There was more than a touch of irony in today's arrival of the Airbus A380 super-jumbo jet in New York and Los Angeles. On its maiden flights to both cities, the massive jetliners wowed crowds and the media with its sheer size, but even the p.r. buzz and excitement can't conceal a sobering fact.
In commercial aviation's most important market--the United States--no one wants the A380.
While describing the A380 (somewhat incorrectly) as "the rock star of the aviation world," The New York Times also notes that U.S. carriers haven't placed a single order for passenger versions of the jet. In the air cargo sector, market leaders FedEx and UPS cancelled orders for A380 freighters last year, citing continuing delays in the program. That's quite a reversal from Airbus's original estimates; at one point, the European manufacturer estimated that it would sell 281 of its super-jumbos in North America alone.
Currently, Airbus has orders for at least 156 A380s, well-below the 250 sales figure that was initially touted as a"break-even" point for the aircraft. However, that threshhold was calculated before the latest round of production delays, which have cost Airbus a reported $3 billion dollars and pushed back first deliveries until later this year. More recent estimates suggest that Airbus must sell at least 412 A380s to turn a profit on the project. And with crude oil still hovering around 60% a barrel--roughly 45% higher than when the super-jumbo was conceived--the economics of a 600-seat jetliner are problematic at best, makng Airbus sales efforts all the more difficult.
Meanwhile, Airbus rival Boeing is enjoying strong sales for three models that compete indirectly with the A380. British Airways recently four additional 777s, for use on long-haul routes that the super-jumbo was designed for. The British carrier already has 43 777s in its inventory. Additionally, Air France--one of the A380's "core customers"--has also ordered more Boeing 777s, and last month Lufthansa (which operated the super-jumbo that landed at JFK yesterday) became the launch customer for Boeing's newest variant of its venerable jumbo jet, the 747-8.
Boeing has also racked up almost 300 orders for its 787 "Dreamliner," more than Airbus has for the A380 and the A350 combined. The A350 is designed to compete directly with the Dreamliner, but that Airbus program is in disarray, and first models of the European jet will enter service years behind the Boeing product. The ready availability of the American-made aircraft, coupled with projected fuel savings, make them more attractive to airlines and air freight companies alike. Passenger versions of the 777 and 787 have less than half the seating capacity of the A380, but they fuel efficiency is up to 20% higher. In the "jumbo jet" category, the 747-8 integrates easily with existing maintenance, logistics and crew training systems, eliminating some of the "overhead" costs associated with the A380.
Yet, for all its recent troubles, there was something damned impressive about the A380 sitting on the ramp at JFK. Airbus deserves credit for pulling off a tremendous engineering feat, if nothing else. But, unfortunately for the Europeans, aviation history is littered with aircraft that were technical marvels, but commercial flops. Time will render the ultimate verdict on the A380; for the near term, Airbus will soldier on with its super-jumbo, secure in the knowledge that European taxpayer subsidies will keep the project--and the company--afloat, until the A380 can turn the corner.
Monday, March 19, 2007
Sunday, March 18, 2007
The Army and the Times
On the Sunday editorial page, The New York Times opines (as only it can) on "The Army After Iraq," offering its thoughts on how the service should be rebuilt after the war ends.
If the Times was genuinely interested in reforming--and improving--the Army, their thoughts would be a welcome addition to the debate. But a quick read of the editorial reveals (to no one's surprise), that the paper is less interested in bettering the nation's ground forces, and more concerned with reciting its grievances with the Bush Administration. That's evident in the lead paragraph:
"You do not have to look very hard these days to see the grave damage the Bush administration’s mismanagement of the Iraq conflict has inflicted on the United States Army. Consider the moral waivers for violent offenders, to meet recruitment targets. Or the rapid rotation of exhausted units back to the battlefield. Or the scandalous shortages of protective armor. Or the warnings from generals that there are not enough troops available to sustain increased force levels for more than a few months."
Let's begin with the recruitment issue. To hear the Times tell it, the Army is only able to meet recruiting goals by signing up reform school parolees and petty criminals. While the service has granted a greater number of moral waivers to recruits in recent years--excusing prior misdemeanor offenses and some minor felonies--those totals remain rather small, when considering the Army's overall recruitment efforts.
For example, the Times (and the rest of the MSM) breathlessly reported last month that the service granted 901 felony waivers in 2006, but what they didn't tell you is that total represents only one percent of the Army's incoming recruits. The press also noted that 20% of Army enlistees needed some sort of waiver to enlist in 2006, while barely acknowledging that the program covers everything from age requirements and medical conditions, to past run-ins with the law. And, of course, the Times won't tell you that any recruit with a felony more serious than DUI or a simply assault will never get a waiver, period.
Then, there's the hypocrisy element. If I'm not mistaken, the NYT is the same paper that has lobbied to restore a felon's right to vote? Using that logic, if you believe that convicted murderers and rapists should regain their franchise upon release from prison, then shouldn't individuals with less serious criminal records have the right to join the military--but only if they obtain the requisite waiver(s)? Editorial writers at the Times might argue that allowing a convicted felon to vote is not the same thing as allowing them to join the military. But both actions fall under the general heading of giving someone a second chance, a principle the paper seems to support, at least on a selective basis. As in other matters, the hypocrisy of the Times is simply breath-taking.
As for the rest of the editorial, it's standard boiler-plate: our Army is over-stretched, worn out and in need money for equipment repair and recapitalization. Our toops don't have enough armor, and wounded warriors receive substandard care. There is--or more accurately--there was an element of truth in those statements, but once again, the paper is selective how it describes the current state of the Army. The armor problem has been fixed; the medical issues are the product of many factors, including cut-backs in support services that the Army made a decade ago (more on that in a moment), and political decisions that put Walter Reed on the BRAC chopping block, with a lower priority for funding. Equipment and maintenance issues are also a product of that decision-making process, but the Times--conveniently--ignores those factors. As far as the paper is concerned, Iraq is the root cause of the service's current problems, and only a pull-out can allow the Army to begin healing itself.
But how did we arrive at this point? For starters, we eliminated six Army divisions--18 combat brigades--before George W. Bush arrived in the White House. Most of those cuts occurred during the Clinton Administration, which (according to the Times) , represented something of a gilded age of military management. While the paper is quick to recognize the value of ground troops in the War on Terror, we don't recall a single peep from the Times editorial board when Bill Clinton's Pentagon deactivated four Army divisions, or when two others were cut under President George H.W. Bush. The combined strength of those eliminated units? 100,000-120,000 troops, plus hundreds of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, helicopters and other weapons that would make it easier to secure Iraq. Making matters worse, the reductions in combat strength (which the paper tacitly endorsed) were accompanied by corresponding cuts in support services, including the Army's medical corps. In other words, the seeds of the service's current problems were sown long before we rolled into Baghdad, but you wouldn't know that by reading the Times.
Finally, as we've observed in the past, the blame for these decisions extends well beyond the Oval Office, or the E-ring of the Pentagon. Many of the retired generals who provide anti-administration quotes to Times reporters are the same officers who served in key leadership positions during the 1980s and 1990s. The same officers who favored complex (and ultimately) failed weapons systems like the Comanche helicopter and Crusader self-propelled gun, over the sustainment of more combat brigades. Yet, none of these retired three and four-star generals has ever been questioned about their decisions in these matters, or the advice they offered to the Pentagon's civilian leaders.
Make no mistake. The burden of simultaneous, long-term conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have created serious problems for the United States Army. To remedy those difficulties, the service would be well-advised to ignore the counsel of the NYT. As in other matters relating to the armed services, the paper offers political diatribes disguised as "informed" analysis, proving once again that it is an unserious observer of the military, and the issues it faces.
If the Times was genuinely interested in reforming--and improving--the Army, their thoughts would be a welcome addition to the debate. But a quick read of the editorial reveals (to no one's surprise), that the paper is less interested in bettering the nation's ground forces, and more concerned with reciting its grievances with the Bush Administration. That's evident in the lead paragraph:
"You do not have to look very hard these days to see the grave damage the Bush administration’s mismanagement of the Iraq conflict has inflicted on the United States Army. Consider the moral waivers for violent offenders, to meet recruitment targets. Or the rapid rotation of exhausted units back to the battlefield. Or the scandalous shortages of protective armor. Or the warnings from generals that there are not enough troops available to sustain increased force levels for more than a few months."
Let's begin with the recruitment issue. To hear the Times tell it, the Army is only able to meet recruiting goals by signing up reform school parolees and petty criminals. While the service has granted a greater number of moral waivers to recruits in recent years--excusing prior misdemeanor offenses and some minor felonies--those totals remain rather small, when considering the Army's overall recruitment efforts.
For example, the Times (and the rest of the MSM) breathlessly reported last month that the service granted 901 felony waivers in 2006, but what they didn't tell you is that total represents only one percent of the Army's incoming recruits. The press also noted that 20% of Army enlistees needed some sort of waiver to enlist in 2006, while barely acknowledging that the program covers everything from age requirements and medical conditions, to past run-ins with the law. And, of course, the Times won't tell you that any recruit with a felony more serious than DUI or a simply assault will never get a waiver, period.
Then, there's the hypocrisy element. If I'm not mistaken, the NYT is the same paper that has lobbied to restore a felon's right to vote? Using that logic, if you believe that convicted murderers and rapists should regain their franchise upon release from prison, then shouldn't individuals with less serious criminal records have the right to join the military--but only if they obtain the requisite waiver(s)? Editorial writers at the Times might argue that allowing a convicted felon to vote is not the same thing as allowing them to join the military. But both actions fall under the general heading of giving someone a second chance, a principle the paper seems to support, at least on a selective basis. As in other matters, the hypocrisy of the Times is simply breath-taking.
As for the rest of the editorial, it's standard boiler-plate: our Army is over-stretched, worn out and in need money for equipment repair and recapitalization. Our toops don't have enough armor, and wounded warriors receive substandard care. There is--or more accurately--there was an element of truth in those statements, but once again, the paper is selective how it describes the current state of the Army. The armor problem has been fixed; the medical issues are the product of many factors, including cut-backs in support services that the Army made a decade ago (more on that in a moment), and political decisions that put Walter Reed on the BRAC chopping block, with a lower priority for funding. Equipment and maintenance issues are also a product of that decision-making process, but the Times--conveniently--ignores those factors. As far as the paper is concerned, Iraq is the root cause of the service's current problems, and only a pull-out can allow the Army to begin healing itself.
But how did we arrive at this point? For starters, we eliminated six Army divisions--18 combat brigades--before George W. Bush arrived in the White House. Most of those cuts occurred during the Clinton Administration, which (according to the Times) , represented something of a gilded age of military management. While the paper is quick to recognize the value of ground troops in the War on Terror, we don't recall a single peep from the Times editorial board when Bill Clinton's Pentagon deactivated four Army divisions, or when two others were cut under President George H.W. Bush. The combined strength of those eliminated units? 100,000-120,000 troops, plus hundreds of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, helicopters and other weapons that would make it easier to secure Iraq. Making matters worse, the reductions in combat strength (which the paper tacitly endorsed) were accompanied by corresponding cuts in support services, including the Army's medical corps. In other words, the seeds of the service's current problems were sown long before we rolled into Baghdad, but you wouldn't know that by reading the Times.
Finally, as we've observed in the past, the blame for these decisions extends well beyond the Oval Office, or the E-ring of the Pentagon. Many of the retired generals who provide anti-administration quotes to Times reporters are the same officers who served in key leadership positions during the 1980s and 1990s. The same officers who favored complex (and ultimately) failed weapons systems like the Comanche helicopter and Crusader self-propelled gun, over the sustainment of more combat brigades. Yet, none of these retired three and four-star generals has ever been questioned about their decisions in these matters, or the advice they offered to the Pentagon's civilian leaders.
Make no mistake. The burden of simultaneous, long-term conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have created serious problems for the United States Army. To remedy those difficulties, the service would be well-advised to ignore the counsel of the NYT. As in other matters relating to the armed services, the paper offers political diatribes disguised as "informed" analysis, proving once again that it is an unserious observer of the military, and the issues it faces.
More Good News From Iraq
From the most recent edition of "Inside the Ring" in the Washington Times. Military officials in Baghdad report that Air Force F-16s have destroyed four terrorist anti-aircraft guns that may have played a role in that recent spate of helicopter losses.
According to the Times' Bill Gertz, American UAVs patrolling over Baghdad discovered that insurgents had mounted heavy machineguns in the backs of pickup trucks, and covered the weapons with tarpaulins. When they heard the sound of an approaching helicopter, the terrorists would stop, uncover the weapon and begin firing. After engaging the choppers, terrorist gunners would cover the machinegun and drive away, complicating coalition targeting efforts.
Unfortunately for the bad guys, persistent surveillance from UAVs (mostly Predators) allowed intelligence analysts to identify and track the gun trucks, sometimes referred to as technicals. Once their locations were pinpointed, commanders called in airstrikes that eliminated the threat. The recent introduction of the 250-lb small diameter bomb has further improved our ability to strike small targets, even in a crowded, urban environment.
Obviously, destruction of these gun trucks won't completely eliminate the threats faced by coalition helicopters. But it will send the terrorists back to the drawing board, in search of more effective ways to "surprise" our choppers--and preserve their own, limited air defense assets.
According to the Times' Bill Gertz, American UAVs patrolling over Baghdad discovered that insurgents had mounted heavy machineguns in the backs of pickup trucks, and covered the weapons with tarpaulins. When they heard the sound of an approaching helicopter, the terrorists would stop, uncover the weapon and begin firing. After engaging the choppers, terrorist gunners would cover the machinegun and drive away, complicating coalition targeting efforts.
Unfortunately for the bad guys, persistent surveillance from UAVs (mostly Predators) allowed intelligence analysts to identify and track the gun trucks, sometimes referred to as technicals. Once their locations were pinpointed, commanders called in airstrikes that eliminated the threat. The recent introduction of the 250-lb small diameter bomb has further improved our ability to strike small targets, even in a crowded, urban environment.
Obviously, destruction of these gun trucks won't completely eliminate the threats faced by coalition helicopters. But it will send the terrorists back to the drawing board, in search of more effective ways to "surprise" our choppers--and preserve their own, limited air defense assets.
The Forgotten Spy
I'm anxiously awaiting my copy of True Believer, the inside story of America's first major spy scandal of the 21st Century. Written by Scott Carmichael, a senior counterintelligence investigator for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Believer recounts the identification--and arrest of Ana Montes--the only senior U.S. intelligence official ever convicted of spying for Cuba. Over a 16-year career as a DIA analyst, Montes passed some of the nation's most vital intelligence secrets to Castro's security services, and shaped our own government's views (and policies) toward Cuba.
Almost six years after her arrest and conviction, the Montes case remains largely unknown outside intelligence and security services. The reason? Ms. Montes was arrested by the FBI only 10 days after the 9-11 attacks, and her subsequent trial was overshadowed by the War on Terrorism. According to Mr. Carmichael, Montes's arrest came only one day before she would gain access to plans for the invasion of Afghanistan--information that would have been quickly transmitted to her handlers in Havana, and passed on to other regimes that cooperate with the Cubans. We can only imagine how many additional casualties the U.S. would have sustained in the invasion of Afghanistan, had Havana obtained the invasion plans, and passed that information to the Taliban and Al Qaida.
