NBC News is reporting a significant victory in the War on Terrorism. An airstrike in the tribal lands of northern Pakistan has reportedly killed Moshin Musa Matawalli Atwah, an Egpytian who was known as one of Al-Qaida's top bomb makers. U.S. authorities had placed a $5 million bounty on his head, claiming that Atwah had trained the terrorist bombers who attacked U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, killing more than a dozen Americans, and hundreds of African nationals.
Atwah was apparently one of fourteen terrorists killed in today's air strike, but it's unclear who deserves credit for the operation. Pakistani officials claim the attack was carried out by one of its helicopter gunships, which targeted a building that housed the insurgents. However, local residents claim a U.S. Predator drone launched a Hellfire missile at the structure, killing the terrorists inside.
The competing claims are significant. A similar operation a few months ago also killed a key Al-Qaida bomb-maker, but it also strained relations between Washington and Islamabad. The reason? That strike was carried out by a Predator, but (officially) U.S. aircraft and drones aren't supposed to operate on Pakistan's side of the border. In reality, our UAVS frequently cross the border and the Pakistanis don't object, as long as that fact isn't heavily publicized.
Here's the likely scenario behind today's attack and the explanation: Atwah and his cohorts had likely been under surveillance by U.S. drones for some time. When the hit was ordered, the U.S. coordinated with Pakistan to have their helicopters operating in the same area. The Pak pilot was probably ordered to launch a missile and strafe the area after observing the Hellfire explosion. That secondary strike served a two-fold purpose: eliminating any terrorists emerging from the rubble, and offering some measure of cover for both Washington and Islamabad.
Pakistan has a limited number of U.S.-made attack helicopters (AH-1 Cobras), but they are equipped with older, TOW missiles, not the more advanced Hellfire. And, since the U.S. does not "push" Predator video into the cockpit of Pakistan's attack helos, the Pakistani crew would have to be briefed on which target to fire on (in advance) if they launched at all. Video from the target area will probably indicate whether the building was struck by a single missile (probably a Hellfire), or by missiles from the drone and the helicopter.
Today's operation highlights improved cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistan, including its p.r. aspects. U.S. officials are referring media queries on the attack to their Pakistani counterparts, who ensure reporters that 'we were responsible." Both sides clearly want to avoid another situation like the previous Predator strike, which exposed U.S. operations, and left Pakistan President Musharaff in an embarassing position.
About the time that Atwah became eligible for his vigin quota, Al-Qaida's #2 man, Ayman al-Zawahiri, appeared in a new video. In the tape, Zawahiri praises terrorist fighters in Iraq, and their leader, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi. The tape appears "new" only in the sense that it hasn't been previously aired. Some of the references in the tape suggest it was recorded last November. That may suggest that either Zawahiri is more reluctant to leave his hiding place (he was the target of the previous Predator strike that killed several of his associates) or that Al Qaida is having a harder time getting its message out. In either case, that's good news, as is the demise of Atwah.
Thursday, April 13, 2006
Who's Minding the Store?
There's a disturbing report in the Los Angeles Times that discarded military computer hard drives, memory sticks and other storage devices are turning up for sale, in the shops and bazaars of Afghanistan. According to the Times, some of these devices contain classified or sensitive information. One flash memory drive examined by a Times reporter contained the names, photographs and phone numbers of Afghans who are working as spies for the U.S. Most of the memory devices were offered for sale near Bagram Air Base, a sprawling installation that supports air and ground operations in Afghanistan.
It doesn't take a genius to figure out that Bagram has a serious security problem. The DOD has clear, precise rule for marking, safeguarding and destroying classified media, but enforcement of those policies at Bagram ppears lax, at best. According to press accounts, military police units are canvassing the bazaars and shops, attempting to round up the computer equipment. But the Times reports that some memory devices can still be had--for a price. We can only imagine how many hard drives or memory sticks never made it to the local market and were, instead, scooped up by Al-Qaida or Taliban operatives. If I were an Afghan providing intel information to the U.S. military or an intelligence service, I'd be very, very worried.
Why has there been an apparent security melt-down at Bagram? I believe there are several factors. First of all, everyone at Bagram is deployed, serving tours ranging from a few weeks to one year. In that kind of environment--and given the installation's high operations tempo--it's difficult to sustain an effective communications security (COMSEC) program, and verify compliance. With combat operations going on literally around the clock, it's difficult to verify that everyone has their computer media properly marked, stored and classified. But, in the wake of this scandal, that approach is about to change. I'm guessing that Bagram will be getting a much more stringent COMSEC program very, very soon.
There's also the issue of exactly who has access to Bagram. Thousands of Afghans work on the base, and while they've supposedly been vetted, there may be a few Taliban and Al Qaida operatives in their ranks. With Afghans able to access many of the offices and workspaces, it would be easy for an enemy spy to pick up a memory stick, a thumb drive or even a discarded hard drive, smuggle it off base, and turn it over to his terrorist counterparts. In one respect, the devices found at the bazaars may just be the tip of the ice berg; those items were apparently looted in hopes of making a quick buck. The Taliban or Al Qaida could easily send an Afghan "insider" on a specialized shopping mission, targeting specific offices or types of information
Finally, there's the problem of old-fashioned carelessness. With the proliferation of computer technology and small memory devices, almost everyone in the military has access to them. When a personal memory stick goes missing, the errant soldier, Marine or airman probably won't report it--especially if that revelation might result in disciplinary action. Instead, they quietly procure another one, and go about their business. Meanwhile, the misplaced hard drive (or other device) winds up in the local market, for sale to the highest bidder.
Exploiting a captured memory device is well within the capabilities of Al Qaida and the Taliban. And, believe it or not, those classified documents are not the real treasure trove now on sale near Bagram. "Unclassified" hard drives and memory sticks can yield equally important information, including personnel rosters, social security numbers, phone listings, recall rosters, billeting assignments--even training and operational schedules for local units. Analyzed as a whole, such information can provide valuable insights into force levels, rotation patterns, and projected operations--data that would make it easier for the terrorists to avoid Allied attacks, while (conversely) improving their ability to strike at us.
We need to find out who was supposed to be minding the security "store" at Bagram, and hold them accountable. This appears to be a snafu of the first magnitude.
It doesn't take a genius to figure out that Bagram has a serious security problem. The DOD has clear, precise rule for marking, safeguarding and destroying classified media, but enforcement of those policies at Bagram ppears lax, at best. According to press accounts, military police units are canvassing the bazaars and shops, attempting to round up the computer equipment. But the Times reports that some memory devices can still be had--for a price. We can only imagine how many hard drives or memory sticks never made it to the local market and were, instead, scooped up by Al-Qaida or Taliban operatives. If I were an Afghan providing intel information to the U.S. military or an intelligence service, I'd be very, very worried.
Why has there been an apparent security melt-down at Bagram? I believe there are several factors. First of all, everyone at Bagram is deployed, serving tours ranging from a few weeks to one year. In that kind of environment--and given the installation's high operations tempo--it's difficult to sustain an effective communications security (COMSEC) program, and verify compliance. With combat operations going on literally around the clock, it's difficult to verify that everyone has their computer media properly marked, stored and classified. But, in the wake of this scandal, that approach is about to change. I'm guessing that Bagram will be getting a much more stringent COMSEC program very, very soon.
There's also the issue of exactly who has access to Bagram. Thousands of Afghans work on the base, and while they've supposedly been vetted, there may be a few Taliban and Al Qaida operatives in their ranks. With Afghans able to access many of the offices and workspaces, it would be easy for an enemy spy to pick up a memory stick, a thumb drive or even a discarded hard drive, smuggle it off base, and turn it over to his terrorist counterparts. In one respect, the devices found at the bazaars may just be the tip of the ice berg; those items were apparently looted in hopes of making a quick buck. The Taliban or Al Qaida could easily send an Afghan "insider" on a specialized shopping mission, targeting specific offices or types of information
Finally, there's the problem of old-fashioned carelessness. With the proliferation of computer technology and small memory devices, almost everyone in the military has access to them. When a personal memory stick goes missing, the errant soldier, Marine or airman probably won't report it--especially if that revelation might result in disciplinary action. Instead, they quietly procure another one, and go about their business. Meanwhile, the misplaced hard drive (or other device) winds up in the local market, for sale to the highest bidder.
Exploiting a captured memory device is well within the capabilities of Al Qaida and the Taliban. And, believe it or not, those classified documents are not the real treasure trove now on sale near Bagram. "Unclassified" hard drives and memory sticks can yield equally important information, including personnel rosters, social security numbers, phone listings, recall rosters, billeting assignments--even training and operational schedules for local units. Analyzed as a whole, such information can provide valuable insights into force levels, rotation patterns, and projected operations--data that would make it easier for the terrorists to avoid Allied attacks, while (conversely) improving their ability to strike at us.
We need to find out who was supposed to be minding the security "store" at Bagram, and hold them accountable. This appears to be a snafu of the first magnitude.
A Man of Great Moral Courage
It's a given; defense attorneys will say--or do--almost anything to keep their clients out of jail, even when the evidence is overwhelmingly against them.
Consider the case of RAF Flight Surgeon Malcolm Kendall-Smith. Dr. Smith refused to deploy with his unit to Iraq in 2005, claiming that the British military presence in that country is illegal, and the war "is a crime." Not impressed, Kendall-Smith's superiors brought him up on charges of disobeying orders, and refusing to prepare and train for deployment. Yesterday, a court-martial panel found him guilty on five counts, and sentenced him to eight months in the brig.
