the militaristic society of the 1930s and 40s. Japan's post-war constitution, partially drafted by General Douglas MacArthur's JAG staff, contains strict limitations on the nation's military, including the prohibition on offensive attacks.
These legal measures, coupled with Japan's own war experiences, have created a strong pacifist streak within Japanese society that is reflected in its military. Tokyo has mounted only one troop deployment since World War II, a small, support mission to Iraq that will end in the coming months. The deployment was largely unpopular with segments of the Japanese public, which viewed it as inconsistent with the post-war constitution. Japanese military units are referred to as "self-defense" forces, and their equipment and doctrine reflects a true defensive orientation. Development of even a modest offensive capability would require several years, an investment of billions of dollars--and convincing the Japanese public to support such a plan.
Still, Japan's mere willingness to examine potential "offensive options" underscores Tokyo's growing frustration with the North Korean missile tests, and a perceived lack of support from its neighbors in the region. China and Russia are unwilling to back draft UN resolutions on the missile issue, and South Korea (in a nod to domestic politics) has accused Tokyo of inflaming the situation.
That, of course, leaves the U.S. in a difficult position. The Bush Administration has been trying to develop a regional consensus on the issue, and Tokyo's support has been both valued and welcome. But increasingly, the U.S. and Japan find themselves isolated on the issue, with little tangible support from Moscow, Beijing or Seoul. If North Korea continues its missile and WMD programs, Japan has every right to expand its military forces and consider potential offensive options--a prospect that will clearly infuriate the Chinese, South Koreans and Russians. In that scenario, what would President Bush (or more likely, his successor) do? Undermine a critical alliance with Japan, or risk antagonizing key trading partners in the region?
While Japan weighs its military options for the future, the missile episode has (if nothing else) provided a dramatic wake-up call for Tokyo. Facing a growing missile threat from North Korea (and China's own, massive military build-up), Japan has come to the sobering realization that it lives in an increasingly dangerous part of the world, and responsibility for its defense begins not in Washington, but in Tokyo. The Chinese, Russians and South Koreans won't be happy, but Japan (and the U.S.) will be more secure if Tokyo improves its military capabilites to deal with regional threats.
On the Rocks
Kim Jong-il must be chuckling right about now. Almost a week after his provocative missile tests, there is still no regional consensus on what should be done about North Korea, thanks (in part) to South Korean domestic politics, and a renewed fondness for Japan-bashing in Seoul.
More on that in a moment. On the diplomatic front, China was, at last report, pressuring North Korea to abide by its previous commitments. A Chinese delegation, led by Vice Premier Hui Liangyu, is reportedly in Pyongyang for talks. However, both China and Russia remain opposed to tougher sanctions against North Korea, and could veto any UN Security Council resolution offered by the United States and Japan.
Meanwhile, the government in Seoul is also signaling that it prefers more deferential treatment for North Korea. In fact, some ROK government officials have been more critical of Tokyo than Pyongyang, accusing the Japanese of using a "shrill" voice to push for new sanctions against the North.
To most Americans, such comments sound a bit odd. Afterall, South Korea has the most to lose from North Korean militarism. Efforts to reign in Pyongyang would certainly benefit Seoul, which must sustain a huge defense budget to offset the DPRK's massive military, which is concentrated along the DMZ that seperates the two Koreas. South Korea's Presidential mansion, the Blue House, lies within range of North Korean artillery along the DMZ. Based on that sobering reality, you'd think that Seoul would welcome any effort to help mitigate the DPRK threat.
But it depends on who's making that effort. Hatred of the Japanese remains endemic in South Korea, based on Tokyo's brutal occupation of the peninsula from 1910-1945. During that time, the Japanese plundered Korea's natural resources, and forced thousands of Korean women into prostitution for the Imperial Army. And despite the passage of time, tales from the occupation remain vivid in the Korean psyche, and ROK politicians manipulate those sentiments on a regular basis.
For example, the current ROK President, Roh Moo Hyun, is currently locked in an increasingly bitter dispute with Tokyo over the Liancourt Rocks, a pair of tiny islets in the Sea of Japan, located equidistant between the two countries. While the Japanese and Koreans have disputed control of the islands for centuries, Roh has pressed the issue in recent months, partially to deflect public attention away from a corruption scandal, which resulted in his impeachment in 2004. The impeachment was later overturned by South Korea's highest court, (and Roh was reinstated as President). Despite that favorable ruling, Roh's term has been highlighted by failed initiatives and political missteps, making him one of the least popular chief executives in South Korean history.
Meanwhile, the "Japan issue" has provided a welcome diversion for Roh. Speeches critical of Tokyo's claims to Liancourt Rocks have given him a temporary boost in the polls, and Roh has tried to keep the issue on the front-burner. Additionally, Mr. Roh favors a "Sunshine" policy toward North Korea, continuing the overtures begun by his predecessor, Kim Dae Jung. Roh reportedly wants some sort of diplomatic agreement with the DPRK before he leaves office, in hopes of salvaging something from his presidency. Achieving that goal explains why Seoul is willing to go easy on Pyongyang--while simultaneously bashing Tokyo for being too harsh. Even in South Korea, all politics are local.
Unfortunately, Roh's political salvage operation comes at the expense of a regional consensus on North Korea and the missile crisis. By opposing tougher sanctions against Pyongyang, Mr. Roh may actually create more serious issues for future occupants of the Blue House. Last week's North Korean "test" generated actual fear in Japan, which lies within range of hundreds of DPRK missiles. There is a growing demand within Japan for increased defense spending, discussions about the acquisition of offensive weapons, and even the development of WMD, as a hedge against the growing North Korean threat.
South Korea will, of course, view any Japanese military build-up with alarm. In a post-North Korea environment, Seoul has long viewed Tokyo as its major adversary, a point that has been emphasizsed in various defense white papers over the past decade. But it is slightly ironic that an emerging "Japanese threat" would be partly the result of Mr. Roh's refusal to follow the lead of Tokyo (and Washington) in getting tough with the DPRK.
More on that in a moment. On the diplomatic front, China was, at last report, pressuring North Korea to abide by its previous commitments. A Chinese delegation, led by Vice Premier Hui Liangyu, is reportedly in Pyongyang for talks. However, both China and Russia remain opposed to tougher sanctions against North Korea, and could veto any UN Security Council resolution offered by the United States and Japan.
Meanwhile, the government in Seoul is also signaling that it prefers more deferential treatment for North Korea. In fact, some ROK government officials have been more critical of Tokyo than Pyongyang, accusing the Japanese of using a "shrill" voice to push for new sanctions against the North.
To most Americans, such comments sound a bit odd. Afterall, South Korea has the most to lose from North Korean militarism. Efforts to reign in Pyongyang would certainly benefit Seoul, which must sustain a huge defense budget to offset the DPRK's massive military, which is concentrated along the DMZ that seperates the two Koreas. South Korea's Presidential mansion, the Blue House, lies within range of North Korean artillery along the DMZ. Based on that sobering reality, you'd think that Seoul would welcome any effort to help mitigate the DPRK threat.
But it depends on who's making that effort. Hatred of the Japanese remains endemic in South Korea, based on Tokyo's brutal occupation of the peninsula from 1910-1945. During that time, the Japanese plundered Korea's natural resources, and forced thousands of Korean women into prostitution for the Imperial Army. And despite the passage of time, tales from the occupation remain vivid in the Korean psyche, and ROK politicians manipulate those sentiments on a regular basis.
For example, the current ROK President, Roh Moo Hyun, is currently locked in an increasingly bitter dispute with Tokyo over the Liancourt Rocks, a pair of tiny islets in the Sea of Japan, located equidistant between the two countries. While the Japanese and Koreans have disputed control of the islands for centuries, Roh has pressed the issue in recent months, partially to deflect public attention away from a corruption scandal, which resulted in his impeachment in 2004. The impeachment was later overturned by South Korea's highest court, (and Roh was reinstated as President). Despite that favorable ruling, Roh's term has been highlighted by failed initiatives and political missteps, making him one of the least popular chief executives in South Korean history.
Meanwhile, the "Japan issue" has provided a welcome diversion for Roh. Speeches critical of Tokyo's claims to Liancourt Rocks have given him a temporary boost in the polls, and Roh has tried to keep the issue on the front-burner. Additionally, Mr. Roh favors a "Sunshine" policy toward North Korea, continuing the overtures begun by his predecessor, Kim Dae Jung. Roh reportedly wants some sort of diplomatic agreement with the DPRK before he leaves office, in hopes of salvaging something from his presidency. Achieving that goal explains why Seoul is willing to go easy on Pyongyang--while simultaneously bashing Tokyo for being too harsh. Even in South Korea, all politics are local.
Unfortunately, Roh's political salvage operation comes at the expense of a regional consensus on North Korea and the missile crisis. By opposing tougher sanctions against Pyongyang, Mr. Roh may actually create more serious issues for future occupants of the Blue House. Last week's North Korean "test" generated actual fear in Japan, which lies within range of hundreds of DPRK missiles. There is a growing demand within Japan for increased defense spending, discussions about the acquisition of offensive weapons, and even the development of WMD, as a hedge against the growing North Korean threat.
South Korea will, of course, view any Japanese military build-up with alarm. In a post-North Korea environment, Seoul has long viewed Tokyo as its major adversary, a point that has been emphasizsed in various defense white papers over the past decade. But it is slightly ironic that an emerging "Japanese threat" would be partly the result of Mr. Roh's refusal to follow the lead of Tokyo (and Washington) in getting tough with the DPRK.
Sunday, July 09, 2006
Weekend Reading Assignment
From the 7 July edition of Opinion Journal. Daniel Henninger opines that the U.S. military needs to launch a p.r. counter-offensive against a media obsessed with alleged war crimes in Iraq.
The Summer of Haditha, as we termed it, is alive and well.
The Summer of Haditha, as we termed it, is alive and well.
Friday, July 07, 2006
Duh
When it comes to North Korea may do next (in terms of additional missile launches), stick with the blogosphere for reliable, accurate information.. This AP story manages to contradict itself between the headline and its opening paragraph. The headline suggests Pyongyang may have another long-range missile at the Taepodong test site, indicating that a second launch in the offing. But, in the lead paragraph, the wire service notes (correctly), that the other TD-2 is hardly ready to be fired.
Here are some compelling reasons that North Korea won't launch a second TD-2 in the coming days. First, as we noted previously, Kim Jong-il can't afford another colossal embarassment, given his desire to sell the missile to other nations. Secondly, the processing of stacking (or assembling the missile), conducting pre-launch checkouts and fueling the TD-2 would likely take several weeks, although it could be accomplished in a matter of days (if the DPRK really wanted to). In light of this week's disaster, North Korea has reason to be cautious, when--and if--it tries again.
But here's the biggest reason you won't see a TD-2 launch over the next week. Apparently, the AP bureau in Seoul doesn't understand that typhoons generally prevent missile tests, due to the high-level winds they generate at the surface, and in the upper atmosphere. According to meterologists, a typhoon will pass across the Korean peninsula between 9-11 July, creating unfavorable conditions at the North Korean missile test range.
Duh.
Here are some compelling reasons that North Korea won't launch a second TD-2 in the coming days. First, as we noted previously, Kim Jong-il can't afford another colossal embarassment, given his desire to sell the missile to other nations. Secondly, the processing of stacking (or assembling the missile), conducting pre-launch checkouts and fueling the TD-2 would likely take several weeks, although it could be accomplished in a matter of days (if the DPRK really wanted to). In light of this week's disaster, North Korea has reason to be cautious, when--and if--it tries again.
But here's the biggest reason you won't see a TD-2 launch over the next week. Apparently, the AP bureau in Seoul doesn't understand that typhoons generally prevent missile tests, due to the high-level winds they generate at the surface, and in the upper atmosphere. According to meterologists, a typhoon will pass across the Korean peninsula between 9-11 July, creating unfavorable conditions at the North Korean missile test range.
Duh.
A Little Perspective
Various Japanese media outlets are reporting that North Korea's failed Taepodong-2 missile was on a trajectory that would have carried it near Hawaii, had the missile completed its test flight.
At this point, a little perspective is in order. Given the missile's short flight duration, we can't say with any certainity where it was aimed. According to missile analysts I've spoken to, the TD-2 had apparent guidance and control problems from almost the moment it left the launch pad, meaning that it's flight trajectory was highly erratic, at best.. Radar tracking data from U.S. and Japanese naval vessels--cited in Japan media reports--should be taken with a large grain of salt, because the missile (in all likelihood) wasn't following its intended trajectory before it failed, roughly 45 seconds into flight.
Additionally, the azimuth assessment for the TD-2 was revised several times before the launch, based on the best available information. Early projection suggested the flight path might carry it toward Hawaii, but later estimates suggested an azimuth that would carry it further away from the islands.
From what I can judge, the Japanese media reports are speculative at best, and not necessarily supported by available information.
At this point, a little perspective is in order. Given the missile's short flight duration, we can't say with any certainity where it was aimed. According to missile analysts I've spoken to, the TD-2 had apparent guidance and control problems from almost the moment it left the launch pad, meaning that it's flight trajectory was highly erratic, at best.. Radar tracking data from U.S. and Japanese naval vessels--cited in Japan media reports--should be taken with a large grain of salt, because the missile (in all likelihood) wasn't following its intended trajectory before it failed, roughly 45 seconds into flight.
Additionally, the azimuth assessment for the TD-2 was revised several times before the launch, based on the best available information. Early projection suggested the flight path might carry it toward Hawaii, but later estimates suggested an azimuth that would carry it further away from the islands.
From what I can judge, the Japanese media reports are speculative at best, and not necessarily supported by available information.
Thursday, July 06, 2006
Our Friends in Beijing (and Moscow)
Less than 48 hours after the North Korean missile launches, our erstwhile freinds in Beijing and Moscow are (predictably) being less-than-helpful on the issue. When the U.N. Security Council took up the matter yesterday, both Russia and China quickly reiterated their opposition to tough action against Pyongyang.
Beijing, which has long been North Korea's closest ally and biggest trading partner, issued a statement that avoided direct criticism of Kim Jong-il regime. Instead, China appealed for "calm" (apparently, the required first statement in any official PRC announcement on any global crisis), while expressing "serious concern" about "what had happened." (Yawn).
The language from Moscow was equally benign. Russia's UN envoy, Valery Churkin, called the missile tests a "deplorable development," but stopped short of supporting new sanctions against North Korea. Instead, both China and Russia reportedly favor a U.N. presidential statement on the issue. Presidential statements are non-binding, and are considered even weaker than UNSC resolutions. I'm sure the boys in Pyongyang are positively quaking in their boots at that prospect. Lest we forget, a long line of dictators, thugs and despots have ignored scores of U.N. resolutions against their regime. Given the likely "impact" of such toothless actions, a U.N. presidential statement literally isn't worth the paper it's printed on.
Meanwhile, countries in the line of fire from North Korean missiles have more useful ideas on what ought to be done. South Korea has suspended humanitarian aid to Pyongyang, a move that may have more impact than first thought, since much of that assistance winds up in the hands of the North Korean military. Japan has responded by proposing tougher financial measures against the DPRK, and is pressing for immediate development of a ballistic missile defense system to protect the Japanese homeland.
In the interim, the U.S. has agreed to deploy advanced Patriot PAC-3 missiles to U.S. bases in Japan, and Aegis-equipped U.S. naval vessels already operate in Japanese waters. Both systems can provide a limited defensive capability until the Japanese system is fully operational. The Japanese Navy already has Aegis-equipped destroyers, and in the wake of Wednesday's North Korean missile test, it seems likely that the U.S. will approve the transfer of SM-2 Block IV missiles and the software upgrades to give the Japanese vessels an advanced BMD capability.
Japanese cooperation on financial issues can have a more immediate impact on Pyongyang. Millions of ethnic Koreans still live in Japan, including members of the Chosin Soren, a group with close ties to Pyongyang. Members of the Chosen Soren funnel millions of dollars to North Korea every year; crackdowns against the group and its quasi-legal activities will deny Pyongyang badly-needed revenue. Japan can also play a useful role in cracking down on North Korea's counterfeit activities, which net the DRPK an estimated $100 million a year. Hat tip: Captains Quarters.
Russia and China could take similar steps within their borders, but there's no indication that Moscow or Beijing will play ball. The reason? For starters, their "tolerance" of North Korea and its antics give both countries additional leverage with the U.S. If Washington wants Russian and Chinese support against the DPRK, then the U.S. has to reciprocate on trade and economic issues. The U.S. will soon discover (if we haven't already) what it will "cost" to gain Moscow's and Beijing's support for even diluted sanctions against North Korea.