According to Mr. Carmichael, Montes was something of a rarity among American traitors--she spied for ideology, not for financial gain. And, because she didn't fit the "profile" of a typical spy, Carmichael had a hard time convincing the FBI to launch an investigation into her activities. The bureau's probe eventually confirmed Carmichael's suspicions, and over time, intelligence officials, FBI agents and federal prosecutors built an airtight case against Ms. Montes. She pleaded guilty to espionage charges in 2002 and was sentenced to 25 years in prison. Currently incarcerated at a Bureau of Prisons medical facility in Fort Worth, Texas, Montes is scheduled for release in 2023.
Montes joined DIA in 1985 and quickly rose through the ranks, eventually becoming the agency's top analyst on Cuba. In hindsight, Mr. Carmichael and other counter-intelligence officials believe that Montes may been a Cuban agent when she joined DIA, and her treachery began almost immediately. Two years after joining the spy agency, Montes was briefed on the location of a secret U.S. special forces training camp in El Salvador. Montes passed the information to Havana, and less that two weeks later, Cuban-backed rebels attacked the camp, killing Sergeant Gregory Fronius, a Green Beret. Proceeds from Carmichael's book will be given to the Fronius family.
Mr. Carmichael's book--and his recent press interviews--have also revealed a rift in counter-intelligence circles, regarding Cuba's alleged penetration of our government and intelligence services. Officially, Montes has always been regarded as an anomaly--the exception, rather than the rule. But Carmichael believes that other Cuban agents remain inside our government, passing on critical information to Castro's regime. And he believes the level of penetration is stunning, as are the long-term consequences of such activity. As he told Bill Gertz:
"I believe that the Cuban Intelligence Service has penetrated the United States government to the same extent that the old East German intelligence service, the Stasi, once penetrated the West German government during the Cold War," he said.
Havana's intelligence service shares its stolen secrets with U.S. adversaries, including China, Russia, Iran and Venezuela, Mr. Carmichael said.
"If Cuban agents among us today are indirectly passing our innermost secrets, via their Cuban handlers, to countries who actively work to undermine American interests throughout the world, then we will suffer for it, in many ways," he said. "War fighters like Greg Fronius will die as a result. This is not a game."
As for Ms. Montes, she remains unrepentant, a true believer in Fidel's failed cause, and (based on her actions) quite willing to sacrifice the lives of other Americans toward that goal. Montes will be 66 when she is released from prison, but I'm still of the opinion that she got off easy. We reported almost two years ago, most American spies are not serving life sentences (or, life terms that offer the possibility of parole or release). And, the majority of those traitors are not being held in maximum security prisons. Ms. Montes' current confinement--in a federal prison hospital--doesn't exactly qualify as "hard time."
Almost six years after her arrest and conviction, the Montes case remains largely unknown outside intelligence and security services. The reason? Ms. Montes was arrested by the FBI only 10 days after the 9-11 attacks, and her subsequent trial was overshadowed by the War on Terrorism. According to Mr. Carmichael, Montes's arrest came only one day before she would gain access to plans for the invasion of Afghanistan--information that would have been quickly transmitted to her handlers in Havana, and passed on to other regimes that cooperate with the Cubans. We can only imagine how many additional casualties the U.S. would have sustained in the invasion of Afghanistan, had Havana obtained the invasion plans, and passed that information to the Taliban and Al Qaida.
According to Mr. Carmichael, Montes was something of a rarity among American traitors--she spied for ideology, not for financial gain. And, because she didn't fit the "profile" of a typical spy, Carmichael had a hard time convincing the FBI to launch an investigation into her activities. The bureau's probe eventually confirmed Carmichael's suspicions, and over time, intelligence officials, FBI agents and federal prosecutors built an airtight case against Ms. Montes. She pleaded guilty to espionage charges in 2002 and was sentenced to 25 years in prison. Currently incarcerated at a Bureau of Prisons medical facility in Fort Worth, Texas, Montes is scheduled for release in 2023.
Montes joined DIA in 1985 and quickly rose through the ranks, eventually becoming the agency's top analyst on Cuba. In hindsight, Mr. Carmichael and other counter-intelligence officials believe that Montes may been a Cuban agent when she joined DIA, and her treachery began almost immediately. Two years after joining the spy agency, Montes was briefed on the location of a secret U.S. special forces training camp in El Salvador. Montes passed the information to Havana, and less that two weeks later, Cuban-backed rebels attacked the camp, killing Sergeant Gregory Fronius, a Green Beret. Proceeds from Carmichael's book will be given to the Fronius family.
Mr. Carmichael's book--and his recent press interviews--have also revealed a rift in counter-intelligence circles, regarding Cuba's alleged penetration of our government and intelligence services. Officially, Montes has always been regarded as an anomaly--the exception, rather than the rule. But Carmichael believes that other Cuban agents remain inside our government, passing on critical information to Castro's regime. And he believes the level of penetration is stunning, as are the long-term consequences of such activity. As he told Bill Gertz:
"I believe that the Cuban Intelligence Service has penetrated the United States government to the same extent that the old East German intelligence service, the Stasi, once penetrated the West German government during the Cold War," he said.
Havana's intelligence service shares its stolen secrets with U.S. adversaries, including China, Russia, Iran and Venezuela, Mr. Carmichael said.
"If Cuban agents among us today are indirectly passing our innermost secrets, via their Cuban handlers, to countries who actively work to undermine American interests throughout the world, then we will suffer for it, in many ways," he said. "War fighters like Greg Fronius will die as a result. This is not a game."
As for Ms. Montes, she remains unrepentant, a true believer in Fidel's failed cause, and (based on her actions) quite willing to sacrifice the lives of other Americans toward that goal. Montes will be 66 when she is released from prison, but I'm still of the opinion that she got off easy. We reported almost two years ago, most American spies are not serving life sentences (or, life terms that offer the possibility of parole or release). And, the majority of those traitors are not being held in maximum security prisons. Ms. Montes' current confinement--in a federal prison hospital--doesn't exactly qualify as "hard time."
Friday, March 16, 2007
The Liar's Wife
Forgive me for not live-blogging today's "much-anticipated" testimony of Valerie Plame before the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee. "Much anticipated" is (of course) a description that applies only to Congressional Democrats and members of the MSM, anxious to sustain this kerfuffle beyond the recent conviction of Scooter Libby--on charges that had nothing to do with the Ms. Plame's supposed status as a covert CIA operative. As for your humble correspondent, there are better things to do on a blustery Friday than listen to Ms. Plame offer the same line of baloney that her husband--the sainted Joe Wilson--has been peddling for more than two years.
As the Oversight and Reform Committee's ranking member, Virginia Congressman Tom Davis had the misfortune to sit through the Plame spectacle. I thought he summarized it well, opining that Plame's "star turn" before the Congressional panel would yield little insight into the matter. And, let the record show that Mr. Davis made that prediction before the former CIA officer took the witness chair. I don't think Congressman Davis would describe himself as a prophet, but he's been around Washington long enough to recognize a made-for-the-media hearing, complete with testimony that has little basis in reality.
Consider this "early" headline from Ms. Plame's appearance. She told the committee that her name and identity "were carelessly and recklessly abused by senior officials in the White House and State Department," in retaliation for her husband's criticism of pre-war intelligence on Iraq. And, as a result of the "leak,"I could no longer perform the work for which I had been highly trained." Plame also insisted that she played no role in sending her husband on that infamous fact-finding trip to Niger, to determine if Saddam Hussein was attempting to buy yellowcake uranium from that African nation.
It's hardly a surprise, but in the matter of a few minutes before the committee, Ms. Plame proved herself to be as practiced and proficient a liar as her husband--no mean feat. Let's begin with the charge that her name and identity were "abused" by administration officials. You'll note that she added the State Department to the list of conspirators, an apparent nod to former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who recently revealed as the first administration official to discuss Ms. Plame's employment status with members of the press. Of course, Mr. Armitage was never charged with any crime in connection with her alleged outing, and Mr. Libby's conviction stemmed from charges of perjury and obstruction of justice, largely because his changing recollection of events failed to jibe with the changing recollections of media members who testified against him.
But let's return to Ms. Plame's central charge, that she was somehow "outed" by the Bush Administration, and that somehow prevented her from performing clandestine work for her employer. Unfortunately, the facts don't support her assertion. Bill Gertz of the Washington Times reported almost three years ago that Ms. Plame's "cover" had apparently been blown not once, but twice, and long before Bob Novak printed his column in 2003. Intelligence officials told Mr. Gertz that Plame's status with the agency had been disclosed to Russia by a spy in Moscow in the mid-1990s, and was revealed a second time in classified documents obtained by the Cuban government.
In other words, the CIA was responsible for outing its own agent, long before Scooter Libby talked with reporters. Obviously, such bungling by the agency would have destroyed Plame's potential effectiveness as an operative with non-official cover (NOC). With her CIA affiliation known to both Russian and Cuban intelligence--and likely shared with other hostile intelligence agencies--the odds that Ms. Plame would return to covert work were approximately zero. I'm guessing that those inconvenient facts never surfaced in today's hearing on Capitol Hill.
Not that it really mattered. By all accounts, years elapsed between Ms. Plame's last clandestine assignment, and the time her name became fodder for the Washington rumor mill. That meant that she was no longer covered by the federal statute that makes it a crime to reveal the identity of classified operatives. Special prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald knew that before he launched his investigation, and it was no surprise that his probe quickly shifted its focused from a criminal "outing" of an undercover operative, to charges of lying to investigators and obstruction of justice.
Readers will also note that the questioning of Ms. Plame failed to cover other, salient points, namely that Bob Novak wasn't the first journalist to describe her as a CIA employee with NOC. That honor belongs to liberal columnist David Corn of the Nation, who used those terms in a piece that ran only days after Novak's. In fact, Corn's article contains far more information on Ms. Plame's activities than the Novak column. And the likely source for that information? Cliff May, a former reporter for The New York Times (who now writes for National Review), believes it was none other than Joe Wilson. If May's thesis is correct--and Corn has never offered a firm denial--then the former Ambassador-turned-Bush-critic was partly responsible for "outing" his wife.
In her testimony today, Ms. Plame also denied that she played an instrumental role in sending her husband on that trip to Niger.
"I did not recommend him. I did not suggest him. There was no nepotism involved. I did not have the authority," she said.
Poor Val. Apparently, she's unfamiliar with the final report of the Senate Intelligence Committee on pre-war intelligence in Iraq. On page 50 of that document, the committee concludes that Ms. Plame led the efforts to dispatch Joe Wilson to Niger, based on the notes and memoranda of a State Department intelligence analyst who attended the meeting. For the record, Wilson and Plame dispute that version of events, but the committee supports the State Department's account.
In another time, the obvious contradictions between the Wilsons' story and official government investigations would bring them public scorn, perhaps even charges of perjury and lying to investigators. But alas, we live in a new age, when inconsistencies between their assertions and other records mean nothing. Having attained the status of "unimpeachable sources," Mr. Wilson and Ms. Plame are apparently free to perpetuate their falsehoods for anyone willing to listen. After her close-up in Washington today, Ms. Plame will return to her new home in New Mexico, and put the finishing touches on her book (for which she received a hefty advance). After that, Warner Brothers is planning a movie about her life, which should add a few more zeroes to their joint bank account. Factor in future fees for lectures and TV commentary, and the Wilsons should profit handsomely from their new careers as celebrity liars.
Only in America.
As the Oversight and Reform Committee's ranking member, Virginia Congressman Tom Davis had the misfortune to sit through the Plame spectacle. I thought he summarized it well, opining that Plame's "star turn" before the Congressional panel would yield little insight into the matter. And, let the record show that Mr. Davis made that prediction before the former CIA officer took the witness chair. I don't think Congressman Davis would describe himself as a prophet, but he's been around Washington long enough to recognize a made-for-the-media hearing, complete with testimony that has little basis in reality.
Consider this "early" headline from Ms. Plame's appearance. She told the committee that her name and identity "were carelessly and recklessly abused by senior officials in the White House and State Department," in retaliation for her husband's criticism of pre-war intelligence on Iraq. And, as a result of the "leak,"I could no longer perform the work for which I had been highly trained." Plame also insisted that she played no role in sending her husband on that infamous fact-finding trip to Niger, to determine if Saddam Hussein was attempting to buy yellowcake uranium from that African nation.
It's hardly a surprise, but in the matter of a few minutes before the committee, Ms. Plame proved herself to be as practiced and proficient a liar as her husband--no mean feat. Let's begin with the charge that her name and identity were "abused" by administration officials. You'll note that she added the State Department to the list of conspirators, an apparent nod to former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who recently revealed as the first administration official to discuss Ms. Plame's employment status with members of the press. Of course, Mr. Armitage was never charged with any crime in connection with her alleged outing, and Mr. Libby's conviction stemmed from charges of perjury and obstruction of justice, largely because his changing recollection of events failed to jibe with the changing recollections of media members who testified against him.
But let's return to Ms. Plame's central charge, that she was somehow "outed" by the Bush Administration, and that somehow prevented her from performing clandestine work for her employer. Unfortunately, the facts don't support her assertion. Bill Gertz of the Washington Times reported almost three years ago that Ms. Plame's "cover" had apparently been blown not once, but twice, and long before Bob Novak printed his column in 2003. Intelligence officials told Mr. Gertz that Plame's status with the agency had been disclosed to Russia by a spy in Moscow in the mid-1990s, and was revealed a second time in classified documents obtained by the Cuban government.
In other words, the CIA was responsible for outing its own agent, long before Scooter Libby talked with reporters. Obviously, such bungling by the agency would have destroyed Plame's potential effectiveness as an operative with non-official cover (NOC). With her CIA affiliation known to both Russian and Cuban intelligence--and likely shared with other hostile intelligence agencies--the odds that Ms. Plame would return to covert work were approximately zero. I'm guessing that those inconvenient facts never surfaced in today's hearing on Capitol Hill.
Not that it really mattered. By all accounts, years elapsed between Ms. Plame's last clandestine assignment, and the time her name became fodder for the Washington rumor mill. That meant that she was no longer covered by the federal statute that makes it a crime to reveal the identity of classified operatives. Special prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald knew that before he launched his investigation, and it was no surprise that his probe quickly shifted its focused from a criminal "outing" of an undercover operative, to charges of lying to investigators and obstruction of justice.
Readers will also note that the questioning of Ms. Plame failed to cover other, salient points, namely that Bob Novak wasn't the first journalist to describe her as a CIA employee with NOC. That honor belongs to liberal columnist David Corn of the Nation, who used those terms in a piece that ran only days after Novak's. In fact, Corn's article contains far more information on Ms. Plame's activities than the Novak column. And the likely source for that information? Cliff May, a former reporter for The New York Times (who now writes for National Review), believes it was none other than Joe Wilson. If May's thesis is correct--and Corn has never offered a firm denial--then the former Ambassador-turned-Bush-critic was partly responsible for "outing" his wife.
In her testimony today, Ms. Plame also denied that she played an instrumental role in sending her husband on that trip to Niger.
"I did not recommend him. I did not suggest him. There was no nepotism involved. I did not have the authority," she said.
Poor Val. Apparently, she's unfamiliar with the final report of the Senate Intelligence Committee on pre-war intelligence in Iraq. On page 50 of that document, the committee concludes that Ms. Plame led the efforts to dispatch Joe Wilson to Niger, based on the notes and memoranda of a State Department intelligence analyst who attended the meeting. For the record, Wilson and Plame dispute that version of events, but the committee supports the State Department's account.
