It Only Gets Worse

Kudos to Debbie Schlussel, Michelle Malkin and the New York Post, who are still digging into on the Nada Prouty scandal, while the MSM takes the a pass.

Readers will recall that Ms. Prouty is the former FBI Special Agent and CIA Operative who pleaded guilty last week to charges of fraudulently obtaining U.S. citizenship, unlawfully obtaining information from a government computer system, and defrauding the United States.

The charges stemmed from Prouty's use of a sham marriage to attain citizenship, a prerequisite for federal employment. Once on the FBI payroll, she attempted to gain information on the bureau's efforts to investigate Hizballah activities in the U.S. and abroad. Prouty's brother-in-law, who provided employment during the 1990s, is a reported Hizballah fund-raiser, accused of funneling more than $20 million to the terrorist group before fleeing the United States.

Now, it seems that Prouty has a former sister-in-law who pulled a similar scam, to enlist in the United States Marine Corps. Reporter Jeane MacIntosh of the Post has discovered that Samar Khalil Nabbou Spinelli married the brother of the man that Prouty wed to obtain U.S. citizenship. Both marriages took place in 1990; neither woman ever lived with their "husbands," and once the naturalization process was complete, they filed for divorce. Sources tell the Post that the Michigan men involved in the scheme, Christopher and Jean Paul Deladurantaye, agreed to the deal.

With her citizenship in hand, Samar Khalil Nabbou enlisted in the Marine Corps and eventually became a commissioned officer; her rank has not been disclosed. However, depending on when she earned her commission, Nabbou is at least a Captain (O-3), a Major (O-4). After entering the Corps--and divorcing her sham husband--Nabbou married a fellow Marine, giving her yet another last name.

So far, the Marine Corps has said little about Samar Khalil Nabbou Spinelli, reporting only that she is currently stationed in Japan. The Corps has not provided information on her military specialty or past duty assignments. However, with her background and language skills, it would not be surprising to learn that Spinelli is an intelligence officer.

This much we know: as a commissioned officer in the Marine Corps, Spinelli held a "Secret" security clearance at a minimum. If she held a Top Secret/SCI security clearance, Spinelli had access to Intelink, the secure "intranet" which allows the FBI, intelligence agencies and military intelligence to access and share information, including some of the nation's most sensitive secrets. As an FBI agent, Prouty may have had access to the same system, and she certainly used Intelink during her subsequent employment as a CIA operative.

What remains unclear is the relationship between Prouty and Spinelli once their sham marriages ended. The Post reports that both women lived together--with Prouty's sister--during their marriages to the Deladurantayes. However, Spinelli enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1990, while Prouty remained in the Detroit area until 1997, when she applied for a position with the FBI. Prouty used Spinelli as a reference on her employment application, suggesting there was some contact after her former "sister-in-law" began her military career.

At this point, the Marine Corps won't say what punishment (if any) Spinelli might face. For starters, there's the issue of Fraudulent Enlistment, which is a crime under Article 83 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). To become a Marine officer, Spinelli had to be a U.S. citizen, and she obtained her citizenship through fraud.

Spinelli was also named as an unindicted co-conspirator in the federal case against Prouty, along with the former CIA operative's sister, and her Hizballah-connected husband, Talil Kahil Chahine. We're guessing that Spintelli's status as a co-conspirator was based on more than merely providing a reference for Prouty's FBI application. Needless to say, the Marines will frown on Spinelli's role in the Prouty case, and her own, fraudulent enlistment into the Corps.

Beyond Spinelli's potential problems with the military justice system, there are other, equally pressing issues that require immediate resolution. The emergence of the Marine officer as an un-indicted co-conspirator raises new questions about her own access to classified information, contact with Nada Prouty after 1997, and how Spinelli's entrance into the Marine Corps (and subsequent commissioning) were vetted by authorities.

***

Complete background on the Prouty case from the experts at the Counter-Intelligence Centre.

The Prouty File

Somewhere in that Great Safehouse in the Sky, James Jesus Angleton is shaking his head.

The CIA's late, legendary Chief of Counter-Intelligence (CI) must be saddened over the deplorable state of his craft. Thirty-four years after his forced resignation from the CIA, Angleton's zeal for ferreting out moles and double-agents has all but vanished in an intelligence community now ruled by expediency and political correctness. While it is true that Mr. Angleton was fooled by some notable spies (most notably, the British turncoats Kim Philby, Donald Maclean and Anthony Burgess), his record in counter-intelligence was far better than those who now ply that most demanding of trades.

If we could channel Angleton, he'd probably say that CI hit a new low last week, with the conviction of Nada Nadim Prouty. In terms of skill and intrigue, the 37-year-old Lebanese woman is hardly a match for Philby or Burgess, but history may record that she also inflicted grave damage on national security. Equally damning, the Prouty case illustrates that today's spy catchers are hard-pressed to find the most obvious plants; we can only wonder how many big espionage "fish"--on the scale of Rick Ames or Robert Hanssen--remain undetected.

As you've probably heard, Ms. Prouty pleaded guilty last week to charges of fraudulently obtaining U.S. citizenship, unlawfully obtaining information from a government computer system, and defrauding the United States. It was all part of an (apparently) successful effort to obtain information on our efforts to monitor Hizballah, the terrorist group which counts Prouty's brother-in-law as a long-time fund-raiser. Did we mention that Ms. Prouty worked for him during two extended periods in the 1990s? Or that the same man wrote a letter
affirming to the validity of her sham marriage to a U.S. resident--which provided the basis for her fraudulent citizenship?

Never mind those early red flags. With citizenship papers in hand, the one-time waitress gained employment as an FBI Special Agent, and later, as a CIA operative. During her time with the FBI, Prouty accessed the agency's Automated Case System (without authorization) to obtain information on her brother-in-law and a separate national security investigation into the terror group, conducted by the FBI's Detroit field office.

But it gets better. While working for the FBI, Nada Prouty obtained a security clearance. And, at some point, she gained a Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmentalized Information (TS/SCI) clearance, giving her access to some of the nation's most vital intelligence information. The FBI reports that Ms. Prouty didn't work on Hizballah-related cases during her time with the agency, but that doesn't mean she couldn't access intelligence files on the terrorist organization.

Indeed, during her time as a CIA employee (2003-2007), Prouty almost certainly had access to Intelink, the classified intranet of the intelligence community. With Prouty working on the inside, Hizballah was in a position to gain valuable insights on our collection activities and, possibly, sources within the group. While the Justice Department says there's "no evidence of actual espionage" and "no evidence [Prouty] was working as a spy," they did tell CBS News:

"..she is accused of passing information to sympathizers of Hezbollah, a group the U.S. has labeled a terrorist organization."

We'd love to get Jim Angleton's take on that one. In his day if it "looked like a spy, and acted like a spy," well, you get the idea. Incidentally, Debbie Schlussel, who's been on this story since Day One, notes that a later version of the CBS story claims Prouty was also accused of "improperly taking classified information home with her." But, the government says there's no evidence of actual espionage. In other words, Ms. Prouty was quite adept at covering her tracks--or the feds are afraid of where their trail might lead.

As Ms. Schlussel observes, the trail of corruption and incompetence in the Prouty case is simply stunning. Her brother-in-law, accused of funneling up to $20 million to Hizballah, was allowed to flee the country in 2003. Prouty's family ties to terror came to light more years ago, but she remained on the FBI payroll, and then moved on to the CIA. In fact, her resignation from the agency took effect on November 6, 2007--one week before she entered a guilty plea on those federal charges. And, in case you're wondering, Ms. Prouty is facing a sentence of less than 12 months in jail--or possibly, no prison time at all, along with three years' supervised probation and a $2500 fine, under a federal plea deal.

Obviously, the Justice Department is anxious to close the books on Ms. Prouty, as is the CIA. Still, there are a number of unanswered questions about this affair, issues that demand a Congressional investigation. Among them:

--When was Ms. Prouty's original National Agency Check (NAC)--a requisite for a Secret-level clearance--completed? Was there anything in that review that raised suspicions?

--When did Prouty obtain her TS/SCI clearance? The date is essential, since an SSBI investigation (required for that clearance) covers every detail of your life for the preceding 10 years, a period which included her sham marriage and association with Hizballah fund-raisers? If Prouty gained her TS/SCI clearance during her FBI career, then the 10-year review would have covered those events?

--Who was interviewed in connection with her SSBI? Federal screeners are trained to look for inconsistencies or gaps in information provided by interviewees. Given Prouty's checkered past, it seems that everyone's "story" matched--suggesting an elaborate, well-rehearsed effort to plant a spy in the U.S. security apparatus--or agents overlooked obvious clues.

