The Marines Change Course

Marines don't retreat, the old axiom goes, they simply attack in a new direction. Hmm...maybe they'll trot out that explanation (again) to justify last week's dramatic reversal on its tuition assistance (TA) policy for the Corps.

Just days after implementing a major cut in tuition assistance funding, the Marines shifted course last Wednesday, announcing that TA funding would be restored to previous levels. That means Marines will again receive $4500 a year for college tuition, paid at a maximum rate of $750 per course. Under the reduced rates, the yearly cap was cut to $3500 a year, but most Marines would receive only $825, based on data that most program participants took only 5-7 credit hours per year.

Why the sudden change? We're guessing that senior leadership got an earful from unit commanders and senior NCOs, who understand that TA is a very effective retention tool. If the tuition assistance program is gutted (or eliminated entirely, as some in the Pentagon prefer), it will wreak havoc with experience levels, particularly at the platoon and company levels.

The reason, as we've explained in previous posts, is simple. Without access to TA (or limited education funds under that program), Marines will use GI Bill benefits to fund their education. And, the highest payments under that program go to veterans who have left the military and receive their full housing allowance, along with education benefits.

Under proposed defense cuts, the Marine Corps will undergo a 10% reduction by 2015, a move that will eliminate 20,000 personnel. So, the TA reduction was aimed (in part) at convincing more Marines to leave the service, so the Corps can meet its new manning totals. But there was clear concern that a lot of experienced E-4s and E-5s--Marines who should be senior NCOs and officers down the road--will exit the Corps as well. That realization is what prompted the Marines to reverse course on the TA program.

Still, tuition assistance for the military is facing an uncertain future. As the Marines were modifying their position, the Air Force was unveiling changes for its personnel. Beginning in November, airmen can only apply for TA within 30 days of a course start date. Currently, they can apply for financial aid two months in advance, giving them more flexibility in planning their studies.

With a shorter timeline for signing up, the Air Force believes it can achieve savings in its TA program, since some airmen won't have enough time to complete the process. The USAF spends more than $200 million a year on TA; at the DoD level, the total bill for tuition assistance is about $600 million annually.

As we've noted in previous posts, the TA program has been under fire in recent months--and targeted for major reductions. According to various critics, tuition assistance isn't very cost effective, and does little to keep troops in uniform.

But the facts tell a different story. Thousands of military members earn their associate's, bachelor's or master's through the TA program each year. Payment caps within the program encourage participating schools to keep costs low, and the armed forces recoup money from service members who fail a course.

By comparison, the new Post 9-11 GI Bill is shaping up as a multi-billion dollar boondoggle. Two years into the program, costs are running three times higher than projected ($15 billion a year), and vets attending school under the program have an 88% dropout rate and only 3% remain in school long enough to earn their degree. But so far, no one is talking about "reforming" the latest version of the GI Bill.

Today's Reading Assignment

Max Boot, in Commentary magazine, on President Obama's decision to remove all U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of this year:

Far from being cause for celebration, Obama’s announcement that we will keep only 150 U.S. troops in Iraq after the end of the year–down from nearly 50,000 today–represents a shameful failure of American foreign policy that risks undoing all the gains that so many Americans, Iraqis, and other allies have sacrificed so much to achieve. The risks of a catastrophic failure in Iraq now rise appreciably. The Iranian Quds Force must be licking its chops because we are now leaving Iraq essentially defenseless against its machinations. Conversely the broad majority of Iraqis who fear Iranian influence and who want their country to become a democracy will come to rue this day, however big a victory it might appear in the short term for the cause of Iraqi nationalism.

Ostensibly this pull-out was dictated by the unwillingness of Iraqi lawmakers to grant U.S. troops immunity from prosecution. But Iraqi leaders of all parties, save the Sadrists, also clearly signaled their desire to have a sizable American troop contingent post-2011. The issue of immunity could have been finessed if administration lawyers from the Departments of State and Defense had not insisted that Iraq’s parliament would have to vote to grant our troops protections from Iraqi laws. Surely some face-saving formula that would not have needed parliamentary approval could have been negotiated that would have assuaged Iraqi sovereignty concerns while making it unlikely in the extreme that any U.S. soldier would ever go before an Iraqi court for actions taken in the line of duty.

Clearly, we can't stay in Iraq forever, but the Obama plan runs counter to the security interests of both the United States and our Iraqi allies. As Mr. Boot notes, both the U.S. military and much of the Iraqi government favored a continuing American presence, for counter-terrorism operations; as a deterrent against Iranian meddling, and to ensure adequate training for Iraqi security forces.

Boot argues that the U.S. should re-open negotiations on our military presence as soon as the current withdrawal is complete. He believes we need at least 10, 000 troops in Iraq to handle the security and training mission--about half the number recommended by senior American military commanders earlier this year.

Unfortunately, prospects for a short-term U.S. return are virtually nil. Mr. Obama saw an opportunity to appease his base and fulfill a campaign promise, with little regard for the long-term security consequences. That raises another issue: will President Obama (or a Republican successor) be willing to send even larger numbers of U.S. troops back to Iraq in two or three years, when the security situation becomes untenable? Or will the Commander-in-Chief sit idly by and allow Iraq to become a puppet of Tehran?

It's a question worth posing at the next White House press conference (fat chance of that happening), and at the next GOP presidential candidates' debate.

***

ADDENDUM: Similar warnings from Professor Frederick Kagan (the intellectual father of the Iraq surge strategy) at the Weekly Standard.

The Death of Tuition Assistance

The end of the U.S. military's tuition assistance program may be at hand. Yesterday, the Marine Corps announced that annual benefits will be cut, from a maximum of $4500 a year, to $3500.

Additionally, the Corps is reducing payments per credit hour to $175 for undergraduate courses and $225 for graduate programs. However, the "real" TA cap for the majority of Marines will be only $875 per year, based on "analysis" that shows most participants take only 5-6 credit hours annually.

Changes in the Marine Corps TA program were made retroactive to 1 October. While the other services have not announced similar cuts, all are watching the USMC experiment and may unveil their own reductions in the coming months.

Currently, the Pentagon spends over $600 million a year on tuition assistance, which provides money for active-duty military members (along with guardsmen and reservists) to attend off-duty college classes. The program's price tag has more than doubled over the past decade, after the military raised the payment rate from 75% for each class, to 100%, with a cap of $750 per course.

