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Friday, October 30, 2015

The Offer

Over at Foreign Policy's "Best Defense" blog, guest writer Hank Waggy offers an innovative solution for getting rid of the worst troops in the all-volunteer military: pay them to leave the service at the end of basic training.

Waggy is an active-duty Major in the Army, serving as an intelligence officer.  So, it's a fair assumption that Waggy has run across a few troops who had no business in uniform.  From his perspective, both the soldier and the service would be better off if they parted ways before the military makes an even greater investment in an individual who probably won't pan out.

From Waggy's column:

As a leader, 90 percent of your problems are caused by 10 percent of your subordinates, or so says the old wisdom. A lone service member on the wrong end of the performance spectrum can monopolize multiple leaders’ time. In extreme cases, young, disgruntled soldiers can jeopardize lives and risk national security. Sorting out the military’s future problem children would benefit the organization as a whole. Identifying who the problems will be presents a challenge only answerable in hindsight. Fortunately, the private sector provides a ready solution perfectly scalable for the military: pay people to quit very early in their career.

Zappos, the on-line shoe retailer, garnered attention in 2008 when Harvard Business Review detailed what Zappos called “The Offer.” During an employee’s initial training, Zappos offered the employee cash to quit, a sum that grew over time from just $100 to $4,000. The logic behind the offer: any employee willing to forego employment for the payout would likely be a poor fit for the company in the future and lacked the strong commitment to the company’s vision. For a company like Zappos that prides itself on its customer service, a disgruntled employee costs money. Reportedly, about 97 percent of trainees decline The Offer. 

An on-line shoe retailer may not be perfectly analogous to the military, but both organizations benefit from a motivated workforce. The strength of the all-volunteer military is the combination of dedicated volunteers and the elimination of disgruntled conscripts. For military volunteers, the chance to join the military may fulfill a lifelong dream, provide excitement, pay for school, continue a family tradition, acquire marketable skills, build discipline, or any of the practically innumerable reasons folks join the military. But for a (hopefully) small cohort, joining the military is a decision they soon regret. Perceived as trapped by their initial enlistment contract, the disgruntled trainees soon bring bad attitudes and poor performance to their first duty station. Their organizations will soon pay the price.

To illustrate this problem, Waggy offers the examples of Bo Berghdahl and Bradley Manning.  From Day One of basic training, it was apparent that both were a poor fit for the Army.  By releasing them from service during or after basic, the nation would have been spared Berghdahl's traitorous turn in Afghanistan, or Manning passing thousands of classified documents to WikiLeaks.

To get rid of the slackers, malcontents and poor performers, Major Waggy suggests offering a "separation payment" to the bottom 10% of each basic training class.  The stipend would be equal to one or two months' of basic pay, providing a small sum to help the former soldiers get on with their lives.  

The concept is not without merit; if their basic training performance is any indication, many of these soldiers will remain sub-standard performers, creating problems for their commanders, platoon sergeants and anyone else in their chain of command.  Many of these laggards will be denied reenlistment and by the time the Army reaches that point, the taxpayer will have invested hundreds of thousands of dollars in pay, benefits and training, with little to show for that outlay.

But why pay a soldier, sailor, airman, Marine or coastie who can't cut the mustard?  There are procedures in place to help "cull the herd," from the recruiting station to the operational unit.  The late, great Chief Buddy used to preach that all supervisors had an obligation to "flush early and often," and you can't fault his logic.  Contrary to what some believe, the military is not a social welfare project and the armed services do not have an obligation to retain troops who can't pull their weight.  So, instead of "wash-out bonuses," perhaps the answer is better enforcement of existing standards.  

To be fair, that is not as easy as it sounds.   If the Army (or any other branch) is going to eliminate the bottom 10% in basic training, then recruiters will have to increase the number of accessions, to ensure required manning levels are maintained.  And obviously, the cost of recruiting and training new soldiers will increase, in an era when the military is finding it increasingly difficult to meet enlistment quotas.  But we believe the service should hold the line at offering separation payments for those unable to meet fundamental standards in basic training.  A few weeks of unsatisfactory performance should not be worth a small payout, even if it is only $2,000.   

Besides, what sort of message does it send to recruits who make the grade?  True, most of them will serve at least four years in the military, but the thought of wash-outs being sent off with a stipend is bound to create resentment.  Additionally, it represents an unnecessary expense in an era when defense dollars would be better spent on those who will actually contribute--not those who fail to measure up.   
       