Secondly, North Korea offers military advantages for both Russia and China. With its large Army and expanding WMD capabilities, Pyongyang still ties up a substantial chunk of U.S. military power, including an Army division (the ROK-based 2ID), a Marine division on Okinawa, four USAF fighter wings (two in Korea, two in Japan), and a Japan-based carrier battle group. If the North Korean problem disappeared, much of that combat capability could be re-directed against other threats, most notably China. As long as North Korea exists, the U.S. must prepare for that threat as well, to the tune of billions of dollars a year.
Finally, by challenging the U.S. and even being rewarded for past bad behavior, Pyongyang can make Washington look weak. That, in turn, helps advance the agendas of both Russia and China, who are quick to point out the Superpower's flaws, including the inability to effectively deal with a rogue state like North Korea.
The Bush Administration is correct in pursuing a "regional solution" to the North Korean problem. When the DPRK collapses (and it will, eventually), the ramifications of that event will be felt throughout Northeast Asia, and directly impact every country in the region. But until that happens, we shouldn't expect much help from our friends in Russia or China. They still have something to gain by keeping Kim Jong-il in power, and on a confrontation course with the U.S.
Beijing, which has long been North Korea's closest ally and biggest trading partner, issued a statement that avoided direct criticism of Kim Jong-il regime. Instead, China appealed for "calm" (apparently, the required first statement in any official PRC announcement on any global crisis), while expressing "serious concern" about "what had happened." (Yawn).
The language from Moscow was equally benign. Russia's UN envoy, Valery Churkin, called the missile tests a "deplorable development," but stopped short of supporting new sanctions against North Korea. Instead, both China and Russia reportedly favor a U.N. presidential statement on the issue. Presidential statements are non-binding, and are considered even weaker than UNSC resolutions. I'm sure the boys in Pyongyang are positively quaking in their boots at that prospect. Lest we forget, a long line of dictators, thugs and despots have ignored scores of U.N. resolutions against their regime. Given the likely "impact" of such toothless actions, a U.N. presidential statement literally isn't worth the paper it's printed on.
Meanwhile, countries in the line of fire from North Korean missiles have more useful ideas on what ought to be done. South Korea has suspended humanitarian aid to Pyongyang, a move that may have more impact than first thought, since much of that assistance winds up in the hands of the North Korean military. Japan has responded by proposing tougher financial measures against the DPRK, and is pressing for immediate development of a ballistic missile defense system to protect the Japanese homeland.
In the interim, the U.S. has agreed to deploy advanced Patriot PAC-3 missiles to U.S. bases in Japan, and Aegis-equipped U.S. naval vessels already operate in Japanese waters. Both systems can provide a limited defensive capability until the Japanese system is fully operational. The Japanese Navy already has Aegis-equipped destroyers, and in the wake of Wednesday's North Korean missile test, it seems likely that the U.S. will approve the transfer of SM-2 Block IV missiles and the software upgrades to give the Japanese vessels an advanced BMD capability.
Japanese cooperation on financial issues can have a more immediate impact on Pyongyang. Millions of ethnic Koreans still live in Japan, including members of the Chosin Soren, a group with close ties to Pyongyang. Members of the Chosen Soren funnel millions of dollars to North Korea every year; crackdowns against the group and its quasi-legal activities will deny Pyongyang badly-needed revenue. Japan can also play a useful role in cracking down on North Korea's counterfeit activities, which net the DRPK an estimated $100 million a year. Hat tip: Captains Quarters.
Russia and China could take similar steps within their borders, but there's no indication that Moscow or Beijing will play ball. The reason? For starters, their "tolerance" of North Korea and its antics give both countries additional leverage with the U.S. If Washington wants Russian and Chinese support against the DPRK, then the U.S. has to reciprocate on trade and economic issues. The U.S. will soon discover (if we haven't already) what it will "cost" to gain Moscow's and Beijing's support for even diluted sanctions against North Korea.
Secondly, North Korea offers military advantages for both Russia and China. With its large Army and expanding WMD capabilities, Pyongyang still ties up a substantial chunk of U.S. military power, including an Army division (the ROK-based 2ID), a Marine division on Okinawa, four USAF fighter wings (two in Korea, two in Japan), and a Japan-based carrier battle group. If the North Korean problem disappeared, much of that combat capability could be re-directed against other threats, most notably China. As long as North Korea exists, the U.S. must prepare for that threat as well, to the tune of billions of dollars a year.
Finally, by challenging the U.S. and even being rewarded for past bad behavior, Pyongyang can make Washington look weak. That, in turn, helps advance the agendas of both Russia and China, who are quick to point out the Superpower's flaws, including the inability to effectively deal with a rogue state like North Korea.
The Bush Administration is correct in pursuing a "regional solution" to the North Korean problem. When the DPRK collapses (and it will, eventually), the ramifications of that event will be felt throughout Northeast Asia, and directly impact every country in the region. But until that happens, we shouldn't expect much help from our friends in Russia or China. They still have something to gain by keeping Kim Jong-il in power, and on a confrontation course with the U.S.
Wednesday, July 05, 2006
The Limits of Technology
From today's Financial Times, a dose of reality concerning Tuesday's North Korean missile test. As the the paper reminds us, Pyongyang has a long way to go in mastering ICBM technology. The TD-2 that was test-fired yesterday fell apart after only 40 seconds in flight, underscoring the current limits of North Korean expertise in missile engineering.
The good news? Pyongyang is trying to build an ICBM on the cheap, using 50s-era SCUD technology. Unfortunately, Kim Jong-il is absorbing the same lesson that Saddam learned during the first Gulf War--there's only so much you can do with a missile airframe designed to fly relatively short distances. Trying to increase the range--by extending the missile body, reducing the payload and boosting fuel tanks and engines--places severe stress on the design, and greatly increases the chances for catastrophic failure.
In fact, the odds of producing a viable ICBM from a basic SCUD design are somewhat remote. But necessity is the mother of invention, and in Pyongyang's case, SCUD technology is available and affordable, so Kim Jong-il's rocket scientists have steadily pursued that option for fielding the DPRK's first long-range missile.
The bad news? If the TD-2 doesn't pan out, the North now has access to a better design, via the transfer of SS-N-6 technology from Russia. The SS-N-6 clone (which the North Koreans call the BM-25) is classified as an intermediate range missile, suitable for targeting Europe from a launch site in Iran, or hitting Guam or Hawaii from the DPRK. It was designed to carry a nuclear warhead, although Russia insists that the designs acquired by Pyongyang lack that capability. If you believe that, perhaps I could interest you in a bridge in Brooklyn.
The BM-25 is a slightly newer missile, and (at least in theory) more easily adaptable as an ICBM. But even a "stretch" BM-25 would have its limits; the missile would still be relatively inaccurate (and capable of carrying only a small payload), but it's better than the "Super SCUD" option Pyongyang has been working on. Indeed, Israeli intelligence reports that Iran has already acquired the BM-25, and other North Korean clients may purchase the missile as well.
More disturbingly, Tuesday's launches also prove that Pyongyang has mastered short and medium-range missile technology. There were no apparent malfunctions among the SCUDs and NO DONGS fired yesterday, and those missiles form the backbone of North Korea's missile force. By some estimates, Kim Jong-il may have as many as 700 missiles (most of them SCUDs), capable of targeting all of South Korea, as well as portions of Japan. The NO DONGS, with a range of roughly 700 miles, can target all of Japan, and U.S. bases on Okinawa. North Korea's ICBM threat may still be a few years away, but the threat from short and medium-range missiles is mature, and very real. That's a compelling reason to continue our investment in theater ballistic missile defenses, for ourselves--and our allies.
The good news? Pyongyang is trying to build an ICBM on the cheap, using 50s-era SCUD technology. Unfortunately, Kim Jong-il is absorbing the same lesson that Saddam learned during the first Gulf War--there's only so much you can do with a missile airframe designed to fly relatively short distances. Trying to increase the range--by extending the missile body, reducing the payload and boosting fuel tanks and engines--places severe stress on the design, and greatly increases the chances for catastrophic failure.
In fact, the odds of producing a viable ICBM from a basic SCUD design are somewhat remote. But necessity is the mother of invention, and in Pyongyang's case, SCUD technology is available and affordable, so Kim Jong-il's rocket scientists have steadily pursued that option for fielding the DPRK's first long-range missile.
The bad news? If the TD-2 doesn't pan out, the North now has access to a better design, via the transfer of SS-N-6 technology from Russia. The SS-N-6 clone (which the North Koreans call the BM-25) is classified as an intermediate range missile, suitable for targeting Europe from a launch site in Iran, or hitting Guam or Hawaii from the DPRK. It was designed to carry a nuclear warhead, although Russia insists that the designs acquired by Pyongyang lack that capability. If you believe that, perhaps I could interest you in a bridge in Brooklyn.
The BM-25 is a slightly newer missile, and (at least in theory) more easily adaptable as an ICBM. But even a "stretch" BM-25 would have its limits; the missile would still be relatively inaccurate (and capable of carrying only a small payload), but it's better than the "Super SCUD" option Pyongyang has been working on. Indeed, Israeli intelligence reports that Iran has already acquired the BM-25, and other North Korean clients may purchase the missile as well.
More disturbingly, Tuesday's launches also prove that Pyongyang has mastered short and medium-range missile technology. There were no apparent malfunctions among the SCUDs and NO DONGS fired yesterday, and those missiles form the backbone of North Korea's missile force. By some estimates, Kim Jong-il may have as many as 700 missiles (most of them SCUDs), capable of targeting all of South Korea, as well as portions of Japan. The NO DONGS, with a range of roughly 700 miles, can target all of Japan, and U.S. bases on Okinawa. North Korea's ICBM threat may still be a few years away, but the threat from short and medium-range missiles is mature, and very real. That's a compelling reason to continue our investment in theater ballistic missile defenses, for ourselves--and our allies.
What We Know
Here's a brief recap of what we know so far, concerning yesterday's missile launches by North Korea. Definitive analysis will take longer, as we sort through data collected by various sensors.
--So far, Pyongyang has fired a total of seven missiles, a mixture of short-range SCUD Cs, medium-range NO DONGs and of course, the long-range TAEPODONG-2. Initial analysis suggests that North Korea may have launched up to four NO DONGs and two SCUDS, in addition to the TD-2. The long-range missile, which failed less than a minute into its flight, was the third missile fired in a four-hour window by the DPRK.
--The TD-2 launch was surprising in at least one sense: it took place in the pre-dawn hours of 5 July (Korean time). Analysts had assumed that the TD-2 test would occur during daylight hours, when visual observation and optical tracking conditions would be optimum.
--The number of NO DONG and SCUD launches was also a bit unusual, although some experts believed that the TD-2 event might be part of a larger "firepower" demonstration. While at least two of the launches were near-simultaneous, the rest were staggered through the pre-dawn and early morning hours of 5 July. The launches were easily tracked and identified by U.S. intelligence.
--There were no apparent efforts to engage the TD-2, which failed in the early stages of its flight. Cause of the failure remains unknown.
--It is unclear if any foreign VIPs or observers were in North Korea for yesterday's event. If foreigners were present, the TD-2 failure would prove especially embarassing, particularly if Pyongyang was trying to market the missile to other nations.
--North Korea probably has the ability to mount another TD-2 test over the short term; however, in light of yesterday's failure, such an effort is considered unlikely. The setback for the TD-2 program is probably measured in years; there was an eight-year gap between the failed 1998 TD-1 test and yesterday's event; it may be even longer before NK attempts another long-range missile test.
--Perhaps the "real" story from Tuesday's event is not the TD-2 failure, but rather, NK's ability to marshal, conceal and launch a significant number of short and medium-range missiles, with minimal intelligence warning. That possibility underscores the difficulties associated with tracking (and potentially targeting) mobile missiles.
--So far, Pyongyang has fired a total of seven missiles, a mixture of short-range SCUD Cs, medium-range NO DONGs and of course, the long-range TAEPODONG-2. Initial analysis suggests that North Korea may have launched up to four NO DONGs and two SCUDS, in addition to the TD-2. The long-range missile, which failed less than a minute into its flight, was the third missile fired in a four-hour window by the DPRK.
--The TD-2 launch was surprising in at least one sense: it took place in the pre-dawn hours of 5 July (Korean time). Analysts had assumed that the TD-2 test would occur during daylight hours, when visual observation and optical tracking conditions would be optimum.
--The number of NO DONG and SCUD launches was also a bit unusual, although some experts believed that the TD-2 event might be part of a larger "firepower" demonstration. While at least two of the launches were near-simultaneous, the rest were staggered through the pre-dawn and early morning hours of 5 July. The launches were easily tracked and identified by U.S. intelligence.
--There were no apparent efforts to engage the TD-2, which failed in the early stages of its flight. Cause of the failure remains unknown.
--It is unclear if any foreign VIPs or observers were in North Korea for yesterday's event. If foreigners were present, the TD-2 failure would prove especially embarassing, particularly if Pyongyang was trying to market the missile to other nations.
--North Korea probably has the ability to mount another TD-2 test over the short term; however, in light of yesterday's failure, such an effort is considered unlikely. The setback for the TD-2 program is probably measured in years; there was an eight-year gap between the failed 1998 TD-1 test and yesterday's event; it may be even longer before NK attempts another long-range missile test.
--Perhaps the "real" story from Tuesday's event is not the TD-2 failure, but rather, NK's ability to marshal, conceal and launch a significant number of short and medium-range missiles, with minimal intelligence warning. That possibility underscores the difficulties associated with tracking (and potentially targeting) mobile missiles.
Tuesday, July 04, 2006
Kim's Failure
Over the next few days, the MSM is likely to cast the North Korean missile launchers as something of a propaganda coup. On the very day "The Imperialist Yankee Clique" celebrates its most important national holiday, Pyongyang managed to steal the media spotlight, by launching as many as six missiles toward Japan (and U.S. bases in the Far East), including a long-range TD-2. Using that logic, the fact that the TD-2 failed 35 seconds into its flight becomes a secondary consideration, almost irrelevant. With his Fourth of July stunt, Kim Jong-il managed to thumb his nose at Washington (again), and compel the world community to focus its attention on North Korea and its demands.
But if Kim's missile spectacular was a "success" in that respect, it was also a colossal failure on other, equally important levels. For almost a decade, Kim Jong-il has wanted a platform that can put a satellite into orbit, or (if used an ICBM), threaten the United States. Today's TD-2 failure reminds everyone that the TD program has been almost a complete bust, consuming scarce resources that might have been devoted to other programs. It's hard to imagine that Pyongyang will actually pull the plug on the TD-2, but it may be a decade before a re-worked long-range missile reaches the launch pad. North Korea can't afford any more failures on the scale of the 1998 TD-1 launch, or today's failed effort.
That's because ballistic missiles are Pyongyang's most important product--and one of their few viable sources of hard currency. North Korea has enjoyed tremendous success in marketing short-range SCUDs to various Middle Eastern clients, and its technology from its medium-range No Dong has made its way into missiles developed by Iran (Shahab-3) and Pakistan. Now, those clients are anxious for a missile with a little more oomph, something that could give them a crude ICBM capability. With today's TD-2 failure, those customers are still waiting, and may look to other sources for the technology. Fewer missile sales would represent another blow to North Korea's already-bankrupt economy, and slow the pace of upgrades for Pyongyang's own missile forces.
Usually known for its bombast, look for Pyongyang to be remarkably quiet in the coming days, as they try determine the cause of the failure--and persuade Pakistan, Iran and other customers to keep investing in their missile program. Ironically, today's TD-2 debacle may provide a boost for North Korea's BM-25 missile program, which is based on old Russian SLBM technology. The BM-25/SS-N-6 is a proven weapons system, which can easily accomodate a nuclear warhead. Iran has reportedly acquired the BM-25 in recent months, and other clients may be interested as well. With the TD-2 in trouble, the BM-25 may become the only game in town for North Korean client states interested in a longer-range missile.
But if Kim's missile spectacular was a "success" in that respect, it was also a colossal failure on other, equally important levels. For almost a decade, Kim Jong-il has wanted a platform that can put a satellite into orbit, or (if used an ICBM), threaten the United States. Today's TD-2 failure reminds everyone that the TD program has been almost a complete bust, consuming scarce resources that might have been devoted to other programs. It's hard to imagine that Pyongyang will actually pull the plug on the TD-2, but it may be a decade before a re-worked long-range missile reaches the launch pad. North Korea can't afford any more failures on the scale of the 1998 TD-1 launch, or today's failed effort.
That's because ballistic missiles are Pyongyang's most important product--and one of their few viable sources of hard currency. North Korea has enjoyed tremendous success in marketing short-range SCUDs to various Middle Eastern clients, and its technology from its medium-range No Dong has made its way into missiles developed by Iran (Shahab-3) and Pakistan. Now, those clients are anxious for a missile with a little more oomph, something that could give them a crude ICBM capability. With today's TD-2 failure, those customers are still waiting, and may look to other sources for the technology. Fewer missile sales would represent another blow to North Korea's already-bankrupt economy, and slow the pace of upgrades for Pyongyang's own missile forces.