In closing arguments, Kendall-Smith's attorney (Phillip Sapsford) made an impassioned plea for his client (and his refusal to serve), describing the flight surgeon as a "man of great moral courage." However, the court wasn't impressed by that tactic; the judge ruled that the British military presence in Iraq is legal, and that members of the court martial panel should ignore the morality arguments of Kendall-Smith and his attorney.
A tip of the hat to that British military judge and the RAF officers who sat in judgment of Dr. Kendall-Smith--they certainly reached the correct verdict. The RAF flight surgeon is no moral titan--a gutless coward with a medical degree would seem to be a far more approprite description. In southern Iraq, Kendall-Smith would actually face far fewer hazards than his American colleagues in central Iraq; the Air Force-run hospital at Balad Air Base is within range of enemy mortars, yet the medical staff continues to provide world-class medical care for wounded Americans and Iraqis alike. The hospital was recently featured in an excellent Los Angeles Times series on the care of combat casualties in Iraq. Reading those articles, it was clear that the doctors and other medical specialists at Balad honor their professional oaths by put patient care ahead of politics--a priority that Kendall-Smith can't seem to grasp.
Kendall-Smith also pales in comparison to Lt Cmdr Rich Jadick, a Navy doctor who led a medical team during the Battle for Fallujah in 2004. Braving intense enemy fire, Dr. Jadick and his corpsmen helped save the lives of more than wounded 50 Marines. For his efforts, Jadick became the first military doctor with win a Bronze Star with a "V" Device (for Valor) during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Read the article on Dr. Jadick, and decide which doctor truly is a man of courage.
Dr. Kendall-Smith is a disgrace to both his profession and his uniform. When he gets out of jail, perhaps he'll move on to a more fitting position, such as staff medic at Cindy Sheehan's "Camp Casey," where he can tend to the other whack jobs who deliberately confuse morality with partisan politics.
Consider the case of RAF Flight Surgeon Malcolm Kendall-Smith. Dr. Smith refused to deploy with his unit to Iraq in 2005, claiming that the British military presence in that country is illegal, and the war "is a crime." Not impressed, Kendall-Smith's superiors brought him up on charges of disobeying orders, and refusing to prepare and train for deployment. Yesterday, a court-martial panel found him guilty on five counts, and sentenced him to eight months in the brig.
In closing arguments, Kendall-Smith's attorney (Phillip Sapsford) made an impassioned plea for his client (and his refusal to serve), describing the flight surgeon as a "man of great moral courage." However, the court wasn't impressed by that tactic; the judge ruled that the British military presence in Iraq is legal, and that members of the court martial panel should ignore the morality arguments of Kendall-Smith and his attorney.
A tip of the hat to that British military judge and the RAF officers who sat in judgment of Dr. Kendall-Smith--they certainly reached the correct verdict. The RAF flight surgeon is no moral titan--a gutless coward with a medical degree would seem to be a far more approprite description. In southern Iraq, Kendall-Smith would actually face far fewer hazards than his American colleagues in central Iraq; the Air Force-run hospital at Balad Air Base is within range of enemy mortars, yet the medical staff continues to provide world-class medical care for wounded Americans and Iraqis alike. The hospital was recently featured in an excellent Los Angeles Times series on the care of combat casualties in Iraq. Reading those articles, it was clear that the doctors and other medical specialists at Balad honor their professional oaths by put patient care ahead of politics--a priority that Kendall-Smith can't seem to grasp.
Kendall-Smith also pales in comparison to Lt Cmdr Rich Jadick, a Navy doctor who led a medical team during the Battle for Fallujah in 2004. Braving intense enemy fire, Dr. Jadick and his corpsmen helped save the lives of more than wounded 50 Marines. For his efforts, Jadick became the first military doctor with win a Bronze Star with a "V" Device (for Valor) during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Read the article on Dr. Jadick, and decide which doctor truly is a man of courage.
Dr. Kendall-Smith is a disgrace to both his profession and his uniform. When he gets out of jail, perhaps he'll move on to a more fitting position, such as staff medic at Cindy Sheehan's "Camp Casey," where he can tend to the other whack jobs who deliberately confuse morality with partisan politics.
Wednesday, April 12, 2006
A Page Out of Buck Rogers
Somehow, I missed this report when it aired on Fox News a few days ago. Israeli scientists have developed a new system that provides added protection against rocket-propelled grenades and anti-tank missiles, by literally creating an invisible, defensive "shield" around their vehicles. RPGs are the second-leading killer of U.S. troops in Iraq, and according to correspondent Mike Tobin, the Pengaton is planning a combat test of system in the near future. Watch the video. The countermeasure system literally detects--and disables--an RPG in flight. Fascinating stuff.
Hat tip: Roger L. Simon.
Hat tip: Roger L. Simon.
A Death in Memphis
nless you're from Memphis or the Mid-South region, you've probably never heard of Logan Young. Until a couple of years ago, Mr. Young was best known as the local Pepsi-Cola bottler, and the original owner of the city's USFL team, which played in the early 1980s.
But more recently, Logan Young became synonmyous with the seamy underside of college football, where rich alumni and supporters provide cash and other gifts, to lure talented players to their school. Last year, Mr. Young was convicted on federal racketeering and money laundering charges, stemming from his role in a 2000 recruiting scandal involving the University of Alabama. According to media reports and court testimony, Young paid more than $150,000 to a Memphis high school football coach, Lynn Lang. In return, Lang persuaded his star player, defensive tackle Albert Means, to sign with the Crimson Tide--the school that counted Logan Young as an influential booster and donor to the football program. Ironically, Means and his family never received any money. After a year in Tuscaloosa, Means transferred to the University of Memphis, where he finished his playing career.
On Tuesday, Logan Young was found dead in his Memphis home, the apparent victim of foul play. Police haven't ruled the death a homicide, but there were signs of a struggle and "lots of blood," according to one detective. Young had been sentenced to six months in jail by a federal judge, but remained free so he could undergo a kidney transplant. Police have not named any suspects in connection with Young's death, although his son (Logan Young III) was interviewed shortly after the father's body was found.
If money is the mother's milk of politics, then the same rule applies to college football. Officially, it's still a game played by amateurs, but "pay for play" has long been an integral part of big-time programs. Talk to anyone who's been around the game for a while, and you'll discover that almost everyone cheats; "special" players get cash, cars and more in exchange for signing with the right school and delivering on the gridiron. The Young case was unique in that it is one of the few times that a major booster has been caught with the checkbook in his hands, and actually punished for his misdeeds.
Who would want Mr. Young dead? Beyond his son (who has professed his innocence), the list of other, potential suspects is long. The Alabama recruiting scandal wrecked lives and careers, and there are signs that someone (or perhaps a group of individuals) want the episode to end, once and for all. Before Logan Young was found dead on Tuesday, an attorney representing two Alabama coaches implicated in the scandal was attacked, and key documents were stolen from him. The attorney (who survived the attack) was preparing a lawsuit on behalf of the disgraced coaches against the NCAA.
There's also lingering suspicion that others could be called to justice in the scandal. The grand jury that indicted Logan Young remained empaneled well after the original indictments were handed down. There was also talk that Mr. Young was cooperating with investigators after his conviction. That prospect alone might have motivate someone to silence Logan Young--permanently.
In another ironic twist, reports in various media outlets indicate that Mr. Young never actually attended the University of Alabama. But he eagerly cast his lot with the Crimson Tide, and was welcomed on campus as a well-heeled donor--until that federal grand jury became interested in his activities. It's just a hunch, but I'm guessing that the when the Tide opens its 2006 football season, there won't be a moment of silence in Bryant-Denny Stadium for Logan Young.
But more recently, Logan Young became synonmyous with the seamy underside of college football, where rich alumni and supporters provide cash and other gifts, to lure talented players to their school. Last year, Mr. Young was convicted on federal racketeering and money laundering charges, stemming from his role in a 2000 recruiting scandal involving the University of Alabama. According to media reports and court testimony, Young paid more than $150,000 to a Memphis high school football coach, Lynn Lang. In return, Lang persuaded his star player, defensive tackle Albert Means, to sign with the Crimson Tide--the school that counted Logan Young as an influential booster and donor to the football program. Ironically, Means and his family never received any money. After a year in Tuscaloosa, Means transferred to the University of Memphis, where he finished his playing career.
On Tuesday, Logan Young was found dead in his Memphis home, the apparent victim of foul play. Police haven't ruled the death a homicide, but there were signs of a struggle and "lots of blood," according to one detective. Young had been sentenced to six months in jail by a federal judge, but remained free so he could undergo a kidney transplant. Police have not named any suspects in connection with Young's death, although his son (Logan Young III) was interviewed shortly after the father's body was found.
If money is the mother's milk of politics, then the same rule applies to college football. Officially, it's still a game played by amateurs, but "pay for play" has long been an integral part of big-time programs. Talk to anyone who's been around the game for a while, and you'll discover that almost everyone cheats; "special" players get cash, cars and more in exchange for signing with the right school and delivering on the gridiron. The Young case was unique in that it is one of the few times that a major booster has been caught with the checkbook in his hands, and actually punished for his misdeeds.
Who would want Mr. Young dead? Beyond his son (who has professed his innocence), the list of other, potential suspects is long. The Alabama recruiting scandal wrecked lives and careers, and there are signs that someone (or perhaps a group of individuals) want the episode to end, once and for all. Before Logan Young was found dead on Tuesday, an attorney representing two Alabama coaches implicated in the scandal was attacked, and key documents were stolen from him. The attorney (who survived the attack) was preparing a lawsuit on behalf of the disgraced coaches against the NCAA.
