Random thoughts on almost anything and everything, with an emphasis on defense, intelligence, politics and national security matters..providing insight for the non-cleared world since 2005.
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Monday, September 24, 2012
Today's Reading Assignment
A Navy P-8 Poseidon in flight. Program delays and the threat of sequestration could create more difficulties for the new ASW aircraft, leaving the Navy with inadequate airborne resources for detecting, tracking and attacking enemy subs (Wikipedia photo).
An excellent post at The NavLog, on the Navy's troubled P-8 ASW aircraft. The service is moving forward with long-standing plans to replace what's left of its P-3 Orion fleet with the next-generation ASW airframe, based on the Boeing 737-800. But, as the author observes, successful implementation of the P-8 depends on technology that is inmature (at best), and on a planned aircraft "buy" that is inadequate for the mission:
We recently attended a briefing on the Navy’s new P-8 Poseidon aircraft, the replacement for the P-3C Orion. The short version is that it is not working out as hoped and that US Navy airborne anti-submarine warfare (ASW) is in jeopardy.
[snip]
{the} Boeing P-8 was conceived as a 156-airframe replacement for the already dwindling number of P-3s, a number of P-8s then reduced to 108 aircraft, to be augmented by dedicated UAVs and UCAVs for persistent surveillance over-ocean missions. The P-3’s 330 knot enroute speed would be substantially increased to over 500 knots with the P-8, meaning a faster arrival on station. Since a jet burns far more fuel per mile than a turboprop, the P-3’s low-level endurance was to be sacrificed by a never before tried high-altitude precision ASW at or above 20,000 feet, meaning abandonment of what had been traditional low-level tracking of and attack upon a submarine. Torpedoes dropped from 200-500 feet will now become glide-bombs: torpedoes with wings dropped from 20,000 feet to somehow reach a fleeing submarine before it's long gone. The P-8s MAD boom was summarily dispatched. To those of us with real world ASW experience, the picture was questionable and depended upon no yet developed new ASW techniques and technology.
At the recent brief we were instructed about new, smaller, light-weight sonobouys equipped with GPS that will be launched from rotary launchers aboard the P-8. This is aimed at plot stabilization, or plotstab, a critical element in ASW. A submarine or surface contact is positioned with respect to the sono pattern dropped. Unless you know where your bouys are, you can’t know where your target is. The GPS-broadcasting bouys are meant to align target location with the real world. This will be especially tough because the P-8 is meant to stay above 20,000 feet. This altitude restriction is imposed for several reasons, but we were informed it is primarily because the P-8s planned onsta performance is not even close to what the Boeing and Navy engineers estimated, and is, in fact perhaps four hours, or about half that of the P-3 or even the P-2
And unfortunately, the problems don't end there. While the Navy plans to field 12 P-8 squadrons, each unit will have only six assigned aircraft. Do the math, and you'll discover that our "new" ASW fleet will consist of only 72 aircraft, along with a smaller number of P-3s that will be re-winged to extend their service life. Once upon a time, the Navy had more than 400 Orions, with most devoted to the ASW mission. True, those numbers existed during the heyday of the Soviet Navy, but it's worth noting that many countries are now building or purchasing quiet diesel submarines, so the threat is steadily increasing. And, when you consider the P-8 won't the endurance of its predecessors, it's clear the Navy won't have enough of the new ASW jets for the mission.
As we've noted in the past, the ASW mission was largely ignored after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Making matters worse, the Navy wasted years of development time (and millions of dollars) on the "first" Orion replacement, the Lockheed P-7, which was scrapped in the 1980s. Meanwhile, the service was flying the wings off its remaining P-3s (quite literally) by reassigning the aircraft for overland missions in places like Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan.
One more thing: as The NavLog observes, lead-in training for a new P-8 crew member will be an "astounding" 15 months, so the Navy will be hard-pressed to meet its goal of geting the first squadron operational in 2013. And no one wants to predict the potential impact of sequestration on the Poseidon. If the P-8 doesn't survive under sequestration, then we'll be left with a dwindling number of deteriorating P-3s, and no replacement in sight--truly, the worst case scenario.
But that's just the tip of the fiscal iceberg. Multiply this sort of program cancellation across the services, and you'll have a good idea of what our military may look like in the years to come.