Usually known for its bombast, look for Pyongyang to be remarkably quiet in the coming days, as they try determine the cause of the failure--and persuade Pakistan, Iran and other customers to keep investing in their missile program. Ironically, today's TD-2 debacle may provide a boost for North Korea's BM-25 missile program, which is based on old Russian SLBM technology. The BM-25/SS-N-6 is a proven weapons system, which can easily accomodate a nuclear warhead. Iran has reportedly acquired the BM-25 in recent months, and other clients may be interested as well. With the TD-2 in trouble, the BM-25 may become the only game in town for North Korean client states interested in a longer-range missile.
Missile Launch
***UPDATE***
7:03 PM/PDT
Spoke with a senior defense analyst, who's worked the NK missile program for years. According to this source, there were indications of possible problems with the TD-2's upper stage, or perhaps its payload, in the week before the launch. Those problems may have delayed launch plans for Pyongyang, although atmospheric conditions--and a desire to steal the media spotlight from the space shuttle--were contributing factors as well. At this point, it's unclear if the apparent, pre-launch problems were contributing factors in the TD-2 failure.
***
***UPDATE***
4:43 PM/PDT
Media outlets now reporting 6 missile launches, including a single TD-2. More launches could be in the offing. BTW, I'm hearing reports of possible problems with the TD-2 when it was still on the launch pad.
**UPDATE***
3:01 PM/PDT
Where did it land..that is the next question regarding today's TD-2 launch. With the long-range missile apparently failing 40 seconds into flight, it is possible that debris from the TD-2 fell on Russia. That may be why UN Ambassador John Bolton is pushing for immediate consultations on today's missile launch.
***UPDATE***
2:39 PM/PDT
U.S. military is confirming three missile tests...two short-range (probable SCUD) and one long-range, i.e. the TD-2. Early analysis indicates the missile "failed" 40 seconds into its flight. That would be within the intercept envelope for Aegis-equipped U.S. naval vessels in the Sea of Japan. However, there is no confirmation (yet) of any attempt to knock down the missile.
***UPDATE***
2:07 PM/PDT
News accounts as to what transpired in North Korea are all over the place. I've seen reports that North Korea fired four SCUD-type missiles; others suggest the TD-2 was also launched, and failed in mid-air. Time to take a breath, sit back and see what actually transpired. A combination SCUD/TD-2 launch is entirely possible, particularly if Pyongyang was trying to get the U.S.'s attention and/or confuse our collection assets and missile defense systems.
***
***UPDATE***
1:46 PM/PDT
Updated information indicates the two missiles fired by North Korea were not ballistic, suggesting that they were probably short-range anti-ship missiles, fired from coastal sites. Japanese sources indicate the missiles landed in the Sea of Japan. Cobra Ball typically doesn't cover anti-ship or cruise missile tests, although its unknown if that platform was on station today. The launch of two, non-ballistic missiles might have been part of a "firepower demonstration," perhaps a prelude to the TD-2 launch.
***
Fox and CNN are reporting that North Korea has test-fired a missile within the last 45 minutes. The missile was apparently NOT the long-range TD-2, which has been sitting on a launch pad for weeks. There had been speculation in the intelligence community that Pyongyang might launch a sort-range SCUD before firing the TD-2. Today's launch might have been intended to provoke a U.S. response, including flights by U.S. RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft. That, in turn, could allow the North to attempt an intercept or even a shoot-down of those platforms. On a less provocative scale, the first launch could be designed to put our "Cobra Ball" recce aircraft in a poor position to cover the TD-2 launch. Upper atmospheric winds are now reportedly favorable launch of the long-range missile.
There are no reports (yet) of any U.S. attempt to engage the missile. Details to follow.
7:03 PM/PDT
Spoke with a senior defense analyst, who's worked the NK missile program for years. According to this source, there were indications of possible problems with the TD-2's upper stage, or perhaps its payload, in the week before the launch. Those problems may have delayed launch plans for Pyongyang, although atmospheric conditions--and a desire to steal the media spotlight from the space shuttle--were contributing factors as well. At this point, it's unclear if the apparent, pre-launch problems were contributing factors in the TD-2 failure.
***
***UPDATE***
4:43 PM/PDT
Media outlets now reporting 6 missile launches, including a single TD-2. More launches could be in the offing. BTW, I'm hearing reports of possible problems with the TD-2 when it was still on the launch pad.
**UPDATE***
3:01 PM/PDT
Where did it land..that is the next question regarding today's TD-2 launch. With the long-range missile apparently failing 40 seconds into flight, it is possible that debris from the TD-2 fell on Russia. That may be why UN Ambassador John Bolton is pushing for immediate consultations on today's missile launch.
***UPDATE***
2:39 PM/PDT
U.S. military is confirming three missile tests...two short-range (probable SCUD) and one long-range, i.e. the TD-2. Early analysis indicates the missile "failed" 40 seconds into its flight. That would be within the intercept envelope for Aegis-equipped U.S. naval vessels in the Sea of Japan. However, there is no confirmation (yet) of any attempt to knock down the missile.
***UPDATE***
2:07 PM/PDT
News accounts as to what transpired in North Korea are all over the place. I've seen reports that North Korea fired four SCUD-type missiles; others suggest the TD-2 was also launched, and failed in mid-air. Time to take a breath, sit back and see what actually transpired. A combination SCUD/TD-2 launch is entirely possible, particularly if Pyongyang was trying to get the U.S.'s attention and/or confuse our collection assets and missile defense systems.
***
***UPDATE***
1:46 PM/PDT
Updated information indicates the two missiles fired by North Korea were not ballistic, suggesting that they were probably short-range anti-ship missiles, fired from coastal sites. Japanese sources indicate the missiles landed in the Sea of Japan. Cobra Ball typically doesn't cover anti-ship or cruise missile tests, although its unknown if that platform was on station today. The launch of two, non-ballistic missiles might have been part of a "firepower demonstration," perhaps a prelude to the TD-2 launch.
***
Fox and CNN are reporting that North Korea has test-fired a missile within the last 45 minutes. The missile was apparently NOT the long-range TD-2, which has been sitting on a launch pad for weeks. There had been speculation in the intelligence community that Pyongyang might launch a sort-range SCUD before firing the TD-2. Today's launch might have been intended to provoke a U.S. response, including flights by U.S. RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft. That, in turn, could allow the North to attempt an intercept or even a shoot-down of those platforms. On a less provocative scale, the first launch could be designed to put our "Cobra Ball" recce aircraft in a poor position to cover the TD-2 launch. Upper atmospheric winds are now reportedly favorable launch of the long-range missile.
There are no reports (yet) of any U.S. attempt to engage the missile. Details to follow.
Monday, July 03, 2006
The Party Hack
Democrats are positively salivating over the Virginia Senate race. They believe their candidate, former Navy Secretary James Webb, has a fighting chance to defeat the incumbent, Republican Senator George Allen. While Allen remains popular in the Old Dominion, it's no secret that he has his eyes on a bigger prize, namely the GOP Presidential nomination in '08. Democrats have tried to potray Allen as a politician who is ignoring his constituents, as he gears up for a run for the White House.
In Webb, the Democrats believe they've found the ideal opponent for Allen. Webb styles himself as a Reagan Democrat, with enough conservative credentials to win votes in rural districts, but "progressive" enough to carry urban areas in Norfolk and Arlington, and capture the all-important suburbs that surround Washington, D.C.
Webb is also expected to run on his military record. In addition to his service in the Reagan Administration, Webb was also a Marine Corps infantry commander in Vietnam, where he won the Navy Cross for heroism. Webb later used his combat experiences as the foundation for a best-selling novel Fields of Fire, one of the greatest fictional works of the Vietnam era. By comparison, George Allen never served in the military, a point Webb is expected to drive home in a state where active duty military personnel and retirees form a significant voting bloc.
That's why Webb's weekend gaffe is so surprising. In the Democratic response to President Bush's weekly radio address, Webb invoked the "Q" word (quagmire) in describing Iraq, and urged the withdrawal of American troops. Webb also recitied the standard party talking points, saying that speaking out against the war is not disloyal to the troops. In the course of a five-minute radio speech, Webb aligned himself squarely with the Kennedy-Kerry-Murtha caucus, on the far fringes of the Democratic Party. Mr. Webb, it appears, is now a full-fleged member of the cut-and-run chorus.
And that's a shame, since Webb has the credentials and experience to offer a genuine alternative to the Bush Administration plan, other than an immediate withdrawal. Mr. Webb could talk specifics, offering his own suggestions for units that could be withdrawn first, areas that could be turned over to Iraqi control and a realistic timetable for when the drawdown could begin.
But rational proposals for national security simply aren't in the lexicon of today's Democratic Party. Instead, Webb used his national forum to solidify his ties to the "get out now" wing of his party. And what happens to Iraq (and its fledgling democracy) after that happens? Webb, like other members of his party, won't say. But it is more than just a bit ironic that a combat vet who expressed bitterness at the Fall of Saigon in 1975 seems more than willing to leave Iraq prematurely, and leave that country to Zarqawi's successors.
That type of message may resonate with the Kos Kids, but it won't play well among Virginia's military voting bloc. If George Allen is a smart politician, he'll start running radio and TV spots in media markets near the state's huge military bases--Norfolk, Hampton/Newport News, and Washington, D.C. Link Jim Webb with the phrase "cut and run," and the former Navy secretary has a problem on his hands.
The reason? Huge numbers of current and retired military members who live in those areas--and vote, in numbers above the rest of the electorate. Democratic strategists realize that the military bloc is a Republican constituency, so they've adopted a strategy of "keep it close" in recent elections. For example, the conventional wisdom for winning a statewide election in Virginia says that a Democratic must be within 5 points of the GOP candidate in Virginia Beach, one of the state's largest military bastions, and a key district for Republicans. In last year's governor's race, Democrat Tim Kaine ran within that margin against Republican Jerry Kilgore in Hampton Roads, and won by a comfortable margin across the rest of the state. Kaine ran as a "new" Democrat, appealing to conservatives and riding the coattails of popular retiring governor Mark Warner.
Webb, on the other hand, has given military voters a strong reason to oppose him, abandoning any semblance of a viable strategy in Iraq for the "cut and run" approach. Against a popular incumbent, Webb may discover that his remarks will cause military voters to run to the poll and pull the lever for his opponent. By positioning himself as little more than a Democratic hack--with the policies and talking points to match--Webb may have dug himself an early hole in what promises to be an uphill race.
In Webb, the Democrats believe they've found the ideal opponent for Allen. Webb styles himself as a Reagan Democrat, with enough conservative credentials to win votes in rural districts, but "progressive" enough to carry urban areas in Norfolk and Arlington, and capture the all-important suburbs that surround Washington, D.C.
Webb is also expected to run on his military record. In addition to his service in the Reagan Administration, Webb was also a Marine Corps infantry commander in Vietnam, where he won the Navy Cross for heroism. Webb later used his combat experiences as the foundation for a best-selling novel Fields of Fire, one of the greatest fictional works of the Vietnam era. By comparison, George Allen never served in the military, a point Webb is expected to drive home in a state where active duty military personnel and retirees form a significant voting bloc.
That's why Webb's weekend gaffe is so surprising. In the Democratic response to President Bush's weekly radio address, Webb invoked the "Q" word (quagmire) in describing Iraq, and urged the withdrawal of American troops. Webb also recitied the standard party talking points, saying that speaking out against the war is not disloyal to the troops. In the course of a five-minute radio speech, Webb aligned himself squarely with the Kennedy-Kerry-Murtha caucus, on the far fringes of the Democratic Party. Mr. Webb, it appears, is now a full-fleged member of the cut-and-run chorus.
And that's a shame, since Webb has the credentials and experience to offer a genuine alternative to the Bush Administration plan, other than an immediate withdrawal. Mr. Webb could talk specifics, offering his own suggestions for units that could be withdrawn first, areas that could be turned over to Iraqi control and a realistic timetable for when the drawdown could begin.
But rational proposals for national security simply aren't in the lexicon of today's Democratic Party. Instead, Webb used his national forum to solidify his ties to the "get out now" wing of his party. And what happens to Iraq (and its fledgling democracy) after that happens? Webb, like other members of his party, won't say. But it is more than just a bit ironic that a combat vet who expressed bitterness at the Fall of Saigon in 1975 seems more than willing to leave Iraq prematurely, and leave that country to Zarqawi's successors.
That type of message may resonate with the Kos Kids, but it won't play well among Virginia's military voting bloc. If George Allen is a smart politician, he'll start running radio and TV spots in media markets near the state's huge military bases--Norfolk, Hampton/Newport News, and Washington, D.C. Link Jim Webb with the phrase "cut and run," and the former Navy secretary has a problem on his hands.
The reason? Huge numbers of current and retired military members who live in those areas--and vote, in numbers above the rest of the electorate. Democratic strategists realize that the military bloc is a Republican constituency, so they've adopted a strategy of "keep it close" in recent elections. For example, the conventional wisdom for winning a statewide election in Virginia says that a Democratic must be within 5 points of the GOP candidate in Virginia Beach, one of the state's largest military bastions, and a key district for Republicans. In last year's governor's race, Democrat Tim Kaine ran within that margin against Republican Jerry Kilgore in Hampton Roads, and won by a comfortable margin across the rest of the state. Kaine ran as a "new" Democrat, appealing to conservatives and riding the coattails of popular retiring governor Mark Warner.
Webb, on the other hand, has given military voters a strong reason to oppose him, abandoning any semblance of a viable strategy in Iraq for the "cut and run" approach. Against a popular incumbent, Webb may discover that his remarks will cause military voters to run to the poll and pull the lever for his opponent. By positioning himself as little more than a Democratic hack--with the policies and talking points to match--Webb may have dug himself an early hole in what promises to be an uphill race.
Sunday, July 02, 2006
The Jihadist Graceland?
Osama bin Laden and his chief lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri, have been busy of late in the propaganda wars. Zawahiri appears more confident after that recent American airstrike that killed several of his subordinates along the Afghan border--and might have killed Al Qaida's #2 man, if he had followed through on his original dinner plans.
After laying low for a bit, Zawihiri recently released a new videotape. The message wasn't particularly new, but the production values were notably improved from previous Al Qaida efforts. The terrorist group has apparently upgraded their video production capabilities, using computer-generated backgrounds to cover potential geographic clues. Zawahiri apparently learned a lesson from the recent rub-out of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Don't give your trackers any video clues to your whereabouts, as did Zarqawi in his infamous "machine gun" video.
As for bin Laden, he has released two new tapes on consecutive days, suggesting (again) that Al Qaida is finding it easier to get its messages to the internet and other friendly media forums. The terrorist leader used his first message to pay homage to Zarqawi, urging the Jordanian government to allow his body to be buried in his homeland. Jordan's King Abdullah has steadfastly refused that request, and the chances that Zarqawi's remains will return to that country are approximately zero. Abdullah understands that a Jordanian grave for Zarqawi would create a shrine for jihadis and compound his internal security problems.
Likewise, Zarqawi's final resting spot in Iraq will remain a closely guarded secret. Regarding the location of Zarqawi's grave, the Iraqi national security advisor has stated that it is somewhere in the Baghdad area, and the terrorist leader was interred in accordance with Muslim traditions. Members of Zarqawi's family were reportedly upset, and initiated a request to bring his remains "home" for burial, a theme bin Laden was happy to echo in his recent message.
There is a certain irony that Zarqawi received a proper Islamic burial from the "Crusaders" and their Iraqi allies, reminding us that the U.S. military and the new Iraqi government are more sensitive to Muslim traditions than Zarqawi ever was. And that begs another question: given Zarqawi's perverted past in Jordan--and his role in the deaths of thousands of Iraqi civilians--wasn't there a point when the terrorist leader ceded his right to a traditional Muslim burial? There is no evidence that Zarqawi ever repented of his murderous ways; indeed, at the moment that Air National Guard F-16 sent him in search of his virgin quota, Zarqawi was meeting with associates, probably plotting more attacks against Iraqi civilians and coalition forces.
The timing of bin Laden's announcement was equally ironic, coming about the same time that Al Qaida's #1 enemy, George Bush, visited a shrine to one of history's most enduring icons, Elvis Presley. Mr. Bush toured Graceland on Friday, along with Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi who is described as something of an Elvis fanatic. The throngs who visit Graceland each year are, of course, a tribute to Elvis's enduring legacy and popularity, and (on a more cynical level), the understanding that some figures become immeasurably larger in death. When Elvis died suddenly in 1977, his career had long since peaked, and while he remained a popular concert draw, his record sales were a fraction of what they'd been just a decade earlier.