There are signs that more cuts may be in the offing. Earlier this year, the Pentagon's chief of voluntary education, Carolyn Baker, said the current TA program is "unsustainable." Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK) has described TA as a "poor recruiting and retention tool," advocating a 90% reduction in the program. More recently, a Colorado Congressman asked DoD to consider a return to the 75% payment rate, which was in effect for decades. There is growing consensus in Congress (and the Pentagon) that TA must be cut, as the military faces hundreds of billions in budget cuts.

But the rush to gut TA may be premature--and short-sighted. Reducing (or eliminating) tuition assistance will force most military members to rely on their other education benefits program, notably the Post 9-11 GI Bill. That program is aimed at veterans who have left the service, paying full rates for tuition and a housing allowance, among other benefits.

Still, any shift to the GI Bill won't be cheap or cost-effective. Consider these numbers, announced at last week's meeting of the Colorado Advisory Council on Military Education:

- When it was signed into law three years ago, the Post 9-11 GI Bill was budgeted at $5 billion a year. But so many vets have entered the program, it is currently costing taxpayers $15 billion a year, and that tab is growing.

- Some participants see the program as little more than a benefit check. According to the Department of Veterans Affairs, one in five departing service members become full-time students under the GI Bill. But only 3% of those students stick around long enough to earn their degree. Grad rates for GI Bill participants are ten times lower than their civilian counter-parts.

- VA statistics show that 88% of GI Bill students drop out of school within their first year.

Based on those figures, the GI Bill is shaping up as a $15 billion a year boondoggle. Indeed, the program actually pays for "Fs." Students can flunk classes and still receive full benefits, although schools are now required to more closely monitor--and report--student performance.

As for that supposedly "inefficient" TA program::

- Thousands of military members receive their degree each year, using TA benefits.

- A typical bachelor's degree earned with TA benefits costs taxpayers about $40,000; the same four-year diploma, funded with the GI Bill, runs $100,000 (or more).

- Students using TA who fail a class must reimburse the military--a powerful incentive for military members to do well in class.

- TA participants remain on active-duty, providing valuable contributions to national defense. By comparison, most GI bill students have left active service, and the military will receive no direct benefit of their advanced education.

To be fair, both programs have their problems; you'll find fraud and waste in each. But it's rather interesting that TA is being cut, in favor of a "new" GI Bill that is shaping up as an educational and fiscal disaster. In light of skyrocketing costs and low graduation rates, the public and lawmakers should ask: just how much bang are we getting for that $15 billion a year?

***

Disclosure: Your humble correspondent is employed by a private, non-profit university that participates in both the tuition assistance and GI Bill programs. :

Thanks, John

According to the Military Advantage Blog at Military.com, Senator John McCain of Arizona has indicated support for a proposal to cut military benefits:

The AP reports that McCain sup­ports Pres­i­dent Obama’s pro­posal to start charg­ing older mil­i­tary retirees a $200 annual enroll­ment fee for TRICARE for Life. In addi­tion, McCain urged the super­com­mit­tee to con­sider restrict­ing working-age mil­i­tary retirees and their depen­dents from enrolling in TRICARE Prime. McCain pointed out that the Con­gres­sional Bud­get Office has esti­mated that such a move would save $111 bil­lion over 10 years.

McCain also said he sup­ports the administration’s pro­posal for a com­mis­sion to review pos­si­ble changes to the 20 year mil­i­tary retire­ment sys­tem and the cur­rent mil­i­tary pay and com­pen­sa­tion model.

Not that we're surprised; look up "Rino" in the dictionary, and you'll find McCain's picture in the margin. But it's also worth remembering that Mr. McCain is also a retired Naval officer who spent more than two decades on active duty, including five-and-a-half years as a POW in the Hanoi Hilton.

Given his background, you'd think McCain would appreciate the sacrifice made by military members and their families. You'd also think that Senator McCain would understand that most military retirees get by on a pension of $1600 a month (after taxes) and increases in Tricare fees (and other expenses) put a big dent in their budget.

But then again, John McCain lost touch with the military rank-and-file a long time ago. He became intoxicated with power during his tour as a Navy legislative liasion on Capitol Hill and quickly segued into the ruling class after retiring--and marrying the richest woman in Arizona. Between his Senate health care plan and family fortune, Mr. McCain isn't too worried about changes to the military retirement system, or higher medical expenses for military retirees.

If you ask Senator McCain to explain his position, he'd probably say he's putting "Country First," to help resolve the nation's fiscal crisis. Gee...whatever happened to the mantra of "Leave No Man (or Woman) Behind," something McCain learned from his earliest days at Annapolis. By endorsing the Obama "reform" plan, Mr. McCain is leaving a lot of military members behind.

Thanks again, John.

Curious, but Sloppy

We're still scratching our heads over the alleged Iranian plot to assassinate Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the United States. Not that the scheme isn't credible; Tehran has a long list of scores to settle with Riyadh, ranging from the kingdom's backing of Saddam Hussein during the 1980s Iran-Iraq War, to its more recent support of Bahrain, during that nation's crackdown against anti-regime protesters, who were aided by elements of Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps.

Eliminating the Saudi ambassador in Washington promised other rewards as well. A successful assassination would create a greater divide between the United States and one of its most important allies in the Arab world. Additionally, the assassination would be viewed as a direct warning to the Saudi monarchy, since the kingdom's current Ambassador to the United States, Adel al-Jubeir, is a key advisor to the king on national security matters. So, Iran has no shortage of reasons for wanting to kill the senior Saudi diplomat in America.

But if that was the case, why was the "plot" conceived is such ham-handed fashion? According to court papers (and the comments of various U.S. officials), the key figure in the operation was Manssor Arbabsiar, a 56-year-old Iranian-American used car salesman from Texas. Arbabsiar reportedly attempted to enlist assistance from Mexico's infamous Zetas drug cartel in acquiring explosives and carrying out the attack. The plan reportedly involved detonating a bomb inside one of the ambassador's favorite D.C. restaurants while he ate.

Arbabsiar is now in custody; a second man named in the indictment, Gholam Shakuri, is said to be in Iran. Sources indicate the assassination plot involved high-level officials in the Qods force, the clandestine arm of the IRGC. Turk al-Faisal, a former Saudi ambassador to the U.S. told reporters this afternoon that "the burden of proof and amount of evidence in the case is overwhelming, and clearly shows official Iranian responsibility for this...someone in Iran will have to pay the price." In response, Iran described the terror plot as a "fabrication" and a "diversion," aimed at shifting domestic attention away from U.S. economic problems."

