Exaggeration of the Day

Iranian Shahab-3 test launch (AP file photo via Jerusalem Post)

From Iran's dubious Assar Iran website comes the day's most laughable claim. According to the site--which is affiliated with the Iranian government--Tehran will fire 600 Shahab-3 missiles at Israel (and U.S. targets in Iraq) if either Iran or Syria is attacked.

The vow (which has no basis in fact) was reprinted up by the Jerusalem Post, which ought to know better:

"Iran will shoot at Israel 600 missiles if it is attacked," the Iranian news website, Assar Iran, reported. "600 missiles will only be the first reaction."

For the record, Iran actually has two missiles capable of reaching Israel, the Shahab-3 (with a maximum range of 800 miles, and the recently-delivered BM-25, a North Korean derivative of the Soviet-designed, SS-N-6 submarine launched ballistic missile (maximum range: 1500 miles). The operational status of the BM-25 is uncertain; a German diplomat reported last March that Iran had acquired 18 disassembled missiles from North Korea, presumably with a smaller number of launchers. Iran has never conducted a test launch of the BM-25, so it's unclear if the missile would be available for operations against Israel and U.S. targets in the Middle East.

As for the Shahab-3, that system attained its initial operating capability less than three years ago, after a long and troubled development. Most estimates place the number of Shahab-3 airframes in Iran at no more than 40, with a launcher inventory of less than half that total. Obviously, the number of available launchers is critical, since it limits the number of missiles that can be fired at any given time. So much for that 600 missile salvo.

It should be noted, however, that Iran uses the Shahab designation for many of its mobile missiles. If you include the Shahab-2 (Tehran's version of the SCUD C), plus various battlefield rockets, then the Iran could muster a larger a larger mass launch, but nothing on the scale claimed by that website. And only a fraction of those missiles (Shahab-3s and BM-25s) would be capable of reaching Israel. Additionally, if you assume that Iran would keep some of its medium and intermediate-range missiles in reserve, then the size of Tehran's opening salvo against Israel would be further reduced.

That's the good news. The bad news is that U.S. facilities in the Persian Gulf region present a much more accessible target, and many can be reached with a wider variety of missile systems. However, you may recall that President Bush ordered the deployment of Patriot batteries to the region earlier this year, to provide additional protection for our forces--and our allies. A very prudent move, to say the least.

New Details (and Lingering Questions)

Israeli Air Force F-15Is (GlobalSecurity.org)

Sunday's U.K. Times provided tantalizing details of Israel's recent airstrike against that Syrian nuclear facility.

Based on reporting from the Middle East and Washington, the Times story confirmed that Israeli warplanes targeted nuclear materials that were apparently shipped to Syria by North Korea. The article also verified claims that the recent strike was an air/ground operation, with Israeli commandos providing laser designation for F-15Is, which dropped precision weapons on their targets.

Sources also tell the Times that the raid destroyed storage bunkers at a supposed "agricultural" complex along the Euphrates River, near the Iraqi border. The facility apparently gained the attention of Israel's intelligence services, which ordered additional overhead coverage of the target in recent months. According to the Times (and the Washington Post), the raid appeared to coincide with the arrival of a North Korean ship at a Syrian port. The North Korea vessel docked only three days before the airstsrike, carrying a cargo listed was as cement, but was suspected of concealing nuclear equipment.

Not surprisingly, the raid was cloaked in secrecy and deception--hallmarks of past Israeli military operations. Only three members of the Israeli cabinet knew about the raid in advance --Prime Minister Olmert, Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Tzipi Livni, the foreign minister. To deceive the Syrians, Mr. Olmert reduced Israel's troop presence along the Golan Heights in the days before the attacks, suggesting an easing of tensions between the two countries.

Obviously, the Israeli strategy worked; the operation caught Damascus by surprise (there was apparently little reaction from Syria's air defense system); the Israelis inflicted serious damage on the target, and both the F-15I crews and the commandos escaped unscathed. Syria has threatened retaliation, but its options are limited. The odds of Syrian aircraft penetrating Israeli airspace are slim, and a missile strike would invite a devastating response, as would an attack across the Golan Heights.

Still, the Times article leaves a number of questions unanswered. We'll begin with the issue of Israel successfully penetrating Syria's air defense system. While it's happened before, the Syrian air defense network was supposedly re-organized after an embarrassing 2003 Israeli strike against a Palestinian terrorist camp near Damascus. During that raid, the Israelis reportedly exploited confusion over geographic responsibilities within the Syrian defense system. The most recent mission--which involved a much deeper penetration into Syrian territory--suggests that (a) Bashir Assad's air defense network hasn't improved, or (b) the Israelis are using more advanced measures to target the system, and render it impotent.

Then, there's the matter of that commando team. If the Times is correct, those personnel arrived in the target area a day ahead of the fighters, inserted (we'll assume) by Israeli Sea Stallion helicopters. As we've noted before, the successful infiltration of a commando team by helicopter, deep into Syrian territory, is an impressive operational feat, indeed. But getting the commandos (and their choppers) all the way across Syria (and back again), undetected, represents a monumental challenge, even for a state-of-the-art military like the IDF.

That raises another interesting question: where did the commandos and their choppers come from? The target also lies relatively close to Syria's northern border with Turkey, which just happens to have close military ties with Israel. It would be far easier for those Sea Stallions to infiltrate from an airfield or forward operating base in Turkey, rather than making the long trip across Syria. So far, little has been said about a possible Turkish "role" in the enterprise, despite the fact that the IDF has long trained in that country, and members of Turkey's armed forces routinely utilize Israeli military facilities.

There's also the possibility that the commando team staged from a location in Iraq, as suggested by the Times:

According to Israeli sources, American air force codes were given to the Israeli air force attaché in Washington to ensure Israel’s F15Is would not mistakenly attack their US counterparts.

But that's something of a red herring. The "codes" refer to signal transmitted by the Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) transponders carried by all combat aircraft. But in a combat environment, attacking aircraft shut off their IFF before entering hostile airspace. Israeli jets attacking that Syrian "agricultural" complex (presumably) weren't transmitting an IFF "squawk." Moreover, the target is apparently far enough from the border that an accidental "intrusion" into Iraqi airspace--and targeting by U.S. jets--was a remote possibility, at best. And, the Israelis knew that our fighters wouldn't respond to an incident that was clearly within Syrian territory, and posed no threat to our own forces.

So why did the Israelis have our IFF codes? There are several possibilities. First, there's the slimmest of chances that the commando force staged from one of Saddam's old airfields in western Iraq. However, the chances of that happening are virtually non-existent; in today's Middle East environment, the U.S. can't afford to provide direct support to an Israeli strike on a Muslim nation.

On the other hand, there a better chance that the U.S. would allow a crippled Israeli aircraft to land at an airfield in western Iraq that is under our control. Al Asad Airfield, located 180 miles west of Baghdad would be the most likely candidate for a divert base; obviously, an emergency landing at Al Asad or any other U.S.-controlled airfield would be facilitated by transmitting the right IFF squawk, and preventing intercept by our fighters. There's also the possibility that Israel has made "other arrangements" within Iraq, and needed the IFF codes to simply allow transit through U.S.-protected airspace.

While the aircraft used on the Syrian raid--the F-15I--is no surprise, the inclusion of a ground team (or, at least their stated purpose) is a bit curious. As we noted last week, Israel's most advanced jet fighters are trained (and equipped) for employment of JDAM, which relies on satellite guidance. In many respects, that weapon would be a better choice for targeting the Syrian storage bunkers, since the guidance kit can be attached to virtually any type of conventional bomb (including penetrators), eliminating the need for ground designation. The presence of that commando team suggests that Israel was concerned about potential GPS jamming, or (more likely) the commando were dispatched to retrieve nuclear material from the site--a claim repeated in the Times' article.

Finally, there is still debate over exactly what was at the Syrian complex, and the urgency of the Israeli strike. In the Times' account, the target is alternately referred to as nuclear "material" and "equipment." Obviously, those descriptions are a bit vague, covering everything from fissile uranium (and other bomb components) to the machinery used in fabricating nuclear weapons. But then, there's this quote--from an Israeli source--which suggests the IDF were going after something much more ominous:

“This was supposed to be a devastating Syrian surprise for Israel,” said an Israeli source. “We’ve known for a long time that Syria has deadly chemical warheads on its Scuds, but Israel can’t live with a nuclear warhead.”