But that changed--and changed dramatically--with Presley's untimely passing. With renewed interest in The King (and shrewd management by his estate) Elvis in death became bigger than ever. A recent compilation of his #1 singles soared to the top of the Billboard charts, a remarkable feat for an artist who had been dead for years. "Nice career move," sneered wags in the entertainment industry--and they weren't far off the mark. Almost thirty years after he departed this life, Elvis remains the gold standard for deceased celebrities and their ability to endure over time. Graceland has become the ultimate shrine to its former owner, a place where fans and the curious can, for the price of admission, pay their respects to a long-dead superstar.
When bin Laden asked King Abdullah to allow burial of Zarqawi's remains in Jordan, I doubt that he had Elvis in mind. But the Al Qaida leader clearly understands the power of an iconic figure, particularly one that can be enshried for visits by the faithful. At the risk of offending Elvis fans everywhere (including your humble correspondent), it seems clear that bin Laden wants to elevate Zarqawi in death, with a Jordanian burial site become the Jihadi equivalent of Graceland. Wisely, King Abdullah, the Iraqi government and U.S. authorities have ignored that request. Some figures, including Elvis, deserve to be lionized by history. Others, like Zarqawi, deserve the fate of an anonmyous grave, eventually erased by the shifting sands of the desert.
One final thought: as Strategy Page (and others have noted), Zarqawi probably is more beneficial in death than in life. Over the last two years of his "leadership" in Iraq, Zarqawi played out an ultimately losing hand, undercutting potential support for Al Qaida by the wanton slaughter of innocent Iraqis. In death, bin Laden hopes that Zarqawi can become a potential rallying figure, playing a similar role deceased Latin American Revolutionary, Che Guevara. Che also attained iconic status after his death, masking the fact that Che was (ultimately) a miscast and failed guerilla leader. If we see a Middle Eastern version of "The Motorcycle Diaries" in 30 years, then bin Laden's attempts at revisionist image-making will be judged a success.
After laying low for a bit, Zawihiri recently released a new videotape. The message wasn't particularly new, but the production values were notably improved from previous Al Qaida efforts. The terrorist group has apparently upgraded their video production capabilities, using computer-generated backgrounds to cover potential geographic clues. Zawahiri apparently learned a lesson from the recent rub-out of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Don't give your trackers any video clues to your whereabouts, as did Zarqawi in his infamous "machine gun" video.
As for bin Laden, he has released two new tapes on consecutive days, suggesting (again) that Al Qaida is finding it easier to get its messages to the internet and other friendly media forums. The terrorist leader used his first message to pay homage to Zarqawi, urging the Jordanian government to allow his body to be buried in his homeland. Jordan's King Abdullah has steadfastly refused that request, and the chances that Zarqawi's remains will return to that country are approximately zero. Abdullah understands that a Jordanian grave for Zarqawi would create a shrine for jihadis and compound his internal security problems.
Likewise, Zarqawi's final resting spot in Iraq will remain a closely guarded secret. Regarding the location of Zarqawi's grave, the Iraqi national security advisor has stated that it is somewhere in the Baghdad area, and the terrorist leader was interred in accordance with Muslim traditions. Members of Zarqawi's family were reportedly upset, and initiated a request to bring his remains "home" for burial, a theme bin Laden was happy to echo in his recent message.
There is a certain irony that Zarqawi received a proper Islamic burial from the "Crusaders" and their Iraqi allies, reminding us that the U.S. military and the new Iraqi government are more sensitive to Muslim traditions than Zarqawi ever was. And that begs another question: given Zarqawi's perverted past in Jordan--and his role in the deaths of thousands of Iraqi civilians--wasn't there a point when the terrorist leader ceded his right to a traditional Muslim burial? There is no evidence that Zarqawi ever repented of his murderous ways; indeed, at the moment that Air National Guard F-16 sent him in search of his virgin quota, Zarqawi was meeting with associates, probably plotting more attacks against Iraqi civilians and coalition forces.
The timing of bin Laden's announcement was equally ironic, coming about the same time that Al Qaida's #1 enemy, George Bush, visited a shrine to one of history's most enduring icons, Elvis Presley. Mr. Bush toured Graceland on Friday, along with Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi who is described as something of an Elvis fanatic. The throngs who visit Graceland each year are, of course, a tribute to Elvis's enduring legacy and popularity, and (on a more cynical level), the understanding that some figures become immeasurably larger in death. When Elvis died suddenly in 1977, his career had long since peaked, and while he remained a popular concert draw, his record sales were a fraction of what they'd been just a decade earlier.
But that changed--and changed dramatically--with Presley's untimely passing. With renewed interest in The King (and shrewd management by his estate) Elvis in death became bigger than ever. A recent compilation of his #1 singles soared to the top of the Billboard charts, a remarkable feat for an artist who had been dead for years. "Nice career move," sneered wags in the entertainment industry--and they weren't far off the mark. Almost thirty years after he departed this life, Elvis remains the gold standard for deceased celebrities and their ability to endure over time. Graceland has become the ultimate shrine to its former owner, a place where fans and the curious can, for the price of admission, pay their respects to a long-dead superstar.
When bin Laden asked King Abdullah to allow burial of Zarqawi's remains in Jordan, I doubt that he had Elvis in mind. But the Al Qaida leader clearly understands the power of an iconic figure, particularly one that can be enshried for visits by the faithful. At the risk of offending Elvis fans everywhere (including your humble correspondent), it seems clear that bin Laden wants to elevate Zarqawi in death, with a Jordanian burial site become the Jihadi equivalent of Graceland. Wisely, King Abdullah, the Iraqi government and U.S. authorities have ignored that request. Some figures, including Elvis, deserve to be lionized by history. Others, like Zarqawi, deserve the fate of an anonmyous grave, eventually erased by the shifting sands of the desert.
One final thought: as Strategy Page (and others have noted), Zarqawi probably is more beneficial in death than in life. Over the last two years of his "leadership" in Iraq, Zarqawi played out an ultimately losing hand, undercutting potential support for Al Qaida by the wanton slaughter of innocent Iraqis. In death, bin Laden hopes that Zarqawi can become a potential rallying figure, playing a similar role deceased Latin American Revolutionary, Che Guevara. Che also attained iconic status after his death, masking the fact that Che was (ultimately) a miscast and failed guerilla leader. If we see a Middle Eastern version of "The Motorcycle Diaries" in 30 years, then bin Laden's attempts at revisionist image-making will be judged a success.
Friday, June 30, 2006
Worst Supreme Court Decision Ever?
I'm not an attorney, nor a legal scholar, so I'm in unfamilar territory commenting on a Supreme Court decision. But the more I read about yesterday's ruling in the Hamdan v. Rumsfeld case, the more I'm convinced that the decision will (ultimately) rank among the worst ever made by the high court--on the same level as the Dred Scott decision, which tilted the legal balance of power in favor of slave holders (and helped precipitate the Civil War), and Plessy v. Ferguson, which helped institutionalized segregation in the United States.
At first blush, such comparison may seem a bit overwraught. Afterall, the Scott and Ferguson decisions denied basic rights to African-Americans, perpetuating inequality and racisim for decades. But, in its own right, Hamdan also sets justice on its ear. Over the course of a 167-page decision, Justice John Paul Stevens (who wrote the majority opinion), joined by Justices David Souter, Steven Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Anthony Kennedy, manage to accomplish some rather amazing legal gymnastics. Among their feats of jurisprudence:
--Abandoning Legal Precedent. Yesterday's ruling conveniently ignores a Supreme Court ruling from World War II which upheld the legality of military tribunals for foreign combatants. In that case, Nazi spies caught infiltrating into the U.S. They were tried and sentenced to death by military courts.
--Awarding Geneva Convention Protections (Where None Existed). The convention was careful to limit its protection to combatants representing recognized governments and nation-states. Efforts to extend that protection have been routinely rejected by the signatories, and for good reason. Under that approach, persons affiliated with any seperatist, terrorist, or eco-terrorist group would be a potential POW, entitled to protection under the convention, and greatly increasing the legal, investigative and financial burden on nations abiding by the treaty.
--Undercuting the Authority of the Commander-in-Chief. As Justice Clarence Thomas noted in a stinging dissent, Hamdan effectively dilutes the chief executive's wartime powers--in a time of war.
--Circumventing the Foreign Policy Process. By conveying legal protection to "stateless" Al Qaida suspects, the Supreme Court (it could be argued) negotiated a treaty with a terrorist organization. So much for the President, and so much for Senate review and consent. If it's good enough for Justice Stevens and Osama bin Laden, it should be good enough for the Administration and the American people.
As the court's leading liberal, Justice Stevens (at the age of 86) probably sees his opinion as the capstone of a 30-year career on the court. We can only hope that future generations look back on Hamdan as a legal travesty, much as we view Dred Scott, or the "seperate but equal" doctrine of the Ferguson case.
OpinionJournal.com has some reassuring thoughts. But there is little doubt that Justice Stevens and Co. put the U.S. on a slippery legal slope, and created an opening for all sorts of potential judicial activism.
At first blush, such comparison may seem a bit overwraught. Afterall, the Scott and Ferguson decisions denied basic rights to African-Americans, perpetuating inequality and racisim for decades. But, in its own right, Hamdan also sets justice on its ear. Over the course of a 167-page decision, Justice John Paul Stevens (who wrote the majority opinion), joined by Justices David Souter, Steven Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Anthony Kennedy, manage to accomplish some rather amazing legal gymnastics. Among their feats of jurisprudence:
--Abandoning Legal Precedent. Yesterday's ruling conveniently ignores a Supreme Court ruling from World War II which upheld the legality of military tribunals for foreign combatants. In that case, Nazi spies caught infiltrating into the U.S. They were tried and sentenced to death by military courts.
--Awarding Geneva Convention Protections (Where None Existed). The convention was careful to limit its protection to combatants representing recognized governments and nation-states. Efforts to extend that protection have been routinely rejected by the signatories, and for good reason. Under that approach, persons affiliated with any seperatist, terrorist, or eco-terrorist group would be a potential POW, entitled to protection under the convention, and greatly increasing the legal, investigative and financial burden on nations abiding by the treaty.
--Undercuting the Authority of the Commander-in-Chief. As Justice Clarence Thomas noted in a stinging dissent, Hamdan effectively dilutes the chief executive's wartime powers--in a time of war.
--Circumventing the Foreign Policy Process. By conveying legal protection to "stateless" Al Qaida suspects, the Supreme Court (it could be argued) negotiated a treaty with a terrorist organization. So much for the President, and so much for Senate review and consent. If it's good enough for Justice Stevens and Osama bin Laden, it should be good enough for the Administration and the American people.
As the court's leading liberal, Justice Stevens (at the age of 86) probably sees his opinion as the capstone of a 30-year career on the court. We can only hope that future generations look back on Hamdan as a legal travesty, much as we view Dred Scott, or the "seperate but equal" doctrine of the Ferguson case.
OpinionJournal.com has some reassuring thoughts. But there is little doubt that Justice Stevens and Co. put the U.S. on a slippery legal slope, and created an opening for all sorts of potential judicial activism.
Thursday, June 29, 2006
A Major Legal Setback
Drudge has the headline (and now a link): Supreme Court blocks Gitmo War Trials. By a 5-3 ruling, the high court has determined that the Bush Administration overstepped its authority by ordering military tribunals for terrorist detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The Supreme Court made its ruling in the case of Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni national who once worked as a driver for Osama bin Laden. Hamdan filed suit against Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, prompting the court case that eventually resulted in today's decision.
Today's majority decision was written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the court's most liberal member. He was joined by the usual suspects, plus Justice Anthony Kennedy (surprise, surprise). New Chief Justice John Roberts was barred from voting in the case. As a federal appellate judge, he ruled against Hamdan when the case was brought before his appeals court. Today's ruling overturns the appellate court decision.
There is no way to mitigate the potential damage inflicted by his misguided decision. Take the legal antics of the Moussaoui trial (which lasted more than three years), multiply that by the number of inmates at Guantanamo, and you've got some idea of what's ahead for our federal courts system. From the district court to the Supreme Court, the system will be jammed with Al-Qaida suspects for years to come, each determined to create their own courtroom circus, and drag the process out as long as possible.
And who knows? If the Democrats regain the White House (and get a few court vacancies to work with), there's no telling what rights the SCOTUS may eventually confer on stateless terrorists. Meanwhile, every defense attorney with an Al Qaida client will mount their own, personal fishing expedition through U.S. national security files , in search of "evidence" to support their clients. Naturally, much of the information obtained in discovery will wind up on the front pages of friendly newspapers. Afterall, the public has a right to know, don't they? Bill Keller and the gang at the Times must be positively atwitter at that prospect.
C'mon, Spook surely you exaggerate. To the contrary, the legal assault on classified files by defense attorneys has alread begun, and let me offer a personal example. Earlier this week, a former colleague told me that he had been directed to seach his files for anything related to a certain terror suspect, now in federal custody. Apparently, the suspect's attorney is requesting information that may exist in intelligence files on his client, and he's casting the widest possible dragnet. Please note that my friend's area of expertise is adversary aircraft and tactics--he has never worked terrorism issues. But he had to spend an hour carefully checking his files, and responding to the request, a process that was repeatedly hundreds (if not thousands) of times across the intel community. This type of query will increase exponentially, as more Guantanamo suspects gain access our legal system, clogging both the courts and our intelligence community with useless requests for information.
I'm not a lawyer, but the most "interesting" element of this morning's decision is the Supreme Court's apparent finding that the Bush Administration plan violates not only U.S. law, but the Geneva Convention. You may recall that the convention provides no protection for combatants who do not fight for a nation-state or recognized government. But somehow, the five justices found enough wiggle room to determine that military trials violate both U.S. law and international accords. There must be dancing in the halls at ACLU offices around the country; the group's lawyers must be salivating at the prospect of a full-fledged legal war on the Bush Administration, courtesy of the nation's highest courts. And I'm sure the personal injury lawyers won't be far behind. Was that prison guard verbally or physically abusive, Mr. Terrorist? Don't worry, we'll make him pay.
Reacting to today's ruling, the DOD says it will have no affect on the detention effort at Gitmo. Don't be so sure. Emboldened by today's decision, I'm sure that a battalion of "human rights" attorneys will challenge the legality of the detention program, claiming that inmates are subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, through isolation and indefinite confinement. President Bush said a few months ago that he's like to shut down Gitmo. With a little help from the Supreme Court and the legal community, he may get that chance.
Today's majority decision was written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the court's most liberal member. He was joined by the usual suspects, plus Justice Anthony Kennedy (surprise, surprise). New Chief Justice John Roberts was barred from voting in the case. As a federal appellate judge, he ruled against Hamdan when the case was brought before his appeals court. Today's ruling overturns the appellate court decision.
There is no way to mitigate the potential damage inflicted by his misguided decision. Take the legal antics of the Moussaoui trial (which lasted more than three years), multiply that by the number of inmates at Guantanamo, and you've got some idea of what's ahead for our federal courts system. From the district court to the Supreme Court, the system will be jammed with Al-Qaida suspects for years to come, each determined to create their own courtroom circus, and drag the process out as long as possible.
And who knows? If the Democrats regain the White House (and get a few court vacancies to work with), there's no telling what rights the SCOTUS may eventually confer on stateless terrorists. Meanwhile, every defense attorney with an Al Qaida client will mount their own, personal fishing expedition through U.S. national security files , in search of "evidence" to support their clients. Naturally, much of the information obtained in discovery will wind up on the front pages of friendly newspapers. Afterall, the public has a right to know, don't they? Bill Keller and the gang at the Times must be positively atwitter at that prospect.
C'mon, Spook surely you exaggerate. To the contrary, the legal assault on classified files by defense attorneys has alread begun, and let me offer a personal example. Earlier this week, a former colleague told me that he had been directed to seach his files for anything related to a certain terror suspect, now in federal custody. Apparently, the suspect's attorney is requesting information that may exist in intelligence files on his client, and he's casting the widest possible dragnet. Please note that my friend's area of expertise is adversary aircraft and tactics--he has never worked terrorism issues. But he had to spend an hour carefully checking his files, and responding to the request, a process that was repeatedly hundreds (if not thousands) of times across the intel community. This type of query will increase exponentially, as more Guantanamo suspects gain access our legal system, clogging both the courts and our intelligence community with useless requests for information.
I'm not a lawyer, but the most "interesting" element of this morning's decision is the Supreme Court's apparent finding that the Bush Administration plan violates not only U.S. law, but the Geneva Convention. You may recall that the convention provides no protection for combatants who do not fight for a nation-state or recognized government. But somehow, the five justices found enough wiggle room to determine that military trials violate both U.S. law and international accords. There must be dancing in the halls at ACLU offices around the country; the group's lawyers must be salivating at the prospect of a full-fledged legal war on the Bush Administration, courtesy of the nation's highest courts. And I'm sure the personal injury lawyers won't be far behind. Was that prison guard verbally or physically abusive, Mr. Terrorist? Don't worry, we'll make him pay.