According to the U.K. Guardian, some western diplomats have expressed skepticism about the plot, saying it was highly unlikely that senior Iranian officials would sign off on such a plan. And they have a point; if Tehran wanted to kill Ambassador al-Jubeir, why entrust the enterprise to someone who hardly fits the profile of a professional Qods force operative.

The U.S. military has spent years battling Qods force agents in Iraq and Afghanistan; intelligence officers will tell you they represent the most capable elements in the IRGC. Put another way, there are plenty of Qods force operatives who could easily enter the United States, carry out the plot and make a clean get-away. Why involve a used car salesman and drug cartels?

Several possibilities come to mind. First, the assassination plot may have been a deliberate ruse, aimed at shifting intelligence and law enforcement resources away from other teams preparing to carry out separate attacks. You'd better believe the folks at FBI Headquarters, Langley and Fort Meade are double-checking their information, looking for clues that might lead to other (and perhaps more menacing) Iranian plots while Arbabsiar spins his tale for investigators.

There's also a chance the assassination scheme was launched by rogue elements within the IRGC and Iranian political circles (yes, we realize that is an oxymoron). Angered by the lack of progress in "getting even" with Riyadh, members of the Qods Force, in concert with political elements, might have decided to do a little free-lancing and hatched a plan to blow up the Saudi ambassador in Washington.

However, you can't rule out the option that senior Iranian officials endorsed (and participated in) the hare-brained scheme. Intelligence and covert ops organizations have a long history of launching plots that are breathtakingly dumb. Readers will recall that the CIA engaged in a series of operations aimed at killing Fidel Castro, involving such diverse elements as an exploding cigar and the U.S. mafia. None of those plots came close to succeeding, but the boys at Langley kept trying, anyway. The men running the Qods Force are not immune to bad ideas, either.

Perhaps the most fascinating element of this story is how quickly talk of military action entered the picture. Mr. al-Faisal's remarks will be interpreted (in some circles) as a green light for U.S. attacks against Iranian targets. And late this afternoon, Massachusetts Senator John Kerry said military action against Tehran "could not be ruled out." There are also unconfirmed reports that the Obama Administration will provide a briefing this evening on the plot to key members of the Senate Intelligence, Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees.

Predictably, such talk has raised a "wag the dog" scenario, with the Obama Administration using the Iranian plot to divert attention away from a host of domestic woes. We're not prepared to go down that road, but stoking sentiment against Iran could serve another purpose. As we've noted in previous posts this year, Tehran is on the cusp of acquiring nuclear weapons--a development which could occur before the end of the year. If public (and political) sentiment is already aligned against Iran, it would make it that much easier to launch military strikes against Iran. By launching a clumsy effort to kill a senior Saudi official, Iran may have given the U.S. an opportunity to rally international opposition against the Tehran regime.

***

ADDENDUM: Thomas Joscelyn at The Long War Journal reminds us that some of the Iranians implicated in the assassination plot are quite capable of carrying out deadly operations. Abdul Reza Shahlai, identified as "coordinator" of the planned attack, was the mastermind of a 2007 strike against U.S. troops in Karbala. Shahlai, who was previously identified as a Deputy Commander of the IRGC-QF, is the cousin of Manssor Arbabsiar; Gholam Shakuri, who served as an intermediary, is Shahlai's deputy. Family ties between Shahlai and Arbabsiar made the Iranian-American a convenient tool for the operation, but it still doesn't explain why the IRGC-QF was interested in farming out the enterprise to less-skilled personnel.

Infected

Noah Shachtman at the Danger Room has this disturbing exclusive: the U.S. Air Force drone fleet has been hit by a computer virus.

The virus, first detected nearly two weeks ago by the military’s Host-Based Security System, has not prevented pilots at Creech Air Force Base in Nevada from flying their missions overseas. Nor have there been any confirmed incidents of classified information being lost or sent to an outside source. But the virus has resisted multiple efforts to remove it from Creech’s computers, network security specialists say. And the infection underscores the ongoing security risks in what has become the U.S. military’s most important weapons system.

“We keep wiping it off, and it keeps coming back,” says a source familiar with the network infection, one of three that told Danger Room about the virus. “We think it’s benign. But we just don’t know.”

Military network security specialists aren’t sure whether the virus and its so-called “keylogger” payload were introduced intentionally or by accident; it may be a common piece of malware that just happened to make its way into these sensitive networks. The specialists don’t know exactly how far the virus has spread. But they’re sure that the infection has hit both classified and unclassified machines at Creech. That raises the possibility, at least, that secret data may have been captured by the keylogger, and then transmitted over the public internet to someone outside the military chain of command.

It's no secret that UAVs have become a weapon-of-choice in the War on Terror; our expanding fleet of drones (most of them operated and maintained by the USAF) allow intelligence specialists to monitor large stretches of territory for and strike high-value targets. Just last week, a CIA-operated UAV took out Al Qaida bigwig Anwar Awlaki; all told, American UAVs have killed more than 2,000 suspected terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan since President Obama took office, according to the Washington Post.

So far, the infection appears limited to Creech, while pilots and sensor operators control dozens of UAVs operating around the world. There is no evidence the virus has spread to the Distributed Common Ground Station (DCGS) facilities which analyze intelligence collected by the drones. While drone operations have received lots of media attention, many Americans are unaware of the huge intel network required to support UAV operations. At places like Langley AFB, VA; Hickam AFB, Hawaii, Beale AFB, California (and others), hundreds of intel specialists monitor, record and decipher data from the drone's on-board sensor suite.

The Air Force hasn't said how the virus found its way into the Ground Control Stations that direct UAV missions. But the most likely culprit is an external drive or some other type of external device that was plugged into A GCS computer, providing an entry point into the network. If information captured by the keylogger program was transmitted to individuals outside DoD, it could provide valuable insights regarding drone operations and the command-and-control network that control them.

As you might expect, this sort of thing isn't supposed to happen. Computers that direct UAV flights (and the intel systems that support them) are part of intranets, separate from the internet. But they remain vulnerable to external viruses and other hazards, through something as simple as a flash drive.

Was it a deliberate attack? The jury's still out on that one, but recent trends are not encouraging. Adversaries are quite aware of U.S. reliance on UAVs, and they're looking for ways to cripple our capabilities in that area. There have been several "infections" of secure networks in recent years, raising concerns about our susceptibility to outside attacks. Coincidence? You decide.