In another time, the obvious contradictions between the Wilsons' story and official government investigations would bring them public scorn, perhaps even charges of perjury and lying to investigators. But alas, we live in a new age, when inconsistencies between their assertions and other records mean nothing. Having attained the status of "unimpeachable sources," Mr. Wilson and Ms. Plame are apparently free to perpetuate their falsehoods for anyone willing to listen. After her close-up in Washington today, Ms. Plame will return to her new home in New Mexico, and put the finishing touches on her book (for which she received a hefty advance). After that, Warner Brothers is planning a movie about her life, which should add a few more zeroes to their joint bank account. Factor in future fees for lectures and TV commentary, and the Wilsons should profit handsomely from their new careers as celebrity liars.
Only in America.
Thursday, March 15, 2007
They Fired the Wrong Guy
In today's Opinion Journal, Daniel Henninger weighs in on the recent dismissal of Major General George Weightman, the first senior Army official dismissed in the wake of the Walter Reed scandal. As Mr. Henninger notes, General Weightman is the type of leader who could have fixed the problems at the Army medical center. Instead he was fired--only six months into his tour as the center's commander--and largely to satisfy the Washington feeding frenzy.
We said similar things a couple of days ago. I'm not quite prepared to give General Weightman a free pass on the problems in his former command, but a few things are clear. First, the recent round of high-level dismissals that consumed two flag officers and the Army secretary are as much about public relations as they are about reform. As an old Washington hand, Defense Secretary Robert Gates understands that a few high-level firings can create an appearance of action, and give senior officials a little breathing room to actually address the issues at hand.
Secondly, we're still wondering how the dismissal of those officials will produce lasting change in a system and bureaucracy that was riddled with problems years ago (Mr. Henninger has a summary of a House hearing in 2005 that highlighted similar issues at Walter Reed). Obviously, the Army dropped the ball in solving problems at the medical center, but so did Congress and the White House. We're still waiting for the first politician--other than President Bush--to accept some degree of responsibility for the situation at Walter Reed.
And finally, we agree with Henninger's assertion that the military health care "scandal" is yet another example of the Washington establishment throwing good people on bonfires of its own making.
We said similar things a couple of days ago. I'm not quite prepared to give General Weightman a free pass on the problems in his former command, but a few things are clear. First, the recent round of high-level dismissals that consumed two flag officers and the Army secretary are as much about public relations as they are about reform. As an old Washington hand, Defense Secretary Robert Gates understands that a few high-level firings can create an appearance of action, and give senior officials a little breathing room to actually address the issues at hand.
Secondly, we're still wondering how the dismissal of those officials will produce lasting change in a system and bureaucracy that was riddled with problems years ago (Mr. Henninger has a summary of a House hearing in 2005 that highlighted similar issues at Walter Reed). Obviously, the Army dropped the ball in solving problems at the medical center, but so did Congress and the White House. We're still waiting for the first politician--other than President Bush--to accept some degree of responsibility for the situation at Walter Reed.
And finally, we agree with Henninger's assertion that the military health care "scandal" is yet another example of the Washington establishment throwing good people on bonfires of its own making.
Idiot of the Week
It's been a while since we bestowed an "Idiot of the Week" award, but that doesn't reflect a shortage of worthy candidates. Unfortunately, this blog has focused on more pressing issues in recent weeks, denying that moment in the sun for deserving nitwits.
Happily, both the timing and candidate are perfect for our latest award of "Idiot of the Week" honors. If you live in the New York City area, you've already seen our recipient. His name is Steve Bartelstein, and until recently, he was one of anchors for the morning newscast on WABC-TV. It's a job that paid extremely well (in the mid-six figures, by some accounts), and required little in return, other than being able to read well from a teleprompter, look nice on camera, and interact with the other anchors on the set.
We note those qualifications because Mr. Bartelstein didn't exactly have impressive journalistic credentials prior to his assignment at WABC. Before arriving in New York, he was a sports anchor at CNN Headline News, delivering five-minute updates during network newscasts. As we recall, Bartelstein never covered hard news at CNN--and we're guessing that someone else wrote his sports copy --but that didn't matter. WABC liked what they saw, brought Bartelstein to the Big Apple to anchor their morning show, alongside former MSNBC anchor Lorie Stokes and meterologist Bill Evans.
Apparently, New Yorkers liked him too, because WABC's early morning newscast consistently topped the local ratings in recent years. Morning news is an increasingly important time slot for local stations, and Bartelstein's performance helped boost WABC's bottom line. As for Mr. Bartelstein, no one was suggesting that he fill in for Charlie Gibson, but he did receive a new contract last summer, and he was certainly aware that local morning shows have been the springboard for other network anchors, including NBC's Matt Lauer.
But somewhere on the road to TV super-stardom, Mr. Bartelstein developed some habits that didn't exactly endear him to station management, or the corporate suits at Disney. A sexual harrassment suit was filed against him (and later withdrawn). In 2005, he was suspended for two weeks after showing up late for work, and missing a local newsbreak. Last November, he did the same thing, reportedly missing another newsbreak so he could meet actor Samuel L. Jackson, who was appearing on Live with Regis and Kelly, a program which also airs from the WABC broadcast center.
Last Thursday, Bartelstein hit the no-show trifecta, sleeping through a scheduled update on that tragic Brox housefire that killed nine people. The anchor was apparently asleep in his office when he was supposed to be in front of the camera. After that, WABC decided enough was enough, and gave Bartelstein the boot.
For a confounding inability to show up on time--and blowing a truly sweet broadcasting gig--Steve Bartelstein is a genuinely worthy "Idiot of the Week." We wish him well, noting that with more time on his hands, Mr. Bartelstein can (presumably) catch up on his sleep, and find more opportunities to chat up celebrities.
Happily, both the timing and candidate are perfect for our latest award of "Idiot of the Week" honors. If you live in the New York City area, you've already seen our recipient. His name is Steve Bartelstein, and until recently, he was one of anchors for the morning newscast on WABC-TV. It's a job that paid extremely well (in the mid-six figures, by some accounts), and required little in return, other than being able to read well from a teleprompter, look nice on camera, and interact with the other anchors on the set.
We note those qualifications because Mr. Bartelstein didn't exactly have impressive journalistic credentials prior to his assignment at WABC. Before arriving in New York, he was a sports anchor at CNN Headline News, delivering five-minute updates during network newscasts. As we recall, Bartelstein never covered hard news at CNN--and we're guessing that someone else wrote his sports copy --but that didn't matter. WABC liked what they saw, brought Bartelstein to the Big Apple to anchor their morning show, alongside former MSNBC anchor Lorie Stokes and meterologist Bill Evans.
Apparently, New Yorkers liked him too, because WABC's early morning newscast consistently topped the local ratings in recent years. Morning news is an increasingly important time slot for local stations, and Bartelstein's performance helped boost WABC's bottom line. As for Mr. Bartelstein, no one was suggesting that he fill in for Charlie Gibson, but he did receive a new contract last summer, and he was certainly aware that local morning shows have been the springboard for other network anchors, including NBC's Matt Lauer.
But somewhere on the road to TV super-stardom, Mr. Bartelstein developed some habits that didn't exactly endear him to station management, or the corporate suits at Disney. A sexual harrassment suit was filed against him (and later withdrawn). In 2005, he was suspended for two weeks after showing up late for work, and missing a local newsbreak. Last November, he did the same thing, reportedly missing another newsbreak so he could meet actor Samuel L. Jackson, who was appearing on Live with Regis and Kelly, a program which also airs from the WABC broadcast center.
Last Thursday, Bartelstein hit the no-show trifecta, sleeping through a scheduled update on that tragic Brox housefire that killed nine people. The anchor was apparently asleep in his office when he was supposed to be in front of the camera. After that, WABC decided enough was enough, and gave Bartelstein the boot.
For a confounding inability to show up on time--and blowing a truly sweet broadcasting gig--Steve Bartelstein is a genuinely worthy "Idiot of the Week." We wish him well, noting that with more time on his hands, Mr. Bartelstein can (presumably) catch up on his sleep, and find more opportunities to chat up celebrities.
The Confession
When Al Qaida mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was captured in 2003, intelligence officials assured us that he was a very big fish, indeed. As operations chief for the terrorist group, KSM (as he was known) had a hand in most of Al Qaida's activities, and detailed knowledge of its planning and preparations for future attacks.
With release of Mohammed's "confession" on Wednesday, we're getting a more complete picture of his role within the terror organization, and the scope of his efforts to bring death and destruction to the west. In a document submitted to a military hearing at the Guantanamo Bay Navy Base in Cuba, Mohammed linked himself--and Al Qaida--to a string of terrorist attacks dating back to the first bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993. KSM freely admitted to being the architect of 9-11 ("I was responsible from A to Z"); he also claimed responsibility for the murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl, the deadly Bali nightclub bombing; attacks against an Israeli-owned resort and jetliner in Kenya, and even the failed "shoe bomb" plot of terrorist Richard Reid.
In all, KSM claims to have played a role in planning or supporting 31 terrorist attacks, which killed more than 3,000 people. His "confession" paints a chilling picture of a terrorist group with grandiose plans that--increasingly--went unfulfilled after 9-11. Mohammed's list of Al Qaida plots includes many that were apparently foiled by counter-terrorism efforts, or they simply never progressed beyond the planning stage. Among those operations was a plan to kill former U.S. presidents that was never publicly disclosed prior to Mohammed's confession.
If his claims are accurate, KSM was a very busy man, hell-bent on launching as many terror attacks as possible, and eliminating scores of "infidels" in the process. And, certainly, there is evidence to support those contentions. But Mohammed's confession also bears the sign of a man who's been in jail for quite a while and understands that his future is solely in the hands of his captors. Avoiding the death penalty--or simply getting better treatment while in captivity--means that KSM has ample reasons to prove his "value" to U.S. investigators. Put another way, Mohammed wouldn't be the first jail house canary to sing about his importance within a terrorist organization, and exaggerate his role in some operations.
Make no mistake: I have no doubt that KSM was the chief operational planner of 9-11, and for that alone, he deserves to die. And, there's ample reason to believe that Mohammed was involved in the abduction and brutal slaying of Daniel Pearl. Beyond that, we'll have to see what amplifying evidence can be produced at Mohammed's eventual military tribunal, and how many claims can be verified through other law enforcement and intelligence sources.
If there's any reason to believe KSM's assertions, it lies in Al Qaida's activities after his capture. With Mohammed as operations chief, planning for future attacks was much more centralized and ambitious. Following his arrest, that process became much more de-centralized, with local Al Qaida affiliates assuming a greater role in identifying targets and launching subsequent strikes--the Madrid and London transit bombings are cases in point.
But KSM's arrest was not the only reason for the shift in Al Qaida operations. The U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan destroyed the group's operational base, scattered top leadership, and put the organization squarely on the defensive. Even if Mohammed had remained free a bit longer, he could not have planned (nor conceived) operations with the same impunity he enjoyed before 9-11.
At the time of KSM's arrest, many analysts noted the difficulty that Al Qaida faced in replacing him, and in a sense, he has never been replaced. But the group's subsequent inability to plan and execute spectacular attacks (on the scale of 9-11) is less a reflection of Mohammed's skills, and more a testament to our own success in the War on Terror. KSM's list of "confessed" operations largely corresponds with an era when the U.S. refused to recognize the terrorist threat for what it was--and paid dearly for that mistake. And finally, the terrorist's admission provides a cautionary note, a reminder of what could happen again if we lose sight of that threat, or surrender our willingness to fight.
***
Jules Crittenden has an excellent dissection of KSM's confession, including the terrorist's own, perverted vision of himself.
With release of Mohammed's "confession" on Wednesday, we're getting a more complete picture of his role within the terror organization, and the scope of his efforts to bring death and destruction to the west. In a document submitted to a military hearing at the Guantanamo Bay Navy Base in Cuba, Mohammed linked himself--and Al Qaida--to a string of terrorist attacks dating back to the first bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993. KSM freely admitted to being the architect of 9-11 ("I was responsible from A to Z"); he also claimed responsibility for the murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl, the deadly Bali nightclub bombing; attacks against an Israeli-owned resort and jetliner in Kenya, and even the failed "shoe bomb" plot of terrorist Richard Reid.
In all, KSM claims to have played a role in planning or supporting 31 terrorist attacks, which killed more than 3,000 people. His "confession" paints a chilling picture of a terrorist group with grandiose plans that--increasingly--went unfulfilled after 9-11. Mohammed's list of Al Qaida plots includes many that were apparently foiled by counter-terrorism efforts, or they simply never progressed beyond the planning stage. Among those operations was a plan to kill former U.S. presidents that was never publicly disclosed prior to Mohammed's confession.
If his claims are accurate, KSM was a very busy man, hell-bent on launching as many terror attacks as possible, and eliminating scores of "infidels" in the process. And, certainly, there is evidence to support those contentions. But Mohammed's confession also bears the sign of a man who's been in jail for quite a while and understands that his future is solely in the hands of his captors. Avoiding the death penalty--or simply getting better treatment while in captivity--means that KSM has ample reasons to prove his "value" to U.S. investigators. Put another way, Mohammed wouldn't be the first jail house canary to sing about his importance within a terrorist organization, and exaggerate his role in some operations.
Make no mistake: I have no doubt that KSM was the chief operational planner of 9-11, and for that alone, he deserves to die. And, there's ample reason to believe that Mohammed was involved in the abduction and brutal slaying of Daniel Pearl. Beyond that, we'll have to see what amplifying evidence can be produced at Mohammed's eventual military tribunal, and how many claims can be verified through other law enforcement and intelligence sources.
If there's any reason to believe KSM's assertions, it lies in Al Qaida's activities after his capture. With Mohammed as operations chief, planning for future attacks was much more centralized and ambitious. Following his arrest, that process became much more de-centralized, with local Al Qaida affiliates assuming a greater role in identifying targets and launching subsequent strikes--the Madrid and London transit bombings are cases in point.
But KSM's arrest was not the only reason for the shift in Al Qaida operations. The U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan destroyed the group's operational base, scattered top leadership, and put the organization squarely on the defensive. Even if Mohammed had remained free a bit longer, he could not have planned (nor conceived) operations with the same impunity he enjoyed before 9-11.
At the time of KSM's arrest, many analysts noted the difficulty that Al Qaida faced in replacing him, and in a sense, he has never been replaced. But the group's subsequent inability to plan and execute spectacular attacks (on the scale of 9-11) is less a reflection of Mohammed's skills, and more a testament to our own success in the War on Terror. KSM's list of "confessed" operations largely corresponds with an era when the U.S. refused to recognize the terrorist threat for what it was--and paid dearly for that mistake. And finally, the terrorist's admission provides a cautionary note, a reminder of what could happen again if we lose sight of that threat, or surrender our willingness to fight.
***
Jules Crittenden has an excellent dissection of KSM's confession, including the terrorist's own, perverted vision of himself.
Justice for the Cole
A federal judge in Norfolk has ruled that Sudan was responsible for the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen, and is liable for paying damages to the families of the sailors who died in the attack.
Federal District Judge Robert Doumar, a Reagan appointee, announced his ruling yesterday. The judge is expected to issue a written opinion in the near future, to explain his reasoning. Judge Doumar has asked for additional documentation--including tax returns from the dead sailors--to help him calculate damages.
