A Convenient (and Profitable) Exit

Lois Lerner, the embattled director of the IRS's Tax Exempt Organizations Division, has announced her retirement from the agency.  She leaves under a cloud, but will collect a pension estimated at more than $115,000 a year (National Review photo) 


Lois Lerner, the IRS official at the center of the efforts to harass Tea Party groups and deny them tax-exempt status, is bowing out.  Ms. Lerner, who has been on administrative leave--with pay--since late May has retired from the agency, according to The Wall Street Journal.

A Democratic congressional aide said Ms. Lerner's decision came after an IRS review board had informed her that it was set to propose her removal from the agency. The board had found "neglect of duties" during her tenure as director of the IRS exempt-organizations division, as well as mismanagement consistent with critical findings of an earlier inspector general's report, the aide said. However, the congressional aide noted the board found no evidence of political bias or willful misconduct.

"Removing" Lerner from the IRS would have been the first step in her termination as a federal employee.  But Ms. Lerner avoided that possibility by simply submitting her retirement paperwork.  And we're guessing the agency set new records in approving her request, since it can now depict the targeting of conservative groups as the actions of a "former" employee.

In exchange for falling on her sword, Lerner will be nicely compensated.  As a career federal bureaucrat, she has a fat government pension to fall back on, somewhere in the neighborhood of $115,000 annually.  This calculation is based on Lerner's coverage under the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS), which covers government workers who began their careers before 1987.

Retirement annunities governed by that plan are based on a percentage of the employee's highest three-year salary average.  During the latter stages of her IRS career, Lerner averaged $185,000 a year; using the Office of Personnel Management formula, that gives the disgraced federal official an estimated monthly retirement check of $10,110, before taxes and other deductions.

We use the term "estimated" because it's been virtually impossible to find a biography of Ms. Lerner that provides a complete listing of her federal service.  This much we know: after earning her bachelor's at Northeastern University, Lerner graduated from the Western New England University School of Law in 1978.  Then, she made a beeline for D.C., signing on as a staff attorney at the Carter Justice Department.  Eight years later, she moved to the Federal Election Commission, where her partisan enforcement style first became obvious.  From Eliana Johnson at National Review:

One of Lerner’s former colleagues tells National Review Online that her political ideology was evident during her tenure at the FEC, where, he says, she routinely subjected groups seeking to expand the influence of money in politics — including, in her view, conservatives and Republicans — to the sort of heightened scrutiny we now know they came under at the IRS.

[snip]

“I’ve known Lois since 1985,” says Craig Engle, a Washington, D.C., attorney who from 1986 to 1995 served as the executive assistant to one of the FEC’s commissioners and later worked as general counsel to the National Republican Senatorial Committee. “I’m probably one of the few people in Washington who really knows her whole career as opposed to those who have come across her lately.”

Engle describes Lerner as pro-regulation and as somebody seeking to limit the influence of money in politics. The natural companion to those views, he says, is her belief that “Republicans take the other side” and that conservative groups should be subjected to more rigorous investigations. According to Engle, Lerner harbors a “suspicion” that conservative groups are intentionally flouting the law.          

Despite her obvious "suspicion" (read: bias), Ms. Lerner's career flourished at the FEC, where she held the position as Associate General Counsel and head of the Enforcement Office.  From there, she joined the IRS in 2001, rising to the top of its Tax Exempt Organizations division, giving her enormous influence over political groups applying for that status.  By our count, Lerner spent at least 34 years on the federal payroll, using her position to target conservative groups and candidates.  And despite obvious warning signs from her FEC days, few raised objections to her tactics and enforcement "style" until the IRS scandal erupted earlier this year.   

So why did Lerner quit?  The odds of her actually being fired from the bureaucracy are ridiculously low; a 2011 study by USA Today found that the average federal worker was more likely to die on the job than be dismissed for cause.  For personnel at the upper levels of the GS scale and members of the Senior Executive Service, the chances of being dismissed are akin to being struck by a meteorite.  During FY2011, the paper reported, the federal government fired only 11,000 personnel--out of a workforce of more than 2 million (excluding postal service workers and military personnel).   

We're guessing that Ms. Lerner was told to submit her retirement papers, probably by the new IRS Commissioner and (likely) at the direction of the White House.  Both the administration and the agency want to move beyond the targeting scandal, and having the central figure on paid vacation certainly doesn't help that cause.     There is also reason to believe that even more damning revelations about Lerner and her minions are about to unfold and there's still the possibility (albeit remote) that the former bureaucrat could face criminal prosecution some day. 

By retiring now, Lerner has effectively secured her six-figure pension; as outlined in a recent report by the Congressional Research Service, laws that can strip pensions from convicted members of Congress--and other senior government officials--are rarely enforced.  In fact, a CNN report (from 2007) estimated that 20-25 former Congressmen, all convicted of various offenses, were still collecting their federal pensions at that time, even while incarcerated.
               
Against that backdrop, Ms. Lerner has little to worry about, even if lightning strikes (quite literally) and she spends a little time behind bars.  It's easy to run a politically-motivated vendetta when you have little to fear in the way of punishment.       

Passing the Buck

In the wake of Monday's mass shooting at the Washington Navy Yard, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel has, predictably, ordered an inquiry into security practices at the nation's military installations. 

According to some reports, the probe will focus on physical security at bases and other facilities controlled by the armed forces, along with a review of security clearance procedures.  The gunman responsible for yesterday's massacre, 34-year-old Aaron Alexis, held a "Secret" security clearance--and as a defense contractor had acess to military posts, despite a history of discipline problems during his time in the Navy Reserve and treatment for mental illness.

Perhaps Mr. Hagel and Navy Secretary Ray Mabus will expand the official inquiry to determine who "passed the buck" on an individual who should have been booted from the reserves for his conduct and denied both a security clearance and employment as a defense contractor.  As more is learned about the former Petty Officer, we seem ample opportunities for intervention--opportunities that were continually ignored, for whatever reasons.

Sadly, this isn't the first time that commanders and supervisors have taken a pass on dealing with a troubled individual, with deadly consequences.  And we're not referring to Fort Hood, either.

Flashback to 1992.  A young man from Michigan with a long history of mental illness appeared at an Air Force recruiting office.  Apparently, his problems never surfaced during the enlistment process; the individual either lied to the recruiters, or the service ignored potential warning signs.  With a solid score on his ASVAB, the individual was allowed to enlist and shipped out for basic training.

At Lackland AFB, the recruit's military training instructor (MTI) observed behavior he considered alarming.  The MTI referred the recruit to the base mental health clinic and urged his squadron commander to begin paperwork for an administrative discharge.  Mental health professionals at the clinic concurred with his assessment.  But the commander decided the new airman deserved a second chance and ignored the advice of her MTI and base psychologists.  The troubled recruit made it through basic and moved on to technical school at Lowry AFB, Colorado. 

A similar pattern was observed during the long training course.  The airmen went through several roommates; all complained about his odd behavior, and one received a death threat from him.  Once again, the airman was referred to base mental health specialists--and once again--he was recommended for discharge.  But a senior officer in the airman's chain-of-command rejected that request, because the disturbed young man "made good grades" in the equipment calibration technician course.  Never mind that he threatened to kill a roommate.  Or was often observed sitting by himself, laughing out loud.  Or simply staring at the wall for long periods of time.

After tech school, the disturbed airman was sent to his first duty station, at Fairchild AFB, Washington.  There, his behavior grew more disturbing.  Asked by his roommate where he was from, the airman said he "needed to get to know someone before answering a question like that."  The airman also masturbated in front of his roommate and his girlfriend.  There was another referral to the mental health clinic and once more, a recommendation for discharge.  Again, the recommendation was ignored.  The commander wanted the Air Force to recoup some of the money it had invested in the airman's training; besides, he was doing "okay" at work.

As the airman's behavior continued to deteriorate, he was sent to the USAF's Wilford Hall Medical Center (back at Lackland) for in-patient psychiatric treatment.  During his stay, the airman was diagnosed with several serious mental conditions--all of which were grounds for discharge.  Yet, he somehow managed to avoid discharge.  After extended treatment, the airman was reassigned to Cannon AFB, New Mexico.