Today's Reading Assignment

...from Jim Lacey, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Marine Corps War College, writing at National Review on-line. Professor Lacey shares our outrage at a recent article in The New York Times, which described the armed forces retirement program as "another big social welfare system." Recounting the long list of military operations over the past two decades, Lacey reminds us that a soldier who enlisted in 1990 had more than "earned" his pension by the time he retired last year. A few evocative paragraphs:

"..Fresh out of boot camp, our typical infantry soldier was sent to the 24th Infantry Division, and was soon on his way to the Middle East as part of the force sent to evict the Iraqi army from Kuwait. Living under the most primitive conditions for months, our young private spends most of his time training. What free time he has is for writing home, repeatedly telling his folks to ignore the numerous predictions that at least 10,000 Americans will die if fighting erupts. Later, while lying under the stars and trying to ward off the desert chill, he wonders if he will be one of the 10,000, for he really has no reason to doubt the predictions. Finally, the assault begins, and our young private finds himself in one of the spearhead formations living through the fear and thrill of shredding several of Saddam’s much-vaunted Republican Guard divisions.

[snip]

At the end of his first hitch, he reenlists and is promoted to sergeant, and is sent to Germany to join the 1st Armored Division. Our infantryman knows he is going to have to work and train hard. But, as the Cold War is over, he is also expecting a bit of downtime and a chance to see some of Europe. What he did not expect was to be ordered into the Balkans.

In late December 1995, the 1st Armored is sent to Bosnia to bring the long-running Yugoslavian violence to an end. For the troops to get to their destination, a pontoon bridge had to be thrown across the Sava River, which was experiencing its worst flooding in 70 years. Weather conditions were terrible all through the days of the bridge’s construction, and no better when the 1st Armored Division began its crossing. As our young sergeant led his armored vehicles across the makeshift bridge, a journalist asked a bystander, “What does this mean to you?” The reply: “It means peace. It is as simple as that.”

[snip]

The second half of our typical infantryman’s career saw him promoted to Sergeant First Class, where he cared for and trained a few dozen soldiers, and eventually to First Sergeant, where he was responsible for an entire company of close to 150 soldiers. Still with the 3rd Infantry Division, he spent most of 2002 in Kuwait preparing for the invasion of Iraq. And then, early the following year, he again was part of a spearhead unit, the one that conducted the 21-day blitz from Kuwait that culminated in the thunder runs into the center of Baghdad.

Unfortunately, capturing Baghdad was not the end of our soldier’s involvement in Iraq. Over the remaining seven years of his Army career he would spend half of that time in Iraq, while many of his brothers had alternate tours in Iraq and Afghanistan. Throughout this period he never much concerned himself with the politics of our involvement. His focus was always much more narrow and visceral: What do I have to do today to help destroy a violent extremist insurgency and to take as many of my men as possible home safely?

[snip]

This nation asks a lot of its military, and they have given in full measure. One soldier captured it all when he said to me after finishing 20 years of service: “I have given the Army, my country, and my brothers everything I had. If there is anything left in me it is going to go to my family.” When he departed the service he took with him a retirement paycheck of less than $25,000 a year. It was promised to him. He earned it.

As Jim Lacey observes, this story of this solider isn't remarkable. In fact, it captures the shared experiences of thousands of soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines who have served during these tumultuous times. Not all served in front-line combat, but all endured the rigors and sacrifices that come with a career in uniform. And all of them were volunteers.

Social welfare, indeed.

***

ADDENDUM: Lacey's column is yet another reminder of the escalating battle over military benefits. Last week, Army Times (a Gannett publication that can hardly be described as an organ of the vast, right-wing conspiracy) ran a cover story entitled "Obama's War on Your Benefits." While the article isn't available on the paper's website, it does capture the growing frustration of many military members, who believe promises made to them are being broken while entitlement programs for the great unwashed go untouched.

Meanwhile, that deafening silence you hear is from the Republican presidential field. When President Obama chided them for not "standing up" for a gay soldier who booed (by about four people) during a recent GOP debate, not one of the Republican contenders provided the obvious rejoinder: why is the Commander-in-Chief so concerned about the plight of one soldier, while benefits promised to thousands of military members are eroding under his watch?

The most obvious reasons? First, only two of the Republican candidates have actually served in the military. Secondly, it appears that none of the GOP hopefuls want to paint themselves in a box on the issue, giving them the flexibility to make further cuts (as required) if they are elected president.

Sounds like a "lose-lose" for hundreds of thousands of career military members (and retirees) who gave so much for that $25,000 a year pension. We should also note that Professor Lacey's prototypical retiree was something of a fast burner. The average non-commissioned officer who leaves active duty after 20 years is an E-6, with an average annual pension of less than $20,000 a year.

The Shopping Trip

It may be the worst piece of political stagecraft since George H.W. Bush visited a grocery store 20 years ago and expressed amazement at a checkout scanner--a device that was long-since familiar to "ordinary" Americans.

But this time, it wasn't a commander-in-chief who looked out of place; it was First Lady Michelle Obama, during Thursday's trip to a Target store in Alexandria, Virginia. After Mrs. Obama was repeatedly criticized for her lavish vacations, designer clothes and general taste for the good life, someone in the White House decided she needed a little image work, making her seem less like Marie Antoinette, and more like the common folk who are trying to stretch a buck.

“One thing she loves to do is shop at Target,” President Barack Obama said of his wife Friday in an interview with Philadelphia radio personality Michael Smerconish. Mr. Obama's comments were eagerly reprinted in the Politico, ready to advance the narrative that the FLOTUS simply needed to get out of the White House "bubble" for a little while.

Give me a break. Does anyone outside the Politico staff (and the rest of the White House press corps) really believe that? As is often the case with this administration, the "official" version of events doesn't quite square with reality.

For starters, there's no such thing as an "impulse" trip by the POTUA or his spouse. Even for a short jaunt to Target, security must be coordinated--in advance--by the various agencies involved, including the Secret Service; the Washington, D.C. police force; the Virginia State Police and the local department in Alexandria.

And of course, the First Lady simply doesn't stroll into a store that hasn't been carefully searched (and re-checked) before she enters. It's a given that Target's corporate headquarters was contacted days in advance and preparations at the store began long before Mrs. Obama showed up. We're also guessing there was a heavy security presence around that store hours before the visit began; after all, it takes time--and effort--to deploy snipers, undercover officers, canine teams and the other precautions that accompany that type of visit.