 

Wednesday, October 28, 2015

Between the Lines

Somewhere in the Big Hangar in the Sky, Jack Northrop must be smiling.

The aviation pioneer, aircraft designer and visionary is probably pleased as punch, since the company he founded--now a part of Northrop-Grumman--has won the contract to build the next-generation long-range strike/bomber (LRS-B) for the U.S. Air Force.  Defense Secretary Ash Carter made the announcement this afternoon, revealing that Northrop-Grumman won the $21.4 billion contract over a rival team, which paired Lockheed-Martin and Boeing. 

"Calling the Long Range Strike Bomber the "back bone" of the Air Force's future strike and deterrence capabilities, Mr. Carter said the new aircraft allows the U.S. to "project power across the globe now and into the future."

"The age of our bomber fleet requires new thinking and new capabilities," Carter said. "Building this bomber is a strategic investment for the next 50 years."

Officials have been tight-lipped as to the specific capability expectations for the LRS-B, but indications are that it will be stealth, able to carry conventional and nuclear weapons and could possibly operate both with and without a pilot.

At $550 million a copy, LRS-B represents an expensive, but necessary investment.  The last bomber to join the USAF fleet, the B-2 Spirit, rolled off the Northrop assembly line almost 25 years ago.  Air Force B-1 Lancers--which can only carry conventional weapons--date to the early 1980s, and the "newest" B-52 Stratofortress entered the inventory in 1962.  With both the B-1 and B-2 scheduled for retirement by 2030, introduction of a modern, long-range strike platform has become imperative.  The Air Force hopes to buy 100 of the new bombers, providing sufficient numbers (and capabilities) to replace airframes nearing the end of their service lives.  

The LRS-B will also occupy a key role in U.S. power projection, particularly in Asia.  In a commentary posted at Forbes.com earlier this month, Dr. Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute noted current deficiencies in American military capabilities to deal with the growing threat from China:

"Concern about that emerging challenge explains why the Obama Administration declared in 2012 that the main focus of U.S. military planning was shifting to the Asia-Pacific region.  It is no coincidence that President Obama in the same timeframe enunciated the need for a new long-range bomber.  Discussion of specific weapon programs seldom rises to the presidential level, so the fact that the president singled out the bomber as a pressing military need is portentous.  The simple truth is that if the United States does not revitalize its dwindling fleet of heavy bombers, it probably cannot prevail in a war against China.

The main vehicle for bringing about that revitalization is the LRS-B.  Despite frequent public discussion of the program, though, much of official Washington does not understand that America’s future as a world power may hinge on its success.  So here is a concise explanation of why America can’t beat back the next great challenge to its global influence without a new bomber.

...any U.S. war plan for defeating China would have to consist mainly of the skillful application of air power and sea power.  The basic goal would be to threaten the Chinese Communist Party with the loss of its political power, military might and economic strength by holding several thousand high-value targets at risk.  Nuclear weapons probably can’t be used without provoking retaliation in kind, so aside from the moral objections there are practical reasons why the campaign would need to rely on large numbers of precision-guided conventional munitions launched by aircraft and warships (U.S. war plans would need to include mechanisms for discouraging any Chinese use of nuclear weapons)."

Of course, it will be almost a decade before the first LRS-B enters operational service and a lot can happen between now and 2025, including annual installments of the budget wars between Congress and succeeding administrations.  With the pressure to make more cuts in a defense budget that is already hollow, the new bomber program will make a tempting target.  Lest we forget, the Air Force originally envisioned a B-2 fleet of more than 100 airframes, but the end of the Cold War (and pressures to cut Pentagon spending) reduced the production run to only 21 aircraft, all based at Whiteman AFB, Missouri.  The contract awarded today covers only engineering and development costs for LRS-B; DoD and the Air Force will have to go back to Congress and the White House in a few years and convince our political leaders to fund actual production.   

In the interim, there will be plenty of speculation over why Northrop-Grumman got the nod over its competitors.  Obviously, the company has experience with stealth designs and production, dating back to the B-2.  But so does Lockheed-Martin, which developed the Air Force's original very low observable prototype (Have Blue) and its operational offspring, the F-117.  Since then, Lockheed has developed and produced the F-22 Raptor and has begun limited production of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), another stealth design. 

The Nighthawk was a game-changer in aerial warfare and the Raptor (as a multi-role fighter) has even more impressive capabilities.  In missions over Syria, F-22s often perform multiple tasks on the same mission, including escorting strike aircraft; employing their own ordnance against ground targets, providing electronic warfare support for allied formations and collecting intelligence data from the battlefield.  When the F-35 enters operational service, it will perform many of the same duties and will be fully "networked" with the Raptor and other platforms.  With all that expertise, why did Lockheed-Martin (and partner Boeing) come up short?