Attorneys for the sailors' families contended that Sudanese support for Al Qaida helped the terrorist group mount the October 12, 2000 attack on the Cole, which was in port at Aden, Yemen. A small boat packed with explosives rammed the destroyer as it sat at a refueling berth, ripping a 40-foot hole in its side, and killing 17 members of the crew. After the attack, the Cole was out of commission for almost 18 months, and the ship required extensive repairs to return to operational service.
Fittingly, the lawsuit against Sudan was heard in a federal court house only miles from the Norfolk Naval Base, where the Cole is based. Four experts on terrorism testified--either by deposition or in person--that Sudanese support was instrumental in the attack. They noted that the Sudanese government allows terror training camps to operate on its soil, and gave Al Qaida members diplomatic passports and pouches to ship explosives and weapons. Lawyers representing the Khartoum government tried to have the lawsuit dismisssed, claiming that too much time had passed since the attack occurred.
Judge Doumar heard the case without a jury, and it's unclear how much money he may award to the plantiffs. Attorneys for the victims' families had requested $105 million in damages, but Doumar has indicated that he he is inclined to apply the Death on the High Seas Act, which permits compensation for economic losses but not for pain and suffering. That could reduce the eventual award to $25-30 million, and it will be up to attorneys to actually collect damages from Sudanese assets frozen in the United States.
Incidentally, Judge Doumar is of Syrian and Lebanese descent. He became something of a darling of the ACLU crowd back in 2002, when he ruled that the government could not deny legal counsel to Yaser Hamdi, the American-born Al Qaida fighter who was captured in Afghanistan. A few years ealier, Doumar infuriated some of the same civil liberties types by opining that "people with HIV that have unprotected sex should be shot."
Obviously, yesterday's ruling won't bring back the heroes of the Cole, or ease the anguish and loss felt by their families. But it does provide a measure of justice for the sailors who were murdered in Aden harbor, with the willing assistance of the Sudanese government.
Federal District Judge Robert Doumar, a Reagan appointee, announced his ruling yesterday. The judge is expected to issue a written opinion in the near future, to explain his reasoning. Judge Doumar has asked for additional documentation--including tax returns from the dead sailors--to help him calculate damages.
Attorneys for the sailors' families contended that Sudanese support for Al Qaida helped the terrorist group mount the October 12, 2000 attack on the Cole, which was in port at Aden, Yemen. A small boat packed with explosives rammed the destroyer as it sat at a refueling berth, ripping a 40-foot hole in its side, and killing 17 members of the crew. After the attack, the Cole was out of commission for almost 18 months, and the ship required extensive repairs to return to operational service.
Fittingly, the lawsuit against Sudan was heard in a federal court house only miles from the Norfolk Naval Base, where the Cole is based. Four experts on terrorism testified--either by deposition or in person--that Sudanese support was instrumental in the attack. They noted that the Sudanese government allows terror training camps to operate on its soil, and gave Al Qaida members diplomatic passports and pouches to ship explosives and weapons. Lawyers representing the Khartoum government tried to have the lawsuit dismisssed, claiming that too much time had passed since the attack occurred.
Judge Doumar heard the case without a jury, and it's unclear how much money he may award to the plantiffs. Attorneys for the victims' families had requested $105 million in damages, but Doumar has indicated that he he is inclined to apply the Death on the High Seas Act, which permits compensation for economic losses but not for pain and suffering. That could reduce the eventual award to $25-30 million, and it will be up to attorneys to actually collect damages from Sudanese assets frozen in the United States.
Incidentally, Judge Doumar is of Syrian and Lebanese descent. He became something of a darling of the ACLU crowd back in 2002, when he ruled that the government could not deny legal counsel to Yaser Hamdi, the American-born Al Qaida fighter who was captured in Afghanistan. A few years ealier, Doumar infuriated some of the same civil liberties types by opining that "people with HIV that have unprotected sex should be shot."
Obviously, yesterday's ruling won't bring back the heroes of the Cole, or ease the anguish and loss felt by their families. But it does provide a measure of justice for the sailors who were murdered in Aden harbor, with the willing assistance of the Sudanese government.
Wednesday, March 14, 2007
Morality and the Military
A couple of days ago, a member of the Chicago Tribune editorial board re-ignited the debate over gays in the military, asking the JCS Chairman, General Peter Pace about his thoughts on the issue, and the military's current "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy.
As you might expect from a Marine, General Pace responded forthrightly, saying that while he supports the current policy, he personally believes that homosexuality is wrong. "I do not believe the United States is well served by a policy that says it is OK to be immoral in any way," Pace told the Tribune, noting that such behavior can undermine order and discipline within the ranks. General Pace likened homosexuality to adultery, and said the military should not condone it by allowing gays to serve openly.
Needless to say, the gay community and their friends in Congress are up in arms. John Warner, the Virginia Republican who's been running scared since George Allen's loss last November, said he "respectually but strongly disagrees with the chairman's view." Apparently Mr. Warner is making an early play for the gay vote in Alexandria, Richmond and Hampton Roads when he runs for re-election next year. Some pundits also suggest that Warner might be willing to revisit his position on "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," which Congressional Democrats are trying to overhaul.
And, of course, the Tribune has its own issues with General Pace, outlined in an editorial that ran today. While acknowledging that Pace is entitled to his own opinion, the Trib feels that the general (unlike the enlightened members of its editorial board) is:
..."Out of step with the evolving sensibilities of U.S. troops and the American people, who are increasingly willing to accept the reality that gay men and women are serving capably and honorably, and that efforts to keep them in the closet hurt the military."
The Tribune follows that assertion with some of the standard arguments supporting an end of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." They cite a recent Zogby Poll, which reports that 73% of returning vets from Iraq and Afghanistan "have no problem" serving alongside gays and 23% are sure they already have." Unfortunately, Mr. Zogby forgot to ask the logical, follow-up question: Would you be willing to serve with gays if their lifestyle or behavior would be prejudicial to good order and discipline. Having spent over 20 years in uniform, I can safely predict that the response to that question would be much different.
And that bring us to the very core of this difficult issue. Gay rights activists--who tend to be very different in their outlook than homosexuals who actually wear the uniform--strongly believe that gays should be free to pursue their lifestyle throughout the military community. That would mean gay couples in base housing, "partners" as members of the NCO or Officer's Wives Clubs, and among the lowest ranks, openly gay soliders, sailors, airmen and Marines in the cramped quarters of open bay barracks and enlisted dormitories.
If societal attitudes toward gays are changing--and I believe they are--then the local Officer's Wives Club might not have a problem with Col X's new male "partner" joining the organizations. But an openly gay soldier or Marine in the barracks would present a different set of challenges. During my time as a teacher, I learned that teenagers (and particularly male teens, the very group targeted by military recruiters) are among the most homophobic elements of our society.
Injecting openly gay troops into an environment populated (largely) by young men that are struggling with their own identity--and who may have less-than-enlightened views on homosexuality--is a recipie for trouble. With many units rotating to the war zones on a recurring basis, no commander would welcome the added burden of investigating charges of anti-gay behavior among straight personnel, or (on the other side) gay troops filing false complaints to seek retribution against superiors--or fellow soliders--that they simply don't like. Ask any commander about the number of false sexual harrassment complaints they receive, and you'll get some idea of the additional problems that might be created by allowing gays to serve openly.
The Tribune also argues that discharging gays has created huge costs for training replacement personnel--almost $200 million since 1994, according to one government study. That's an average of $15 million a year--veritable chump change in a defense budget that tops $500 billion. Supporters of gays in the ranks also observe that some who are discharged are highly trained and difficult to replace; other reports suggest that some 50 Arabic linguists have, in recent years, been removed from active duty because they're gay, at a time when the military is woefully short of those language skills.
But the paper ignores one of the unspoken truths in these cases. A significant number of discharges for homosexual conduct come at the request of the military member. In some situations, the pain of remaining in the closet, or leading a "double life" is too much to bear. But in other instances, a quick discharge for being gay can put the former service member on the fast-track to a higher-paying civilian job. By simply telling their commander that they are "gay," an enterprising young specialist can exit the military years ahead of schedule, and quickly double, or even triple their pay. For example, "civilian" intelligence agencies no longer prohibit gay employees (nor do defense contractors), but they covet foreign language skills. It would be very interesting to know how many of those Arabic linguists initiated their own discharge, and how many transitioned to higher-paying jobs in the private sector. I would also argue that many of those linguists could have remained on active duty, if they had simply been more discreet, or kept their mouths shut.
As we've written before, the days of "witch hunts" for gays in the military are long since over. Even in the "bad old days" of the Reagan Defense Department, long before "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," I knew at least two gay NCOs who served with me in a couple of different Air Force units. One had a partner, and later died of AIDS (reportedly inflicted through a contaminated dental instrument). He served in an organization commanded by a prototypical SAC Colonel, who apparently had no problem with the gay sergeant in his budget office. The reason? That particular NCO was an outstanding performer, as was the senior NCO I met later in my career. He was more careful in revealing his orientation, but it was common knowledge within the unit that he was gay. That senior NCO served on active duty for more than 20 years, won accolades for his work, and as far as I know, his sexuality was never an issue.
That's why 23% of those Zogby respondents believe they've already served alongside a gay soldier, sailor, airman or Marine. Few in the military really care how their comrades spend their off-duty time, as long as that behavior doesn't affect unit performance, or bring discredit upon the organization. The Tribune claims that gays deserve the "same right" as straight personnel to engage in private, consensual sex during their off-duty time, without interference from Uncle Sam. I would argue that gays in the military already have that right--even if it isn't codified by executive order or the UCMJ.
As you might expect from a Marine, General Pace responded forthrightly, saying that while he supports the current policy, he personally believes that homosexuality is wrong. "I do not believe the United States is well served by a policy that says it is OK to be immoral in any way," Pace told the Tribune, noting that such behavior can undermine order and discipline within the ranks. General Pace likened homosexuality to adultery, and said the military should not condone it by allowing gays to serve openly.
Needless to say, the gay community and their friends in Congress are up in arms. John Warner, the Virginia Republican who's been running scared since George Allen's loss last November, said he "respectually but strongly disagrees with the chairman's view." Apparently Mr. Warner is making an early play for the gay vote in Alexandria, Richmond and Hampton Roads when he runs for re-election next year. Some pundits also suggest that Warner might be willing to revisit his position on "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," which Congressional Democrats are trying to overhaul.
And, of course, the Tribune has its own issues with General Pace, outlined in an editorial that ran today. While acknowledging that Pace is entitled to his own opinion, the Trib feels that the general (unlike the enlightened members of its editorial board) is:
..."Out of step with the evolving sensibilities of U.S. troops and the American people, who are increasingly willing to accept the reality that gay men and women are serving capably and honorably, and that efforts to keep them in the closet hurt the military."
The Tribune follows that assertion with some of the standard arguments supporting an end of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." They cite a recent Zogby Poll, which reports that 73% of returning vets from Iraq and Afghanistan "have no problem" serving alongside gays and 23% are sure they already have." Unfortunately, Mr. Zogby forgot to ask the logical, follow-up question: Would you be willing to serve with gays if their lifestyle or behavior would be prejudicial to good order and discipline. Having spent over 20 years in uniform, I can safely predict that the response to that question would be much different.
And that bring us to the very core of this difficult issue. Gay rights activists--who tend to be very different in their outlook than homosexuals who actually wear the uniform--strongly believe that gays should be free to pursue their lifestyle throughout the military community. That would mean gay couples in base housing, "partners" as members of the NCO or Officer's Wives Clubs, and among the lowest ranks, openly gay soliders, sailors, airmen and Marines in the cramped quarters of open bay barracks and enlisted dormitories.
If societal attitudes toward gays are changing--and I believe they are--then the local Officer's Wives Club might not have a problem with Col X's new male "partner" joining the organizations. But an openly gay soldier or Marine in the barracks would present a different set of challenges. During my time as a teacher, I learned that teenagers (and particularly male teens, the very group targeted by military recruiters) are among the most homophobic elements of our society.
Injecting openly gay troops into an environment populated (largely) by young men that are struggling with their own identity--and who may have less-than-enlightened views on homosexuality--is a recipie for trouble. With many units rotating to the war zones on a recurring basis, no commander would welcome the added burden of investigating charges of anti-gay behavior among straight personnel, or (on the other side) gay troops filing false complaints to seek retribution against superiors--or fellow soliders--that they simply don't like. Ask any commander about the number of false sexual harrassment complaints they receive, and you'll get some idea of the additional problems that might be created by allowing gays to serve openly.
The Tribune also argues that discharging gays has created huge costs for training replacement personnel--almost $200 million since 1994, according to one government study. That's an average of $15 million a year--veritable chump change in a defense budget that tops $500 billion. Supporters of gays in the ranks also observe that some who are discharged are highly trained and difficult to replace; other reports suggest that some 50 Arabic linguists have, in recent years, been removed from active duty because they're gay, at a time when the military is woefully short of those language skills.
But the paper ignores one of the unspoken truths in these cases. A significant number of discharges for homosexual conduct come at the request of the military member. In some situations, the pain of remaining in the closet, or leading a "double life" is too much to bear. But in other instances, a quick discharge for being gay can put the former service member on the fast-track to a higher-paying civilian job. By simply telling their commander that they are "gay," an enterprising young specialist can exit the military years ahead of schedule, and quickly double, or even triple their pay. For example, "civilian" intelligence agencies no longer prohibit gay employees (nor do defense contractors), but they covet foreign language skills. It would be very interesting to know how many of those Arabic linguists initiated their own discharge, and how many transitioned to higher-paying jobs in the private sector. I would also argue that many of those linguists could have remained on active duty, if they had simply been more discreet, or kept their mouths shut.
As we've written before, the days of "witch hunts" for gays in the military are long since over. Even in the "bad old days" of the Reagan Defense Department, long before "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," I knew at least two gay NCOs who served with me in a couple of different Air Force units. One had a partner, and later died of AIDS (reportedly inflicted through a contaminated dental instrument). He served in an organization commanded by a prototypical SAC Colonel, who apparently had no problem with the gay sergeant in his budget office. The reason? That particular NCO was an outstanding performer, as was the senior NCO I met later in my career. He was more careful in revealing his orientation, but it was common knowledge within the unit that he was gay. That senior NCO served on active duty for more than 20 years, won accolades for his work, and as far as I know, his sexuality was never an issue.
That's why 23% of those Zogby respondents believe they've already served alongside a gay soldier, sailor, airman or Marine. Few in the military really care how their comrades spend their off-duty time, as long as that behavior doesn't affect unit performance, or bring discredit upon the organization. The Tribune claims that gays deserve the "same right" as straight personnel to engage in private, consensual sex during their off-duty time, without interference from Uncle Sam. I would argue that gays in the military already have that right--even if it isn't codified by executive order or the UCMJ.
More Signs the Surge is Working
Data provided by the Multi-National Force -Iraq Combined Press Information Center offers more evidence that the troop surge is working. Since the launch of new security measures in mid-February, the number of deaths among U.S. troops in Baghdad has dropped by 60%.
According to the military, only 17 troops died in the Baghdad region during the one-month period between 14 February and 13 March, compared to 42 deaths from 13 January-13 February. Those periods represent the first month under the new security measures, and the last 30 days before they went into effect.