There's also the little matter of the press coverage generated by the Target run. What a coincidence--an Associated Press photographer just happened to arrive in time to snap pictures of Mrs. Obama in the checkout line. And this wasn't some stringer or general assignment shutter jockey; the AP photog who got the exclusive was Charles Dharapak, who's been assigned to the White House beat for years. Gee...what are the odds that Mr. Dharapak shows up at the same store Michelle Obama is shopping at without a tip from the White House Press Office? Approximately zero.

El Rushbo deserves credit for doing what the MSM wouldn't dare, describing the "event" in more realistic terms: "“What a phony-baloney plastic banana good-time rock-and-roll optic photo-op that was,” he said on his Friday radio show.

Mr. Limbaugh was also one of the few observers who bothered to look in the First Lady's shopping basket, casting further doubts about the motive behind the shopping expedition. Among the items purchased? A bottle of Lysol cleaner. That's a rather odd choice, considering that Mrs. Obama and her family live in a government mansion (with a professional house-keeping staff) that buys cleaning supplies by the truckload through the General Services Administration.

Too bad Mr. Smerconish didn't ask the President what his wife was going to clean with that Lysol. As one wag observed, the last First Lady who actually cleaned the White House was Dolly Madison, after the Brits torched the place during the War of 1812. Since then, all the dusting, scrubbing and other chores have been handled by the White House staff. So, what's the probability that Mrs. Obama will personally use that bottle of Lysol to disinfect the White House living quarters?

You'd think that even the "journos" at Politico would be able to figure that one out.
***
ADDENDUM: To be fair, all administrations create photo ops on a daily basis. But few have been as transparent or clumsily constructed as the Target visit. Could you imagine the reaction if a Republican First Lady, say, Laura Bush, conducted a similar shopping trip? The same reporters who fret over Michelle Obama's tough life in the bubble would be in high dungeon over an obvious political stunt and efforts at "media manipulation."

We should also note one other curious element to this story--one that even the Politico scribes have picked up on. Since Mrs. Obama's visit on Thursday, the staff at the Alexandria target have been on virtual lock down, with only the manager authorized to speak with the press--and only by telephone.

And just how much did the photo-op cost the taxpayers? A former member of the White House presidential advance team (which performs similar services for the First Lady) put the tab (conservatively) in the "tens of thousands of dollars." The source notes that, along with security, there was also a requirement to establish secure comms at the site (through the White House Communications Agency); determine the location of the nearest medical facilities and coordinate treatment planning, in the event of an emergency. Those tasks--and others--are part and parcel of any trip by the president or the first lady, and they require time, money and personnel to complete.

Put another way, that was a very expensive bottle of Lysol.

MANPADs for the NYPD?

On the streets of New York? In an interview with CBS News, NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly stated his department has the ability to "take down" aircraft which threaten the city--without assistance from the federal government. Kelly's comments have raised speculation the NYPD has acquired a system like the Boeing Avenger, shown here during a 2003 deployment in Washington, D.C. The Avenger has Stinger missiles mounted on a HUMVEE (UPI photo).

Tonight's edition of 60 Minutes featured a segment on one of the world's most sophisticated anti-terrorism units--the New York City Police Department. Over the past decade, NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly (and the city) have spent $3 billion on measures designed to prevent or mitigate future attacks.

According to Kelly, more than 1,000 NYPD officers are assigned to the counter-terrorism unit, which was essentially created after the 9-11 attacks. In his interview with Scott Pelley, outlined the obvious strategy behind this organization, and one of its very surprising capabilities:

Ray Kelly: We're the number one target in this country. That's the consensus of the intelligence community. We're the communications capital. We're the financial capital. We're a city that's been attacked twice successfully. We've had 13 terrorist plots against the city since September 11. No other city has had that.

[snip]

We were with him, in his hi-tech command truck last Wednesday when he headed to the east side as New York hosted the United Nations General Assembly. He wanted to be there when President Obama arrived. To prepare for those 137 heads of State, Kelly has to understand the threats that all of those foreign leaders have at home so their local troubles don't play out here.

Kelly: We have to look abroad. We do that with the Secret Service, to see what the issues are in another country. Does that raise the threat level here?

The threat level in New York was already high. Intelligence said that there could be a car bomb attack on the tenth anniversary of 9/11 and that worry had still not been resolved.

Extra: Kelly on 1993 WTC attack

Vinny Giordano [nat sound]: All our interior and exterior checkpoints are up and running. Bomb squad's completed all its sweeps and their Ops are up.

Kelly had the tower of the U.N. Secretariat building surrounded. Snipers on the roof tops, divers in the river, helicopters above. Mr. Obama slipped into the U.N. with the Secret Service, under the blanket of the NYPD. All of this came just ten days after Kelly's team had secured the most sensitive event in the nation.

It was the 9/11 National Memorial on the tenth anniversary of the attack on America. Osama bin Laden had written about attacking again on this very day. And Kelly had more than 8 million New Yorkers to protect.

As the names of the fallen were being read, Kelly was watching from his brand new Joint Operations Center.

From here he can see everything. All in one cavernous room Kelly has representatives from the military, the FBI, Federal Emergency Management, state and local first responders. The center is a symbol of the 10 years and three billion dollars that he has spent to prepare for every kind of threat.

Pelley: Are you satisfied that you've dealt with threats from aircraft, even light planes, model planes, that kind of thing?

Kelly: Well, it's something that's on our radar screen. I mean in an extreme situation, you would have some means to take down a plane.

Pelley: Do you mean to say that the NYPD has the means to take down an aircraft?

Kelly: Yes, I prefer not to get into the details but obviously this would be in a very extreme situation.

Pelley: You have the equipment and the training.

Kelly: Yes.

Obviously, there are only a certain number of ways to bring down an aircraft, namely jet fighters, anti-aircraft guns and surface-to-air missiles. Since we haven't seen any F-15s or F-16s with NYPD markings (or AAA guns deployed around New York), it seems rather obvious that the New York police force has been equipped with shoulder-fired SAMs, most likely a Stinger variant.

While we understand the reasoning behind this capability, it does raise some pertinent questions, namely, what are the ROE for downing a suspect aircraft, and what coordination--if any--would occur before an NYPD aims his MANPAD, uncages the seeker and pulls the trigger. Under most scenarios, we assume there would be some warning from NORAD, alerting the police to the situation and giving them time to deploy MANPAD teams.