One explanation may lie in rising costs and delayed deliveries of the JSF.  Now billions over its original budget, the F-35 won't be available in significant numbers until the end of this decade, and at a much-higher-than-originally-projected price tag.  With so much riding on LRS-B, the Pentagon's procurement managers may have determined they can't afford a repeat of the JSF's development woes in the new program.

There's also a desire to "share the wealth," to help maintain the industrial base and intellectual talent required to produce state-of-the-art defense systems.  With the exception of the Navy's X-47B UAV and the RQ-4 Global Hawk, Northrop-Grumman has been largely absent as a producer of military aircraft over the past two decades, concentrating instead on its growing (and profitable) electronics, technical services and IT businesses.  However, the company continues to maintain and update older, legacy systems such as the B-2 and the Navy's E-2D Hawkeye radar plane.  Northrop-Grumman has been trying to re-establish itself as a military aircraft manufacturer, and securing the LRS-B contract will help cement that "comeback." 

Ironically, the company's diversification efforts may have buttressed its case to build the new bomber.  Like the F-22, the LRS-B will truly be a "system of systems," designed to preform multiple roles during a single mission.  Northrop-Grumman's expertise in such disciplines as electronic warfare, cyber-security, radar technology and systems integration represent the skills that will be needed to field the new bomber.  Maybe that was the edge that tilted the contract in favor of Northrop-Grumman, although that claim can be disputed, since Lockheed-Martin has considerable experience in those fields as well.  

   

     



 



 





Wednesday, October 07, 2015

Mr. Putin's No-Fly Zone

From the earliest days of the Syrian conflict, the U.S. and its so-called "coalition partners" have debated creation of a no-fly zone over that war-torn country.  Years of discussions and trial balloons have led to...nothing.

Now, barely a week after his warplanes began combat missions over Syria, Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be on the verge of creating--you guessed it--a no-fly zone.  Russian jets have become increasingly aggressive as they patrol the country's skies, conduct bombing missions against forces opposing their ally, Syrian dictator Bashir Assad, and even intrude into the airspace of neighboring Turkey.

Officially, the Russians have only a handful of air-to-air capable jets at their base near Latakia, on the Mediterranean coast, but those six SU-30 Fullbacks have been busy.  By various accounts, they chased away a four-ship formation of Israeli F-15s over Latakia, and entered Turkey's airspace as well, locking onto a Turkish F-16 for a reported five minutes (emphasis ours).  Readers will note these claims have not been verified and read more like Russian propaganda than reliable reporting:

Six Russian fighter jets type Multirole Sukhoi SU – 30 SM have intercepted 4 Israeli McDonnell Douglas F-15’s fighter bombers attempting to infiltrate the Syrian coast. The Israeli F 15 warplanes have been flying over Syrian airspace for months and in particular the coast of Latakia, which is now the bridgehead of the Russian forces in Syria.

The Israeli jets would generally follow a fairly complex flight plan and approach Latakia from the sea.
On the night of 1 October 02, 2015, six Sukhoi SU-30 Russian SM fighters took off from the Syrian Hmimim airbase in the direction of Cyprus, before changing course and intercepting the four Israeli F-15 fighters off the coast of Syria, that were flying in attack formation.

Surprised by a situation as unexpected and probably not prepared for a dogfight with one of the best Russian multipurpose fighters, Israeli pilots have quickly turned back south at high speed over Lebanon.
The Lebanese army has officially announced at 2313 Z (local time) that four “enemy aircraft” (Israeli) had crossed the airspace of the Lebanon.

This ‘incident’ between the Russian and Israeli combat aircraft struck with amazement the command of the Israeli air force, which has estimated that a possible dogfight between F-15 Israelis and the Russian Su-30 would have led to the destruction of the four aircraft Israelis.

But another incident has been confirmed.  U.S. authorities report that Russian fighters--perhaps the same SU-30s--intercepted Predator drones over Syria on several occasions last week.  More from Fox News:

Russian fighter jets shadowed U.S. predator drones on at least three separate occasions high above Syria since the start of Russia’s air campaign last week, according to two U.S. officials briefed on this latest intelligence from the region.

[snip]

U.S. officials tell Fox News the drone encounters took place over ISIS-controlled Syria, including its de facto headquarters in Raqqa, as well as along the Turkish-Syrian border near Korbani. Another occurred in the northwest, near the highly contested city of Aleppo.