Truth be told, we may never know what was at that "agricultural center" along the Euphrates. But it is revealing that the Israelis, who had been watching the facility for months, suddenly elected to strike the complex, after that "cargo" arrived from North Korea. Something about the shipment spurred Israel to action, suggesting that it was more than equipment, or material that could be eventually used in nuclear weapons.

***

ADDENDUM: We're also a bit intrigued by claims that the targeted items were transferred to Syria by ship. While seaborne delivery is a more innocuous, it is suspect to intercept/boarding by U.S. or Israeli naval forces. Given that vulnerability, it seems strange that Pyongyang would ship that "material" by sea, especially when transport aircraft routinely fly between North Korea and Iran, and between Iran and Syria. Conversely, maritime delivery would make sense if the cargo was heavy or bulky--say, production equipment removed from a North Korean nuclear facility. The sea transfer might also reflect North Korea's concerns about obtaining required overflight clearances, or a potential refueling stop in a "third country," which would raise the prospect of an aircraft inspection and possible cargo seizure.

***

UPDATE: WorldTribune.com has more on the subject. A senior State Department official, Andrew Semmel, has confirmed the nuclear link between Damascus and Pyongyang. While he describes "contact" between Syria and suppliers of nuclear equipment, he did not indicate that Damascus had received a nuclear device from Pyongyang or other sources. But Mr. Semmel did note the large number of North Korean scientists and technicians in both Syria and Iran, another indication of how Kim Jong-il has "exported" his nuclear program.

WorldTribune also indicates that the Israeli strike package was relatively small, consisting of two F-15Is, four F-16Is and an electronic support aircraft. The website also reports that the raid was "coordinated" with the U.S. Draw your own conclusion.

Bears on the Prowl (Again)

An RAF Typhoon shadows a Russian Bear H bomber, during an intercept flown last month (U.K. MoD via AFP)

For the third time in less than a month, Norwegian and British fighters have been scrambled to intercept Russian bombers over the North Atlantic.

According to AFP, a pair of TU-160 Blackjack bombers were intercepted by Norwegian F-16s and British fighters today, as they flew near NATO airspace. The encounter came barely a week after eight TU-95 Bear bombers flew a similar profile, prompting another scramble by Norwegian and British jets.

A spokesman for the Norwegian MoD said the F-16s launched from Bodo AB, which is (typically) tasked for the intercept mission. The British fighters launched from RAF bases in northern Scotland, although the type of aircraft wasn't specified. Eurofighter Typhoons (pictured above) are replacing the older F3 Tornados in the air defense role. Last week's intercept was carried out by Tornados, while the new Typhoon handled a similar mission in August.

Today's bomber mission came as no surprise, given the recent increase in training activity by Russian strategic aviation--and Vladimir Putin's public pledge to resume such flights. So far this year, Russian bombers have flown multiple missions near Norway and Britain, with additional flights over the Arctic Ocean, and against U.S. defenses in Alaska and Guam.

While the TU-160 (Russia's equivalent of the B-1) is a much more advanced aircraft than the venerable "Bear," it has been seen less frequently on missions flown toward U.S. or European airspace. The Blackjack is less reliable than the TU-95 and more expensive to operate. However, with the recent spike in oil revenues, Moscow has been able to revive the TU-160 program, significantly increasing the number of flights by Blackjack crews.

We still believe that Russia is setting the stage for a bomber flight against the U.S. east coast, perhaps in a matter of weeks. The TU-95 is the odds-on favorite for that mission; with a maximum range of over 7,000 miles, the Bear is more than capable of shadowing the eastern seaboard before landing in Cuba, or (potentially Venezuela). A Blackjack flying the same profile would require extensive in-flight refueling from IL-78 Midas tankers--something that has never been observed on Russian bomber missions over the North Atlantic.

At last report, the Blackjacks were heading for home, so (apparently) the Russians won't try to take advantage of today's Air Force "safety day" to probe our air defenses. The service's Air Combat Command (ACC)--which "owns" CONUS-based air defense fighters--is using the day to review safety procedures, in wake of the recent accidental "transfer" of nuclear tipped cruise missiles from North Dakota to Louisiana.

But the Russians also understand that our air defense mission continues around-the-clock, 365 days a year. Flying an east coast mission during our safety standdown, a Russian Bear would get the same reception as any other day--an escort of F-15s and F-16s, with an AWACS and tankers providing support.

Today's Reading Assignment

Outside the U.S. military, few have heard of a system called Rover. It's combination video receiver and laptop computer that allows ground forces to "see" the same thing as a UAV sensor or fighter aircraft targeting pod, and quickly task the drone (or manned aircraft) to strike a target..

Rover's been around for a while, but in the summer of 2003, it was only deployed with a handful of special operations units. Conventional forces in Iraq and Afghanistan only had a limited idea of what the drones were watching, and getting them to engage a target was cumbersome and slow; sometimes 45 minutes passed between the request and the missile being fired from the UAV. Needless to say, a lot of terrorists got away.

That frustrated an Air Force pilot named Greg Harbin, who was then serving as a coordinator for UAV operations at Prince Sultan Airbase in Saudi Arabia. Harbin, now a Lieutenant Colonel, knew what the answer was: get more Rovers into the field, and train people how to use them.

Today's Los Angeles Times has a terrific story (written by Julian Barnes) on how Lt Col Harbin did just that--changing the way that the Air Force provides close air support--and the day that Rover actually saved Harbin's life.

Guess the IISS Didn't Get the Word...

Al-Qaida in Iraq takes heavy losses.

And remember, the UPI article is describing only a pair of on-going operations. The enemy has been sustaining these types of losses since the surge hit high gear. And, if anything, the number of enemy casualties reported in the press is understated.

Obviously, AOI losses aren't the only barometer of battlefield success. But they are indicative of several, positive trends. First, we're taking the fight to the enemy and holding areas that were previously terrorist strongholds. Secondly, our tactical success has bolstered the confidence of Iraqi civilians, who (in turn) are providing us more/better intelligence on where the enemy is. That, in turn, allows us to plan an execute more effective operations, which results in more dead terrorists.

Utterly Predictable

From today's U.K. Guardian comes this utterly predictable account of Al Qaida's "resurgence." According to the paper, the terrorist organization has revived, spread and is again capable of staging another "spectacular" attack on the scale of 9-11.

The Guardian story is based on the annual assessment of world affairs by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), which released its report yesterday. While the IISS is highly respected, it is also decidedly liberal in its outlook--no wonder the Guardian considers it to be the "Holy Grail." If you need proof of their bias, consider one of the "other" findings from yesterday's report:

"...if climate change is allowed to continue unchecked, its affects will be catastrophic "on the level of nuclear war".

Never mind that the entire "climate change" argument is based on scientific "consensus," rather than irrefutable data. Since that version of climatological events fits the IISS narrative, the think tank is quite willing to accept it as the Holy Grail. And, it's a trend that's evident in other IISS assessments as well. Consider its "doom-and-gloom" view on the state of Al Qaida and the larger issue of radical Islam:

There is increasing evidence "that 'core' al-Qaida is proving adaptable and resilient, and has retained an ability to plan and coordinate large-scale attacks in the western world despite the attrition it has suffered", said the IISS. "The threat from Islamist terrorism remains as high as ever, and looks set to get worse," it added.

"The US and its allies have failed to deal a death blow to al-Qaida; the organisation's ideology appears to have taken root to such a degree that it will require decades to eradicate," it continued.

There is little doubt that Al Qaida has a high degree of resiliency--it's a common trait among terrorist organizations. The IRA fought the British military and intelligence services for almost 30 years; in South America, FARC rebels have been battling the Colombian government since the late 1940s. And the Tamil Tigers have waged a murderous campaign on Sri Lanka since the mid-1970s. In that sense, Al Qaida's resiliency merely follows a well-established pattern.

It's also quite clear that the terrorist group has benefited from the disastrous Waziristan Accords, which allowed them to reestablish safe havens in Pakistan's western tribal lands. With little to fear from the Pakistani government, Al Qaida and its Taliban allies have rebuilt training camps and logistics stockpiles, allowing them to prepare more jihadists for the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan.

But that begs an obvious question--one which the IISS conveniently avoids. If Al Qaida has regained the strength it enjoyed on 9-11, why hasn't the group been able to mount a new "spectacular?" The IISS report cites recently-foiled terror plots in Germany and Denmark as proof of Al Qaida's global reach.