There's also lingering suspicion that others could be called to justice in the scandal. The grand jury that indicted Logan Young remained empaneled well after the original indictments were handed down. There was also talk that Mr. Young was cooperating with investigators after his conviction. That prospect alone might have motivate someone to silence Logan Young--permanently.
In another ironic twist, reports in various media outlets indicate that Mr. Young never actually attended the University of Alabama. But he eagerly cast his lot with the Crimson Tide, and was welcomed on campus as a well-heeled donor--until that federal grand jury became interested in his activities. It's just a hunch, but I'm guessing that the when the Tide opens its 2006 football season, there won't be a moment of silence in Bryant-Denny Stadium for Logan Young.
Time for Action
One day after Iran announced that it had succeeded in enriching uranium, Secretary of State Condolezza Rice announced that it is "time for action" on the Iranian nuclear issue.
Based on this AP account, Secretary Rice is urging more diplomatic action, beginning with Friday's visit to Tehran by IAEA Director General, Mohammed El-Baradei. Mr. Baradei is scheduled to hold talks with Iranian officials, in advance of an IAEA status report on Iran, due to the U.N. Security Council on 28 April.
As for what the UNSC should do, Secretary Rice said the UN body should consider "strong steps" to persuade Iran to change course. She refused to speculate as to what those steps might be, or what the U.S. might be willing to support. There has been speculation in the past that the UNSC might impose economic and political sanctions against Iran, but Russian and Chinese officials have expressed reservations about such measures. It doesn't take a member of the diplomatic press corps to figure out that Moscow and Beijing would likely veto any punitive sactions against Tehran. That's one reason the Iranians publicized their successful enrichment effort--they feel that have nothing to fear from a world community that is split over the nuclear issue.
In the game of nuclear poker, Iran has been playing a winning hand. By signing huge energy and military contracts with the Russians and Chinese, the Iranians bought themselves an almost-certain veto in the Security Council, which much approve any sactions. Tehran has also guessed--correctly--that the Europeans can be cowed on this issue, as evidenced by the P.C. responses to the Islamic riots in France a few months ago, and the more recent Danish cartoon controversy. With the exception of Britain, there isn't a single European military willing to sign on for action against Iran, making the threat much more defined, at least from Tehran's perspective.
That means (essentially) that the task of interdicting Iran's nuclear program will essentially be an American enterprise--a proposition that Tehran is quite willing to accept. Iran believes it can survive a U.S. bombing campaign, while unleashing other elements--including terrorist attacks--that will bloody the U.S., and further erode support for the military effort. Indeed, there are some elements in the Tehran government that believe the Iraq experience has left the U.S. unable to attack Iran, at least from the perspectives of public opinion and the upcoming congressional elections. As evidenced by the recent Israeli elections, Iran judges that a democracy is less likely to attack during a political campaign. With the U.S. election only seven months away, the Iranians may sense a window of opportunity, allowing them to pursue their nuclear ambitions, with less chance of an American attack.
Such an assessment may be faulty, however. President Bush has long demonstrated a willingness to ignore poll numbers, and pursue policies that he deems necessary, but are politically unpopular. But the prospect of losing control of one (or both) houses of Congress untimately affects the decision-making process, no matter how much a President wants to stick to his agenda. Mr. Bush's recent pandering to the illegal immigrant lobby proves that he's willing (in some cases) to accept a higher security risk, in exchange for a few more GOP votes. Already burdened by an unpopular (though necessary) war in Iraq--and with his party facing a tight election in the fall--President Bush may decide to defer any military action against Iran, giving more time for diplomacy (and more time for the mullahs to perfect their bomb).
Which brings us back to Secretary Rice and the call for action against Iran. She's certainly saying the right thing, but (so far) there's no sign of forceful measures to back up the rhetoric. Waiting for the UN to act is foolhardy; the UNSC (and the Europeans) seem anxious only to kick the issue down the road, while sustaining ineffective diplomatic efforts that have only aided Iran. The United States has the willpower (and military might) to break the impasse, but that would require an exceptional act of political and diplomatic courage. While Mr. Bush has demonstrated those qualities before, the realities of domestic politics--and the relentless drumbeat of negative news from Iraq--make it mighty tempting to join the rock-kicking brigade. The time for action has arrived, but so far, no one seems willing to risk anything more that diplomatic talks, and sharply-worded statements.
These must be heady days in Tehran.
Based on this AP account, Secretary Rice is urging more diplomatic action, beginning with Friday's visit to Tehran by IAEA Director General, Mohammed El-Baradei. Mr. Baradei is scheduled to hold talks with Iranian officials, in advance of an IAEA status report on Iran, due to the U.N. Security Council on 28 April.
As for what the UNSC should do, Secretary Rice said the UN body should consider "strong steps" to persuade Iran to change course. She refused to speculate as to what those steps might be, or what the U.S. might be willing to support. There has been speculation in the past that the UNSC might impose economic and political sanctions against Iran, but Russian and Chinese officials have expressed reservations about such measures. It doesn't take a member of the diplomatic press corps to figure out that Moscow and Beijing would likely veto any punitive sactions against Tehran. That's one reason the Iranians publicized their successful enrichment effort--they feel that have nothing to fear from a world community that is split over the nuclear issue.
In the game of nuclear poker, Iran has been playing a winning hand. By signing huge energy and military contracts with the Russians and Chinese, the Iranians bought themselves an almost-certain veto in the Security Council, which much approve any sactions. Tehran has also guessed--correctly--that the Europeans can be cowed on this issue, as evidenced by the P.C. responses to the Islamic riots in France a few months ago, and the more recent Danish cartoon controversy. With the exception of Britain, there isn't a single European military willing to sign on for action against Iran, making the threat much more defined, at least from Tehran's perspective.
That means (essentially) that the task of interdicting Iran's nuclear program will essentially be an American enterprise--a proposition that Tehran is quite willing to accept. Iran believes it can survive a U.S. bombing campaign, while unleashing other elements--including terrorist attacks--that will bloody the U.S., and further erode support for the military effort. Indeed, there are some elements in the Tehran government that believe the Iraq experience has left the U.S. unable to attack Iran, at least from the perspectives of public opinion and the upcoming congressional elections. As evidenced by the recent Israeli elections, Iran judges that a democracy is less likely to attack during a political campaign. With the U.S. election only seven months away, the Iranians may sense a window of opportunity, allowing them to pursue their nuclear ambitions, with less chance of an American attack.
Such an assessment may be faulty, however. President Bush has long demonstrated a willingness to ignore poll numbers, and pursue policies that he deems necessary, but are politically unpopular. But the prospect of losing control of one (or both) houses of Congress untimately affects the decision-making process, no matter how much a President wants to stick to his agenda. Mr. Bush's recent pandering to the illegal immigrant lobby proves that he's willing (in some cases) to accept a higher security risk, in exchange for a few more GOP votes. Already burdened by an unpopular (though necessary) war in Iraq--and with his party facing a tight election in the fall--President Bush may decide to defer any military action against Iran, giving more time for diplomacy (and more time for the mullahs to perfect their bomb).
Which brings us back to Secretary Rice and the call for action against Iran. She's certainly saying the right thing, but (so far) there's no sign of forceful measures to back up the rhetoric. Waiting for the UN to act is foolhardy; the UNSC (and the Europeans) seem anxious only to kick the issue down the road, while sustaining ineffective diplomatic efforts that have only aided Iran. The United States has the willpower (and military might) to break the impasse, but that would require an exceptional act of political and diplomatic courage. While Mr. Bush has demonstrated those qualities before, the realities of domestic politics--and the relentless drumbeat of negative news from Iraq--make it mighty tempting to join the rock-kicking brigade. The time for action has arrived, but so far, no one seems willing to risk anything more that diplomatic talks, and sharply-worded statements.
These must be heady days in Tehran.
Tuesday, April 11, 2006
Lost in Translation
Now we know why Ted Kennedy had to use a Spanish translator during yesterday's pandering-to-the illegals rally in D.C. As an alert caller to El Rushbo reminded us this afternoon, Teddy was once suspended from Harvard for cheating on a Spanish exam, or more precisely, trying to convince another undergrad to take the test for him.
Rumor has it that he flunked driver's ed in high school, too.
Rumor has it that he flunked driver's ed in high school, too.
Today's Essential Reading
This one goes beyond the ordinary reading assignments, occasionally offered in this space. Today's required read is from the great Mark Steyn in the latest issue of City Journal. The first line of his essay "Facing Down Iran," says it all.
Newt Gets It Wrong
Personal judgment and discretionary flaws aside, Newt Gingrich may be the most brillant man to ever serve as Speaker of the House. I once sat in an audience at Maxwell AFB (a lone Major in the back of a room filled with Colonels and flag officers) as Mr. Gingrich expounded on the subject of change in the 21st Century. It was a verbal and intellectual tour-de-force; he spoke for more than two hours (without notes) on topics ranging from nuclear proliferation to global economic trends; throughout the presentation, he demonstrated a grasp of economic, political and technical knowledge that was truly impressive.
However, even great minds get it wrong from time to time, and Newt Gingrich is no exception. The former speaker made some misguided comments in South Dakota yesterday, describing the U.S. occupation of Iraq as a "terrible mistake," and suggesting that the bulk of our troops be withdrawn from that country, leaving behind a "small force," just as we did in post-war Germany and Korea.
Gingrich made the comments during a Q-and-A session that followed his speech at the University of South Dakota. Perhaps he was speaking off the cuff, with little regard for the illogical nature of his remarks. Whatever the reason, Mr. Gingrich's remarks are strangely asinine, and unworthy of a serious observer of the international scene.