Not surprisingly, the young man's bizarre behavior continued at his new assignment.  But commanders at Cannon refused to pass the buck.  Acting on the advice of his superiors (and their mental health team), they discharged the airman in early 1994, citing a severe personality disorder.  Unable to dodge the separation bullet, the airman opted for the cash value of his ticket home and withdrew his savings (about $6,000) from a local bank.  But the team at Cannon did make one mistake; they didn't consider the individual's potential for violence and failed to warn his old base (Fairchild) that the disturbed airman had been discharged.

On the afternoon of 20 June 1994, the airman took a cab back to the base hospital--an ungated, unsecure facility.  He was carrying a Chinese-made MAK-90 assault rifle.  Once inside the hospital, he went to the offices of Major Thomas Brigham, a psychiatrist, and Captain Alan London, a psychologist.  Both had recommended the airman's discharge when he was assigned to Fairchild.  After fatally shooting the two mental health providers, he strolled through the hospital, firing at anything that moved.  He killed three more individuals (and wounded 22 others) before being killed by Senior Airman Andrew Brown, a security policeman on bike patrol.  Airman Brown stopped the gunman at a range of 70 yards, firing four shots from his 9mm pistol.  One of the bullets struck the shooter between the eyes.  It was a remarkable feat of marksmanship.  

The deranged airman was Dean Mellberg.  The subsequent investigation into the massacre--and the events that led to it--revealed the long list of missed warning signs and commanders who refused to deal with the problem.  Yet, there is no evidence that any of them were ever sanctioned for allowing a disturbed individual to remain on active duty, perpetuating the danger that eventually exploded on that terrible June day almost 20 years ago.

Making matters worse, it appears that the defense department learned little from the Fairchild incident.  Fifteen years later at Fort Hood and again this week at the Washington Navy Yard, we saw the consequences of command chains that chose to ignore a festering problem.  Major Nidal Hasan, the Army psychiatrist who killed 13 people at the Texas base became a radicalized jihadi literally before the eyes of his fellow residents at Walter Reed Medical Center in Washington.  They recognized the danger and reported Hasan's comments and actions to their superiors, who did....nothing.  According to various accounts, some senior officers worried about the potential "impact" of investigating and disciplining a Muslim officer, fearing it would jeopardize the Army's treasured "diversity."  There were ample red flags in the months before Hasan's rampage--and those concerns were communicated to officers with the power to neutralize the threat.  Instead, they chose to look the other way. 

And the same pattern is evident in the case of Aaron Alexis.  His long list of disciplinary problems in the Navy Reserve were indicative of someone unsuited for military service.  Collectively, his supervisors in the reserve had more than enough information to punish Alexis and begin discharge proceedings, but instead, they took a powder.  He was promoted to Petty Officer Third Class; his security clearance was never in jeopardy (as far as we can tell) and he left the reserves with an honorable discharge, apparently because his unit was happy to get rid of him--without all the paperwork and headaches of an administrative discharge and/or disciplinary action. 

To be sure, there are limits on what a military commander can do; ditto for mental health professionals in the armed forces and boards that (typically) determine if an individual will be discharged or allowed to remain in service.  But that doesn't excuse what happened with Aaron Alexis.  The Navy Reserve let their "problem" walk out the gate, with little regard for the potential, long-term consequences, following the sorry example set in the Mellberg case and the Fort Hood massacre. 

Being a commander, senior enlisted advisor, first sergeant (or anyone else involved in disciplinary and discharge proceedings) is hardly an easy job.  But it comes with the territory.  And one of the most important tasks facing anyone in that chain is making the quality cuts required to maintain a well-trained, motivated and disciplined force.  Military service is not a right--it is a privilege.  And the number of Americans who meet the minimum criteria to wear the nation's uniform is shockingly small and that's the way it should be. 

Obviously, no system is perfect, so when a few bad apples fall through the cracks of the recruiting and training systems, it's up to commanders, first shirts and Command Chiefs/Sergeants Major to determine if the new soldier, sailor, airman, Marine or coastie can be salvaged.  If they can't, it's time to make the cut.  "Flush early and often," as Chief Buddy would say. 

Unfortunately, some individals entrusted to make those tough calls aren't up to the task, and the consequences can be deadly.  Equally disturbing is the negative impact of political correctness and diversity on the military personnel and justice system.  It's an unspoken fact that some commanders are reluctant to punish (or discharge) minority members, fearing that individual will play the "race card" and ruin their careers.  Others are worried that a large number of disciplinary actions or discharges will highlight their squadron, battalion or section as a "problem area" in the eyes of their superiors, another potential problem for ambitious officers or senior NCOs trying to move up the food chain. 

But it's quite possible for units to maintain fair and firm discipline policies, without impacting the advancement of senior personnel.  Chief Buddy remains a legend in the blue-suit community; new arrivals learned on day one that he was watching them and if they couldn't maintain standards (or created problems within the unit), he would help them find another line of employment.  Strict adherance to the standards resulted in outstand units and Buddy still reached the Air Force's highest enlisted rank, Chief Master Sergeant.  He even received the ultimate compliment from a JAG officer who told him "you never made a bad call."  In other words, he thoroughly documented substandard or illegal conduct, so by the time the JAG and commander took a look, there was no question about how the matter would be handled. 

That should be the standard in the U.S. military (and it is in many units).  But, as evidenced by the shootings at Fort Hood and the Navy Yard, some senior officers apparently can't be bothered with the tough issues of unit discipline and removing those who are unfit for military service.  Such commanders are content to let those matters resolve themselves, and avoid any unpleasantness that might disrupt their next promotion.  To borrow another "Buddy-ism," that isn't leadership, it's chickenship.  And it's high time the military started holding those feckless "leaders" accountable.        

    

                          

       

   

The Fortress Myth

For the second time in less than four years, there has been a mass shooting at a U.S. military installation.

According to Washington, D.C. Police Chief Cathy Lanier, at least 12 people were killed this morning at the Navy Yard in the district's southeastern area, on the banks of the Potomac River.  The shooting occurred in a building that housed the Naval Sea Systems Command headquarters building.  More than 3,000 military and civilian employees worked in the facility.

As many as three gunman may have been involved in the shooting. At a press briefing shortly after 2 pm Eastern Time, Chief Lanier told reporters that one shooter was killed by security personnel responding to the incident.  Fox News (and other media outlets) later identified as 34-year-old Aaron Alexis from Fort Worth, Texas.  According to some reports, Alexis was a Navy contractor who was recently hired to work by The Experts, an IT firm working with Hewlett-Packard on a project involving the Navy and Marine Corps intranet.  A senior executive with The Experts said that Alexis previously worked for the company in Japan in 2012.

At mid-afternoon, the search for other suspects was continuing.  At least one individual, reportedly wearing a "tan-style" [Navy] uniform had been contacted by authorities and cleared as a suspect.  But police were still looking for another person, also clad in a military-style uniform.  By late evening, police had dismissed the theory of additional gunmen, deciding that Aaron Alexis acted alone.

Earlier reports on the dead gunman--which identified him as a retired Navy officer or Petty Officer--proved false.  Those initial accounts were reportedly based on a military ID card found at the scene, raisinig the possibility that a lost or stolen card was used by the shooter to gain access to the Navy Yard.  While that scenario has subsequently been dismissed, ID cards remain a security vulnerability for DoD.

To gain access to a base or facility, individuals are required to present an ID card at the gate or entry control point.  Those cards are issued by the military, at the Pass and ID facility that can be found at almost every base.  Active-duty personnel, uniformed reservists and eligible contractors receive a common access card (CAC) that contains a computer chip.  Other members of the military community, including dependents and retirees, are issued a uniformed services ID card.  That latter card utilizes older technology which can be more easily duplicated, or forged.

As I type this post, I'm looking at my own uniformed services card, issued when I retired from active duty more than a decade ago.  The picture is faded and the lamination could be easily pulled back, allowing someone to alter the photograph or information imprinted on the card.  There are also numerous on-line firms that will provide a phony military ID, for a price.