Yet, a closer examination of those incidents reveals little in common with the 9-11, except that all were "inspired" by Al Qaida. Unlike the 9-11 attacks (which were planned and directed by the group's operations chief, Khalid Sheik Mohammed), the failed plots in Germany and Denmark were the work of affiliated groups, operating largely on their own. In both cases, most of the suspects were "home grown" including two German nationals who had converted to Islam. The thwarted attacks follow the "de-centralized" operational model that Al Qaida has been forced to adopt since 9-11, with local affiliates assuming the lead role in selecting targets and planning strikes.

The IISS analysis also fails to note that not everything is going Al Qaida's way. Earlier this year, the group's Somali "franchise" suffered a stunning setback when the Ethiopian Army (with U.S. air and naval support) crushed the Islamic Courts movement, derailing Al Qaida's plans to reestablish a major operational base in east Africa.

Then, there's the matter of Iraq. While analysts at the British think tank describe the situation as a "strategic hole" for the United States, the conflict is also a major drain on Al Qaida personnel and resources. In a recent conversation with talk radio hosts at the White House, President Bush disclosed that "thousands" of terrorists have been killed in Iraq since the start of the troop surge earlier this year. Presumably, many of those were Al Qaida fighters. Had they not been recruited for the Iraqi front, we can only imagine how many of those terrorists would be assigned to western targets.

Iraq also challenges the notion that Al Qadia's fundamentalist ideology is gaining hearts and minds in the Islamic notion. The population of Al-Anbar Province is part of Iraq's Sunni majority, and presumably, a target audience for Al Qaida. And, for a while, the terrorists found refuge in that region until their brutal tactics drove local Sunnis to the U.S. side. Now, the Anbar "awakening" seems to be spreading to other parts of Iraq. Indeed, most of our tactical "gains" on the ground have come directly at the expense of Al Qaida. The IISS believes that the U.S. position in Iraq is bleak, but the situation is far worse for Al Qaida and its allies, who should be benefiting from the strategic morass.

Not surprisingly, the IISS staff includes its share of former British spooks, including Nigel Inkster, who was once a candidate for the top job at MI6. It's nice to know that the U.K. annuitants (like their American counterparts) can retire to the comfort of think tank, while still offering their particularly skewed view of global threats.

That's not to say the entire IISS report is flawed. Their "worst case" prediction that Iran could gain its first nuclear weapon by 2009-2010 jibes with other assessments in that area. And the institute is correct in noting the increased radicalization of Europe's Muslim population, though it fails to note the role played by European governments in creating that problem.

Still, such kernels of unvarnished truth seem to be relatively few and far between in the IISS assessment. Consider their "take" on the impact of climate change, as reported by the Guardian:

The report said the effects of the predicted rise in global temperatures due to the burning of fossil fuels would cause a host of problems including rising sea levels, forced migration, freak storms, droughts, floods, extinctions, wildfires, disease epidemics, crop failures and famine.

Somewhere on his private jet, Al Gore must be very proud, indeed. That's why the IISS report should be read with a healthy degree of skepticism.

Finding a Lost Hsu

The AP reports that an anonymous tip led the FBI to Democratic fund-raiser Norman Hsu, who skipped a bail hearing last week, and later turned up in a Colorado hospital, after falling ill on an Amtrak train.

According to court documents, a tipster on Sept. 6 told the FBI in San Francisco that Hsu was in the emergency room at St. Mary's Hospital in Grand Junction, Colo.

You'll recall that Mr. Hsu was taken off Amtrak's California Zephyr around 11 a.m., after passengers noted his bizarre behavior, and he asked if he was in jail. But the feds didn't arrest him until almost eight hours later, after receiving that tip.

This latest disclosure raises even more questions about Mr. Hsu, who (until recently) was a major figure in Democratic fund-raising efforts. When paramedics pick up a patient, they complete paperwork that includes the individual's name. More forms were, presumably, completed at St. Mary's. It would be very interesting to know what name Hsu gave to the ambulance crew that picked him up, and the medical personnel that provided care at the hospital. We also wonder what identification Hsu was carrying and how much cash he had at the time.

Earlier reports indicated Hsu purchased a ticket to Denver and not Chicago (the train's ultimate destination). As the mystery surrounding the former "HillRaiser" deepens, we owe a debt of gratitude to that John or Jane Doe who spotted Mr. Hsu and alerted the Feds. If not for his apparent meltdown on the train--and that subsequent tip--it's a fair bet that Mr. Hsu would still be on the lam.

***

ADDENDUM: Updates on the Hsu money trail from today's WSJ and the question of the day from Michelle Malkin. How did Norman Hsu get past Secret Service background checks--some of the most extensive in law enforcement--and attain personal access to Hillary Clinton.

The Wrong Time for a Total Review

North Dakota Senator Byron Dorgan.

In the wake of that recent, inadvertent "transfer" of six nuclear-tipped cruise missiles on an Air Force B-52, North Dakota Senator Byron Dorgan is pushing for a "total review" of the Pentagon's system for handling and controlling nuclear weapons.

According to Air Force Times, Senator Dorgan won approval Tuesday for an amendment mandating a complete review of DoD and Energy Department activities for monitoring and controlling the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile. The Dorgan amendment calls for the review to be completed within 90 days, and that a classified report be submitted to Congress. Dorgan's plan was approved by the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, as it considered next year's defense spending bill.

The vote came less than two weeks after an Air Force B-52 carried six advanced cruise missiles (ACMs) armed with nuclear warheads, from Minot AFB, North Dakota to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. Apparently, neither ground crews nor the bomber's crew realized that the warheads remained mounted on the missiles, which were being transferred to Barksdale for dismantling and retirement.

“Clearly, last week, something went wrong with a system where there can be no mistakes,” Dorgan said in a press statement. “We need to understand exactly what mistakes were made and what changes are needed to ensure it cannot be repeated.”

[snip]

“It is critical that every area of our government that has any chain of custody of nuclear weapons, at any time, have a top to bottom review of procedures, and an evaluation of the process of ensuring the chain of custody of nuclear weapons,” Dorgan stated.

While the type of review mandated for the Senate makes for good political theater, it isn't the answer for what went wrong at Minot. All indications point to human failures in the B-52 incident; after all, missiles didn't load themselves onto the bomber, and someone was supposed to remove the warheads from the cruise missiles before they left the weapons storage area. And of course, there were supposed to be safeguards and double-checks to prevent it from happening in the first place.

Based on our experience, the "system" has worked well for more than 50 years, so the failure at Minot wasn't the result of faulty procedures or ineffective custody controls. So, instead of calling for a three-month review of checklists and procedures, Mr. Dorgan should demand a more focused inquiry, concentrating on these areas:

1) The Personnel Reliability Program (PRP). As we noted in a recent post, there are legitimate concerns about who's being cleared to work on (and around) nuclear weapons. PRP is supposed to prevent access by individuals with medical, financial or emotional problems but with unit commanders ultimately deciding who's cleared, individuals with questionable conduct --or documented personal issues--have remained on PRP. One retired Air Force Chief Master Sergeant (who spent almost a decade in the program and served as Senior Enlisted Advisor at a overseas munitions base) estimates that 25-35% of the individuals on PRP should not be in the program. According to the Chief, the problem was simple: no one wanted to enforce mandated PRP standards, because units would wind up with serious manning shortfalls. That's a damning indictment, and in light of the Minot debacle, the "reliability" of our nuclear screening program deserves serious scrutiny.

2) Training. Protocols for the handling, storing and protection of nuclear weapons have always been exceedingly stringent--for obvious reasons. Those warheads were supposed to be removed from the missiles before they left the weapons storage area and made their way to the flightline and onto that B-52. The failure of anyone to catch that mistake suggests a major training breakdown among munitions crews and aircrew members. After all, it wasn't a munitions troop at the controls of that bomber. Determining the extent of training problems that led to the failure should be a second area for serious inquiry.

3) Management of the Munitions Career Field. After our first post on the Minot incident (5 September), we received a number of thoughtful replies from veterans of the munitions career field, some with decades of nuclear experience. They raised a number of points that should also be addressed as part of the review process. For starters, has the profession become too "generalized" with technicians shuttling between conventional and nuclear units, resulting in a dilution of the experience pool that existed in the heydays of SAC. Also worth considering are the impacts of the recent Air Force draw down (what one commenter describes as the planes-for-people program), and deployments associated with the GWOT. In some cases, munitions troops have apparently pulled combat tours as prison guards and interrogators--not the wisest use of manpower, particularly if experience levels in the career field are hurting.