-- For example, how did Prouty's former "neighbors" explain the fact that she never lived with her "husband?" Or what did the husband have to say about his absentee "wife?" These were obvious red flags that demanded further inquiry, but either no one asked, or the answers were ignored.

--Was Ms. Prouty "read in" to any Special Access Required/Special Access Programs (representing the most sensitive intelligence information)? Did any of these programs relate to Hizballah and/or other terrorist organizations?

--What types of search queries did Prouty perform on Intelink? Did she have access to the system during her days at the FBI, or did it begin with her transfer to the CIA? What was revealed by a search of her agency computer(s)?

--How did Prouty manage to pass at least two polygraphs during her tenure with the federal service? Did she pass a polygraph before receiving any counter-interrogation/counter-poly training for the CIA (if she did, that would provide even more evidence of a plant operation).

--What liaisons (if any) did she perform with other intel agencies? Were any of these activities related to Hizballah and/or other terrorist groups?

--What type(s) of classified information was found at Prouty's home, or on her personal computer?

--How can the feds conclude that "no espionage occurred," despite her obvious ties to Hizballah (and the transport of classified material to her home)?

Debbie Schlussel reminds us that Islamic terror groups have long vowed to infiltrate U.S. intelligence and security agencies. The Prouty case suggests that the infiltration effort is well underway--and how easy it may be for their operatives and plants to gain access to our most sensitive intelligence information.

Four decades after he left the CIA, revisionists remember James Angleton as a paranoid, a man whose obsession with enemy moles and outside manipulation ultimately became counter-productive, both for the agency and the wider intelligence community. But, it also seems likely that CI agents of the Angleton era would have instantly spotted Prouty as an obvious plant, someone unsuitable for federal employment, let alone a security clearance.

Sometimes, a little paranoia is good for the soul--and national security.

***

ADDENDUM: If you thought the Prouty fiasco couldn't get any worse, guess again. Michelle Malkin has a link to an article in today's New York Post. Turns out that Ms. Prouty is married to a senior State Department official, who has held sensitive posts in the Middle East. Ms. Malkin also found this item from the New York Daily News, which has some interesting observations from CIA officials on the scandal:

Several other CIA officers also shrugged off her pleading guilty to rifling FBI files for information on family members and a Hezbollah counterterror case in Detroit.

"As far as I can tell, she was just looking out for her family," another senior official said.

God help us.

Who's Got the Nukes, Part II

As Pakistan's domestic crisis continues, so does the debate about the security of that nation's nuclear arsenal.

The New York Times reported over the weekend that the U.S. has provided almost $100 million in aid since 2001 to help Islamabad improve its nuclear security. According to the Times, the assistance was buried in secret portions of the U.S. budget, and used to fund initiatives that ranged from a nuclear security training center, to a "raft of new equipment."

While the training center has yet to open--and Pakistan has been reluctant to show how and where the equipment is being used--officials in Washington and Islamabad claim that Pakistani efforts have improved in recent years, and that nation's nuclear facilities are secure.

In recent days, American officials have expressed confidence that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is well secured. “I don’t see any indication right now that security of those weapons is in jeopardy, but clearly we are very watchful, as we should be,” Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told a Pentagon news conference on Thursday.

Admiral Mullen’s carefully chosen words, a senior administration official said, were based on two separate intelligence assessments issued this month that had been summarized in briefings to Mr. Bush. Both concluded that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal was safe under current conditions, and one also looked at laboratories and came to the same conclusion.

But the Times account also raises a concern that we highlighted almost two weeks ago: there are limits on what we know about Pakistan's nuclear program. Not only has Islamabad been reluctant to share details of its nuclear security efforts, there are also legitimate questions about the number of nuclear facilities, the location of weapons, their operational status, and the vetting of personnel associated with Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. It would be very interesting to know if the assessments that Admiral Mullen referred to also highlight our intelligence "gaps" regarding the Pakistani nuclear program, and how they affected the bottom-line assessment.

Despite those intel gaps--and Pakistan's reluctance to share sensitive information with the United States--the Bush Administration is debating plans to expand the nuclear security effort, offering more money for training and new equipment. However, there are limits on what Washington is willing to do. So far, the U.S. has refused to share its most sensitive weapons safety technology with Pakistan, including the so-called Permissive Action Links (PALs), which prevent a warhead from being detonated without proper codes and authorizations.

Not surprisingly, the Times steers its coverage toward the notion of sharing PALs technology--considered one of the "crown jewels" of U.S. nuclear technology. Noting that the U.S. has provided sensitive safety data other nations in the past, the paper located a former top nuclear scientist who argues that we should also share warhead technology:

Harold M. Agnew, a former director of the Los Alamos weapons laboratory, which designed most of the United States’ nuclear arms, argued that recent federal reluctance to share warhead security technology was making the world more dangerous.

“Lawyers say it’s classified,” Dr. Agnew said in an interview. “That’s nonsense. We should share this technology. Anybody who joins the club should be helped to get this.”

“Whether it’s India or Pakistan or China or Iran,” he added, “the most important thing is that you want to make sure there is no unauthorized use. You want to make sure that the guys who have their hands on the weapons can’t use them without proper authorization.”

In the past, officials say, the United States has shared ideas — but not technologies — about how to make the safeguards that lie at the heart of American weapons security. The system hinges on what is essentially a switch in the firing circuit that requires the would-be user to enter a numeric code that starts a timer for the weapon’s arming and detonation.

But there's a key element missing from that discussion. When the U.S. shared information in the past--most notably, with France and Russia--there was little chance that the data would be transferred to other nuclear powers, or wind up in the hands of terrorists. Given Pakistan's past history as a nuclear proliferator (through the notorious A.Q. Kahn network) and continued domestic turmoil, the decision to not to share PALs-type technology strikes us as eminently sensible.

Dr. Agnew's proposal is sheer folly. Let's suppose for a moment that we share sensitive warhead safety concepts with Pakistan, and that country falls into the hands of Islamic radicals. Not only would the Islamists gain access to nuclear weapons, they would also gain the ability to build bombs are are less tamper resistant--and much more difficult to disarm. That technology could be easily shared with the Taliban and Al Qaida, creating a true nightmare scenario: a terrorist nuclear bomb with advanced security features, a device that would be almost impossible to neutralize prior to detonation.

Given current conditions in Pakistan, the U.S. should expand nuclear security assistance for Islamabad. But any increase in aid should require a better accounting of how the aid is being used, and better information on the location and function of Pakistani nuclear facilities. While Islamabad will never provide a full accounting of its nuclear activities, an improved database on nuclear sites and their purpose will--if nothing else--provide a better comparison for our own intelligence information.

Scientists like Dr. Agnew believe that "complete transparency" (with the U.S. leading the way) is the only way to ensure nuclear safety. But that view is hopelessly naive, particularly in our dealings with Pakistan. Given that country's current political and security environment, sharing sensitive nuclear technology with Islamabad might easily backfire, resulting in a compromise of information that could have dreadful consequences, both at home and abroad.

Decision Time?

Today's U.K. Guardian report on Iran's nuclear program is largely a rehash of points we've already made. Citing the recently-released IAEA report on Tehran's nuclear efforts, the Guardian notes that Iran now has upwards of 3,000 centrifuges in operation, an array that could produce enough enriched uranium for one nuclear weapon a year, assuming that sufficient purity levels are attained.


And, as the paper observes, the 3,000 centrifuge array may represent a "red line" for potential military action. Allowing Iran to operate the centrifuges for a sustained period--and add more to the operation--would allow Tehran to master the production of nuclear fuel, an important step in developing nuclear weapons. The U.S. has long stated that Iran will not be allowed to obtain nukes, but it's unclear at what point we would employ military force. Similar red lines exist for Israel, which views Tehran's nuclear program and long-range missile forces with growing apprehension.


In some respects, the IAEA report underscore the inability of that organization--and the larger international community--to deal with the Iranian nuclear threat. Former U.N. arms inspector David Kay (who would never be described as a neocon or a John Bolton clone) said that the IAEA assessment tries to "put a happy face on a worsening situation."


"The main issue is that Iran now has 3,000 centrifuges," he said. "The report doesn't even judge the quality of the information being offered, but it's clear it is giving minimal answers."


Indeed, even the nuclear agency acknowledges that Tehran's cooperation has been "reactive rather than proactive." In other words, getting information out of Iran has been the inspection equivalent of pulling teeth. While the IAEA commended Iran for providing access to individuals and answering questions, it seems clear that such cooperation has been reluctant, at best.