But we're also reminded of the confusion that might exist under such circumstances. For well over an hour on the morning of September 11, 2001, no one was really sure how many planes had been hijacked, and when United Flight 93 crashed in rural Pennsylvania, senior government officials assumed it had been shot down by U.S. Air Force F-16s. Only later did they learn that heroic passengers had thwarted the terrorists' plans by storming the cockpit and forcing them to crash the jetliner into the ground.

More than a decade later, coordination between NORAD and other government agencies has improved dramatically. But there can't be any hesitation (or uncertainty) when a police MANPAD team is dispatched to intercept a plane that appears to threaten New York City. Under those conditions, the NYPD (and its partners in the anti-terror mission) have only one chance to get it right--or horribly wrong.

****

While Mr. Kelly won't provide specifics on his department's "air defense" system(s), one likely candidate is the Boeing Avenger system, which consists of pedestal-mounted Stinger missiles on a HUMVEE chassis. The Avenger has been deployed around the nation's capital on several occasions, in response to increased terror threats. Still, if the NYPD has this system, it's rather amazing that the distinctive vehicles have never been seen in New York.

Another option would be Stingers carried in ordinary police vehicles, manned by officers trained in MANPAD operations. However, that employment method would have a major drawback--limited communications. An Avenger vehicle has the ability to link into air defense network, giving gunners a complete air picture, making it easier to track and engage threat aircraft.

***

ADDENDUM: Sources tell the New York Post the police department's "anti-air" capabilities consist of a .50 caliber sniper rifle which could--theoretically--be used to target vital components on a threatening aircraft (talk about a one-in-a-million shot). And Mayor Michael Bloomberg told reporters that the NYPD's air defense weaponry "could not" have prevented the 9-11 attacks, suggesting the department's capabilities are less robust that originally believed. However, the mayor refused to discuss specifics, suggesting (again) that the NYPD may have more in its anti-air arsenal than a sniper rifle.

Not Exactly Shovel Ready

Andrew Malcolm of the Los Angeles Times is (apparently) the only media figure that caught President Obama in another embarrassing gaffe the other day.

It came during his heavily-publicized speech next to the Brent Spence Bridge, spanning the Ohio River between Covington, Kentucky and Cincinnati, Ohio. The "optics" (as the political class describes them) were aimed at generating support for Mr. Obama's new jobs bill. Never mind that the bridge he used as a backdrop isn't falling down; it's merely congested and much of that problem will be alleviated by the planned construction of a new bridge across the Ohio, about five miles downstream. Unfortunately, the project won't get underway until 2015, so construction workers hoping to build the new span won't be hired for another 48 months or so.

Of course, Mr. Obama didn't mention any of those inconvenient facts in his speech. But he did make one rather astonishing claim, as Mr. Malcolm reminds us:

Now, we used to have the best infrastructure in the world here in America. We’re the country that built the Intercontinental Railroad, the Interstate Highway System. (Applause.) We built the Hoover Dam. We built the Grand Central Station. (Applause.)

So how can we now sit back and let China build the best railroads? And let Europe build the best highways? And have Singapore build a nicer airport? At a time when we've got millions of unemployed construction workers out there just ready to get on the job, ready to do the work to rebuilding America.

The Intercontinental Railroad? Is that the one that connects San Francisco and Tokyo, or New York and London. Obviously, they don't exist. We assume President Obama was referring to the transcontinental railroad, completed in 1869. It remains a marvel of engineering and speed, largely because immigrant work crews didn't have an OSHA inspector demanding hearing protection for everyone, or the EPA trying to protect every bug, bird and snake that lived along the railroad's right-of-way.

Which leads us to another element missing from Mr. Obama's address: The legal and regulatory difficulties associated with many of his beloved infrastructure projects. Securing authorization for a new airport serving a major city would be a nightmare, complete with scores of lawsuits and endless red tape, ensuring that the project complies with thousands of federal, state and local rules (assuming it ever gets off the ground). That's a big reason that most localities are content to expand or improve existing facilities, avoiding the 20 years (and billions of dollars) required to build a major airport from scratch.

It's also worth noting that some of the overseas projects touted by President Obama are being described as failures. China's high-speed rail network, often touted as a "model" for the U.S., has run up close to $300 billion in debt, and most travelers still prefer slower (but much cheaper) buses. In fact, it's hard to find a bullet train line anywhere that's making money.

Clearly, Mr. Obama isn't going to sweat those details. He's desperately trying to sell his jobs bill and paint Republicans as obstructionists who want Americans to remain unemployed. Besides, if most Americans actually read the jobs plan, they'd see it for what it is: Stimulus II (or is it III), aimed at benefiting the president's friends in big labor and the public employee unions. Never let the ugly truth get in the way of a good political narrative.

An Inauspicious Debut

This is the time of year when TV stations roll out their new syndicated offerings--those programs (mostly talk shows) that air in the morning and late afternoon, and provide lead-in audiences for local news shows. Since news is a critical revenue source, it's important to have a lead-in program that actually delivers an audience.

The latest crop of syndicated shows are making their debut this week, and at least one high-profile project is stumbling out of the gate. We refer to the daytime talk fest hosted by CNN star Anderson Cooper. Its debut on Monday drew the second-lowest rating of any daytime talk show (only Wendy Williams had a smaller audience). Meanwhile, some of Cooper's competitors (most notably, Dr. Oz) posted significant audience gains.

Obviously, one day does not make an entire season, and there's still time for the audience to "discover" Mr. Cooper's program, as TV execs like to say. But it's clearly not what Warner Bros. television had in mind when they approved this project and signed Cooper to a lucrative contract.

Still, the early results aren't exactly surprising, considering the host's track record at CNN. Mr. Cooper has anchored an evening news program at the cable network for years, and his broadcast runs far behind the competition on Fox News Channel and is occasionally bested by MSNBC as well. In other words, Cooper hasn't exactly been an audience magnet in cable news; so why did the folks at Warner Bros. think he'd fare any better in the cutthroat world of syndicated TV?

But in the parallel universe of the MSM, performance is sometimes secondary to your connections. Mr. Cooper became a household name at CNN, a network synonymous with the kind of news coverage that turns off millions of viewers. But since TV executives run in the same circles as media personalities (and hold the same world view), giving Anderson Cooper at daytime show was a perfectly logical step. The real surprise (from their perspective) is why most Americans are ignoring it.

This much is certain: local stations that bought the Cooper program won't wait indefinitely for ratings to improve. If audience levels remain low, look for local stations to move the show to a graveyard time slot (1 am or later), before bailing on the project entirely. With millions of dollars of revenue at stake, particularly in the larger markets, local affiliates can't afford to stick with a turkey.