Carefully examining these areas should identify the root causes of the Minot debacle--and prevent similar mistakes in the future. But the investigation will miss its mark without full accountability for the failure, up and down the chain of command. Another retired senior NCO, who spent much of his Air Force career guarding nuclear weapons and delivery systems, put it succinctly:

"They should not stop at firing just the munitions squadron commander...the Installation Commander, the Maintenance Group Commander, both the Maintenance and Security Forces Commanders, and all involved in safety, security and reliability need to be courtsmartialed!..all involved need to go down in a ball of flames."

That may sound a little harsh--and it doesn't sound like what Senator Dorgan has in mind. Fact is, the Senate-directed "top to bottom review" is, in some respects, a waste of time and taxpayer dollars. Existing procedures for handling, storing and safeguarding nuclear weapons are both adequate and effective, assuming that (a) they're properly enforced; (b) personnel are trained to follow them and (c) key specialists are correctly vetted and they're not over-taxed by deployments and duties outside their career field.

Fixing those issues--and holding personnel accountable for the recent screw-up at Minot--are the best ways to prevent such "accidents" from happening again. And that's likely what the Air Force will address in its own, on-going investigation of the incident. At this point, Mr. Dorgan would be well-advised to let the Air Force team do its job before mandating a more extensive review.

But that doesn't make for a headline-grabbing Senate Amendment or press release, does it?

What Did the Israelis Hit?

An Israeli Air Force F-16I Sufa (Storm) Photo courtesy GlobalSecurity.org

Reports continue to circulate about the possible target of last week's Israeli military strike in eastern Syria.

According to The New York Times, U.S. officials believe that weapons caches, earmarked for Hizballah, were the most likely target of the raid, which reportedly included both air and ground units. A Defense Department official told the Times that Israeli warplanes hit "at least one target" in northeastern Syria, but said it was unclear what was struck, and the extent of the bombing damage.

Based on our past experience in BDA (battle damage assessment), that claim is a bit difficult to believe. Given the variety of sensors available to the intelligence community, it seems doubtful that we're largely in the dark about the target and the bombing results. The official's comment to the Times suggests that he (or she) is out of the loop (i.e., doesn't have access to current imagery products), or--more likely--is being deliberately vague about our knowledge of the attack.

But the real stunner in the Times report comes in the sixth paragraph, with this revelation from an unnamed member of the Bush Administration:

One Bush administration official said Israel had recently carried out reconnaissance flights over Syria, taking pictures of possible nuclear installations that Israeli officials believed might have been supplied with material from North Korea. The administration official said Israeli officials believed that North Korea might be unloading some of its nuclear material on Syria.

“The Israelis think North Korea is selling to Iran and Syria what little they have left,” the official said. He said it was unclear whether the Israeli strike had produced any evidence that might validate that belief.

The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were discussing a military action by another government.

The possible transfer of "nuclear material" from North Korea to other rogue states is something we've written about at length, including this most recent installment. Fact is, we don't know the full extent of the "relationship" between Pyongyang, Tehran and Damascus. Clearly, North Korea has been the primary source of ballistic missile technology for both Iran and Syria; both countries have active WMD programs and an interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. But clear evidence of a nuclear transfer has never been offered, at least publicly.

However, there is enough anecdotal evidence to suggest that Tehran and Damascus have a more-than-passing interest in Pyongyang's nuclear expertise. Some intelligence analysts suggest that delegations from Iran and Syria were in the DPRK during last year's marginally successful nuclear test. And there were also reports that a number of Syrian technicians died in a 2004 blast at a railroad crossing along the border between China and North Korea. That explosion has been described as both an assassination attempt on Kim Jong-il (who was returning from China along that route), or some sort of failed WMD experiment involving Syria and the DPRK.

In any event, the purported demise of at least 30 Syrian scientists and engineers (by one estimate) remains a bit curious, given the circumstances of their deaths. As you might expect, massive explosions are rare along major rail lines in the DPRK, particularly on a route used by the "Dear Leader" just a few hours earlier.

With North Korea "officially" abandoning its nuclear program (under the Six Party agreement with the U.S. and its partners), a transfer of material and technology to Syria and Iran certainly makes sense from Pyongyang''s perspective. By going along with the agreement, Pyongyang gets energy aid and other goodies from the U.S. and South Korea; the sale of nuclear materials to the Middle East would generate another economic windfall. It would also give the DPRK a mechanism for continuing their nuclear research efforts, while appearing to comply with the Six Party accord.

And, it would be relatively easy for Pyongyang to arrange such a transfer, but difficult for the U.S. to detect. North Korean vessels have delivered missile cargoes to the Middle East for years, and the same transports sighted at airfields near Pyongyang have turned up in Iran and Syria.

Such reporting does not provide conclusive proof that North Korea's nuclear program has moved to the Middle East, but it is cause for concern. More importantly, the Israelis (who had their own nuclear arsenal for more than three decades) know what to look for in spotting suspect nuclear facilities. The sites imaged in Syria apparently have signatures associated with nuclear storage or development capabilities.

So far, both the Israelis (and the U.S.) are being vague about what's been observed. If we had to speculate--and we must emphasize that it's only speculation at this point--we'd guess that Israeli analysts have detected something that resembles a nuclear storage facility. We base our conclusion on this key point: it takes years to build a nuclear R&D facility like Natanz or Esfahan in Iran, and there have been no reports of similar construction projects in Syria. On the other hand, a nuclear storage complex can be built much more quickly, and those facilities (regardless of location) have certain features in common. What might be in that facility--assuming it exists and has a "nuclear function"--is anyone's guess.

We must also emphasize that the reported nuclear facility was apparently not the target for last week's IDF strike. Israel's Ynet News, quoting a Israeli-Arab newspaper published in Nazareth, said that the raid targeted "a Syrian-Iranian missile base in northern Syria that was financed by Iran...it appears that the base was completely destroyed." The paper based its reporting on anonymous Israeli sources.

But that claim is also rather odd. The area described by the newspaper (The Assennara) is home to a major Syrian SCUD facility, built almost entirely underground and extensively hardened. Complete destruction of the base would require exceptionally accurate bombing with penetrating weapons, and quite possibly, a follow-on ground assault. While the Israelis are capable of staging such an attack, the Syria base is heavily defended, and would present an exceptionally challenging target.

By comparison, other sources (including those U.S. officials quoted in the Times) place the target in northeastern Syria, not far from the Iraqi border. That would represent a logical area for training Hizballah crews on long-range rockets supplied by Iran. The area is remote, and the Syrians apparently thought it was relatively immune to Israeli attack (until last week). A less-hardened missile base or logistics facility would be easier to target and destroy, resulting in that "hole in the desert" claimed by IDF sources.

As for the reported "nuclear site," its existence may be short-lived, particularly if Israel has evidence that some sort of transfer has occurred, or is about to take place. That might mean that last week's attack was merely the opening blow, and not an isolated event.

9/11/07

Task Force Marne Soldiers take time on the sixth anniversary of the attacks Sept. 11, 2001, for a remembrance ceremony at the Task Force Marne Headquarters. Camp Victory firefighters are also present to represent the emergency responders who lost their lives six years ago. Photo by Tony Lindback, 302nd Mobile Public Affairs Detachment.

They haven't forgotten....but sadly, a lot of Americans have. Michelle Malkin has links to Moonbat thoughts on today's anniversary.

Never, ever forget. This is what Islamic facism did to America on 9/11/.




Photo by Richard Drew/Associated Press

And this is how you prevent it from happening again.



AC-130 in action over Afghanistan (H/T Talking Proud).

Israel Strikes Back

A little over a year after its war with Hizballah, Israel has apparently struck at weapons intended for the group, and Syrian military facilities used to support the delivery process.

Both CNN and the Jerusalem Post are reporting that last week's raid went far beyond an "accidental incursion" in Syrian airspace, as the event was originally described. Damascus claimed that its air defenses fired on Israeli fighters which entered northern Syria last Thursday. Spokesman for the Israeli Defense Forces have refused comment on the original report and on the details that have emerged in recent days.

"...Sources told CNN the military operation, which happened Wednesday into Thursday, may have also involved Israeli ground forces who directed the airstrike which "left a big hole in the desert" in Syria.

The strike may have targeted Hezbollah weapons coming into Syria or transiting through the country from Iran -- a pattern over the past three or four years which has occurred without any retaliation or action taken against it -- the sources said.

The Israeli government is very happy with the success of the operation, the sources said.

The Post has a copy of the graphic which shows the Syrian version of events, depicting a flight path that took Israeli jets across northern Lebanon and Syria before striking targets near the Iraqi border.