So, do these events genuinely place the U.S. and its allies at a decision point for military action?

At this juncture, we still believe the answer is "no." Despite claims that plans for an Iran operation are "up to date," we have not seen a build-up of air and naval forces that would likely signal an attack. The U.S. has also done nothing (at least officially) to discourage on-going diplomatic efforts, included tougher sanctions.

However, progress on that track is decidedly slow; as the Guardian notes, a planned U.N. security council meeting on sanctions, scheduled for Monday, has been postponed because the Chinese delegation is unable to attend. Both Beijing and Moscow--with extensive economic and military ties to Iran--are urging more diplomacy before new sanctions are imposed. Both Russia and China remained opposed to any military action against Tehran.

Against that backdrop--and with U.S. military forces stretched thin by on-going conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan--the Bush Administration appears hesitant to pull the trigger. That's one reason that Tehran remains bellicose in official statements on its nuclear program, and refuses to back down. At this point, Iran believes it has little to fear from pressing ahead with its nuclear ambitions, even if it has pushed the west to a decision time.

Numbers

A hat tip to Fox News and Glenn Reynolds, who discovered this under-reported study from the Congressional Research Service, detailing U.S. military deaths over the last quarter-century.

As you might expect, the study (which was released last June) shows a spike in military deaths since the invasion of Iraq in 2003. A total of 1,228 military personnel died that year, followed by 1,874 in 2004, 1,942 in 2005, and a total of 1,858 last year. Readers will note that the study includes all fatalities among active duty personnel, full-time guard and reserve members and selected full-time reservists. The totals include both combat deaths and service members who died from other causes, including accidents, diseases and even violent crime.

Describing the study as eye-opening would be an understatement. While the media (and war critics) have emphasized the growing number of military deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan, those figures obscure some very startling facts. Despite the toll of combat operations in the Middle East, the number of military fatalities since the Iraq invasion was actually lower than during the comparable period in the 1980s, when combat deployments were extremely limited.

Here are the death totals for each year during the selected periods (as calculated by the CRS), along with the total number of military personnel who were serving full-time:

A. 1983-1986

YEAR//TOTAL MILITARY FTE(a)//NBR OF U.S. Military Deaths

1983//2,273, 364//2,465

1984//2,297,922//1,999

1985//2,323,185//2,252

1986//2,359,855//1,984

(a) FTE = Full Time Equivalent personnel, based on DoD fiscal year-end totals

Now, here are the comparable totals for the most recent, four-year period:

B. 2003-2006

2003//1,732,632//1,228

2004//1,711,916//1,874

2005//1,664,014//1,942

2006//1,664,014//1,858

Source: CRS Report for Congress, American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics, Updated June 29, 2007

Military death totals from the mid-1980s may seem a bit surprising at first glance, but they actually underscore an inescapable fact: military duty is often hazardous, even in times of peace. Of the 2,465 military members that died in 1983, more than half (1,413) perished in accidents, many of them training-related. Operating high-performance aircraft, training with live ammunition or working on the deck of an aircraft carrier are but a few of the dangerous jobs performed by military personnel on a daily basis. Despite extensive safety precautions, accidents invariably occur, and claim the lives of service members.

The accidental deaths also include fatalities from traffic mishaps, long a problem among junior personnel. During the 1980s, that trend was compounded by a more tolerant attitude toward alcohol on military installations, which resulted in more DUI crashes. When the Pentagon adopted a "no tolerance" policy for drinking and driving--and banned alcohol sales to personnel under the age of 21--the number of DUI related offenses (and fatalities) began to decrease.

In fact, the numbers presented in the CRS study are a testament to the effectiveness of military flight, ground and weapons safety programs. Thanks to those efforts (along with better training and equipment) military deaths due to accidents between 2003 and 2006 were 2-3 times lower than in the mid-1980s. The drop in accidental deaths more than offset the jump in combat fatalities, which increased steadily after the invasion of Iraq, then declined after the recent troop surge.

Four years of combat in Iraq (and six years of fighting in Afghanistan) make the CRS figures truly noteworthy. You don't need to be General Patton to understand that war increases the chances for mishaps; the stress of combat--or simply being in a war zone--can raise chances for vehicle crashes, weapons accidents and other incidents that claim the lives of military personnel. After climbing slightly in 2004 and 2005, the number of service members who died in accidents dropped to 465 last year, which was slightly below the average for the last decade (498).

More impressively, combat deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan comprise a tiny fraction of those who have served, despite intense combat in places like Fallujah, Ramidi and Baghdad. As we noted in a recent post, the losses of U.S. World War II bomber crews on a single raid (Ploesti, Schweinfurt) equalled months of fighting in Iraq, or years in Afghanistan. It's also worth noting that the CRS statistics do not include totals for 2007. Recently proclaimed as the "bloodiest year yet" for U.S. forces in Iraq, the final figures for this year will also reflect a sharp drop in combat deaths in recent months, another measure that the troop surge is working.

In offering any analysis of this type, we're always reminded of Mark Twain's famous maxim about "lie, damned lies and statistics." But it's hard to refute the numbers from that CRS study, or the trends now evident in Iraq.

The Day After

An Arrow 2 missile, designed (and deployed) primarily to protect Israeli from attack by medium and intermediate range Iranian missiles (Israeli Aircraft Industries photo via The Jerusalem Post)

A Reuters dispatch out of Israel indicates that the Olmert government is preparing for "The Day After"--the possibility that deterrence efforts will fail, and Iran will acquire nuclear weapons.

According to the report, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has instructed his ministers to draft proposals on how to cope with a nuclear Iran.

The report was later denied by a senior Prime Minister's Office official, Israel Radio reported.

The agency quoted a source close to Olmert as saying there were "long-term ramifications to be addressed, like how to maintain our deterrent and military response capabilities, or how to off-set the attrition on Israeli society that would be generated by fear of Iranian nukes."

Despite the official denials, cabinet member Ami Ayalon told Reuters there is a need for a three-point strategy against Iran:

"First, we must make clear that this is a threat not just to Israel, but to the wider world. Second, we must exhaustively consider all preventive options. And third, we must anticipate the possibility of those options not working," Ayalon said.

Reaction to the story has been decidedly mixed. Some in the blogosphere have claimed that Mr. Olmert is "selling Israel down the drain," concluding that a nuclear-armed Iran is all-but-inevitable.

Other pundits believe that the Israeli government is simply being prudent. The international community has consistently refused to take more decisive action against Iran (and its nuclear program), and there's no guarantee that military action would completely eliminate the threat. Under that scenario, Israel could very well face a nuclear-capable Iran at some point in the very near future.

Reading between the lines, we believe the Israeli comments reflect a number of considerations, and they're aimed at both domestic and American audiences. First, the statement is an indirect admission that there are limits on Israel's ability to strike Iran. As we've noted in the past, the IAF is constrained by its ability to provide in-flight refueling for an air strike against Iran, and the need to cross hostile airspace.

Given those limitations, an IAF attack would likely be a "one-time" operation, involving a relatively limited number of F-16Is, F-15Is and KC-707s (with probably no more than 24 strike aircraft). That means elements of Iran's nuclear program might escape serious damage, and could be quickly reconstituted. The problem is further exacerbated by the possibility that Tehran has a parallel, covert nuclear effort, in locations unknown to Israeli or western intelligence.

That's why the Israelis would prefer that the U.S. take military action against Iran. American carriers in the Gulf--and Air Force expeditionary winds based in the Middle East--could launch a sustained aerial bombardment of Tehran's key military and nuclear facilities, reducing survival prospects for key installations, equipment and personnel.

But that creates serious problems for Washington, both politically and militarily. On the political side, there are concerns that an attack against Iran would completely destroy GOP prospects for retaining the White House in 2008. While President Bush's decision-making has never been controlled by polls and electoral concerns, he is not oblivious to the political ramifications of attacking Iran.

Additionally, a number of senior U.S. military officials have recently noted that a "new front" against Iran would place a further strain on our armed forces, already stretched-thin by the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. While none of those officials have stated that we lack the capability to attack Iran, they have cautioned that expanded operations would come at a very high price, particularly in terms of money and equipment.

And, if Mr. Bush takes a pass on striking Iran before his term ends, then it's all-but-certain that a Democratic successor would also refrain from military action. That's why those Israeli comments (conveniently offered to a Reuters correspondent) are also aimed at Democratic presidential hopefuls. Tel Aviv has no confidence in the willingness of a Democratic administration to deal forcefully with Tehran--and those concerns are well-founded. Not long ago, one of the party's leading presidential hopefuls suggested that he would be willing to talk with Ahmadinejad, the same man who has suggested that Israel should be "wiped off" the map.