Cooper's slow start also offers a cautionary tale for other programmers already working on the next generation of celebrity talk shows. Katie Couric's daytime program will start airing next September and it's already being touted as a sure-fire winner. After all, Ms. Couric was the Queen of Morning TV for more than a decade, and the viewers who watched her on "Today" are bound to flock to her talk show. Never mind that she was a total flop as anchor of the "CBS Evening News," and she has the same type of media pedigree as Anderson Cooper. Sounds like a can't-miss ratings bonanza to us.

Today's Reading Assignment

...from Newt Gingrich, on the rapidly escalating crisis in the Middle East--and no discernible response from Washington (what a surprise).

The former Speaker of the House is not alone. Various outlets (including our little blog) have voiced similar concerns in recent months. However, it is rather surprising that Mr. Gingrich puts Iran's imminent entry into the nuclear club at #5 on his list. In our estimation, that should be our #1 concern.

The entire piece is well worth the read at Human Events.

How Did Barksdale Pass?

Newly-Released Report Raises Questions About Unit's Nuclear Readiness After the 2007 "Minot Incident"

by Nate Hale

Four years ago this month, an evaluation team from Air Combat Command arrived at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, to conduct a Limited Nuclear Surety Inspection of the 2nd Bomb Wing, the Air Force's largest B-52 unit.

But it was anything but a routine inspection. Events that unfolded just days earlier gave a new urgency to the evaluation, making it a bellwether for the Air Force's troubled nuclear enterprise.

Less than three weeks before the inspection team arrived at Barksdale, the 2nd Bomb Wing had been involved in one of the most serious nuclear incidents in the nation's history. On 29 August, one of the unit's B-52s began a 1,200 mile flight from Minot AFB, North Dakota to the Louisiana installation. The giant, eight-engine bomber was carrying six cruise missiles scheduled for deactivation. It was supposed to be a normal ferry mission, part of the planned retirement of early-model AGM-129 air-launched cruise missiles. Once at Barksdale, the missiles would be downloaded from the giant bomber, demilitarized and destroyed, in accordance with arms control protocols.

But unknown to crews at Barksdale, their counterparts at Minot had committed a grave error. The missiles slated for transfer to Louisiana had their nuclear warheads removed, a mandatory procedure before a ferry mission. But personnel at the North Dakota base mistakenly loaded six nuclear-tipped missiles onto the bomber. Amazingly, the mistake was never detected by teams at Minot that loaded the weapons; the 2nd BW crew that flew the B-52, or personnel at Barksdale that greeted the jet.

In fact, the nuclear warheads were not "discovered" until almost 12 hours later, when a Barksdale load crew arrived to remove the cruise missiles. By that time, the warheads had been officially "missing" for more than 36 hours, a period that included the previous evening at Minot, where the bomber sat, without required security measures, before the flight to Barksdale.

The incident was reportedly classified as Bent Spear, a term used to describe serious nuclear mishaps which may include breaches or violations of security and handling regulations. News of the incident was immediately briefed to senior Air Force officials; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and President George W. Bush.

The military quickly launched a full-scale investigation of the mistaken transfer, and began punishing those deemed responsible for the incident. Within days of the mishap, rumors about firings and dismissals began to make the rounds.

And those rumors were not unfounded; as the official inquiry began to gather steam, the Air Force fired Colonel Bruce Emig (Commander of the 5th BW at Minot); Colonel Cynthia Lundell, commander of Minot's maintenance group, and Colonel Todd Westhauser, leader of the 2nd Operations Group at Barksdale. In that capacity, Westhauser "owned" the B-52 and crew that brought the nuclear warheads to the Louisiana base. Eventually, the discovery of other problems in the USAF's nuclear enterprise would result in the dismissal of the Air Force Secretary and the service's Chief of Staff, along with sanctions for dozens of lower-ranking personnel.

Against that backdrop, the 2nd BW faced the most critical LNSI in its history. For nine days (18-27 September), evaluators from ACC, shadowed by experts from Air Force Space Command and other federal agencies, inspected every element of the bomb wing's nuclear mission. Records were carefully screened; equipment was inspected and wing personnel demonstrated key elements of their unit's nuclear capabilities.

When it was over, the 2nd BW received an overall rating of "Satisfactory," and Air Force officials breathed a sign of relief. Had the Barksdale unit failed its LNSI, the nation's bomber leg of its nuclear triad would have been seriously crippled. Without Barksdale and Minot, America's nuclear bomber force would have been reduced to a handful of B-2 stealth bombers, based at Whiteman AFB, Missouri. But with Barksdale earning a passing grade, that unit could continue its nuclear mission and perform key tasks for the 5th BW as well, while the Minot unit worked to regain its nuclear certification.

But new questions are being raised about the results of the 2007 inspection at Barksdale. In response to a Freedom of Information Act request filed almost four years ago by "In From the Cold," the Air Force recently released a lightly-redacted version of the LNSI report. According to experts who reviewed the document at the request of this blog, the report details discrepancies that typically result in a failing grade for a unit.

In particular, they point to the 2nd BW's inability to properly load weapons and generate simulated nuclear sorties during the inspection. Section III of the 36-page report details prolonged efforts by 2nd BW crews to perform essential tasks, including an air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) pylon upload; preparation of a ferry aircraft with one ALCM pylon and one advanced cruise missile pylon, and one complete aircraft generation, from weapons transfer through aircrew acceptance.

As noted in the inspection report, Barksdale personnel struggled mightily to complete their assigned duties. According to evaluators, the first attempt at aircraft generation was terminated after 14 hours, due to problems with weapons handling trailers and generators.

A second try at aircraft generations also failed. The exercise was initially delayed (due to uneven pavement under the B-52 weapons bay), prompting a relocation of the aircraft. As the exercise continued, crews experienced more equipment problems. The second attempt was finally halted at the 15-hour point, when "critical faults" were discovered during post-load checks.

During the next attempt, the 2nd BW attempted to generate two aircraft. The third B-52 was rejected due to a critical fault during post-load checks. Ground crews managed to generate the fourth bomber, but not before another equipment problem (with a lift arm) required a weapons demate/mate.

All told, Barksdale personnel spent more than 30 hours generating a single nuclear-capable aircraft. Yet despite the reported difficulties, the 2nd BW still received a "Satisfactory" grade for the Loading and Mating portion of the evaluation, a rating that left some nuclear experts stunned.