Consider his notion that the U.S. should have largely vacated Iraq in the summer of 2003. Without a government. Without a constitution. Without any organized security forces. With a broken economy. Critics contend that today's Iraq is essentially a mess, but the domestic situation would have far worse if the U.S. had simply deposed Saddam, then largely abandoned Iraq--as Gingrich suggested. Under that scenario, the "best case" would have been a re-emergence of the Baathists, the resturn of autocratic rule under a Saddam clone, and a gradual resumption of WMD programs. A worst case would have witnessed a quick devolution into civil war and (eventually) a federated Iraq, with Tehran pulling the strings of the Shiite "republic" that would emerge in the south.
Gingrich's "vision" of an Iraq left for the Iraqis--without the tools to "make it work"--is a recipe for chaos and violence on a scale that is unimaginable. Colin Powell was right; when we invaded Iraq and ejected Saddam, we assumed an obligation to get the country back on its feet--a process that is difficult, somewhat bloody, and altogether necessary. We certainly didn't abandon Germany and Japan after WWII; successive administrations showed great patience while those nations developed democratic institutions and a modern economy. Iraq has the ability to complete a similar transition, but that process will be measured in years, not months. It is not a task for the faint of heart, a group that Mr. Gingrich has apparently joined.
Equally laughable is Gingrich's plan to leave a "small force" behind. I'm not sure what his definition of "small" is, but the U.S. forces that still guard Germany, Japan and South Korea and not inconsequential. For example, the defense of the Korean peninsula still requires two wings of Air Force fighters and an entire an Army division--more than 30,000 personnel--with ready support from a Marine division in Okinawa and a Japan-based carrier battle group. As recently as the early 1990s, there was still an Army Corps in Germany (more than 60,000 troops), plus four Air Force wings and a huge support infrastructure. Even today--more than a decade after the end of the Cold War--there are still more than 30,000 U.S. troops in Germany, a sizeable force by any definition. Is Gingrich willing to make the same commitment for Iraq, to protect another country making the transition from totalitarianism to democracy?
Reading between the lines, it seems clear that Gingrich's remarks were aimed at the 2008 presidential race. Having left the House long before the invasion of Iraq, Gingrich can position himself as a candidate who would have waged a different war--something John Kerry tried to articulate as "fighting smarter." The American electorate didn't buy that argument in 2004, but Gingrich believes it could be a winner in 2008, attracting support from disgruntled neo-cons (call them the Fukuyama wing of the GOP) and Democrats to the right of Joe Lieberman.
As a potential basis for our policy in Iraq, Gingrich's ideas are clearly a non-starter, and I don't think they'll work as political strategy, either. Everyone's entitled to bad ideas, and Newt outlined a couple of real clunkers in his remarks in South Dakota.
However, even great minds get it wrong from time to time, and Newt Gingrich is no exception. The former speaker made some misguided comments in South Dakota yesterday, describing the U.S. occupation of Iraq as a "terrible mistake," and suggesting that the bulk of our troops be withdrawn from that country, leaving behind a "small force," just as we did in post-war Germany and Korea.
Gingrich made the comments during a Q-and-A session that followed his speech at the University of South Dakota. Perhaps he was speaking off the cuff, with little regard for the illogical nature of his remarks. Whatever the reason, Mr. Gingrich's remarks are strangely asinine, and unworthy of a serious observer of the international scene.
Consider his notion that the U.S. should have largely vacated Iraq in the summer of 2003. Without a government. Without a constitution. Without any organized security forces. With a broken economy. Critics contend that today's Iraq is essentially a mess, but the domestic situation would have far worse if the U.S. had simply deposed Saddam, then largely abandoned Iraq--as Gingrich suggested. Under that scenario, the "best case" would have been a re-emergence of the Baathists, the resturn of autocratic rule under a Saddam clone, and a gradual resumption of WMD programs. A worst case would have witnessed a quick devolution into civil war and (eventually) a federated Iraq, with Tehran pulling the strings of the Shiite "republic" that would emerge in the south.
Gingrich's "vision" of an Iraq left for the Iraqis--without the tools to "make it work"--is a recipe for chaos and violence on a scale that is unimaginable. Colin Powell was right; when we invaded Iraq and ejected Saddam, we assumed an obligation to get the country back on its feet--a process that is difficult, somewhat bloody, and altogether necessary. We certainly didn't abandon Germany and Japan after WWII; successive administrations showed great patience while those nations developed democratic institutions and a modern economy. Iraq has the ability to complete a similar transition, but that process will be measured in years, not months. It is not a task for the faint of heart, a group that Mr. Gingrich has apparently joined.
Equally laughable is Gingrich's plan to leave a "small force" behind. I'm not sure what his definition of "small" is, but the U.S. forces that still guard Germany, Japan and South Korea and not inconsequential. For example, the defense of the Korean peninsula still requires two wings of Air Force fighters and an entire an Army division--more than 30,000 personnel--with ready support from a Marine division in Okinawa and a Japan-based carrier battle group. As recently as the early 1990s, there was still an Army Corps in Germany (more than 60,000 troops), plus four Air Force wings and a huge support infrastructure. Even today--more than a decade after the end of the Cold War--there are still more than 30,000 U.S. troops in Germany, a sizeable force by any definition. Is Gingrich willing to make the same commitment for Iraq, to protect another country making the transition from totalitarianism to democracy?
Reading between the lines, it seems clear that Gingrich's remarks were aimed at the 2008 presidential race. Having left the House long before the invasion of Iraq, Gingrich can position himself as a candidate who would have waged a different war--something John Kerry tried to articulate as "fighting smarter." The American electorate didn't buy that argument in 2004, but Gingrich believes it could be a winner in 2008, attracting support from disgruntled neo-cons (call them the Fukuyama wing of the GOP) and Democrats to the right of Joe Lieberman.
As a potential basis for our policy in Iraq, Gingrich's ideas are clearly a non-starter, and I don't think they'll work as political strategy, either. Everyone's entitled to bad ideas, and Newt outlined a couple of real clunkers in his remarks in South Dakota.
Monday, April 10, 2006
Strategic Calculus
The Washington-Based Nixon Center recently held a seminar on Iran, considering various options for dealing with the regime in Tehran, and its nuclear program. The World Tribune finally published a brief summary of the meeting today--better late than never, I suppose. A quick Google search revealed only sporadic press coverage of the event; the Washington Post, for example, completely ignored the event. Perhaps the prospect of writing about a center named for the paper's arch enemy is simply too much to bear.
According to the World Tribune, the Nixon Center's 23 March seminar featured some interesting observations on Iran's nuclear program, and the ability of the U.S. and Israel to interdict it. The bottom line, according to retired Colonel Patrick Lang (former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency's Middle East section) is that only the U.S. has the military power to conduct the sustained air campaign needed to disrupt Tehran's nuclear effort. He calculates that it would take at least "1,000" combat sorties to inflict sufficient damage on Iran's nuclear program to set the program back a few years. Lang emphasized that the goal of any military effort should be to significantly delay or disrupt Tehran's nuclear efforts, suggesting that it would be virtually impossible for airpower to permanently halt the program.
Regarding a preemptive Israeli attack, Lang observed that the Jewish state lacks the military resources to mount a sustained air campaign against Iran. That may be true, but his assessment of Israeli intentions is a bit off the mark, in a couple of respects. First, the Israelis believe they can inflict enough damage to disrupt the program by a few years--simply by targeting a handful of key facilities, with a relatively small strike package (say, less than 30 aircraft). Such a plan leaves little margin for error, but the Israelis believe they can be successful.
Other Israeli options--previously discussed in this blog--envision a commando attack accompanying the air strikes, increasing the risk for its military forces, but improving overall prospects for success. The IDF (Israeli Defense Forces) have invested heavily in developing a capability to strike Iran, primarily through the acquisition of the F-15I long-range strike fighter and the Jericho II medium range ballistic missile (MRBM). It would be a mistake for Tehran--or anyone else--to underestimate Israel's ability and willingness to target Iran's nuclear program. Lang (a former Army officer) is apparently out of his element in discussions about airpower; for example, he downplays the prospects of an Israeli airstrike because the Israeli Navy lacks aircraft carriers. Simply stated, the Israelis don't need a Nimitz-class carrier to hit Tehran; just a force of 20-30 F-15Is and F-16s, refueled in flight by KC-707 tankers. That force would be sufficient to hit key targets at Iran's four major nuclear facilities, and (if successful)inflict significant damage. The unknowns in that equation are (a) the number of covert nuclear sites, located away from the primary facilities, and the ability of the IAF to target deep underground complexes using JDAM.
Discussing U.S. capabilities, Colonel Lang seems to be on firmer ground. His estimated number of required sorties is certainly reasonable, if perhaps a bit low. He is also correct in noting that any campaign against Iran would put on strain on U.S. forces in Iraq, as well as American political and military initiatives throughout the Middle East. He also downplayed a potential ground invasion of Iran, saying that "no real army can be sustained by air transportation." That's an indirect slap at the Navy, hinting that our fleet would be unable to sustain navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. In reality, it would be Iran that would be hard-pressed to close the Strait. The U.S. could mount an invasion of Iran--the real problem is finding enough "boots," with much of the Army currently tied up in Iraq.
On the political front, Ray Takeyh, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, described the Iranian public as "apathetic," with no serious opposition groups that could engineer regime change from within. He described the central government in Iran as 'strong" and suggested that the theocratic regime will be around for some time to come.
Does any of this sound familiar? In the late 1980s, we were saying similar things about the former Soviet Union, particularly in regard to the supposed resilience and durability of the communist government. During those days, the conventional wisdom was "negotiate with the Soviets, they're here to stay." Twenty years later, a similar strain of though seems to be emerging on Iran. The military option is unthinkable (to some degree) and the regime seems impervious to change. We need to talk with the Iranians, not provoke them.