With their own military options constrained--and the U.S. seemingly unable to act, it's no wonder that Israel is growing increasingly pessimistic in its outlook. With the world community unwilling to aggressively confront Iran, and with limited military possibilities, planning for "The Day After" may become Israeli state policy by default.

Today's Reading Assignment

...from Andrew Walden at The American Thinker, on the supporters that the Ron Paul campaign won't acknowledge--or apparently, repudiate. Turns out that the GOP/Libertarian Congressman-turned-presidential-hopeful has picked up quite a following among neo-Nazis and anti-Semites.

More disturbingly, it appears that the candidate has accepted donations from at least one Neo-Nazi group and its leader--in fact, the organization has a donation link to the Paul campaign, which (at last report) has not been blocked. Additionally, there is no indication that Mr. Paul has returned any money raised from these sources.

As Mr. Walden notes, this is more than a case of a solitary link from a hate-group website, or a single donation by a well-known white supremacist. A large segment of the kook fringe, including avowed racists and anti-Semites, are coming out of the woodwork to back Mr. Paul. And while other politicians would repudiate their support--and their venomous message--the Paul campaign remains strangely silent.

Hat tip: Powerline.

Today's Reading Assignment

...from the pages of the Los Angeles Times. In an op-ed published today, Pakistani poet and writer Fatima Bhutto makes the case that her aunt, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, is not the woman who can restore democracy in her native land. Quite the opposite; Fatima Bhutto makes the case that her aunt is actually profiting from the recent declaration of emergency rule:

The reality, however, is that there is no one better placed to benefit from emergency rule than she is. Along with the leaders of prominent Islamic parties, she has been spared the violent retributions of emergency law. Yes, she now appears to be facing seven days of house arrest, but what does that really mean? While she was supposedly under house arrest at her Islamabad residence last week, 50 or so of her party members were comfortably allowed to join her. She addressed the media twice from her garden, protected by police given to her by the state, and was not reprimanded for holding a news conference. (By contrast, the very suggestion that they might hold a news conference has placed hundreds of other political activists under real arrest, in real jails.)

Ms. Bhutto's political posturing is sheer pantomime. Her negotiations with the military and her unseemly willingness until just a few days ago to take part in Musharraf's regime have signaled once and for all to the growing legions of fundamentalists across South Asia that democracy is just a guise for dictatorship.

She also reminds us that the former Prime Minister is no stranger to corruption--the same charges leveled against Pakistan's current leader, General Pervez Musharraf.

It is widely believed that Ms. Bhutto lost both her governments on grounds of massive corruption. She and her husband, a man who came to be known in Pakistan as "Mr. 10%," have been accused of stealing more than $1 billion from Pakistan's treasury. She is appealing a money-laundering conviction by the Swiss courts involving about $11 million. Corruption cases in Britain and Spain are ongoing.

It was particularly unappealing of Ms. Bhutto to ask Musharraf to bypass the courts and drop the many corruption cases that still face her in Pakistan. He agreed, creating the odiously titled National Reconciliation Ordinance in order to do so. Her collaboration with him was so unsubtle that people on the streets are now calling her party, the Pakistan People's Party, the Pervez People's Party. Now she might like to distance herself, but it's too late.

And, lest we forget, Benazir Bhutto has her own tied to Islamic radicals:

Ms. Bhutto's repeated promises to end fundamentalism and terrorism in Pakistan strain credulity because, after all, the Taliban government that ran Afghanistan was recognized by Pakistan under her last government -- making Pakistan one of only three governments in the world to do so.

Obviously, Fatima Bhutto has reasons to be angry with the former Prime Minister. Her father --Benazir Bhutto's younger brother--was killed in 1996, in what was described as a carefully-planned police assassination. Benazir Bhutto's role in the murder has never been explained, but a three-judge Pakistani panel concluded that the killing could not have occurred without approval from a "much higher" political authority.

While Benazir Bhutto often receives fawning coverage from the western press, it is clear that she is less popular at home that we would believe. Which leads to an obvious question: if Musharraf goes down the tubes--and Ms. Bhutto can't muster enough support--who does the U.S. support?

As with many elements of the Pakistan "problem" there are few easy answers, or palatable choices.

A Tale of Two Programs

A DSP deployment during a Space Shuttle mission in 1991. Other satellites in the constellation have been launched from Air Force Titan IV and Delta IV rockets (Wikipedia photo).

For the space and intelligence communities, the first decade of the 21st Century will be remembered as the time when two critical satellite programs ended, but for very different reasons. One, the Defense Support Program (DSP), went out in a blaze of glory on Saturday, with the launch of a satellite that was completed almost a decade ago. Its delayed launch was not the product of technical delays and escalating costs, but largely because DSP satellites have lasted much longer--and performed better--than originally forecast, slowing the need for replacement craft.

The other program, quite literally, never got off the ground. It was cancelled two years ago, but Sunday's edition of The New York Times contained an extensive post-mortem on the effort, aimed at producing the nation's next generation of imagery satellites. As the Times revealed, the program (known as Future Imagery Architecture or FIA) was beset by unrealistic expectations, massive cost overruns, and a contractor that lacked extensive experience in building spy satellites. The result was a "perfect storm" of spiraling costs, shoddy work and unrealized technical specifications that cost the taxpayers "tens of billions" of dollars, according to one U.S. Senator.

In some respects, it may be unfair to compare the DSP and FIA programs. After all, an imagery bird is an infinitely more sophisticated piece of equipment, designed to capture high-resolution electo-optic, infra-red or multi-spectral images of targeted installations, on orbits more than 200 miles above the earth. The DSP constellation, on the other hand, is designed to detect missile launches from its geosynchronous orbit, and relay that information to the ground. Built around advanced IR sensors, DSP is smaller and less complex that imagery satellites, but it performs a mission that is equally important.

But the resounding success of the DSP program (and the comparative failure of FIA) was more than a matter of technology, as the Times article indicates.

"...the collapse of the project, at a loss of at least $4 billion, was all but inevitable — the result of a troubled partnership between a government seeking to maintain the supremacy of its intelligence technology, but on a constrained budget, and a contractor all too willing to make promises it ultimately could not keep.

“The train wreck was predetermined on Day 1,” said A. Thomas Young, a former aerospace executive who led a panel that examined the project.

And problems associated with the project quickly spiraled out of control:

Boeing had never built the kind of spy satellites the government was seeking. Yet when Boeing said it could live within the stringent spending caps imposed by Congress and the satellite agency, the government accepted the company’s optimistic projections, a Panglossian compact that set the stage for many of the travails that followed. Despite its relative inexperience, Boeing was given responsibility for monitoring its own work, under a new government policy of shifting control of big military projects to contractors. At the same time, the satellite agency, hobbled by budget cuts and the loss of seasoned staff members, lacked the expertise to make sound engineering evaluations of its own.

The satellites were loaded with intelligence collection requirements, as numerous intelligence and military services competed to influence their design. Boeing’s initial design for the optical system that was the heart of one of the two new satellite systems was so elaborate that optical engineers working on the project said it could not be built. Engineers constructing a radar-imaging unit at the core of the other satellite could not initially produce the unusually strong radar signal that was planned.

A torrent of defective parts, like gyroscopes and electric cables, repeatedly stalled work. Even an elementary rule of spacecraft construction — never use tin because it deforms in space and can short-circuit electronic components — was violated by parts suppliers.

By the time the project, known by its initials, F.I.A., was killed in September 2005 — a year after the first satellite was originally to have been delivered — cost estimates ran as high as $18 billion.

But there was plenty of blame to go around. The FIA program was on an extremely tight budget, with little room for error. And, making matters worse, the Clinton Administration had eased oversight on key government contracts, allowing vendors to essentially monitor their own efforts. When the program fell behind schedule and over budget, there were fewer government overseers to sound the alarm. And Boeing kept offering rosy predictions, claiming that the program could still be delivered on time.

Instead, FIA had to be eventually scrapped, at a cost of between $4-18 billion, depending on whose estimate you believe. Meanwhile, cancellation of the new imagery satellite (and, the more recent termination of a stealth spy satellite program) has left the United States with an aging intelligence constellation, one that is increasingly vulnerable to mechanical problems and enemy denial and deception (D&D) efforts.