But even if the bad guys get their hands on an ID card, there are supposed to be additional lines of defense, starting with the guard at the gate, or entry control point.  Some are military police; others are civilian contractors.  DoD regulations require that security personnel check the ID of everyone attempting to enter the installation.  The operative word is "check."  In some instances, ID cards are scanned; the portable device is linked to the DEERS database, so if the card has been lost, stolen or it's a forgery, the guard will be instantly notified.  Security personnel are also required to visually inspect all cards presented for entry, ensuring that the photo matches the face of the holder, and and key elements (such as the branch of service and DoD shield) are present.  If something seems amiss, security personnel are authorized to turn away or detain suspicious individuals.

Sounds reassuring, right?  Think again.  At the height of morning rush hour, guards manning the installation's access gates or entry control points have only a few seconds to inspect each card.  Anything beyond a cursory review would create traffic jams in just a matter of minutes.  Additionally, you'd be surprised to learn just how infrequently cards are scanned against the data base, and how few bases require individuals seeking entry to obtain a visitor's pass.

Let me cite a personel example: in my current job, I visit military installations around the country and in some cases, security is surprisingly lax.  A few weeks back, I visited a major Army post in western Texas; that particular base is an open installation; anyone presenting a valid ID (including a driver's license) can access the post.  Among the bases I travel to on a recurring basis, none are open posts, but almost none bother to scan the ID cards that pass through their gates.

Given those realities, it's little surprise that the shooter (or shooters) was able to breeze onto the Navy Yard this morning.  Once inside the gate, it was simply a matter of finding a parking space, grabbing weapons and heading into the building.  More detailed vehicle checks, which might have uncovered Alexis's small arsenal, are rarely conducted, particularly during morning rush hour, when hundreds of drivers are attempting to access the base.
There are obvious solutions for these problems.  First, bring back base decals which were required for years on the front of vehicles allowed to access the base.  The decals, which were eliminated in a cost-savings measure, provided another level of verification for individuals entering the post.  Now, in the "post-decal" era, virtually any vehicle can enter the post, as long as the driver presents a valid ID card.

Additionally, the Uniformed Services ID Card should be upgraded, making it more resistant to tampering and forgery.  Few would argue that retirees and dependents need CAC cards, but incorporation of biometric and tamper-resistent features would make it more difficult for criminals, terrorists and psychopaths to obtain phony documents.

Beyond that, the inspection process at the gate must become more careful and detailed.  Every ID card should be scanned and if the holder can't be found in the database, access should be denied.  If the card isn't scanned, it becomes relatively easy for individuals to enter the post, using forged or stolen identification cards.

DoD should also spend whatever it takes to clean up the databases used to issue and track ID cards.  Unfortunately, the system doesn't always catch important changes, such as the death of a military retiree, a new marriage, or the loss of an ID card.  Consequently, a clever criminal or enterprising terrorist stands a good chance of getting on base with a stolen or forged card.

There's nothing particularly "revolutionary" about these fixes--just implementing corrective measures that should be mandatory on any military installation.  And here's another idea: why not put more armed personnel on patrol around the post?  Every armed forces organization have individuals who can be trained and pressed into service as security augmentees.  A greater armed presence could have a deterrent effect on individuals contemplating future attacks.  Another solution is allowing some service members to enjoy the same, concealed carry rights afforded to their civilian counterparts.

In an era when many Americans have no contact with the military, they (incorrectly) assume that military bases are virtually fortresses, and almost impervious to this type of attack.  Those of us who served knew better; the Fort Hood massacre exposed the vulnerability of military posts to this type of assault and today's events at the Navy Yard only reaffirmed those weaknesses.

So far, officials are dismissing the possibility of terrorism, even though multiple shooters may have been involved.  But rest assured that Al Qaida was watching and taking notes.  Today wasn't the first mass-shooting incident on a U.S. military base and it certainly won't be the last.

***ADDENDUM**
Subsequent reporting on Aaron Alexis reveals that he served four years on active duty in the Navy (apparently in the Dallas-Fort Worth area), but was eventually discharged for disciplinary reasons.  Still, Alexis managed to reach the rank of Petty Officer Third Class (E-4), which is common for a first-term enlistee.  And, despite the disciplinary issues that ended his Navy career, he was hired twice by the same defense contracting firm. 

Hmm....sounds vaguely reminiscent of Edward Snowden, the IT contractor accused of revealing hundreds of sensitive NSA secrets.  Despite getting bounced from Army basic training (and his lack of a high school degree), Snowden was hired by at least two defense contractors and given a TS/SCI clearance.  There were plenty of reasons to deny employment--and a clearance--to Mr. Snowden, but he was hired anyway and we know what happened after that.  Likewise, Alexis's dismissal from the Navy should have raised red flags about his suitability to work as a defense contractor, but he still got the job.  Alexis was preparing to start his new job at the Navy Yard at the time of the shooting and it's still unclear what prompted the rampage, though the former sailor had anger management issues.           

                              
 

From Debacle to Disaster

How does a foreign policy crisis move from mere debacle to absolute disaster in the matter of a few hours?  Just ask Team Obama.

Over a 12-hour span on Monday, the administration essentially ceded control of the Syria situation to Russian President Vladimir Putin and the regime in Damascus.  And the speed at which the transition occurred was simply stunning.  To be fair, President Obama's national security advisers are the weakest and most inept in 50 years.  But even by their low standards, the surrender on Syria was nothing less than jaw-dropping.  And here is how it happened.

The day began with Secretary of State John Forbes Kerry (in case you haven't heard, he served in Vietnam), trying to rally support for a military strike against Syria from the Arab League.  By most accounts, things were going well--or reasonably well, considering the corner Mr. Obama had painted himself into.  Sources indicated that Saudi Arabia and the other oil-rich kingdoms of the Persian Gulf would underwrite the cost of a U.S. campaign.  There is little love for Bashir Assad in places like Riyadh, Doha and Abu Dhabi, so the sheiks were willing to underwrite a potential U.S. strike, and push the dictator a few steps closer to oblivion.

Then, Mr. Kerry opened his mouth.  Trying to assure his audience that an American attack wouldn't become an all-out war, he described the planned strike as "unbelieveably small."  You could almost hear the cheers from Damascus.  Then, just a few minutes later, he suggested a strike might be averted if Mr. Assad gave up his chemical weapons arsenal.

That certainly got the attention of Vladimir Putin.  In near-record time, the Russian leader agreed to lead efforts to put Syria's WMD arsenal under "international" control.  Stunned by Kerry's blunder--and Putin's clever exploitation--President Obama initially tried to "walk back" the remarks of his Secretary of State.  But a few hours later, he gave up on that futile effort and "welcomed" the diplomatic initiative in a series of TV interviews.

Now, some 24 hours later, the Obama Crew is in full spin mode, hailing the original gaffe as a genuine "breakthrough."  And many of the stenographers in the mainsteam press are more than happy to echo that narrative.

But wait just a minute.  What exactly have Mr. Obama and his advisers agreed to?

Let's start with the notion of the "international community" gaining control of Assad's chemical weapons inventory.  Remember the various organizations charged with finding Saddam's WMD in Iraq, or tracking down the Iranian nuclear program?  Describing them as less-than-successful would be charitable, at best.  There is virtually no guarantee than any of them would have more luck in Syria.

And of course, we can certainly trust Vladimir Putin.  After all, Syria has been Moscow's chief client state in the Middle East for more than 30 years and its' a fair bet that Russian WMD technology has "assisted" Damascus's development of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.  Does anyone really expect Putin to come clean about his nation's role in the Syrian chem program, or pressure Assad into full disclosure?  Beyond that, what does Putin expect in return?  A free hand in making deals with Iran?  The end of U.S. missile defense?  Far greater cuts in our nuclear arsenal while Moscow modernizes?  All the above?  

There's also the matter of what the Syrian dictator gains by giving up his WMD program--except cancellation of a U.S. attack.  Chemical, biological and even nuclear weapons are one of Assad's ultimate guarantors of his regime.  Without them, the imbalance of power between Syria and its powerful neighbors (Israel and Turkey) becomes even more pronounced, and will certainly influence their strategic thinking.  The lack of WMD will also weaken Assad's hand in the on-going civil war.