Thankfully, leaders like Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher saw beyond the Soviet facade, and chose a more direct approach, hastening the demise of communism in eastern Europe. In some ways, the menace posed by Islamic fascism sponsored by Iran is an even tougher challenge, but it is not insurmountable. We need to encourage domestic opposition groups, develop military options that are viable, and engage Iran on clear, unwavering terms. If we don't the terrorist cancer that originates in Tehran will continue to metastisize and grow, creating dire security implications far beyond the Persian Gulf. Unfortunately, the rhetoric expressed at the Nixon Center is reflective of increasingly timid thinking--and action--toward Iran, something that encourages (rather than discourages) the government in Tehran.
According to the World Tribune, the Nixon Center's 23 March seminar featured some interesting observations on Iran's nuclear program, and the ability of the U.S. and Israel to interdict it. The bottom line, according to retired Colonel Patrick Lang (former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency's Middle East section) is that only the U.S. has the military power to conduct the sustained air campaign needed to disrupt Tehran's nuclear effort. He calculates that it would take at least "1,000" combat sorties to inflict sufficient damage on Iran's nuclear program to set the program back a few years. Lang emphasized that the goal of any military effort should be to significantly delay or disrupt Tehran's nuclear efforts, suggesting that it would be virtually impossible for airpower to permanently halt the program.
Regarding a preemptive Israeli attack, Lang observed that the Jewish state lacks the military resources to mount a sustained air campaign against Iran. That may be true, but his assessment of Israeli intentions is a bit off the mark, in a couple of respects. First, the Israelis believe they can inflict enough damage to disrupt the program by a few years--simply by targeting a handful of key facilities, with a relatively small strike package (say, less than 30 aircraft). Such a plan leaves little margin for error, but the Israelis believe they can be successful.
Other Israeli options--previously discussed in this blog--envision a commando attack accompanying the air strikes, increasing the risk for its military forces, but improving overall prospects for success. The IDF (Israeli Defense Forces) have invested heavily in developing a capability to strike Iran, primarily through the acquisition of the F-15I long-range strike fighter and the Jericho II medium range ballistic missile (MRBM). It would be a mistake for Tehran--or anyone else--to underestimate Israel's ability and willingness to target Iran's nuclear program. Lang (a former Army officer) is apparently out of his element in discussions about airpower; for example, he downplays the prospects of an Israeli airstrike because the Israeli Navy lacks aircraft carriers. Simply stated, the Israelis don't need a Nimitz-class carrier to hit Tehran; just a force of 20-30 F-15Is and F-16s, refueled in flight by KC-707 tankers. That force would be sufficient to hit key targets at Iran's four major nuclear facilities, and (if successful)inflict significant damage. The unknowns in that equation are (a) the number of covert nuclear sites, located away from the primary facilities, and the ability of the IAF to target deep underground complexes using JDAM.
Discussing U.S. capabilities, Colonel Lang seems to be on firmer ground. His estimated number of required sorties is certainly reasonable, if perhaps a bit low. He is also correct in noting that any campaign against Iran would put on strain on U.S. forces in Iraq, as well as American political and military initiatives throughout the Middle East. He also downplayed a potential ground invasion of Iran, saying that "no real army can be sustained by air transportation." That's an indirect slap at the Navy, hinting that our fleet would be unable to sustain navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. In reality, it would be Iran that would be hard-pressed to close the Strait. The U.S. could mount an invasion of Iran--the real problem is finding enough "boots," with much of the Army currently tied up in Iraq.
On the political front, Ray Takeyh, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, described the Iranian public as "apathetic," with no serious opposition groups that could engineer regime change from within. He described the central government in Iran as 'strong" and suggested that the theocratic regime will be around for some time to come.
Does any of this sound familiar? In the late 1980s, we were saying similar things about the former Soviet Union, particularly in regard to the supposed resilience and durability of the communist government. During those days, the conventional wisdom was "negotiate with the Soviets, they're here to stay." Twenty years later, a similar strain of though seems to be emerging on Iran. The military option is unthinkable (to some degree) and the regime seems impervious to change. We need to talk with the Iranians, not provoke them.
Thankfully, leaders like Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher saw beyond the Soviet facade, and chose a more direct approach, hastening the demise of communism in eastern Europe. In some ways, the menace posed by Islamic fascism sponsored by Iran is an even tougher challenge, but it is not insurmountable. We need to encourage domestic opposition groups, develop military options that are viable, and engage Iran on clear, unwavering terms. If we don't the terrorist cancer that originates in Tehran will continue to metastisize and grow, creating dire security implications far beyond the Persian Gulf. Unfortunately, the rhetoric expressed at the Nixon Center is reflective of increasingly timid thinking--and action--toward Iran, something that encourages (rather than discourages) the government in Tehran.
Today's Reading Assignment
Gateway Pundit has the best summary I've seen on the circumstances behind President Bush's decision to declassify the 2003 National Intelligence Summary on Iraq. As you'll recall, the information was provided to The New York Times after former Ambassador Joe Wilson began spouting lies about his infamous trip to Niger, the person who recommended him for that mission, and Iraq's potential interest in yellowcake from that African country.
Against that backdrop, Mr. Bush decided to defend himself by declassifying intelligence information on the subject. Note the word "declassify." As Vice President Cheney (and others) have noted, the President and V-P have the authority to declassify and release sensitive information. Any suggestion that release of the NIE (by then VP Chief of Staff Scooter Libby) was a classified "leak" is completely false.
As Gateway Pundit reminds us, the NYT, WaPo and other media outlets don't normally have a problem with leaks; indeed, they've feasted on them for years. But when a report or estimate is declassified to debunk claims that are demonstrably false--and undercut the credibility of a left-wing icon--well, that's a different matter altogether. Ditto for a President using that information to defend his decision to take a nation to war.
As a former spook, I still have great reservations about the declassification and release of sensitive information. But there is no doubt (legally) that the President had the right to release the NIE, and using the report to knock down Joe Wilson's lies is a strong justification for declassification. Unfortunately, the release of the Iraq NIE is yet another example of "how the game is played" in Washington, and will inspire future administrations to declassify sensitive data, for more partisan reasons. Democracy will always demand a surprising amount of secrecy, but you can't tell that to the folks inside the beltway.
Hat tip: Powerline.
Against that backdrop, Mr. Bush decided to defend himself by declassifying intelligence information on the subject. Note the word "declassify." As Vice President Cheney (and others) have noted, the President and V-P have the authority to declassify and release sensitive information. Any suggestion that release of the NIE (by then VP Chief of Staff Scooter Libby) was a classified "leak" is completely false.
As Gateway Pundit reminds us, the NYT, WaPo and other media outlets don't normally have a problem with leaks; indeed, they've feasted on them for years. But when a report or estimate is declassified to debunk claims that are demonstrably false--and undercut the credibility of a left-wing icon--well, that's a different matter altogether. Ditto for a President using that information to defend his decision to take a nation to war.
As a former spook, I still have great reservations about the declassification and release of sensitive information. But there is no doubt (legally) that the President had the right to release the NIE, and using the report to knock down Joe Wilson's lies is a strong justification for declassification. Unfortunately, the release of the Iraq NIE is yet another example of "how the game is played" in Washington, and will inspire future administrations to declassify sensitive data, for more partisan reasons. Democracy will always demand a surprising amount of secrecy, but you can't tell that to the folks inside the beltway.
Hat tip: Powerline.
Sunday, April 09, 2006
Contingency Planning
Over the course of some 5,000 words, Sunday's Washington Post manages to confirm what most of us already know--the U.S. is exploring various military options that could be used against Iran.
According to the Post, the use of military force does not appear imminent. However, the Bush Administration and Pentagon planners are reportedly considering at least two options--if diplomacy fails. These options are described as a limited air and missile strike, and a more prolonged, intense air campaign, reminiscent of Operation Allied Force in 1999.
Despite careful caveats that a military strike may be months off--if it ever gets the green light--the tone of the article is familiar and predictable. A raft for former defense and intelligence officials express misgivings about the strike, warning that it might provide only a minor setback for Iran's nuclear program, and galvanize anti-American sentiment in the Muslim world.
Missing from all of this is a seminal question: what if diplomatic efforts with Iran fail--a prospect that seems increasingly likely. Then what? Do we simply allow Tehran to build a nuclear arsenal, then share the technology with other rogue states (I'm sure Bashir Assad would like a bomb of his own) and terrorist organizations? That's the real bottom line in this equation, but an issue the Post carefully avoids in its reporting. Precisely when should the U.S. and its allies utilize the military option? If the alternative--a nuclear-armed Iran--is untenable for both the Gulf Region the west (and indeed it is), then it is prudent to explore potential military options and update contingency plans for the Iran scenario.
Judging from the spate of recent articles on "military options against Iran," you'd think the Pentagon had only recently begun examining the issue. The issue--as we've patiently explained before in this space--is that the U.S. military has standing operations plans (or OPlans) for a variety of potential threats and adversaries, including Iran. Whatever is happening in the Pentagon (and at CENTCOM HQ) right now is merely a continuation of a planning process that has been going on for decades. Plans are routinely reviewed and updated, reflecting changes in the geopolitical situation, enemy defensive improvements and our own military capabilities, among other considerations.