By comparison, the weekend launch of our final DSP satellite provided a stark contrast to the collapse of the FIA effort, providing a reminder of when U.S. space programs delivered dazzling technology, on time, on budget and sometimes exceeding original performance specifications.

Over the past 37 years, the DSP program has become the backbone of our space-based missile warning system. During that time, the platform has undergone a series of technical refinements, improving its detection capabilities and performance reliability. DSP satellites can now detect tactical ballistic launches in the Middle East (and elsewhere), supplanting their original mission of tracking ICBM and SLBM activity in the former Soviet Union and China.

Originally projected to have a service life of less than two years, the DSP platforms are now designed to operate a minimum of five years. But, thanks to superb design and engineering, some of the platforms have lasted for 20 years. Officially, the Air Force won't say how many DSP birds are still in operation, but some are expected to remain on duty well past 2009, when the first replacement satellites (part of a system called SIBRS) will be launched.

Reading the account of the final DSP launch, you also gain an appreciation for the highly-skilled experienced workforce associated with the long-running Northrup-Grumman program. Peggy Paul, Northrup's DSP manager, estimates that more than 25% of her team is retirement eligible, and "quite a few" will leave the company, now that the last DSP satellite is on orbit. Many of Paul's engineers have decades of experience in the program; some have spent their entire careers working on DSP.

Replacing that talent is going to be a major problem, not only for Northrup-Grumman, but for the entire defense establishment. Engineers who spent their careers in programs like DSP were motivated by a desire to work on cutting edge technology, and contribute to the nation's defense.

Today, fewer young Americans are opting for careers in science and engineering, and many of them would rather work for Apple or Google, instead of Northrup-Grumman and Boeing. If we don't find a way to reverse that trend (and build stable, experienced engineering teams at defense contractors) we'll face more debacles like FIA. Of course, it would also be equally helpful to fix the acquisition process, ensuring that the Pentagon isn't hoodwinked by contractors who promise more than their engineers can deliver--and expect the taxpayers to bail them out when they fail.

Unfinished Business

A Cane Corso, seized from Michael Vick's property last April, is now up for adoption at the Virginia Beach, VA ASPCA (Newport News Daily Press)

It's been more than six months since authorities first raided the Surry County, Virginia property of NFL star Michael Vick, uncovering the dog-fighting ring that led to a federal investigation, indictments, and a subsequent, guility plea from the Falcons quarterback. Vick will be sentenced next month for his role in the dog-fighting operation, and most observers believe he will receive a 1-2 year prison sentence for the crimes.

Since the scandal broke, Vick has lost his $130 million contract with the Falcons. He's also lost millions in endorsement deals that were cancelled by various sponsors (Coca-Cola, AirTran Airlines and Nike, to name a few), and his future NFL career is in doubt. More recently, Vick has also defaulted on a pair of multi-million dollar loans, another indicator of "Ookie's" growing legal and financial woes.

But another element of the Vick scandal is also working its way through the system. According to the Newport News, VA Daily Press, a dozen dogs removed from Vick's property during the investigation will soon be available for adoption. The animals--nine Beagles, two Rottweilers and a large dog believed to be a Cane Corso are currently at the Virginia Beach SPCA, and will soon be available for adoption. As the Daily Press reports:

The 12 dogs under the SPCA's care show no signs of breeding or training as fighters and have no scars indicative of dogfighting. They're undergoing behavioral and medical evaluations and then will be ready for adoption. Some are ready for suitable homes now, said Teresa Lamarche, community outreach director with the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals.

"They have great temperaments. They are nice animals," Lamarche said. "The majority, we anticipate, if not all of them, will be adoptable."

Lamarche told the paper that Vick's former dogs have been mixed in with the shelter's general population. Potential owners won't learn of their history until they're well along in the adoption process.

"The dogs are not being highlighted," Lamarche said. "You may not even know which ones they are, and that's a good thing in our mind.

"However, if people get far enough along in the adoption process and ask, the SPCA will share that information, Lamarche said.

It's not known if the animals up for adoption served as pets, or were intended for more sinister purposes. Some trainers use "bait animals" to test a dog's fighting instinct, and they are often killed or mauled in the process. However, the lack of scars and behavioral cues suggest that the dogs now at the shelter were not used to support Vick's dog-fighting operation.

Anyone interested in adopting one of the dogs should contact the Virginia Beach SPCA at (757) 427-0070, or visit their website at http://www.vbspca.com/. If you'd like to make a donation towards their support, the web address is http://vbspca.com/donate. As you might guess, the SPCA isn't receiving any money from Vick to pay for the care and feeding of his dogs. We can only hope that a federal judge rectifies that situation when he imposes Vick's sentence (and fine) next month.

Readers will also note that Norfolk-based PETA, which made public relations hay of the Vick scandal, has (again) disappeared on the issue, although their protestors will be out in force for the sentencing next month. But, since caring for the animals and placing them in suitable homes doesn't attract TV cameras, PETA has taken a pass on that element of the Vick case, leaving those jobs in the hands of the ASPCA. PETA is an absolute embarrassment to anyone who's genuinely concerned about animal welfare.

***

On a related note, Tuesday was the deadline for animal rescue groups to apply for the 48 pit bulls rescused from Vick's estate last spring. Those animals are now in the hands of a court-appointed guardian, a law professor at Valparaiso University in Indiana. Because many of the dogs were used for fighting, it's unclear if any of them can be saved.

***

Finally, the effects of the Vick case were also felt in Surry County last week. The county's incompetent Commonwealth's Attorney (Gerald Poindexter), who intially tried to bury the investigation, was officially running unopposed for a new term. However, more than 1,000 Surry County residents voted for a late-entry, write-in candidate, instead of supporting Mr. Poindexter. The write-in candidate received 42% of the vote, which speaks volumes about Poindexter's dwindling support in his own county--and public perceptions of how he mishandled the Vick case.

The Airlift Debate Continues

The C-5 Galaxy (USAF Photo)

In yesterday's Washington Times, Delaware Senator Tom Carper responded to a recent op-ed by New Jersey Congressman Jim Saxton, who has called for cancellation of the troubled C-5 modernization program, so that the Air Force can buy more C-17s. With refurbishment costs now approaching $100 million per aircraft, Mr. Saxton argues that it makes little sense to modernize the C-5, which has a 25% lower mission capability rate than the newer C-17.

Not surprisingly, Senator Carper disagrees. As we've noted in the past, Mr. Carper and other members of the Senate have a vested interest in keeping the C-5 in service, and he remains a strong backer of the refurbishment effort. However, his arguments sound slightly less-than-convincing:

It is true that in the past, the C-5 has experienced a lower reliability rate than the much newer C-17. The mission capable rates for the C-5A have frequently fallen below 50 percent, and the rate for the C-5Bs hovers somewhere around 65 percent.

But Congress and the Bush administration realized the need to correct this reliability issue several years ago and directed the Air Force to begin the process of modernizing its C-5s, given the likelihood that the large cargo aircraft have another 25 years or more of useful life on their wings and fuselages. To date, the Air Force has worked with a contractor to modernize three C-5Ms, and it is flight testing and evaluating the aircraft to determine if it will meet the contractor-guaranteed mission capable rate of 75 percent.

While we won't know with absolute certainty until June 2010 whether the C-5 modernization process will increase the reliability to the specified rate, flight-test results over the past year suggest that it will likely be met, and possibly exceeded.

In other words, Mr. Carper believes we should continue with the modernization program, in hopes that it can meet specified bench marks--in three years. Meanwhile, the cost of converting C-5As and C-5Bs to the new "M" standard has skyrocketed. Recent Air Force estimates put the cost per aircraft at $120 million per aircraft, while Lockheed maintains it can do the job for $83 million each. By comparison, a new C-17 costs about $200 million.

It is true that the a single C-5 can fly missions that would require the services of two C-17s--plus tanker support. And, in a perfect world, the Air Force would benfit from a mix of C-5s and C-17s. But, in the current budget environment, it seems increasingly likely that the service can't afford both programs. Facing that reality, the Pentagon (and the nation) may be better off by retiring the C-5 and concentrating on a newer airlifter, one that offers superior reliability, lower maintenance costs and a much longer service life.

We'll give Mr. Carper credit for trying to protect a program that's important to his state's largest military installation, Dover AFB. But, in our view, it's becoming difficult to support a modernization program that has grown increasingly expensive, and has only an outside chance of meeting required performance standards.

Today's Reading Assignment

Ralph Peters, in the New York Post, noting the inverse relationship of recent developments in Iraq and media reporting on the conflict. As the situation improves, he notes, coverage dries up.

