tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10820485.post2926100519121732540..comments2023-11-03T09:36:22.100-04:00Comments on In From the Cold: Try, Try AgainGeorge Smileyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07049707648660651119noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10820485.post-74176702244342461472008-07-12T13:46:00.000-04:002008-07-12T13:46:00.000-04:00Spook 86There are several things going on here.It ...Spook 86<BR/><BR/>There are several things going on here.<BR/><BR/>It is vital to all the services that the USAF tanker fleet gets replaced ASAP. This resolves down to two issues for Gates. <BR/><BR/>The first is that Congress no longer trusts the USAF senior procurement officials to run the tanker procurement.<BR/><BR/>The second issue is that the other services don't trust those same USAF officials to be team players and not short non-USAF tanker needs in favor of more F-22 procurement. <BR/><BR/>The second problem is decoded as follows:<BR/><BR/>Please read summary paragraph #4 in the Government Accounting Office (GAO) report on the Tanker deal closely. (I found it at this link: http://www.defensetech.org/archives/004257.html)<BR/> <BR/><BR/>""4. The Air Force conducted misleading and unequal discussions with Boeing, by informing Boeing that it had fully satisfied a key performance parameter objective relating to operational utility, but later determined that Boeing had only partially met this objective, without advising Boeing of this change in the agency’s assessment and while continuing to conduct discussions with Northrop Grumman relating to its satisfaction of the same key performance parameter objective.""<BR/> <BR/>In the bidding process, the USAF originally wanted to use as much of the existing KC-135 infrastructure as possible. That is why Boeing was bidding the KC-767 rather than the larger KC-777, which could not use the same hangers and shorter air fields that the smaller KC-135 could.<BR/> <BR/>The USAF decided mid-competition that fewer, bigger, tanker planes was better for the USAF procurement budget, and went for the KC-30.<BR/> <BR/>In so many words, the USAF changed the tanker requirements in the middle of the bid process, they told Northrop-Grumman, BUT DID NOT TELL BOEING that it did so.<BR/> <BR/>That is the biggest reason why the GAO upheld Boeing's protest, in my opinion.<BR/> <BR/>I strongly suspect the reason why both Tanker replacement bids blew up on the USAF was the Fighter Pilot General's insistence to maximize F-22s buys in the USAF's limited procurement budget. The USAF brass involved with the bidding process were playing cost shifting games to move tanker replacement costs out of the service’s procurement budget and into the operations and facilities/infrastructure budgets.<BR/> <BR/>Any infrastructure cost hits for switching to the larger Northrop-Grumman KC-30 mid-bid over the Boeing KC-767 would come from either the operations or facilities budgets; hence the USAF could buy more F-22s with the KC-30 than the KC-767, even if the latter cost less over all.<BR/> <BR/>The original "Tanker leasing deal" was built around "using a different color of money" than what would be used to buy the F-22. Leasing would be part of the USAF Operation budget. By law, you cannot use “Operations dollars” to buy new equipment. That is what the procurement budget is for. Yet that is what the first “Tanker deal” did, leaving the F-22 “funding wedge” intact without the competition of tanker planes.<BR/> <BR/>There are far more Congressional financial and reporting controls placed on the DoD procurement budget than either the operations or facilities line items. This "color of money" funding game is what attracted Sen. McCain's attention to the first tanker deal and uncovered the procurement fraud that senior USAF officials were involved in with senior Boeing officials.<BR/> <BR/>This time, Boeing found out all of these latest rounds of USAF cost shifting games in their failed bidder out brief, and here we are.<BR/> <BR/>Based on my professional experience in American military procurement, I would say the failure of both Tanker bids lies at the feet of the Fighter Pilot Generals, for their insistence of playing budget games to buy more F-22s.<BR/> <BR/>Gates move to make the DoD run the procurement addresses both issues to a degree. <BR/><BR/>In addition, to shore up Congressional support for a 3rd rebid, Sec. of Defense Gates publicly knifed the Senior USAF procurement people in front of Congress (see below from the DoD Buzz blog).<BR/><BR/>""That enormous sucking sound you heard at the Pentagon Thursday was the intake of breath by the senior OSD and acquisition officials who handled the tanker contract when they heard Defense Secretary Robert Gates offer almost no defense of the contracting process that led to the Northrop Grumman contract.<BR/><BR/>Gates was asked Thursday point blank if he had confidence in Sue Payton, assistant secretary of the Air Force for acquisition, who led the team that decided to award the contract. “I have confidence in the team until I find evidence to the contrary,” Gates said. Given the recent forced resignations of Air Force Secretary Mike Wynne and Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Mike Moseley, Payton must be getting ready to move out if asked since Gates also said the Government Accountability Office’s report found that the “Air Force team made significant errors.” At the same time, Gates did say he “needs to get a better feel for the nature of criticisms” made by the congressional watchdog and had not made any decisions about the contract yet, adding that the “first indication” he had of trouble with the contract award was the GAO report.""<BR/><BR/> The last time a Secretary of Defense said something like this in testimony before Congress, about a failed major military procurement, was when the A-12 Avenger program imploded on then Defense Secretary Cheney. <BR/><BR/> The end result of that mess was two Navy Admirals and a full commander getting fired from their jobs and demoted besides.<BR/><BR/> IMO, given Secretary Gates recent performance with US Army medical and USAF nuclear weapons scandals, now is a good time to be thinking of immediate retirement options, if you are a General officer or senior civilian in the USAF procurement field.Mil-Tech Bardhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11654312581130984629noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10820485.post-47016554195286486152008-07-11T20:03:00.000-04:002008-07-11T20:03:00.000-04:00I read the shift in acquisition authority slightly...I read the shift in acquisition authority slightly differently than you do. <BR/>I believe this DoD move is designed to do one thing over all others: get a tanker going as fast as possible given the political climate. I base my opinion on three things. <BR/>First, the DoD and AF know it is politically unacceptable to proceed without addressing the GAO's findings (which IMHO are incredibly weak on 7 of 8 counts) so it moved authority up to the DoD. Second, DoD has decided to make changes to the RFP in only those areas that the GAO had 'findings'. Third, instead of cutting the AF out of the loop completely, the SecDef recognizes that out of more than 100 complaints made by Boeing, only a relatively few 'stuck', so the AF acquisition team will be assiting the DoD authority in the way forward: for the most part the AF's determinations stand. <BR/>Because of the DoD response to the GAO recommendations, Boeing's advocates in Congress cannot claim the AF or DOD 'ignored' the GAOs findings. Because the DoD is only revisiting the areas that were contested, this elevates the risk to any offeror who radically changes their offering.<BR/><BR/>Prediction: It won't be over in December. Boeing will claim they can only respond with further delays and they will radically change their offer, which their lackeys in Congress will claim is neccessary to ensure 'competition'. <BR/><BR/>Where the system is broken is how politicized these competitions have become. I think Boeing's corruption of the process is most ironic because I'm convinced their 'intensity' has little to do with the contract or even the military side of their business. I'm certain they, more than anything else, want to maintain their position as the only major commercial airframer in the U.S. For Boeing to quit after December will require some leadership changes at the top.SMSgt Machttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08126690689798203866noreply@blogger.com