In support of the "military force won't work" theme, the Post quotes Retired Air Force Colonel Sam Gardiner, a professor at the National Defense University in Washington. According to Colonel Gardiner, he recently participated in an Iran wargame, and the military option "didn't work." But some crucial elements and caveats are missing from that assessment. What was the scenario--a limited strike against the nuclear facilities, a prolonged air campaign, or an actual invasion of Iran? Likewise, what were the strategic objectives of the game--destruction of the nuclear program, delay of Iran's nuclear efforts, regime change, or a total collapse of Tehran's theocratic government. Without this information, it is impossible to guage the context of Colonel Gardiner's remarks.
For the record, I worked with Colonel Gardiner (on a recurring basis) during various AF wargames in the late 1990s. As a wargamer, strategist and instructor, Colonel Gardiner has few peers and his assessment has definite credibility. But in wargaming, the context and objectives are absolutely vital in understanding and assessing the outcome. And quite predictably, those elements are missing from the Post's report. I'm guessing that the WaPo reporting team didn't have the good sense to ask those essential questions, or (if they did), Colonel Gardiner's response might have diluted the impact of his quote, so that information never made its way into print. Never let context get in the way of a good, closing quote.
However, the Post is a model of journalistic accuracy compared to Sy Hersh's latest offering in the New Yorker. As you've probably heard, Mr. Hersh is out with an article, claiming that the U.S. is considering the use of nuclear "bunker-buster" bombs against Iran's underground nuclear facilities. Actually, the "bunker-buster" element is only part of lengthy article, outlining a debate within military and political circles over the Iran issue.
Hersh's article is heavily based on anonmyous sources, so it's hard to know where this information is coming from, and how reliable it might be. Reading between the lines, however, it is easy to surmise that Hersh got much of his information from disaffected, senior career civil servants (current and former), working in both the Pentagon and the CIA. That group--particularly the Langley branch--has long opposed the Bush Administration and its conduct of foreign policy, so it's not surprising that they're "concerned" about our supposed head-long rush to war with Iran.
At the risk of bursting Mr. Hersh's bubble, I can report that the military has long had "nuclear" options for Iran, just as it has nuclear targeting plans for other potential adversaries. As with conventional war plans, the nuclear options are continuously updated and reviewed, reflecting changes in the target sets and our employment capabilities. The discovery of new nuclear facilities--or better information on sites already identified--could easily prompt the kind of targeting update that Mr. Hersh describes. Instead, Hersh suggests that the U.S. may be considering some sort of pre-emptive nuclear strike, to eliminate key, hardened underground facilities in Iran. While that option is possible in a post 9-11 world, I can say (as a former nuclear targeteer), that such a scenario seems unlikely. From my perspetcive, a U.S. nuclear strike against Iran would only follow a WMD attack against an American city (or U.S. interests overseas) that was staged by Tehran's military forces, or by Iranian proxies--with clear, unambiguous linkage to the mullahs in Iran. Under those circumstances, it would be difficult for an American President to avoid the nuclear option.
One final note: Mr. Hersh's credibility on national security issues is hardly above reproach, and that fact is worth remembering as you read his Iran piece. About two years ago, Hersh was among the first to break the Abu Ghraib prison abuse story. In his recent book on the Iraq War (Chain of Command), he hinted darkly that the scandal would reach the highest levels of the Pentagon and the White House. However, subsequent military investigations have revealed that the abuse at the prison was confined to a group of lower-ranking, poorly-led soldiers NCOs, working the night shift. We'll see if Mr. Hersh's crystal ball is any more accurate in forecasting U.S. intentions towards Iran.
According to the Post, the use of military force does not appear imminent. However, the Bush Administration and Pentagon planners are reportedly considering at least two options--if diplomacy fails. These options are described as a limited air and missile strike, and a more prolonged, intense air campaign, reminiscent of Operation Allied Force in 1999.
Despite careful caveats that a military strike may be months off--if it ever gets the green light--the tone of the article is familiar and predictable. A raft for former defense and intelligence officials express misgivings about the strike, warning that it might provide only a minor setback for Iran's nuclear program, and galvanize anti-American sentiment in the Muslim world.
Missing from all of this is a seminal question: what if diplomatic efforts with Iran fail--a prospect that seems increasingly likely. Then what? Do we simply allow Tehran to build a nuclear arsenal, then share the technology with other rogue states (I'm sure Bashir Assad would like a bomb of his own) and terrorist organizations? That's the real bottom line in this equation, but an issue the Post carefully avoids in its reporting. Precisely when should the U.S. and its allies utilize the military option? If the alternative--a nuclear-armed Iran--is untenable for both the Gulf Region the west (and indeed it is), then it is prudent to explore potential military options and update contingency plans for the Iran scenario.
Judging from the spate of recent articles on "military options against Iran," you'd think the Pentagon had only recently begun examining the issue. The issue--as we've patiently explained before in this space--is that the U.S. military has standing operations plans (or OPlans) for a variety of potential threats and adversaries, including Iran. Whatever is happening in the Pentagon (and at CENTCOM HQ) right now is merely a continuation of a planning process that has been going on for decades. Plans are routinely reviewed and updated, reflecting changes in the geopolitical situation, enemy defensive improvements and our own military capabilities, among other considerations.
In support of the "military force won't work" theme, the Post quotes Retired Air Force Colonel Sam Gardiner, a professor at the National Defense University in Washington. According to Colonel Gardiner, he recently participated in an Iran wargame, and the military option "didn't work." But some crucial elements and caveats are missing from that assessment. What was the scenario--a limited strike against the nuclear facilities, a prolonged air campaign, or an actual invasion of Iran? Likewise, what were the strategic objectives of the game--destruction of the nuclear program, delay of Iran's nuclear efforts, regime change, or a total collapse of Tehran's theocratic government. Without this information, it is impossible to guage the context of Colonel Gardiner's remarks.
For the record, I worked with Colonel Gardiner (on a recurring basis) during various AF wargames in the late 1990s. As a wargamer, strategist and instructor, Colonel Gardiner has few peers and his assessment has definite credibility. But in wargaming, the context and objectives are absolutely vital in understanding and assessing the outcome. And quite predictably, those elements are missing from the Post's report. I'm guessing that the WaPo reporting team didn't have the good sense to ask those essential questions, or (if they did), Colonel Gardiner's response might have diluted the impact of his quote, so that information never made its way into print. Never let context get in the way of a good, closing quote.
However, the Post is a model of journalistic accuracy compared to Sy Hersh's latest offering in the New Yorker. As you've probably heard, Mr. Hersh is out with an article, claiming that the U.S. is considering the use of nuclear "bunker-buster" bombs against Iran's underground nuclear facilities. Actually, the "bunker-buster" element is only part of lengthy article, outlining a debate within military and political circles over the Iran issue.
Hersh's article is heavily based on anonmyous sources, so it's hard to know where this information is coming from, and how reliable it might be. Reading between the lines, however, it is easy to surmise that Hersh got much of his information from disaffected, senior career civil servants (current and former), working in both the Pentagon and the CIA. That group--particularly the Langley branch--has long opposed the Bush Administration and its conduct of foreign policy, so it's not surprising that they're "concerned" about our supposed head-long rush to war with Iran.
At the risk of bursting Mr. Hersh's bubble, I can report that the military has long had "nuclear" options for Iran, just as it has nuclear targeting plans for other potential adversaries. As with conventional war plans, the nuclear options are continuously updated and reviewed, reflecting changes in the target sets and our employment capabilities. The discovery of new nuclear facilities--or better information on sites already identified--could easily prompt the kind of targeting update that Mr. Hersh describes. Instead, Hersh suggests that the U.S. may be considering some sort of pre-emptive nuclear strike, to eliminate key, hardened underground facilities in Iran. While that option is possible in a post 9-11 world, I can say (as a former nuclear targeteer), that such a scenario seems unlikely. From my perspetcive, a U.S. nuclear strike against Iran would only follow a WMD attack against an American city (or U.S. interests overseas) that was staged by Tehran's military forces, or by Iranian proxies--with clear, unambiguous linkage to the mullahs in Iran. Under those circumstances, it would be difficult for an American President to avoid the nuclear option.
One final note: Mr. Hersh's credibility on national security issues is hardly above reproach, and that fact is worth remembering as you read his Iran piece. About two years ago, Hersh was among the first to break the Abu Ghraib prison abuse story. In his recent book on the Iraq War (Chain of Command), he hinted darkly that the scandal would reach the highest levels of the Pentagon and the White House. However, subsequent military investigations have revealed that the abuse at the prison was confined to a group of lower-ranking, poorly-led soldiers NCOs, working the night shift. We'll see if Mr. Hersh's crystal ball is any more accurate in forecasting U.S. intentions towards Iran.
Friday, April 07, 2006
I Hate to Disappoint the Folks in College Station..
Recently, there's been some speculation on a Texas A&M alumni board that your humble correspondent is a former Aggie. In the spirit of disclosure, I must report tell you that I never attended your hallowed institution, although I am a great admirer of both A&M and its traditions.
And no, I didn't go to that "school in Austin," either.
And no, I didn't go to that "school in Austin," either.
If Cynthia McKinney Had Any...
decency, self-respect, or integrity, she'd resign from Congress. Her conduct during and after that altercation with a Capitol Hill police officer has been beneath contempt. However, I'm guessing that the "cutest little communist in Congress" (as Neal Boortz once described her) will soldier on, hoping the scandal eventually dissipates.
Meanwhile, Victor Davis Hanson recounts a similar incident at the U.S. Naval Academy a few years back. The Academy Superintendent, a three-star Navy admiral, tried to enter the installation without his military ID. A young Marine guard--doing his job--refused. There was an altercation. The admiral subsequently admitted that he might have touched the guard. A subsequent investigation cleared the Marine. The admiral resigned his post, and retired from the service.