Measures of Sacrifice

In a column posted today at OpinionJournal.com, author Daniel Ford reiterates a point that we've often made in this blog: American casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan--while clearly distressing--pale in comparison to those from previous conflicts. While that fact may offer little consolation to the familes of military personnel killed in the War on Terror, we clearly paid a higher price in blood during wars past.

Over 50,000 Americans died during World War I, despite our late entry into that conflict. More than 300,000 perished during World War II; the Korean War claimed another 30,000 military personnel and 58,000 died during Vietnam. By comparison, the number of troops killed in Iraq and Afghanistan now totals just over 4,000 (in 73 months of combat), a testament to improvements in tactics and training, better protective gear and advances in combat medicine.

As Mr. Ford reminds us, a single battle or engagement during World War II created carnage that exceeded months of fighting in the War on Terror. To illustrate that, he cites the ill-fated 1943 bombing raid at Ploesti, Romania, staged on August 1, 1943. Located just north of Bucharest, the refineries in Ploesti produced most of the petroleum used by the German war machine. Allied planners hoped that a surprise raid could knock out the refineries, and cripple the enemy war effort.

Almost from the start, the operation was vexed by poor intelligence and questionable decision-making. Located almost 1,200 miles behind enemy lines, the Ploesti refineries were believed to be lightly defended; in fact, they were ringed by scores of German fighters and more flak guns "than those defending Berlin" as historian Duane Schultz discovered. To ensure maximum damage (and ensure surprise), planners decided to send in formations of B-24 bombers at low altitude.

Enroute to the target, more problems ensued. The aircraft carrying the lead navigator crashed over the Mediterranean, leaving a poorly-prepared lieutenant in charge. As they approached the target, towering cumulus clouds obscured visibility and the formation became disorganized, with some groups pushing 30 minutes ahead of the others. Finally, one B-24 group missed the initial point (IP) and turned at the wrong location, putting them on the wrong heading. Operating under strict radio silence, there was no way for mission commanders to recall the errant formation or abort the raid; it was too late, so the attack proceeded.

The result was an aerial bloodbath. German anti-aircraft crews quickly confirmed what allied practice missions had suggested: gunners had no trouble tracking or engaging the bombers at low altitude. Dreaded 88 mm guns put up walls of flak, aided by small caliber weapons. Scores of B-24s were lost to anti-aircraft fire; German ME-109 fighters picked off other bombers as they exited the target area. Of the 178 bombers dispatched to Ploesti, 44 were shot down and seven more landed in Turkey, where their crews were interned. A total of 532 aircrew members were killed, wounded or captured in 27 minutes of hellish combat.

Results of the raid were mixed, at best. Despite the heroism and sacrifice of the B-24 crews, the Ploesti refineries quickly recovered, and within weeks, petroleum production was higher than before the attack, according to Mr. Schultz. Five aircrew members won the Medal of Honor over Ploesti, a record for any engagment by the Army Air Corps or its successor, the U.S. Air Force.

And, lest we forget, Ploesti raid wasn't the only mission where bomber crews paid a heavy price for shoddy intelligence, operational mistakes, or overly-ambitious planning. Barely six weeks after the disaster in Romania, 59 Air Corps B-17s were shot down during the second raid on the German ball-bearing production center of Schweinfurt; 590 pilots, navigators and gunners never returned from that mission.

The staggering losses continued into 1944. Another 247 B-17s and B-24s were downed during the "Big Week" of February 20-25, aimed at smashing the Luftwaffe. In reality, those losses (along with preparations for the Normandy invasion) limited daylight bombing raids over Germany until P-51 fighters arrived in large numbers, escorting the bombers to their targets and back home again.

In his recent PBS documentary, Ken Burns featured two veterans of the air war--a former B-17 ball turret gunner and a retired P-47 pilot. Both affirmed the horrors of air combat; the gunner was wounded twice before being sent home; the fighter pilot recalled that the two men who witnessed his last will and testament died in combat, less than six months after signing the document. All told, aircrew members suffered more casualties in World War II than any other combat branch, save the infantry.

It's a bit ironic that Mr. Ford's column appeared on the same day as this article, detailing the hazards faced by latter-day airmen in Iraq. The Air Force Times piece details a recent study by researchers at the University of Pennsylvania, which found that airmen deployed to Iraq are not only less likely to be killed (in comparison to their Army and Marine Corps counterparts), their death rate is also lower than their civilian peers here in the states.

The study, published in the September issue of the journal Population and Development Review, found that the annual death rate for airmen deployed for OIF is 0.37 deaths per thousand people, compared with 1.32 deaths per thousand for the U.S. population aged 20 to 34.

That means that young civilian adults at home are more than 3½ times more likely to die than airmen deployed for OIF.

That revelation will bring the usual jokes about the "Chair Force" and claims that the Air Force fights its war from a cockpit at 30,000 feet--beyond the reach of enemy air defenses--or from an ergonomic chair, in front of a computer screen. But that notion belies the fact that thousands of airmen are pulling dangerous duty in Iraq, serving on EOD teams, running convoys, or handling security outside airfields and other key installations.

Indeed, the relative "safety" of airmen assigned to Iraq is a measure of how far air warfare has progressed since the dark days of World War II. Our military forces in Iraq are free to focus on ground-based threats because allied airpower--led by the USAF--smashed Saddam's air arm almost 20 years ago, and finished it off during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Sixty-plus years later, American air dominance is considered essential for any military operation, and our ability to control the skies seems almost guaranteed. But today's Air Force was born out of the men and units that were forged in the fires of World War II, progenitors of a proud legacy shaped by Ploesti, Schweinfurt and a thousand other aerial engagements.

That's why those battles still resonate today, and offer a useful benchmark for our current efforts in Iraq. In 30 minutes of hell over Romania, the U.S. endured casualties that equal months of fighting in Iraq. That doesn't lessen the sacrifice of those who die in Iraq, but it does offer provide a useful counterpoint to media reports of "record" casualties. We can only wonder how today's press corps would have reported the news from England or Egypt in 1943, when so many bomber crews failed to return.

Over There and Gone Forever

Sunday marked the 89th anniversary of the armistice that ended World War I. At the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month, the guns finally fell silent along the western front, bringing the "War to End All Wars" to a close.

Almost a century later, the horrors of that conflict have receded into history. In an era when less than two hundred combat deaths a year (in Afghanistan) brings anguish and talk of military failure, we forget the carnage that was the Great War. Over a quarter-million dead at Verdun in barely 10 months; nearly 20,000 British dead on a single day--July 1, 1916--during the first hours of the Somme offensive.

If the passage of time has dulled the horrors of that war, it has also eclipsed our own role in the conflict. More than two million young Americans were shipped to Europe in 1917-1918, providing the reinforcements that bolstered the allied cause, and (eventually) spearheaded the final attacks that forced the Germans to accept the armistice.

Ten decades later, only one of the doughboys sent "over there" is still with us. In today's edition of The New York Times, writer Richard Rubin profiles Frank Buckles, America's only surviving World War I veteran who served overseas. Mr. Buckles, who lied about his age to enlist, never made it to France; his unit was posted in Britain, where he guarded German POWs during his tour of duty.

In his op-ed, Rubin describes Mr. Buckles' life as extraordinary, and it's hard to disagree. After being discharged from the Army at the end of World War I, he returned to civilian life. In early 1942, he was the manager for a U.S. steamship company in Manila when the Japanese Army occupied the city. Mr. Buckles became a POW and spent 39 months in captivity before being liberated in late 1945. He later settled in West Virginia and became a farmer, a vocation he pursued until well after his 100th birthday. Today, at age 106, he is one of only three surviving U.S. veterans of World War I. The others were still in basic training when the war ended and never made it overseas.

As Mr. Rubin reminds us, the passing of those remaining veterans will mean that later generations will lose their last human contact with events that scarred and shaped a century. He writes:

It’s hard for anyone, I imagine, to say for certain what it is that we will lose when Frank Buckles dies. It’s not that World War I will then become history; it’s been history for a long time now. But it will become a different kind of history, the kind we can’t quite touch anymore, the kind that will, from that point on, always be just beyond our grasp somehow. We can’t stop that from happening. But we should, at least, take notice of it.

On what may be the last Armistice Day for the generation that fought the war, we should take notice, indeed.

Heard It With Our Own Ears (and We Still Don't Believe It)

In case you missed it, El Rushbo had a rather disturbing call just before 2 pm (EST) today, from a woman in Sarasota, Florida. She explained that her son is a fourth-grader at Bay Haven Elementary School in the city, and was pleased to learn that the school will celebrate Veteran's Day tomorrow.