Reacting to today's ruling, the DOD says it will have no affect on the detention effort at Gitmo. Don't be so sure. Emboldened by today's decision, I'm sure that a battalion of "human rights" attorneys will challenge the legality of the detention program, claiming that inmates are subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, through isolation and indefinite confinement. President Bush said a few months ago that he's like to shut down Gitmo. With a little help from the Supreme Court and the legal community, he may get that chance.
Calling Card
As we've noted before, it isn't easy being Bashir Assad, the current Syrian dictator and son of that nation's long-time ruler, Hafez al-Assad. After succeeding his father in 2000, the younger Assad has committed a series of blunders that have weakened Syria and his own, personal authority. In 2003, he openly sided with Saddam Hussein and Iraq in the run-up the the U.S.-led invasion, further isolating his regime.
Two years later, Assad's intelligence services were implicated in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, prompting the so-called "Cedar Revolution" that forced a withdrawl of most Syrian military forces, and ending Damascus's de-facto control of its neighbor. The bombing that killed Hariri earned Syria more international condemnation, and was viewed (internally) as a humiliation. It also prompted grumbling from Syrian elites, who had profitted handsomely from their nation's 30-year occupation of Lebanon.
Making matters worse, Bashir Assad also has a failing economy, two powerful--and hostile--ighbors on his doorstep (Israel and Turkey), and continuing condemnation from the United States, for Syria's support of terrorism in Iraq and elsewhere. Not exactly a recipie for long-term regime survival, but the younger Assad soldiers on, using Iranian-backed terroristsin southern Lebanon (notably Hizbollah) to pressure Israel, and Hamas to perform the same function in the West Bank and Gaza.
Has Bashir Assad finally over-played his hand? That seemed to be the message yesterday, delivered by the Israeli Air Force. A flight of four IAF jets (apparently F-16s) overflew Assad's seaside villa near Latakia, in northwestern Syria--and the Syrian President was reportedly at home when the F-16s made their run. Damascus claims that its air defense forces "drove off" the Israeli formation, but such claims are laughable, considering Syria's long-standing inability to effectively engage the the IAF. Consider these examples over the past 25 years:
-- October 2003: Israeli jets attack a Palestinian terrorist camp near Damascus. There is apparent confusion in Damascus's air defense system, and the Syrians never fire a shot, or scramble a single jet. The Israelis destroy key facilities at the camp; IAF jets were in Syrian airspace for almost 20 minutes, but Damascus proved unable--or unwilling--to engage them.
-- June 1982: Syria deploys SA-6 surface to air missile batteries in Lebanon's Bekka Valley, in response to the Israeli incursion into south Lebanon, to destroy PLO forces based there. The IAF quickly determines that the SA-6s must be neutralized. Over a two-day period (9-10 June), the IAF destroys all 19 missile batteries in the Bekka Valley. When the Syrian Air Force (SAF) rises to challenge the IAF, they pay dearly for that decision. In air-to-air combat, the final score was IAF: 82 SAF: 0. In response, Moscow disptaches a high-level military team to find out what went wrong; their conclusion--the Syrians were thoroughly outclassed, both technically and tactically. After the Bekka Valley disaster, the SAF avoids challenging the IAF, a policy that continues to this day.
If I had to bet, I'd guess there weren't any Syrian fighters within 50 miles of the Israeli formation. It is possible that ground-based defenses got off a shot or two, but they had no apparent impact. Like most dictators, Bashir Assad has assured that his nation's air defense network covers his vacation home, but yesterday's IAF incursion proves that (a) Syrian air defense is almost a contradiction in terms, and (b) Israeli intelligence is adept at tracking Mr. Assad's movements.
Yesterday's aerial calling card was designed to send a clear, unambiguous message to Bashir Assad. Use your influence to free the kidnapped Israeli soldier and get Hamas back in line, or face the potential consequences. Or, the next time the IAF flies over Latakia, they may deliver a different sort of calling card (call it a Zarqawi special), the kind that leaves a large crater, and drives down property values.
Two years later, Assad's intelligence services were implicated in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, prompting the so-called "Cedar Revolution" that forced a withdrawl of most Syrian military forces, and ending Damascus's de-facto control of its neighbor. The bombing that killed Hariri earned Syria more international condemnation, and was viewed (internally) as a humiliation. It also prompted grumbling from Syrian elites, who had profitted handsomely from their nation's 30-year occupation of Lebanon.
Making matters worse, Bashir Assad also has a failing economy, two powerful--and hostile--ighbors on his doorstep (Israel and Turkey), and continuing condemnation from the United States, for Syria's support of terrorism in Iraq and elsewhere. Not exactly a recipie for long-term regime survival, but the younger Assad soldiers on, using Iranian-backed terroristsin southern Lebanon (notably Hizbollah) to pressure Israel, and Hamas to perform the same function in the West Bank and Gaza.
Has Bashir Assad finally over-played his hand? That seemed to be the message yesterday, delivered by the Israeli Air Force. A flight of four IAF jets (apparently F-16s) overflew Assad's seaside villa near Latakia, in northwestern Syria--and the Syrian President was reportedly at home when the F-16s made their run. Damascus claims that its air defense forces "drove off" the Israeli formation, but such claims are laughable, considering Syria's long-standing inability to effectively engage the the IAF. Consider these examples over the past 25 years:
-- October 2003: Israeli jets attack a Palestinian terrorist camp near Damascus. There is apparent confusion in Damascus's air defense system, and the Syrians never fire a shot, or scramble a single jet. The Israelis destroy key facilities at the camp; IAF jets were in Syrian airspace for almost 20 minutes, but Damascus proved unable--or unwilling--to engage them.
-- June 1982: Syria deploys SA-6 surface to air missile batteries in Lebanon's Bekka Valley, in response to the Israeli incursion into south Lebanon, to destroy PLO forces based there. The IAF quickly determines that the SA-6s must be neutralized. Over a two-day period (9-10 June), the IAF destroys all 19 missile batteries in the Bekka Valley. When the Syrian Air Force (SAF) rises to challenge the IAF, they pay dearly for that decision. In air-to-air combat, the final score was IAF: 82 SAF: 0. In response, Moscow disptaches a high-level military team to find out what went wrong; their conclusion--the Syrians were thoroughly outclassed, both technically and tactically. After the Bekka Valley disaster, the SAF avoids challenging the IAF, a policy that continues to this day.
If I had to bet, I'd guess there weren't any Syrian fighters within 50 miles of the Israeli formation. It is possible that ground-based defenses got off a shot or two, but they had no apparent impact. Like most dictators, Bashir Assad has assured that his nation's air defense network covers his vacation home, but yesterday's IAF incursion proves that (a) Syrian air defense is almost a contradiction in terms, and (b) Israeli intelligence is adept at tracking Mr. Assad's movements.
Yesterday's aerial calling card was designed to send a clear, unambiguous message to Bashir Assad. Use your influence to free the kidnapped Israeli soldier and get Hamas back in line, or face the potential consequences. Or, the next time the IAF flies over Latakia, they may deliver a different sort of calling card (call it a Zarqawi special), the kind that leaves a large crater, and drives down property values.
Wednesday, June 28, 2006
How Times Have Changed
For years, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) was often referred to as the "super secret" or "shadowy" National Reconnaissance Office. And with good reason. As chief architect of the nation's spy satellite program, the NRO was tasked with developing and deploying the crown jewels in the nation's intelligence community, the space-based platforms that collect and downlink information on a variety of countries, programs and issues.
The NRO was once so highly classified that the organization officially "didn't exist." NRO engineers and program managers operated under a variety of cover stories (DOD civilians, Air Force employees) to conceal ties to their real employer. There was a certain irony in the attempts at secrecy; despite its official "clandestine" status, the NRO was well-known on Capitol Hill, where generations of Congressman and Senators gave the agency the required funding to build even more sophisticated satellites.
The NRO's clout in Washington was legendary and well-deserved, much to the chagrin of larger, most established intelligence organizations. A former NSA director once complained that NRO represented "less than two percent" of the intel community (in terms of manning), but they controlled virtually the entire satellite budget, giving them a disproportionate influence on not only how information was collected, but what could be collected as well.
My, how times have changed. In today's ever-tightening budget envrionment, today's NRO has clearly emerged from "behind the green door," and has taken steps to raise its public profile. If you were watching CNN last night, you saw live coverage of an NRO satellite launch (on a Delta IV rocket) from Vandenburg AFB, California. Space.com has details on the event and informed speculation on the satellite's likely mission. CNN's invitation to cover the launch is remarkable; not too many years ago, the press would have been barred from Vandenburg, with the satellite being described (tersely) as a "classified, military payload."
But CNN's coverage wasn't limited to the actual lift-off. With NRO's permission, one of the cable network's reporters was given a tour of a "clean room" while the satellite was being prepped for launch. From what I'm told, NRO limited what CNN could show of the tour, but you've got to wonder: our intel analysts, working with far less information, do an amazing job at constructing the capabilities of foreign satellites. How much data did foreign analysts glean last night, from that officially-sanctioned dog-and-pony on CNN. And, BTW, I'm not blaming the cable network. They were invited guests for the launch, and for the "clean room" tour shown to millions of viewers around the world.
Openess is fine, but when it comes to protecting spy satellite technology, I much prefer the old, secretive NRO.
The NRO was once so highly classified that the organization officially "didn't exist." NRO engineers and program managers operated under a variety of cover stories (DOD civilians, Air Force employees) to conceal ties to their real employer. There was a certain irony in the attempts at secrecy; despite its official "clandestine" status, the NRO was well-known on Capitol Hill, where generations of Congressman and Senators gave the agency the required funding to build even more sophisticated satellites.
The NRO's clout in Washington was legendary and well-deserved, much to the chagrin of larger, most established intelligence organizations. A former NSA director once complained that NRO represented "less than two percent" of the intel community (in terms of manning), but they controlled virtually the entire satellite budget, giving them a disproportionate influence on not only how information was collected, but what could be collected as well.
My, how times have changed. In today's ever-tightening budget envrionment, today's NRO has clearly emerged from "behind the green door," and has taken steps to raise its public profile. If you were watching CNN last night, you saw live coverage of an NRO satellite launch (on a Delta IV rocket) from Vandenburg AFB, California. Space.com has details on the event and informed speculation on the satellite's likely mission. CNN's invitation to cover the launch is remarkable; not too many years ago, the press would have been barred from Vandenburg, with the satellite being described (tersely) as a "classified, military payload."
But CNN's coverage wasn't limited to the actual lift-off. With NRO's permission, one of the cable network's reporters was given a tour of a "clean room" while the satellite was being prepped for launch. From what I'm told, NRO limited what CNN could show of the tour, but you've got to wonder: our intel analysts, working with far less information, do an amazing job at constructing the capabilities of foreign satellites. How much data did foreign analysts glean last night, from that officially-sanctioned dog-and-pony on CNN. And, BTW, I'm not blaming the cable network. They were invited guests for the launch, and for the "clean room" tour shown to millions of viewers around the world.
Openess is fine, but when it comes to protecting spy satellite technology, I much prefer the old, secretive NRO.
A Chip off a Legendary Block
Sunday's Pacific edition of Stars and Stripes, the venerable military newspaper, had a feature article on the Air Force's bomber presence on Guam. For a number of months, small groups of U.S. bombers--B-52s, B-1s and B-2--have rotated to Anderson AFB on Guam, providing an added strategic presence in the Pacific.
Four B-2s from Whiteman AFB in Missouri are currently deployed to Anderson. The detachment is led by the commander of Whiteman's 393rd Bomb Squadron, Lt Col Paul Tibbets. If the name sounds familar, it should. Almost sixty-one years ago, Lt Col Tibbets' grandfather (and namesake), Col Paul Tibbets, was the pilot of the Enola Gay, the B-29 that dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima.
"I do think about my grandfather and feel connected to this area," Lt Col Tibbets said. "It's a very humbling experience." Indeed. The Enola Gay launched on its famous mission from an airfield on Tinian Island, which (like Guam) is part of the Marianas chain. Lt Col Tibbets's squadron is a part of the Air Force's 509th Bomb Wing, the direct descendant of his grandfather's World War II unit.
Command of the 393rd is a plum assignment, indicating that the Air Force has bigger things in store for Lt Col Tibbets. His grandfather retired as a Brigadier General, and remains an iconic figure at the age of 91. Unfortunately, the elder Tibbets's career is often summarized in the Enola Gay mission, but his contributions to the Air Force (and strategic airpower) go well beyond that day in August, 1945. Before assuming command of the original 509th (and literally, building that organization from scratch), Paul Tibbets was a B-17 bomb squadron commander in Europe. After the war, he served in a variety of command and staff positions, including a brief posting as Air Attache to India in the 1960s. Unfortunately, he was withdrawn from the post after various Indian political parties protested his assignment, due to his role in the bombing of Hiroshima.
I've never met General Tibbets, but in an era and culture that have come to regard Hiroshima as a black mark on human history (and the United States), I admire Tibbet's unwavering conviction that he did the right thing. In 2005, he told an interviewer from the Columbus (Ohio) Dispatch: "If you give me the same circumstances, hell yeah, I'd do it again." General Tibbets understood that his mission would inflict horrific casualties on the Japanese, but it would also save millions of lives on both sides, by eliminating the need to mount an invasion of Japan. Tibbets was equally straight-forward on the issue of collateral damage, and concerns over civilian casualties, as evidenced by this exchange with Studs Terkel in 2002:
Terkel: One last thing, when you hear people say, "Let's nuke 'em," "Let's nuke these people," what do you think?
Tibbets: Oh, I wouldn't hesitate if I had the choice. I'd wipe 'em out. You're gonna kill innocent people at the same time, but we've never fought a damn war anywhere in the world where they didn't kill innocent people. If the newspapers would just cut out the shit: "You've killed so many civilians." That's their tough luck for being there."
Read the entire interview here. It confirms what General Hap Arnold knew when he recommended Tibbets for command of the 509th--he was the was the right man for an extremely difficult job. Six decades later, his grandson seems to be the right man for the 509th's return to the Marianas. A chip off a legendary Air Force block.
Four B-2s from Whiteman AFB in Missouri are currently deployed to Anderson. The detachment is led by the commander of Whiteman's 393rd Bomb Squadron, Lt Col Paul Tibbets. If the name sounds familar, it should. Almost sixty-one years ago, Lt Col Tibbets' grandfather (and namesake), Col Paul Tibbets, was the pilot of the Enola Gay, the B-29 that dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima.
"I do think about my grandfather and feel connected to this area," Lt Col Tibbets said. "It's a very humbling experience." Indeed. The Enola Gay launched on its famous mission from an airfield on Tinian Island, which (like Guam) is part of the Marianas chain. Lt Col Tibbets's squadron is a part of the Air Force's 509th Bomb Wing, the direct descendant of his grandfather's World War II unit.
Command of the 393rd is a plum assignment, indicating that the Air Force has bigger things in store for Lt Col Tibbets. His grandfather retired as a Brigadier General, and remains an iconic figure at the age of 91. Unfortunately, the elder Tibbets's career is often summarized in the Enola Gay mission, but his contributions to the Air Force (and strategic airpower) go well beyond that day in August, 1945. Before assuming command of the original 509th (and literally, building that organization from scratch), Paul Tibbets was a B-17 bomb squadron commander in Europe. After the war, he served in a variety of command and staff positions, including a brief posting as Air Attache to India in the 1960s. Unfortunately, he was withdrawn from the post after various Indian political parties protested his assignment, due to his role in the bombing of Hiroshima.
I've never met General Tibbets, but in an era and culture that have come to regard Hiroshima as a black mark on human history (and the United States), I admire Tibbet's unwavering conviction that he did the right thing. In 2005, he told an interviewer from the Columbus (Ohio) Dispatch: "If you give me the same circumstances, hell yeah, I'd do it again." General Tibbets understood that his mission would inflict horrific casualties on the Japanese, but it would also save millions of lives on both sides, by eliminating the need to mount an invasion of Japan. Tibbets was equally straight-forward on the issue of collateral damage, and concerns over civilian casualties, as evidenced by this exchange with Studs Terkel in 2002:
Terkel: One last thing, when you hear people say, "Let's nuke 'em," "Let's nuke these people," what do you think?
Tibbets: Oh, I wouldn't hesitate if I had the choice. I'd wipe 'em out. You're gonna kill innocent people at the same time, but we've never fought a damn war anywhere in the world where they didn't kill innocent people. If the newspapers would just cut out the shit: "You've killed so many civilians." That's their tough luck for being there."
Read the entire interview here. It confirms what General Hap Arnold knew when he recommended Tibbets for command of the 509th--he was the was the right man for an extremely difficult job. Six decades later, his grandson seems to be the right man for the 509th's return to the Marianas. A chip off a legendary Air Force block.