And, as this report from the Kuwait News Agency (KUNA) points out, the decrease in combat deaths occurred as U.S. troops established a permanent presence in some of Baghdad's most dangerous neighborhoods, and stepped up patrols in the Iraqi capital. Before the troop surge began, many pundits predicted at least a short-term spike in casualties, with more troops exposed to sniper fire, IEDs, and other hazards.
The KUNA dispatch offers other encouraging signs from Iraq. Successful attacks against U.S. helicopters have all but ended, after a flurry of crashes in late January/early February that claimed the lives of more than 30 soldiers. The military also reports that sectarian violence in Baghdad has dropped by 80% since the new security measures were implemented.
In fairness, the Kuwaiti report notes that the combat losses do not include U.S. casualties in outlying provinces, such as Anbar and Diyala, where some insurgents are attempting to regroup. Wondering if the same trend was evident across Iraq, I researched totals at the normally accurate Iraq Coalition Casulaty Count. Here's the "nationwide" data, including Baghdad, for the same referenced periods:
January 13 - February 13 2007
Total U.S. Military Deaths During Period: 113
From non-hostile causes: 9
Combat deaths during period: 104
February 14-March 13 2007
Total U.S. Military Deaths During Period: 69
From non-hostile causes: 7
Combat deaths during period: 62
Decrease in combat deaths: 59%
While these numbers are certainly encouraging, they are not a harbinger of impending victory. General Petraeus (and other senior commanders) have repeatedly cautioned that it will take several months for definitive proof that the surge is achieving desired effects. But if the first three weeks are any indication, we appear headed in the right direction.
The greatest irony about this story is its source--the Kuwaiti News Agency. We can only assume that "western" reporters attended the same press conference where the Baghdad numbers were released, but I have yet to see those statistics in any report from the AP, Reuters, AFP, or any of the MSM's broadcast outlets.
And is that any surprise?
***
ADDENDUM: John Hinderaker at Powerline has some equally encouraging numbers on the drop in Iraqi civilian deaths since the troop surge began. Those totals were released by Iraqi officials and recounted in a Reuters report, but (again), I can't find any significant coverage of the drop in U.S. casualties by the MSM.
According to the military, only 17 troops died in the Baghdad region during the one-month period between 14 February and 13 March, compared to 42 deaths from 13 January-13 February. Those periods represent the first month under the new security measures, and the last 30 days before they went into effect.
And, as this report from the Kuwait News Agency (KUNA) points out, the decrease in combat deaths occurred as U.S. troops established a permanent presence in some of Baghdad's most dangerous neighborhoods, and stepped up patrols in the Iraqi capital. Before the troop surge began, many pundits predicted at least a short-term spike in casualties, with more troops exposed to sniper fire, IEDs, and other hazards.
The KUNA dispatch offers other encouraging signs from Iraq. Successful attacks against U.S. helicopters have all but ended, after a flurry of crashes in late January/early February that claimed the lives of more than 30 soldiers. The military also reports that sectarian violence in Baghdad has dropped by 80% since the new security measures were implemented.
In fairness, the Kuwaiti report notes that the combat losses do not include U.S. casualties in outlying provinces, such as Anbar and Diyala, where some insurgents are attempting to regroup. Wondering if the same trend was evident across Iraq, I researched totals at the normally accurate Iraq Coalition Casulaty Count. Here's the "nationwide" data, including Baghdad, for the same referenced periods:
January 13 - February 13 2007
Total U.S. Military Deaths During Period: 113
From non-hostile causes: 9
Combat deaths during period: 104
February 14-March 13 2007
Total U.S. Military Deaths During Period: 69
From non-hostile causes: 7
Combat deaths during period: 62
Decrease in combat deaths: 59%
While these numbers are certainly encouraging, they are not a harbinger of impending victory. General Petraeus (and other senior commanders) have repeatedly cautioned that it will take several months for definitive proof that the surge is achieving desired effects. But if the first three weeks are any indication, we appear headed in the right direction.
The greatest irony about this story is its source--the Kuwaiti News Agency. We can only assume that "western" reporters attended the same press conference where the Baghdad numbers were released, but I have yet to see those statistics in any report from the AP, Reuters, AFP, or any of the MSM's broadcast outlets.
And is that any surprise?
***
ADDENDUM: John Hinderaker at Powerline has some equally encouraging numbers on the drop in Iraqi civilian deaths since the troop surge began. Those totals were released by Iraqi officials and recounted in a Reuters report, but (again), I can't find any significant coverage of the drop in U.S. casualties by the MSM.
Tuesday, March 13, 2007
Talking Points
Noah Shachtman and the gang at the Danger Room are having a bit of fun, at the Air Force's expense. They obtained a copy of a recent talking points paper, outlining the service's contributions to the GWOT, and highlighting the need for additional funding in the future. Danger Room views the memo--somewhat correctly--as another weapon in the Pentagon budget wars, aimed at helping the Air Force preserve its share of the funding pie.
As a former blue-suiter, I read the talking points with a great deal of interest. Actually, the memo's major fault (IMO) is that it tries to cram too much information into a two-page document. Covering everything from deployment levels in Iraq to the number of ICBMS on alert, the talking points are, essentially, a snapshot of today's of Air Force, with particular emphasis of its role in the War on Terror, and a description of key programs the service needs for the future.
But the reasoning behind the talking points is sound. Senior leadership is apparently concerned that the Air Force hasn't done an effective job in reminding both the public--and Congress--that the service is fully engaged in the GWOT, and makes significant contributions to allied operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other locations. The Talking Points outlined below highlight the Air Force's daily contributions; missions executed in the CENTCOM region are listed in bold type.
What We’re Doing Today:
We fly approximately 400 daily sorties for Enduring Freedom / Iraqi Freedom
Global Vigilance
16 ISR sorties in AOR; 11.5 UAV (Global Hawk & Predator) CAPs in CENTCOM AOR alone.
Track satellites from 55 countries – 560 satellites over-flights daily.
100+ operational US satellites, 450+ satellite ops events.
2 AWACS on alert for Homeland Defense.
Global Reach
1 AMC departure every 90 seconds…24/7/365.
250 airlift sorties, 2500 PAX, 1000 s-tons, 58 offloads.
30 tanker missions in AOR.
13 Air Evac missions with 50 patients.
8,000 people per month off the roads in Iraqi convoy duty because of intra-theater airlift.
8 tankers on alert for Homeland Defense.
49 consecutive successful national security space launches.
Global Power
80 strike / Electronic Warfare / Non-Traditional ISR sorties in AOR.
7 Special Ops / Search and Rescue sorties in AOR.
40 fighters on alert for Homeland Defense.
480 ICBMs on alert for the nation every day.
Had I been given the assignment for writing these talking points, I would have divided the assignment into three different papers, covering "the Air Force at War," "Homeland Defense," and "Ensuring Air and Space Power for the Future." In its present format, I don't think the writers can do justice to the USAF's support for Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. While only 25,000 Air Force members are deployed to the Middle East on a given day, they make contributions that far outweigh their numbers.
--For example, how many Americans know that many of the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams that respond to IEDs in Iraq are comprised of Air Force. And that seven blue-suit EOD technicians have been killed in operations over the past year?
--Or, that the Air Force operates--and staffs--the two largest combat hosptials in Iraq and Afghanistan, facilities that have saved the lives of thousands of coalition soldiers?
--Then, there's coverage by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). The Air Force controls most of the UAVs flown in Iraq and Afghanistan, and owns the resources used to operate these aircraft and exploit information from on-board sensors. Air Force UAV missions around a single, high-value facility (Balad AB) led to the arrest of 25 terrorists in less than three months, and disrupted potential attacks against the installation and its security patrols. "Armed" Air Force Predators have also come to the aid of coalition ground units, eliminating enemy positions and minimizing the risks faced by soldiers or Marines.
--On the ground, airmen have been running convoys along Iraq's most dangerous roads for more than two years, while airlift crews fly more sorties to reduce the number of personnel who must perform convoy duty.
--To protect those convoys--and the airfields--Air Force security forces are increasingly engaged in active patrols "beyond the wire," reducing the operational load for Army and Marine units that were once exclusively responsible for those missions
--Air Force engineers also developed a new turret for protecting HUMVEE gunners from sniper fire--and fielded the first prototype only 80 days after an airman was killed by a sniper while on patrol.
--And, it's the Air Force which operates many of the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft and battle management platforms that help pinpoint enemy activity, and direct the employment of our own forces. One of the ISR platforms--RC-135 Rivet Joint signals intelligence aircraft--have been continuously deployed in the Middle East for more than 6,000 days, and will remain in place long after our ground forces have gone home. Meanwhile, information from the E-8 JSTARS helps Army and Marine units pinpoint enemy activity, weapons caches and smuggling routes.
--Finally, the Air Force has also done its fair share in eliminating the bad guys. Lest we forget, it was an Air Guard F-16 that brought Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's career to an end last year (with a lot of help from our SOF operators).
In a conflict dominated by small-unit battles on the ground, it's sometimes easy to ignore the work of Air Force platforms and personnel. But the service is playing an important role in Iraq and Afghanistan, and leadership needs to highlight those contributions. Better yet, the service should invite some military bloggers to embed with Air Force units in the Middle East, to increase the public's awareness of what blue-suiters are bringing to the fight.
As a former blue-suiter, I read the talking points with a great deal of interest. Actually, the memo's major fault (IMO) is that it tries to cram too much information into a two-page document. Covering everything from deployment levels in Iraq to the number of ICBMS on alert, the talking points are, essentially, a snapshot of today's of Air Force, with particular emphasis of its role in the War on Terror, and a description of key programs the service needs for the future.
But the reasoning behind the talking points is sound. Senior leadership is apparently concerned that the Air Force hasn't done an effective job in reminding both the public--and Congress--that the service is fully engaged in the GWOT, and makes significant contributions to allied operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other locations. The Talking Points outlined below highlight the Air Force's daily contributions; missions executed in the CENTCOM region are listed in bold type.
What We’re Doing Today:
We fly approximately 400 daily sorties for Enduring Freedom / Iraqi Freedom
Global Vigilance
16 ISR sorties in AOR; 11.5 UAV (Global Hawk & Predator) CAPs in CENTCOM AOR alone.
Track satellites from 55 countries – 560 satellites over-flights daily.
100+ operational US satellites, 450+ satellite ops events.
2 AWACS on alert for Homeland Defense.
Global Reach
1 AMC departure every 90 seconds…24/7/365.
250 airlift sorties, 2500 PAX, 1000 s-tons, 58 offloads.
30 tanker missions in AOR.
13 Air Evac missions with 50 patients.
8,000 people per month off the roads in Iraqi convoy duty because of intra-theater airlift.
8 tankers on alert for Homeland Defense.
49 consecutive successful national security space launches.
Global Power
80 strike / Electronic Warfare / Non-Traditional ISR sorties in AOR.
7 Special Ops / Search and Rescue sorties in AOR.
40 fighters on alert for Homeland Defense.
480 ICBMs on alert for the nation every day.
Had I been given the assignment for writing these talking points, I would have divided the assignment into three different papers, covering "the Air Force at War," "Homeland Defense," and "Ensuring Air and Space Power for the Future." In its present format, I don't think the writers can do justice to the USAF's support for Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. While only 25,000 Air Force members are deployed to the Middle East on a given day, they make contributions that far outweigh their numbers.
--For example, how many Americans know that many of the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams that respond to IEDs in Iraq are comprised of Air Force. And that seven blue-suit EOD technicians have been killed in operations over the past year?
--Or, that the Air Force operates--and staffs--the two largest combat hosptials in Iraq and Afghanistan, facilities that have saved the lives of thousands of coalition soldiers?
--Then, there's coverage by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). The Air Force controls most of the UAVs flown in Iraq and Afghanistan, and owns the resources used to operate these aircraft and exploit information from on-board sensors. Air Force UAV missions around a single, high-value facility (Balad AB) led to the arrest of 25 terrorists in less than three months, and disrupted potential attacks against the installation and its security patrols. "Armed" Air Force Predators have also come to the aid of coalition ground units, eliminating enemy positions and minimizing the risks faced by soldiers or Marines.
--On the ground, airmen have been running convoys along Iraq's most dangerous roads for more than two years, while airlift crews fly more sorties to reduce the number of personnel who must perform convoy duty.
--To protect those convoys--and the airfields--Air Force security forces are increasingly engaged in active patrols "beyond the wire," reducing the operational load for Army and Marine units that were once exclusively responsible for those missions
--Air Force engineers also developed a new turret for protecting HUMVEE gunners from sniper fire--and fielded the first prototype only 80 days after an airman was killed by a sniper while on patrol.
--And, it's the Air Force which operates many of the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft and battle management platforms that help pinpoint enemy activity, and direct the employment of our own forces. One of the ISR platforms--RC-135 Rivet Joint signals intelligence aircraft--have been continuously deployed in the Middle East for more than 6,000 days, and will remain in place long after our ground forces have gone home. Meanwhile, information from the E-8 JSTARS helps Army and Marine units pinpoint enemy activity, weapons caches and smuggling routes.
--Finally, the Air Force has also done its fair share in eliminating the bad guys. Lest we forget, it was an Air Guard F-16 that brought Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's career to an end last year (with a lot of help from our SOF operators).
In a conflict dominated by small-unit battles on the ground, it's sometimes easy to ignore the work of Air Force platforms and personnel. But the service is playing an important role in Iraq and Afghanistan, and leadership needs to highlight those contributions. Better yet, the service should invite some military bloggers to embed with Air Force units in the Middle East, to increase the public's awareness of what blue-suiters are bringing to the fight.
Precision Artillery
From today's Examiner.com, a report on the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS), which has revolutionized artillery support for close-quarters battle. In the battle to retake the Iraqi city of Tal Afar in 2005, the system delivered a precision strike on a terrorist safe house--in the middle of the city--from a range of 40 miles.
To reach its target, rockets fired by a GMLRS battery fly a high, parabolic arc, forcing Army commanders to "deconflict" airspace with the other services. Actually, that requirement is nothing new for the MLRS system. The Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), which is also launched from the MLRS platform, also requires airspace deconfliction. More than 20 were fired during Desert Storm, and over 400 ATACMS rounds were launched during Operation Iraqi Freedom, which also required airspace coordination. Latest variants of the missile are equipped with GPS guidance, for improved accuracy.
But GMLRS is even more accurate than ATACMS and delivers a smaller warhead, which is essential for minimizing collateral damage in urban environments. The 2005 strike in Tal Afar destroyed the safe house, without harming other structures nearby. According to the Examiner's Rowan Scarborough, some attacks in Iraq that are described as airstrikes are actually the work of GMLRS.
Somewhere, that old French artilleryman must be smiling.
To reach its target, rockets fired by a GMLRS battery fly a high, parabolic arc, forcing Army commanders to "deconflict" airspace with the other services. Actually, that requirement is nothing new for the MLRS system. The Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), which is also launched from the MLRS platform, also requires airspace deconfliction. More than 20 were fired during Desert Storm, and over 400 ATACMS rounds were launched during Operation Iraqi Freedom, which also required airspace coordination. Latest variants of the missile are equipped with GPS guidance, for improved accuracy.
But GMLRS is even more accurate than ATACMS and delivers a smaller warhead, which is essential for minimizing collateral damage in urban environments. The 2005 strike in Tal Afar destroyed the safe house, without harming other structures nearby. According to the Examiner's Rowan Scarborough, some attacks in Iraq that are described as airstrikes are actually the work of GMLRS.