In other words, Bashir Assad has plenty of reasons to play the shell game perfected over the past 20 years by North Korea and Iran, among others.  Syria will make a show of allowing inspectors into a few sites and even turn over a few weapons.  But it's a safe bet that much of Syria's WMD will remain hidden, if not at secret sites inside its borders, then at bunkers in other countries.

Lest we forget, the current Director of National Intelligence, (Ret) General James Clapper opined famously in 2003 that much of Saddam's arsenal was moved to Syria, before the U.S. invasion.  Similar claims were made in a book by the former chief of the Iraqi Air Force.  It wouldn't be hard for Moscow and Tehran to airlift Syrian chem and bio warheads in Iran, beyond the reach of international inspectors.  Has anyone been monitoring IL-76 flights between Damascus and Iran in recent days?

But President Obama isn't about to let an inconvenient scenario interfere with the current "breakthrough."  He plans to ask Congress to put off a vote on military action for at least two weeks, to give diplomacy a chance to work.

You can move a lot of WMD out of a country in 14 days.  Watching this little fiasco unfold, we were reminded of another diplomatic "triumph" from the last century.  It was 1938 and British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain had returned from Munich and his meeting with Adolf Hitler, proclaiming "peace in our time."  We know how that turned out.

Of course, Mr. Chamberlain later admitted his mistakes.  Good luck getting a similar admission out of the current U.S. administration, now preoccupied with touting its "triumph."

Now, go home and sleep quietly in your beds.                                        

Cal Worthington, R.I.P.

Los Angeles car dealer Cal Worthington, in one of his famous TV commercials (Worthington collection via The New York Times)

Cal Worthington died Sunday at the age of 92.  If the name doesn't ring a bell, you (a) never lived in Southern California; (b) don't watch car dealer commercials on TV, (c) never worked in sales, or (d) all the above. 

Mr. Worthington was the Los Angeles-area car dealer whose angular features, cowboy suit and ubiquitious "Dog Spot" (an animal that was never a canine) graced thousands of commercials over a career more than 50 years.  The Television Advertising Bureau described him as the "greatest car pitchman" in the history of the medium, and it's hard to disagree.  At the height of his advertising blitz (mostly late at night, on local stations in LA), Worthington spent $12 million on commercials that aired 50,000 times a year.  His dealerships--that once stretched from Alaska to Texas--sold billions of dollars worth of vehicles and made Cal Worthington a very wealthy man.

Most advertising "pros" recoil at the Worthington model; by their standards, he did almost everything wrong.  In an era that favored smooth-talking announcers, Cal looked and sounded like your uncle from Oklahoma (where he was born and grew up during the Dust Bowl).  His spots weren't particularly artistic, but they certainly caught your attention.  There was Cal, doing a headstand on the hood of a car, promising to "stand on my head, 'til my ears turn red" (to sell a vehicle).  The background music was a jingle that was lifted from "If You're Happy and You Know It," with a home-spun chorus telling viewers to "Go see Cal/Go see Cal/Go See Cal" about every three seconds.  Incidentally, the jingle had 26 stanzas, for those keeping score at home.  Worthington wrote it himself.

But the pitchman reached his zenith in the early 70s, with his "Dog Spot" ads.  As he later told the Los Angeles Times, at least two competitors were featuring dogs in their commercials, including one dealer who promised a new puppy from the pound with every vehicle sold.  Worthington decided to lampoon them with Spot, who was (in other incarnations), a 1,000-pound pig; a bear, various birds, a python, a killer whale and perhaps most famously, a Bengal Tiger who seemed more interested in eating Cal than selling cars.

And, in those days before the 500-channel cable universe, Worthington had the ability to saturate the airwaves with his ads.  Whether your were watching Johnny Carson on KNBC; the CBS Late Movie on KNXT; Dick Cavett on KABC or movies and reruns on KTLA, KTTV, KCAL or KCOP, you couldn't miss Cal.  Seeing him astride Shamu..err, Spot, and hearing that jingle thousands of times a year did the trick; at the height of the great love affair between Californians and their cars, Cal Worthington put a lot of people of the road.

It was a classic American success story.  Born into poverty, Worthington dropped out of school in the ninth grade to help support his family.  When the U.S. entered World War II, he volunteered for the Army Air Corps and despite his lack of formal education, made it through flight school and became a B-17 pilot, flying 29 combat missions over such garden spots as Berlin and Hamburg.  After leaving the service, he hoped to become an airline pilot, but was rejected due to his lack of a college degree.

Instead, Worthington opened a gas station in Corpus Christi, Texas.  The station wasn't very successful, but the former bomber pilot quickly discovered his talent for selling cars.  By the early 50s, he had relocated to SoCal, opening the first car lot that eventually grew into an empire that included 29 dealerships.  At the time of his death, Worthington still owned at least four dealerships and a huge ranch in northern California.  He also remained an active pilot for much of his life, flying his Lear Jet to various appointments around the country.

In passing, Cal Worthington will be largely remembered for those thousands of TV commercials that made him a cultural icon.  But that does him something of a dissservice; Worthington belonged to that same generation of Americans that included men like Ray Kroc and Sam Walton; businessmen who were salemen at heart, that knew what their customers wanted and sold the hell out of their product line.  Selling, as practiced by a Walton, Kroc or Worthington, is an art.  But unfortunately, it's a dying art; today's generation seems less interested in closing the deal if it can't be done on-line.   

While reading Worthington's obituary in the Times, I happened to glance up and see a commercial for a local car dealer in the Richmond area.  No cowboy suit, no headstand, no Dog Spot.  In fact, the guy looked like he had stopped by the dealership after a shopping spree at the Armani store.  He was perfectly attired, blown dry and dripping sincerity.  Free oil changes for life; free engines, and a movie theater inside the dealership.  I'm sure the spot was carefully crafted by an ad agency and the message was focus-group tested.  Two minutes later, I couldn't remember the name of the dealer, or the nameplate he was selling.

Cal Worthington never had that problem.  R.I.P.
*****
ADDENDUM: Watch Cal's greatest hits here.

The Last 24 Notes

Today's reading assignment is from Matt Labash of The Weekly Standard, and his piece on "Bugles Across America," a volunteer organization that performs "Taps" at the funerals of military retirees and honorably-discharged veterans, utilizing a real bugler, and yes, a real bugle. 

The organization is run by Tom Day, a 73-year-old former Marine who decided those who wore the nation's uniform deserved something better than a recording of Taps on a boombox, or the rendering of those mournful notes on "the device," a bugle look-alike that also works electronically.  By his own estimate, Mr. Day has played Taps at more than 5,000 funerals, dating back more than 50 years.  But his mission took on additional urgency with the passing of the Greatest Generation--and a shortage of buglers. 

"..what to some might seem like a nice gesture or a morbid hobby was transformed into high calling in 2000. It was then that federal legislation passed stipulating that every honorably discharged veteran had the right to at least two uniformed military personnel to fold and present the flag, and to sound “Taps” at their funeral. Day thought this was good. The bad news, the fine print added, was that if a bugler could not be found, a recording should be used.


Finding a live bugler proved a mathematical impossibility. With 1,800 vets dying every day (at one point, World War II veterans were dying at the rate of one every two minutes), the military had only 500 buglers to share the load. Day estimates there’s considerably fewer now, with general cutbacks and sequestration. Honor guards were thus initially directed to bring boom boxes to funerals, looking to stealthily place CD players behind tombstones, as they prayed the disc didn’t skip or scratch, that the batteries didn’t fail, or worst of all, that instead of “Taps,” they hit the wrong track and accidentally played “Reveille.” “Sounds funny, but it’s happened,” Day growls.

To add greater insult, the Defense Department then introduced what it calls “ceremonial bugles.” In the venerable Pentagon procurement tradition of the $435 hammer or the $600 toilet seat, the digital bugles cost $530 a throw, and many purists/people-with-taste consider them abominations. Day’s volunteers, when they call them anything printable, tend to refer to these as “fake bugles,” while Day himself just calls it “The Device.” As one Navy musician tells me, “This is it, it’s the last song. Your veteran is dead. And it looks like you’re playing him off with something from Toys’R’Us.”