Saturday, September 22, 2012
Who Knew, Redux
Mr. Stevens and his colleagues didn't have to have to die--it's that simple. There were warnings of a possible attack up to three days prior, from Libyan officials and Egyptian intelligence. There are also indications that the Brits knew something was up and shared that information with us, but to no avail. Ambassador Stevens, who reportedly told co-workers he "had a price on his head," elected to travel to the unsecure Benghazi facility, with no dedicated security detail. However, it is unclear if Stevens received the latest threat information before setting out for the consulate.
And, it now evident that senior U.S. officials knew the Benghazi compound was under attack as it unfolded (emphasis ours). According to media reports, President Obama was told of the assault between 90 minutes and three hours into the incident. He later went to bed, before the fate of Ambassador Stevens and his colleagues was determined.
But that timeline is predictably fuzzy. Earlier this week, Libyan officials claimed that U.S. officials intercepted communications between Al Qaida's Libyan affiliate and members of the Islamist Ansar al-Sharia brigade discussing the planned attack. So far, it has not been disclosed if those conversations came before, during or after the attacks on the consulate and the safe house, which unfolded over several hours.
In any event, there is reason to believe that Mr. Obama may have learned of events in Libya long before the three-hour mark, and here's why: reports of escalating threats to U.S. interests in the Middle East should have put the National Security Agency (and its global intercept capabilities) on heightened alert.
It's also worth noting that the U.S. (read: NSA) monitored several phone conversations between Al Qaida operatives and representatives of the Ansar al Sharia group. During the calls, they discussed the attack on the American consulate in Benghazi. So far, U.S. officials have not revealed if the chatter was related to planning the assault, or if it occurred while the attack was in progress.
But let's assume that the conversations occurred just prior to the attack and while it unfolded. We make this assumption (hoping) that if NSA had advance notice that our consulate was being targeted, protective measures would be implemented to safeguard our personnel. Obviously, we cannot make this assumption with complete certainty; after all, the agency collects millions of bits of information on a daily basis. There are delays in translation, and even with sophisticated data-mining and keyword search techniques, analysts don't always receive information required to provide timely warning.
Still, if we're reading the tea leaves correctly, it appears that NSA was monitoring terrorist communications for a period that included the actual attack on the consulate and the murder of Ambassador Stevens. If that's the case, then the agency most likely issued its highest priority message traffic (known in the trade as FLASH/CRITICs).
These alerts, reserved for the most important global events, are supposed to be in the hands of the President--and other senior officials--within 10 minutes of receipt. There are established guidelines for events considered worthy of a CRITIC, and NSA has sometimes rejected submissions from lower levels in the signals intelligence (SIGINT) community. For example, when U.S. listening posts in Japan detected the shoot down of Korean Airlines Flight 007 in 1983, initial CRITICS sent to NSA were rejected, on the grounds of insufficient information. However, as the situation became more clear, FLASH/CRITIC traffic was quickly forwarded to President Reagan and key members of his national security team.
Based on what we're hearing, it seems likely that President Obama was in receipt of similar messages on the night our consulate was breached and Ambassador Stevens was murdered, along with three other Americans. And, if NSA was monitoring terrorist phone calls in the run-up to the attack, there is a very real possibility that the commander-in-chief knew what was going on well before the "three hour" mark. That possibility raises very real questions about what Mr. Obama knew, when he knew it, and his initial response to the crisis.
As Congress digs deeper into the incident, they should ask the NSA Director (General Keith Alexander) about CRITIC reporting from Libya on the night in question. The amount of CRITIC reporting by NSA is very small--usually no more than a handful of messages a year. It won't be very hard to determine if any FLASH/CRITIC messages were sent to the White House that night; when the President received them, and exactly what he knew before his "command decision" to go back to bed.
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Thursday, September 20, 2012
The Right Call
Monday, September 17, 2012
Crossing the Red Line?
Friday, September 14, 2012
Who Knew?
Thursday, September 13, 2012
The "Logistics" of Intelligence
As the nominee, Romney should receive classified briefings on U.S. intelligence, but administration officials said that hasn't been arranged yet.