Somewhere, that old French artilleryman must be smiling.
Off With Their Heads
Newsweek's John Barry gets today's prize for stating the obvious, observing that "no one should have been terribly surprised" by the forced retirement of Army Surgeon General Lieutenant General Kevin Kiley. Yesterday, General Kiley became the latest casualty of the Walter Reed scandal with the Army's announcement that he was stepping down, effective immediately. Kiley served as commander of the Army medical center when that infamous outpatient facility opened; more recently, he was reappointed to fix conditions at Walter Reed, after the Washington Post found some soliders living in squalor at the outpatient center, while others were unable to get needed care, thanks to red tape and bureaucratic snafus.
With his retirement, Kiley becomes the third senior Army official to get the boot because of problems at Walter Reed. Major General George Weightman (who became Walter Reed's commander in 2006), was fired shortly after the scandal broke, and a few days later, Defense Secretary Robert Gates forced the resignation of Army Secretary Francis Harvey. Washington pundits claim that Gates' willingness to lop off some senior heads is evidence that he is much different that his predecessor, (the hated Don Rumsfeld), both in terms of management style and his demands for accountability from senior leaders.
So far, so good, right? Maybe. As we noted in this post (and a subsequent follow-up), the so-called "scandal" at Walter Reed is far more complex than the Post (or members of Congress) would have you believe. As the Army "downsized" in the mid-1990s, it made corresponding cuts in its health care system, believing (mistakenly) that future conflicts would be of shorter duration, and produce fewer combat casualties. Meanwhile, advances in combat medicine were improving survival rates for wounded troops, allowing more to recovery from their injuries and even remain on active duty. Those advances, coupled with extended conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, created a flood of wounded soldiers--requiring prolonged care--in a system that simply wasn't prepared to handle them.
But will the forced retirements of two senior medical officers (and the Army Secretary) actually produce meaningful change? Mr. Barry suggests that the "incuriousity" of Generals Weightman and Kiley was sufficient grounds for their dismissal; he claims that the commander's residence at Walter Reed overlooks the infamous Building 18, but (apparently) neither bothered to inspect the dilapidated outpatient facility. As for Dr. Harvey, the scandal happened on his watch, and Mr. Gates deemed his intial response as insufficient. If change begins at the top, then Secretary Gates certainly has the Army's attention, and it's a given that the replacements for Weightman, Kiley and Harvey won't make the same mistakes.
But you don't need to be a flag officer (or a former CIA Director) to understand that lasting change is not only a top-down process. Fixing the problems at Walter Reed (and other military health facilities) will require the support and participation of administrators and staff personnel, and that's where the real problem lies. Early reports suggest that both Kiley and Weightman were served by inefficent, unresponsive staffs, which failed to fix festering problems, or refused to elevate them to command level for resolution. That doesn't excuse the failings of Lieutenant General Kiley and Major General Weightman, but it is evidence of a system and culture that helped create these difficulties, and is exceptionally resistant to change.
Consider the problems at Building 18, where out-patient soldiers lived amid mold and peeling paint, waiting months for follow-on care. At one point, a Walter Reed staffer realized that the troops needed something help them pass the time, and received permission to buy additional recreational equipment. But that proposal was subsequently rejected by another bureaucrat, unaware of problems in the outpatient system. Many of the staffers who helped create this morass will survive the purge at the top, and they remain the greatest impediment to potential solutions. Will firing the Army Surgeon General really improve the efficiency of a GS-5 clerk with a bloated file of past-due outpatient appointments--and no real incentive for improving their performance?
Over at Newsweek, Mr. Barry believes the next round of Congressional hearings (and the recently-appointed presidential panel) will expose more administrators who bear responsibility for existing difficulties. I strongly disagree. Consider the example of the intelligence bureaucracy, which emerged largely unscathed after post-9-11 reviews. Yes, the overall structure was revamped, but there were virtually no dismissals of personnel for the actual intelligence failures. If history is any judge, the rank-and-file bureaucrats who populate the military and veterans' health care systems have little to fear from pending inquires, and will likely remain in their jobs long after the current "scandal" fades.
So, what purpose was actually served by sacking two generals and the Secretary of the Army? As a long-time Washington insider, Mr. Gates understands that high-level firings in the wake of a scandal serve two purposes: First, they generate the impetus for change at the highest levels of an organization, and secondly, they create a perception of action within the bureaucracy--useful for getting ahead of a scandal, at least from a public relations perspective. But translating these dismissals into genuine reform will take more than a house cleaning in the Walter Reed command section, or replacing the Army Secretary. It requires someone who can actually take the bull by the horns and make the system work--or, better yet--revamp the system by applying private sector solutions to the problems.
In terms of how that might work, Saturday's Opinion Journal offered two common sense solutions for the situation at Walter Reed. To ease the backlog of soliders awaiting outpatient treatment, offer "vouchers" that wounded personnel could use at a health care facility of their choosing. To improve billeting arrangements, the WSJ suggests enlisting the Fisher House foundation, which has built--and operates--dozens of private facilities that provide temporary accomodations for the families of sick and injured military personnel. Both are excellent ideas, but you'll also note that no one (outside the WSJ editorial board) is pushing those suggestions, either.
With his retirement, Kiley becomes the third senior Army official to get the boot because of problems at Walter Reed. Major General George Weightman (who became Walter Reed's commander in 2006), was fired shortly after the scandal broke, and a few days later, Defense Secretary Robert Gates forced the resignation of Army Secretary Francis Harvey. Washington pundits claim that Gates' willingness to lop off some senior heads is evidence that he is much different that his predecessor, (the hated Don Rumsfeld), both in terms of management style and his demands for accountability from senior leaders.
So far, so good, right? Maybe. As we noted in this post (and a subsequent follow-up), the so-called "scandal" at Walter Reed is far more complex than the Post (or members of Congress) would have you believe. As the Army "downsized" in the mid-1990s, it made corresponding cuts in its health care system, believing (mistakenly) that future conflicts would be of shorter duration, and produce fewer combat casualties. Meanwhile, advances in combat medicine were improving survival rates for wounded troops, allowing more to recovery from their injuries and even remain on active duty. Those advances, coupled with extended conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, created a flood of wounded soldiers--requiring prolonged care--in a system that simply wasn't prepared to handle them.
But will the forced retirements of two senior medical officers (and the Army Secretary) actually produce meaningful change? Mr. Barry suggests that the "incuriousity" of Generals Weightman and Kiley was sufficient grounds for their dismissal; he claims that the commander's residence at Walter Reed overlooks the infamous Building 18, but (apparently) neither bothered to inspect the dilapidated outpatient facility. As for Dr. Harvey, the scandal happened on his watch, and Mr. Gates deemed his intial response as insufficient. If change begins at the top, then Secretary Gates certainly has the Army's attention, and it's a given that the replacements for Weightman, Kiley and Harvey won't make the same mistakes.
But you don't need to be a flag officer (or a former CIA Director) to understand that lasting change is not only a top-down process. Fixing the problems at Walter Reed (and other military health facilities) will require the support and participation of administrators and staff personnel, and that's where the real problem lies. Early reports suggest that both Kiley and Weightman were served by inefficent, unresponsive staffs, which failed to fix festering problems, or refused to elevate them to command level for resolution. That doesn't excuse the failings of Lieutenant General Kiley and Major General Weightman, but it is evidence of a system and culture that helped create these difficulties, and is exceptionally resistant to change.
Consider the problems at Building 18, where out-patient soldiers lived amid mold and peeling paint, waiting months for follow-on care. At one point, a Walter Reed staffer realized that the troops needed something help them pass the time, and received permission to buy additional recreational equipment. But that proposal was subsequently rejected by another bureaucrat, unaware of problems in the outpatient system. Many of the staffers who helped create this morass will survive the purge at the top, and they remain the greatest impediment to potential solutions. Will firing the Army Surgeon General really improve the efficiency of a GS-5 clerk with a bloated file of past-due outpatient appointments--and no real incentive for improving their performance?
Over at Newsweek, Mr. Barry believes the next round of Congressional hearings (and the recently-appointed presidential panel) will expose more administrators who bear responsibility for existing difficulties. I strongly disagree. Consider the example of the intelligence bureaucracy, which emerged largely unscathed after post-9-11 reviews. Yes, the overall structure was revamped, but there were virtually no dismissals of personnel for the actual intelligence failures. If history is any judge, the rank-and-file bureaucrats who populate the military and veterans' health care systems have little to fear from pending inquires, and will likely remain in their jobs long after the current "scandal" fades.
So, what purpose was actually served by sacking two generals and the Secretary of the Army? As a long-time Washington insider, Mr. Gates understands that high-level firings in the wake of a scandal serve two purposes: First, they generate the impetus for change at the highest levels of an organization, and secondly, they create a perception of action within the bureaucracy--useful for getting ahead of a scandal, at least from a public relations perspective. But translating these dismissals into genuine reform will take more than a house cleaning in the Walter Reed command section, or replacing the Army Secretary. It requires someone who can actually take the bull by the horns and make the system work--or, better yet--revamp the system by applying private sector solutions to the problems.
In terms of how that might work, Saturday's Opinion Journal offered two common sense solutions for the situation at Walter Reed. To ease the backlog of soliders awaiting outpatient treatment, offer "vouchers" that wounded personnel could use at a health care facility of their choosing. To improve billeting arrangements, the WSJ suggests enlisting the Fisher House foundation, which has built--and operates--dozens of private facilities that provide temporary accomodations for the families of sick and injured military personnel. Both are excellent ideas, but you'll also note that no one (outside the WSJ editorial board) is pushing those suggestions, either.
Tracking the Supernote
A hat tip to GI in Korea, for this article from a recent edition of the Asia Sentinel. The paper sent reporters to Dandong, a Chinese city on the Yalu River, to buy North Korean "supernotes" --high-quality, counterfeit copies of U.S. $100 bills. Turns out, the fake bills were relatively easy to procure, but easily spotted by professional money changers, and machines used to detect counterfeit currency.
If that's the case, then why are so many bogus bills, printed by Pyongyang, still in circulation. For starters, North Korea counterfeits on an industrial scale, using printing presses, paper and ink that rivals that of the U.S. Treasury. And secondly, as the Sentinel discovered, there are "disincentives" for Chinese banks to detect bad notes and remove them from circulation. Given Dandon'g role in getting the counterfeit currency into circulation, it's obvious that Pyongyang has friends in Chinese commercial and banking circles who provide a ready conduit for the phony Franklins.
North Korea apparently uses the counterfeit bills to obtain needed hard currency and purchase luxury goods for the ruling elite. The Swiss-made printing presses that generate the phony $100 bills in Pyongyang are said to be among the world's best, rivaling those at the U.S. Bureau of Printing and Engraving that produce the real thing. North Korea obviously believes the presses are a sound investment--despite U.S. led efforts to crackdown on the counterfeiting operation, it still generates tens of millions of dollars a year in hard currency. With Pyongyang's printed fakes trading at 30-50% of face value, North Korea still earns a handsome return on its efforts, even when printing and "circulation" costs are factored in.
If that's the case, then why are so many bogus bills, printed by Pyongyang, still in circulation. For starters, North Korea counterfeits on an industrial scale, using printing presses, paper and ink that rivals that of the U.S. Treasury. And secondly, as the Sentinel discovered, there are "disincentives" for Chinese banks to detect bad notes and remove them from circulation. Given Dandon'g role in getting the counterfeit currency into circulation, it's obvious that Pyongyang has friends in Chinese commercial and banking circles who provide a ready conduit for the phony Franklins.
North Korea apparently uses the counterfeit bills to obtain needed hard currency and purchase luxury goods for the ruling elite. The Swiss-made printing presses that generate the phony $100 bills in Pyongyang are said to be among the world's best, rivaling those at the U.S. Bureau of Printing and Engraving that produce the real thing. North Korea obviously believes the presses are a sound investment--despite U.S. led efforts to crackdown on the counterfeiting operation, it still generates tens of millions of dollars a year in hard currency. With Pyongyang's printed fakes trading at 30-50% of face value, North Korea still earns a handsome return on its efforts, even when printing and "circulation" costs are factored in.
Monday, March 12, 2007
Slow to Pay
One of the great truisms in life is "never lend money to a relative." In the arena of arms trading and technology transfers, the maxim is "never do business with Iran," that is, if you're a stickler for such trivial details as "full payment" and payments made on time.
Russia appears to be learning that lesson the hard way (again), via the deal to build Iran's first nuclear power plant at Bushehr. Drudge has the link to this AP story, indicating that the state-owned Russian firm is delaying launch of the reactor, because Tehran is paying only a fraction of the $25 million monthly bill for construction and start-up activity at the complex.
In a statement, the Russian firm Atomstroiexport said that Iranian payment delays will postpone the scheduled September start-up of the plant's nuclear reactor. The firm also said that there "can be no talk" of supplying fuel for the reactor until the payment issue is cleared up. Representatives of Atomstroiexport met with Iranian representatives last week (in an effort to resolve the dispute) but those talks collapsed, prompting Moscow's threat to delay the project. Delivery of nuclear fuel for the Bushehr reactor is scheduled for this month, and on Sunday, Iran "sternly" urged Russia to meet that deadline, according to the AP.
On a related note, the Russian media reports indicates that Moscow is growing tired of Tehran's continued defiance of U.N. security council sanctions, warning the Iranians to cooperate and stop playing "anti-American" games. That comment--from an unnamed official--suggest that Russia might be close to yielding to western pressure for tougher sanctions against Iran's nuclear program.
While such a stand would be helpful, a word of caution is in order. Quite frankly, it is possible to read too much into these developments. After failing to resolve the payment issue in last week's negotiations, Moscow is now using the press to convey pressure tactics to Iran. If Tehran doesn't pay up, the Russians can threaten to delay fuel deliveries to Bushehr, start-up at that complex, and--if all else fails--they can side with the west and (perhaps) derail the entire project. But that would also mean the loss of hundreds of jobs for skilled Russian engineers and technicians, and the billions potentially riding on completion of the facility and its operation. At this point, I doubt that Moscow is ready to throw in the towel; reading between the lines of the AP dispatch, one gets the impression that a big check from Tehran could get the entire venture back on track.
As for the Iranians, the fact that they've fallen behind on payments for the Bushehr complex is no surprise. Any analyst who's followed Iranian arms purchases and tech transfers for any length of time can tell stories about projects that fall behind schedule--or end completely--for a couple of reasons:
1) Tehran's military industrial complex is notoriously cheap, inefficient and corrupt [and]
2) Iran rarely pays its bills on time
Let's begin with the cheap and corrupt portion of the equation. As we've noted on numerous occasions in this blog, Iran is a nation sorely in need of new military hardware, particularly in its air defense sector. For example, the Russian-made S-300 surface-to-air missile system seems tailor made for Tehran, offering state-of-the-art protection against air and missile attack, even at long ranges. And, credible intelligence reporting suggests that there have been contacts between Russia and Iran about a possible purchase over the past decade. In some cases, the information suggested "imminent" deliveries, but to date, the S-300 has never materialized in Iran, which still relies on 1960s and 1970s-era Chinese, American and Russian missiles for air defense. Given the apparent need, why have these acquisitions been derailed? After early interest, Iran (typically) balks at the price, suspends negotiations, and the deal remains dormant until some in Tehran starts the process again, angling for a better deal.