Bugles Across America, or BAA, became Mr. Day's personal response to the boom boxes and faux horns.  He has organized a network of some 8,000 players across the country, who now cover 35% of funerals for veterans and military retirees.  All are volunteers, who pay their own travel expenses.  Donations cover the organization's modest administrative expenses.

Read the whole thing.  And while you're at it, hit the donation button at the organization's web site and make a contribution.              

The Gathering Storm (Syria Edition)

It's often been said that a military plan never survives the first contact with the enemy.  By any reasonable estimate, we're still several days away from a first strike against Syria, yet our plan appears to be constantly changing. 

To be fair, no one outside the operational chain has actually seen the plan, so much of what we know is based on rumors and leaks, some well-informed, others near-fantasy.  But one thing seems clear; what was originally described as a limited, "catharic" attack--lasting only a couple of days--is now evolving into something much longer and more complex.

From today's edition of The New York Times:

 President Obama has directed the Pentagon to develop an expanded list of potential targets in Syria in response to intelligence suggesting that the government of President Bashar al-Assad has been moving troops and equipment used to employchemical weapons while Congress debates whether to authorize military action.

Mr. Obama, officials said, is now determined to put more emphasis on the “degrade” part of what the administration has said is the goal of a military strike against Syria — to “deter and degrade” Mr. Assad’s ability to use chemical weapons. That means expanding beyond the 50 or so major sites that were part of the original target list developed with French forces before Mr. Obama delayed action on Saturday to seek Congressional approval of his plan.

In some regards, the expanded target list might be viewed as a reality check.  The original plan outlined by administration officials seemed little more than a "feel good" strike, aimed (largely) at salvaging the Commander-in-Chief's reputation after Basha al-Assad crossed Mr. Obama's infamous "red line" on chemical weapons employment at least five times. 

Apparently, the President's national security team convinced him that a few volleys of cruise missiles would achieve little in the way of "hurting" the Syrian dictator; his military forces, or their ability to deliver chemical weapons.  Indeed, there was great concern in the White House about Assad winning the propaganda war, emerging from an underground bunker unscathed, after taking a direct blow from the U.S. military.

An expanded target list would suggest a longer campaign, forcing Assad to remain in hiding longer, while his armed forces absorb greater punishment.  That, in turn, will supposedly make it more difficult for the Syrian leader to rally his degraded forces.

But there are a couple of problems with that scenario.  A longer bombing campaign, with an expanded target list, requires more military force.  But so far, we're not seeing the required deployment of additional ships, planes and personnel that could sustain attacks for a period of weeks.  While some U.S. assets (notably B-52 and B-2 bombers) can stage from bases here in the CONUS, you need to position other units closer to the fight.

For example, let's say Mr. Obama and his planners want to mount tactical airstrikes against targets in Syria, using aircraft from the USS Nimitz, now positioned in the Red Sea.  Like any super-carrier, the Nimitz carries only about 50-55 strike aircraft (F/A-18s).  The rest are support platforms, such as the EA-6B or EA-18 (for electronic warfare support); the E-2C (for airborne early warning), or SH-60 helicopters, which perform a variety of missions, ranging from anti-submarine warfare, to search-and-rescue.  Four dozen Hornets can pack quite a punch, but they're not enough to cover an expanded target list, even with surface ships firing volleys of cruise missiles at targets ashore.

A sustained campaign against Syria would require scores of additional aircraft, ranging from KC-135 and KC-10 tankers, to AWACS platforms; SIGINT aircraft (such as the USAF RC-135); additional strike assets (notably F-16s and F-15Es), along with rescue and airlift assets, to name a few.  Some of those aircraft are already based in theater (RC-135s and F-15Es are based in England, while there is a wing of F-16s at Aviano AB, Italy), but other assets would have to be deployed from the states.  And if plans call for "round-robin" strike missions from places like Lakenheath and Aviano, our combat power will be decreased, since crews will spend much of their time flying to and from their distant targets.

So far, we haven't seen the required deployment of needed assets to airfields in Turkey, or Cyprus.  But, since this plan seems to be evolving on the fly, there is the possibility that such movements could occur in the coming days.  But that would further delay any attack on Syria, since the Pentagon would need more time to arrange the tanker and airlift assets needed to move aircraft and personnel to the Mediterranean.  At this point, with no mobilization orders in the offing, it seems the attack on Syria will be carried out by forces already on station, or those able to operate across long distances.  So, we're guessing that many of the "additional" targets will be reserved for the carrier air wing on the Nimitz, and bombers staging from Barksdale, Whiteman and Minot.

But we're not the only military power that can ad lib an operational plan.  Russian President Vladimir Putin has indicated that Russia might support Syria, possibly providing a "missile shield" to its allies in the region.  That appears to be a slightly-veiled reference to the S-300 air defense system, which has capabilities against both aircraft and cruise missiles.  Moscow has a contract to provide the S-300 to Syria, but has never fulfilled that obligation, bowing to pressure from Israel and the United States.

However, Mr. Putin may have changed his mind.  Russia's Interfax news agency reported today that a ship heading for Syria will stop in the Black Sea port of  Novorossiysk to pick-up a "special cargo" before completing its journey to Tartus.  Novorossiysk and other Black Sea ports have been traditional shipping points for S-300s being delivered to foreign customers.

Needless to say, the introduction of the S-300 would be something of a game changer, even though U.S. crews have practiced against similar air defense systems.  The potential delivery of the S-300 means Mr. Obama has a relatively short window to strike (with or without Congressional approval).  Otherwise, he'll need to add more assets, gear up for a longer campaign and prepare for potential losses of aircraft, missile and crews. 

And, did we mention the possibility of a military confrontation with Russian and Iran as well?  Tehran has also pledged to help Damascus, and they might use an American strike as a pretext for attacking our assets in the Middle East, or dragging Israel into the fray.  Likewise, Moscow could retaliate for U.S. attacks on Syrian bases where Russian advisers and technicians are operating.  It's a much more distant possibility than Iranian action, but something that cannot be entirely dismissed.

"Another fine mess," as Laurel and Hardy might say.  Except this one has deadly serious (and far-reaching) consequences, the product of security policy built on speeches, sound-bites and vows that meant nothing--until a Syrian dictator decided to call the Commander-in-Chief's bluff.            

         

     

Hide and Seek

The first wave of U.S. cruise missile strikes against Syria are just a matter of time--even if it takes a week (or more) for Congress to grant some form of approval. 

According to various sources, American military preparations for an attack are complete; a sixth U.S. warship joined a naval strike group in the eastern Mediterranean during the past 48 hours, increasing the number of missiles that could be launched against Syrian military facilities. President Obama insists he hasn't made a final decision on a strike against Libya, but if that choice is made, the attack could begin in a matter of minutes.

But, since the administration has largely telegraphed its attack plans, some analysts are wondering exactly what might be accomplished by the expected strike. Reuters reports that Syria has been busily repositioning SCUD missiles and launchers in recent days, making them more difficult to target:

President Bashar al-Assad's forces have removed several Scud missiles and dozens of launchers from a base north of Damascus, to protect them from a Western attack, opposition sources said on Thursday.

[snip]

The move from the position in the foothills of the Qalamoun mountains, one of Syria's most heavily militarised districts, appears part of a precautionary but limited redeployment of armaments in areas of central Syria still held by Assad's forces, diplomats based in the Middle East told Reuters [snip] At the headquarters of the army's 155th Brigade, a missile unit whose base sprawls along the western edge of Syria's main highway running north from the capital to Homs, rebel scouts saw dozens mobile Scud launchers pulling out early on Thursday.

[snip]

Rebel military sources said spotters saw missiles draped in tarpaulins on the launchers, as well as trailer trucks carrying other rockets and equipment. More than two dozen Scuds – 11-metre (35-foot) long ballistic missiles with ranges of 300km (200 miles) and more – were fired from the base in the Qalamoun area this year, some of which hit even Aleppo in the far north.