“The first time it happened, we thought the Russians got lucky. Then it happened two more times,” said one official. 

The U.S. military's MQ-1 Predator drone is not a stealth aircraft.

"It is easy to see a predator on radar," said one official.

Well, maybe not as easy as the unnamed official suggests. U.S. drones flew over Iraq during much of the 1990s--when Saddam was still in power--and his Air Force had virtually no success tracking or intercepting our UAVs.  There is also evidence that American and Israeli drones have been active over Iran, and Tehran has tried to shoot them down, but their efforts have been equally futile.  

Moscow's ability to track and intercept American drones over Syria indicates that Russia has a very robust SIGINT capability in the region, utilizing ground, sea-based and (possibly) airborne platforms. The Russians obviously have the ability to "meld" such information with their air picture, allowing controllers to steer fighters towards adversary aircraft.  

Meanwhile, NATO is still smarting from that recent intercept of Turkish F-16s inside that country's airspace by Russian-made MiG-29 Fulcrums, probably operated by the Syrian Air Force.  According to multiple reports, the Fulcrums "locked up" an F-16 for more than five minutes with its air intercept radar.  That account suggests that the Turkish jets were turning away from the threat as the MiG-29s gave chase.  Locking onto another aircraft with a fighter's AI radar is considered an act of war.  It is virtually unheard of for a warplane to maintain radar lock for that length of time.  Ask a fighter pilot to describe someone who is locked on for that long, and he (or she) will probably use one word: dead.  But the MiG-29s did not open fire, though the incident has further exacerbated tensions in the region. 

These episodes are anything but a coincidence.  Putin is clearly spoiling for a fighter, hoping to create an incident that would cause the U.S. and its allies to cease operations over Syria, while highlighting the capabilities of his own forces.  At this juncture, the Russians seem to have free reign in the skies; earlier today, a Pentagon spokesman announced that U.S. aircraft were rerouted in Syrian airspace, to avoid a nearby formation of Russian jets.  

And there's one more element that Moscow may use to reinforce a potential no-fly zone.  Eleven days ago, Russian TV released video of the cruiser Moskva leaving its Black Sea port, enroute to the Mediterranean, and most likely, a port call at the naval base in Tartus.  The Moskva carries the SA-N-6, the naval version of the SA-10 surface-to-air missile system.  

From positions in port or off the Syrian coast, the Moskva could engage targets at ranges up to 200 miles, covering a good portion of southwestern Turkey, western Syria, all of Lebanon and northern Israel.  How will the U.S. or Israel respond when the Moskva locks up one of our aircraft, or shoots down a drone?  We may soon find out.     


 



Strategika 51: Six Russian fighter jets type Multirole Sukhoi SU - 30 SM have intercepted 4 Israeli McDonnell Douglas F-15's fighter bombers attempting to infiltrate the Syrian coast.The Israeli F 15 warplanes have been flying over Syrian airspace for months and in particular the coast of Latakia, which is now the bridgehead of the Russian forces in Syria.
The Israeli jets would generally follow a fairly complex flight plan and approach Latakia from the sea

On the night of 1 October 02, 2015, six Sukhoi SU-30 Russian SM fighters took off from the Syrian Hmimim airbase in the direction of Cyprus, before changing course and intercepting the four Israeli F-15 fighters off the coast of Syria, that were flying in attack formation.

Surprised by a situation as unexpected and probably not prepared for a dogfight with one of the best Russian multipurpose fighters, Israeli pilots have quickly turned back South at high speed over the Lebanon.

The Lebanese army has officially announced at 2313 Z (local time) that four "enemy aircraft" (Israeli) had crossed the airspace of the Lebanon.

This 'incident' between the Russian and Israeli combat aircraft struck with amazement the command of the Israeli air force, which has estimated that a possible dogfight between F-15 Israelis and the Russian Su-30 would have led to the destruction of the four aircraft Israelis.
- See more at: http://www.rense.com/general96/6russian.html#sthash.Xul19Msa.dpuf
Strategika 51: Six Russian fighter jets type Multirole Sukhoi SU - 30 SM have intercepted 4 Israeli McDonnell Douglas F-15's fighter bombers attempting to infiltrate the Syrian coast.The Israeli F 15 warplanes have been flying over Syrian airspace for months and in particular the coast of Latakia, which is now the bridgehead of the Russian forces in Syria.
The Israeli jets would generally follow a fairly complex flight plan and approach Latakia from the sea

On the night of 1 October 02, 2015, six Sukhoi SU-30 Russian SM fighters took off from the Syrian Hmimim airbase in the direction of Cyprus, before changing course and intercepting the four Israeli F-15 fighters off the coast of Syria, that were flying in attack formation.