That incident reminds me of an old Air Force story--one that I've never been able to fully verify. While it may be an urban legend, it does provide another example of security personnel doing the right thing, and refusing to be bullied or intimiated by authority.
Back in the 1950s, Strategic Air Command was the largest--and most important--in the Air Force. In the days before ICBMs and SLBMs, SAC's bomber fleet essentially was the nation's strategic nuclear deterrent. General Curtis LeMay was CINCSAC during much of that period, and he set exacting standards. The promote performance, LeMay even had the authority to hand out spot promotions, elevating (or demoting) anyone in the command by one grade, depending on how they did their jobs.
LeMay was a frequent visitor to SAC bomber and tanker bases. However, he had no patience for waiting for the "gate guard" to check his ID, and usher him onto the base. If LeMay was driving to a SAC base, arrangements were made in advance to recognize the car and wave him through.
However, during one base visit, the system fell through. LeMay was driving in from another SAC installation in a blue Air Force staff car, but the sentry at the main gate was never notified. The young security policeman had been trained to stop any unauthorized entries to the base; when the staff car whizzed by a 50 mph, he followed his training. He yelled "Halt" and when the car failed to stop, he drew his pistol and opened fire. The first shot shattered the rear window; the second punctured a tire and disabled the car.
When the base commander and the chief of security police squadron arrived on the scene, the young "skycop" had both LeMay and his driver face down on the ground, threatening to shoot them if they moved. After a little explaining, the general was allowed to proceed, but not before he gave the sentry a spot promotion for doing his job, while demoting the commander of the security police squadron, for failing to do his.
Here's hoping the good people of Georgia decided to "demote" Cynthia McKinney this fall.
Meanwhile, Victor Davis Hanson recounts a similar incident at the U.S. Naval Academy a few years back. The Academy Superintendent, a three-star Navy admiral, tried to enter the installation without his military ID. A young Marine guard--doing his job--refused. There was an altercation. The admiral subsequently admitted that he might have touched the guard. A subsequent investigation cleared the Marine. The admiral resigned his post, and retired from the service.
That incident reminds me of an old Air Force story--one that I've never been able to fully verify. While it may be an urban legend, it does provide another example of security personnel doing the right thing, and refusing to be bullied or intimiated by authority.
Back in the 1950s, Strategic Air Command was the largest--and most important--in the Air Force. In the days before ICBMs and SLBMs, SAC's bomber fleet essentially was the nation's strategic nuclear deterrent. General Curtis LeMay was CINCSAC during much of that period, and he set exacting standards. The promote performance, LeMay even had the authority to hand out spot promotions, elevating (or demoting) anyone in the command by one grade, depending on how they did their jobs.
LeMay was a frequent visitor to SAC bomber and tanker bases. However, he had no patience for waiting for the "gate guard" to check his ID, and usher him onto the base. If LeMay was driving to a SAC base, arrangements were made in advance to recognize the car and wave him through.
However, during one base visit, the system fell through. LeMay was driving in from another SAC installation in a blue Air Force staff car, but the sentry at the main gate was never notified. The young security policeman had been trained to stop any unauthorized entries to the base; when the staff car whizzed by a 50 mph, he followed his training. He yelled "Halt" and when the car failed to stop, he drew his pistol and opened fire. The first shot shattered the rear window; the second punctured a tire and disabled the car.
When the base commander and the chief of security police squadron arrived on the scene, the young "skycop" had both LeMay and his driver face down on the ground, threatening to shoot them if they moved. After a little explaining, the general was allowed to proceed, but not before he gave the sentry a spot promotion for doing his job, while demoting the commander of the security police squadron, for failing to do his.
Here's hoping the good people of Georgia decided to "demote" Cynthia McKinney this fall.
The View From 600 Meters
Over at The Mudville Gazette, I found a link to a terrific blog by a U.S. Army sniper, currently serving in Iraq. During an engagement in Samarra, one of the team took out a terrorist running past a small window (inside a building) at a range of 600 meters. As someone who always struggled to qualify with the M-16 and 9 mm, I can only tip my hat to such amazing feats of marksmanship.
One shot, one kill.
One shot, one kill.
Thursday, April 06, 2006
Intelligent War-Fighting
I ran across this intriguging article in a Virginia newspaper, based on a recent speech by General Lance Smith (USAF), Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM).
According to General Smith, our ability to win the War on Terrorism (and similar conflicts in the future) will depend, in large part, on the rapid dissemination of intelligence information, to the "right" consumer, at the right time. He also advocates a unification of the effort between operations and intelligence. For too long, these disciplines are been separate realms within armed services, breeding inefficiency, distrust and even contempt. During my intel career, I met more than a few operators who were conviced that "the spooks were withholding information" that could save their lives. Our retort was that the operators often ignored our advice, believing (falsely) that they could blast every MiG from the skies and kill everything on the ground without intelligence.
In reality, we've made some strides toward removing the traditional barriers between operations and intelligence. Those precision strikes you saw in Desert Storm, Allied Force, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom were no accident; surgical strikes require exacting intelligence, fully integrated into the campaign and operational planning cycles.
But General Smith's comments about collecting, processing and disseminating intelligence are correct. In my last intel job, there were three separate computer towers in my cubicle, one for unclassified information, one for Secret-level data, and the third for Top Secret-level data. Each operated on its own, distinct network. In a coalition environment, there was often a fourth "box" for information releasable to our allies. For security reasons, there was no inner-connectivity. The same document might exist on multiple networks, but it had to uploaded (or downloaded) from each system individually.
What we need is a common architecture with built-in filters and firewalls that allow dissemination to the right customer, at the right classification level. In other words, a system that can deliver collateral-level (Secret) data to an infantry battalion G-2, while disseminating higher-level data to analysts at the national level or in a Joint Intelligence Center. It's a daunting challenge, but we are making progress, and such a network (a unified intelligence intranet) may be available in the near future.
Tearing down the intel and ops "stovepipes" may be a more difficult task. In the armed services, the "operators" have historically dominated (for obvious reasons) leaving fewer opportunities for the spooks to reach senior ranks. The total integration of ops and intel would seem to exacerbate that problem; it could result in more junior intel officers leaving the service early in their careers, seeing no room for themselves "at the top." Making the integration process work means giving qualified intel officers the necessary "ops" training, career broadening opportunities, and (ultimately) a shot at commanding operational units. This process won't make an intel officer an F-16 pilot, but it should provide a sufficient grounding in operational planning, tactics and execution needed to function as part of the team. Likewise, operators will have to learn more about intel and how it works (or in some cases, doesn't work).
The transformation will also require a culture change within the military, where intel officers have been consigned to "commands" in their functional areas. However, there are faint signs that paradigm is beginning to change; for example, an intel officer commanded the Air Force's 55th Wing at Offut AFB for the past two years. For the integration proposal to work, that sort of "promotion" will have to occur more frequently.
According to General Smith, our ability to win the War on Terrorism (and similar conflicts in the future) will depend, in large part, on the rapid dissemination of intelligence information, to the "right" consumer, at the right time. He also advocates a unification of the effort between operations and intelligence. For too long, these disciplines are been separate realms within armed services, breeding inefficiency, distrust and even contempt. During my intel career, I met more than a few operators who were conviced that "the spooks were withholding information" that could save their lives. Our retort was that the operators often ignored our advice, believing (falsely) that they could blast every MiG from the skies and kill everything on the ground without intelligence.
In reality, we've made some strides toward removing the traditional barriers between operations and intelligence. Those precision strikes you saw in Desert Storm, Allied Force, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom were no accident; surgical strikes require exacting intelligence, fully integrated into the campaign and operational planning cycles.
But General Smith's comments about collecting, processing and disseminating intelligence are correct. In my last intel job, there were three separate computer towers in my cubicle, one for unclassified information, one for Secret-level data, and the third for Top Secret-level data. Each operated on its own, distinct network. In a coalition environment, there was often a fourth "box" for information releasable to our allies. For security reasons, there was no inner-connectivity. The same document might exist on multiple networks, but it had to uploaded (or downloaded) from each system individually.
What we need is a common architecture with built-in filters and firewalls that allow dissemination to the right customer, at the right classification level. In other words, a system that can deliver collateral-level (Secret) data to an infantry battalion G-2, while disseminating higher-level data to analysts at the national level or in a Joint Intelligence Center. It's a daunting challenge, but we are making progress, and such a network (a unified intelligence intranet) may be available in the near future.
Tearing down the intel and ops "stovepipes" may be a more difficult task. In the armed services, the "operators" have historically dominated (for obvious reasons) leaving fewer opportunities for the spooks to reach senior ranks. The total integration of ops and intel would seem to exacerbate that problem; it could result in more junior intel officers leaving the service early in their careers, seeing no room for themselves "at the top." Making the integration process work means giving qualified intel officers the necessary "ops" training, career broadening opportunities, and (ultimately) a shot at commanding operational units. This process won't make an intel officer an F-16 pilot, but it should provide a sufficient grounding in operational planning, tactics and execution needed to function as part of the team. Likewise, operators will have to learn more about intel and how it works (or in some cases, doesn't work).
The transformation will also require a culture change within the military, where intel officers have been consigned to "commands" in their functional areas. However, there are faint signs that paradigm is beginning to change; for example, an intel officer commanded the Air Force's 55th Wing at Offut AFB for the past two years. For the integration proposal to work, that sort of "promotion" will have to occur more frequently.
Howard Dean's Worst Nightmare
In year when the Dims are supposed to take back the House and Senate, there are indications that the party's stranglehold on black voters ending. A new study from a Democratic strategist finds that as many as 44% of African-American voters in Maryland are willing to abandon the party, and support Lieutenant Governor Michael Steele, the black Republican who is seeking an open Senate seat. The strategist who prepared the report, Cornell Belcher, warns Democrats "not to wait to knock Steele down."