Then, her son asked: "Mommy, what's a conscientious objector?"

Turns out that her son's teacher plans to commemorate the holiday by recognizing those who refused to serve. The woman complained to the school's principal, who said she could not dictate how teachers observed Veteran's Day; however, she did agree to the mother's request that her son be moved to another classroom on Friday, for a more appropriate observation of the holiday.

And it gets worse--from an educational perspective. Bay Haven isn't your run-of-the-mill K-5 institution; it's the only magnet school among the 23 elementary schools in the Sarasota County system. It's been recognized as "National School of Merit;" an "A School; " a "5-Star School" and a Golden School Award Winner. In other words, it's supposedly a model of educational excellence.

Or should we saw indoctrination?

***

ADDENDUM: For the record, we have nothing against legitimate conscientious objectors (notably the Amish and Quakers) who have long refused military service on religious grounds. But, contrary to what that teacher in Sarasota may believe, refusing to serve is not the same thing as wearing the uniform. The fourth-grade teacher's "commemoration" is an abomination to all veterans, and its deplorable that the school system is allowing her to proceed.

Disturbing Signs

Bill Roggio reports that Pakistan is denying claims of a deteriorating internal security situation, and troop redeployments away from the Indian border.

In a story published Wednesday, The Khaleej Times of India claimed that large numbers of Pakistani troops had been withdrawn from the heavily-defended border between the two countries, leaving a greatly-reduced military presence. Intelligence reports provided to India's security cabinet indicated that as many as 38,000 Pakistani soldiers have been moved from the border region in recent weeks, a move without precedent in its long, contentious history with India.

According to Indian intelligence, most of the troops are being transferred to Pakistan's western tribal lands, the scene of recent pitched battles with Taliban and Al Qaida terrorists. Press reporting suggest that Pakistani losses have been heavy, and Islamabad has decided it needs more troops to continue that offensive and improve internal security. Indian officials believe as many as 15 Pakistani brigades are now operating in the tribal regions.

Among the units redeployed are elements of Islamabad's Elite Strike Corps, designed to slice into enemy territory in the early stages of a renewed Indo-Pakistan War. The Strike Corps is considered one of the most capable units in the Pakistani Army. The willingness of President Musharaaf (and his generals) to redeploy Strike Corps assets is a clear indication of a worsening security situation inside Pakistan.

The Khaleej Times also reports that Pakistan is facing an ops tempo problem, with over half of its combat brigades now in action. That raises issues about Islamabad's ability to mount sustained operations in the tribal lands, maintain internal security and sustain a credible presence along the Indian border.

We should note that India's intelligence services--like our own--are sometimes off the mark in their assessments. Still, Pakistan is Dehi's #1 surveillance target, and it seems likely that Indian overhead assets--and other platforms--have detected a clear shift among Islamabad's military forces. And that may be the best indicator (yet) of just how perilous the situation in Pakistan has become.

More on Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal...

...and its relative security, from today's Baltimore Sun. In the article, reporter David Wood repeats many of the points made in our post of two days ago. However, he does provide a brief discussion of the Passive Action Link (PAL) code device, installed on Pakistani nukes to prevent tampering with the weapons.

That's really no surprise; we have the same type of technology on our weapons, and so do the other nuclear powers, for that matter. The only problem, from what we're told, is that Pakistani PALs are far less tamper-proof that their U.S. counterparts, and as the Sun reports, Islamabad has not accepted technical advice on how to improve the devices.

Mr. Wood also notes that Pakistan has a special, 10,000-man security force to protect its nuclear arsenal. However, he doesn't quite connect all the dots, failing to note that concerns about Islamist infiltration--long a problem in Pakistan's intelligence services--also extend to the nuclear security forces.

Picture of the Year, But Don't Bother With That Pulitzer Nomination

From the indefatigable Michael Yon, who recently captured this amazing sign of hope, faith and freedom in Iraq. He writes:

Thanks and Praise: I photographed men and women, both Christians and Muslims, placing a cross atop the St. John’s Church in Baghdad. They had taken the cross from storage and a man washed it before carrying it up to the dome.

A Muslim man had invited the American soldiers from “Chosen” Company 2-12 Infantry to the church, where I videotaped as Muslims and Christians worked and rejoiced at the reopening of St John’s, an occasion all viewed as a sign of hope.

The Iraqis asked me to convey a message of thanks to the American people. ” Thank you, thank you,” the people were saying. One man said, “Thank you for peace.” Another man, a Muslim, said “All the people, all the people in Iraq, Muslim and Christian, is brother.” The men and women were holding bells, and for the first time in memory freedom rang over the ravaged land between two rivers.

A number of bloggers, including Wretchard at The Belmont Club, have noted the striking similarity between Yon's photograph, and another iconic wartime image, captured 62 years ago.

Side-by-side: Joe Rosenthal's epic photograph of the Iwo Jima flag-raising in 1945, and Michael Yon's recent image from Baghdad (graphic courtesy of The Belmont Club).

It's difficult to improve on some of the posts we're read about the photograph, particularly those from The Anchoress and Kim Priestap. We can only add that Mr. Yon's image, like all great photographs, speaks to ideals and dreams that transcend a particular moment in time.

Consider those Marines on Iwo Jima, immortalized in Rosenthal's photo and James Bradley's book "Flags of Our Fathers." When they climbed Mount Suribachi on 23 February 1945, the battle was in its fifth day; hundreds of Americans had already died, and the men of the flag-raising detail knew that weeks of brutal fighting lay ahead. Three of the six men captured in the Rosenthal photograph died in combat before the battle ended. For the flag-raisers, that moment on Suribachi was not a symbol of final victory, only a measure of hard-won progress, and a reminder of what remained undone.

Likewise, the Baghdad residents in Yon's photo harbor no illusions that the battle for their country has been finally won. All could tell stories of unspeakable horrors and tragedies that have befallen their families and neighborhoods in recent years, and more tough days probably lie ahead. But recent events--namely the troop surge--have given them new optimism, creating enough hope for them to remove the cross from storage, and restore that greatest symbol of hope to its rightful place.

***

Other bloggers have suggested that Yon's photo is worthy of the Pulitzer Prize. We concur, with the realization that those awards have now fallen victim to the dictates of political correctness. In 1945, Joe Rosenthal's immortal flag-raising shot was a near-unanimous choice for the Pulitzer--the only photograph to receive the award in the same year it was taken. Fifty-seven years later, the Pulitzer jury took a pass on Thomas Franklin's iconic 9-11 image--which Life magazine described as one of the "100 photographs that changed the world.

Firefighters raise Old Glory over the remains of the World Trade Center, 11 September 2001 (photograph by Thomas E. Franklin, The Bergen Record)

While no one can doubt the power and majesty of Franklin's work, the jury gave the top photography prize of 2001 to The New York Times, for its coverage of the terrorist attacks.

The absence of American flags--or other patriotic symbols--in the Times' winning portfolio is particularly telling. Against that backdrop, Michael Yon's marvelous photo doesn't stand much of a chance.

Bomb Watch (Iran Edition)

Iran's nutjob-in-chief, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has again boasted that his country has 3,000 uranium enrichment centrifuges in operation. The Iranian leader made the claim today, in a speech in the northeastern city of Birjand.

To its credit, AFP notes that this is not the first time that Ahmadinejad has claimed that Iran has 3,000 operational centrifuges, which can be used to produce nuclear fuel, or (in a highly enriched form) the fissile core for an atomic bomb. Ahmadinejad made a similar statement in early September, bragging that his country had reached the 3,000 threshold, and was adding new centrifuges "every week."

More disturbingly, the Iranian president's appear to have some basis in fact. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed in August that Tehran had 1968 operational centrifuges, and another 656 were under construction or being tested. Assuming that the second batch of centrifuges are now fully functional (and more have been added), it's quite possible that Iran has 3,000 operational centrifuges.

Of course, the real issue is the purity of the enriched uranium now being produced in Iran. Typical early centrifuge operations can yield fuel-grade uranium (with a purity of 10% of less), but that's a long way from the 90-percent "purity" required for weapons-grade uranium.

The 3,000 centrifuge benchmark is considered important because that's the number that can produce enough highly-enriched uranium for a bomb in one year--assuming that required purity levels are reached and sustained.

Ahmadinejad's claim may be exaggerated, but it comes only days after Israeli intelligence released its latest assessment of Iran's nuclear threat. According to the Israelis, Iran could have its first nuclear weapon by 2009, but that is clearly a "best case" scenario. Most estimates envision Iran attaining a nuclear capability after 2010.