Now, suppose that the right people in Iran actually decide to follow through on a purchase. That's the hard part, right? Guess again. Like many military-industrial complexes in the third world, Iran's procurement system is replete with front companies, middlemen, retired officers and other "interested parties" (read: mullahs and their off-spring) that want a piece of the action. The actual sale will, likely, be negotiated through an Iranian arms dealer or front organization, used to penetrate the MOD establishment and obtain a favorable decision. Obviously, that sort of access costs money, and there are plenty of "vendors" who've been burned by Iranians who promise more than they can deliver, while accepting huge "fees" for their services. By comparison, the U.S. DoD procurement system is a veritable model of efficiency and integrity, regardless of what John McCain might think.
Let me offer a case in point that illustrates the Iranian system in action. A few years back, someone the MOD in Tehran decided that the military needed better technology for concealing some of its equipment from attack. A middleman approached a well-known vendor in the Far East, promising potentially large orders and joint ventures, if the company could deliver what the Iranians were looking for. The vendor--known for advanced technology is that particular area--was interested and offered to sell a few prototypes to Tehran for $50K. If the Iranians found them satisfactory, the vendor could supply more, at a set price. To get the ball rolling, the Far East firm required the stated down payment. Additional installments--for series production --would follow after the prototypes were delivered and approved. No problem, the middleman replied. You'll have your money within a month. And, by all indications, the vendor had every reason to believe the sincerity of the middleman--and the Iranian MOD interests he represented.
Needless to say, the Far East firm did not receive the promised payment in 30 days. Months dragged by, and still no money from Tehran. When pressed, the Iranians indicated that they were still interested, and the check was, well...err...being processed, or something like that. Down payment for this "priority program" was finally made almost a year later, and by all indications, Iran never followed up with more orders. And remember: this was a decidedly low-dollar program; total value for the package was somewhere in the six-figure range. Obviously, we're not talking about new airplanes, missiles or even fuel for a nuclear reactor. The technology involved is not covered by international agreement, so obtaining an export license (or approval of a third party government) was not an issue.
So what happened? Hard to say. One theory suggested that the Iranians were trying to pull a fast one, obtaining advanced prototypes for little/nothing, then attempting to reverse engineer them. When the vendor refused to deliver without required payment, that plan fell through. Another possibility is that the middleman lost influence, or someone within the MOD decided that the project wasn't a high priority afterall. There's also the chance that the "right" palms weren't greased within the Iranian bureaucracy, putting a kabosh on the deal once and for all.
And finally, there's the most likely scenario: this program was simply another case of Iran refusing to pay its bills in a timely manner, while attempting to get maximum value for minimum payment. The same may be true at Bushehr; years into the project, Tehran may feel that Moscow has "too much invested" in the complex to pull out now, allowing them to put the squeeze on monthly payments. Conversely, those recent "threats" from the Russians are meant to show that they have leverage, too. The next step in this process would be for Iran to threaten to "fire" the Russian contractor and attempt to finish the job itself, hire a Chinese firm to do the job, or simply make the required payments.
***
ADDENDUM: There are isolated examples of Iran paying for equipment--and receiving it--in a timely manner (the SA-15 program comes to mind) but those are exceptions, and not the rule. In Tehran, the phrase "the check is in the mail" takes on an entirely different meaning. The impasse a Bushehr may also indicate that Iran is unhappy with the work performed at the nuclear facility. Moscow has its own reputation for shoddy work and double-dealing, as almost anyone with experience in their "joint ventures" can tell you.
In fact, this entire episode is something of a kabuki dance between players who are adept at manipulating the art of the deal. On one side, you've got the Russians, who often promise advanced technology at bargain basement prices, only to inform buyers (once the deal is signed) that there's an additional charge for maintenance, training and other services . On the other side, Moscow may have met its match in Tehran, which demands state-of-the-art equipment, but has its own agenda in actually paying for it.
Russia appears to be learning that lesson the hard way (again), via the deal to build Iran's first nuclear power plant at Bushehr. Drudge has the link to this AP story, indicating that the state-owned Russian firm is delaying launch of the reactor, because Tehran is paying only a fraction of the $25 million monthly bill for construction and start-up activity at the complex.
In a statement, the Russian firm Atomstroiexport said that Iranian payment delays will postpone the scheduled September start-up of the plant's nuclear reactor. The firm also said that there "can be no talk" of supplying fuel for the reactor until the payment issue is cleared up. Representatives of Atomstroiexport met with Iranian representatives last week (in an effort to resolve the dispute) but those talks collapsed, prompting Moscow's threat to delay the project. Delivery of nuclear fuel for the Bushehr reactor is scheduled for this month, and on Sunday, Iran "sternly" urged Russia to meet that deadline, according to the AP.
On a related note, the Russian media reports indicates that Moscow is growing tired of Tehran's continued defiance of U.N. security council sanctions, warning the Iranians to cooperate and stop playing "anti-American" games. That comment--from an unnamed official--suggest that Russia might be close to yielding to western pressure for tougher sanctions against Iran's nuclear program.
While such a stand would be helpful, a word of caution is in order. Quite frankly, it is possible to read too much into these developments. After failing to resolve the payment issue in last week's negotiations, Moscow is now using the press to convey pressure tactics to Iran. If Tehran doesn't pay up, the Russians can threaten to delay fuel deliveries to Bushehr, start-up at that complex, and--if all else fails--they can side with the west and (perhaps) derail the entire project. But that would also mean the loss of hundreds of jobs for skilled Russian engineers and technicians, and the billions potentially riding on completion of the facility and its operation. At this point, I doubt that Moscow is ready to throw in the towel; reading between the lines of the AP dispatch, one gets the impression that a big check from Tehran could get the entire venture back on track.
As for the Iranians, the fact that they've fallen behind on payments for the Bushehr complex is no surprise. Any analyst who's followed Iranian arms purchases and tech transfers for any length of time can tell stories about projects that fall behind schedule--or end completely--for a couple of reasons:
1) Tehran's military industrial complex is notoriously cheap, inefficient and corrupt [and]
2) Iran rarely pays its bills on time
Let's begin with the cheap and corrupt portion of the equation. As we've noted on numerous occasions in this blog, Iran is a nation sorely in need of new military hardware, particularly in its air defense sector. For example, the Russian-made S-300 surface-to-air missile system seems tailor made for Tehran, offering state-of-the-art protection against air and missile attack, even at long ranges. And, credible intelligence reporting suggests that there have been contacts between Russia and Iran about a possible purchase over the past decade. In some cases, the information suggested "imminent" deliveries, but to date, the S-300 has never materialized in Iran, which still relies on 1960s and 1970s-era Chinese, American and Russian missiles for air defense. Given the apparent need, why have these acquisitions been derailed? After early interest, Iran (typically) balks at the price, suspends negotiations, and the deal remains dormant until some in Tehran starts the process again, angling for a better deal.
Now, suppose that the right people in Iran actually decide to follow through on a purchase. That's the hard part, right? Guess again. Like many military-industrial complexes in the third world, Iran's procurement system is replete with front companies, middlemen, retired officers and other "interested parties" (read: mullahs and their off-spring) that want a piece of the action. The actual sale will, likely, be negotiated through an Iranian arms dealer or front organization, used to penetrate the MOD establishment and obtain a favorable decision. Obviously, that sort of access costs money, and there are plenty of "vendors" who've been burned by Iranians who promise more than they can deliver, while accepting huge "fees" for their services. By comparison, the U.S. DoD procurement system is a veritable model of efficiency and integrity, regardless of what John McCain might think.
Let me offer a case in point that illustrates the Iranian system in action. A few years back, someone the MOD in Tehran decided that the military needed better technology for concealing some of its equipment from attack. A middleman approached a well-known vendor in the Far East, promising potentially large orders and joint ventures, if the company could deliver what the Iranians were looking for. The vendor--known for advanced technology is that particular area--was interested and offered to sell a few prototypes to Tehran for $50K. If the Iranians found them satisfactory, the vendor could supply more, at a set price. To get the ball rolling, the Far East firm required the stated down payment. Additional installments--for series production --would follow after the prototypes were delivered and approved. No problem, the middleman replied. You'll have your money within a month. And, by all indications, the vendor had every reason to believe the sincerity of the middleman--and the Iranian MOD interests he represented.
Needless to say, the Far East firm did not receive the promised payment in 30 days. Months dragged by, and still no money from Tehran. When pressed, the Iranians indicated that they were still interested, and the check was, well...err...being processed, or something like that. Down payment for this "priority program" was finally made almost a year later, and by all indications, Iran never followed up with more orders. And remember: this was a decidedly low-dollar program; total value for the package was somewhere in the six-figure range. Obviously, we're not talking about new airplanes, missiles or even fuel for a nuclear reactor. The technology involved is not covered by international agreement, so obtaining an export license (or approval of a third party government) was not an issue.
So what happened? Hard to say. One theory suggested that the Iranians were trying to pull a fast one, obtaining advanced prototypes for little/nothing, then attempting to reverse engineer them. When the vendor refused to deliver without required payment, that plan fell through. Another possibility is that the middleman lost influence, or someone within the MOD decided that the project wasn't a high priority afterall. There's also the chance that the "right" palms weren't greased within the Iranian bureaucracy, putting a kabosh on the deal once and for all.
And finally, there's the most likely scenario: this program was simply another case of Iran refusing to pay its bills in a timely manner, while attempting to get maximum value for minimum payment. The same may be true at Bushehr; years into the project, Tehran may feel that Moscow has "too much invested" in the complex to pull out now, allowing them to put the squeeze on monthly payments. Conversely, those recent "threats" from the Russians are meant to show that they have leverage, too. The next step in this process would be for Iran to threaten to "fire" the Russian contractor and attempt to finish the job itself, hire a Chinese firm to do the job, or simply make the required payments.
***
ADDENDUM: There are isolated examples of Iran paying for equipment--and receiving it--in a timely manner (the SA-15 program comes to mind) but those are exceptions, and not the rule. In Tehran, the phrase "the check is in the mail" takes on an entirely different meaning. The impasse a Bushehr may also indicate that Iran is unhappy with the work performed at the nuclear facility. Moscow has its own reputation for shoddy work and double-dealing, as almost anyone with experience in their "joint ventures" can tell you.
In fact, this entire episode is something of a kabuki dance between players who are adept at manipulating the art of the deal. On one side, you've got the Russians, who often promise advanced technology at bargain basement prices, only to inform buyers (once the deal is signed) that there's an additional charge for maintenance, training and other services . On the other side, Moscow may have met its match in Tehran, which demands state-of-the-art equipment, but has its own agenda in actually paying for it.
Not In Tournament
When the first round of the NCAA Men's Basketball Tournament begins on Thursday, the Air Force Academy Falcons won't be there. Despite a 23-8 record and "quality" wins over Stanford, Texas Tech and Long Beach State, the Falcons didn't make the field for March madness, and will (instead) host a first-round NIT game Wednesday night against Austin Peay.
In fairness, the Falcons didn't exactly endear themselves to the selection committee. After a 17-1 start, they lost seven of their final 13 games and made an early exit from last week's Mountain West Conference Tournament. During that stretch, the Falcons lost to such non-powers as Utah and Texas Christian, effectively ending hopes for an NCAA bid, and sealing their exile to the NIT.
Still, there's much to be said for a service academy that has enjoyed remarkable success in Division I basketball over the past 5 or 6 years, despite serious recruiting disadvantages and a series of coaching changes. It's almost a given that talented basketball players with a 1200 SAT score tend to gravitate toward Duke or North Carolina, not the Air Force Academy. Then, there's the little matter of being a college athlete in a demanding academic and military environment, where players are expected to meet the same rigorous standards as other students. And after graduation, any dreams of a pro career must be deferred at least five years, while the player fulfills his military service commitment.
Needless to say, the Academy hasn't exactly been a Mecca for great basketball players and teams. While the program's founder (legendary coach Bob Spear) managed two NCAA appearances in the early 1960s, it would be another 40 years before the Falcons returned to the Big Dance, under Princeton alum Joe Scott. His 2003-04 team won an at-large beth, after finishing with a record of 22-7, the first winning record in 26 years. Unfortunately for the Falcons, Scott followed the same path of other successful coaches in difficult recruiting situations, bolting for his alma matter after the '04 season. Scott's successor, Chris Mooney, did the same thing, departing for the head coaching job at Richmond after a single season.
Since 2005, Jeff Bzdelik has served as the Falcons' head coach, leading them back to the tournament a year ago. Bzdelik, who looks far younger than his 53 years, has more than a decade of NBA experience, including a stint as coach of the Denver Nuggets. When he inherited the Falcons, Bzdelik had the good sense to retain the "Princeton" offense of his predecessors, which emphasizes passing, precise cuts to the basket and high-percentage shots--the perfect style for a team often described as "too small" and "too slow" for a Division I program. But Bzkelik compensates for his team's (supposed) lack of athleticism by emphasizing hustle, defense and complete game preparation--almost to the point of paranoia.
Graduating four senior starters off this year's team, Bzdelik will have his work cut out for him next year. Until then, the Falcons have enough talent to make a deep run into the NIT. True, it's not the same thing as the Big Dance, but in an era when most college basketball players excell at only one thing, it's refreshing to see a team of true student-athletes extend their season by at least one more game. With a little luck--and a better performance than they exhibited in the Mountain West tournament--the Falcons might wind up in Madison Square Garden on 29 March, for the finals of the NIT.
Finally, the standard disclaimer: I am not a graduate of the Air Force Academy, having earned my commission the old-fashioned way, through 13 weeks at OTS.
***
ADDENDUM: I am not a bracket-ologist, and this will likely be my only post on the college basketball tournaments. But, like other casual fans, I am constantly mystified by the selection process, and some of the (apparent) politics that influence the process. For example, how can you justify Kentucky's selection for the tournament, other than (a) they go every year, and (b) wherever they travel, 40,000 members of the Wildcat Nation are sure to follow, clogging hotels and restaurants, and spending lots of cash. For the record, this year's UK squad had a solid RPI (#13 nationally, according to one service), but finished only 1-6 against Top 25 teams, had a 9-7 record in conference play, and lost in the second round of the SEC tournament to a Mississippi State team that's headed for the NIT. Without their "tradition" and name-recognition, the Cats might also be looking at an NIT bracket.
In fairness, the Falcons didn't exactly endear themselves to the selection committee. After a 17-1 start, they lost seven of their final 13 games and made an early exit from last week's Mountain West Conference Tournament. During that stretch, the Falcons lost to such non-powers as Utah and Texas Christian, effectively ending hopes for an NCAA bid, and sealing their exile to the NIT.
Still, there's much to be said for a service academy that has enjoyed remarkable success in Division I basketball over the past 5 or 6 years, despite serious recruiting disadvantages and a series of coaching changes. It's almost a given that talented basketball players with a 1200 SAT score tend to gravitate toward Duke or North Carolina, not the Air Force Academy. Then, there's the little matter of being a college athlete in a demanding academic and military environment, where players are expected to meet the same rigorous standards as other students. And after graduation, any dreams of a pro career must be deferred at least five years, while the player fulfills his military service commitment.