The 155th is one of the most important units in the Syrian military, responsible for operations involving SCUDs and other types of ballistic missiles. The brigade commander is the brother of Syrian President Bashir Assad, ensuring that orders from the dictator are carried out promptly, and to the letter.

Some intelligence organizations in the Middle East believe the 155th was responsible for the 21 August chemical weapons attack that killed hundreds of civilians in a Damascus suburb. Given its value to the Syrian regime, it's logical that the 155th and its missile assets would be near (or at) the top of any U.S. target list in Syria, and it's equally certain that Assad will do everythng he can to protect his chemical arsenal and delivery platforms.

And he might just succeed. In the Middle East, Syria is the most accomplished practitioner of denial and deception, skills acquired from Russian experts over the last 50 years. Damascus invests heavily in its deception program, utilizing everything from advanced camouflage netting and decoy equipment, to vast underground complexes and "drive-through" missile shelters.

Over the past decade, Syria has built additional, subterranean missile bases in the central part of that country, complementing the long-established Al Safir complex near the Turkish border. These facilities provide the capability for below-ground storage, maintenance and warhead mating for SCUDs and other ballistic missiles in the Syrian inventory.

Tunnel entrances at the Al Safir SCUD base in northern Syria. The entrances, which lead to a large underground complex, are flush with the side of a mountain, making it more difficult to target with precision weapons (Public Eye/Digital Globe imagery, posted at GlobalSecurity.org)

At other locations, the Syrians have built dozens of drive-through missile shelters, for both its SCUD force and shorter-range SS-21s. There are far more shelters than launchers and missiles, creating an elaborate "shell game" for potential adversaries. The shelters provide concealment during dispersal operations, after missile launches and during periods when enemy satellites and/or drones might be overhead. Damascus has maintained an effective satellite warning program for more than a decade; Syrian intelligence is very familiar with coverage windows for U.S. satellites, and it's a safe bet that recent movements occurred during gaps in our surveillance.

Similar measures will also be employed for other assets that might be targeted, such as attack helicopters that might have been involved in other chemical attacks. Choppers are easily dispersed and can be moved quickly. Simply shifting helicopters from a base to a nearby soccer field or empty farmland is enough to protect them from attack. Putting them in the sky works even better, since cruise missiles have no capability against airborne targets.  Chemical warheads can also be easily moved, and it's a safe bet that weapons not mated to delivery systems are on the move as well.

To be fair, there are limits to Syria's denial and deception program. Some targets, such as command-and-control facilities, can't be moved; if they are within 30-40 feet of the surface, these bunkers could be destroyed by cruise missiles, though conventionally-armed Tomahawks have a limited capability against hardened, buried targets. A better option would be B-2 stealth bombers, employing penetrating weaponry, but there are no indications (at this point) that President Obama will mount air strikes against Syria. 

It's also worth noting that Israel has always had great success against the Syrians, despite their extensive D&D efforts.  One reason for that is the extraordinarily productive human intelligence (HUMINT) campaign that Israel has waged against Damascus for more than 60 years.  Before the 1967 war (which saw Israeli forces take the Golan Heights), the number three official in the Syrian government was a Mossad agent and since that time, Israel's intelligence services have been able to recruit well-placed assets that have provided invaluable information.  

Conversely, there are few indications that the CIA has those types of sources in place.  Given that limitation--and the constraints being placed on our planned military action--it might be time to pose a rather obvious question: what happens if we mount a cruise missile strike and don't hit anything?

Posturing

As of this writing, four U.S. Navy destroyers are on station in the eastern Mediterranean, postioned (ostensibly) for a strike against Syria and its chemical weapons facilities. 

The move came four days after an horrific nerve gas attack in a Damascus suburb that killed at least 300 people, most of them civilians.  An Obama administration official said there is "little doubt" that forces loyal to Syrian President Bashir al-Assad were responsible for the slaughter.  It was merely the latest example of Asad using weapons of mass destruction against his own people, violating the "red line" that Mr. Obama imposed more than a year ago. 

Which brings us to that Navy strike group, now awaiting orders off the Syrian coast.  Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel says the U.S. is "prepared for all contingencies," but based on those recent military movements, it's fairly easy to envision what our response would be: a fusilade of cruise missiles, targeting chemical weapons storage complexes; command and control facilities and weapons systems capable of delivering chem and biological weapons. 

It sounds like a forceful response, but as retired Major General Bob Scales has observed, a few salvoes of cruise missiles doesn't represent a "strategy" in Syria, and it may have little effect on Assad's chemical weapons inventory, for a variety of reasons. 

First, there's the matter of timing.  The White House (understandably) wants hard evidence that Assad was behind the attack, evidence that can be presented to the U.N., our allies and anyone else who might be asked to support U.S. military action.  Of course, gathering and analyzing that type of information takes time, assuming you can actually gain access to it.  Strangely enough, the Assad regime announced today that it will allow a United Nations team to examine the site of last week's chemical attack, suggesting the government may have already tampered with the evidence that remains.  So much for conclusive proof. 

Additionally, the search for evidence will give the Syrian government more time to scatter its remaining CW assets.  It's a safe bet that the U.S. will not attack while the UN team is on the ground, so Assad and his generals may have a week--or longer--to move chemical weapons to secondary storage sites, and move light aircraft and helicopters to dispersal locations.  The expected delay could also give the Syrians time to mate chemical weapons with other delivery platforms, giving them more options for future attacks.  No wonder President Assad was so happy to honor the UN's inspection request. 

Various "experts" inside The Beltway claim that Mr. Obama is closer to military action than at any time since the Syrian conflict began more than two years ago.  Admittedly, there are no good options in Syria, and you can easily make the case that the U.S. missed its military window-of-opportunity long ago.  But when a dictator is gassing his own people--and the President insists such actions will not be allowed to stand--military action becomes almost inevitable, at some point. 

Other sources say the White House has been studying the 1999 air campaign against Serbia as a possible model for Syria.  But those assertions seem far-fetched; the air war over Kosovo came after a huge build-up of American airpower in southern Europe, and the campaign was an all-out assault against Belgrade's military forces.  Air strikes went on around the clock for almost three months, with Allied aircraft hitting everything from airfields and SAM missile sites, to the Serbian power grid. 

This time around, there is no surge of airpower in the eastern Mediterranean; in fact, there's been no mention of a carrier group in the region, usually one of the first power-projection assets to arrive on the scene.  Perhaps a better model for Syria is the air "campaign" that hastened Mummar Qadhafi's exit from power in Libya.  The number of sorties over Libya was a fraction of those flown against Serbia, and some of our partners complained openly that the U.S. wasn't "doing enough," particularly in the early stages of the effort. 

There may be similar mummurings this time around.  Without a build-up of air assets in places like Turkey, Italy, Sicily, and Jordan, any strike against Syria would be build largely around cruise missiles and sorties by B-2 stealth bombers, flying round-robin from their home base in Missouri.  While the B-2 has played a prominent role in all air operations since Kosovo, there has been some debate over potential strikes against Syria.  Assad's air defenses include relatively sophisticated SA-17 surface-to-air missiles, which pose more of a challenge than than the 1950s and 60s-era SA-2s and SA-3s found in places like Kosovo and Iraq.  But veterans of the B-2 program claim the jet has never been tracked for more than a few seconds--let along engaged by air defense systems--and they believe the stealth bomber would figure prominently in attacks on Syria. 

But without additional air assets--and the personnel and logistics for a sustained effort--any campaign against Syria would be fleeting, and its effects uncertain.  And that's probably the preferred option for this administration, which views drone strikes as the ideal platform for prosecuting the war on terror.  Hit selected targets; virtually eliminate the chance of collateral damage, and claim victory when the raid is judged successful.  Any combination of B-2 and cruise missile strikes on Syria would almost certainly follow that pattern. 

Would it have any impact on the conflict's eventual outcome?  Probably not, but that's not the objective.  Having painted himself into a corner with those red line comments--and embarassed by the Syrian regime--Mr. Obama now finds himself compelled to act.  So, he will likely borrow a page from the Clinton playbook and we don't mean Kosovo.  Instead, we refer to our response to the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.  In his reply to Osama bin Laden, Mr. Clinton ordered cruise missile strikes on terror training camps in Afghanistan (which were largely empty) and a suspected chemical weapons plant in Sudan, later identified as an aspirin factory.  We rather doubt that Assad's aspirin complex is at the top of potential target lists, but it does seem likely that the target roster is rather limited, and there won't be very many follow-on attacks. 