Assuming of course, that they haven't acquired key components--or a finished weapon--from their friends in Pyongyang. We know that nuclear "material" from North Korea was shipped to Syria and destroyed in that recent Israeli airstrike. It's worth remembering that there have been plenty of shipments between North Korea and Iran in recent years, too.

Ending the Never-Ending Debate

As Bret Stephens reminds us in his most weekly WSJ column, the recent death of Paul Tibbets, the pilot of the B-29 that dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima in 1945, will reinvigorate the debate about "the strategic value and moral justification of the aerial bombardment of civilian targets in wartime." It's a debate that's been raging for more than 60 years, and (unfortunately) shows no sign of slowing.

Even in an era of satellite-guided weapons and pin-point targeting, the subject of "collateral damage"--including civilian casualties remains contentious. Afghan President Hamid Karzai has repeatedly complained about civilian casualties from NATO airstrikes in his country, claiming that "hundreds" of Afghans have died this year alone.

It's a theme that has also been echoed on the campaign trail; Democratic President hopeful Barack Obama recently accused allied forces of "air raiding" villages in Afghanistan, inflicting civilian casualties that turn local populations against us, and obliterate the gains of individual bombing missions. Humanitarian concerns aside, it's a message that clearly resonates with the constituencies of both President Karzai and Mr. Obama.

On the other hand, it is worth noting that the debate over the deliberate targeting of civilians is largely historic. The last time it happened on a grand scale was during World War II, when all sides bombed enemy population centers for psychological and strategic reasons. Since then, western powers (particularly the United States) have gone to great lengths to avoid collateral damage, capitalizing on improved technology that has improved the accuracy of aerial weapons, and the political need to avoid excessive civilian casualties.

Indeed, many of the highly-publicized collateral damage incidents in recent conflicts (the Al Fidros Bunker in Desert Storm; the Djakovica convoy during Operation Allied Force, and recent civilian deaths in Afghanistan) were the product of faulty intelligence, or combatants hiding among innocents. They were not an attempt to sap the morale of an enemy populace, a rationale sometimes used to justify the targeting of cities during World War II.

Regrettably, decades of revisionist history have created the impression that killing enemy civilians was a key aim of strategic bombing campaigns in the Second World War. Mr. Stephens notes a recent essay by Algis Valiunas in the summer issue of Commentary, which highlights four recent books on the air war, with emphasis on British and American raids against German targets. They are:

Michael Bess’s Choices Under Fire: Moral Dimensions of World War II ; Jörg Friedrich’s The Fire: The Bombing of Germany 1940-1945; A.C. Grayling’s Among the Dead Cities: The History and Moral Legacy of the World War II Bombing of Civilians in Germany and Japan ; and Marshall De Bruhl’s Firestorm: Allied Airpower and the Destruction of Dresden. According to Valiunas, all four recount the history of air warfare in theory and practice; describe the nature of the attacks and the damage done to human life, property, and cultural inheritance; and examine whether the bombings were militarily necessary or morally justifiable. He also finds that three of the four are decidedly revisionist in their conclusions.

"...Bess, a history professor at Vanderbilt University, has written the most wide-ranging volume of the four, with chapters on topics as diverse as the Allied pact with Stalin, kamikaze attacks, and the Nuremberg and Tokyo war-crimes trials. In a chapter subtitled “A Case of Moral Slippage,” he concludes that the large-scale bombing of cities was an unpardonable atrocity, “the single greatest moral failure of the Anglo-American war effort.” Grayling, a philosophy professor at the University of London, essentially concurs with this judgment, at much greater length; he goes so far as to insist that Allied airmen ought to have refused to carry out area-bombing raids, designed to kill civilians."

"Friedrich, a Berlin broadcast journalist turned historian, avoids Grayling’s kind of pontification, but nevertheless indicates that the time has come for Germans to “appropriate” their past as the suffering victims of a brutal air war. De Bruhl, a distinguished editor and publishing executive, is the only one of the four to defend the firebombing of German cities, with full awareness of how terrible the destruction was and how difficult it is to make his case."

To support their positions, each of the writers notes the horrors inflicted on the cities of Hamburg (in 1943) and Dresden, in February 1945. Successive attacks by RAF Bomber Command and the U.S. Eighth Air Force killed between 30-40,000 people over an eight-day period in late July and early August. The heaviest raid, by 700 RAF bombers on the night of 27 July, touched off a literal firestorm that killed 40,000 civilians--80% of those who died during the campaign, dubbed Operation Gomorrah by the allies.

While Hamburg's status as a legitimate target is beyond dispute--its shipyards and manufacturing plants were vital to the German war effort--Dresden is often cited as a city with no military value. Instead, it is described as a "Florence on the Danube," an artistic and cultural center whose destruction has become emblematic of the Allied bombing effort and its supposed moral failings. As Mr. Valiunas notes, only one of the recent writers mentions Dresden's importance to Hitler's military machine:

De Bruhl illustrates the point by listing some of the military-industrial installations in Dresden—110 of them, employing 50,000 people, and manufacturing everything from small arms to aircraft to antiaircraft and field guns to poison gas. He observes that the city was essential to the national postal and telegraph system, and that three great railway trunk routes met there. And he notes that the bombing helped ease the Soviet westward advance and impeded the Nazi retreat.

Additionally, De Bruhl is only historian (among the four) who makes a case for continuing American and British bombing raids into 1945, when allied victory was already assured. Two months after Dresden, he writes, President Harry Truman was told that Germany would not fall until October 1945 (at the earliest), and Japan would continue fighting well into 1946. Against that backdrop, Allied leaders decided--correctly--that it was the worth the effort to sustain the strategic bombing campaign. De Bruhl is also alone in noting that Germany's collapse accelerated extermination of the Jews, debunking claims that there was no moral imperative for the air campaign after 1944.

To be fair, there were limits on what the Allies achieved. The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, released in September 1945, painted a picture of mixed results. While the deliberate targeting of key industries and production facilities limited German supplies of oil and ammunition, Nazi production of other war staples--including aircraft and armored vehicles--actually peaked in 1944, despite years of British and American air attacks. Results of the survey also confirmed what Allied intelligence analysts already knew; the accuracy attained by Army Air Corps and RAF bombers was poor. Only 20% of the bombs landed within 1,000 feet of their intended aim points, and many missed the target by miles.

Still, any objective reading of history would suggest that the Allied bombing campaigns against Germany and Japan were, indeed, morally defensible. The revisionists tend to forget that the great raids on Hamburg, Berlin, Dresden and Tokyo came after the terror bombings of Rotterdam, Oslo and Shanghai. While the notion of revenge may provide shaky justification, history records this is was the Axis (not the Allies) that initiated the targeting of civilians during the war.

True, enemy bombing raids inflicted fewer casualties but the reasons are rooted in strategy, not humanitarian concerns. First, by launching their own bomber offensive, the Allies took the fight to Germany and Japan--forcing them to build more fighters and anti-aircraft guns, rather than long-range bombers. And secondly, while Japan and Germany embraced the ideals of strategic aviation, both neglected to fully develop their bomber fleets.

But more importantly, moral concerns about Allied bombing campaigns during World War II can summarized in a single question: what are good men willing to do in order to defeat evil in their time? As Mr. Valiunas writes, the answer lies in the conundrum that all democracies face in going to war:

The war locked decent men into a tragic dilemma. In so consuming a conflict, in which the stakes are nothing less than the survival of civilization, a decent people’s viciousness increases in direct proportion to that of its most unclean enemy—or else its chances of survival diminish drastically. To fail to do all you can to defeat an enemy truly malignant would be the greatest evil.

Valiunas also believes that the real moral failing of the west occurred before the war began, and not when fleets of B-17s, B-24s and Lancaster bombers wreaked death and destruction on Germany:

The fire from the sky that consumed Germany in 1945 became a necessary instrument of war only because the Allies failed to stop Hitler when he was just getting started. It is a lesson to take to heart as we face the prospect of another conflagration with a ruthless and evil enemy that is just getting started.

That's the real lesson to carry from the endless debate over the justification for Allied strategic bombing in World War II. General Tibbets should be remembered as a hero, not a war criminal. Continuing the controversy about the "morality" of our bombing campaigns from 60 years ago is the latter day equivalent of arguing about how many angels can fit on the head of a pin. It may be an interesting intellectual argument, and fill more than a few books. But in the end, it's a pointless exercise, and one that obscures history's real lessons for contemporary audiences.