If that version of events is accurate, then Damascus should find it very disturbing, for a variety of reasons. First, take a look at this graphic, depicting operational Syrian Air Force bases (courtesy of the Dutch aviation magazine Scramble, a superb on-line resource).





If you believe the Syrian foreign minister, then the Israelis flew through the heart of his nation's air defenses--apparently undetected--to strike at targets near the country's eastern border. And it wouldn't be the first time that the IAF has accomplished such a feat; in 2003, Israeli jets struck a Palestinian terrorist complex near Damascus, taking advantage of confusion within the Syrian air defense system to bomb the target and escape, with no reaction from fighters or ground-based air defenses. The success of this particular raid suggests that despite a reported shake-up of the Syria's air defense organization, the system remains incapable of defeating an Israeli attack.

And, making matters worse, the IDF raid apparently included a ground attack, featuring commandos that were (presumably) ferried in by helicopter. While IAF CH-53 Sea Stallions have the range (540 NM) to reach distant targets, getting the chopper(s) and the commandos in and out of enemy territory was indeed an impressive feat. Apparently, the Syrians fared no better against the heliborne element of the mission than they did against the IAF jets. However, given the location of the target area--and initial Syrian comments about Israeli aircraft "coming out of Turkey," it's quite possible that the helicopters (and commando elements) staged from a "foreign" base.

As for their mission, some analysts might suggest that the Israeli ground teams were dispatched to "designate" the target for precision weapons dropped by Israeli fighters. But with all IAF F-16 and F-15I squadrons now JDAM capable, the need for laser designation has decreased. More than likely, the IDF commandos were on the ground for a secondary demolition mission, or (more likely) to kill or capture high-value assets.

In its coverage of the event, Time magazine suggests that the Israeli raid might be connected to the acquisition of Russian-made Pantsyr-1 air defense systems by Syria and Iran. Damascus took initial deliveries of the system in August, and Iranian crews are likely training on the Pantsyr as well. But the destruction of an air defense training site wouldn't account for that "big hole" in the desert. The attack was apparently concentrated in an area that's not far from known Syrian surface-to-surface missile facilities. Given the scope of the damage inflicted--and the apparent size of the Israeli strike force--we're guessing that the attack was aimed at more than air defense equipment.

In any case, it looks like Hizballah's order-of-battle will be missing a few items, at least temporarily. The raid was also a wake-up call for Damascus and Tehran, reminding them that the IDF can reach remote targets with air and ground forces. And finally, the strike illustrates that "Syrian Air Defense" is still an oxymoron, no matter how much hardware they buy from the Russians, or anyone else.

***

ADDENDUM: Last week's Israeli raid came six months after a former Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander, General Ali Reza Asghari, defected to the west. Media reporting suggests that General Asghari--who helped create Hizballah and was Iran's senior military official in Lebanon for years--is now in the United States, along with his family. But what are the odds that information from a former IRGC commander, a man with itimate knowledge of the Iran/Syria/Hizballah relationship, might have provided some information that prompted the IDF raid in eastern Syria?

An Even Bigger Bear Chase

CF-18 over Hawaii (Wikipedia)

A hat-tip to reader John, who discovered this item in the Halifax Nova Scotia Chronicle Herald. In a conversation with the paper's editorial board last Friday, Lieutenant General Angus Watt, Chief of the Canadian Air Staff, revealed that CAF fighters also intercepted Russian Bear bombers over the Arctic last week. The Canadian intercept occurred as Russia dispatched 14 long-range bombers on missions over the Pacific, Atlantic and Arctic Oceans.

In other words, last week's reported flight of eight Bear H's over the North Atlantic was part of a much bigger effort--apparently, one of the largest (if not the largest) operation by Russian bombers since the Cold War. General Watt didn't provide specifics on the Canadian intercept, but it apparently happened about the same time that Norwegian F-16s, and later, British F3 Tornadoes were shadowing TU-95s over the North Atlantic. According to General Watt, the Canadian encounter took place just outside his country's airspace, near Inuvik in the Northwest Territories.

"It’s where we pay attention to people coming in," Lt.-Gen. Watt said. "They were never in our airspace. They were never in our sovereign territory."

But the Russian aircraft were within visual range of the Canuck fighter pilots during their meeting, something that has become a more frequent occurrence lately.

[snip]

"We have responded in the traditional way to Russian incursions of our airspace by meeting them as they enter our airspace with our fighters to escort them through to show them that we’re paying attention," Lt.-Gen. Watt said.

Despite the apparent flexing of Russian military muscle, don’t expect a return to the icy animosity that once existed between the Kremlin and countries belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

"It’s a different world. We’re not going back to the Cold War," Lt.-Gen. Watt said.

General Watt did not specify the number of TU-95s intercepted by Canadian fighters. And so far, there's been no reporting on the "Pacific leg" of the operation. For decades, Russian bombers have periodically tested U.S. air defenses in such locations as Alaska and Guam prompting scrambles by USAF F-15s and U.S. Navy aircraft. Russian Bear and TU-22M Backfire bombers have also flown profiles against Japan, prompting intercepts by Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) F-15s and other aircraft.

The Canadian Air Force Chief is correct when he observed that "It’s not exactly a new challenge; it’s an old challenge that has returned." Given the scope of last week's mission, we'll stick by our earlier prediction: a Bear "run" against the U.S. east coast now seems inevitable, and the number of aircraft that participate in that mission may be higher that what we saw in the Cold War.

Indeed, the only limiting factor for that profile would be the availability of aviation fuel at their most likely destination--Cuba. But, if the TU-95s decide to fly on to Venezuela (or Hugo Chavez has filled the POL tanks at Fidel's airfields), then we might see a "large" Bear formation--four or more aircraft--off our east coast, in a matter of weeks.

***

ADDENDUM: Last week's successful intercepts by Canadian, British and Norwegian fighters also suggests that our "system" for detecting Bear activity--at extended ranges--still works quite well. Thanks to those intelligence methods, we can provide timely cuing for air defense units, allowing them to scramble fighters and intercept the TU-95s outside Allied airspace.

The Discarded Hsu

We're learning a bit more about Norman Hsu, the shady Democratic fund-raiser (and friend of Hillary) who was arrested in Colorado last week, two days after skipping out on his bail hearing in Colorado. The hearing stemmed from Mr. Hsu's flight to avoid jail time in 1992 on grand theft charges, years before he emerged as a major "bundler" of campaign contributions for powerful Democrats, raising more than $825,000 for Mrs. Clinton alone.

First, in true Clintonian fashion, all the money "bundled" by Mr. Hsu will now be returned to contributors. Originally, Mrs. Clinton's campaign planned to return only $23,000 in donations made by Hsu personally, but with more stories emerging about past business dealings--and the feds looking into campaign fundraising activities--the one-time "Hillraiser" became persona non grata. A Clinton spokesman indicates that some 260 donors will be receiving checks from the campaign.

As those checks go out, it will be interesting to see how many are deemed "undeliverable." As you may remember, more than 50 individuals involved in Bill Clinton's 1996 campaign fund-raising scandal either fled the country or took the 5th, protecting themselves against a federal investigation. With a similar probe now taking shape, it wouldn't be surprising if more Clinton donors discover pressing business overseas, or simply "lawyer up" and "clam up."

Meanwhile, Mr. Hsu remains in a Colorado hospital, where he was taken after falling "ill" on an Amtrak train heading for Chicago. For those keeping score at home, Hsu hopped the train instead of showing up for his bail hearing last Wednesday--and after flying back to California on a charter jet. Monday's Wall Street Journal provided new details of Hsu's rather bizarre train trip, as witnessed by fellow passengers:

That night, passengers on in the sleeper compartment across the aisle from his noticed a hat, a book and other items spilling into the hallway from under the door. The next morning, the drapes were still drawn. Returning from breakfast, one passenger peeked through the curtains and saw a person wedged against the door. The passenger, Joanne Segale, a retired school-bus driver from Sonora, Calif., knocked on the window but got no answer. Segale said she saw a man who appeared to be in fetal position, bare-chested. “It appeared this person had fallen out of bed,” she said.

Eventually, three conductors used the crowbar to pry the door open.

Segale said that Hsu “could not stand. He was acting like he didn’t understand them. They tried to get him up but he couldn’t walk.” At one point, Hsu asked the Amtrak attendants if he was in jail, according to Segale.
When Hsu was helped to the bathroom, Segale says she saw “lots and lots of medication in that room. I could see pills on the floor and rolling around.”