Surprised by a situation as unexpected and probably not prepared for a dogfight with one of the best Russian multipurpose fighters, Israeli pilots have quickly turned back South at high speed over the Lebanon.

The Lebanese army has officially announced at 2313 Z (local time) that four "enemy aircraft" (Israeli) had crossed the airspace of the Lebanon.

This 'incident' between the Russian and Israeli combat aircraft struck with amazement the command of the Israeli air force, which has estimated that a possible dogfight between F-15 Israelis and the Russian Su-30 would have led to the destruction of the four aircraft Israelis.
- See more at: http://www.rense.com/general96/6russian.html#sthash.Xul19Msa.dpuf











   


Saturday, October 03, 2015

Collateral Damage

The Pentagon has launched a formal investigation into an accidental strike on a Doctors Without Borders medical facility in the northern Afghan city of Kunduz.

A spokesman for the international charity said that twelve staff members and seven patients--including three children--were killed in a "sustained" bombing attack on the complex that began early Saturday morning and reportedly continued for more than 20 minutes.   Doctors Without Borders claims that the location of their facility had been provided to both sides in the Afghan conflict as recently as Tuesday of last week, to prevent a possible attack.

This much we know: Afghan Army troops, supported by U.S. special forces and airpower, have been attempting to dislodge terrorists from Kunduz, which was captured by Taliban forces last week.  Areas around the hospital were still in Taliban control late Friday night (and engaging coalition forces), prompting a call for air support.  An AC-130 gunship was dispatched to the scene and may have been the aircraft that mistakenly struck the medical complex on Saturday morning.   Taliban fighters were being treated at the hospital at the time of the attack; Doctors Without Borders provides treatment to personnel from both sides, along with civilians caught in the cross-fire.

But here's what we don't know, and answers these questions will go a long way in determining what happened.  First, no one has confirmed that the Doctors Without Borders facility was displaying the Red Cross, Red Crescent or other symbol used by protected facilities.  Hospitals in war zones typically show one of those symbols to prevent inadvertent attacks.
   
However, those symbols are sometimes deliberately misused to protect ammo dumps, command and control sites and other military facilities.  The Palestinian Authority has a long history of hiding military assets inside medical buildings and cultural landmarks that are normally protected from attack.  Such violations of the laws of armed conflict further complicate the targeting process.

Enemies like the Taliban (and others) also have a history of operating inside or adjacent to protected facilities, hoping to create collateral damage incidents.  At this point, it's unclear if the Taliban was firing on Afghan troops and U.S. special forces from inside the compound, but it is certainly a possibility.

The AC-130 carriers a variety of sensors to help it identify and strike ground targets, including low-light TV and IR.  It's a safe bet the investigation team will take an early look at what those sensors captured, before and during the engagement.  And if the data confirms the Taliban caused the attack on the hospital, the military should quickly release the video or FLIR footage and show how enemy actions led to the tragedy.

Unfortunately, investigations of this type take time--usually months--to complete.  By that time, the incident will have been largely forgotten by the global media, which will use the ensuring weeks to set the coverage template.   
     

Friday, October 02, 2015

Coming Home

Borrowing a phrase from Jeremiah Wright, it looks like President Obama's foreign policy chickens have come home to roost.

We'll start with the ugliest rooster in the bunch, our debacle in Syria.  As of this writing, the Russian Air Force is two days into a bombing campaign against "terrorist" targets, in support Syrian dictator Bashir al-Assad.  According to satellite imagery, there are more than two dozen Russian warplanes at an airfield in Latakia, near the Mediterranean Coast; the jets began arriving there two weeks ago and initiated combat operations this week:
















Russian SU-30 Flanker multi-role fighters (left) and SU-25 Frogfoot ground attack aircraft on the ground in Syria.  These assets are now flying ground attack missions in support of Moscow's objectives in the region (AllSource Analysis imagery via ABC News)

Of course, it's bad enough that Mr. Obama's dawdling--and sheer incompetence--have created a power vacuum that Vladimir Putin was happy to fill.  But the Russian leader added insult to injury by targeting U.S.-supported "moderate" rebels in the first missions flown by his aircraft.  That put the President in a rather embarrassing position; after initially telling Russia's military to stay out of the conflict, Mr. Obama's national security team had to scramble and develop a plan for "de-conflicting" operations between U.S. and Russia aircraft.  At last report, those talks are still on-going, and until some sort of agreement is reached, there is the possibility of an engagement between American fighter jets and their Russian counterparts.