"Tell me this is a joke," said one retired Air Force weapons expert, with more than 20 years of nuclear experience. Pages 9 and 10 [of the report] are enough to result in automatic "Unsats" (unsatisfactory ratings). No pass, go to jail or whatever. If you can't load, you can't be inspected, and if you can't be inspected, you are UNSAT, he continued. "Don't waste the gas to send the team. Where the hell is the leadership?"

The weapons expert who reviewed the Barksdale report spoke on the condition of anonymity.

Another former expert was equally blunt in his criticism of the unit and the evaluation. "It's very, very difficult to believe they could receive a passing grade on any kind of inspection when they were unable to generate a single successful nuclear sortie until the fourth attempt," he said.

The retired Air Force official also observed that evaluators seemed to put most of the blame on faulty equipment--and not the crews that maintained it

"Members of the inspection team (and I'm sure the 2nd Bomb Wing) seem to want to attribute their inability to generate a sorties on equipment failures. However, the sheer amount of failure makes this very hard to accept," he said. "In theory, all of the vehicle inspection and checklist compliance pieces are supposed to ensure that equipment is in good working order. Clearly, in practice, that wasn't the case. It appears they were given a set of mulligans to account for equipment failures and ensure they were able to (eventually" generate a sortie."

The second expert--who also requested anonymity--expressed amazement at another apparent trend in the report. He said the document repeatedly "spins" the lack of a negative finding into a positive one, and offered several examples:

"On page 11, paragraph 2 of the report, 'the weapons loading community overcame numerous equipment malfunctions,' instead of being held accountable for poorly-maintained equipment, they are lauded for how they dealt with failures," he commented.

The expert also chuckled at a paragraph praising Barksdale personnel for following required communications security (COMSEC) practices. "This is ridiculous," he said, "They just described compliance. You can't comply "exceptionally."

As a third example of "spin," the nuclear expert cited a paragraph on page 14 of the report, noting that Barksdale had only one "incident" of a close-in sentry abandoning his post. "Having a sentry leave his position is a huge issue," the former official observed. "They frame his 'one failure' as 'well, it was just one failure and categorize it as a [unit] strength."

The inspection report also highlighted problems that may have contributed to nuclear incident that occurred in late August of 2007. Evaluators found that 2nd BW personnel "did not ensure that markings for ferry payloads and Type 3 trainers were applied or legible prior to use for payload mate to missile." It is unknown what markings--if any--were applied to the nuclear missiles mistakenly transferred from Minot to Barksdale, or if crews at the Louisiana base failed to recognize payload markings when the B-52 arrived.

Overall, the 2007 LNSI at Barksdale evaluated management and performance in 17 different areas related to the unit's nuclear mission. The 2nd BW earned "Excellent" ratings in 10 categories, five were judged as "Satisfactory," and only two were rated "Marginal." Those areas, Program Management and Administration and Unit Administration, received low marks for a critical finding, the certification of non-qualified aircrew members as mission ready. Inspectors found that the unit failed to ensure proficiency in all nuclear-related events before declaring initially-qualified aircrew and "combat mission ready."

The report lists more than 30 findings during the Barksdale inspection, including those serious issues in weapons loading/aircraft generation and aircrew certification. That raised concerns about pressure on the evaluators to generate a satisfactory score, and prevent de-certification of the 2nd Bomb Wing. The former Air Force official believes "external pressures were driving inspectors to deliver a passing grade."

"While there is no way I can say with certainty that the pressure affected the outcome," he continued," It's" very difficult to imagine a situation where an inspection team would be willing to deliver the message if there was any possible way it could be avoided."

After passing the 2007 inspection, the 2nd BW continued its nuclear mission and performed critical duties at Minot as well, while the 5th Bomb Wing struggled to regain its certification. Personnel from the Louisiana base remained at Minot through the first half of 2008, until the 5th Wing was re-certified to perform its nuclear mission. Had Barksdale failed its evaluation in the fall of 2007, the re-qualification process would have been much longer and more complex, crippling the bomber leg of the nuclear triad for months, and limiting options for strategic planners.

Observers note that the Barksdale evaluation was the first "no-notice" inspection conducted in the wake of the Minot incident. The 2007 event ushered in an era of more rigorous nuclear standards and evaluations, as well as a reorganization of the USAF's nuclear enterprise. Almost two years later, Global Strike Command became operational and took charge of the Air Force's nuclear mission from its headquarters at Barksdale.

Creation of the new command was one of the recommendations from a task force (chaired by former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, who chaired a task force that investigated the Minot incident. The Schlesinger panel discovered that nuclear expertise in the Air Force had been badly eroded by a variety of factors, ranging from decreased emphasis on the mission, to the use of technicians in other capacities (such as guarding prisoners in Iraq).

Over the past two years, there have been fewer reported problems in the Air Force nuclear enterprise, but there were clear growing pains. After the Minot incident, four more USAF wings failed their nuclear surety inspections in 2008 and 2009, leading (in some cases) to more personnel changes. The 5th Wing also failed its initial NSI in May 2008, though it regained its nuclear certification, and passed a make-up evaluation three months later.

The service was also embarrassed by the mis-shipment of nuclear components to Taiwan in early 2008, an event that led to more calls for greater accountability, and changes in Air Force nuclear operations. At least six USAF generals were disciplined over that matter, along with a larger number of lower-ranking officers. The sanctions were announced just weeks after the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Michael Moseley and the Air Force Secretary, Michael Wynne, were asked to resign because of continuing problems in the nuclear enterprise.

Air Force public affairs officials did not respond to e-mail requests for comment on the 2007 report.

No explanation was given as to why it took so long to release the report. Only two paragraphs in the report were redacted, included a brief section describing the "health" of Barksdale's nuclear stockpile at the time of the evaluation. The report was originally classified "For Official Use Only/DoD Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information." Release of the 2007 report was authorized by Major General Harold Mitchell, the Air Force's Deputy Inspector General.

Some of the personnel connected with the original Minot episode have remained in the service. Colonel Emig, the 5th Bomb Wing commander who was fired in the weeks after the incident, now runs the Irregular Warfare Division at Air Combat Command Headquarters, and has played a major role in shaping Air Force UAV operations. Colonel Westhauser, the former commander of the 2nd Operations Group at Barksdale, is now assigned at Maxwell AFB, AL, where he is Director of Doctrine Development at the Curtis LeMay Center.