Tuesday, June 27, 2006
If You're Looking for a Hero
...he's not on the silver screen this summer, he wemt for a jog at the White House on Tuesday, with President Bush. Staff Sergeant Christian Bagge is a double amputee who was injured by a roadside bomb in Iraq. Sergeant Bagge's right leg ends just above the knee, and his left leg was amputated at the ankle. When the President met Bagge last January, at Brooke Army Medical Center, the Army NCO told the Commander-in-Chief he wanted to run with him, despite his injuries. Privately, Mr. Bush reportedly had his doubts, given the soldier's long and difficult road to recovery. But barely six months later, Sergeant Bagge made good on his promise.
Read his story and be inspired. More amazingly, this account was written by Associated Press reporter Jennifer Loven, not the most objective correspondent on the White House beat.
P.S.--I just waiting for the Democrats to accuse Mr. Bush of "using" a wounded soldier for a photo op.
Read his story and be inspired. More amazingly, this account was written by Associated Press reporter Jennifer Loven, not the most objective correspondent on the White House beat.
P.S.--I just waiting for the Democrats to accuse Mr. Bush of "using" a wounded soldier for a photo op.
Unfinished Business
This past Sunday, June 25th, marked the 10-year anniversary of the Khobar Towers bombing. As a former Air Force member, that event holds special significance. Not only did the blast kill 19 fellow airmen, it also leveled a building that once served as my temporary home. In the fall of 1994, Building 131 of the Khobar complex provided billeting for myself and members of my squadron, during our deployment to Saudi Arabia. The deployment was prompted by renewed threats against Kuwait by Saddam Hussein, so we made the long flight from the CONUS to the sprawling Saudi airfield at Dhahran.
Khobar Towers was roughly adjacent to the airfield, seperated by a busy Saudi highway that often resembled a NASCAR race. The housing complex had been built as a "gift" from the Saudi monarch to his Bedouin subjects, but when the nomads were told they couldn't keep their herds in the apartment buildings, they said "no thanks" and the complex remained largely vacant until the first Gulf War. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the complex became home for thousands of allied military personnel. When operations shifted to no-fly zone enforcement, Khobar Towers remained a military housing area for units rotating in and out of Dhahran, including mine.
When we arrived in 1994, the potential threat to Building 131 was readily apparent. The multi-story apartment building, built from reinforced concrete, sat on a corner of the complex. Only a masonry wall separated the building from the surrounding area. Air Force security police (and Saudi MPs) protected the complex, but anyone could drive up or walk to the wall, which was located less than 100 feet from the building's main entrance. Even in those days, it was easy to envision a car or truck bomb attack, like the one that eventually transpired.
During our deployment to Saudi Arabia, my squadron shared Building 131 with a rescue unit from Patrick AFB, Florida. Dhahran had become a regular deployment for that squadron's aircrews, pararescuemen, maintenance personnel and support personnel. In the event a coalition aircraft was downed over Iraq, rescue HC-130s and helicopters would scramble from Dhahran and attempt to recover the pilot or aircrew. Combat search and rescue (CSAR) remains one of the most demanding Air Force missions, and the Patrick squadron was among the very best.
Eventually, Saddam backed down in the fall of 1994, and my squadron's deployment to Dhahran came to an end. But the rescue mission continued, so the Patrick airmen kept deploying to Dhahran and their billeting spaces in Building 131. Less than two years later, the terrorists struck, killing 19 USAF personnel. The Patrick squadron suffered most of the casualties, along with another deployed unit from Eglin AFB, Florida. In the aftermath of that tragedy, I scanned the pictures of the victims, trying to see if I recognized a familar face. I'm almost certain that I met some of those airmen in the Fall of 1994, during my sojourn in Khobar Towers.
Ten years after the bombing, former FBI Director Louis Freeh reminds us that we have unfinished business with those behind the bombing, specifically, the government of Iran. Despite consistent prodding from Mr. Freeh, the Clinton Administration refused to press the Saudi government to let FBI agents interview bombing suspects. When former President George H.W. Bush took up the request, the suspects confirmed what many already suspected: Tehran had sponsored the deadly attack. Alarmed that the FBI would spoil its overtures toward Tehran, the Clinton Administration quickly dropped the matter, and Freeh became a pariah at the White House.
More recently, there has been more discussion about direct negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program, and we've pointed out the potential folly of that approach. But if there ever are talks with Iran, the issue of Khobar Towers must be at the top of the list. This bit of unfinished business has been ignored for far too long, despite indictments in the bombing case under the current Bush Administration. The victims--and their families--deserve justice, even if it is justice delayed.
***
POSTSCRIPT: Khobar Towers remains a controversial subject in the Air Force, despite the passage of time. The bombing occurred as the Commander of the 4404th Provisional Wing, Brigadier General Terry Schwalier, was moving to a new assignment; by some accounts, he was drafting a "changeover" report for his successor when the bombing occurred. A subsequent inquiry into the bombing, chaired by retired Army General Wayne Downing, faulted Schwalier for failing to take necessary force protection measures. General Schwalier responded with copies of letters to Saudi officials, asking them to beef up security, both in and around the complex. Then-Air Force Chief of Staff Ron Fogelman retired "early" from his post, in protest of Schwailer's treatment.
At the time, sentiment in the Air Force was divided. Some saw Fogelman's move at little more than the General Officers Protective Association (GOPA) in action. General Schwalier was considered a golden boy in some circles, and his tarring in the Khobar Towers attack derailed a career that might have carried him to the highest levels of leadership. At the time of the attack, Schwalier was on the promotion list for Major General--a list that General Fogelman had approved.
But others argue that Schwalier was sacrificed unnecessarily. They point out that force protection was a low priority in 1996--even for units deployed to Saudi Arabia, and despite information that the terrorist threat was increasing. Moreover (as even the Downing Commission acknowledged), General Schwalier was poorly served by a wing organization that lacked an organic intelligence capability.
Khobar Towers was roughly adjacent to the airfield, seperated by a busy Saudi highway that often resembled a NASCAR race. The housing complex had been built as a "gift" from the Saudi monarch to his Bedouin subjects, but when the nomads were told they couldn't keep their herds in the apartment buildings, they said "no thanks" and the complex remained largely vacant until the first Gulf War. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the complex became home for thousands of allied military personnel. When operations shifted to no-fly zone enforcement, Khobar Towers remained a military housing area for units rotating in and out of Dhahran, including mine.
When we arrived in 1994, the potential threat to Building 131 was readily apparent. The multi-story apartment building, built from reinforced concrete, sat on a corner of the complex. Only a masonry wall separated the building from the surrounding area. Air Force security police (and Saudi MPs) protected the complex, but anyone could drive up or walk to the wall, which was located less than 100 feet from the building's main entrance. Even in those days, it was easy to envision a car or truck bomb attack, like the one that eventually transpired.
During our deployment to Saudi Arabia, my squadron shared Building 131 with a rescue unit from Patrick AFB, Florida. Dhahran had become a regular deployment for that squadron's aircrews, pararescuemen, maintenance personnel and support personnel. In the event a coalition aircraft was downed over Iraq, rescue HC-130s and helicopters would scramble from Dhahran and attempt to recover the pilot or aircrew. Combat search and rescue (CSAR) remains one of the most demanding Air Force missions, and the Patrick squadron was among the very best.
Eventually, Saddam backed down in the fall of 1994, and my squadron's deployment to Dhahran came to an end. But the rescue mission continued, so the Patrick airmen kept deploying to Dhahran and their billeting spaces in Building 131. Less than two years later, the terrorists struck, killing 19 USAF personnel. The Patrick squadron suffered most of the casualties, along with another deployed unit from Eglin AFB, Florida. In the aftermath of that tragedy, I scanned the pictures of the victims, trying to see if I recognized a familar face. I'm almost certain that I met some of those airmen in the Fall of 1994, during my sojourn in Khobar Towers.
Ten years after the bombing, former FBI Director Louis Freeh reminds us that we have unfinished business with those behind the bombing, specifically, the government of Iran. Despite consistent prodding from Mr. Freeh, the Clinton Administration refused to press the Saudi government to let FBI agents interview bombing suspects. When former President George H.W. Bush took up the request, the suspects confirmed what many already suspected: Tehran had sponsored the deadly attack. Alarmed that the FBI would spoil its overtures toward Tehran, the Clinton Administration quickly dropped the matter, and Freeh became a pariah at the White House.
More recently, there has been more discussion about direct negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program, and we've pointed out the potential folly of that approach. But if there ever are talks with Iran, the issue of Khobar Towers must be at the top of the list. This bit of unfinished business has been ignored for far too long, despite indictments in the bombing case under the current Bush Administration. The victims--and their families--deserve justice, even if it is justice delayed.
***
POSTSCRIPT: Khobar Towers remains a controversial subject in the Air Force, despite the passage of time. The bombing occurred as the Commander of the 4404th Provisional Wing, Brigadier General Terry Schwalier, was moving to a new assignment; by some accounts, he was drafting a "changeover" report for his successor when the bombing occurred. A subsequent inquiry into the bombing, chaired by retired Army General Wayne Downing, faulted Schwalier for failing to take necessary force protection measures. General Schwalier responded with copies of letters to Saudi officials, asking them to beef up security, both in and around the complex. Then-Air Force Chief of Staff Ron Fogelman retired "early" from his post, in protest of Schwailer's treatment.
At the time, sentiment in the Air Force was divided. Some saw Fogelman's move at little more than the General Officers Protective Association (GOPA) in action. General Schwalier was considered a golden boy in some circles, and his tarring in the Khobar Towers attack derailed a career that might have carried him to the highest levels of leadership. At the time of the attack, Schwalier was on the promotion list for Major General--a list that General Fogelman had approved.
But others argue that Schwalier was sacrificed unnecessarily. They point out that force protection was a low priority in 1996--even for units deployed to Saudi Arabia, and despite information that the terrorist threat was increasing. Moreover (as even the Downing Commission acknowledged), General Schwalier was poorly served by a wing organization that lacked an organic intelligence capability.
Quote of the Day?
Drudge has a question mark by this quote, and rightfully so. In Art Buchwald's latest column in the Washington Post, there is a remark, attributed to Dan Rather, on whether his "replacement" (Katie Couric) can prevail in the evening network news war. (Supposedly) Dan said:
"In time, I think she will. It took her 15 years to make the 'Today' show a hit. I'm sure it will take her longer than that to beat Charlie Gibson and Brian Williams."
Of course, Mr. Buchwald writes a humor column, so his quotes and observations should be taken with a large grain of salt. In fact, a later quote sounds more like Buchwald's imagination that something The Dan would actually say. At one point, Rather describes himself as "one of the greats," along with the recently retired Mike Wallace. "Mike and I will go down in history along with Walter Cronkite and Maury Povich," observes Rather. Nod, nod; wink, wink.
Still, Rather and Buchwald have been friends for decades, and it's not beyond the departed CBS anchorman to use a media buddy to take a few digs at the competition. As readers of Bernie Goldberg's book Bias may recall, Rather went to great lengths to undercut his co-anchor, Connie Chung, in the mid-1990s.
When Ms. Chung received critical praise for her coverage of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, Rather returned early from vacation and became CBS's primary anchor on the scene. Network staffers told Goldberg that Rather spent much of his "off-duty" time on the phone with friendly television writers (notably) Peter Johnson of USA Today, criticizing Chung and her reporting. Rather's comments were subsequently attributed to anonmyous network sources, and over time, they produced the desired effect. Ms. Chung's tenure on the CBS Evening News ended less than two years later, and Rather remained as sole anchor until being forced out last year.
If Rather actually made the remark about Couric, there is a certain irony in his words. It may actually take 15 years for CBS to climb out of the rating hole that Rather dug for his old network. During his two decades in the anchor chair, The Dan took the Evening News from #1 to #3, and drove away millions of viewers in the process. If CBS affiliates had their way, Rather would have been booted from the anchor desk years earlier, because the ratings-challenged network broadcast provided a meager lead-in audience for their local newscasts. By some accounts, the CBS-owned stations in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles and other markets lost millions in ad revenue because Rather drove down audience levels for local news programs.
At the end of his column, Buchwald provides CBS's supposed reaction to Rather's comments. "When I called back to CBS," he claims, "they said the last they'd see of Rather, he was flying down outside the 30th floor window of the CBS building." I'm sure there are lots of folks at CBS who would have preferred that Dan take the plunge.
"In time, I think she will. It took her 15 years to make the 'Today' show a hit. I'm sure it will take her longer than that to beat Charlie Gibson and Brian Williams."
Of course, Mr. Buchwald writes a humor column, so his quotes and observations should be taken with a large grain of salt. In fact, a later quote sounds more like Buchwald's imagination that something The Dan would actually say. At one point, Rather describes himself as "one of the greats," along with the recently retired Mike Wallace. "Mike and I will go down in history along with Walter Cronkite and Maury Povich," observes Rather. Nod, nod; wink, wink.
Still, Rather and Buchwald have been friends for decades, and it's not beyond the departed CBS anchorman to use a media buddy to take a few digs at the competition. As readers of Bernie Goldberg's book Bias may recall, Rather went to great lengths to undercut his co-anchor, Connie Chung, in the mid-1990s.
When Ms. Chung received critical praise for her coverage of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, Rather returned early from vacation and became CBS's primary anchor on the scene. Network staffers told Goldberg that Rather spent much of his "off-duty" time on the phone with friendly television writers (notably) Peter Johnson of USA Today, criticizing Chung and her reporting. Rather's comments were subsequently attributed to anonmyous network sources, and over time, they produced the desired effect. Ms. Chung's tenure on the CBS Evening News ended less than two years later, and Rather remained as sole anchor until being forced out last year.
If Rather actually made the remark about Couric, there is a certain irony in his words. It may actually take 15 years for CBS to climb out of the rating hole that Rather dug for his old network. During his two decades in the anchor chair, The Dan took the Evening News from #1 to #3, and drove away millions of viewers in the process. If CBS affiliates had their way, Rather would have been booted from the anchor desk years earlier, because the ratings-challenged network broadcast provided a meager lead-in audience for their local newscasts. By some accounts, the CBS-owned stations in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles and other markets lost millions in ad revenue because Rather drove down audience levels for local news programs.
At the end of his column, Buchwald provides CBS's supposed reaction to Rather's comments. "When I called back to CBS," he claims, "they said the last they'd see of Rather, he was flying down outside the 30th floor window of the CBS building." I'm sure there are lots of folks at CBS who would have preferred that Dan take the plunge.
Monday, June 26, 2006
Remembering the Somme
This Saturday, British dignitaries--including the Prince of Wales--will gather in northwestern France, to mark the 90th anniversary of the Battle of the Somme. On July 1, 1916, elements of 13 British divisions pushed into no-man's land, hoping to deal a decisive blow against the Germans (and achieve the long-sought breakthrough on the Western Front), or at the very least, relieve pressure on the French Army, which had been bled white during the seige at Verdun.
Despite a week-long preparatory bombardment and careful planning, the Somme offensive quickly disintegrated into chaos and stalemate. Today, the first day of the Somme is not remembered not as the start of a decisive military campaign, but instead, as the bloodiest day in the history of the British Army. By the the end of that day, over 19,000 British soldiers had died, with another 35,000 wounded and more than 2,000 missing in action. The number of British combat deaths on that day was roughly equal to the number of soldiers assigned to a heavy division in today's U.S. Army. Put another way, the British lost the equivalent of the 101st Airborne Division in less than 18 hours of fighting. It was a military disaster of the first order.
Beyond the staggering loss of life, the Somme is also remembered as one of the first major battles captured by the motion picture camera. British cinematographers Geoffrey Malins and John McDowell were invited to film the battle, in hopes of producing a propaganda film. Instead, Malins and McDowell succeeded in capturing the brutal realities of trench warfare, and the human toll it exacted. Footage taken by Malins and McDowell was eventually edited into a feature film that was released to British audiences later that year. Simply entitled "The Battle of the Somme," the film remains one of the most widely viewed in British history. More than 20 million people saw the film in its first two months of release--roughy half of the wartime population of England.
Now, on the eve of the 90th anniversary of the battle, Malin and McDowell's film has been subjected to a critical analysis by a team of documentarians, historians and forensic experts. According to the U.K. Independent, they confirmed that some sequences were staged, but they discovered that much of the battle footage was authentic. The researchers also managed to identify some of the soldiers whose faces appear in the film, and tracked down their surviving relatives. The "new" documentary will air on Britain's Channel 5 this Saturday. American audiences can only hope that the History Channel or Discovery Channel will acquire the rights to this fascinating work.
Hat tip: Transterrestrial Musings.
Despite a week-long preparatory bombardment and careful planning, the Somme offensive quickly disintegrated into chaos and stalemate. Today, the first day of the Somme is not remembered not as the start of a decisive military campaign, but instead, as the bloodiest day in the history of the British Army. By the the end of that day, over 19,000 British soldiers had died, with another 35,000 wounded and more than 2,000 missing in action. The number of British combat deaths on that day was roughly equal to the number of soldiers assigned to a heavy division in today's U.S. Army. Put another way, the British lost the equivalent of the 101st Airborne Division in less than 18 hours of fighting. It was a military disaster of the first order.