Making matters worse, Russia issued its own ultimatum to Washington just before its air campaign began.  A Russian general delivered the message: American aircraft were to depart Syrian airspace immediately and remain outside the country's borders.  Of course, the U.S. ignored Moscow's directive, but the directive underscored the contempt Mr. Putin has for President Obama and the United States.

Meanwhile, the smart boys and girls at the White House, the Pentagon and the State Department have another Syria-related problem on their hands: what to do about Russian airstrikes against our erstwhile allies on the ground?  According to media reports, discussions are underway about possibly creating a "no-fly zone" over areas occupied by U.S.-supported rebels. 

Presumably, that area would be very small, given the wholesale failure of American efforts to vet, train and equip moderates to fight against ISIS.  The Associated Press estimates that about 80 U.S.-trained fighters are currently battling terrorist elements in Syria, after an investment of more than $500 million. And late last month, Reuters reported that one group of American-backed rebels gave a portion of their equipment to the Al Qaida-affiliated Al Nusra Front, in exchange for safe passage.  

That disturbing development eliminates another option for protecting the rebels, by equipping them with advanced, shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles.  Obviously, if our carefully trained and vetted rebels are willing to hand over tons of equipment (including six new pick-up trucks), they'd have no qualms about surrendering MANPAD SAMs to their buddies in Al Qaida, which would use the weapons against U.S. warplanes operating over Syria (and elsewhere).

But the real concerns lie with those Russian jets at Latakia.  ISIS doesn't have an air force, but Moscow's airpower contingent includes at least four SU-30 Flankers which have excellent air-to-air and ground attack capabilities.  Why send the Flankers--roughly equivalent to a U.S. F-15E--if Putin wasn't preparing for all eventualities, including a potential dogfight with coalition aircraft.

And make no mistake: the Russian dictator isn't backing away from that contingency.  If Moscow were truly interested in coordinating the air campaign, they would provide a list of missions, callsigns, targets and IFF "squawks" that could be incorporated into an overall air tasking order, and directed by AWACS.  But Mr. Putin has a different agenda at work in Syria and partnering with the allied coalition is somewhere near the bottom of his priority list.

In fact, the Russians would like to inflict some sort of humiliation on western air assets.  Along with bailing out the Assad regime; protecting Iran's western flank, and extending Russian influence to the Persian Gulf and Red Sea (among other objectives), Mr. Putin wants to drive the U.S. out of the region and sell some military hardware to boot.  If a Russian pilot "accidentally" shot down an American jet-- or one belonging to our partners--the Kremlin won't lose much sleep, figuring correctly that Mr. Obama will never hold them accountable.

That's the price you pay for empty threats, endless vacillation and leading from behind.  Putin, the former KGB Colonel, has rightly sized up his adversary in Washington and finds him weak, feckless and incompetent.  It's an ideal environment for advancing Russia's aims, and Mr. Putin plans to take full advantage of the situation.  Having been largely banished from the key states of the Middle East over the past 30 years, Russia now finds itself as the new king-maker, supporting friends and allies and taking the fight to the terrorists while the U.S. slinks from the regional stage.                    

It is a positively stunning and frightening turn of events.  What's worse, some in the GOP see nothing wrong with this changing of the guard.  In a recent interview with CNN, Republican front runner Donald Tump seemed quite content to let Putin take on the Syrian problem.  In fairness, he has a point; our current Syria policy is an absolute disaster, and it makes little sense to continue programs that aren't working.

But Mr. Trump is missing the bigger picture.  Someone ought to ask him about the ramifications of a new Russian sphere of influence, extending southward into the Persian Gulf, across Iraq (which has grown closer to Moscow and Tehran in recent weeks) and westward through the Black Sea into the eastern Mediterranean.  With that move, the Russians gain access to even greater energy reserves, allowing them to increase their leverage with western Europe, and at some point, potentially fracture NATO.

Sadly, all of this might have been prevented, by following the recommendations of our generals in Iraq; avoiding encouragement of the Arab Spring, with no regard for the forces behind it and their long-term consequences, and pursuing coherent strategies in places like Libya and Syria.  Instead, Barack Obama has made a total hash of the region; Vladimir Putin is moving in and a man who wants to be the next President sees little wrong with that tectonic shift.