That's what happens when posturing becomes a substitute for strategy.                                        

Justice for Traitors

After years of fits and starts, military courts have finally imposed justice on Private Bradley Manning and Major Nidal Hassan. 

Manning, the former intelligence analyst, was found guilty earlier this week of passing reams of classified documents to Wikileaks, exposing various diplomatic and military secrets.  For his crimes, Manning received a 35-year prison sentence which will (most likely) be served in the U.S. Military Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Hasan, a former Army psychiatrist, was convicted earlier today on multiple counts of murder and attempted murder.  He was accused of gunning down thirteen former soldiers and civilians during a shooting spree at Fort Hood in November 2009.  Hasan, an American-born Muslim--whose medical education had been funded completely by the U.S. taxpayer--had become radicalized while completing a residency in psychiatry at Walter Reed Medical Center in Washington, DC. 

While his comments and behavior alarmed colleagues, Army commanders chose to look the other way, fearing a possible backlash for persecuting a Muslim officer.  Instead, they allowed Hasan to complete his residency, move on to a new assignment at Fort Hood, where he unleashed his deadly rampage after receiving orders to deploy to Afghanistan.

Hasan hasn't been sentenced yet, but it's clear he's angling for the death penalty.  After successfully petitioning the military judge to serve as his own lawyer, Hasan put up virtually no legal defense, calling no witnesses and passing on his opportunity to provide a closing argument.

Readers will note that neither Hasan or Manning were tried on treason charges.  It's difficult to prove that an American legally betrayed his country, and with ample evidence of other crimes, prosecutors elected not to charge them with treason.  Still, you can make a strong case that both Private Manning and Major Hasan betrayed their fellow Americans, engaging in acts that resulted in the deaths of military personnel (as in the case of the Fort Hood massacre), or contributed to casualties on the battlefield, thanks to the secrets betrayed by Bradley Manning.

While there is broad agreement that Hasan and Manning got what they deserve, neither is likely to fade away into the bowels of the military corrections system.  Just hours after his conviction, Bradley's defense attorney turned up on the "Today" show and issued a statement, announcing his desire to "live as a woman."

"As I transition into this next phase in my life, I want everyone to know the real me.  I am Chelsea Manning.  I am a female.  Given the way that I feel and have felt since childhood, I want to start hormone therapy as soon as possible," the statement read.

The statement also asked people to use the feminine pronoun when referring to Manning.  It was signed "Chelsea E. Manning" and contained a hand-written signature.

Almost as quickly, the Army released its own statement, noting that the military does not provide sex reassignment treatments or surgery, implying that Manning will serving his sentence as a man.

But don't expect Manning to give up without a fight.  By declaring himself a woman, the former intelligence analyst will create headaches for the military, in terms of where Manning will be incarcerated and how we will be housed in the prison population.  The military prison at Leavenworth accepts only male prisoners; female military inmates are housed at the Naval Consolidated Brig at Miramar, California. 

While the Leavenworth complex has been modernized in recent years, conditions at the Naval brig are considered "better," and Manning probably believes he would be safer in that environment.  However, such claims are specious, at best.  Security at Leavenworth is extremely tight, and attacks on prisoners are extremely rare.  Put another way, Bradley Manning will be far safer in Leavenworth than he would be in the general population at an equivalent civilian facility.

But it doesn't take a defense lawyer (or corrections expert) to see the real motive behind Manning's actions.  Faced with a long prison sentence, Manning and his supporters hope to make him the biggest "problem" in the military corrections system, based on unreasonable demands and perpetual legal appeals.  Various LGBT groups and the American Civil Liberties Union are lining up behind Manning, claiming the military cannot deny medical treatment to help him become a woman.  And somewhere, there is probably a federal judge who might agree, assuming that Manning's lawyers can get his case out of the military system.  If that happens--and it is very much a long shot--Manning could wind up at
a civilian facility, undergoing gender-reassignment treatments, on your dime.

Manning's defense teams hope the combination of legal maneuvering and pressure from the LGBT community will force President Obama to commute the turncoat's sentence before he leaves office.  
Again, the odds of that happening are rather small, but Obama knows that Democrats need the gay and transgender vote for 2014 and 2016, so if those groups maintain their pressure, Bradley Manning might be a free man well before 2048.

And sadly, we haven't heard the last of Nidal Hasan, either.  The former psychiatrist has his own medical issues (he was paralyzed by a police bullet during his shooting spree at Fort Hood), and it's a certainity that Hasan and his appellate team will emphasize his "special needs" during confinement.  Don't be surprised if they push for incarceration in a federal prison hospital (rather than Leavenworth), even if Hasan receives the death penalty.  It's also a safe bet that Hasan's surrogates will try to keep  
his case "alive" long after he becomes a military inmate.  At a minimum, the one-time Army Major will demand accomodations consistent with his "faith," then file complaints and appeals when those requests aren't met.  Put another way: Nidal Hasan, like Bradley Manning, will be a thorn in the side of the military justice system until the moment he expires from natural causes, or he is executed.  So, the saga of Major Hasan will continue to play out for years to come, in the nation's courts corrections system.

Quite a change from World War II, when military tribunals convicted Nazi saboteurs within weeks of their capture, and six of the eight were excecuted less than two months after they splashed ashore on Long Island.  Obviously, the cases of Bradley Manning and Nidal Hasan are different in one key regard: both are American citizens, with constitutional rights that had to be secured.  But it's positively absurd that it took years to convict both soldiers in open-and-shut cases.  And, it's even more nauseating that both will try to advance their agendas, from behind prison bars, while we pay for their incarceration and legal expenses.

Not much consolation to the victims at Fort Hood, or the individuals who were exposed by Bradley Manning's treachery.          
                               

Military Epidemics that Aren't

Today's essential reading from Thomas Donnelly, writing at The Wall Street Journal.  A few excerpts:

"...Begin with suicides by servicemen and women, which have increased in recent years—but by dozens of deaths, not in the epidemic fashion that news coverage sometimes seems to suggest. That said, the 349 military suicides in 2012 did exceed the 295 deaths of U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan. The question is: why?

A major study published this month in the Journal of the American Medical Association found that factors such as substance abuse, depression, financial and relationship problems accounted for the rise in soldier suicides—in other words, the same factors that influence civilians to take their own lives. "The findings from this study," the authors concluded, "are not consistent with the assumption that specific deployment-related characteristics, such as length of deployment, number of deployments, or combat experiences, are directly associated with increased suicide risk."

Nor does the rate of military suicides differ significantly from suicides in the general population. Using data from 2009, another study by the U.S. Army and the National Institute of Mental Health calculated the military suicide rate at 18.5 per 100,000, just below the civilian rate of 18.8 per 100,000.   [snip]   The recent debate about sexual assault in the military also reflects the notion that there is something fundamentally diseased about the institution itself. The New York Times has editorialized on "the military's entrenched culture of sexual violence." Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand (D., N.Y.) demands that the country replace the military chain of command with civilian legal processes in cases of sexual harassment and assault because the military is inadequate to deal with crimes of "dominance and violence and power." Ms. Gillibrand has been joined in her legislative effort by two leading libertarian Senate Republicans, Rand Paul and Ted Cruz.