Needless to say, the Academy hasn't exactly been a Mecca for great basketball players and teams. While the program's founder (legendary coach Bob Spear) managed two NCAA appearances in the early 1960s, it would be another 40 years before the Falcons returned to the Big Dance, under Princeton alum Joe Scott. His 2003-04 team won an at-large beth, after finishing with a record of 22-7, the first winning record in 26 years. Unfortunately for the Falcons, Scott followed the same path of other successful coaches in difficult recruiting situations, bolting for his alma matter after the '04 season. Scott's successor, Chris Mooney, did the same thing, departing for the head coaching job at Richmond after a single season.
Since 2005, Jeff Bzdelik has served as the Falcons' head coach, leading them back to the tournament a year ago. Bzdelik, who looks far younger than his 53 years, has more than a decade of NBA experience, including a stint as coach of the Denver Nuggets. When he inherited the Falcons, Bzdelik had the good sense to retain the "Princeton" offense of his predecessors, which emphasizes passing, precise cuts to the basket and high-percentage shots--the perfect style for a team often described as "too small" and "too slow" for a Division I program. But Bzkelik compensates for his team's (supposed) lack of athleticism by emphasizing hustle, defense and complete game preparation--almost to the point of paranoia.
Graduating four senior starters off this year's team, Bzdelik will have his work cut out for him next year. Until then, the Falcons have enough talent to make a deep run into the NIT. True, it's not the same thing as the Big Dance, but in an era when most college basketball players excell at only one thing, it's refreshing to see a team of true student-athletes extend their season by at least one more game. With a little luck--and a better performance than they exhibited in the Mountain West tournament--the Falcons might wind up in Madison Square Garden on 29 March, for the finals of the NIT.
Finally, the standard disclaimer: I am not a graduate of the Air Force Academy, having earned my commission the old-fashioned way, through 13 weeks at OTS.
***
ADDENDUM: I am not a bracket-ologist, and this will likely be my only post on the college basketball tournaments. But, like other casual fans, I am constantly mystified by the selection process, and some of the (apparent) politics that influence the process. For example, how can you justify Kentucky's selection for the tournament, other than (a) they go every year, and (b) wherever they travel, 40,000 members of the Wildcat Nation are sure to follow, clogging hotels and restaurants, and spending lots of cash. For the record, this year's UK squad had a solid RPI (#13 nationally, according to one service), but finished only 1-6 against Top 25 teams, had a 9-7 record in conference play, and lost in the second round of the SEC tournament to a Mississippi State team that's headed for the NIT. Without their "tradition" and name-recognition, the Cats might also be looking at an NIT bracket.
Al-Sadr's Best Hope?
A hat tip to Paul Mirengoff at Powerline, for spotting this Robert Kagan column in yesterday's Washington Post. Mr. Kagan, a conservative scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, notes the current dichotomy in U.S. policy toward Iraq. As Congressional Democrats try to legislate a withdrawal of American forces by next year, there are growing signs that the troops surge--you remember, the strategy that was so roundly criticized just a a few months ago--is working.
Mr. Kagan writes from Brussels (where is wife is the current American Ambassador to NATO), so he relies on others for evidence that the surge is working. And his choices could hardly be described as fellow neo-cons; from Iraq the Model, Kagan cites observations from Baghdad-based bloggers Omar and Mohammed Fadhil, who reported that the surge has "changed the dynamic." Before the troop increase, the Fadhil brothers note, there was an assumption (among friends and foes alike) that the U.S. was preparing to withdrawal. Now, with the U.S. and Iraqi governments devoting required resources to the security situation, those assumptions have changed, and many insurgents have left the city.
Similar comments were made by NBC News anchor Brian Williams, who just returned from a week in Iraq. During his stay, Mr. Williams visited the Iraqi cities of Ramidi and Hit, where the security situation was precarious just a few months ago. Now, according to the NBC anchor, The new American strategy of "getting out, decentralizing, going into the neighborhoods, grabbing a toehold, telling the enemy we're here, start talking to the locals -- that is having an obvious and palpable effect." The result, according to Williams, is "that the war has changed."
Readers will note that neither Brian Williams nor the Fadhil brothers are predicting quick victory. But, as Kagan reminds us, there has been a near-dearth of stories about the surge's early success in recent weeks. Meanwhile, Democratic efforts to force a troop withdrawal by 2008 were big news last week, and similar efforts in the future will continue to grab the headlines.
This leads Mr. Kagan to conclude that the Democrats (and their friends in the media) may yet represent the best hope for insurgents. By imposing some sort of artificial deadline, and continuing to emphasize the negative in Iraq, critics of the war--both in the government and the press--can encourage the terrorists to hang on for another year or so, then achieve the victory they have sought for so long.
Kagan concludes by noting that our final success in Iraq is far from assured; the violence continues (albeit at reduced levels), and the insurgents who have fled may return, and cause more problems down the road. And, he says, no one is asking journalists to report only good news from Iraq. But, it would be nice to see a little balance, highlighting the positive effects of the surge (so far), along with the daily diet of car bombings and suicide attacks. Is that likely to happen? I think most of us know the answer to that one.
Mr. Kagan writes from Brussels (where is wife is the current American Ambassador to NATO), so he relies on others for evidence that the surge is working. And his choices could hardly be described as fellow neo-cons; from Iraq the Model, Kagan cites observations from Baghdad-based bloggers Omar and Mohammed Fadhil, who reported that the surge has "changed the dynamic." Before the troop increase, the Fadhil brothers note, there was an assumption (among friends and foes alike) that the U.S. was preparing to withdrawal. Now, with the U.S. and Iraqi governments devoting required resources to the security situation, those assumptions have changed, and many insurgents have left the city.
Similar comments were made by NBC News anchor Brian Williams, who just returned from a week in Iraq. During his stay, Mr. Williams visited the Iraqi cities of Ramidi and Hit, where the security situation was precarious just a few months ago. Now, according to the NBC anchor, The new American strategy of "getting out, decentralizing, going into the neighborhoods, grabbing a toehold, telling the enemy we're here, start talking to the locals -- that is having an obvious and palpable effect." The result, according to Williams, is "that the war has changed."
Readers will note that neither Brian Williams nor the Fadhil brothers are predicting quick victory. But, as Kagan reminds us, there has been a near-dearth of stories about the surge's early success in recent weeks. Meanwhile, Democratic efforts to force a troop withdrawal by 2008 were big news last week, and similar efforts in the future will continue to grab the headlines.
This leads Mr. Kagan to conclude that the Democrats (and their friends in the media) may yet represent the best hope for insurgents. By imposing some sort of artificial deadline, and continuing to emphasize the negative in Iraq, critics of the war--both in the government and the press--can encourage the terrorists to hang on for another year or so, then achieve the victory they have sought for so long.
Kagan concludes by noting that our final success in Iraq is far from assured; the violence continues (albeit at reduced levels), and the insurgents who have fled may return, and cause more problems down the road. And, he says, no one is asking journalists to report only good news from Iraq. But, it would be nice to see a little balance, highlighting the positive effects of the surge (so far), along with the daily diet of car bombings and suicide attacks. Is that likely to happen? I think most of us know the answer to that one.
Friday, March 09, 2007
Meet Your New Boss
Network anchors get a little testy when someone describes them as "news readers," or "presenters," to use the British term. "We're journalists," they insist; a few even claim the title of "managing editor," suggesting someone who is actively involved in the editorial process, and helps shape the broadcast's content and scope.
Take Katie Couric, for example. Not only is she the anchor of the CBS Evening News, she also holds the mantle of managing editor, following in the footsteps of her predecessors, Dan Rather and Walter Cronkite. Given her annual salary ($15 million), Ms. Couric is certainly earns enough to perform two or three jobs at the network's struggling news division.
But we digress. Actually, you've got to wonder how much influence Ms. Couric actually has at the Evening News, in the wake of today's story in the NYT. According to the Times, CBS executives didn't tell Ms. Couric that Rick Kaplan would be her new executive producer until after he accepted the job. So much for being in the loop.
In reality, the title of "managing editor" at a TV newscast is little more than window dressing. Anchors are certainly aware of the stories that will be covered; most report from the field from time-to-time, and some make contributions to their scripts (which are written by other staffers). But others are decidedly hands-off. Early viewers of satellite TV could watch the late Max Robinson of ABC talking on the phone about his art collection during pre-broadcast technical rehearsals from his Chicago studio. And, one of the Windy City's true news legends, the late Floyd Kalber of NBC (and later, WLS-TV) reportedly arrived for work only one hour before his 6 p.m. newscast, and departed shortly after it ended. However, I'm note sure if either Robinson or Kalber claimed the exalted title of "managing editor." For the record, some other notables in the history of broadcast news (including Chet Huntley, David Brinkley and Peter Jennings) also managed to get by without that mantle.
Which brings us back to Ms. Couric at CBS. As someone who once worked in the salt mines of broadcasting, I don't begrudge her position, or her paycheck. Anchoring a newscast is definitely an acquired skill, and Couric earned her spurs in the morning news wars. But describing her--or any other anchor--as hands-on, take charge managing editors is a bit silly. Their job, in a nutshell, is to read the news and look attractive. That may be one of the reasons that Katie Couric was among the last to know that she had a new executive producer.
Take Katie Couric, for example. Not only is she the anchor of the CBS Evening News, she also holds the mantle of managing editor, following in the footsteps of her predecessors, Dan Rather and Walter Cronkite. Given her annual salary ($15 million), Ms. Couric is certainly earns enough to perform two or three jobs at the network's struggling news division.
But we digress. Actually, you've got to wonder how much influence Ms. Couric actually has at the Evening News, in the wake of today's story in the NYT. According to the Times, CBS executives didn't tell Ms. Couric that Rick Kaplan would be her new executive producer until after he accepted the job. So much for being in the loop.
In reality, the title of "managing editor" at a TV newscast is little more than window dressing. Anchors are certainly aware of the stories that will be covered; most report from the field from time-to-time, and some make contributions to their scripts (which are written by other staffers). But others are decidedly hands-off. Early viewers of satellite TV could watch the late Max Robinson of ABC talking on the phone about his art collection during pre-broadcast technical rehearsals from his Chicago studio. And, one of the Windy City's true news legends, the late Floyd Kalber of NBC (and later, WLS-TV) reportedly arrived for work only one hour before his 6 p.m. newscast, and departed shortly after it ended. However, I'm note sure if either Robinson or Kalber claimed the exalted title of "managing editor." For the record, some other notables in the history of broadcast news (including Chet Huntley, David Brinkley and Peter Jennings) also managed to get by without that mantle.
Which brings us back to Ms. Couric at CBS. As someone who once worked in the salt mines of broadcasting, I don't begrudge her position, or her paycheck. Anchoring a newscast is definitely an acquired skill, and Couric earned her spurs in the morning news wars. But describing her--or any other anchor--as hands-on, take charge managing editors is a bit silly. Their job, in a nutshell, is to read the news and look attractive. That may be one of the reasons that Katie Couric was among the last to know that she had a new executive producer.
Truth in Advertising
A few months ago, the state of Michigan was running a radio ad blitz, inviting companies to move there. The ads were voiced by actor Jeff Daniels, a Michigan native who still runs a small, not-for-profit theater in his home state. Firms that moved to Michigan, Mr. Daniels informed us, could take advantage of billions of dollars in state assistance and spport. Other ads in the series highlighted some of the companies that had taken the plunge, making the Wolverine State sound like an absolute business nirvana.
But today's Opinion Journal tells the other side of the story. Apparently, one reason the state wants more companies to relocate there is so it can tax the hell out of them. Michigan's Democratic Governor, Jennifer Granholm, has proposed a new corporate income tax, a two percent excise tax on 100 business services, and five percent death tax on estates over $ 2 million--measures almost guaranteed to drive more businesses out of the state. As the Journal notes, Michigan has lost more than 360,000 jobs since 2000; the state is saddled with an $860 million budget deficit, and per capita income is at its lowest in 75 years, relative to the national average. And the solution to those problems? Why raise taxes, of course!
In fairness, much of Michigan's economic woes can be traced to the steady decline of the nation's automobile industry, which is continuing its migration to more business-friendly, right-to-work states in the south. But Granholm's proposed increases in taxes and fees will actually increase the burden on businesses she's trying to bring to the state. In reality, Governor Granholm's proposal is nothing more than a standard, Democratic bait-and-switch. She eliminated the state's anti-growth single business tax, but (apparently) can't resist the temptation to other hike fees and levies that businesses must pay. Judging from the Journal article, it doesn't sound like companies are exactly rushing to Michigan, and the few that actually made the move may question their decision. Just this week, one of the state's oldest and largest bank holding companies, Comercia, announed that it will transfer its corporate headquarters from Detroit to Dallas, citing "better growth opportunites" in the Lone Star Stte.
As for Mr. Daniels, he professes to "love" Michigan in one of the ads, and it doesn't look like his Purple Rose Theater (located in Chelsea) will move anytime soon. But you've got to wonder if the actor realizes Governor Granholm's economic policies have made him the pitchman for something of a scam. Michigan (and its economic development fund, which hired Mr. Daniels) are eager to bring companies to the state, and even offers some generous incentives. But, once there, the Granholm plan would reduce potential advantages in the marketplace, thanks to the built-in costs of higher taxes and fees that Michigan firms would add to their products and services.
If Granholm's tax proposals are approved by the state legislature, business owners would have to be suckers to move their firms to Michigan. And even Harry Dunne--the dim-witted character that Mr. Daniels played in Dumb and Dumber--would understand that.
But today's Opinion Journal tells the other side of the story. Apparently, one reason the state wants more companies to relocate there is so it can tax the hell out of them. Michigan's Democratic Governor, Jennifer Granholm, has proposed a new corporate income tax, a two percent excise tax on 100 business services, and five percent death tax on estates over $ 2 million--measures almost guaranteed to drive more businesses out of the state. As the Journal notes, Michigan has lost more than 360,000 jobs since 2000; the state is saddled with an $860 million budget deficit, and per capita income is at its lowest in 75 years, relative to the national average. And the solution to those problems? Why raise taxes, of course!
In fairness, much of Michigan's economic woes can be traced to the steady decline of the nation's automobile industry, which is continuing its migration to more business-friendly, right-to-work states in the south. But Granholm's proposed increases in taxes and fees will actually increase the burden on businesses she's trying to bring to the state. In reality, Governor Granholm's proposal is nothing more than a standard, Democratic bait-and-switch. She eliminated the state's anti-growth single business tax, but (apparently) can't resist the temptation to other hike fees and levies that businesses must pay. Judging from the Journal article, it doesn't sound like companies are exactly rushing to Michigan, and the few that actually made the move may question their decision. Just this week, one of the state's oldest and largest bank holding companies, Comercia, announed that it will transfer its corporate headquarters from Detroit to Dallas, citing "better growth opportunites" in the Lone Star Stte.
As for Mr. Daniels, he professes to "love" Michigan in one of the ads, and it doesn't look like his Purple Rose Theater (located in Chelsea) will move anytime soon. But you've got to wonder if the actor realizes Governor Granholm's economic policies have made him the pitchman for something of a scam. Michigan (and its economic development fund, which hired Mr. Daniels) are eager to bring companies to the state, and even offers some generous incentives. But, once there, the Granholm plan would reduce potential advantages in the marketplace, thanks to the built-in costs of higher taxes and fees that Michigan firms would add to their products and services.
If Granholm's tax proposals are approved by the state legislature, business owners would have to be suckers to move their firms to Michigan. And even Harry Dunne--the dim-witted character that Mr. Daniels played in Dumb and Dumber--would understand that.
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