But the most intriguing aspect of the Hsu case is the money trail. Both the Los Angeles Times and The New York Times have been examining Mr. Hsu's various business ventures, but so far, reporters have been unable to trace the source of the fund-raiser's wealth. However, the NYT did find evidence of close financial ties between Hsu and at least nine other Democratic donors. As the Times Mike McIntire discovered:

The records show that Components Ltd., a company controlled by Mr. Hsu that has no obvious business purpose and appears to exist only on paper, has paid a total of more than $100,000 to at least nine people who made campaign contributions to Mrs. Clinton and others through Mr. Hsu. The payments occurred in the spring of 2003, several months before Mr. Hsu emerged as a contributor to Democrats and more than a year before he started bundling checks from those same people for various campaigns. In all, he has raised more than $1 million for Democrats.

The records make clear that the group was more than just a loose collection of friends, family and co-workers that bundlers typically rely on when raising money for a candidate. Rather, each person had a direct financial relationship with Mr. Hsu, either receiving money from his company or paying into it, even though many of them appear to have other jobs or businesses independent of him. The purpose of the payments, and whether they related to business costs, fees or expenses, is unclear.

[snip]

The records show that during that one-month period, Components Ltd. took in close to $600,000, about a third of it wired to the company’s account by two people in California and New York who also were part of Mr. Hsu’s circle of campaign contributors. At the same time, the company issued checks and wire transfers totaling $660,000, much of it to the same group of people, including two checks for more than $100,000 apiece that bounced because of insufficient funds.

According to the NYT, their story was based on a month's worth of limited financial records for only one of Hsu's companies. We can only imagine what a thorough examination of Mr. Hsu's complete records would reveal. Of course, locating those records may prove difficult. Over the past two decades, Hsu has done business in his native Hong Kong, San Francisco, New York and (perhaps) other locations as well. During that time, he's been bankrupt twice (once in Hong Kong, once in California), yet he never had any problem in raising large sums of money for his various ventures and favored political candidates.

With the Clinton campaign having officially washed its hands of Mr. Hsu, we wonder if the NYT and Los Angeles Times will stay on the story. Clearly, there is much we don't know about Hsu's financial dealings; how did he acquire such large sums of cash through ventures that were little more than shell companies? Who were those folks in California and New York who wired $200,000 into the accounts of Components, Ltd., and who were the recipients of the checks and wire transfers (totaling $660,000) during the same, month-long period. Following the curious money trail of Norman Hsu should be very interesting, indeed--assuming that the MSM doesn't elect to "buy" the Clinton's explanations (Hey! We're Dong Background Checks on Donors) and simply let the story die.

Additionally, beyond the tangled web of Mr. Hsu's campaign contributions and business interests, there's another, equally important question, as posed by Scott Johnson of Powerline: "Why was it so important to Norman Hsu that Hillary Clinton become President?"

***

Regardless of what the MSM does, Suitably Flip is still on the case. He's been wading through campaign donor documents and discovered that the former Hillraiser is now running neck-and-neck with Jack Abramoff in the corrupt donor sweepstakes. Flip believes there's more Hsu money to be found and if future discoveries match the current pace, the contributions from the Chinese moneyman could easily surpass those of Mr. Abramoff.

Also, don't miss Flip's recent walking tour of Norman Hsu's New York. After an earlier visit to Hsu's apartment, Flip stopped by the addresses listed for three of his business ventures. Not surprisingly, it was hard to find any trace of the Democratic fundraiser at those locations. But, let's play along and say that Hsu did operate from those addresses. Three locations in mid-town Manhattan. Very pricey. And by the way, Hsu has listed at least residences in the area as well.

Where did the money come from?

Measuring Success in Iraq

General David Petraeus testifies before the House of Representatives.

General David Petraeus is currently testifying before the House of Representatives, providing details of his long-awaited report on progress in Iraq.

And, judging by the data compiled in his report, substantial, no stunning progress is being made. Politico.com has a link to General Petraeus' briefing slides. We've done some trend analysis on the numbers from the PowerPoint presentation; it reveals favorable trends virtually across-the-board, achieved in remarkably short order. A few highlights are provided below:

OVERALL ATTACKS:

--Peaked in Jun '07 at 1750/month (nationwide); now at 1000 a month (Aug '07)

CIVILIAN DEATHS:

--Peaked at 3000 in Dec '06 (nationwide); now running 1550 a month (Aug '07)

--In Baghdad, reached 2100/month (Dec '06); Aug '07 total was 550

ETHNO-SECTARIAN DEATHS:

--Nationwide, hit 2100/month (Dec '06); most recent total (Aug '07) was 900
--In the 10 Baghdad districts, ethno-sectarian deaths have dropped from a peak of 1600 (Dec '06) to roughly 400 in Aug '07

WEAPONS CACHES FOUND AND CLEARED:

-- Across the country, 2726 were discovered and cleared in 2006; the total for this year (with almost four months remaining) is 4409
--Anbar Province; 1222 found and cleared last year; the 2007 total (so far) is 2111

IEDs (Includes Those Found and Cleared, and Those Detonated by the Enemy)

--Nationwide: Peaked at 3500 in Mar '07; dropped to 2100 by Aug '07
--Baghdad: Highest monthly total was 1200 in May '07; declined to 600 by August of this year
--Anbar: Hit 600/month in March of this year; dropped to 200/month by August

ANBAR ATTACKS

--Decreased from 1350 in Oct '07, to only 200 last month.

Lest we forget, General Petraeus has already been accused by Congressional Democrats of "cooking the books," and his assessment derided as the "Bush-Petraeus" report. That's why he made it a point to remind Congressmen that the testimony is his own, written by the general himself.

Reading early press accounts of General Petraeus's testimony, it's clear that the MSM doesn't want to get into the specifics of his presentation. Instead, they (predictably) focused on criticism by House Democrats, which preceded his remarks. And no wonder; any objective analysis of the data affirms General Petraeus's assertion that the military objectives of the surge are "in large measure being met."

For military (and political) reasons, the general is soft-peddling the surge's success. In his testimony today, Petraeus warned against a pre-mature withdrawal of U.S. forces, warning that such a move could have devastating consequences. If favorable trends continue, General Petraeus suggested that our military presence could return to pre-surge levels--about 130,000 troops--by next summer.

It's a very prudent plan, laid out by a man who has proved his mettle on the battlefields of Iraq. Again, it's worth noting that the "surge" strategy wasn't implemented until February of this year; the bulk of additional ground forces didn't start arriving until the late spring, and the surge won't hit its peak until next month. That makes our military progress even more impressive; as depicted on General Petraeus's first slide, the number of enemy attacks actually peaked in early June, just he launched multiple offenses against the enemy. Since then, the number of terrorist strikes (in all categories) has dropped by more than 40%.

That's quantifiable progress. Not that the Democrats are paying attention; they were too busy trying to transform today's testimony into farce. Hmmm....we wonder how Cindy Sheehan and the Code Pink folks managed to make their way into the hearing room, and wasn't it a coincidence that General Petraeus's microphone didn't work for almost 10 minutes.

But the Petraeus presentation is also aimed at another audience, beyond the Beltway. And, for Americans who bother to actually read his testimony and review those briefing slides, the report will be an eye-opener. By any objective standard, we are making significant gains in Iraq, they have been achieved in a relatively short time, and current trends are likely to continue. And no amount of Democratic criticism, distortions or political stunts can change that.

***

ADDENDUM: Critics of the Petraeus-Crocker Report keep yapping about the lack of "political progress" in Iraq, and we'll hear more of that refrain in the coming days. But their critique ignores a critical point: political progress depends on improvement in the security situation. As conditions on the ground continue to improve, so will the environment for real political progress.

Admiring Nowak

We're still shaking our heads over Buzz Aldrin's comments about Lisa Nowak.

Aldrin, the second man to walk on the moon (and a retired Air Force Brigadier General) says that disgraced former astronaut Lisa Nowak is someone to be "admired"--but not excused--for her "resolve" in confronting a romantic rival.

According to the AP, General Aldrin's comments were made on Time magazine's website:

"Astronauts are not superhuman. They lead ordinary lives and have varied personalities," Aldrin said.

[snip]

"I think Nowak should be admired for traveling across the country at night and not getting out of her car to put in gas or go to the restroom. It is not excusable, but it is understandable for an achiever to fall into a trap."

Wow. Captain Nowak was able to negotiate her way from Houston to Orlando (just like millions of other motorists) and she did it while wearing an astronaut diaper. What discipline. What concentration. What a stinky car that must have been at the end of her journey.