Yet the numbers bandied about to show an epidemic of sexual violence in the U.S. military are questionable. In May, Capt. Lindsay Rodman, a judge advocate stationed at U.S. Marine Headquarters in Arlington, Va., reported on this page, for example, that the number of military sexual assaults frequently cited in Congress and elsewhere are based on a badly distorted interpretation of a Defense Department survey. In recent months the American public has often heard that 26,000 service members were sexually assaulted last year. But that statistic comes from an unscientific poll and refers to "unwanted sexual contact," including touching the buttocks or even attempted touching. *** Sadly, there are agendas at work here.  Ms. Gillibrand, like many liberals, harbors a deep suspicion of the military and those who run it.  She is quick to accept a flawed survey as "proof" that the armed forces are filled with sexual predators who victimize thousands of young women each year.  Unfortunately, scandals like those involving Air Force training instructors at Lackland AFB, Texas only reinforce those perceptions, and mask the distorted data.  It's worth noting that Gillibrand, Mr. Cruz and Dr. Paul are among the majority of senators who have never served in the U.S. military; they have little understanding of the chain-of-command concept and the critical role played by commanders in the military justice system.    On the issue of PTSD, it's worth noting that the system has become clogged with thousands of claims that are dubious at best.  For every soldier, sailor, airman and Marine who has experienced the horrors of combat first-hand--and bear the mental scars of that ordeal--there are dozens of claims by rear-echelon types who claim they're suffering PTSD as a result of their military service.    In some cases, their trauma is valid; consider an Air Force intelligence specialist, serving at a DCGS site at home or abroad.  Monitoring the feed from their UAV mission, they watch the convoy or patrol they're supporting come under attack and take casualties.  Or the military trauma teams who work at places like the large USAF hospital at Bagram, Afghanistan.  Many of the most badly-wounded wind up there; the struggle to save the lives of those soliders takes an enormous toll on combat surgeons, nurses and medics, miles from the front lines.    But in other instances, a PTSD claim becomes a way to earn a disability pension, pad existing benefits or get a break from future rotations.  Concerns about military mental health and suicide rates demand that each case be carefully evaluated, and relatively few claims are rejected outright.  Unfortunately, the bogus cases not only place a burden on taxpayers, they often delay processing of claims from servicemembers who are suffering from PTSD and other disabilities.  Perhaps the most blatant example of a "questionable" PTSD claim was the infamous case of Air Force Major Jill Metzger, who claimed she was "kidnapped" during a deployment to Kyrgyzstan in 2006.      Major Metzger's wild story had more holes that a block of Swiss cheese, but she was quickly awarded a 100% disability pension (based on PTSD) and placed on the temporarily retired list.  Despite her "disability," Metzger was able to compete in several marathons and she later returned to active duty.  At last report, she was stationed at a base in northern California and up for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel.     Going after the cheaters and gold-bricks would speed the processing of benefits for service members who suffered mental injuries and are in need of assistance.  Sadly, we don't know how many phony PTSD claims are in the military medical retirement and VA systems right now, but the number is conservatively estimated at "several thousand."     Now there's an "epidemic" worth  investigating.                        

Taking Flight

It was powerful symbol of a sudden shift in the balance-of-power in the Middle East. 

The "symbol" (in this case) was an Air Force C-17 transport, lifting off from an airfield in Yemen.  On board the Globemaster III were members of the U.S. diplomatic staff from our embassy in Sanaa, evacuated over concerns about a pending terrorist strike by Al Qaida.  While a small contingent will remain at the embassy, operations will be greatly curtailed and the State Department has urged all Americans to leave the country, noting that its ability to assist U.S. citizens will be greatly reduced, in an "extremely high" security threat level.        

Americans aren't the only ones fleeing Yemen.  Britain has announced plans to reduce its official presence in that country, assessing (correctly) that its diplomats and facilities may be targeted as well.  More western countries are expected to follow suit, amid reports that terror teams have been dispatched are now positioned near their assigned targets.  Al Qaida's most dangerous affiliate has long been active in Yemen, and many analysts believe it is a likely locale for a major attack. 

The decision to remove most of our official delegation from Yemen came after U.S. intelligence intercepted a communication from Al Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and the leader of his affiliate in Yemen, discussing plans for an upcoming major attack.  The conversation was part of a "major increase in chatter" recently detected by intel organizations (read: NSA).  Congressional leaders briefed on these developments claim that terrorist communications are at their highest levels since 9-11, adding more credence to reports that a major attack is in the offing. 

In view of the current security situation, the evacuation of U.S. diplomats from Yemen was probably a prudent move.  With the spectre of Benghazi (and four dead Americans) still hanging over the White House, no one wants to risk another debacle at a weakly-defended diplomatic outpost.  In fact, we're told the key White House meeting that led to the Yemen evacuation (and the temporary closing of embassies in 20 other Muslim countries) was chaired by none other than Susan Rice, the National Security Advisor who was roundly criticized last September, when (as UN Ambassador) she was disptached on the Sunday shows and claimed the Benghazi incident was in response to an anti-Muslim video. 

Readers will note that President Obama was not present for that meeting.  It was his birthday weekend, afterall, and not even a major terrorist threat was going to keep him off the golf course.  That prompted some speculation about the exact nature of the threat; afterall, it was serious enough to shutter our embassies across the Middle East (and prompt an evacuation from Yemen), why was the President playing golf, and not meeting with his national security team. 

It's also worth remembering that the plot has been evolving over a period of time.  Media reports suggest that the spike in chatter began several weeks ago, but the public wasn't informed until late last week.  Obviously, thee spooks wanted to monitor terrorist communications for as long as possible, hoping to learn more details about the plot.  But why was the warning delayed so long?  Judging by the far-flung nature of the warning, it would appear that Al Qaida may be preparing to strike in multiple countries at once, or we still don't have the particulars on terror plot.  If that latter scenario is true, it raises new questions about the effectiveness NSA's recently-disclosed, on-line surveillance efforts that have (supposedly) thwarted a number of terrorist attacks. 

Indeed, one report suggests that Al Qaida isn't particularly concerned that the folks at Fort Meade might be listening in.  According to Eli Lake at the Daily Beast, U.S. officials decided to issue the terror warning after intercepting an Al Qaida "conference call" that included more than 20 operatives, including Zawahiri, Nasser al-Wuhayshi (head of the Yemeni branch) and leaders of affiliates in locations ranging from Nigeria to Uzebekistan. 

Intelligence officials familiar with the call believe the Al Qaida leaders thought the call was secure, and suggested that we have been monitoring these "board meetings" for several months.  That will obviously change, but such large-scale meetings are hardly indicative of a terror group that is on the run.  For once, we actually agree with Lindsey Graham, who recently observed that Al Qaida has been "on steriods" since last year's successsful strike in Benghazi. 

Oddly enough, the current circumstances seem to be a "win-win" for all sides.  Al Qaida has demonstrated that it is far from "decimated," and with just a spike in chatter, they have forced the U.S. to close diplomatic facilities from North Africa to Pakistan.  Given the level of the American response, there is a very real perception in the Muslim world that Al Qaida has the United States on the defensive, if not on the run. 

For the Obama Administration, the terror threat came at an opportune moment.  Benghazi was bubbling up again, amid CNN's report that almost two dozen CIA operatives were on the ground when the consulate came under attack.  That renewed speculation that the diplomatic facility--and Ambassador Chris Stevens--were heavily involved in the transfer of weapons to Syrian rebels.  In fairness, credible sources have dimissed those claims, but CNN is standing by its story.  When the terror warning surfaced late last week, Benghazi was displaced by the new "story of the day," albeit temporarily. 

Reports about intercepted chatter also gave a reprieve to the NSA, which has been under fire for months, after Edward Snowden's disclosures about its domestic surveillance program.  Supporters of the agency were quick to highlight NSA's role in detecting the latest threat, obscuring larger questions about the scope of its efforts and the need to collect phone and internet data from ordinary Americans. 

Finally, the latest terror warning gave the White House an opportunity to make the most of a sudden crisis.  That weekend meeting (minus the President) created the appearance of being on top of the situation, while tamping down criticism of the NSA and domestic spying.  Predictably, the administration's friends in the press were more than happy to go along with the changing narrative. 

At this point, it appears Al Qaida has achieved a major, tactical victory without attacking a single target or detonating a single bomb.  Closing our diplomatic facilities in 22 Muslim countries was a major setback, debunking administration claims that the terror group is in retreat.  Now, the White House faces the challenge of re-opening our embassies and consulates across the Middle East--and preventing possible terrorist strikes.  But it's hard to erase the image that appeared in the skies over Yemen yesterday, the image of a superpower taking flight, from an enemy it had supposedly decimated.