Beyond the staggering loss of life, the Somme is also remembered as one of the first major battles captured by the motion picture camera. British cinematographers Geoffrey Malins and John McDowell were invited to film the battle, in hopes of producing a propaganda film. Instead, Malins and McDowell succeeded in capturing the brutal realities of trench warfare, and the human toll it exacted. Footage taken by Malins and McDowell was eventually edited into a feature film that was released to British audiences later that year. Simply entitled "The Battle of the Somme," the film remains one of the most widely viewed in British history. More than 20 million people saw the film in its first two months of release--roughy half of the wartime population of England.
Now, on the eve of the 90th anniversary of the battle, Malin and McDowell's film has been subjected to a critical analysis by a team of documentarians, historians and forensic experts. According to the U.K. Independent, they confirmed that some sequences were staged, but they discovered that much of the battle footage was authentic. The researchers also managed to identify some of the soldiers whose faces appear in the film, and tracked down their surviving relatives. The "new" documentary will air on Britain's Channel 5 this Saturday. American audiences can only hope that the History Channel or Discovery Channel will acquire the rights to this fascinating work.
Hat tip: Transterrestrial Musings.
Spies Among Us
***Update***
27 Jul/0430 PDT
Dr. J. Michael Waller at The Fourth World War offers this example of Montaperto in action, as an agent of influence for Beijing. We can only imagine how Montaperto slanted analysis on the PRC during his days at DIA.
A Hat tip to the reader posting as Fresh Air, for directing me to Dr. Waller's site.
***
This story broke on Friday, but it received comparatively little attention except in the blogosphere, and in Bill Gertz's story in the Washington Times. A former Defense Intelligence Agency analyst, Ronald Montaperto, has pleaded guilty to the illegal retention of classified documents, and admitted (in a plea agreement) to passing "top secret" information to Chinese intelligence officials.
There a number of things that bother me about this case. First, Montaperto was more than just a "line" analyst at DIA. Over a 20-plus-year-career in government, he advanced through the ranks, enventually becoming Dean of a U.S. Pacific Command think tank in Hawaii. In that position, Montaperto was at least a GG-15 (civilian equivalent of a full Colonel), or more likely, a member of the Senior Executive Service, equivalent to a military flag officer. In other words, a man with extensive, high-level contacts within the military and intelligence communities, a man that, potentially, could have passed large amounts of sensitive information to his Chinese contacts.
Additionally, there's the disturbing possiblity that Montaperto provided information to the PRC for an extended period of time. As Bill Gertz noted Friday:
"Montaperto admitted to verbally providing [Chinese military] attaches a considerable amount of information that was useful to them, including classified information," according to a statement of facts submitted in the case.
Montaperto told investigators he could not recall specific information he gave Chinese attaches Col. Yang Qiming, Col. Yu Zhenghe and other Chinese officers during his 22-year career in government. But the statement said it included both "secret" and "top secret" data. It also said he had close unauthorized relationships with the two officers.
--snip--
A Pentagon official said Montaperto's value to China included both the secrets he shared and his role facilitating Chinese deception of U.S. intelligence by providing feedback on how those efforts were working.
A senior U.S. intelligence official bluntly stated, "He was a spy for China."
During questioning by investigators in Hawaii in 2003, where he was dean of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Montaperto said he verbally gave Col. Yang and Col. Yu both "secret" and "top secret" information, the statement said.
Readers will note that Montaperto pleaded guilty to only a single count of illegally holding classified documents, punishable by up to 10 years in prison and a $250,000 fine. I haven't been able to access court documents in this case, but it sounds like Montaperto is getting off easy, in view of his admitted activities. One wonders why espionage charges weren't brought against the former intelligence official. I'm not a lawyer, and can only surmise that federal prosecutors lacked corroborating evidence, although Montaperto's "confession" seems quite damning. It's also a bit disturbing that a long investigation (that began in 2003) resulted in a plea on that single charge. Montaperto must have been adept at covering his tracks--or in destroying evidence that could have led to indictments for espionage.
Finally, you'll note that suspicions about Montaperto were first raised back in 1991, when he sought a position with the CIA. Again, this is supposition on my part, but I'm guessing that Montaperto may have failed a screening polygraph, and the agency alerted DIA. Apparently, the early inquiry into Montaperto's activities came to a speedy conclusion, and he kept advancing in the intel bureaucracy, culminating in leadership of that PACOM think tank.
The Montaperto case has some striking parallels to that of Ana Montes, another DIA analyst who was arrested and convicted of spying for Cuba. Ms. Montes served as a Cuban spy for an extended period of time, and (like Montaperto) she also rose steadily in the intel ranks. At the time of her arrest, Montes was DIA's senior analyst for Cuba, giving her access to our most sensitive information on Castro's regime, which she (in turn) passed to Fidel. Montes also reportedly betrayed information about U.S. efforts to detect adversary denial and deception, the same type of information that Montaperto passed to Beijing.
Montaperto also bears a resemblance to CIA turncoat Rick Ames. Some within that agency had doubts about Ames for years, but he retained his secruity clearance (and posting in sensitive positions), despite such warning signs as sudden wealth, and the discovery of classified information on his personal laptop. As a result, Ames continued his betrayal until the mid-1990s, resulting in the loss of key HUMINT sources in Russia, and the deaths of more than 20 operatives working for the U.S. According to court documents (and Bill Getz's reporting) it appears that Montaperto's spy career was prolonged by at least another decade, through bureaucratic indifference and incompetence.
A final thought: one reason for the plea deal (and potentially light sentence) may be the "contact" program that Montaperto participated in. At one point, DIA appparently encouraged some sort of contacts between selected employees and Chinese embassy officials. There may have been concern about potential disclosures within that program, if the Montaperto case was tried in an open court. A lot of information made its way to the PRC in the 1980s and 1990s, and there are probably a lot of government officials--current and former--who may be nervous or embarassed about what we gave the Chinese, under the aegis of an "official" program.
As for Mr. Montaperto, prosecutors should demand maximum punishment.
27 Jul/0430 PDT
Dr. J. Michael Waller at The Fourth World War offers this example of Montaperto in action, as an agent of influence for Beijing. We can only imagine how Montaperto slanted analysis on the PRC during his days at DIA.
A Hat tip to the reader posting as Fresh Air, for directing me to Dr. Waller's site.
***
This story broke on Friday, but it received comparatively little attention except in the blogosphere, and in Bill Gertz's story in the Washington Times. A former Defense Intelligence Agency analyst, Ronald Montaperto, has pleaded guilty to the illegal retention of classified documents, and admitted (in a plea agreement) to passing "top secret" information to Chinese intelligence officials.
There a number of things that bother me about this case. First, Montaperto was more than just a "line" analyst at DIA. Over a 20-plus-year-career in government, he advanced through the ranks, enventually becoming Dean of a U.S. Pacific Command think tank in Hawaii. In that position, Montaperto was at least a GG-15 (civilian equivalent of a full Colonel), or more likely, a member of the Senior Executive Service, equivalent to a military flag officer. In other words, a man with extensive, high-level contacts within the military and intelligence communities, a man that, potentially, could have passed large amounts of sensitive information to his Chinese contacts.
Additionally, there's the disturbing possiblity that Montaperto provided information to the PRC for an extended period of time. As Bill Gertz noted Friday:
"Montaperto admitted to verbally providing [Chinese military] attaches a considerable amount of information that was useful to them, including classified information," according to a statement of facts submitted in the case.
Montaperto told investigators he could not recall specific information he gave Chinese attaches Col. Yang Qiming, Col. Yu Zhenghe and other Chinese officers during his 22-year career in government. But the statement said it included both "secret" and "top secret" data. It also said he had close unauthorized relationships with the two officers.
--snip--
A Pentagon official said Montaperto's value to China included both the secrets he shared and his role facilitating Chinese deception of U.S. intelligence by providing feedback on how those efforts were working.
A senior U.S. intelligence official bluntly stated, "He was a spy for China."
During questioning by investigators in Hawaii in 2003, where he was dean of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Montaperto said he verbally gave Col. Yang and Col. Yu both "secret" and "top secret" information, the statement said.
Readers will note that Montaperto pleaded guilty to only a single count of illegally holding classified documents, punishable by up to 10 years in prison and a $250,000 fine. I haven't been able to access court documents in this case, but it sounds like Montaperto is getting off easy, in view of his admitted activities. One wonders why espionage charges weren't brought against the former intelligence official. I'm not a lawyer, and can only surmise that federal prosecutors lacked corroborating evidence, although Montaperto's "confession" seems quite damning. It's also a bit disturbing that a long investigation (that began in 2003) resulted in a plea on that single charge. Montaperto must have been adept at covering his tracks--or in destroying evidence that could have led to indictments for espionage.
Finally, you'll note that suspicions about Montaperto were first raised back in 1991, when he sought a position with the CIA. Again, this is supposition on my part, but I'm guessing that Montaperto may have failed a screening polygraph, and the agency alerted DIA. Apparently, the early inquiry into Montaperto's activities came to a speedy conclusion, and he kept advancing in the intel bureaucracy, culminating in leadership of that PACOM think tank.
The Montaperto case has some striking parallels to that of Ana Montes, another DIA analyst who was arrested and convicted of spying for Cuba. Ms. Montes served as a Cuban spy for an extended period of time, and (like Montaperto) she also rose steadily in the intel ranks. At the time of her arrest, Montes was DIA's senior analyst for Cuba, giving her access to our most sensitive information on Castro's regime, which she (in turn) passed to Fidel. Montes also reportedly betrayed information about U.S. efforts to detect adversary denial and deception, the same type of information that Montaperto passed to Beijing.
Montaperto also bears a resemblance to CIA turncoat Rick Ames. Some within that agency had doubts about Ames for years, but he retained his secruity clearance (and posting in sensitive positions), despite such warning signs as sudden wealth, and the discovery of classified information on his personal laptop. As a result, Ames continued his betrayal until the mid-1990s, resulting in the loss of key HUMINT sources in Russia, and the deaths of more than 20 operatives working for the U.S. According to court documents (and Bill Getz's reporting) it appears that Montaperto's spy career was prolonged by at least another decade, through bureaucratic indifference and incompetence.
A final thought: one reason for the plea deal (and potentially light sentence) may be the "contact" program that Montaperto participated in. At one point, DIA appparently encouraged some sort of contacts between selected employees and Chinese embassy officials. There may have been concern about potential disclosures within that program, if the Montaperto case was tried in an open court. A lot of information made its way to the PRC in the 1980s and 1990s, and there are probably a lot of government officials--current and former--who may be nervous or embarassed about what we gave the Chinese, under the aegis of an "official" program.
As for Mr. Montaperto, prosecutors should demand maximum punishment.
Sunday, June 25, 2006
Crazy Jack
When Pennsylvania Congressman Jack Murtha began speaking out against the War in Iraq, his remarks gained instant credibility with his Democratic colleagues and members of the MSM. As we were told, Murtha was a retired Colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve who had served in Vietnam (perhaps you heard, John Kerry was there as well). That experience, coupled with Murtha's long support of defense issues (chiefly, programs that benefitted his district or relatives of his Democratic colleagues) made the Congressman an expert on Iraq whose views must be taken seriously, even if many of his comments make no sense from a military or political standpoint.
Speaking in Miami over the weekend, Murtha illustrated again why he cannot be taken seriously as a military expert, or even as a critic of American national security policy. At a town hall meeting sponsored by Florida Congressman Kendrick Meek (and held at Florida International University), Congressman Murtha announced that the U.S. military presence in Iraq is more dangerous to world peace than nuclear threats from North Korea and Iran.
Let that one sink in for a moment. From Murtha's perspective, American efforts to bring democracy and stability to Iraq are more threatening to global security than attempts by two rogue nations to develop and acquire nuclear weapons, and the means to deliver them against western targets. It goes without saying that Murtha's logic train jumped the tracks a long time ago, but there is no evidence that the Congressman's Democratic/university audience voiced event a hint of disagreement. To the contrary; I'd guess that Murtha's remarks probably received a standing ovation. Afterall, Murtha is an authoritative Democratic voice on national security matters, or what passes for one in today's version of his party.
When we last checked on Congressman Murtha, he was assuring Tim Russert that U.S. military forces in the Gulf region could be easily re-deployed to "nearby" bases on Okinawa. When Russet suggested that Okinawa is a bit distant for "quick reaction" forces assigned to the Middle East, Murth--with a straight face--assured Mr. Russert that American aircraft could reach the Gulf in no time at all.
Never mind the fact that Kadena AB (our primary airfield on Okinawa) is more than 4,000 miles from Baghdad. Never mind that the most direct route would require overflying China, a prospect that is exceptionally unlikely. Never mind that the "available route" (through the Malaccan Strait and across the Indian Ocean) would require 16-hour round-robin missions, and the support of much of our aerial tanker fleet. Never mind that such operations would create all sorts of diplomatic problems and wreak havoc with aircraft maintenance schedules, crew rest and a host of other operational issues. And finally, never mind that the Murtha "plan" simply doesn't make sense.
The real question here is at what point a (supposedly) informed member of Congress loses whatever shred of credibility he/she has left, and is held up to the scorn and ridicule they so richly deserve. Murtha has been easy meat for the blogosphere, where his pronouncements on Iraq and recent "air support" proposals were savaged by anyone with more than cursory knowledge of military operations.
Obviously, that's not the case in the MSM. Other than a few mildly tough questions from Tim Russert, Congressman Murtha has spouted his imbecelic "strategy" with nary a peep from the drive-by press, who seem to regard him as the greatest military thinker since Clausewitz. In another media era (or, say, if Murtha was a Republican) his remarks would be roundly criticized and quickly dismissed. The New York Times would probably weigh in with a lead editorial deriding the "folly" of such remarks, and invitations for the Sunday talk shows would probably cease.
But in today's media environment, Murtha has become a left-wing hero who will likely remain the Democrats' public voice for defense and security issues. That raises a couple of other questions: first, how did someone with such a marginal understanding of military issues ever rise to the rank of Colonel, even in the Marine Corps Reserve? The Corps has long prided itself on having officers and NCOs who can adapt to rapidly changing strategic, operational and tactical conditions, and "think outside the box" in developing innovative solutions. Murtha obviously missed that class at Quantico, and again failed to absord the lesson at intermediate and senior service schools--assuming (of course) that he actually completed those courses. In reality, Murtha's rise to the rank of Colonel is more a testament to the Corps' efforts to maintain a powerful ally in Congress than the Congressman's ability as a military leader.
And that brings us to our second, more pressing question: has Jack Murtha taken leave of his senses? His comments over the past week suggest a man who will say anything to keep himself in the media spotlight, or someone whose grasp on military reality appears to be fading. As the November election approaches, voters in Pennsylvania's 12th Congressional District should ask themselves if "Crazy Jack" is better suited for the House of Representatives, or (perhaps) a more confined, comfortable facility, with padded walls, and those nice, long sweaters that tie in the back.
Saturday, June 24, 2006
Today's Reading Assignment
Michael Ledeen at The Corner on the public's "right to know" about classified information, and the glaring double-standard practiced by The New York Times.
Hat tip: Powerline.
Hat tip: Powerline.
Friday, June 23, 2006
What Threat?
Less than 48 hours after a pair of Republican lawmakers announced a major discovery of WMD in Iraq, elements within the DOD and the intel community are in their normal spin mode. Since Senator Rick Santorum and Representative Peter Hoekstra (Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee) held the press conference on Wednesday, various "unnamed" defense and intelligence officials have assured us:
"They're old weapons."
"They're not useable."
"They pose only a limited threat."
"This wasn't the WMD we were looking for."
In other words (as California Representative Jane Harman told a network interviewer last night) "there's nothing new here." That begs an obvious question, namely what Ms. Harman defines as "something new." Until a couple of days ago, Congressional Democrats were only too happy to remind us that "Bush lied" because we never found any WMD in Iraq. Now, faced with the inconvenient truth that some of Saddam's WMD arsenal is still around, the Dims believe it's time to move along, and the MSM is only too happy to accomodate that request.
But let's examine the talking points. If the liberals are right, this is much ado about nothing. But if they're wrong, then the left has suffered yet another self-inflicted wound, proving (again) that they cannot be trusted with the nation's security. Do liberal claims about these recently-discovered weapons stand up to the facts? Decide for yourself.
1. They're Old Weapons. Admittedly, most of these chemical-filled shells and rockets were produced before the first Gulf War. But not all weapons lose their potency over time; sarin nerve gas--which was found in many of these weapons--remains extremely toxic, even over a long period of time. If one of those twenty-year-old sarin shells or rockets were detonated today, the effects could be just as deadly as when Saddam was using them against the Kurds, or against enemy troops in the Iran-Iraq War. More importantly, as a Powerline reader pointed out, the weapons may be old, but we didn't nkow anything about them until they were discovered by coalition forces. That discovery, coupled with the fact that many of the weapons were in fair-to-good condition, suggests someone in Iraq was trying to preserve them, and maintain at least a limited WMD capability. So much for the assertion that Saddam didn't have any WMD at the time of the 2003 invasion.