If that's an accomplishment to be applauded by the masses, God help us. Our standards for public admiration have (apparently) reached a new low.

General Aldrin failed to mention that Nowak had a few "companions" on her trip to Orlando, various implements (including a hammer) that were aimed at harming her romantic rival, Air Force Captain Colleen Shipman. According to Florida prosecutors, Captain Nowak had a little more in mind than simply confronting a rival. That's why she's facing felony charges of assault and attempted kidnapping, to name a few.

As a former astronaut, it's understandable that General Aldrin would look for some redeeming features in Lisa Nowak's little escapade. And certainly, Captain Nowak led an exemplary life until she decided to have an extra-marital affair (with fellow astronaut Bill Oefelein) and became enraged when her lover dumped her for a younger woman. That's what prompted that marathon drive to Orlando.

Never mind that she had a husband and three children back in Houston. Never mind that she was--and is--a senior officer in the United States Navy, which demands only the highest standards of conduct from individuals at her rank. And never mind that she parlayed her training as a naval aviator into a position as an astronaut--a job sought by thousands of our best and brightest, but afforded to only a few. And, having reached that lofty position, Lisa Nowak was willing to throw it all away over an adulterous relationship. There is nothing admirable about the course Captain Nowak embarked on six months ago, regardless of past achievements.

We will agree with General Aldrin's assertion that astronauts are not superhuman. They deal with the same problems that many of us face. By his own admission, Aldrin struggled with alcohol and depression after returning from the moon, but eventually overcame those demons. Likewise, Lisa Nowak is hardly beyond redemption. After dealing with the criminal charges she now faces--and the personal issues that triggered the entire, sorry episode--Captain Nowak can move on to a healthy, productive life.

But part of that healing process means confronting her current problems head-on. And, in that regard, the jury on Captain Nowak is still out. In recent weeks her attorneys have complained (successfully) about the inconvenience of a court-ordered monitoring bracelet, and announced plans for a "temporary insanity" defense. These tactics suggest a defendant who's more concerned about avoiding unpleasant consequences, rather than assuming full responsibility for her actions.

Taking a step in that direction--however difficult--would be admirable, indeed.

In Case You Missed It

Senior Qods Force Link Captured in Karbala.

Bill Roggio has details; the MSM doesn't. No surprise there.

How many days until the Petraeus report?

H/T: Informationdissemination.

The Perils of Privatization

Almost a decade ago, the Air Force (along with the rest of DoD) went on a "privatization" binge. The reasoning was simple: by converting thousands of positions from military billets to civilian contractor positions--and "outsourcing" a variety of functions, the Pentagon hoped to save billions of dollars, and improving the quality of services and support provided to the troops.

Ten years later, DoD's privatization venture has produced mixed results, at best. For every successful enterprise, there seems to be a corresponding horror story of cost overruns, unforeseen consequences, and promises that were never kept.

One of those outsourcing horror stories has been unfolding at Moody AFB, Georgia for the past three years. Located just north of Valdosta, near the Florida state line, Moody is sometimes viewed as a backwater, an assignment to be avoided, if at all possible. Having spent some time at Moody, we can assure you that the base and its host unit, the 347th Rescue Wing, play a vital role in the nation's defense. And you'll never find a community more appreciative or supportive of the military than Valdosta, Georgia.

In return, the Air Force has steadily expanded Moody's mission and facilities. By 2009, almost 1,000 additional airmen (and their families) will be assigned to the base. That influx has created a need for more military housing, to accommodate the new arrivals and replace older units that were nearing the end of their service life. To satisfy those goals, Moody became part of a DoD program to provide "privatized" quarters for military personnel.

Here's how the project was supposed to work: under the 1996 Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MPHI), a developer was supposed to build and maintain 606 new units for Moody personnel. A contract for the project was awarded in February 2004 to a Meriden, Connecticut firm, Carabetta Enterprises, LLC. The Moody project was the smallest of six privatization contracts awarded at Georgia military bases over the past seven years. Carabetta has a total of $3.3 billion in military housing projects, scattered across five states.

So, three years (and millions of dollars later), what does the Air Force have to show for the Moody privatization effort? According to the Duluth (GA) Weekly, approximately two new housing units. The rest of the project is a morass of unpaid bills, unfinished homes and litigation. The Valdosta Daily Times reports that the project was padlocked last March, after Carabetta's partner, American Eagle Communities, failed to pay local sub-contractors working on the housing units.

The problems at Moody have caught the attention of Georgia Senator Saxby Chambliss, who highlighted the issue on the Senate floor Wednesday evening. Mr. Chambliss says he's "disappointed" with the service's response so far. Senator Chambliss wants an "action plan" for the Air Force, and answers to some troubling questions about the Moody project, namely:

--What prompted the USAF to award the contract to Carabetta, which filed for bankruptcy in 1990?

--Why isn't the Air Force taking steps to terminate the contract?

--Where does the service plan to house personnel that planned to live in the now-shuttered community?

Mr. Chambliss is also pushing for the Air Force (or DoD) Inspector General to take a look at the Moody program, and the Carabetta firm. When lenders stopped advancing money for the project six months ago, it was already $25 million over budget, and hopelessly behind schedule. According to Mr. Chambliss, Carabetta's other military housing projects have been halted as well; the Valdosta Daily Times reports that the firm is trying to sell some of those ventures to another company. At this point, prospects for the Moody project look rather bleak. The Air Force has told Senator Chambliss that since it has "no legal agreements" with the contractor, issues of non-payment must be resolved through the court system.

That must be awfully reassuring to Air Force families who planned to use their housing allowance to rent one of those privatized housing units.

***

ADDENDUM: There are a number of lessons to be learned from the Moody debacle. First, the DoD contracting system is hard-broke; as Senator Chambliss wondered, how does a firm with a history of financial trouble (and poor performance) wind up with billions of dollars in military housing contracts? Secondly, housing is a market that works best with minimal government interference, particularly in a community like Valdosta. Recent data indicates that the median home price in the area is only $115,000--well below the national average. That translates to an "average" mortgage payment of $700-$800 a month, within the reach of most military families.

Finally, as with other "outsourcing" ventures, the "savings" initially promised to DoD often prove illusory, especially when you consider some of the "unplanned" problems that arise after the contract is awarded. When Columbus AFB, Mississippi (a pilot training base) privatized its aircraft maintenance function in the late 1990s, no one anticipated a "wild cat" strike by civilian mechanics that shut down flight operations for a week, and threw the training schedule into chaos. Similarly, when ground was broken for the Moody housing project, no one expected that the venture would wind up in the local court, with work halted, more military families on the way, and only two units to show for the taxpayer's investment.

Fugitive on a Train

Amtrak's California Zephyr. Fugitive Democratic fund-raiser Norman Hsu was taken from the train when it passed through Grand Junction, Colorado on Thursday. Hsu is facing jail time on a 1992 grand theft conviction--and lots of questions about his recent fund-raising for the Democratic Party (Wikipedia photo).

It sounds like something from a Hitchcock movie, but fugitive Democratic fund-raiser Norman Hsu resurfaced on a train Thursday, two days after he skipped out on his bail hearing in California.

According to media reports, Mr. Hsu was arrested at a hospital in Grand Junction, Colorado last night. He was taken to the hospital earlier in the day, after "falling ill" on an Amtrak's California Zephyr train as it passed through town. Hsu was listed in fair condition at St. Mary's hospital early Friday; medical officials refused to discuss the nature of his illness, although Matt Drudge is raising the possibility of a suicide attempt.

As Democratic politicians scramble to return Hsu's contributions (or give them to charity), the saga of their former campaign "bundler" grows stranger by the hour. Facing jail time for a 15-year-old grand theft conviction, Mr. Hsu was due in a California courtroom on Wednesday, to surrender his passport and petition the judge to lower his $2 million dollar bail.

Hsu's attorneys told prosecutors that their client was scheduled to arrive at Oakland International Airport--on a charter flight--at 5:30 a.m. Wednesday, in preparation for his court appearance. When he failed to show up for court, the judge issued a warrant for arrest, and Hsu remained on the lam until he was arrested in Grand Junction, about eight hours after paramedics removed him from the train.

The MSM is noting the "similarities" between Hsu's latest disappearance and his 1992 flight to avoid prison on grand theft charges. But they're ignoring a lot of obvious--and unanswered--questions. Mr. Hsu's mode of travel for his trip to Oakland (charter jet) is pricey, to say the least, and beyond the reach of "mere mortal" fugitives. Why didn't Hsu head overseas, to a country that's unlikely to extradite him back to the United States. If Mr. Hsu could afford a charter, he probably has sufficient assets to finance a life in exile, at a comfortable location.