Put another way, the Senate race is going to get even nastier. Steele has already the victim of an illegal Democratic operation that Michelle Malkin dubbed "Chuckaquiddick," after New York Senator Charles Schumer, who heads the Democratic Senatorial Committee. Aides from Schumer's committee illegally obtained Steele's personal credit report, obviously looking for potential dirt. Unfortunately, the Bush Justice Department largely dismissed the episode; only one Schumer staffer faces legal action, and there was no real effort to plumb the depths of the illegal operation, and determine if Schumer was directly involved.
Over in Ohio, Secretary of State Kenneth Blackwell (Howard Dean's other Republican nightmare) still faces a primary fight to win the GOP nomination for governor. Blackwell is an equally formidable candidate, and more than capable of defeating Congressman Ted Strickland, the presumptive Democratic nominee. But state Attorney General Jim Petro has refused to drop out of the Republican primary, and he now claims front-runner status, after the recent withdrawal of another GOP challenger, state auditor Betty Montgomery.
As a former Ohioan, I still believe that Blackwell remains the favorite for the Republican nomination, and I'll predict that he'll be elected the state's first African-American governor in November, attracting significant numbers of "cross-over" black voters. In Maryland, I think Michael Steele faces a tougher fight; he's clearly a top target for the Democrats, and they'll spare no effort to "knock him down." But those tactics could also backfire; black constituencies willing to listen to Steele might be put off by efforts to smear him. Who knows? Howard Dean might wake up in November and find his worst nightmare coming true: a black Republican Senator in Maryland, a black Republican governor in Ohio, and new problems in maintaining the Democratic Party's African-American "base."
Put another way, the Senate race is going to get even nastier. Steele has already the victim of an illegal Democratic operation that Michelle Malkin dubbed "Chuckaquiddick," after New York Senator Charles Schumer, who heads the Democratic Senatorial Committee. Aides from Schumer's committee illegally obtained Steele's personal credit report, obviously looking for potential dirt. Unfortunately, the Bush Justice Department largely dismissed the episode; only one Schumer staffer faces legal action, and there was no real effort to plumb the depths of the illegal operation, and determine if Schumer was directly involved.
Over in Ohio, Secretary of State Kenneth Blackwell (Howard Dean's other Republican nightmare) still faces a primary fight to win the GOP nomination for governor. Blackwell is an equally formidable candidate, and more than capable of defeating Congressman Ted Strickland, the presumptive Democratic nominee. But state Attorney General Jim Petro has refused to drop out of the Republican primary, and he now claims front-runner status, after the recent withdrawal of another GOP challenger, state auditor Betty Montgomery.
As a former Ohioan, I still believe that Blackwell remains the favorite for the Republican nomination, and I'll predict that he'll be elected the state's first African-American governor in November, attracting significant numbers of "cross-over" black voters. In Maryland, I think Michael Steele faces a tougher fight; he's clearly a top target for the Democrats, and they'll spare no effort to "knock him down." But those tactics could also backfire; black constituencies willing to listen to Steele might be put off by efforts to smear him. Who knows? Howard Dean might wake up in November and find his worst nightmare coming true: a black Republican Senator in Maryland, a black Republican governor in Ohio, and new problems in maintaining the Democratic Party's African-American "base."
Under the Gun
Just days after the deadly tornado outbreak that killed almost 30 people in Northeast Arkansas, the Missouri Bootheel and Western Tennessee, the same region is bracing for another bout of severe weather. The area will be under a moderate risk for severe thunderstorms and tornadoes on Friday, as another major weather system tracks east. This is shaping up as the most active tornado season since 1999. That year saw a number of deadly tornadoes, notably a massive F5 that roared through central Oklahoma, killing at least 36 people, many of them in the town of Moore.
The National Weather Service in Memphis has completed its preliminary assessment of Sunday's tornadoes in the Mid-South. The tornado that devastated Carutersville, Missouri and Newbern, Tennessee actually began in Northeast Arkansas (near Pocohontas), and remained on the ground for about one hour and 45 minutes, covering a distance of 110-120 miles. In terms of duration and track length, that's comparable to some of the killer storms from the 1974 "Super Outbreak" in the south and Ohio Valley-- but it pales in comparison to the Great Tri-State Tornado of 1925, which covered a 219-mile track across Missouri, Illinois and Indiana, killing 695 people.
While the Tri-State storm of 1925 and many of the long track tornados from 1974 were rated as F5s on the Fujita scale, last Sunday's deadly tornado was rated a strong F3, with top winds of 200 mph. Of course, that's no consolation for residents who lost property or loved ones in the storm. This animation from NWS Memphis doppler radar clearly shows the storm's progression across the tri-state area; look for the distinctive "hook" in the southwestern tail of the storm. Ironically--and tragically--the tornado claimed most of its victims near the end of its track, as it churned across Western Tennessee.
The National Weather Service in Memphis has completed its preliminary assessment of Sunday's tornadoes in the Mid-South. The tornado that devastated Carutersville, Missouri and Newbern, Tennessee actually began in Northeast Arkansas (near Pocohontas), and remained on the ground for about one hour and 45 minutes, covering a distance of 110-120 miles. In terms of duration and track length, that's comparable to some of the killer storms from the 1974 "Super Outbreak" in the south and Ohio Valley-- but it pales in comparison to the Great Tri-State Tornado of 1925, which covered a 219-mile track across Missouri, Illinois and Indiana, killing 695 people.
While the Tri-State storm of 1925 and many of the long track tornados from 1974 were rated as F5s on the Fujita scale, last Sunday's deadly tornado was rated a strong F3, with top winds of 200 mph. Of course, that's no consolation for residents who lost property or loved ones in the storm. This animation from NWS Memphis doppler radar clearly shows the storm's progression across the tri-state area; look for the distinctive "hook" in the southwestern tail of the storm. Ironically--and tragically--the tornado claimed most of its victims near the end of its track, as it churned across Western Tennessee.
Wednesday, April 05, 2006
Let Me be the Last to Report
...that "perky" Katie Couric is leaving the Today Show to become the new anchor of the CBS Evening News. By my calendar, Ms. Couric's depature comes roughly years after another Today host jumped ship to anchor an evening news program. And we all know what happened to Barbara Walters.
However, unlike Ms. Walters, Couric apparently won't have a grouchy co-anchor to contend with. Ms. Couric is leaving a dominant morning program for an evening newscast that is dead last in the ratings, and has only a fraction of the audience it had in the mid-1980s. Moreover, her prospects for turning that around are slim, at best. With the advent of cable news channels, the internet and blogs, Americans are increasingly discarding the network evenings newscasts as an information source. Making matters worse, virtually all of CBS's owned-and-operated stations, located in major markets like New York, Chicago and L.A., are also laggards; their local newscasts won't provide much of a lead-in for Ms. Couric and her version of the Evening News.
Not that it really matters. The network evening newscasts are dinousaurs, doomed to extinction in a rapidly changing media environment. Couric may very well go down in broadcast history and the first female anchor and the last anchor of the CBS Evening News, at least in the traditional sense. Enjoy the new gig, Katie--while it lasts.
However, unlike Ms. Walters, Couric apparently won't have a grouchy co-anchor to contend with. Ms. Couric is leaving a dominant morning program for an evening newscast that is dead last in the ratings, and has only a fraction of the audience it had in the mid-1980s. Moreover, her prospects for turning that around are slim, at best. With the advent of cable news channels, the internet and blogs, Americans are increasingly discarding the network evenings newscasts as an information source. Making matters worse, virtually all of CBS's owned-and-operated stations, located in major markets like New York, Chicago and L.A., are also laggards; their local newscasts won't provide much of a lead-in for Ms. Couric and her version of the Evening News.
Not that it really matters. The network evening newscasts are dinousaurs, doomed to extinction in a rapidly changing media environment. Couric may very well go down in broadcast history and the first female anchor and the last anchor of the CBS Evening News, at least in the traditional sense. Enjoy the new gig, Katie--while it lasts.
Today's Reading Assignments
...from the March issue of Armed Forces Journal. Ralph Peters offers a timely analysis of the Indian Ocean's importance in U.S. security strategy. While some Pentagon planners remain pre-occupied with the Pacific (and the growing Chinese naval threat), Peters reminds us that naval contingency operations in the Indian Ocean--and its adjacent waters--are much more likely, at least over the short term. As always, Peters's analysis is spot-on, and definitely worth a read.
Also in the March issue of AFJ, Christian Lowe reports on signs of hope and frustration in Iraq. Mr. Lowe spent several weeks with U.S. Marines and Army units in Iraqi "hotspots" and found surprisingly little activity. Is this a sign the insurgency is losing steam, or the terrorists are simply waiting for the U.S. to leave? The jury's still out on that one, but it is encouraging that the "frustration" our troops report is the result of fewer terrorist attacks, and a decrease in IED strikes. In places like Ramidi, Tal Afar and Hit--once terrorist strongholds--those declines are significant.
Also in the March issue of AFJ, Christian Lowe reports on signs of hope and frustration in Iraq. Mr. Lowe spent several weeks with U.S. Marines and Army units in Iraqi "hotspots" and found surprisingly little activity. Is this a sign the insurgency is losing steam, or the terrorists are simply waiting for the U.S. to leave? The jury's still out on that one, but it is encouraging that the "frustration" our troops report is the result of fewer terrorist attacks, and a decrease in IED strikes. In places like Ramidi, Tal Afar and Hit--once terrorist strongholds--those declines are significant.
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