2. They're Not Useable. Critics who have downplayed the discovery point out that many of the chemical-filled rockets and artillery shells couldn't be employed, due to damage to guidance finds, nose cones, and other external features. However, such charges miss a critical point: the insurgents in Iraq don't have howitzers or rocket launchers, either, but they've employed left-over weapons extensively in IEDs and VBIEDs. A leftover 500-lb bomb or 155mm artillery shell doesn't need to fall from the sky to explode; all that's required is someone proficient in rigging some sort of remote-controlled detonator, and presto, an instant IED/VBEID that is just as lethal as if they'd been dropped from a plane, or fired from an artillery tube. The same holds true for the WMDs. The terrorists in Iraq aren't interested in launching chemical barrage with artillery; they'd rather use these weapons in a daisy-chain IED, creating a large cloud of mustard or nerve gas that could inflict mass casualties on a convoy, or a quick-reaction security forces. The recently-discovered WMDs are, in fact, highly-useable, just not in the conventional sense.
3. They Pose Only a Limited Threat. Once again, it depends on how you define "limited." My contacts tell me that the original NGIC report had a lengthy section depicting the potential effects of these weapons, used as IEDs or VBIEDs in an urban environment. Aginst U.S. troops, equipped with chemical detection and protection gear, the number of potential casualties would probably be low, once the threat was identified. However, against civilian target-- say, shoppers in an open-air market, the effects could be catastrophic. Only three nerve gas shells were used in one of Saddam's most horrific strikes, an attack against a Kurdish village that killed more than 4,000 civilians. The prospect of scores of military and civilian casualties from a daisy-chain of 2 or 3 chemical weapons doesn't strike me as a minor threat. Defense Secretary Don Rumsfeld apparently feels the same way. Hat tip: Powerline.
What has been announced is accurate, that there have been hundreds of canisters or weapons of various types found that either currently have sarin in them or had sarin in them, and sarin is dangerous. And it's dangerous to our forces, and it's a concern.
So obviously, to the extent we can locate these and destroy them, it is important that we do so. And they are dangerous. Anyone -- I'm sure General Casey or anyone else in that country would be concerned if they got in the wrong hands.
They are weapons of mass destruction . They are harmful to human beings. And they have been found. And that had not been by Saddam Hussein, as he inaccurately alleged that he had reported all of his weapons . And they are still being found and discovered.
4. This Wasn't the WMD We Were Looking For. There remains a popular misconception that the Iraq invasion was supposed to roll-up huge quantities of ready-made chemical weapons, and huge production facilities literally dripping mustard gas, sarin, VX, and a host of biological agents. What we found (instead) were large quantities of pre-cusor chemicals (think of them as raw ingredients) and dual-use facilities, which could be quickly converted to CW or BW production. Technically, an insecticide factory isn't a CW plant, but with a few minor modifcations here and there, a facility that produces bug spray can be converted into a nerve gas laboratory in minimum time. Saddam invested heavily in dual-use technology during the 1990s (in spite of U.N. sanctions), realizing that such facilities offered his best hope for hiding covert production efforts, or resurrecting his CW/BW capabilities once U.N. sanctions were lifted.
Reliance on dual-use technology and facilities, coupled with Iraq's extensive deception efforts (and possible pre-war shipments to Syria) made our pre-war "expectations" unrealistic. Moreover, the continuing discovery of chemical weapons in Iraq highlights fundamental flaws in weapons searches conducted by the U.N. and the Iraq Survey Group. The fact that U.S. troops are routinely finding weapons that supposedly don't exist underscores Saddam's apparent ease at hiding WMD. The fact that many of these weapons remain unlocated affirms the fact that the final chapter on WMD in Iraq is yet to be written--despite liberal efforts to close the book, once and for all.
"They're old weapons."
"They're not useable."
"They pose only a limited threat."
"This wasn't the WMD we were looking for."
In other words (as California Representative Jane Harman told a network interviewer last night) "there's nothing new here." That begs an obvious question, namely what Ms. Harman defines as "something new." Until a couple of days ago, Congressional Democrats were only too happy to remind us that "Bush lied" because we never found any WMD in Iraq. Now, faced with the inconvenient truth that some of Saddam's WMD arsenal is still around, the Dims believe it's time to move along, and the MSM is only too happy to accomodate that request.
But let's examine the talking points. If the liberals are right, this is much ado about nothing. But if they're wrong, then the left has suffered yet another self-inflicted wound, proving (again) that they cannot be trusted with the nation's security. Do liberal claims about these recently-discovered weapons stand up to the facts? Decide for yourself.
1. They're Old Weapons. Admittedly, most of these chemical-filled shells and rockets were produced before the first Gulf War. But not all weapons lose their potency over time; sarin nerve gas--which was found in many of these weapons--remains extremely toxic, even over a long period of time. If one of those twenty-year-old sarin shells or rockets were detonated today, the effects could be just as deadly as when Saddam was using them against the Kurds, or against enemy troops in the Iran-Iraq War. More importantly, as a Powerline reader pointed out, the weapons may be old, but we didn't nkow anything about them until they were discovered by coalition forces. That discovery, coupled with the fact that many of the weapons were in fair-to-good condition, suggests someone in Iraq was trying to preserve them, and maintain at least a limited WMD capability. So much for the assertion that Saddam didn't have any WMD at the time of the 2003 invasion.
2. They're Not Useable. Critics who have downplayed the discovery point out that many of the chemical-filled rockets and artillery shells couldn't be employed, due to damage to guidance finds, nose cones, and other external features. However, such charges miss a critical point: the insurgents in Iraq don't have howitzers or rocket launchers, either, but they've employed left-over weapons extensively in IEDs and VBIEDs. A leftover 500-lb bomb or 155mm artillery shell doesn't need to fall from the sky to explode; all that's required is someone proficient in rigging some sort of remote-controlled detonator, and presto, an instant IED/VBEID that is just as lethal as if they'd been dropped from a plane, or fired from an artillery tube. The same holds true for the WMDs. The terrorists in Iraq aren't interested in launching chemical barrage with artillery; they'd rather use these weapons in a daisy-chain IED, creating a large cloud of mustard or nerve gas that could inflict mass casualties on a convoy, or a quick-reaction security forces. The recently-discovered WMDs are, in fact, highly-useable, just not in the conventional sense.
3. They Pose Only a Limited Threat. Once again, it depends on how you define "limited." My contacts tell me that the original NGIC report had a lengthy section depicting the potential effects of these weapons, used as IEDs or VBIEDs in an urban environment. Aginst U.S. troops, equipped with chemical detection and protection gear, the number of potential casualties would probably be low, once the threat was identified. However, against civilian target-- say, shoppers in an open-air market, the effects could be catastrophic. Only three nerve gas shells were used in one of Saddam's most horrific strikes, an attack against a Kurdish village that killed more than 4,000 civilians. The prospect of scores of military and civilian casualties from a daisy-chain of 2 or 3 chemical weapons doesn't strike me as a minor threat. Defense Secretary Don Rumsfeld apparently feels the same way. Hat tip: Powerline.
What has been announced is accurate, that there have been hundreds of canisters or weapons of various types found that either currently have sarin in them or had sarin in them, and sarin is dangerous. And it's dangerous to our forces, and it's a concern.
So obviously, to the extent we can locate these and destroy them, it is important that we do so. And they are dangerous. Anyone -- I'm sure General Casey or anyone else in that country would be concerned if they got in the wrong hands.
They are weapons of mass destruction . They are harmful to human beings. And they have been found. And that had not been by Saddam Hussein, as he inaccurately alleged that he had reported all of his weapons . And they are still being found and discovered.
4. This Wasn't the WMD We Were Looking For. There remains a popular misconception that the Iraq invasion was supposed to roll-up huge quantities of ready-made chemical weapons, and huge production facilities literally dripping mustard gas, sarin, VX, and a host of biological agents. What we found (instead) were large quantities of pre-cusor chemicals (think of them as raw ingredients) and dual-use facilities, which could be quickly converted to CW or BW production. Technically, an insecticide factory isn't a CW plant, but with a few minor modifcations here and there, a facility that produces bug spray can be converted into a nerve gas laboratory in minimum time. Saddam invested heavily in dual-use technology during the 1990s (in spite of U.N. sanctions), realizing that such facilities offered his best hope for hiding covert production efforts, or resurrecting his CW/BW capabilities once U.N. sanctions were lifted.
Reliance on dual-use technology and facilities, coupled with Iraq's extensive deception efforts (and possible pre-war shipments to Syria) made our pre-war "expectations" unrealistic. Moreover, the continuing discovery of chemical weapons in Iraq highlights fundamental flaws in weapons searches conducted by the U.N. and the Iraq Survey Group. The fact that U.S. troops are routinely finding weapons that supposedly don't exist underscores Saddam's apparent ease at hiding WMD. The fact that many of these weapons remain unlocated affirms the fact that the final chapter on WMD in Iraq is yet to be written--despite liberal efforts to close the book, once and for all.
Thursday, June 22, 2006
Getting Tough With the DPRK
Former Defense Secretary William Perry believes the Bush Administration isn't being tough enough with North Korea. In an op-ed in today's Washington Post, Mr. Perry and his co-author, former Assistant Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, argue that if Pyongyang continues launch preparations for its TD-2 long-range missile, the United States should be prepared to destroy it--before it can be fired.
At first blush, Mr. Perry's suggestion seems surprisingly forceful, given his role in a Clinton Administration that (arguably) coddled Kim Jong-il, and entered into a sham "Agreed To" framework that allowed the North to build nuclear weapons, while receiving fuel and food assistance from the U.S. But apparently, the former SecDef has always been more hawkish than most of the Clinton crowd, particularly in his views on North Korea. The Post reports that Mr. Perry supervised plans for potential airstrikes against the DPRK in 1994, in the event that diplomacy failed.
Unfortunately, the paper ignores a salient fact in hyping Mr. Perry's "get tough credentials." In a Clintonian universe, diplomatic efforts with Pyongyang would never fail. In fact, the Administration was so anxious to conclude a deal with the North that it even endorsed the "diplomacy" of former President Jimmy Carter, who helped broker the arrangement. Prospects for airstrikes against the DPRK in 1994 were about the same as George Patton's "phantom army" invading Normandy 40 years earlier. Talk of airstrikes was largely that--just talk, designed to nudge Pyongyang closer to an agreement. When the North saw it would get everything it wanted (and then some), a deal became inevitable.
But I digress. While we've long advocated a tougher approach against North Korea, Mr. Perry's may be a little too draconian. Taking out the TD-2 launch complex with sub-launched cruise missiles would be interpreted by Pyongyang as an act of war, and invite a similar response by the North. The DPRK has hundreds of ballistic missiles, and it's not inconceivable that Pyongyang could retaliate with a SCUD barrage against the South, and NO DONG strikes against U.S. bases in Japan and Okinawa. Such attacks would result in collateral damage, civilian casualties and a potential escalation into all-out war.
According to Mr. Perry, Pyongyang has little incentive to attack the south, since it would mean the end of Kim Jong-il's regime after a "few, short bloody weeks of war." That may be optimistic. As we've noted before, a successful invasion of the south requires that North Korea only grab the northern part of South Korea, including Seoul. Preventing that requires a massive influx of U.S. air and naval power--and the full mobilization of ROK reserves--a process that takes at least two weeks to complete. And that's assuming that we have adequate intelligence warning. With much of North Korea's military and missile forces postured near the DMZ, intel warning for a limited DPRK attack may be measured in hours, not days or weeks. In other words, Pyongyang has the ability to launch a surprise attack and gain many of their objectives before the full weight of allied combat power can be employed. Admittedly, the prospect of a NK ground attack is lower in the summer (when most of the troops are engaged in agriculture), but a counter-attack with ballistic missiles is a genuine possibility, easily executed.
Equally ludicrous is Mr. Perry and Mr. Carter's assertion that "creative diplomacy" could have averted the current crises. If they define innovative diplomacy in terms of the disasterous 1994 agreement, then we'll take a pass. In fact, one could argue that the "Agreed To" framework led to the current situation, by (a) allowing North Korea to proceed with the development of nuclear weapons and delivery platforms, and (b) teaching Pyongyang that the Americans will eventually cave to your demands, if you only bluster and threaten enough. Perry and Carter were part of a national security team that proved--conclusively--that unilateral diplomacy doesn't work with North Korea.
From our perspective, Bush Administration plans to possibly engage the TD-2 with ballistic missile defenses (if it threatens U.S. territory). The odds for a successful engagement are better than Mr. Perry and Mr. Carter would have you believe, and, more importantly, the BMD scenario provides more flexibility in dealing with North Korea after the event occurs. The Perry-Carter approach would work only if the U.S. had hard intelligence that the TD-2 will be an ICBM test (vice a space vehicle launch), and had pre-deployed enough combat power to deter an escalated North Korean response. Absent those factors, the Bush Administration's measured response is a better option, at least for now.
At first blush, Mr. Perry's suggestion seems surprisingly forceful, given his role in a Clinton Administration that (arguably) coddled Kim Jong-il, and entered into a sham "Agreed To" framework that allowed the North to build nuclear weapons, while receiving fuel and food assistance from the U.S. But apparently, the former SecDef has always been more hawkish than most of the Clinton crowd, particularly in his views on North Korea. The Post reports that Mr. Perry supervised plans for potential airstrikes against the DPRK in 1994, in the event that diplomacy failed.
Unfortunately, the paper ignores a salient fact in hyping Mr. Perry's "get tough credentials." In a Clintonian universe, diplomatic efforts with Pyongyang would never fail. In fact, the Administration was so anxious to conclude a deal with the North that it even endorsed the "diplomacy" of former President Jimmy Carter, who helped broker the arrangement. Prospects for airstrikes against the DPRK in 1994 were about the same as George Patton's "phantom army" invading Normandy 40 years earlier. Talk of airstrikes was largely that--just talk, designed to nudge Pyongyang closer to an agreement. When the North saw it would get everything it wanted (and then some), a deal became inevitable.
But I digress. While we've long advocated a tougher approach against North Korea, Mr. Perry's may be a little too draconian. Taking out the TD-2 launch complex with sub-launched cruise missiles would be interpreted by Pyongyang as an act of war, and invite a similar response by the North. The DPRK has hundreds of ballistic missiles, and it's not inconceivable that Pyongyang could retaliate with a SCUD barrage against the South, and NO DONG strikes against U.S. bases in Japan and Okinawa. Such attacks would result in collateral damage, civilian casualties and a potential escalation into all-out war.
According to Mr. Perry, Pyongyang has little incentive to attack the south, since it would mean the end of Kim Jong-il's regime after a "few, short bloody weeks of war." That may be optimistic. As we've noted before, a successful invasion of the south requires that North Korea only grab the northern part of South Korea, including Seoul. Preventing that requires a massive influx of U.S. air and naval power--and the full mobilization of ROK reserves--a process that takes at least two weeks to complete. And that's assuming that we have adequate intelligence warning. With much of North Korea's military and missile forces postured near the DMZ, intel warning for a limited DPRK attack may be measured in hours, not days or weeks. In other words, Pyongyang has the ability to launch a surprise attack and gain many of their objectives before the full weight of allied combat power can be employed. Admittedly, the prospect of a NK ground attack is lower in the summer (when most of the troops are engaged in agriculture), but a counter-attack with ballistic missiles is a genuine possibility, easily executed.
Equally ludicrous is Mr. Perry and Mr. Carter's assertion that "creative diplomacy" could have averted the current crises. If they define innovative diplomacy in terms of the disasterous 1994 agreement, then we'll take a pass. In fact, one could argue that the "Agreed To" framework led to the current situation, by (a) allowing North Korea to proceed with the development of nuclear weapons and delivery platforms, and (b) teaching Pyongyang that the Americans will eventually cave to your demands, if you only bluster and threaten enough. Perry and Carter were part of a national security team that proved--conclusively--that unilateral diplomacy doesn't work with North Korea.
From our perspective, Bush Administration plans to possibly engage the TD-2 with ballistic missile defenses (if it threatens U.S. territory). The odds for a successful engagement are better than Mr. Perry and Mr. Carter would have you believe, and, more importantly, the BMD scenario provides more flexibility in dealing with North Korea after the event occurs. The Perry-Carter approach would work only if the U.S. had hard intelligence that the TD-2 will be an ICBM test (vice a space vehicle launch), and had pre-deployed enough combat power to deter an escalated North Korean response. Absent those factors, the Bush Administration's measured response is a better option, at least for now.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)