Instead, Hsu hopped a train, heading in the general direction of Chicago. So far, we haven't been told how the fugitive fund-raiser paid for the ticket, or his intended destination. Was he traveling under a phony name? Was he wearing a disguise, did he have a fake driver's license, and (a la O.J.) how much cash was he carrying? Why did it take hours for the feds to move in and make the arrest? By now, the FBI (and state authorities in Colorado and California) probably know answers to many of these questions, but oddly enough, the press doesn't appear interested.

One thing does appear certain. With his photograph plastered on newspaper pages all across America, it's doubtful that Mr. Hsu planned to "ride the rails" all the way to Chicago. With plenty of stops along the Zephyr's route between California and the Windy City, it would have been easy for Hsu to get off at a remote station and fade further into oblivion.

Even the suicide attempt sounds a little fishy. If Hsu wanted to end his life, he (presumably) had ample opportunities in the days and hours before he caught that train. Instead, the effort on the Zephyr--assuming it was a suicide attempt--seems half-hearted and confused, by a man who wasn't sure what to do next.

Unfortunately for Mr. Hsu, that decision has been made for him. When he's well enough to travel, Hsu will return to California and begin serving that long-delayed prison sentence. Meanwhile, the feds will get another chance to speak with him about his fund-raising activities, on behalf of Democratic luminaries that included Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama.

And that prospect is probably making Mr. Hsu--and some of his former beneficiaries--very nervous, indeed.

Bear Chasing

The BBC reports that the RAF scrambled fighters earlier today, in reaction to the latest flight by Russian TU-95 Bear bombers over the North Atlantic.

British defense spokesman tell the BBC that eight of the Russian heavy bombers--flying in loose formations of four pairs, were initially intercepted by Norwegian F-16s. Later, the RAF launched four of its Tornado F3s to continue the intercept, as the Bears headed south into the "NATO zone." The British jets discontinued their mission when the TU-95s turned north and headed home. An RAF AWACS and VC-10 tanker supported the operation.

Based on reported numbers, today's Bear mission over the North Atlantic sounds like one of the largest since the Cold War. And it comes at the end of a busy summer for Moscow's strategic bomber force, when Bears and TU-160 Blackjacks have flown high-profile missions against Norway, the United Kingdom and Iceland. In the Pacific, other TU-95s have recently approached Alaska and Guam, demonstrating Russia's intent to revive it's long-range bomber forces.

Today's mission increases the likelihood that Russian bombers will stage a "run" against the U.S. east coast later this year. As we've noted in the past, that particular profile (which was flown periodically during the Cold War era) is considered highly provocative by both the United States and Russia. But it's the type of mission that Vladimir Putin seems quite willing to stage, reinforcing his contention that Russia's military might has "returned."

Down the Slippery Slope

Kook theories aside (see next post), last week's accidental transfer of six nuclear-tipped cruise missiles from North Dakota to Louisiana does raise serious questions about how such a mistake could happen, and the safeguards associated with America's nuclear stockpile.

So far, the snafu at Minot AFB has cost at least one officer his job. An Air Force spokesman said late Wednesday that the installation's munitions squadron commander has been fired. Earlier reports suggested that the commander of Minot's B-52 squadron had been dismissed. An investigation into the matter is continuing, and military analysts believe that more unit commanders will be fired because of the incident.

If it's any consolation, the Air Force has the right man leading the Minot probe. Air Combat Command (which is ultimately responsible for the bombers and weapons at the North Dakota base) has appointed its Director of Air and Space Operations, Major General Douglas Raaberg, to conduct the inquiry. In a service--and command--dominated by fighter jocks, General Raaberg, a career bomber pilot, is something of a rarity. But his years of experience with heavy bombers and nuclear weapons will be critical in determining what went wrong at Minot's 5th Bomb Wing --and how to fix it.

But the seeds of last week's mistake may have been sown years before load crews attached those advanced cruise missiles to the B-52 and it departed for Barksdale. In response to our original post, we've heard from several military munitions experts, active duty and retired. They paint a picture of a career field that, like many in the military, is stressed by constant deployments (and in some cases) declining experience levels. That doesn't excuse what happened at Minot, but it does suggest problems that go beyond mere paperwork errors.

Some of the most insightful comments on last week's accident came from a good friend of ours, a retired Air Force Chief Master Sergeant who spend almost a decade on the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP), which covers personnel associated with nuclear weapons. One of the Chief's many military assignments was as a combination First Sergeant/Senior Enlisted Advisor at a small Air Force munitions base outside the CONUS. We won't divulge the name of our friend, but he's a legendary leader and straight shooter. What he saw at that overseas post in the late 1990s convinced him that a major weapons screw-up--like the one at Minot--was not a matter of "if," but "when."

According to the Chief, there are a variety of factors that led to last week's mistake. He's identified at least five major issues that may have contributed to the "errant" transfer:

1) The Demise of Strategic Air Command. With the end of the Cold War, the Air Force dissolved SAC in the early 1990s, transferring its bombers to ACC, its ICBMs to Air Force Space Command, and its nuclear planning/warfighting mission to U.S. Strategic Command. As the Chief reminds us, the demise of SAC ended the "stove-piping" that produced two generations of pilots, maintainers and munitions specialists who devoted their careers to the command and its nuclear mission. As a result, experience levels began to decline. Additionally, the Air Force scrapped much of the "supplemental" guidance that SAC provided for virtually every job and operational mission. While regulations governing nukes remained detailed, an incident like the one at Minot was unheard of in SAC, where everyone associated with nukes was trained--and held--to uncompromising standards.

2) Declining Standards for Individuals on PRP. As we've noted in previous posts, all service members involved in the nuclear mission fall under the Air Force's Personnel Reliability Program (PRP), which is supposed to weed out individuals with medical, character or mental flaws that might affect their performance. Yet, the Chief tells us that some commanders were cutting corners on PRP a decade ago, allowing individuals with clear problems to work the nuclear mission. As the Chief notes, unit commanders have the power and authority to certify anyone, and he watched them approve diabetics (an automatic disqualifier in years past), personnel facing medical boards for other serious conditions, troops with a history of financial irresponsibility (including bankruptcies) and some suspected of drug use. When the Chief asked the major command and the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) to enforce mandated standards, he was (essentially) told to "shut up and color."

3) The Medical Corps Takes a Pass. In many cases where medical conditions should have prevented PRP certification, the Chief tells us, Air Force medical officers refused to take a stand. "They complained a lot because it put the monkey on their backs to do their duty," he remembers. "I had medical folks tell me: 'Chief, your standards are too high.'...The mental health folks were the worst. I can count on one finger the number that did their duty. It was both the officers and the NCOs.

4) Poor Leadership. Like other senior NCOs, the Chief bemoans declining standards--and experience--in the officer corps. "I had 'commanders' who had never supervised an enlisted troop in their entire career. We had commanders that went from the cockpit to command, [or]from a program office to command--with no experience leading, and that's as wrong as two boys in a bed." We've heard similar comments before, and the Chief's observations about the need for proven leadership in a munitions squadron (or other organizations supporting the nuclear mission) are telling. A munitions maintenance unit is, typically, 90% enlisted, and many of those personnel are first and second-term airmen.

5) Lack of Accountability. The Chief told us about one airman who arrived at the munitions base and almost immediately ran into severe financial problems--all self-inflicted. He bounced hundreds of dollars in checks, ran up unpaid debts on a government credit card and quickly proved himself unworthy of PRP certification. Our friend got rid of the problem child, but in doing some legwork, he discovered that the dirtball had similar problems at his previous assignment. But rather than addressing the issue--and getting rid of the miscreant--the airman's old unit allowed him to move, pushing their problem off on someone else. Other supervisors and first sergeants have voiced similar complaints about commanders (and the larger system) that are reluctant to make tough calls, or seem willing to tolerate unacceptable behavior. "It's the new Amerika of convicts, criminals, Clintons and corruption" the Chief says.

Clearly, these problems go well beyond individual squadrons, or a single bomb wing in North Dakota. But it will be revealing to learn what role (if any) these issues played in last week's Minot incident, and how serious the Air Force is about addressing them.

***

Amazingly, the 5th Bomb Wing Safety Office at Minot received a Nuclear Surety Category One for "outstanding safety and performance in mishap prevention during fiscal year '06." Should we can take comfort in the fact that the unplanned transfer was conducted in a safe manner?