Saturday, September 08, 2012
A Nation of Flukes
With respect to Sandra Fluke, I think there’s a third future looming. The paperback edition of my book comes out in a week or so, and you can pretty much get the gist of it from the title: After America. For me, the likely scenario isn’t that the Republicans will be terrorizing rape victims or that the Democrats will finally pass the necessary legislation to make contraception available for the contraceptively starved millions crying out for it, but that America will be sliding off the cliff — literally, as Joe Biden would literally say. And when America slides off the cliff it lands with a much bigger thud than Greece or Iceland. I’m not certain that the Republicans will be able to prevent that happening. But I know that the Democrats can’t. America owes more money than anybody has ever owed anyone in the history of the planet. But millions of Americans don’t see it, and millions of those who do see it don’t see it as a problem.
Sandra Fluke is one of them. She completed her education a few weeks ago — at the age of 31, or Grade 25. Before going to Georgetown, she warmed up with a little light B.S. in Feminist, Gender, and Sexuality Studies from Cornell. She then studied law at one of the most prestigious institutions in the nation, where tuition costs 50 grand a year. The average starting salary for a Georgetown Law graduate is $160,000 per annum — first job, first paycheck.
If you want another analogy, Sarah Palin summed it up nicely on Fox News last night. The choice for Americans, she said, is between "freedom and free stuff." Unfortunately, at least 100 million Americans have already decided on the latter, with no regard for the fiscal consequences. Sandra Fluke, that taxpayer-financed product of Cornell and Georgetown law, figures she can ride out the storm, as long as abortion remains legal and someone else pays for her contraception.
Sadly, she is not alone in her thinking. Will Rogers once observed, famously, that America would be the first nation to drive to the poor house in a "brand new car." On our current trajectory, with Barack Obama at the wheel--and 100 million along for the ride--we're rocketing past the poor house, and over the cliff.
Wednesday, September 05, 2012
Changing of the Guard (San Antonio Edition)
Monday, September 03, 2012
Feckless
According to the report, Washington used covert back-channels in Europe to clarify that the US does not intend to back Israel in a strike that may spark a regional conflict.
To anyone outside of Foggy Bottom, this "proposal" is the height of fecklessness--a veritable fool's errand that will almost guarantee the opposite results.
Consider the position of Israel. Based on this "offer," the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will (rightly) conclude it has been sold down the river again, leaving it with no option but striking Iran before that nation's nuclear program reaches the point of no return. The U.S. plan comes on the heels of an announced down-sizing in a planned exercise between American and Israeli forces, scheduled for early this fall. Based on these developments, Israel views itself as "alone" in facing the Iranian menace, adding more urgency to reported attack preparations.
From the Iranian perspective, the proposal is an open invitation for Tehran (and its surrogates) to hit back in retaliation for an Israeli strike, using all the resources at their disposal. In return, the U.S. only asks the Iran, Syria, Hizballah and Hamas simply refrain from hitting our interests in the region.
Yet once again, the administration is deluding itself. The Israeli Air Force will use U.S.-built aircraft and weaponry to carry out any raid against Iran's nuclear facilities. American intelligence has provided some of the data used to formulate Israeli attack options. When IAF F-15s and F-16s head east, there will be claims of U.S. complicity in the attack, even if we distance ourselves from the Israelis, as evidenced by President Obama's new policy options. Against that backdrop, it will be almost impossible for Iran to resist the temptation to strike out at us. calculating its has little to fear from an Obama Administration and a response that will likely be quite measured.
Former U.N. Ambassador John Bolton was quite right today when he described Israel as alone, with no other option than military force for dealing with Iran. From Big Peace:
There is no way at this state to prevent iran from going nuclear without the use of fore. It is very unfortunate in my opinion, but I see no possibility that Obama will use military force, and therefore it falls upon Israel. I think that even though the Administration says that containment is not its policy, it will become its policy the day after Iran possesses nuclear weapons."
Mr. Obama's latest geopolitical machinations remind us of another politician who worked to avoid conflict at all costs, yet only hastened its onset. We speak, of course, of British Prime Neville Chamberlain, architect of the infamous appeasement scheme that was supposed to contain the ambitions of Adolf Hitler. Of Chamberlain and his policies, Winston Churchill aptly observed:
"You were given the choice between war and dishonour. You chose dishonour and you will have war."
And so shall we, sooner rather than later.